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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs ROBERT HOLMES AND IRENE HOLMES, 00-003536 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Inverness, Florida Aug. 28, 2000 Number: 00-003536 Latest Update: Jan. 22, 2002

The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked.

Findings Of Fact Respondents were first licensed as a family foster home in April 1994. As a result of Respondents' obtaining a foster home license, the Department put in their care: M.A1.A and M.Au.A, brother and sister; and, J.H. and L.H., brother and sister. M.Au.A was nine years old and her brother M.A1.A was eight years old. J.H. was eight years old and his sister, L.H., was five years old. J.H. and L.H. were later adopted by their foster parents, Robert and Irene Holmes. J.H. was born September 2, 1991. He was, and is, a very troubled young man. Schizophrenia runs in his biological family and his mother abused chemicals during her pregnancy. He is diagnosed with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and has episodes of violence, aggression, unpredictability, poor impulse control, and agitation. He is likely to be pre-schizophrenic and, given his behavior, could develop full schizophrenia in the future. Even though only diagnosed with ADHD and in addition to stimulant medication prescribed for his ADHD, J.H. takes several psychotropic medications generally prescribed for manic and depressive behavior and other mood disorders. However, these drugs do not seem to fully control his behavior. Because of his aggression and severe behavior problems, J.H. has been involuntarily committed multiple times and has been repeatedly recommended for a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Department has not provided J.H. a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. On October 7, 1999, the Department received an allegation of abuse against Respondents. The allegation involved J.H. The allegations involved alleged favoritism of L.H. over J.H., abandoning J.H. with teachers, emotional abuse, and not wanting him in their home. The Department's investigation, on very tenuous evidence, verified abuse for neglect - abandonment; neglect - failure to protect; abuse - other mental injury; neglect - inadequate supervision; and abuse - confinement/bizarre punishment. The report further found some indication of medical neglect and other physical injury-threatened harm. Because of the abuse report, the Department took L.H. and J.H. into shelter care on October 8, 1999, and filed a dependency action regarding J.H., Case No. 99-628-CJ. Additionally, based on the verified findings of the abuse report, the Department revoked Respondents' foster home license. By Order of the Circuit Court dated July 12, 2000, the dependency action was dismissed for lack of evidence and an utter lack of co-operation by Department's personnel and witnesses during the dependency action. J.H. was returned to Respondents' home and has remained with them to date. L.H. was returned to Respondents' home sometime before her brother's dependency action was concluded. Put simply, at the hearing, none of the allegations of the abuse report or facts supporting the verified findings were supported by the evidence since only uncorroborated hearsay was introduced at the hearing. Moreover, even though the evidence was hearsay, many of the allegations appeared from all the testimony to have been taken out of context and given meanings which were not warranted when their context was known. Significantly, the Department did not call J.H. to testify about any of these allegations. To the contrary, the testimony of various witnesses indicated that Respondents did, in fact, keep a very neat, tidy, and orderly foster household and that J.H. was not abused or neglected. The evidence presented by Respondents and the testimony of their witnesses indicate that J.H. was provided a safe environment. The teachers provided temporary care during the period of time alleged to be when Respondents were neglecting J.H. by being out of town. The witnesses, including the teachers, stated that the plan was that they would care for J.H. until the return of Respondents. Furthermore, there was never any indication that the child was mistreated or neglected or left without care by Mrs. Holmes after returning from a wedding out-of-state. Finally, there was no evidence of noncompliance with any treatment plan, that the multiple involuntary commitments were in any way mentally abusive of J.H., or that the quiet times J.H. needed to calm himself were intended to be time-out punishment or were inappropriate or bizarre punishments of J.H. Because the allegations of abuse were not established, there is no basis on which to revoke Respondents' foster home license. Therefore, Respondents are entitled to their foster home license.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order not revoking Robert and Irene Holmes' family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith J. Ganobsik, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Charles P. Vaughn, Esquire 120 North Seminole Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4125 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (8) 120.52120.5739.20139.202402.301402.319409.175409.176
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ROBERT SHERIN vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 92-004665RX (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 30, 1992 Number: 92-004665RX Latest Update: Jul. 12, 1994

Findings Of Fact Florida Baptist Children's Homes (hereinafter "FBCH") is a multi- service agency providing residential care, foster care, maternity care, and adoptions. FBCH is licensed by the Department as both a child-caring agency and as a child-placing agency. Children are referred to that agency both as voluntary placements and as non-voluntary placements. With voluntary placements, arrangements are made directly between FBCH and the child's family or guardian. With non-voluntary placements, the placement is made either by the Department or by a court. The general mix of FBCH clients in its foster homes is 50 percent voluntary placements and 50 percent Departmental placements. None of those foster children are pregnant. If a pregnant child comes to FBCH for voluntary placement in a foster home due to that client's pregnancy, that client is not considered eligible for foster care in one of FBCH's licensed foster homes; rather, that pregnant child is placed in what FBCH calls its maternity foster care program. FBCH considers its foster care program and its maternity foster care program to be two different program areas. Both the foster care program and the maternity foster care program of FBCH are operated under the same traditional foster care concept. In both foster care and maternity foster care, FBCH's clients are placed in a private home with a family wanting to assist children in need of homes. FBCH does operate a maternity group home in Lakeland, Florida. Since this is the only maternity group home operated by FBCH, it provides maternity care elsewhere in the state of Florida through the vehicle of foster homes which offer "maternity foster care" to pregnant children. Foster homes are licensed by the Department in accordance with its licensure Rule 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code. Maternity homes are institutions, rather than private single family dwellings. Maternity homes serve a larger number of residents and offer more intense services. They are more expensive to operate than traditional foster homes. Maternity homes are licensed by the Department pursuant to licensure Rule 10M-9, Florida Administrative Code, which applies to residential group care. When pregnant children are brought to FBCH for voluntary placement in FBCH's maternity foster care program, the decision has already been made that the child will not have an abortion. The pregnant child comes to FBCH to be cared for through the time of delivery of her child. During her stay, she will receive counseling concerning whether she should keep her baby or place the baby for adoption. Services required to be provided to children in foster homes and child- caring agencies licensed by the Department are set forth in Departmental rules governing the operation of such homes and institutions. The specific services to be provided once such a home or agency has been licensed are set forth in different rules than the rules regulating the licensure process. Although the Department issues the license to family foster homes used solely by child-placing agencies such as FBCH and investigates complaints about such homes, responsibility for recruitment, assessment, training of staff, and supervision of these homes lies with the child-placing agency, and almost all placements are voluntary. In other words, the Department maintains no control or influence as to what the privately-placed pregnant children are taught about planned parenthood, if anything. The Department is considering the private single-family dwelling at 10061 Southwest 158 Terrace, Miami, Dade County, Florida, for licensure as an FBCH maternity foster home. The persons to be placed in that residence as the foster parents would care for five pregnant children between the ages of 11 and 17, with the provision that for a period of time after giving birth, their babies could also reside in that home. The average length of stay of clients in FBCH maternity foster homes is 3 1/2 - 4 months. Petitioner lives directly across the street from the residence the Department intends to license as a maternity foster home. Petitioner fears that the constant turnover of five pregnant teenagers will interfere with his right to quiet repose, will cause his neighborhood to be besieged by crime, and would, therefore, impair his and his neighbors' ability to detect and control criminal activity in the neighborhood.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.54120.57120.68381.0051409.175
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. JACOB AND DONNA VERMEULEN, 84-003338 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003338 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 1985

Findings Of Fact In August, 1980, the home of Jacob and Donna Vermeulen was licensed by Petitioner as a pre-school foster home. Under that licensure, the Vermeulens were able to care for children from birth to four years of age. The subject of this proceeding, hereinafter referred to as S.L., was born on May 26, 1976. When S.L. was four years old he and his younger sister were removed from the custody of his natural mother (after he witnessed the homicide by bludgeoning of his father by his mother) because S.L. and his sister had been physically abused by both natural parents. Petitioner placed S.L. and his sister into the Vermeu1en foster home. After S.L. and his sister had been living with the Vermeulens for approximately six months, Petitioner removed them from the Vermeulen home and returned them to the custody of their natural mother. After approximately six months, the two children were again removed from their natural mother since she again physically abused them. Petitioner requested the Vermeulens to again take custody of S.L. and his sister. The Vermeulens were reluctant to do so since both S.L, and his sister were now older than was allowed under the Vermeulens' license, and because S.L. had problems relating with the other foster children living in that home during his first stay there. However, Petitioner's social workers begged the Vermeulens to take the children back since Petitioner was unable to find any other placement for S.L. The Vermeulens agreed to make their home available to S.L. and his sister, and the two children thereafter lived in the Vermeulen home for approximately two and one-half years prior to April 16, 1984. S.L. is a difficult child to care for; he is very emotional, developmentally immature, fearful, and fidgety. He has difficulty sleeping or listening, has a very low self-esteem, and is unable to complete tasks since he becomes emotionally frustrated. Not only is S.L. a clumsy child (most probably due to medication), he also throws himself onto the floor and onto his toys, both as part of his aggressive play behavior and also in conjunction with throwing temper tantrums. S.L. initiates fights in school, on the school bus and at home with the other children in the Vermeulen home to such an extent that fighting somewhere would have been almost a daily occurrence. His excessive demands for attention were often accompanied by negative behavior, such as hitting other children and throwing temper tantrums. On December 21, 1983, S.L. was evaluated by psychiatrist Josephine Perez. Perez diagnosed S.L. as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity. Perez determined that the high dosages of anti-psychoic medication that S.L. had been taking were inappropriate, and she prescribed different medication for him. Perez recalls that during S.L.'s initial evaluation in December she noticed that his legs and arms were filled with bruises. S.L. began treating weekly with Perez from January 16, 1984, until April 16, 1984. On each visit at least one of the Vermeulens was present, and each visit contained a seasion between Perez and the foster parent discussing the child's progress and training the foster parent in the use of behavioral modification techniques. During those several months S.L. appeared at Perez's office on one occasion with a black eye and on another occasion with a bruising above his eye. One injury resulted from a fall in the bath tub, and another resulted from a fall out of bed; both falls were probably attributable to changes Perez made in S.L.'s medication. The Vermeulens discussed both incidents with Perez since they were concerned that S.L,'s medication was still not in the proper dosage. The Vermeulens testified that sometimes when S.L.'s medication was changed, he was unable to control even his arms and was unable to sit still long enough to eat. In January, 1984, when S.L. began treating with Dr. Perez there were six children living in the Vermeulen home: four foster children, one adopted child, and one natural child. The Vermeulens and Dr. Perez discussed the number of children living in the Vermeulen home, which prohibited giving S.L. the excessive amount of time required by him to satisfy his need for attention. Perez told the Vermeulens that in her professional opinion S.L. should be in a home with no more than one other child. In turn, the Vermeulens told Perez that they had been requesting Petitioner to remove S.L. from their home out of their concern (1) for S.L. since he needed so much more attention than was available to him and (2) for the other children not only because S.L. would kick and hit them but also because the Vermeulens had discovered S.L. in his sister's bedroom standing over her with a knife in his hand on two occasions. Although Perez agreed that S.L. should be placed a different foster setting, she did nothing to assist in obtaining a different placement and did not discuss with any employee of the Petitioner ("HRS") her recommendation and the Vermeulens' desire that S.L. be placed in a setting, preferably, where he was the only child. The Vermeulens, however, continued to request of HRS employees, including the visiting social workers and medical personnel, that S.L. be removed from their home, with visitation rights being given to the Vermeulens if possible. During this time period the Vermeulens determined that they wished to adopt Michelle, a foster child in their care. On Friday, April 13, 1984, an HRS employee went to the Vermeulen home to discuss that petition for adoption and to advise the Vermeulens that HRS would not allow them to adopt Michelle. Mr. and Mrs. Vermeulen S.L., and the rest of the children living in the home were present during that discussion. The Vermeulens were advised that they would not be permitted to adopt Michelle so long as S.L. was living in their home since he is a "therapeutic foster child" and Petitioner's rules would prohibit the adoption while a "therapeutic child" was in the home. Mrs. Vermeulen was unable to understand Petitioner's position: its refusal to remove S.L. from her home after repeated requests and its refusal to allow her to adopt Michelle for the reason that S.L. was in her home. Mrs. Vermeulen became upset, and S.L. told her and Petitioner's employee to put him in a foster home indicating he would rather be sent away than prevent Michelle from being adopted by the Vermeulens. Since the HRS employee was having a difficult time discussing HRS's position, she left the Vermeulen home. On Friday, April 13, 1984, or on Monday, April 16, 1984, S.L. became involved in a fight on the school bus on the way home from school. The bus driver told Mrs. Vermeulen about the fight. On Monday April 16, 1984, Mrs. Vermeulen took S.L. to his weekly therapy session with Dr. Perez. During that session, S.L. indicated to Perez that he had been bad and had been "paddled" on the legs. He would give her no details, but Perez believed it was Donna Vermeulen who paddled S.L. Rather than discuss it with Mrs. Vermeulen, Perez acted as though nothing had been said. Further, although a medical doctor, she did not examine S.L. Instead, Perez discussed with Mrs. Vermeulen behavioral modification techniques to be utilized with S.L. and sent them home. She then telephoned HRS, and a child abuse report was completed. On April 18, 1984, an HRS employee went to S.L.'s school, removed the child from his class, and took the child to be examined by the Child Protection Team. S.L. was first examined by the nurse. When S.L. was unable to explain to the nurse from where each mark on his body originated (or refused to), she interrogated him with questions such as "Did your mommy hit you?" The nurse made notations on a chart indicating numerous marks or bruises on S.L.'s body. However, an HRS employee saw S.L. disrobed when he was being examined by the doctor on the team and saw only two marks on his lower back. Other HRS employees went to the Vermeulen home and removed all the children. No one discussed the incident or accusation with either Mr. or Mrs. Vermeulen until the following day. Until he was removed from her class on April 18, 1984, S.L. was taught by Debbie Froug an Exceptional Education teacher for emotionally disturbed children. Although Froug describes S.L. as a basically honest child, she testified that he sometimes gets very confused. A careful review of the videotaped testimony of S.L. and of the conflicting testimony of the witnesses in this case indicates that Froug's latter description is probably an understatement. No witness in this case heard the same explanation (or accusation) as any other witness. S.L's videotaped testimony illustrates why: there is no statement made by S.L. that is not contradicted by him a few seconds later. For example the videotaped deposition contains on page 27 the following: O. Did you ever have a black eye? A. No. O. Didn't you talk to Dr. Perez about having a black eye once? A. Yes, but I didn't. How did you get the black eye? One of the kids on the bus. Things stated in the affirmative by S.L. in his deposition are also stated in the negative in that same deposition. Further, it is sometimes impossible to ascertain if S.L. is describing being hit by his real father, by his real mother, or by his foster mother. Although no accusation appears to ever have been made, including in the Administrative Complaint, that Jacob Vermeulen ever struck S.L., by the time of S.L.'s deposition eight months after the alleged incident when S.L. was asked if Jacob ever hit him, that question was answered in the affirmative. In short, the evidence is clear that S.L. had some bruises or marks on his body on April 18, 1984; that those bruises or marks were both received accidentally and intentionally inflicted, and that the bruises or marks on S.L.'s body were received as a result of S.L. falling from being uncoordinated or overmedicated, from S.L. flinging himself onto the floor or onto or against objects, and from being hit or kicked by other children with whom S.L. engaged in almost-daily physical combat. Donna and Jacob Vermeulen used only approved behavior modification techniques with S.L. and did not hit S.L. with or without any object, spank S.L., or otherwise inflict physical abuse upon him. Although the Vermeulens' license as a foster home was in effect at all times material hereto, it has lapsed. A foster home license is not automatically renewed but rather requires an annual licensing study. Other than "the incident" charged herein the Vermeulens have received no prior complaints from HRS.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is REC0MENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Administrative Complaint filed herein and directing that any licensure study performed regarding the renewal or extension of Respondents' license be made omitting therefrom consideration of any of the matters set forth herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July,1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 1070 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas J. Walsh, Esquire 590 English Avenue Homestead, Florida 33030 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57409.1756.05
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MR. & MRS. WILLIE JENKINS vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 03-000901 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 14, 2003 Number: 03-000901 Latest Update: Mar. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioners' application for family foster home relicensure should be denied for the reasons set forth in the February 6, 2003, letter that Petitioners received from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Background Information Petitioners are husband and wife. They operated a licensed family foster home at their residence in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for seven years until their most recent license expired. Among the foster children who were in Petitioners' home during the last of these seven years were T. G. and W. B. T. G. was placed in Petitioners' home on October 14, 2002, and was removed from the home on January 21, 2003. W. B. was placed in Petitioners' home on October 21, 2002, and was removed from the home on December 18, 2002. On November 24, 2002, Petitioners and DCFS executed a Bilateral Service Agreement (Agreement) as part of the family foster home licensing process. By signing the Agreement, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows, the Parents "agree[d] to abide by [its] terms": Purpose: The purpose of this Agreement is to identify the expectations for both foster parents and the Department of Children and Families on behalf of the children and families that are served in the foster care program. Note: for this agreement Department means Family Safety staff, Lead Agency Staff, Contract Case Management staff or Contract Licensing staff. This agreement reflects standards of care that are current requirements in Florida Administrative Code, which are based on statutory authority found in section 409.175, Florida Statutes. The premise of this agreement is that the department and foster parents must work as partners to assure safety, to provide for the physical and mental well being and to obtain permanency for each child. * * * Foster Parent Responsibilities to the child include: * * * e. To assist in setting up visits with the child's parent(s) or relatives. * * * To transport and accompany the child to medical, dental, mental health appointments and visits with parents and relatives. To provide the child his/her monthly spending allowance which is included in the board payment. To buy the child clothing . . . with the monthly board rate and clothing allowance . . . . * * * m. To adhere to the department's safety and discipline policies, see Attachment A. Failure to comply with the department's safety and discipline policies may result in the removal of children from the home. * * * To promote the following conditions for the child in the home: Opportunities and encouragement to communicate and have contact with family members, friends and other people important to the child. . . . Respect for the child's body, person, . . . . * * * 7. Provide the child with suitable clothing, [that] is appropriate for the weather, and appropriate for the age of the child. . . . Foster Parent Responsibilities to the department include: * * * j. To use the clothing allowance to buy the child clothes and shoes. * * * n. To allow the child to be removed from the foster home only by a department staff member, Guardian ad Litem, or another party granted permission by the department of the court. To verify the identi[t]y and authority of staff and other parties when not known to the foster parent. * * * p. To know where and with whom the child is staying and the type of supervision the child is receiving when foster parents approve an outing or overnight activity. Children may not remain in an unlicensed setting for any time other than a planned, supervised outing or overnight activity without the explicit approval of the department. * * * Non-compliance with any of the above provisions may result in administrative action by the Department, which could include corrective action, suspension, revocation or denial of further licensure pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Attachment A to the Agreement set forth the following "Discipline Policies," among others: The foster parents must discipline children with kindness, consistency, and understanding, and with the purpose of helping the child develop responsibility with self-control. * * * 3. Foster parents must use positive methods of discipline, including the following: * * * (IV) Grounding, restricting the child to the house or yard, or sending the child out of the room and away from the family activity; * * * The foster parents must not subject children to cruel, severe, humiliating or unusual punishment . . . . The foster parents must not use corporal punishment of any kind. * * * 11. The foster parents must not deny a child contact or visits with his family as punishment. * * * Alleged Violation of Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)6.b., Florida Administrative Code There were occasions when Petitioners refused, without adequate justification, to take T. G. to scheduled doctor's appointments. On these occasions, T. G.'s DCFS case worker, Khalilah Dawes, had to take T. G. to the doctor so he would not miss his appointments. The morning of December 19, 2002, T. G. became ill at school (Lauderdale Manors Elementary School, where he was a kindergarten student). At around 10:00 a.m., he went to the school office, where he spoke to Monica Marshall, the school secretary. There was no school nurse at the school that day to care for T. G. Ms. Marshall, therefore, telephoned Mrs. Jenkins, told Mrs. Jenkins that T. G. was ill, and requested that Mrs. Jenkins come by school to pick T. G. up, which Mrs. Jenkins agreed to do. By 12:30 p.m., however, Mrs. Jenkins had not yet arrived at school. Ms. Marshall, therefore, telephoned Mrs. Jenkins again. During this second telephone conversation, Mrs. Jenkins told Ms. Marshall that, if she (Mrs. Jenkins) was not at school by the end of the school day, Ms. Marshall should just let T. G. walk across the street to the after-school program in which he was enrolled. Mrs. Jenkins did not pick T. G. up at any time during the regular school day.3 Alleged Violation of Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)9.b., c., and d., Florida Administrative Code There were occasions when foster children in Petitioners' care, including T. G., did not go on school field trips because the children did not have money to pay for these trips. It is unclear from the evidentiary record, however, why, on these occasions, the children did not have the money they needed to go on the trips.4 Petitioners purchased school uniforms for the foster children in their care. The record evidence is insufficient to support a finding that "[o]ne of the teachers purchased the school uniforms for the foster children." Mrs. Jenkins, on occasion, did come to Lauderdale Manors Elementary School to talk with school personnel about her foster children attending the school (although, in her dealings with the school's principal, Doris Bennett, Mrs. Jenkins was, at times, "loud and boisterous," displaying a "negative and nasty attitude"). Neither Mrs. Jenkins nor her husband, however, attended "report card night" at the school last year. This was a "well-attended" event, held after school (between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.), where parents had an opportunity to receive their children's report cards from their children's teachers. It is unclear from the evidentiary record why Petitioners were not in attendance. Alleged Violation of Rules 65C-13.010(1)(b)5.a. and 65C- 13.010(1)(b)5.f., Florida Administrative Code The record evidence is insufficient to support a finding that "Mrs. Jenkins pinche[d] T. G." or "ma[d]e[] him stand in the laundry room when he [was] bad."5 Alleged Violation of Rule 65C-13.010(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code Ann Livermore is employed as a case worker by Kids in Distress, Inc., a private entity that has contracted with DCFS to provide care case worker services to foster children supervised by DCFS. Ms. Livermore was W. B.'s case worker during the 2002 Thanksgiving holiday period. W. B.'s sister had obtained a court order allowing W. B. to go on an unsupervised visit to W. B.'s sister's home on Thanksgiving Day 2002. W. B. had not had any previous unsupervised visits with his sister during his time with Petitioners. At no time prior to Thanksgiving Day 2002 had Mrs. Jenkins had any contact with either Ms. Livermore or W. B.'s sister. At 9:00 a.m. on Thanksgiving Day 2002, Ms. Livermore received a telephone call from W. B.'s sister, who complained to Ms. Livermore that Mrs. Jenkins would not let her take W. B. from Petitioners' home. Ms. Livermore responded by telephoning Mrs. Jenkins and explaining to her that W. B. was "allowed to go with" his sister pursuant to a court order that had been obtained by the sister. Mrs. Jenkins responded that she was not aware of any court order and that, if Ms. Livermore intended to come to Petitioners' home to pick up W. B., she should bring with her appropriate identification, as well as be accompanied by the police. As Mrs. Jenkins credibly explained at the final hearing, she did not know what Ms. Livermore "looked like" and, with all the "phony stuff going on," wanted to make sure that W. B. would not fall into the wrong hands. Later that same day, Ms. Livermore, accompanied by the police, went to Petitioners' home. She took with her, to show Mrs. Jenkins, a copy of the court order W. B.'s sister had obtained. Mrs. Jenkins gave Ms. Livermore a difficult time, questioning the adequacy of Ms. Livermore's proof of identification and the authenticity of the copy of the court order that Ms. Livermore showed her. While Mrs. Jenkins may have been overly cautious in her dealings with Ms. Livermore, it does not appear that she was acting in bad faith. Ultimately, W. B. was released to the custody of Ms. Livermore, who turned W. B. over to his sister.6

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, pursuant Section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes, DCFS enter a final order denying Petitioners' application for family foster home relicensure, based on the rule violation alleged in section A. of the notice of intent to deny. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2003.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.569120.57120.60120.68409.175
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs CHERYL SMITH, 01-002837 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake City, Florida Jul. 18, 2001 Number: 01-002837 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2001

The Issue May the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) revoke Respondent's foster home license for violating Section 409.175 (8)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, in that Respondent intentionally or negligently committed acts that materially affected the health and safety of children, to-wit: inadequate supervision of a minor child entrusted to her care?

Findings Of Fact R.G. is the biological mother of the infant female, A.G., born out of wedlock. R.G. gave birth to a male child before A.G. That son was taken away from R.G. by DCF. Both A.G. and R.G., while R.G. was yet a minor under the age of 18 years, were adjudicated dependent children, subject to placement by DCF, pending DNA testing of A.G. and two putative fathers. R.G. had been placed with a licensed foster home other than Respondent's licensed foster home. That home requested R.G.'s removal because R.G. would not follow its rules. R.G. with A.G., was then placed in the licensed foster care home of Respondent. Although the placement of A.G. with Respondent raised Respondent's home population to one more live foster child than Respondent's licensed capacity, a situation to which Respondent objected, DCF personnel informed Respondent that the infant A.G. would be counted as part of R.G.'s placement. Therefore, despite A.G. and R.G. being two separate persons, DCF would not consider Respondent to have exceeded her license's capacity. It was not explained on the record how DCF intended to pay board to Respondent for care of A.G., if A.G. were not considered a whole person, but it is clear that DCF personnel resented Respondent's asking how she would be compensated for A.G.'s care. At all times material, R.G. and A.G. were subject to a Circuit Court Order which permitted only "unsupervised day visitation" by R.G. with A.G. (Emphasis in the original). By implication of the Circuit Court Order, and by her own understanding from instructions by DCF personnel, Respondent knew that R.G., the minor mother, was not permitted to have unsupervised night visitation with the dependent infant, A.G. DCF's and Respondent's understanding of the Circuit Court Order was that Respondent, R.G., and A.G. were required to be in Respondent's home after dark, but Respondent was not required to "eyeball" R.G. and A.G. all night, every night, while they were present in Respondent's foster home. Gracie Rager, DCF foster care worker, authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out of Respondent's foster home during the day for unsupervised visitation. Ms. Rager also authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. to R.G.'s older natural sister's home to spend some nights, including weekends. R.G.'s older natural sister was married and licensed for foster care. Accordingly, DCF personnel, including Ms. Rager, presumed that the older sister was sufficiently responsible and qualified to provide supervision of R.G. and A.G. at night. DCF reasonably concluded that R.G.'s presence with A.G. in her sister's home at night would constitute supervised night visitation and comply with the Court's Order. Ms. Rager never authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out at night by herself, but Ms. Rager reasonably saw no impediment, including the Circuit Court Order, to R.G. taking A.G. with her anywhere she wanted to take the baby during the day. R.G. openly resented being placed with Respondent because Respondent is Black. R.G. wanted to return, with A.G., to a white foster home placement. As a result, R.G. was never cooperative with Respondent. When R.G. turned 18 years of age, she became openly defiant of Respondent. R.G. insisted that she alone, would do everything for A.G., who was still under two years old. R.G. refused all assistance from Respondent concerning A.G. Respondent asked DCF to remove R.G. and A.G. or at least A.G., from her foster home. DCF had no other placement for them and asked Respondent to keep them until another placement was found. R.G. had a part-time day job. To get there, she would "catch a ride" with others. She would not accept a ride from Respondent. Sometimes, R.G. would take A.G. with her to work and go directly from work, with A.G., to her older, licensed sister's home. On these occasions, R.G. and A.G. might be gone for a night or a weekend. When R.G. did not return to Respondent's foster home, Respondent sometimes called R.G.'s older, licensed sister's home to be sure that R.G. and A.G. had arrived there safely. Sometimes, Respondent asked this sister to call her when R.G. and A.G. arrived. However, Respondent did not always contact R.G.'s older, licensed sister or otherwise check-up on R.G.'s and A.G.'s whereabouts overnight or over a weekend. When R.G. and A.G. returned after a night or weekend away, Respondent did not always check up on where they had been. Respondent was under the impression that a different, adult sister of R.G.'s was also a suitable adult supervisor for after dark, even though that sister was not licensed for foster care. Indeed, there is nothing in the Circuit Court Order requiring that supervised night-time visitation of R.G. with A.G. could not be undertaken by any other adult, regardless of whether that person were licensed for foster care. Respondent never checked to see if R.G. and A.G. were with R.G.'s unlicensed sister. At no time did Respondent report to law enforcement or DCF that R.G. had gone off and failed to return or that R.G. was taking A.G. away on weekends. At some point, R.G.'s authorized and licensed older sister called Ms. Rager and said R.G. had taken A.G. out all night with R.G.'s boyfriend and had not returned. It is unclear from Ms. Rager's testimony whether R.G.'s and A.G.'s departure point for their night or weekend of unsupervised visitation was Respondent's home or R.G.'s licensed sister's home. On February 9, 2001, Ms. Page, a DCF protective investigator, responded to an abuse hotline call and met with Respondent in the lobby of a DCF facility. During her interview of Respondent, Ms. Page knew nothing of where either R.G. or A.G. had been picked up, or how long they had been unsupervised at night, but Ms. Page "understood" from Ms. Rager that R.G. and A.G. had been removed from Respondent's home and that Respondent had come to the DCF facility voluntarily. Ms. Page was particularly concerned because of a comment Respondent made in the course of this interview, to the effect that Respondent guessed she had "handled it all wrong" because she had only asked to have the baby, A.G., removed from her care instead of reporting R.G.'s rebelliousness. DCF Investigator Page testified that she "verified" in an abuse report that Respondent was guilty of neglect by failure to notify authorities of R.G.'s unsupervised night visitation with A.G. There is insufficient evidence to determine of Respondent ever had a chance to challenge the abuse report or if the report was ever "confirmed." There is no evidence R.G. or A.G. suffered harm as a result of this incident.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing charges against Respondent and restoring her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: David West, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dr. James Brant, Qualified Representative 1140 Durkee Drive, North Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Cheryl Smith Post Office Box 1053 Lake City, Florida 32056 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.57409.175475.175
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JOHNNIE MAE SMITH AND JOHNNIE MAE SMITH FOSTER HOME vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-000581 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000581 Latest Update: Oct. 13, 1988

The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not Petitioner is eligible to be assigned foster children.

Findings Of Fact Based on the Hearing Officer's observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record complied herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Johnnie Mae Smith, was licensed as a foster parent on July 1, 1987, for one (1) female foster child (Certificate No. 787-48-1). Thereafter, Petitioner requested that foster children be placed in her home and she was denied. Specifically, by letter dated December 4, 1987, Gloria P. Simmons, District Operations Manager, Children Youth and Family (CYF) Services, advised Petitioner that "we are not placing any foster children in your home for the following reasons: Insufficient income to provide adequate cash flow to support additional expenses incurred. Lack of integrity in reporting income while receiving AFDC 1/ payments. "Your provocative, overbearing, abrasive, and implusive (sic) behavior." Petitioner was advised of her right to appeal Respondent's denial of placement of foster children in her home and she timely appealed that denial. Gene Majure, (Majure hereafter) Senior CYF Counselor, has been employed by Respondent in excess of 16 years. Majure is presently assigned to making license recommendations for foster home applicants in Dade County. Majure was assigned Petitioner's foster home applicants license application for review. During October 1986, Petitioner received pre-service training as a foster parent at which time she made application for licensure as a foster parent. Petitioner's initial foster home study was conducted by Gene Majure, who rejected it primarily on the basis of "insufficient income." Petitioner protested her initial foster home application rejection and instead of being processed through normal appeal channels, she was informed by Leonard Helfand, District Legal Counsel, that she would be reinvited to pre- service training and she could reapply. Petitioner reattended the second part of pre-service training on May 21, 1987, and she officially reapplied. Lois Rossman, (hereafter Rossman) Senior Youth and Family Counselor, and Peggy Ann Siegal, Children Youth and Family Supervisor, visited Petitioner in her home on June 12, 1987. Their interview of Petitioner revealed that Petitioner shared her three-bedroom home in Opa Locka with her two daughters, Chantrell (15) and Latrise (14). Petitioner is separated from her husband for approximately one year and his specific whereabouts is unknown. Majure again visited Petitioner during January 1987. At that time, Majure inquired as to Petitioner's financial income and Petitioner responded verbally, and in writing, on October 9, 1986, and again on June 12, 1987, that she has $400 per month earned income which income is derived from a laundry service which she has operated for the past 5 years. On the other hand, Petitioner signed a monthly income statement with AFDC indicating that she has no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner has earned income, she incorrectly reported her income to AFDC since October 1986, which may result in either an overpayment or fraudulent involvement in her income reporting. (Respondent's exhibit 3). Rossman was also assigned Petitioner's case to determine her eligibility to be assigned foster children. Rossman was present on the June 12, 1987, visit to Petitioner's residence at which time Petitioner again related that she had earned income of approximately $400 per month which income statement was contrasted with the available records that Respondent's employees had obtained from the AFDC office wherein Petitioner indicated that she had no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner does not have earned income, she has indicated a total income of $264 per month and stated expenses of approximately $400-$605 per month which creates cause for concern as to her ability to maintain a stable and secure family environment for foster children. Rossman also became involved in circumstances wherein Petitioner repeatedly called the CYF counselor's office demanding to speak with supervisory employees wherein she demanded that she be assigned foster children since she was licensed. When secretarial employees advised Petitioner that her message would be relayed and that as soon as a supervisor or other placement official became available, they would return her call, Petitioner would again call using an alias to attempt to get through. This problem persisted for several months following the time that Petitioner's foster home application was approved in July 1987. Respondent's secretarial employees who answer the phone and greet clients in person have been trained to deal with irate and abusive clients, however Petitioner's unrelentless calling became so problematic that employees felt harassed and one employee broke down and starting crying based on Petitioner's persistence about seeing or talking to certain supervisory employees at certain times. Prior to the time that Petitioner's foster home license application was approved, she was much more pleasant in her conversations with employees in the CYF office. (Testimony of Peggy Siegal and Ellie Roman). Petitioner also keeps three large dogs in her yard, one of which is a Pit Bull and two are large German Shepherds who made threatening postures at Respondent's employees when they visited Petitioner's home for inspections. Although Petitioner maintains that the two German Shepherds do not belong to her, they were at her home on each occasion when she was visited by licensing staff and Respondent's sanitation inspector. Petitioner keeps the dogs, which roam at will around the fenced area her home, at bay by swinging a rubber hose at them. The fact that Petitioner is receiving welfare benefits is not an automatic disqualification which prevents her from being assigned foster children. Petitioner encountered problems with her spouse which culminated in a separation and she was, therefore, left with insufficient income to maintain herself and she applied for and is receiving welfare benefits. Petitioner plans to begin employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital shortly.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not eligible to be assigned foster children. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of October, 1988. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1988.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
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GWEN MCCLAIN vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 92-004055 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jasper, Florida Jul. 06, 1992 Number: 92-004055 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1992

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Gwen McClain, meets the requirements of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, for relicensure as an adult foster home sponsor.

Findings Of Fact Ms. McClain's home has been licensed as an adult foster home by the Department for approximately one year prior to April, 1992. Ms. McClain's husband, Jay McClain, resides with her. At the time of the final hearing of this matter, Ms. McClain provided a home for three adults who were mentally retarded or developmentally disabled. On or about October 31, 1991, Ms. McClain, her husband and a neighbor drove a man from Ms. McClain's home to Georgia. The man was not a family member or even a close friend of Ms. McClain. During the final hearing Ms. McClain described the man as someone her husband worked with. Ms. McClain's neighbor drove the vehicle in which the man was taken to Georgia. Ms. McClain and her husband were passengers. Ms. McClain was aware at the time that she rode to Georgia that the man had shot and wounded another man earlier that evening. Although the man that was shot ultimately died, Ms. McClain was not aware of his death at the time she accompanied the man to Georgia. Ms. McClain and her husband were eventually charged with criminal conduct as a result of the incident described in finding of fact 3. The evidence, however, failed to prove when she or her husband were charged or what she or her husband were charged with. The evidence failed to prove that the Department has adopted any rule which required that Ms. McClain disclose to the Department that she or her husband had been involved in the incident described in finding of fact 3 or that she or her husband had been charged with a crime as a result of the incident. At some time prior to April 1, 1992, probably in February, 1992, Ms. Gwen Howell, a Human Services' Counselor III for the Department, read an article in the Jasper News reporting the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. Howell had been at Ms. McClain's home at least once between October, 1991, and the date when Ms. Howell read about the incident in the newspaper. Ms. McClain had not mentioned the incident to Ms. Howell. Ms. Howell confronted Ms. McClain about the incident described in finding of fact 3 sometime shortly after reading the newspaper article. Ms. McClain, when asked about the incident, responded "how did you know?" The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, what Ms. McClain may have meant by this statement. It is not, therefore, apparent whether Ms. McClain made the comment because she was merely curious where Ms. Howell had heard about the incident, because she had been hoping that Ms. Howell would not find out about the incident or for some other reason. When confronted by Ms. Howell, Ms. McClain admitted her involvement in the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. McClain also admitted her involvement in the incident to Carter Bass, Ms. Howell's immediate supervisor at some time before April, 1992. Ms. McClain was remorseful for her involvement, admitted she had exercised poor judgement and admitted that she had not thought of the consequences of what she had done. On or about March 31, 1992, Ms. McClain signed an Adult Foster Home Annual Renewal Application (hereinafter referred to as the "Renewal Application"). DHRS exhibit #1. The Renewal Application was received by the Department on or about April 1, 1992. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. McClain did not accurately provide all information requested on the Renewal Application. No where on the Renewal Application was Ms. McClain asked any question concerning whether she or her husband had been charged with any crime or whether she or her husband had been involved in any incident similar to the one described in finding of fact 3. Nor has the Department cited any rule which required that Ms. McClain make such a disclosure on the Renewal Application. At the time that Ms. McClain filed the Renewal Application she had admitted her involvement in the incident to Ms. Howell, the Department's employee responsible for investigating and making the initial recommendation concerning the Renewal Application, and Mr. Bass, the Department's employee responsible for recommending to the Department's district office whether the Renewal Application had been approved. The Department was, therefore, on notice of the incident when Ms. McClain filed the Renewal Application. Ms. McClain and her husband had not been adjudicated guilty of any crime at the time the Renewal Application was filed. On April 20, 1992, Ms. McClain plead, and was adjudicated, guilty of the crime of obstructing an officer without violence as a result of the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. McClain was sentenced to one year of supervised probation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the crime for which Ms. McClain was adjudicated guilty involved "harm to others." Also on April 20, 1992, Ms. McClain's husband plead, and was adjudicated, guilty of the crime of accessory after the fact to second degree murder as a result of the incident described in finding of fact 3. Ms. McClain's husband was also sentenced to one year of supervised probation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the crime for which Ms. McClain's husband was adjudicated guilty involved "harm to others." At some time prior to June 5, 1992, Mr. Bass recommended to James Godwin, a program administrator in the Department's district office, that the Renewal Application not be approved. Mr. Godwin exercised his authority to deny the Renewal Application and instructed Mr. Bass to so inform Ms. McClain. By letter dated June 5, 1992, the Department notified Ms. McClain that the Renewal Application was being denied for the following reason: Your application for relicensure as an Adult Foster Home Sponsor has not been recommended for approval at this time for the following reason: You do not meet the Adult Foster Home Sponsor Qualifications as per HRS Manual 140-11, Page 5-12, Paragraph 5-5d. A foster home sponsor should be free of confirmed reports of abuse, neglect or exploitation or any crime involving harm to others. At the final hearing the Department stipulated that Ms. McClain, except as set out in the Department's letter of June 5, 1992, meet the other requirements for relicensure. HRS Manual 140-11, Page 5-12, Paragraph 5-5d, provides the following requirement for licensure as an adult family home sponsor: d. a foster home sponsor should be free of confirmed reports of abuse, neglect, or exploitation or any crime involving harm to others. At the final hearing, the Department also suggested that the Renewal Application was properly denied because Ms. McClain had shown a lack of judgement. The Department, therefore, suggested that Ms. McClain did not meet the requirements of HRS Manual 140-11, Page 5-12, Paragraph 5-5c, which provides: c. A foster home sponsor should be of suitable physical and mental ability, to the extent that he is able to provide care and supervision appropriate for the clients he serves; be capable of handling an emergency situation promptly and intelligently; and be willing to cooperate with the department staff. Although the Department had not previously informed Ms. McClain that paragraph 5-5c also formed part of the reason for denying the Renewal Application, Ms. McClain raised no objection to the evidence concerning this issue presented by the Department. More importantly, it does not appear that Ms. McClain was prejudiced in any way by not being informed of the issue prior to the final hearing. Based upon the weight of the evidence, Ms. McClain's actions during the incident described in finding of fact 3 evidenced a lack of ability to react to a unusual and surprising situation in a calm and rational manner and to make an appropriate decision as to how to respond to the situation. Ms. McClain's actions, therefore, evidence a lack of ability to handle an emergency situation promptly and intelligently. Based upon the testimony of the mothers of two of the adults currently under Ms. McClain's care and four of the six Department employees who testified in this proceeding, Ms. McClain has provided good care to the adults residing in her home.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Department enter a final order denying Ms. McClain's Renewal Application and dismissing, with prejudice, Ms. McClain's petition in this case. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX The Department has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Ms. McClain did not file a proposed recommended order. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact 1 and 10. Finding of fact 12. The last sentence is not relevant. See findings of fact 11 and 13. Not relevant. See findings of fact 11 and 13. Findings of fact 14 and 15. See finding of fact 3. The evidence failed to prove that the man was taken to Texas. The only testimony concerning where the man was taken after he was taken to Georgia was hearsay. Findings of fact 6-9. The fact that Ms. McClain had not voluntarily disclosed the charges against her is irrelevant. The Department has failed to cite any authority which requires that she make such a disclosure. The only rule referred to by the Department during the hearing required disclosure after a conviction. The Department was fully aware of the charges and the incident prior to any adjudication of guilt in this case. See finding of fact 8. Finding of fact 9. Finding of fact 23. Hereby accepted. Findings of fact 9 and 16. Finding of fact 16. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Gwen McClain Post Office Box 314 Jennings, Florida 32053 Ralph McMurphy Assistant Legal Counsel District 3 Legal Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1000 N.E. 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PAUL G. BURNETTE AND PATRICIA BURNETTE vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 85-000951 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000951 Latest Update: Apr. 16, 1986

The Issue The issue at the final hearing was whether the Petitioners met the statutory criteria for licensure as a children's foster home.

Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioners, Paul and Patricia Burnette, were married in 1969 and have lived together continuously since that time. The Petitioners were previously licensed as foster home parents in the State of Florida and have had children placed in their home. During the summer of 1984, the Petitioners' became interested in adopting six (6) children, aged sixteen (16), fifteen (15), eleven (11), six (6), five (5), and four (4) years old. Because the parental rights of the natural mother had not been finally terminated, the Petitioners were advised by their case worker that they should apply for foster home care licensure. The case worker advised the Petitioners that if they were licensed for foster home care, they would be able to obtain custody of the children pending final termination of the parental rights of the natural mother. Thus, the Petitioners sought licensure to provide foster home care as a step toward ultimately adopting the six (6) children. By application dated November 1, 1984, the Petitioners, Paul and Patricia Burnette, applied for a license to provide foster-family care for children in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1983). The application provided for Ms. Burnette to indicate whether or not she had been convicted for anything other than a minor traffic violation. Ms. Burnette did not indicate "yes" or "no" on that portion of the form. On October 4, 1983 Patricia Burnette was convicted in the County Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Orange County, Florida of the offense of petit theft. Ms. Burnette was tried by jury and was represented by counsel. She was adjudicated guilty and placed on six (6) months unsupervised probation. Ms. Burnette was further ordered to pay a fine of $150, $15 victims compensation, $7.50 surcharge and $14 court costs within 30 days. She was sentenced to serve ten (10) days in the Orange County jail, suspended on the condition that she complete ten (10) days of alternative community service beginning October 15, 1983. Ms. Burnette was further ordered not to go onto the premises of Albertson's located at 2801 South Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida. Ms. Burnette was represented at trial by Leo A. Jackson, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Florida. At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Jackson informed Patricia Burnette that the judge had withheld adjudication. Mr. Jackson explained to Ms. Burnette that because the judge had withheld adjudication, she was not convicted of the crime. Based on the legal advice received from Mr. Jackson, Ms. Burnette believed that she had not been convicted of the offense of petit larceny. A medical history form was also included as a part of the application for licensure as a children's foster home. On the medical history form, Ms. Burnette responded "no" to the question of whether or not she had or had ever had any back pain. Prior to licensure as a children's foster home, the applicant's are required to be examined by a physician. The physician is required to complete a form entitled "Physicians Report on Adoption Applicants." As a part of completing the form, the physician requests information from the applicant concerning the applicants medical history or previous illnesses. Ms. Burnette was examined by Dr. Din On-Sun, D.O. on October 5, 1984. During the examination, Ms. Burnette did not indicate any prior back pain or any other problems related to her back. On November 10, 1978, Patricia Burnette was involved in an industrial accident and injured her back. Ms. Burnette was paid temporary total disability benefits for a period of 1,200 days and sustained a 3% permanent impairment as a result of the accident. As a result of her injury, Ms. Burnette was on crutches for two (2) years and was told that she would never walk again. Ms. Burnette occasionally still suffers from back pain and must take pain medication. Because of her back injury, Ms. Burnette did not·perform the community service which was ordered as a result of her conviction for petit theft in October 1983. From October 1983 through September 1984, Ms. Burnette continued to advise Ms. Sue Rash (the Alternative Service Coordinator responsible for arranging her community service) that she was unable to perform any community service because she was having considerable trouble with her back and needed back surgery but could not afford it. In September of 1984, MS. Rash arranged a special assignment for MS. Burnette to work approximately 2 hours per day at the Sand Lake Treatment Plant Laboratory washing glassware and doing "light cleaning up." Ms. Burnette told MS. Rash that she wanted to talk to her doctor before she agreed to do any community service. On September 18, 1984, Ms. Burnette's physician advised Ms. Rash that he didn't think that Ms. Burnette could stand long enough to wash glassware and do clean-up work at the Sand Lake Treatment Plant Laboratory. On October 13, 1984, Ms. Rash sent a letter to the judge who had originally ordered Ms. Burnette to perform the community service. Ms. Rash explained to the judge that Ms. Burnette was still unable to perform her community service and recommended that a different sentence be considered for Ms. Burnette in lieu of community service. At that point, Ms. Rash closed Ms. Burnette's file.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioners' present application for licensure as a children's foster home be VOIDED; and, Petitioners be allowed to submit a new application so that their eligibility for licensure as a children's foster home may be evaluated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services based on full and truthful responses to the inquiries contained therein. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of April, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas L. Whitney, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Robinson Street Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 N. Diane Holmes, Esquire 209 East Ridgewood Street Orlando, Florida 32803 William "Pete" Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 402.301409.175
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KATE SHAW vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 98-005639 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Dec. 24, 1998 Number: 98-005639 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2000

The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be granted a foster home license.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Kate Shaw, applied for a license to operate a family foster home. By letter dated November 18, 1998, the Department notified Petitioner that based on findings in FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954, the Department was denying her application for a license to provide foster care. Furthermore, the letter advised Petitioner that she had the "right to request an [a]dministrative [h]earing to review the Department's decision and to request an exemption." FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954 named Petitioner as the perpetrator of abuse upon her 13-year-old daughter, Crystal Fishburne (Crysal)/Ms. Fishburne). That report was classified as confirmed in July or August 1992. The incident which was the subject of the abuse report occurred on the evening of July 3, 1992, and was reported to the abuse hotline on that same evening. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the agency previously responsible for investigating reports of child abuse, assigned a child protection investigator to investigate the subject report. On July 4, 1992, the investigator assigned to the case went to Petitioner's home and interviewed Petitioner and her daughter, Crystal. During the interviews, both Petitioner and her daughter told the investigator that Petitioner had hit Crystal with an extension cord the prior evening. Welts or marks were left on Crystal's legs, arms, and back as a result of Petitioner's hitting her. As a part of the investigation, these marks were photographed. However, no medical examination was ever conducted. On July 4, 1992, after the investigator interviewed Petitioner and Crystal, she tried to take Crystal to the Family Services Program for a cooling-off period, but Crystal refused to go. After the investigation, an abuse report was prepared finding that Petitioner had hit Crystal several times with an extension cord leaving linear and looped marks on the daughter's legs, arms, and back. Petitioner has never denied that she hit Crystal with an extension cord on the evening of July 3, 1992. However, during the investigation and at the hearing, Petitioner disputed two statements that Crystal made to the investigator on July 4, 1992. First, Crystal reported that Petitioner had hit her with an extension cord on one other occasion. Second, with regard to the July 3, 1992, incident, Crystal stated that her step-father had held her down while her mother hit her. At hearing, Ms. Fisburne (Crystal) provided credible testimony that the aforementioned statements were not true, but were made only because she was angry and wanted to get away from her mother. At the time of the July 1992 incident and during the two years prior thereto, Crystal was a difficult child who refused to follow Petitioner's directions, did whatever she wanted to do, and threatened to call the police if Petitioner "did anything" to her. Crystal exhibited numerous behavior problems. Crystal became violent with Petitioner; routinely skipped school; left home for days at a time; and stole Petitioner's car twice within a one-month period. The first time Crystal stole Petitioner's car, she kept it for one day; the second time Crystal stole the car, she kept it three days. When Crystal ran away from home, she would often return to Petitioner's house during the day when no one was at home and break in and steal food and money. Also, in one instance, Crystal broke into someone else's house. On the day of the incident, Petitioner was "pushed to the limit" and resorted to the use of corporal punishment as a means of redirecting her daughter's behavior. Petitioner expressed regret about hitting her daughter with an extension cord. However, she believed that corporal punishment was appropriate given the seriousness of Crystal's behavior, the length of time Crystal had been exhibiting this behavior, and the ineffectiveness of other disciplinary methods, such as placing Crystal on restrictions and giving her extra chores to perform. Prior to the July 3, 1992, incident, Petitioner had sought help in dealing with Crystal's behavioral problems from various community resources. At the suggestion of a school counselor, Petitioner arranged for counseling for Crystal. However, after several sessions, the counseling was discontinued because Crystal was uncooperative. In Crystal's words, referring to the counselor, "I didn't want to talk to the man." When Crystal ran away from home, Petitioner contacted the Sheriff's Office but was told that it could provide no assistance because there was no law against a child running away from home. However, Petitioner was told by the Sheriff's Office that since Crystal was a minor, whenever she came home, Petitioner would have to allow her to return. Finally, during one or more of Crystal's episodes, Petitioner attempted to take her to the detention center for a 72-hour cooling-off period. These efforts were likewise unsuccessful because the detention center refused to accept Crystal. Other than the incident referred to in the FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954, Petitioner has not been the subject of an abuse report. Since the July 1992, Petitioner has been employed in several jobs that involve working with children. She was employed as a house parent in a home for teenage mothers and their babies; a back-up parent for the Department of Juvenile Justice to children who were removed from their home; and a substitute teacher. Despite the discrepancies in statements made by Petitioner and her daughter and in FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954, there is no evidence that Petitioner requested a hearing to have the abuse report expunged or amended as required in Section 415.504(4)(d)1.b., Florida Statutes (1991). Because the report was never challenged, FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954 remains and is properly deemed a confirmed report of abuse. Furthermore, there is no indication that Petitioner ever applied for or was granted an exemption from disqualification as provided in the Florida Statutes. In light of the confirmed report of abuse naming Petitioner as the perpetrator of abuse against a child and in absence of the Department's granting an exemption from disqualification, the Department properly found that Petitioner failed the required screening and thus, properly denied her application for a foster home license.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kate Shaw 619 38th Street South St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 Amy V. Archibald, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630

Florida Laws (3) 120.5739.201409.175
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs DELORES WILSON, 06-003433 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 13, 2006 Number: 06-003433 Latest Update: May 24, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.

Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.

Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.57409.175
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