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H. GLENN BOGGS, II vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 01-002020 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 23, 2001 Number: 01-002020 Latest Update: Aug. 15, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to receive retirement credit for the period of his employment with the Florida Bar from July 1, 1977 through June 4, 1981.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Florida Bar from July 1, 1977 to June 4, 1981. The record is unclear as to the nature of his employment at the Florida Bar. He is presently employed as a professor at Florida State University and has approximately 24 years' credit in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Employees of the Florida Bar are paid as part of an overall budgetary process generated primarily from members' dues. Their salaries are not established by or funded by legislative appropriation. The Florida Bar has its own pension system that is a defined contribution plan funded entirely by the Florida Bar. The Bar employees contribute nothing to their pension system. This system has been in place since approximately 1970. Salaries of state officers and employees are reported from the State Comptroller to the Division of State Retirement. No salaries of the Florida Bar were paid or reported to the Division for the period of time Petitioner was employed at the Florida Bar. In the 1970's the FRS went from an employee/employer funded system to a strictly employer funded system which became known as a non-contributory system. The Florida Bar does not participate as a paying agency of the FRS and employees of The Florida Bar do not participate in any state employee benefit system. Beginning in 1955, until the establishment of the FRS, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners participated in the former public retirement system. When the FRS was created, participants, such as the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, began reporting into the new system and were allowed to participate in the new system. Mr. Ragsdale, administrator of the enrollment section of the Division, established that the employees of the Board of Bar Examiners participated by contributing into the former retirement system.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement service credit for the period of his employment with the Florida Bar. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2001.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57121.021121.051122.02216.011216.262 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-6.001
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ESTELL R. DORAIS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 83-002051 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002051 Latest Update: Jun. 01, 1990

Findings Of Fact John Wallace began service as a Sumter County school board member on January 1, 1959. (Joint Stipulation). On or about January 1, 1959, he completed a blue-top computer enrollment card (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), which also designated his wife Effie as his first beneficiary of his retirement benefits and his daughter, Mrs. Kindle Johnson, as the second beneficiary. (Joint Stipulation). Effie Wallace died January 22, 1963. (Joint Stipulation) John Wallace married Estell Loudin June 9, 1964. (Joint Stipulation). John Wallace executed an election to transfer to the Florida Retirement System, effective December 1, 1970. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). (Joint Stipulation). John Wallace died September 8, 1975. (Joint Stipulation). On November 12, 1975, Betty Carruthers, an employee of the Sumter County School Board, notified the Division of Retirement of Mr. Wallace's death. Margie Smith in the Division of Retirement completed a form (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) setting forth the information she received from Betty Carruthers in the November 12, 1975, telephone conversation. Not having any beneficiary designation form in the School Board file, Carruthers simply advised Smith that petitioner was Wallace's second wife, his first wife, Effie, having predeceased him. Smith's quick check of the Division of Retirement records management section did not uncover Wallace's designation of beneficiary form. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 5). On March 9, 1977, the Division of Retirement received petitioner's FR- 11, an application (albeit on the incorrect form) for her deceased husband's benefits, along with certain supporting documents. In an April 13, 1977, letter (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) sent out over David Ragsdale's name but written and signed by a benefits calculation specialist trainee, petitioner was erroneously informed that she was the beneficiary of her husband's benefits, since he had designated his first wife Effie, who had predeceased him. But after the letter went out, it came to the attention of Marjorie Smith that the April 13, 1977 letter was incorrect since Wallace's original January 1, 1959 designation of beneficiary form designated Wallace's daughter, Mrs. Kindle [sic] Johnson, who is still living, as Wallace's second beneficiary. In a June 5, 1977, latter (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), again sent out over David Ragsdale's name but dictated by Marjorie Smith and signed by Ragsdale's secretary, petitioner was informed that respondent had located the designation of beneficiary card, signed by Mr. Wallace, designating his daughter, Mrs. Kindle [sic] Johnson, as his second beneficiary. On June 20, 1977, Randall Thornton, petitioner's attorney at the time, wrote a letter (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) to David Ragsdale, seeking a copy of the beneficiary card upon which the respondent based its decision in the June 15, 1977, letter to petitioner. On July 12, 1977, Mr. Thornton sent another letter to the respondent, attention Mrs. Ferguson (Petitioner's Exhibit 9), asking again for a copy of the beneficiary designation upon which its decision was based awarding Mr. Wallace's retirement benefits to his daughter. On the same date, respondent sent Mr. Thornton a letter (Petitioner's Exhibit 10), enclosing a copy of the original enrollment card. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Thornton's secretary called petitioner into the office on July 15, 1977, the day after Thornton received and reviewed respondents' July 12, 1977 letter. Petitioner looked at the copy of Wallace's designation of beneficiary form and stated that she did not believe her husband had written both his first wife's name and his daughter's name as first and second beneficiaries, respectively, at the same time. She did not, however, prove this at final hearing. Petitioner did not prove that there is or ever was another designation of beneficiary executed by Mr. Wallace other than Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Prior to 1972, if a member of the Florida Retirement System or any pension plan in existence prior to December 1, 1970, wanted to change his designated beneficiary, he would complete another blue-top enrollment card. In 1972, a new enrollment form, FRS-M10, was instituted consisting of three identical parts. If a member of the Florida Retirement System completed the form, the original would be sent to the respondent, with a copy to the agency employing the individual and a copy to the individual. (Carruthers deposition, p.4). Respondent has searched its records and has found no other designation of beneficiary form signed by Mr. Wallace apart from Petitioner's Exhibit 1. The files at the Sumter County School Board have been searched and no designation of beneficiary signed by Mr. Wallace found. (Carruthers deposition, p.3). Petitioner's attorney Randall Thornton has searched his files and found no designation of beneficiary signed by Mr. Wallace other than Petitioner's Exhibit (Thornton deposition, p.18)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying petitioner's request for benefits on the ground that she is not, in law and fact, entitled to benefits resulting from the death of her husband, John Wallace. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1984.

Florida Laws (2) 121.091122.12
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MALBA LANIER vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-000128 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000128 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1980

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 1.04120.57121.011121.021121.051121.091216.011216.262
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BRIAN PRINCE AND WENDY P. RIVERS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 09-002582 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 14, 2009 Number: 09-002582 Latest Update: Sep. 15, 2009

The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioners are entitled to Option 2 continuing retirement benefits following the death of Linda Prince, a Florida Retirement System member.

Findings Of Fact Linda J. Prince was employed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (hereinafter "FDLE") and was a vested, regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter "FRS"). After she was diagnosed with a serious health condition, she was able to continue as a full-time employee by participating in the Department's sick leave pool. By November 2008 her family understood that she was terminally ill. About that time, she began alternating staying at the home of her son Brian Prince and at the home of her daughter and son-in- law Wendy and Harrison T. Rivers. During the first week of November 2008, her son, daughter, and son-in-law began discussing whether she should retire rather than remaining in full-pay status. Harrison T. Rivers asked his father Harrison W. Rivers for advice since his father was a retired member of FRS. His father told him that Linda Prince should retire right away under Option 2 since that would guarantee a 10-year payout. One of the persons that Harrison T. Rivers contacted for advice referred him to Annie Lamb, a Personnel Services Specialist at FDLE. He remembers asking her about Option 2 and understood her to tell him that Option 2 required having a spouse or other dependents. She does not recall the conversation. When Harrison T. Rivers conveyed his understanding to Brian Prince, Brian requested that a meeting be set up at FDLE's Personnel Office. The two men met with Samantha Andrews, a different FDLE Personnel Services Specialist, near the end of 2008. All three persons attending the meeting recall that they discussed the sick leave pool, and the two men were assured that there were enough donations to the sick leave pool to cover Linda Prince's continuing need. The attendees at the meeting have different recollections of the other matters discussed. The two men believe they discussed Option 2 and that Samantha Andrews called across the hall to Annie Lamb who confirmed that Option 2 required a spouse. Lamb recalls Andrews asking her a question but does not remember what the question was. Andrews does not recall asking Lamb a question and further does not recall discussing the retirement options at the meeting. At the final hearing, Andrews admitted that she did not understand the differences among the four retirement options until after Linda Prince's death and that before then she thought that one had to be a spouse or a dependent child to be a beneficiary. Andrews' impression of the meeting is that Linda Prince's children wanted to be sure she remained in full- pay status through the sick leave pool to increase her income and keep her benefits available and at a reasonable cost. After this meeting, Linda Prince remained on full-pay employment status. As a result, she received (1) her full salary rather than a reduced retirement amount, (2) health insurance at a cost of $25 bi-weekly, and (3) a $44,000 life insurance policy at the cost of $2 bi-weekly. If she had retired, she would have had to pay nearly $500 a month for the health insurance and would have lost her $44,000 life insurance policy. Instead, she would have had the option of purchasing either a $10,000 or $2,500 life insurance policy for $29.65 or $7.41 a pay period, respectively. On January 10, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers was visiting at his son's home while Linda Prince was staying there. In a conversation with her, he was surprised to learn that she had not retired as he had strongly advised two months earlier. When he later questioned his son as to why she had not retired, his son told him because she did not have a spouse. Harrison W. Rivers told his son that that information was not correct. On January 20, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers met with his own financial advisor David A. Wengert and relayed the information his son had given him. Wengert agreed with Rivers that the information about a spouse or dependent child was not correct but checked with a contact he had at the Department of Corrections. That person confirmed that the spouse or dependent child requirement did not apply to Option 2 and faxed the necessary forms for retiring under Option 2 to Wengert who gave them to Rivers. Harrison W. Rivers gave the folder from Wengert containing the correct information and required forms to his son and told his son to retire Linda Prince immediately. His son subsequently called Brian Prince, gave him the correct information, and told him that Linda Prince should retire. Brian Prince agreed but was out of town at the time. On February 11, 2009, Harrison T. Rivers drove Annie Lamb from FDLE to where Linda Prince was staying. The forms were completed and signed, and Lamb notarized Linda Prince's signature. The forms provided for Linda Prince to take early retirement under Option 2 with Brian Prince and Wendy Rivers as her equal beneficiaries. The forms were filed with Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, the same day. The forms she signed selected February 28, 2009, as Linda Prince's termination of employment date. A termination date of February 28, 2009, resulted in a March 1, 2009, retirement date. Linda Prince died on February 14, 2009. On that date, she was still in full-pay status since she had not terminated her employment and retired. Option 2 under the FRS system provides a reduced monthly benefit payable for the member's lifetime, but if the member dies within ten years after his or her retirement date, the designated beneficiary receives a monthly benefit in the same amount for the balance of the ten-year period, and then no further benefits are payable. Option 1 provides for monthly payments for the member's lifetime, and upon the member's death, no further monthly benefits are payable. It, therefore, pays no continuing benefits to a beneficiary. Options 3 and 4 provide for joint annuitants and reduced monthly benefits. Under Option 3, upon the member's death, the joint annuitant, who must be a spouse or a financial dependent, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount, but there are limitations on the amount and length of those payments for a joint annuitant under 25 who is not a spouse. Option 4 provides an adjusted monthly benefit while the member and the joint annuitant are living, a further reduced monthly benefit after the death of either the member or the joint annuitant, with adjustments if the joint annuitant is under the age of 25 and not a spouse. No benefits are payable after both the member and the joint annuitant are deceased. Thus, only Options 3 and 4 require a spouse or financial dependent in order for continuing benefits to be paid after the member's death. Upon learning of her death, the Division of Retirement researched whether any benefits were due to Linda Prince or her beneficiaries. Since she had paid nothing into the FRS, there were no contributions to refund. Further, since she had not retired, no retirement benefits were payable to her or her beneficiaries. The Division also looked at the dates of birth of her beneficiaries to determine if a beneficiary would qualify as a joint annuitant, but both of her beneficiaries were over the age of 25. The only time that Linda Prince contacted the Division of Retirement was in 2002 when she sent an e-mail asking that her benefits be calculated as to what she would receive if she retired at age 62. The Division performed the calculations and sent her the information as to what her benefits would be under Options 1 and 2. Her file contains her e-mail, the benefits estimates sent to her, and a copy of an informational retirement brochure. Information on the FRS, including descriptions of the Options, has been available on the Division's website, in employee handbooks available from the Division, and was available in written form in FDLE's Personnel Office on the day that Brian Prince and Harrison T. Rivers met with Samantha Andrews. During that meeting, neither Brian Prince nor Harrison T. Rivers requested a copy of the employee handbook or any written materials describing the Options for retirement. Because of Petitioners' estoppel argument, the chronology in this case must be closely reviewed. At least until early November 2008, Linda Prince had made her decision to stay on full-pay status to receive her full salary and benefits rather than take early retirement. In early November, her son, daughter, and son-in-law became involved in that decision. In early November, her son-in-law understood an FDLE employee to say that Linda Prince needed a spouse or financial dependent to qualify for continuing retirement benefits, but his father, who was a retired member of FRS, told him that information was wrong and that Option 2 would provide a ten-year continuing benefit for her beneficiaries. No contact was made on her behalf with the Division of Retirement to ascertain which information was correct. On January 10, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers, upon learning that Linda Prince was still not retired, again told his son that she should be retired under Option 2 and that his son's understanding that she needed a spouse or financial dependent was wrong. Again, no contact was made with the Division of Retirement. On January 20, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers obtained the written information and required forms. Within a few days he gave the information and forms to his son and told him again to see to it that Linda Prince was retired immediately. Yet, the forms were not executed and filed with the Division of Retirement until February 11, 2009. Had Linda Prince or anyone on her behalf contacted the Division of Retirement to clarify which information was correct once they had conflicting information the first week of November 2008, she could have retired starting December 1. Had Linda Prince or anyone on her behalf submitted her application for retirement when Harrison W. Rivers provided the correct information and forms to use in January 2009, she could have retired then with a February 1 retirement date. Even though Petitioners offered evidence to show that they relied upon erroneous information conveyed by Harrison T. Rivers and even though they offered evidence that they received erroneous information from Samantha Andrews, it would have been clear to a reasonable person that such information conflicted with the information given by Harrison W. Rivers, who had gone through the process. Further, in January when Rivers gave them the correct written information and the forms to use, there was no basis for relying upon the erroneous information. If Petitioners had acted to clarify the previous conflicting information or had not delayed in having Linda Prince execute the forms when Rivers provided them, they would have retired her before her death and would have been entitled to continuing benefits. Whatever circumstances caused the further delay in the filing of Linda Prince's application for retirement and supporting documentation, the delay was not caused by the information, erroneous or not, provided by the FDLE employees. Accordingly, Linda Prince was still a full-time employee at the time of her death not as a result of erroneous information provided by FDLE employees as alleged by Petitioners, but as a result of delay in obtaining the easily- accessible correct information from the Division of Retirement and as a result of delay in acting on the correct information when it was provided to them. There are over 960 agencies, including state departments and local governments and school boards, which participate in the FRS. The employer and employee handbooks distributed to those agencies and their employees by the Division of Retirement clearly state that representatives of participating agencies are not the agents of the Division of Retirement but rather only act as a link between employees and the Division of Retirement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Petitioners ineligible for an Option 2 benefit from the FRS retirement account of Linda Prince. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian Prince 1063 Walden Road Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Harrison Rivers 4211 Camden Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57121.021121.091121.190526.012 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.0035
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KENNETH JENNE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 08-001829 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 14, 2008 Number: 08-001829 Latest Update: May 28, 2009

The Issue Whether the Petition has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a result of a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for acts committed in connection with Petitioner's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.

Findings Of Fact From the Joint Stipulation of Facts: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant State Attorney by the State Attorney's Office from December 1972 to January 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed as Executive Director of the Broward County Charter Commission from January 1974 to November 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners from March 1975 to November 1978. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS, and this service is credited as service under the FRS. In November 1978, Petitioner was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature; he continued to serve as a state legislator for approximately 18 years. As a state legislator, Petitioner was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officers, and this service is credited service under the FRS. Most recently, Petitioner was the elected Sheriff of Broward County. By reason of his service as Sheriff, Petitioner was a member of the FRS. Petitioner was initially appointed Sheriff in January 1998 by then-Governor Lawton Chiles. Petitioner was subsequently elected Sheriff in 1998 and reelected in 2000 and 2004. As Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner was Broward County's chief law enforcement officer and was responsible for directing the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"), a law enforcement agency that currently employs over 6,000 employees. The office of Sheriff is a constitutional office established under Article VIII, Section 1(d), Constitution of Florida. Upon assuming his duties as Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner took an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and the State of Florida and to faithfully perform the duties of sheriff pursuant to Article II, Section 5(b), Constitution of Florida. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Charlie Crist notifying him of his resignation from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. By reply letter of the same date, Governor Crist accepted Petitioner's resignation. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS and currently does not receive FRS retirement benefits. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner was charged, by information, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and three counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1). The same four-count information is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr- 60209-WPB as document 1. At all times relevant to the information, Petitioner was the Sheriff of Broward County. The section of the information entitled "General Allegations" contains numerous references to Petitioner's service as Sheriff of Broward County and the power and authority vested in that position. The "Objects of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: An object of the conspiracy was for JENNE to unlawfully enrich himself by obtaining monies from P.P. and L.N., who were Broward Sheriff's Office vendors, by making false representations, omitting to state material facts, and concealing material facts concerning, among other things, the ultimate destination of monies that JENNE asked P.P. and L.N. to give to his secretaries, A.V. and M.Y. It was further an object of the scheme for JENNE to perpetuate and conceal the scheme and the actions taken in furtherance of it by, among other things, making false, misleading, and incomplete statements in public filings and to investigators. The "Manner and Means of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: JENNE and M.Y. arranged for JENNE to receive $20,000 from P.P. by having the money transferred from P.P. through JENNE's secretary, M.Y., to JENNE. JENNE and M.Y. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds. JENNE provided L.N. with access to off- duty Broward Sheriff's Office deputies, who L.N. hired to do work for his companies. On two different occasions, in exchange for the access to the deputies, JENNE instructed L.N. to pay money to JENNE's secretary, A.V., purportedly to compensate A.V. for work done for L.N. JENNE instructed A.V. to cash checks given to her by L.N. and to have the cash deposited into JENNE's bank account. JENNE and A.V. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds, which totaled $5,500. JENNE perpetuated this fraud and attempted to prevent its detection by mailing incomplete and misleading annual financial disclosure forms, which did not list his receipt of the payments from P.P. and L.N., to the Florida Commission on Ethics. On or about September 5, 2007, after being advised of the nature of the charges against him, the above-referenced information, and of his rights, Petitioner waived in open court prosecution by indictment and consented to proceeding by information. The same waiver of indictment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 13. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered into an agreement with the United States of America to plead guilty as charged in the four-count information. The same plea agreement is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 3. Paragraph 7.c. of the plea agreement provides: 7. The United States and the defendant agree that, although not binding on the probation office or the court, they will jointly recommend that the court make the following findings and conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed: * * * c. Advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count: That, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the applicable guideline to be used in calculating the defendant's advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count is § 2B1.1; that under § 2B1.1(a)(1), the Base Offense Level is 7; that under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), four levels are added because the loss was between $10,000 and $30,000; that under § 3B1.3, two levels are added because of the defendant's abuse of his position of public trust; and that under § 3E1.1(b), two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility . . . The United States Sentencing Guide, Section 3B1.3, referenced in paragraph 7.c of the plea agreement, provides in relevant part that "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 3B1.3. Paragraphs 10. and 12. of the plea agreement provide: 10. The defendant confirms that he is guilty of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty; that his decision to plead guilty is the decision that he has made; and that nobody has forced, threatened, or coerced him into pleading guilty. The defendant affirms that he has discussed this matter thoroughly with his attorneys. The defendant further affirms that his discussions with his attorneys have included discussion of possible defenses that he may raise if the case were to go to trial, as well as possible issues and arguments that he may raise at sentencing. The defendant additionally affirms that he is satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys. The defendant accordingly affirms that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and with the benefit of full, complete, and effective assistance by his attorneys. * * * 12. This is the entire agreement and understanding between the United States and the defendant. There are no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered a statement of factual basis for guilty plea with the United States of America (hereinafter "factual proffer"), wherein he agreed that, if the case went to trial, the government would have been able to establish the facts recited therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factual proffer is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 8. On or about September 5, 2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner pled guilty as charged in the information. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to committing the acts set forth in the charges and to which he pled guilty. In addition, at the hearing Petitioner admitted to the following facts and to committing the following actions: At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that he received an $8,130 benefit from P.P. in November 2001 in connection with the demolition of a house he owned in Lake Worth, Florida. Within P.P.'s internal accounting system, the $8,130 check was attributed to the "HIDTA project" (i.e., a lease committing BSO and HIDTA as tenants of an office building owned by P.P.). Petitioner never reported the $8,130 benefit on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that, in September 2002, he had received $10,000 from P.P. as a reward for his work concerning a new company called SuperTech Products, Inc. Petitioner never reported the $10,000 payment on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. Prior to becoming Sheriff, Petitioner was a partner in Conrad, Scherer & Jenne, a law firm located in Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was with the firm from 1992 through the beginning of 1998, when he left to become Sheriff. While Petitioner was at the firm, he, like some other partners, drove a car paid for by the firm's investment arm, CSJ Investments. In October, 1997, at Petitioner's request, the law firm, through CSJ Investments, bought a used 1994 Mercedes E320 convertible for Petitioner to drive. The price of the Mercedes was $61,297. Rather than pay for the car all at once, the firm financed the car with a 60-month loan. When Petitioner left the firm in early 1998 following his appointment as Sheriff, he took the Mercedes with him. Despite the fact that Petitioner no longer worked for the firm, the firm continued to pay off the Mercedes loan for the balance of the loan term, making the final payment in 2003. The loan payments were $1,320 per month, resulting in a total eventual cost to the firm of approximately $79,234 in loan payments, all but approximately $1,320, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. In addition, after Petitioner left the law firm, the firm continued to pay for the insurance on the Mercedes. The insurance payments continued even unto September 2007. At that time, the firm had made a total of approximately $30,961 in insurance payments on Petitioner's behalf, all but approximately $880, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. Petitioner never disclosed any of the loan payments or insurance payments made by the firm on his behalf on any state ethics filing. During the time that Petitioner was receiving these undisclosed payments from Conrad, Scherer, the firm was billing BCSO for legal work that it was doing on its behalf. At the hearing, Petitioner did not take any exception or make any objections to the facts as summarized in the factual proffer. In fact, with the exception of one non-substantive addition, Petitioner accepted the factual proffer as indicated. On or about November 16, 2007, a judgment was entered on the aforesaid guilty plea, wherein Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of all counts charged in the four-count information. The same judgment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 59. By certified letter dated January 24, 2008, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's proposed action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of the aforesaid guilty plea. The notice set forth the basis for the Division's decision and informed Petitioner of his right to an administrative hearing. Petitioner, by and through counsel, timely requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge said proposed agency action. [End of Stipulated Facts] The parties agreed that the following exhibits would be considered in this cause: Petitioner's resignation letter dated September 4, 2007; Governor Crist's letter accepting Petitioner's resignation dated September 4, 2007; The Information filed against Petitioner on September 4, 2007, in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Plea Agreement offered in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Statement of Factual Basis for Guilty Plea of Defendant Kenneth C. Jenne in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Transcript of the Plea of Guilty before the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, U.S. District Judge, United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209- WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Waiver of Indictment from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Judgment in a Criminal Case from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Agency Action letter dated January 24, 2008; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2001 (with attachments and amendments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, June 27, 2002; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2002 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 7, 2003; and Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2004 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 1, 2005. Petitioner did not have a trial on the merits of the charges against him. Instead, he voluntarily accepted and admitted to the factual allegations set forth in the charging and plea documents. The factual statements set forth in those documents are not subject to interpretation or conjecture. They must be considered facts of this case based upon the stipulation of the parties. Petitioner was notified of the Department's preliminary decision to forfeit the FRS benefits and rights and Petitioner timely challenged that decision.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner was convicted of crimes that require the forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the FRS, pursuant to Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark Herron, Esquire Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5579 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire Barbara M. Crosier, Esquire Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160D Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

USC (2) 18 U. S. C. 37126 U. S. C. 7206 Florida Laws (6) 112.3173120.57121.091800.04838.15838.16
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MYRON ROSNER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 17-000662 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 31, 2017 Number: 17-000662 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 2018

The Issue Whether Petitioner forfeits his rights to benefits under the Florida Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact On May 5, 2011, Petitioner was mayor of North Miami Beach, Florida. During Petitioner’s employment as mayor with North Miami Beach, he was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On or about October 17, 2012, Petitioner was charged by Information with nine criminal counts in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. On February 24, 2016, pursuant to a written Plea Agreement, Rosner entered a plea of guilty to Count 11/ Unlawful Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behavior, in violation of section 838.016(2), in Eleventh Circuit case F12023663. That same day in the Eleventh Circuit case F12023663, Judge Martin Bidwill issued the following orders: an Order Ratifying Terms of Plea Agreement; a Disposition Order specifying Rosner’s plea to Count 1 Unlawful Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behavior; and a Finding of Guilt Order to Count 1 Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behav[ior]/Influence. The October 17, 2012, Information detailed the factual basis of Rosner’s plea and conviction in Count 1.2/ Petitioner illegally received unpaid campaign advertising from Martin Outdoor Media, which had a continuing contract with the City of North Miami Beach while Petitioner served as mayor. Count 1 provides in relevant part, the following: COUNT 1 MYRON JOEL ROSNER, on or about May 5, 2011, in the County and State aforesaid, being a public servant to wit: MAYOR OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH did unlawfully, feloniously, and corruptly request, solicit, accept, or agree to accept any pecuniary or other benefit not authorized by law, to wit; UNPAID CAMPAIGN ADS, for the past, future, or future exertion of any influence upon or with any other public servant regarding any act or omission which said public servant represented as being within the official discretion of a public servant, to wit: CONTINUE ALL MARTIN OUTDOOR MEDIA CONTRACTS WITH THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, in violation of s. 838.016(2), Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.3/ Rosner was notified by certified letter dated April 20, 2016, of the Division's proposed action to forfeit his Florida Retirement System rights and benefits pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f). The notice provided the following basis for the proposed action: . . . . as a result of your guilty plea in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, for acts committed in connection with your employment with the City of North Miami Beach. Specifically, on or about October 18, 2012, in Case Number F12-023663 (2012-CF_023663), you were charged by information, in relevant part, with unlawful compensation or award for official behavior, a second degree felony in violation of section 838.016(2), Florida Statutes, based on conduct which occurred on or about May 5, 2011. On or about February 24, 2016, you entered a guilty plea for one count of unlawful compensation or award for official behavior, a second degree felony in violation of section 838.016(2), Florida Statutes, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. By Petition dated May 9, 2016, Rosner contested the Notice and challenged the forfeiture.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of a specified offense committed prior to retirement pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his Florida Retirement System rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2017.

Florida Laws (7) 112.3173120.569120.57121.091838.016838.15838.16
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JOYCE GRIFFITH vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 96-005806 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Dec. 11, 1996 Number: 96-005806 Latest Update: Oct. 08, 1997

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to the retirement benefits of her late husband, Frederick Griffith.

Findings Of Fact Frederick Griffith was employed with the Broward County School System from January 4, 1971, until his death on June 9, 1996. Frederick Griffith was enrolled with the State of Florida Retirement System at the time of his death. Frederick Griffith separated from his first wife, Ruth Griffith, in 1976, and they were divorced on October 25, 1989. Frederick Griffith and Petitioner, Joyce Griffith, were married on November 25, 1989, after having been together for approximately 12 years. Joyce and Frederick Griffith were married at the time of his death. Joyce Griffith applied for her husband's benefits as the surviving spouse. The Respondent, Division of Retirement (Division), denied Joyce Griffith benefits as surviving spouse, stating that the beneficiary of record was Ruth Griffith. The Division advised Joyce Griffith that they would recognize her as surviving spouse and pay her a monthly benefit if Ruth Griffith would disclaim her rights as the designated beneficiary. Ruth Griffith refused to disclaim her rights and applied for the benefits as the designated beneficiary. The Division paid her $4,373.94. Because Ruth Griffith was not dependent on Frederick Griffith at the time of his death, she was entitled only to the lump sum amount that Mr. Griffith had paid into the retirement system. On February 2, 1992, Mr. Griffith submitted Retirement Information Request, Form FR-9, to the Division for a calculation of total years of creditable service and the amount due to purchase his creditable military service. On June 15, 1995, the Division replied to the FR-9 request by issuing Form FRS-40, Estimate of Retirement Benefits. The information provided to Mr. Griffith was calculated based on the assumption that Mr. Griffith would retire with a retirement effective date of February, 1997. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits advised Mr. Griffith that there was an apparent discrepancy with the beneficiary listed on his FR-9 and his named beneficiary listed in the Division's official records. Specifically, Mr. Griffith was advised: The spouse listed on the Retirement Information Request, FR-9, and used for this estimate is not your primary beneficiary. If you intend to change your beneficiary designation, please complete a personal history record, FRS-M10, in your personnel office. Mr. Griffith did not file a revised FRS-M10 in response to the advice given by the Division in the June 15, 1995, FRS-40. After Mr. Griffith received the FRS-40, Joyce Griffith insisted that he call the Broward County School Board to verify that she was the designated beneficiary. Joyce Griffith gave her husband the number to call. The school board personnel assured Mr. Griffith that Joyce Griffith was his beneficiary. Apparently, Mr. Griffith called the department which dealt with life insurance benefits and not retirement benefits. Joyce Griffith was the beneficiary of her husband's employer-provided life insurance policy for $150,000. Mr. Griffith had designated her as his beneficiary on a change of beneficiary form dated August, 1990. Mr. Griffith had completed a form entitled Application for Service Retirement designating Joyce Griffith as his primary beneficiary. The form was notarized on November 25, 1995. Mr. Griffith did not indicate a retirement date on the form and never filed the form with either the Division or his employer. After Mr. Griffith's death, Joyce Griffith found an employee copy of a FRS-10 form among Mr. Griffith's military papers. The form was dated November 19, 1991, and signed by Mr. Griffith. The form was not filed with either the School Board of Broward County or the Division. Neither the school board nor the Division have any record of the form being filed. The form was not correctly completed. In the area of the form entitled Designation of Beneficiaries, the employee is supposed to complete only one of three sections. On the form signed by Mr. Griffith, the first section was checked, and the other two sections were filled out with the names of Joyce Griffith and the children of Mr. Griffith.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request for the retirement benefits of Frederick T. Griffith. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Connie L. Hiaasen, Esquire Regina S. Bushkin, Esquire SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1997. 707 Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.011
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NATHANIEL GLOVER, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-004157 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Nov. 18, 2004 Number: 04-004157 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.

Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000

Florida Laws (5) 1.01120.569120.57121.052121.091
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GILBERT M. RODRIGUEZ vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 92-002418RX (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 21, 1992 Number: 92-002418RX Latest Update: Jul. 10, 1992

Findings Of Fact Between October 1, 1988 and September 30, 1991, Petitioner's salary as the Director of the Department of Emergency Support Services for Hillsborough County was controlled by the compensation structure set forth in the Hillsborough County Exempt Service Classification and Compensation Plan (the Plan). His retirement system benefits were governed by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes as he was a member of the Florida Retirement System administered by the Division of Retirement. The Plan utilized by the County during this period of time created a pay structure for its exempt service employees that caused annual salary increases to be divided into two categories. The Plan referred to the categories as "merit increase" and "performance pay." Any salary adjustment under the "merit increase" category became part of the employee's adjusted base salary. "Performance pay" was an increase granted for a one year term. It was based upon work performance that exceeded performance standards during the preceding year. According to the Plan, the increase in salary from each of the categories was directly tied to the employees' annual performance rating. The possible percentages of the increases were regulated at the high end of the adjustment scale by a Maximum Performance Compensation Table. The one year "performance pay" increase could only be granted if the maximum "merit increase" was granted during the same evaluation. The method used to establish the pay increases for Petitioner under the Plan were applied because his salary was already above the midpoint of the pay grade the Plan dictated the County was willing to pay for the performance of his job when completed to the required standard. Salary increases above the midpoint were divided into the two separate categories in order to balance two distinct County interests. The first was to keep the maximum salary range in a pay grade aligned with the competitive salary indicators in the geographical area for the same type of work. The second was to annually reward each employee whose performance exceeded standards over the past year and to motivate continued high performance on an individualized basis. Petitioner's salary adjustments were divided between "merit increases" and "performance pay" for the three years which are the subject of this proceeding. During the time period between October 1, 1988 and June 30, 1989, the County was required to make a contribution into the Florida Retirement System for Petitioner's benefit. This contribution was a statutorily designated percentage of his monthly salary, including the annual "performance pay" increase. The inclusion of the "performance pay" increase was required by Subsection 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, which defines "compensation". In spite of this contribution into the system by the County, Subsection 121.021(24), Florida Statutes mandated that the Division had to exclude bonuses, whether paid as salary or otherwise, from the calculation of the "average final compensation" for a member seeking to establish the amount of his or her pension benefits. Effective July 1, 1989, the Legislature removed the provision in Subsection 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, which required employers to make a contribution into the system based upon a definition of "compensation" that included "bonuses" in the calculation. The Florida Retirement Systems Act has never included a definition of the word "bonus" as used in Subsections 121.021(22) and (24), Florida Statutes. The term, as used in Subsection 121.021(24) and as previously used in Subsection 121.021(22), is not plain nor the meaning clear. The term "bonus" is defined by the Division's rules, which excludes Petitioner's "performance pay" from any calculation of his "average final compensation." In its computation of Petitioner's "average final compensation", the Division determined that the "performance pay" category of the Hillsborough County Exempt Service Classification and Compensation Plan is a "bonus", as defined by Rule 22B-6.001(11), Florida Administrative Code. A definition of the term "bonus" is necessary to allow the Division to compute the "average final compensation" for each member of the system and for the determination of an employer's contribution into the Florida Retirement System on behalf of the member based on "compensation." Subsection 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, has consistently contained a clear definition of "compensation." The definition included the term "bonuses" until July 1, 1989 and excluded "bonuses" from the definition after that date. The definitions of "bonus" and "compensation" as set forth in Rules 22B-6.001(11) and (16)(a)3, Florida Administrative Code, establish adequate standards for agency decisions regarding retirement benefits. The definitions are based on relevant factors duly considered by the agency and they have been uniformly applied to all members.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68121.021121.031
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