The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to an order, requiring the removal of two signs involved herein which are owned by Respondent, pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act or Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and if so, whether or not the Respondent is entitled to compensation from Petitioner for the value of such signs.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony adduced at the hearing, the documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the Respondent, National Advertising Company, is the owner of certain outdoor advertising signs located in the City of Jacksonville, Florida. The parties also stipulated that Interstate 95 is part of the interstate highway system; that the two signs in question can be seen from Interstate 95 and the signs are located within 660 feet of the road's right-of-way. The parties also stipulated that only the poles which are used to erect the signs were in place prior to midnight on December 8, 1971. It appears that the poles were erected sometime during 1968, and that faces were added to the poles during the spring of 1972. The signs are located at .43 miles North of Pecan Park Road and .73 miles North of Pecan Park Road, respectively, adjacent to Interstate percent Highway 95. The Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation, takes the position that since the faces were not on the signs prior to midnight on December 8, 1981, pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, it is entitled to the entry of an order requiring removal of the signs by Respondent without any compensation for the signs whatsoever. Respondent, through counsel, moved that the hearing be dismissed on the ground that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to hear such matters, in that the signs may be removed only by proceeding under Florida's eminent domain law. 2/ It is undisputed that the signs involved are located within prohibited distances as provided in Chapter; 479.11, Florida Statutes. They are, therefore, a nonconforming structure as provided for within the terms of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. In view of the stipulated facts, the structures involved herein do not constitute signs within the meaning of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, since prior to midnight on December 8, 1971, all that existed of those structures were poles. See A. W. Lee, Jr. v. Reubin O'D. Askew, Case No.2-1798 (2nd DCA, 1979). Within the next year, however, Respondent erected advertising displays which had informative contents that were visible from the main traveled way. At that point, the structures herein became nonconforming outdoor advertising signs and were thereafter required to comply with pertinent State law in effect on that date.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner, upon removal of the signs, remit to the Respondent compensation in the amount of the actual replacement value of the materials used in the signs. It is further recommended that compensation be made pursuant to the State's eminent domain procedures. 3/ RECOMMENDED this, 25th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1981.
Findings Of Fact On February 28, 1979, the manager of Chipley Hotel, Mrs. Linda Cain, made application for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the south side of I-10, 1.4 miles west of S.R. 77 in Washington County, Florida. Employees of the Department in Chipley assisted Mrs. Cain in the completion of the permit application and advised her that the property on which the sign was to be erected was zoned for commercial or industrial use. She had no independent knowledge of the zoning or lack of zoning on this property. Thereafter, Department personnel inspected the site, final approval of the permit application was given by the Department of Transportation, and a permit was issued to Chipley Motel authorizing the erection of an outdoor advertising sign at the requested location on I-10. In reliance on the issuance of this permit, Chipley Motel erected a sign at the permitted location. Each year Chipley Motel has paid to the Department the annual permit fees for the renewal of this permit. These permit fees have been paid for the years 1979 through 1985, and they have been accepted by the Department. Back in 1979, when employees of the Department at the Chipley District Office made their determination that the property where the sign was to be located was zoned commercial or industrial, they inquired of county officials and relied on the information supplied by them. The property where the subject sign has been erected is not zoned either commercial or industrial, and there has never been any actual zoning for this property. There exists no commercial or industrial activity within 800 feet of the subject sign's location which would qualify the site as an unzoned commercial or industrial area.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's Notice of Violation issued on October 3, 1984, be Dismissed, and that the Respondent's sign on the south side of I-10, 1.4 miles west of SR 77, facing west, in Washington County, Florida be allowed to remain in place as a nonconforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 26th day of April, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1985.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the application of petitioner V. J. Allen, d/b/a The Seafood Shack, for a sign permit. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of January, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1985.
The Issue The issue is whether a billboard structure is in compliance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the State Highway System, interstate, or Federal-Aid Primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is in the business of providing outdoor signs for entities wishing to advertise. Lamar owns the sign at the northeast corner of the intersection of Betton Road and Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. The sign was built in 1980 and rebuilt in June 1997. The sign has two sides. One side faces Betton Road, and is visible only to persons on Betton Road. The Department does not assert that a permit is required for that side. The other side of the sign, facing to the west, is within 660 feet of Thomasville Road, which is also referred to as State Route 61, and is visible from Thomasville Road. In 1974, State Route 61 was known as U. S. Highway 319. It was a Federal-Aid Primary route. On June 24, 1974, a road denominated Capital Circle located on the outskirts of Tallahassee, was designated U.S. Highway 319. Thomasville Road although no longer a part of U.S. Highway 319, continued to bear the name State Route 61 and remained a Federal-Aid Primary route. In 1983 the Federal Highway Administration listed both Capital Circle and State Route 61 as Federal-Aid Primary routes. In 1991, the Federal Highway Administration created the National Highway System and ceased using Federal-Aid Primary designations. State Route 61, also known as Thomasville Road, nevertheless remained a Federal-Aid Primary road for outdoor advertising classification purposes at all times pertinent to this case. For federal highway identification purposes, the road is currently in the Surface Transportation Program. Prior to May 23, 1996, Lamar held an outdoor advertising permit pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, for this sign. The sign was assigned tag number BG 518-35. On May 23, 1996, the Department issued a "Notice of Violation--Signs for Which Permits Have Been Issued," addressing permit number BG 518-35. This notice indicates that it was sent to Lamar via registered mail, return receipt requested. It informed that the sign was in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-10 because the sign: "May not be maintained without permission of the person lawfully controlling site (479.11(9), FS)." On July 31, 1996, in a letter signed by District Outdoor Advertising Manager Vicki L. Davis, the Department notified Lamar that, because the Department had received a statement of loss of landowner's permission for the sign bearing tag number BG 518-35, Lamar was required to remove the sign. The Department included a "certificate of cancellation" with the letter. Lamar admits that it voluntarily canceled its permit for the sign in August 1997. Subsequently, the sign remained with its permit tag attached, unmolested by the Department for approximately 11 years. In January 1997, Lamar acquired a separate monopole structure bearing two signs with tag numbers BN 504 and BN 505. These signs are less than 200 feet to the north of the subject sign. During a 2007 inspection, an agent for the Department observed the subject sign. It still bore tag number BG 518-35. On March 14, 2007, the Department issued the "Notice of Violation-Illegally Erected Sign" addressed above. As noted before, the violation was based on the sign's having no permit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the sign is a public or private nuisance and requiring that it be removed as provided in Subsection 479.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and dismissing case number 08-1137. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Second Floor Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has erected two signs advertising a service station business, one of which lies 1.4 miles east of State Road 81 on the north side of Interstate Highway 10, and one of which is located nine-tenths of a mile west of State Road 81 on the south side of Interstate 10. The Petitioner seeks a permit authorizing the erection and maintenance of those two signs. Both signs lie within the corporate limits of the City. of Ponce de Leon. A previous application by the Petitioner was rejected apparently because the subject sign locations were not properly zoned to comply with the exception contained in Section 479.111, Florida Statutes. That is, they were not commercially or industrially zoned and were not in on zoned areas of commercial and industrial character. In denying the instant application, the Respondent has taken the position that the signs, which are within 660 feet of Interstate Highway 10, occupy areas which are located in areas which are "strip zoned" and are therefore improperly zoned. Interstate Highway 10 is part of the interstate system defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The interstate highway was opened at the time that the signs wore erected, and they can be seen from the main traveled way of Interstate 10. The Respondent contends that strip zoning is prohibited by Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter H, Part 750, "Highway Beautification." The testimony of the Petitioner, as well as the zoning map of the City of Ponce de Leon, Florida, embodied in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, establishes that both of the subject signs are in an area zoned commercial, which official zoning map or plan was adopted by the Commission of the City of Ponce de Leon on January 29, 1976. The Petitioner's testimony also, as corroborated by Petitioner's Exhibit 4, establishes that the Ponce de Leon zoning pattern is not unique or unusual, and that strip zoning is analogous to the term "spot zoning" which is used to imply zoning which is improper or aberrational in its relation to the overall character, use and zoning of the property which surrounds or adjoins a "strip" or "spot zoned" tract. There was no showing that the commercially zoned area in which the signs are located is out of context with the proper use of property adjoining it along Interstate 10 and around the subject intersection, nor was it shown to be detrimental to the adjoining properties or the proper enjoyment and use of the adjoining properties. No evidence was adduced by the Respondent which would establish that the zoning map and the zoning plan it represents by the City of Ponce de Leon, insofar as it relates to the subject commercially zoned area, is unique, unusual or improper. The subject zoning ordinances and the map were demonstrated to be duly and properly adopted by the City Commission. Finally, The Respondent's own witness conceded that the area in which the signs are located is not strip zoned in a deleterious sense.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence in the record, pleadings and arguments of counsel, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation granting the petition of Nugget Oil Company, Inc., and permitting the erection and location of the signs described hereinabove located respectively 1.4 miles east of State Road 81 on the north side of Interstate Highway 10, and nine-tenths of a mile west of State Road 81 on the south side of Interstate Highway 10. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Paul H. J. Mosier Post Office Box 1297 Crestview, Florida 32536 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Jacob D. Varn, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Jack M. Wainwright d/b/a Dee-Tara Advertising has met the requirements of Section 479.111(2), and is eligible for a permit for outdoor advertising structures from the Florida Department of Transportation. (a) Whether there is effective control of outdoor advertising structures by any local authority in Leon County as required by Title 23, Section 131, United States Code, the implementing federal regulations and the contract entered into between the Governor and the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration on January 27, 1972, promulgated pursuant to Section 479.02, Florida Statutes. Whether the subject parcel of land can be zoned by the Leon County Commission so that outdoor advertising structures can be permitted by the Florida Department of Transportation and erected within 660 feet of an interstate highway.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Jack M. Wainwright conditionally leased 1.16 acres of land, approximately 113.88 feet on the south right-of-way line of Interstate 10 in Leon County, Florida. The effectiveness of the lease was on the condition that the land be rezoned by the Leon County Board of County Commissioners. If the parcel were so rezoned the lessee promised to pay the lessor $250.00 per year for each side of a billboard to be erected on the parcel and further, the lessee would pay to the lessor any increase in taxes attributable to rezoning. The leasing and application for rezoning was primarily for the purpose of placing outdoor advertising on the property to be rezoned along the interstate highway. The lessor owns a small automotive facility which he had been operating for years on his agricultural-zoned five (5) acres. The rezoning encompassed the portion of his acreage farthest from the highway. He hopes to gain more business from the rezoning effort although there is no access to Interstate-l0 less than a mile from his property. The leased land surrounded by land zoned agriculture-2 as is the remainder of the lessor's acreage. The closest business by way of the Interstate is a truck stop about a mile west of the property on State Road 59 near an interchange on 1-10. The interstate is mostly through agricultural lands in this area as well as through most of Leon County, Florida. The application for rezoning was denied upon the first application to the Leon County Board of County Commissioners. Upon second application to the Board the property was rezoned from "agriculture-2" to "rural-commercial" by ordinance 77-26. Neither the rezoning application or ordinance mentions outdoor advertising. After the rezoning of subject land in July, 1977, Respondent applied to Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation for a permit to erect two outdoor advertising signs on the subject property to be not less than 15 feet but within 660 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate-10. The authority for his claim that billboards could be permitted on the rezoned property was derived from the 3.977 rezoning ordinance together with a 1972 and a 1973 ordinance, infra. Leon County Ordinance 72-114, dated November 21, 1972 allows, inter alia, outdoor advertising signs in designated districts as follows: "1. CT Commercial Tourist District CR Commercial Rural District C-2 General Commercial C-4 Automobile Commercial M-2 General Industrial" There is no "Rural-Commercial" designation as subject property was rezoned by ordinance 77-26 and there are no definitions in the billboard ordinance to describe what type of development was intended to be allowed in such districts. A portion of a 1973 ordinance entitled "Section 6.19 CR Rural Commercial District" states in the "District Intent": "The provisions of the CR district are intended to apply to rural areas with direct access to a major street or roadway located within convenient travelling distance to rural residential and agricultural areas, wherein small groups of commercial establishments, cultural and institutional activities and certain uses for processing or selling agricultural products are permitted. A large variety of commercial activities are permitted in recognition of the rural character and long travel distances from rural areas to urban commercial centers." The Zoning Director for the City of Tallahassee and County of Leon stated that a "commercial-rural" district is a broad commercial classification and is more closely associated with the Leon County Commercial Zone C-4, an Automotive-Commercial zoning of the most intensive of all units located along major thoroughfares in the urban areas. The Petitioner through its state administrator for outdoor advertising, disapproved and returned the application to Respondent stating, "it is felt that the rezoning classification does not meet the requirements imposed by State and Federal regulations for permitting of a sign" it cited various state and federal laws and warned that the lack of "effective control" of outdoor advertising signs, displays and devices subject any state to the loss of 10 percent of the amounts which would be otherwise apportioned to such state under Section 104 of Title 23, United States Code, until such time as such state shall provide "effective control". Respondent applied for an administrative hearing. Pursuant to its powers and duties under Section 125.01(g), the Board of County Commissioners adopted a comprehensive plan known as the "Interim Land Use Plan" in 1971, to be effective until 1995. The comprehensive master plan is basically a map of Leon County but it is also a plan or guideline of goals and policies adopted by the Board of County Commissioners. There is a separate planning commission in Leon County whose duties include public hearings and making recommendations as to land use to the Board of County Commissioners. The Planning Commission recommended to the Board that the 200 feet from the southern boundary of Interstate-10, a part of the subject property, remain agriculture-2 so that outdoor advertising in the area along the interstate would be discouraged. Concern was indicated by the Planning Commission in its April 7, 1977 meeting that if the subject property were rezoned to rural-commercial that the planning commission might be asked to create spot commercial zones along the interstate to accommodate billboards. The Comprehensive Land Use Plan itself was not modified by the subject rezoning and the area remains agriculture-2 on the plan. The Board of County Commissioners itself has the authority to amend the plan but an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan requires a separate and different procedure than the procedure used to rezone property as was done in the subject rezoning. The Hearing Officer further finds: The Leon County Board of County Commissioners followed correct legal procedures in rezoning the subject parcel of land to "rural-commercial". The Respondent has a county permit for the construction of his proposed signs. The Board denied the rezoning of the property in 1974 but granted rezoning on July 12, 1977. The billboard ordinance of 1972 was considered by the Board at the time thee area was rezoned. The rezoning of the area is in fact "spot zoning" or "strip zoning". Respondent contends: That the only authority permitted to zone subject property is the Board of County Commissioners and once zoning is completed by the county it is final state action; That the Board followed the proper procedures when it rezoned the subject property; That once the property was rezoned "commercial" the previously existing ordinance allowing billboards in commercial zones could be used to permit billboards in that area; That "spot zoning" or "strip zoning" is within the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners; That the zoning of property by the Board of County Commissioners renders inapplicable the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, as amended as well as the State's control of outdoor advertising including the Governor's contract with the Federal Highway Administrator; That the Highway Beautification Act and Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, Outdoor Advertisers, allows billboards on any property zoned "Commercial" including lands along interstate and federal aid highways. Petitioner contends: That the Leon County Board of County Commissioners has authority to zone lands in Leon County but the subject zoning is "spot zoning" which is universally condemned and the acre plus of land was rezoned from agriculture in the midst of agriculture zoned land for the primary purpose of erecting billboards on the interstate highway. That the rezoning for the purpose of erecting outdoor advertising by the Board of County Commissioners was a usurpation of state government authority under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. That the rezoning ordinance of 1977, no. 77-26, is silent on the subject of outdoor advertising and the "rural-commercial" zoning of the ordinance only allows "limited commercial or industrial activities. . . and is not considered to be commercial for outdoor advertising control. That the outdoor advertising ordinance of 1972, which allows billboards in "commercial-rural" is inapplicable to the subject rezoned land because it lies in an area zoned agriculture for at least one mile in any direction. That neither ordinance 72-114 or any comprehensive zoning plan has been submitted to or accepted by the Federal Highway Administrator as " effective control" of outdoor advertising as required by federal law and the Contract of the Governor and the Federal Highway Administrator dated January 27, 1972. The main contention of the Respondent is that the Board of County Commissioners has the authority to regulate outdoor advertising through its zoning powers under Chapter 125, County Government. The main contention of the Petitioner is that the State Department of Transportation is required to regulate the outdoor advertising under Chapter 479, Outdoor Advertisers.
Recommendation Deny the application for permit to erect outdoor advertising on subject rezoned property. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 W. Kirk Brown, Esquire Post Office Box 4075 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received including a consideration of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, I make the following relevant factual findings. A new segment of the interstate highway system (I -95) was completed from Gatlin Boulevard to the Martin County line in St. Lucie County, Florida on February 26, 1982. That segment was barricaded, and not opened to the motoring public until April 12, 1985, since there was no interchange open to the motoring public south of the newly completed segment. Lockridge Sales & Marketing Company, Inc., Petitioner, submitted applications to Respondent on July 1, 1986 for state sign permits for site locations at 500 feet, 2,000 feet, and 3,500 feet south of Gatlin Boulevard, on the east side of I-95, 15 feet from the highway right-of-way, in Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida. Petitioner's applications were reviewed by Respondent's outdoor advertising inspector, Vanna Kinchen, who recommended denial of the applications "because the prospective sign site were on a new highway outside an urban area". (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Thereafter, Petitioner's applications were forwarded to Respondent's District Outdoor Administrator, who also reviewed the permit applications and denied them by memorandum of the returned applications on July 11, 1986. (Respondent's Exhibit 3). Current urban area boundaries are based on 1980 U.S. Census designations with recommendations from the metropolitan planning agency and approval by the Department (Respondent) and the Federal Highway Administration. Urban area boundaries can be inside or outside the city limits depending on population density. Typically, urban areas are outside the city limits, however, the current urban area designation for the Fort Pierce area, which includes St. Lucie County and Port St. Lucie, shows the area south of Gatlin Boulevard, adjacent to the east side of I-95, to be outside the subject urban area boundary. Petitioner's General Manager, Gary Hodge, takes the position that since the section of I-95 here under consideration was accepted by the State as completed during 1982, it was a highway at that time. Petitioner offered no evidence to refute Respondent's position that the subject segment of the interstate highway was not opened to the motoring public prior to April 12, 1985. It is therefore found that the subject segment of I-95 was not a highway until April 12, 1985. On April 12, 1985, the subject highway was a "new highway" situated outside an urban area.
Findings Of Fact The sign which is the subject of this proceeding is an outdoor advertising structure owned by the Respondent. It was erected on October 28, 1982, and is located on the south side of Douglas Road, 132 feet east of the edge of U.S. 1, in the City of Miami, Florida. The Respondent's sign is situated so as to be read by eastbound traffic on Douglas Road. Douglas Road is an uncontrolled road, in that it is not a Federal-Aid Primary Highway. The Respondent's sign also faces so as to be visible to traffic travelling south on U.S. 1, and it can be read by this traffic. The subject sign is 51 feet from another sign located on the east side of U.S. 1, facing so as to be read by traffic travelling south on U.S. 1, which is permitted by the Department of Transportation. The subject sign is also 403 feet from another permitted sign located further south on the east side of U.S. 1, and facing so as to be visible to traffic travelling south on U.S. 1. U.S. 1, is a Federal-Aid Primary Highway throughout Dade County, and it was open to the public when the Respondent's sign was erected. The Respondent's sign does not have an outdoor advertising permit.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter its order requiring the removal of the sign of Empire Outdoor Advertising, Inc., located on the south side of Douglas Road, 132 feet east of U.S. 1, in Miami, Florida. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 15 day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32312-8064 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2637 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application for a sign permit, because the proposed site is not zoned commercial and, therefore, fails the requirement for commercial zoning in Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2007),1 and the location does not qualify as an un-zoned commercial/industrial area within the meaning of Subsection 479.01(23).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating outdoor signs at the proposed site. The proposed site is located at 2505 West Bella Vista Street, Lakeland, Florida. Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of full-service advertising in the state, including road-side signs or billboards. On March 21, 2008, Petitioner submitted an application for an outdoor advertising permit for two structures with four sign faces identified in the record by application numbers 57095, 57096, 57097, and 57098. On March 31, 2008, Respondent issued a Notice of Denied Application (the Notice). The Notice notified Petitioner of proposed agency action to deny the permit application. The Notice states two grounds for the proposed denial. The first ground alleges the “Location is not permittable under land use designations of site [sic]” within the meaning of Subsection 479.111(2). The second ground alleges the “Location does not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area” within the meaning of Subsection 479.01(23). Section 479.111 applies to signs located within the interstate highway system and the federal-aid primary highway system (the regulated highway system). The proposed site is located within the regulated highway system adjacent to Interstate 4 in Polk County, Florida. Subsection 479.111(2), in relevant part, authorizes signs within the regulated highway system which satisfy one of two disjunctive requirements. A sign must be located in either a “commercial-zoned” area or must be located in a “commercial- unzoned” area and satisfy a statutorily required use test.2 The term “commercial-unzoned” is defined in Subsection 479.01(23). However, a determination of whether the proposed site satisfies the statutory use test for a “commercial-unzoned” area is not necessary if the proposed site is found to be in a “commercial-zoned” area. The Legislature has not defined the term “commercial-zoned” area, and Respondent has cited no rule that defines the term. The issue of whether the proposed site is in a “commercial-zoned” area is an issue of fact and is not within the substantive expertise of Respondent. Even if the definition were within the substantive expertise of Respondent, Respondent explicated no reasons in the evidentiary record for deference to agency expertise. The evidentiary record explicates reasons for not deferring to purported agency expertise in this case. Respondent previously approved a sign permit from the same applicant on the same property. Petitioner spent $23,000.00 to move the previously approved sign so that both the proposed and existing signs could be permitted on the same property. It is undisputed that the proposed site is located on property zoned as Leisure Recreational in the Polk County Comprehensive Plan. It is also undisputed that Leisure Recreational “allows for multiple uses including commercial.”3 However, Respondent interprets the Leisure Recreational designation to be an “unzoned-commercial” area, because “The subject parcel is not explicitly zoned commercial. ”4 Respondent apparently has adopted a titular test for determining whether the proposed site is “commercial-zoned.” If the zoning designation does not bear the label “commercial,” Respondent asserts it is not “commercial-zoned” within the meaning of Subsection 479.111(2). The fact-finder rejects that assertion and applies a functional test to determine whether the local zoning label permits commercial use. A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the local zoning label of Leisure Recreational means the proposed site is “commercial-zoned” within the meaning of Subsection 479.111(2). Credible and persuasive expert testimony shows that the Leisure Recreational zoning designation specifically designates the proposed site for commercial uses, within the meaning of Subsection 479.01(23),5 including retail structures up to 20,000 square feet, bars, taverns, marinas, and fishing camps. The commercial uses allowed under the Leisure Recreational zoning designation are not discretionary with county planning staff but are permitted as a matter of right. Much of the dispute and evidence in this proceeding focused on two use tests that Respondent performed in accordance with Subsections 479.01(23)(a) and (b). However, the statutory use test applies only to site locations that are “commercial- unzoned.” Findings of fact pertaining to the accuracy of the use tests utilized by Respondent are unnecessary because they are inapposite to “commercial-zoned” property such as the proposed site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the application for a sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2009.
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's sign opposite Respondent's place of business and apparently on the DOT right-of-way of U.S. 19. Measurements were taken by the inspector to locate the sign with respect to U.S. 19. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 at this location is 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U.S. 19. The right-of- way extends fifty feet west of the western edge of the southbound lane of U.S. 19, thus locating the sign some 12 feet inside the right-of-way boundary. Respondent had been advised by a DOT sign inspector where this portable sign could be legally located and the sign was placed in that location out of the DOT right-of-way. On the day the sign was tagged for being on the right-of- way, the man mowing the grass around Wendy's restaurant adjacent to Respondent's restaurant moved the sign to facilitate the mowing. Respondent's owner had previously told the mower to be sure to return the sign to its authorized location if moved to facilitate mowing but, on this occasion, the sign was not immediately relocated to its authorized location.
