The Issue Whether Respondent, Terry Hammer d/b/a Park Drive Apartments, violated the Fair Housing Act, Chapter 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes, by failing to provide a handicapped parking space for Petitioner, Janice Ayers Petty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, in her Proposed Recommended Order, concedes that Petitioner is "a person with a disability." While there is scant actual evidence to support the determination that Petitioner meets the definition of "handicap" in Subsection 760.22(7)(a), Florida Statutes, Petitioner attended the final hearing in a wheelchair and testified that her automobile license plate indicated that she was handicapped; it appears that Petitioner does qualify as a definitional person who "has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities " Respondent is the owner of a 30-unit apartment complex in Indian Harbour Beach, Brevard County, Florida. The apartment complex was built in 1963. In late December 2000, Petitioner and her husband, entered into a 12-month lease with Respondent for a ground floor apartment, unit number 24. It is unclear whether Petitioner requested a disabled parking place as an accommodation for her disability when she entered into the lease or shortly thereafter. Petitioner believed that a disabled parking place required a light blue outline and a sign indicating that the parking place was reserved for disabled permit parking. Respondent responded to Petitioner's request for accommodation by notifying residents of the apartment complex that the parking space immediately in front of Petitioner's unit number 24 was reserved for Petitioner. It is a measured 16 feet from the front of the parking space to Petitioner's front door and is the closest parking space to Petitioner's apartment. The parking space immediately in front of Petitioner's unit, while unpainted and without a sign, was generally available for Petitioner.
Recommendation Based of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent did not make reasonable accommodations for her handicapped condition; Petitioner's Petition for Relief should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Wayne L. Allen, Esquire 700 North Wickham Road Suite 107 Melbourne, Florida 32935-8865 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Janice Ayers Petty 1337 South Patrick Drive Satellite Beach, Florida 32937 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, The Pines at Warrington, LP, et al., and Pinnacle, and American Management Service Company (The Pines), discriminated against Petitioner, Susan M. Walters (Ms. Walters), because of her disability and gender in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walters, during times pertinent, suffered from schizophrenia, chronic differentiated type alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. The Pines is an apartment community consisting of 160 units. The community is managed by Pinnacle, a subsidiary of American Management Services, LLC. Approximately 90 percent of the residents at The Pines are women. Ms. Walters completed a detailed application for residency in The Pines with Joy John (Ms. John), the facility's leasing specialist. Ms. Walters signed the application on October 24, 2007. She entered into a lease for a term of one year on October 31, 2007. During the course of these events, Ms. Walters did not claim a disability or mention that she was disabled. No one in management at The Pines perceived Ms. Walters to be disabled. During the application and contract process, Ms. Walters was provided with copies of the rules and regulations governing residents of The Pines. The lease required Ms. Walters to provide management at The Pines 60 day's notice, if she wanted to vacate the premises. In or around February 2008, Ms. Walters acquired a dog. She informed management at The Pines, and in accordance with the lease agreement, began making payments toward the required pet deposit. During April 2008, Ms. John and Dawn Chapman, Property Manager, received complaints about Ms. Walters' dog. The dog's barking was disturbing residents of The Pines. Four to five complaints were received each week during April. Ms. John and Ms. Chapman advised Ms. Walters of the complaints and provided her with suggestions as to how to ameliorate the problem. Nevertheless, the barking continued. On May 13, 2008, Ms. Walters was provided a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Opportunity to Cure," addressing the dog issue. It informed Ms. Walters that she must prevent the dog from disturbing other tenants. It further informed her that if the problem continued, she might be evicted. Another week of barking precipitated a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Possible Lease Termination Following." This was dated May 21, 2008, and signed by Dawn Chapman. The notice again made clear to Ms. Walters that if the barking continued she might be evicted. These notices were often given to other residents of The Pines when their barking dogs annoyed other tenants. Many of the residents of The Pines were minorities. One of them, Rhonda Lavender, complained about Ms. Walters because she put up a sign in a stairwell that included the word "nigger." Another resident, a disabled man who lived in the unit above her, complained that she "lambasted him" because he dropped a boot and it made a loud noise. Others complained about her coming out of the door to her apartment and screaming. None of the residents, who complained about Ms. Walters' barking dog, or her other offensive actions, mentioned her gender or that she was disabled. At no time during the residency of Ms. Walters at The Pines did she provide Ms. John or Ms. Chapman information with regard to having a disability. The only evidence of a disability presented at the hearing was a form Ms. Walters referred to as "a doctor's release for medical records," signed by an unidentified "physician." It was also agreed that Ms. Walters received payments based on a disability from the U.S. Social Security Administration. However, no evidence was adduced that indicated Ms. Walters was limited in one or more major life activities. Ms. Walters' rent payment for June was due June 5, 2008, but was not paid. On June 6, 2008, a "Three Day Notice- Demand for Payment of Rent or Possession" was affixed to the door of her apartment. The notice demanded payment of the sum of $518.00 or delivery of possession of the premises. The notice informed Ms. Walters that eviction proceedings would ensue if she did not pay in three days. By June 6, 2008, however, Ms. Walters had determined that she was going to vacate the premises. She told Ms. Chapman that she would pay her June rent on June 20, 2008, but this was a prevarication because Ms. Walters had no intention of paying any more rent. On or about July 4, 2008, Petitioner vacated her apartment. She placed her keys in the drop box designated for rental payments. The rent for June was never paid. Ms. Walters testified under oath that during her occupancy of the dwelling her bank card went missing. She stated that on another occasion $20 went missing from her apartment and that subsequently $10 disappeared. She said the fire alarm rang once for two hours. She said she was disturbed by noisy neighbors and a loud maintenance man. She said that once after returning from her job she discovered a glass plate in her apartment that had been shattered. She did not reveal any of these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Ms. Walters claimed that someone entered her apartment in May and sprayed a chemical that encouraged her dog to defecate inside the apartment. She said she could not check her mail because management at The Pines had locked her out of her mailbox. She said someone came in and scratched her Teflon frying pan and burned up her microwave oven. She did not make these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Even if one believes that her property was violated, and evidence to that effect was thin, there is no indication at all that anyone involved in managing The Pines was involved. Moreover, no adverse action was taken toward Ms. Walters. Two notices about barking dogs and a written demand that she pay rent do not amount to an adverse action.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief of Susan M. Walters be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Chapman The Pines at Warrington 4101 West Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507 Angela North Olgetree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, Texas 78701 Susan M. Walters 1112 Bartow Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32507 Monica Jerelle Williams, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner Robert Cowden was the subject of housing discrimination by Respondents based on Mr. Cowden's physical handicap, in violation of Florida's Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has AIDS, which qualifies him as a person with a handicap under state and federal fair housing laws. Petitioner's mother, Alice Cowden, is a resident of King's Gate Club in Venice, Florida. Charles Clotfelter is the general manager of King's Gate Club. King's Gate Club is an adult mobile home community operated by King's Gate Club, Inc. The Articles of Incorporation for King's Gate Club, Inc., specify that permanent occupants shall be 55 years old or older. No permanent occupancy is permitted for persons under the age of 55 unless an exemption is granted at the sole discretion of the board of directors and only if granting the exemption will not result in less than 80 percent of the mobile homes in the community having at least one resident aged 55 or older. The rules of King's Gate Club require residents to limit visits by adult guests under age 55 to a maximum of 120 days within any consecutive 12-month period. Petitioner is an adult, but less than 55 years old. In 2005 and 2006, Petitioner was a frequent visitor at his mother's home in King's Gate Club. Several times in 2006, Respondents informed Petitioner's mother that Petitioner's visits had exceeded the community's visitation rule. Mr. Clotfelter, the manager of King's Gate Club, also discussed the visitation rule issue with Petitioner. On May 7, 2006, Mr. Clotfelter sent a letter to Ms. Cowden requesting that Petitioner either vacate the premises or become a member of King's Gate Club. As a member, Petitioner would not be subject to the visitation rule. Becoming a member requires a $120 application fee and includes a "background check." In June 2006, Petitioner first informed Mr. Clotfelter that Petitioner had AIDS. On July 13, 2006, a certified letter was sent to Ms. Cowden by Harlan Domber, the attorney for King's Gate Club, Inc., informing her that Petitioner's visits exceeded the limits stated in the rules. Mr. Domber advised Ms. Cowden that Petitioner must vacate her premises or she and Petitioner must apply to make Petitioner a co-owner of the mobile home. Instead, Petitioner responded by filing a complaint with the Commission. Petitioner claims that Respondents were required to allow him to visit his mother at King's Gate Club as often as he wanted as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Petitioner testified that he takes medications and receives treatments for his AIDS, but that he has no physical limitation that requires him to use any assistive device, such as a wheelchair, or assistive technology. He also testified that he does not need the care of his mother for his disability. Petitioner never requested that King's Gate Club provide any particular accommodation for his disability. Based on his understanding of the fair housing laws, Petitioner assumed that when he informed Mr. Clotfelter that he had AIDS, Mr. Clotfelter would understand that King's Gate Club could not require Petitioner to comply with the visitation rule. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner's understanding of the law was mistaken. Nevertheless, following Petitioner's complaint to the Commission, the board of directors of King's Gate Club decided not to enforce its visitation rule against Petitioner, and he now visits his mother at King's Gate Club as often as he wishes. This action by the board does not make the case moot, however, because the board could change its position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent Perry Carrell ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Jean Rath’s ("Petitioner") disability and discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability in violation of Florida’s Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact In 2005, Respondent purchased condominium unit 604 in Tiara Towers, located at 3120 North Highway A1A, Fort Pierce, Florida 34949. Respondent purchased the condominium unit as his primary residence. In 2013, Respondent decided to rent the unit to Petitioner. In May 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written residential lease agreement for Petitioner to lease the premises from Respondent from July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2015. Pursuant to the lease, Petitioner was obligated to pay monthly rent to Respondent in the amount of $1,850.00. Petitioner’s tenancy was subject to the rules and regulations of the condominium association. The association’s rules do not allow for tenants to have pets. In addition, the association requires all leases be in writing. The written lease between Petitioner and Respondent expired on June 30, 2015. A properly executed second written lease was never executed by Petitioner and submitted to the association. Nevertheless, Petitioner continued residing at the premises on a month-to-month basis. Petitioner is disabled and requires a service animal because of her disability. Over the course of the tenancy, the association became concerned about Petitioner’s violation of its rules, including the lack of documentation of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal, and the lack of a new written lease after the initial lease expired on June 30, 2015. In an effort to assist Petitioner in keeping the dog, Respondent gathered information to demonstrate the qualifications of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal and provided the documentation to the association on Petitioner’s behalf. Based on the lack of a new written lease and the absence of sufficient documentation as to the service animal, the association fined Respondent $2,000.00. Respondent provided Petitioner with a termination of lease and demand to vacate notice on May 28, 2016. The notice of termination was based on the fines by the association against Respondent for not having a timely signed lease in place, and the association’s belief that sufficient documentation had not been presented to support the dog as a service animal. Petitioner vacated the unit on or about July 1, 2017. Respondent did not re-lease the unit and sold the unit on March 22, 2017. During the appeal process, the fine of $1,000.00 related to the service animal was rescinded by the association. Respondent paid the $1,000.00 fine related to the lack of a written lease, and has not requested reimbursement from Petitioner. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged Respondent did not discriminate against her on the basis of her disability, and that Respondent advocated to the association on her behalf. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Respondent did not fail to reasonably accommodate Petitioner’s disability or discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Jean Rath 422 Southeast Naranja Avenue Port St. Lucie, Florida 34983 Glenn J. Webber, Esquire Glenn J. Webber, P.A. 101 Southeast Ocean Boulevard, Suite 203 Stuart, Florida 34994 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, as alleged in the Housing Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on or about October 9, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, since March 2015, has been a resident at Respondent’s facility. Respondent is a private residential condominium association, which operates and maintains three condominiums in Osprey, Florida. Each condominium unit has its own designated parking space. Petitioner’s assigned parking space, number 364, lies between parking spaces 362 and 366. The respective parking spaces are next to each other, with parallel lines dividing the same. Each parking space has a concrete tire-stop that has painted on it the corresponding condominium unit number so that when a vehicle turns into a space the driver is able to discern the corresponding unit number. All parking spaces and road surfaces relevant to this dispute are paved. If one is positioned such that the painted numbers on the tire-stops are visible, then to the left of space 362 is an unassigned space (unassigned space #1) and to the right of space 366 is an area containing shrubbery. From the photographs admitted into evidence, the dimensions of unassigned space #1 appear to be essentially the same as parking spaces 362, 364, and 366. However, unassigned space #1 differs from the others in that on either side of the parallel lines that demark the interior boundaries of the parking space, there are pathways which provide more space for pedestrian traffic. Although neither party offered evidence of the dimensions of the parking spaces, photographs of the area demonstrate that unassigned space #1, when considering the usable pathways, is wide enough to allow for reasonable entry to and exit from a mid-sized sedan while the vehicle’s occupant is being assisted by a walker or wheelchair. In order to access the parking spaces discussed in the preceding paragraph, motorists must use a one-way road which requires them to turn to the right when they are parking their vehicles such that the front tires are closest to the concrete tire-stops. Approximately 20 feet from unassigned space #1, on the other side of the one-way road used to access the parking area, is another unassigned parking space (unassigned space #2). Unassigned space #2 is perpendicular to unassigned space #1 and spaces 362, 364, and 366. Accordingly, motorists parking in unassigned space #2 enter the space by veering to the left off of the one-way road and driving head-on into the parking space (essentially a parallel parking space). There is no evidence of record as to the exact dimensions of unassigned space #2, but in comparing the photographic evidence, this space is comparable in size to the handicapped parking space near the condominium complex clubhouse. Additionally, unassigned space #2 is situated such that no other vehicles can park in front of, behind, or on either side of a vehicle parked in the space, and there is no curbing that would serve as barrier to accessing one’s vehicle while parked in the space. Although each unit is assigned one designated parking space, Petitioner recalls that when she initially moved in, she parked her vehicle by straddling the line between parking spaces 364 and 366. According to Petitioner, she was able to use both spaces because the respective tire-stops for the spaces were each marked “364.” Petitioner stopped parking her vehicle in this manner after the association re-painted all of the tire- stops; which included refreshing the unit numbers painted on the same so as to make it clear that there were not two parking spaces for unit 364. Also, Petitioner testified that her vehicle was vandalized once while parking her car in spot 364. After Petitioner’s car was vandalized and Respondent re-painted the tire-stops, Petitioner, during the weeks leading to June 2015, began occasionally parking her vehicle in the designated handicapped parking space located at the condominium clubhouse parking lot. Petitioner asserts that because of issues related to her physical disability, it is necessary that she be able to park her car, without restriction, in the handicapped parking space designated by Respondent for use by visitors and residents at the condominium complex clubhouse. The handicap parking space is several hundred feet from Petitioner’s condominium unit, and in order to access the handicap parking space, Petitioner utilizes a pathway constructed of dirt and crushed seashells. There is no record evidence indicating that Petitioner has difficulty traversing the seashell pathway or walking from her condominium unit to her car, and vice versa. Petitioner’s designated parking space is considerably closer to her unit (less than one hundred feet) than the handicapped parking space, but, according to Petitioner, her designated parking space is inadequate because it does not provide her with sufficient space to enter and exit her vehicle. Respondent does not dispute this fact. Petitioner suffers from a physical disability which requires her to ambulate with the occasional assistance of either a walker or wheelchair. Petitioner drives a late model, mid-size four-door Mercedes Benz. Petitioner’s vehicle is not equipped with any special assistive devices, such as a ramp, which would add to the amount of space needed for vehicle ingress and egress. When Petitioner is either entering or exiting her vehicle while using her walker or wheelchair, she requires additional space beyond the swing path of her car doors. Petitioner did not offer evidence of the amount of space required for her to enter or exit her vehicle when using either her walker or wheelchair. Petitioner also did not offer evidence regarding the dimensions of her vehicle, or the dimensions of either her designated parking space or any of the other parking spaces at issue. Nevertheless, Respondent concedes that Petitioner’s designated parking space, when cars are parked on either side of her in spaces 362 and 366, does not afford Petitioner adequate space to reasonably access her walker or wheelchair when entering and exiting her vehicle. In June 2015, Petitioner, as she often did, parked her car overnight in the handicapped parking space at the clubhouse. When Petitioner arrived at her vehicle, she noticed that a note from Respondent had been placed on the car, which reads as follows: Overnight parking in this clubhouse lot must have approval of the Pine Run Board of Directors. Approval is normally awarded for stays of no more than one week. In addition, this handicapped space is reserved for residents or visitors to the pool or clubhouse, not for general resident parking. We discourage resident parking in this lot if not for these reasons. However, if on rare occasion, you wish to park a car in this lot during the day when you are not using the pool or clubhouse, please use an unassigned space on the pond side. This minimizes the chance that you will interfere with our maintenance crew, or the delivery of a large quantity of materials. Within a few days of receiving the note, Petitioner explained to Respondent that she has a handicapped parking decal and should therefore be able to park in the handicapped parking space without restriction. Under the circumstances, Petitioner’s statement is reasonably interpreted as a request to Respondent that her physical disability should be accommodated by allowing her to park in the handicapped space. Respondent took no immediate action regarding Petitioner’s request for accommodation. Respondent did, however, allow Petitioner to continue to park in the handicapped space whenever Petitioner desired to do so. On August 27, 2015, Petitioner sent an email to Respondent and stated therein the following: We are formally informing you again, since our encounters with Mrs. and Mr. Foley, that we do indeed, have a disabled tag, and need and expect accommodations for ours and others, disabled individuals, owners, lessees and visitors, with any parking accommodations, walkers, chairs, etc., and their vehicles and equipment and with regards to any and all entrances to, and any and common areas, we should have easy access to. The circumstances leading up to, and including, Petitioner’s correspondence of August 27, 2015, make clear that Petitioner continues to seek a parking accommodation. At 4:51 p.m. on October 5, 2015, a letter from Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Jennifer Daly, was sent to Respondent’s representative Jim Kraut. The missive from Ms. Daly states: As you are aware, this firm represents Ms. Valerie Collier [Walters] and I am contacting you to notify you and the Association that she will be parking in the handicapped parking spot tomorrow due to a surgery she is having. Please notify the Board of Directors to ensure no threats of towing are made and no notes are left on her car during her recovery. Upon receipt of the email from Ms. Daly, Mr. Kraut immediately conveyed the request to Mrs. Foley, who at the time was president of Respondent’s board of directors. In response to Petitioner’s request, Mrs. Foley, at 5:02 p.m. on October 5, 2015, sent the following email message to Mr. Kraut: Jim, Since the handicapped spot by the Club House is a considerable distance from her unit could you suggest that she just pick a spot in front of her unit that is much closer? We would have no problem identifying a handicapped spot closer to her unit. Mr. Kraut conveyed Mrs. Foley’s suggestion to Petitioner’s attorney Ms. Daly, who at 5:21 p.m. on October 5, 2015, responded via email as follows: Jim, Thank you for your rapid response and Ms. Foley’s suggestion; however, please let her know that choosing a different spot near her unit will not address our client’s needs. Rather, the problem is when the Association repainted the parking lot, the parking spots were made too small. From what we have been advised, all the spaces in close proximity to our client’s unit are only slightly bigger than the width of a sedan and offer no additional space for the opening of doors, much less the further space needed for someone who requires the assistance of a walker or wheelchair in addition to other equipment. Mrs. Foley, in response to Ms. Daly’s email, stated the following: I note your reply concerning Mrs. Valerie Collier [Walters]. Please be advised that the Association has not changed either the size or assignment of any parking spaces in the even 300’s on Pine Run Drive. All of the spaces have been repainted if the numbers were not visible or the curbs required repair in the entire Association. The size of the spaces ha[s] never changed. We would be very willing to accommodate Mrs. Collier’s [Walters] need for a handicapped space closer to her unit if she requested such. My suggestion was the quite large parallel space next to the grass island [unassigned space #2]. There is no curb there and no vehicle could park beside her. Another suggestion would be to swap her space for the adjacent space for #366. This is the same size but an end space, however I think she would have more room with the parallel space just behind her assigned space. Petitioner’s reaction to Respondent’s suggested parking accommodations was to file, on or about October 9, 2015, a charge of housing discrimination. Additionally, Petitioner parked her car in the handicap space without incident following her surgery. As noted in Ms. Daly’s email of October 5, 2015, Petitioner rejected the parking spaces offered by Respondent because the spaces are “too small.” Petitioner offered no standard by which to determine the appropriateness of the offered parking spaces other than her own subjective opinion. Additionally, Petitioner testified that both unassigned spaces are unacceptable because they are too close to the condominium unit of a neighbor she dislikes. Petitioner testified that what she now wants is to park in space 366, if Respondent widens the space by removing the hedges to the immediate right and paving the newly-cleared area. Petitioner offered no credible evidence establishing that this proposed accommodation is equal to, or more reasonable than the accommodations offered by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Run Association, Inc., did not commit unlawful housing discrimination as alleged by Petitioner, Valerie Walters, and denying Petitioner’s Housing Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cindy Hill, Esquire Hill Law Firm, P.A. 456 South Tamiami Trail Osprey, Florida 34229 (eServed) Gary Parker, Esquire Legal Aid of Manasota 1900 Main Street, Suite 302 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Sharon S. Vander Wulp, Esquire Sharon S. Vander Wulp, P.A. 712 Shamrock Boulevard Venice, Florida 34293 (eServed) Scott H. Jackman, Esquire Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A. Suite 400 4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33607 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Cordell John, (Landlord) discriminated against Petitioner, Denise Johnson- Acosta (Johnson) on the basis of her or her daughter’s alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Johnson is a Hispanic woman. She has asthma and other medical conditions. Johnson has a teenage daughter, Ashley Denise Rivera. Ashley has a seizure disorder and has bipolar disorder. Johnson is engaged to Alexis Pons. The Landlord is an African-American male. He owns the property located at 13847 Beauregard Place in Orlando, Florida (the Property). The Property is a single-family residential townhouse. At some unspecified time during calendar year 2012, Johnson approached the Landlord expressing an interest in leasing the Property. At that time, another tenant was living in the Property but was in the process of moving out. The Landlord showed Johnson the Property. Johnson expressed her complete satisfaction with the Property and that she would like to lease it (and possibly buy it in the future). At first sight, Johnson liked everything about the Property except for the back yard. On September 10, 2012, the Landlord emailed a Rental Application to Johnson. The email advised Johnson that there would be a $50 application fee which must be paid when the application was delivered. In response to the email, Johnson confirmed that she wanted to view the Property on the upcoming Thursday. On September 11, 2012, Johnson filled out the Rental Application and provided it to the Landlord for review. The application listed Johnson as the primary tenant and Ashley and Pons as additional residents. The application also noted that Johnson had a pet, a petite Chihuahua, which would be living in the unit. After reviewing the application, the Landlord notified Johnson via email that he would need pictures of the Chihuahua. He also asked how much the dog weighed. The Landlord also told Johnson that the rent would be $1,250 per month and that a $200 nonrefundable pet fee must be paid. Johnson replied that the dog weighed four pounds. She was concerned that the Landlord was now quoting $1,250 per month when earlier discussions had indicated the rent would be $1,200 per month. Johnson thanked the Landlord and agreed to provide a picture of the dog. The Landlord replied to Johnson that when pets are involved, the rent is increased slightly. Johnson and the Landlord had a conversation on September 17, 2012. By email dated September 18, 2012, Johnson told the Landlord that she had decided to withdraw her application because of “multiple misunderstandings” between the parties. At some point thereafter, Johnson decided to go through with the lease after all. On October 20, 2012, Johnson did a walk-through inspection of the Property. By way of her signature on the walk-through check list, Johnson agreed that the living room, kitchen, dining room, both bathrooms, both bedrooms, and all other portions of the Property were satisfactory. The only caveat was that there was stain on a counter in the kitchen area. Johnson said she would “advise at time of move” as to her feelings about the parking areas and the patio/terrace/deck area. On November 2, 2012, Johnson and the Landlord entered into a binding Residential Tenancy Agreement. Johnson initialed each page and signed the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by two individuals. On or about that same date, Johnson gave the Landlord several money orders: A $250 money order for the pet deposit; $50 for Pons’ application fee, and $880 for prorated rent for November. Johnson did not complain about the pet deposit at that time. Johnson moved into the Property on or about November 2, 2012. About two months later, on January 1, 2013, Johnson mailed a letter to the Landlord via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter advised the Landlord that Johnson would be moving out of the Property on or before January 14, 2013. The letter cited several bases for the decision to move out, including: Air condition vents were “visibly covered with dust and dark surroundings”; Johnson and her daughter have severe allergies; Johnson has acute asthma and bronchitis; and The dwelling is unlivable. Johnson also claimed many violations of Florida law by the Landlord concerning the lease, including: Taking a deposit for a pet when that pet was in fact a companion dog. (Johnson submitted a letter into evidence from a behavioral health care employee. The letter, dated some five months after Johnson vacated the unit, said that Ashley would benefit from having a companion dog as she did not have many friends. There was no evidence that the Chihuahua was ever registered or approved as a companion dog.); Smoke alarms which were not in working order; Electrical breakers tripping throughout Property; Unreimbursed expenses, e.g., for changing locks; Failure to put Pons on the lease agreement despite doing a background financial check on him; and Harassment from Bank of America employees trying to collect the Landlord’s mortgage payment for the Property. In the letter stating she would be moving, Johnson expressed her sorrow that the housing situation did not work out. She then set forth the amount of deposit money she believed should be returned to her. In response, she received a letter from the Landlord’s counsel advising that her security and pet deposits had been forfeited. On January 4, 2013, the Landlord posted a notice on the Property door demanding payment of outstanding rent within three days. In lieu of payment, Johnson could vacate the premises within three days. Johnson vacated the premises. On January 14, 2013, Johnson did an exit walk-through of the Property, along with the Landlord, his mother, and Pons. At the completion of the walk- through, Johnson turned over the keys for the Property to the Landlord. Johnson claims discrimination on the part of the Landlord because he failed to recognize or accept the companion dog, failed to put Pons on the lease agreement, and failed to make accommodations for Johnson’s claimed health conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Denise Johnson-Acosta in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cordell John 2921 Swoops Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Denise Johnson-Acosta Post Office Box 453347 Kissimmee, Florida 34745 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue : The issue in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, in alleged violation of Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a physically handicapped person. He resides in a residential unit (Unit 11C) in the Sea Cabins residential complex. The Petitioner is a full-time resident at Sea Cabins and is the owner of unit 11C. The Respondent is a Florida Corporation (not for profit) and is a homeowners association, as defined by Section 720.303, Florida Statutes (2008). Sometime in early May 2007, Nancy Maconi, the Petitioner's wife, placed a number of signs around the Sea Cabins property. The Respondent purports that there were approximately 13 signs. One of the signs was a designated handicap parking space sign for unit 11C. It was erected in close proximity to the Petitioner's Sea Cabins unit 11C. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought reimbursement for the cost of the signs from the homeowners association board of directors, the Respondent. The request was denied at a meeting of the board of May 11, 2007, with the minutes reflecting that the Petitioner had not requested nor been granted permission to install any signs, hence the denial at that point. Ms. Maconi testified at the hearing that she had asked the Respondent's manager for permission to install the signs, which the manager, Willa Merriott, denied. The action of the board at the May 11, 2000 meeting, however, is not in dispute. Thereafter, on approximately June 22, 2007, the attorney for the Respondent wrote the Petitioner requesting that the designated handicap parking sign be removed since it had not been authorized by the board, nor had any formal request for the installation of the sign been made. On June 23, 2007, the Petitioner responded to that letter by requesting that the board formally authorize the handicap parking sign. A letter from the Veterans Administration was attached to that letter to the effect that the Petitioner had a service-connected disability. The specific nature of the disability was not specified, however. In any event, the Respondent association acquiesced in the handicap parking sign at issue remaining in place and use while it investigated whether the Petitioner was actually entitled to a handicap parking space. The Petitioner was advised by letter of October 11, 2007, by the Respondent, that the handicap parking sign could remain in place while his application was pending. A series of letters then passed between the parties or their representatives in October through December 2007. Pursuant to its policy concerning the granting of handicapped parking spaces and the like, the association sought information on the nature of the Petitioner's disability or handicap. The Petitioner countered by taking the position that the association already had enough information upon which to make its decision. In any event, however, through this period, the Petitioner's designated handicapped parking space and sign remained in place in the original location where Ms. Maconi had placed it. The Respondent acquiesced in its presence and in the Petitioner's use of the handicapped space. Counsel for the Respondent received a letter dated January 3, 2008, from Paul E. Brooks, a Podiatrist, revealing for the first time the specifics of the Petitioner's disability. That is, he has an orthopedic condition which limits his ability to walk. This letter was received on January 8, 2008, and considered by the board of directors at a special meeting held January 28, 2008. At that meeting the board formally granted the Petitioner's application for a designated handicap parking space and voted to allow the sign already erected by Ms. Maconi to remain permanently in place. Due to a misunderstanding between the board and its counsel as to who should notify the Petitioner of the decision, the Petitioner was not actually notified of the decision until March. By letter of March 17, 2008, counsel for the homeowners' association wrote the Petitioner of the actions of the board regarding the sign.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Fair Housing Act by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex, national origin, and/or handicap by the manner it enforced its vehicle parking rules.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an 81-year-old female who is a native of Peru. Petitioner does not speak, write, or read English. Petitioner and her late husband were owners and residents of a condominium unit managed by Respondent. Petitioner continued to own and reside in the unit after her husband's death in September 2009. Petitioner and her husband had ten children, two of whom are Patricia Ramirez and Gloria Silva. At the time of his death, Petitioner's husband owned an automobile that he had properly registered with Respondent. Following her husband's death, Petitioner inherited the automobile he had owned. Petitioner does not drive and does not have a driver's license. On September 17, 2009, the title to the car was changed into the names of Petitioner and Gloria Silva. Gloria Silva has not been recognized by Respondent as a "resident" of Petitioner's unit.2 Respondent's rules and policies are set forth in a "Handbook of Rules and Regulations" (the Handbook). Respondent's vehicle parking policies begin on page 28 of the Handbook. Respondent's parking policies for a "Resident Parking Decal" provide, in relevant part, as follows: A "Resident" as set forth in these regulations is a person who has been registered at the Management Office and has been approved by the Association to live in the Unit whether it is an owner or a tenant. All vehicles of Residents parked in the Condominium Property must have a "Resident PARKING DECAL" [sic]. This permit consists of a decal containing a number that is placed on the outside top or bottom left- side corner of the rear glass of the vehicle. For your protection, this decal shall be applied to the glass by an Association Representative only. Only Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. . . .. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Residents' name. There will be a $25.00 refundable deposit for every Resident Parking Decal issued. Failure to return the Decal to the Management Office upon selling and/or disposing of his/her vehicle (including total loss due to an automobile accident) or moving out of the Property, such $25.00 shall be forfeited. . . . If the Resident sells or in any other way disposes of a vehicle to which a Resident Parking Decal was previously issued, that Resident must remove and bring to the Management Office such Resident Parking Decal before a new Resident Parking Decal is issued for a new vehicle. Gary Mars, an attorney representing Respondent, advised Petitioner by letter dated September 10, 2009, that she was in violation of Respondent's vehicle parking policy and its occupancy policy. As to the parking policy, the letter provided, in relevant part, as follows: The Rules and Regulations state that "[o]nly Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. Absentee owners who lease their units are not entitled to having a Resident Parking Decal. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Resident's name. " . . . This correspondence serves as . . . demand that any and all guests of your Unit cease and desist utilizing a resident parking decal immediately upon receipt of this communication and secure the appropriate parking decals from the Property Management Office. Mr. Mars wrote a second letter to Petitioner on November 9, 2009, containing the following demand: This letter is being provided in order to notify you as to a recently recognized violation of the Declaration of Condominium which requires your immediate attention. Specifically, the Association has recognized that the vehicle registered to your deceased husband continues to maintain a residents [sic] parking decal even though the vehicle is utilized by your daughter, Ms. Gloria Silva, who is not a resident of the Condominium. Therefore, this use of a decal is improper and in violation of the Association's controlling documents. The Rules and Regulations state that "[o]nly Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. Absentee owners who lease their units are not entitled to having a Resident Parking Decal. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Resident's name. " Notice is hereby provided of this violation. Specifically, the Association is demanding that your guest permanently cease and desist utilizing a resident parking decal, and remove and return the decal within seventy-two hours of this communication to the Property Management Office. In the event you and your guests fail to comply with the request as set forth herein, the Association may have no alternative but to enforce the Rules and Regulations which may include the towing and removal of the vehicle . . . By letter dated December 31, 2009, Mr. Mars wrote to Petitioner a third and final letter, styled "Final Demand," repeating his notice that the vehicle would be towed if she did not comply with the resident parking policy. On the following dates Respondent had Petitioner's vehicle towed from the condominium property: January 19, January 22, and February 9, 2010. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was out-of-compliance with Respondent's resident parking policy. There was no evidence that Petitioner ever surrendered the Resident Parking Decal that remained on the vehicle after her husband died. There was no evidence that Petitioner filed an application reflecting the change of ownership of the vehicle following her husband's death or paid the application fee for a new decal.3 There was no evidence that Respondent knew or should have known that Petitioner was handicapped or disabled.4 There was no evidence that Respondent's enforcement of its parking policies was motivated by Petitioner's sex, national origin, or handicap.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2011.
