The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent set up, promoted or conducted a lottery for money or other thing of value in violation of Section 849.09, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 26, 1998, the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., d/b/a Personal Investments (Respondent) held license no. 77-00008, Series 2-COP, authorizing it to sell alcoholic beverages. On that date Mr. Stockton Hess was a corporate officer (Vice President). Mr. Hess was also a corporate officer of the Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. (WCKC) on the above date (President). The Respondent is a business regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division) because it sells alcohol. The Washington County Kennel Club (Club) is regulated by the same Department's Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, because it operates a pari-mutuel wagering facility at the Ebro Greyhound Park Dog Track. The Ebro Greyhound Park is owned and operated by the Club. The Club is in the business of selling pari-mutuel tickets, programs and tip sheets. Personal Investments, Inc., sold alcohol at its concession stands and in the lounge and restaurant at Ebro Greyhound Park, located in Ebro, Washington County, Florida. The Respondent served as concessionaire for food and beverage services through its contract with the Club. The Club has held its pari-mutuel wagering permit and annual pari-mutuel licenses continuously for some forty years. They authorize greyhound racing operations at the Ebro track facility. On August 26, 1998, the Club conducted a game promotion at its greyhound track in which any person entering the facility, regardless of whether he or she paid an admission fee, was provided a split-ticket free of charge. One half of the ticket went into a drum located by the entrance way and the other half of the ticket was retained by the patron. Located next to the drum, and on the Club premises, was a wheel which contained representations of prizes such as t-shirts, magnets, key chains and so forth. Subsequent to the tenth race a Club employee, the front gate hostess, would draw a ticket and another employee, the track announcer, would announce the number drawn. The patron holding the other half of the selected ticket would then present himself to the front gate hostess to verify the number. The patron would then spin the wheel and win whatever prize was reflected at the point where the wheel stopped. The Club bought the wheel, paid for the prizes and its employees operated the game in question. Mr. Hess, an officer of both the Club and the Respondent corporation had knowledge of and intentionally participated in the running of the above-described game. On August 26, 1998, a drawing was conducted after the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth races. No patron responded to the number called out following the tenth race, but patrons responded after their announced numbers were called after the twelfth and thirteenth races. Each of those patrons presented a ticket, spun the wheel, and each won a T-shirt. The Division offered no evidence and was unaware, on August 26, 1998, or thereafter, including at hearing, whether those patrons entered the dog track premises by paying an admission ticket price. On August 26, 1998, three hundred ninety-one patrons attended the track. Two hundred eighty-eight of those patrons or approximately 75% attended the track for free, utilizing free passes made widely available by the Club throughout its market area. On a typical racing day or night in excess of 60% to 70% of the patrons entering the Ebro Greyhound Track facility enter utilizing such free passes, the availability of which is a matter of fairly common knowledge in the track's market area. In accordance with the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering requirements, the Club maintains a separate turnstile for patrons entering daily with free passes from those paying an admission fee. Respondent's Exhibit B in evidence is a daily report, submitted to the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, of patrons entering for free as opposed to those who paid an admission fee, including the report for August 26, 1998. It was further the Club's policy that any patron who asks for a free pass at the cashier's window is given one and permitted to enter the track premises free. On August 26, 1998, Division Agent Lee went to the Ebro Greyhound Track, paid a $2.00 admission fee, and used his split- ticket to enter the game promotion. He observed the two patrons who had each won a T-shirt following the twelfth and thirteenth races. He made no attempt to obtain a free admission nor did he inquire as to whether the two patrons who won T-shirts had entered for free. Agent Lee testified that he was unaware at the time he visited the greyhound track on that date that the Club owned the track and conducted the Pari-Mutuel Wagering permit and license, despite the fact that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, a part of the same department, as the Division, was the source of the request to review the game promotion. Agent Lee thought that the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., was conducting the game promotion. In fact, that was not the case, the game promotion was conducted solely by the Club and its employees. Agent Lee testified that on August 26, 1998, as well as on the date of hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence that any agent, servant or employee of the Respondent had set up, promoted or conducted the game promotion or a lottery for money or "other thing of value." Agent Lee also testified that on August 26, 1998, and on the date of the hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence to offer to the effect that Personal Investments, Inc., or its agents, servants or employees attempted to operate, conduct or advertise any lottery scheme or device. Agent Lee was unaware of Division Training Bulletin 93-18 concerning game promotions. This was a memorandum to all District Supervisors of each district office of the Division noting that Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, authorizes game promotions in which the patron must be present to win, provided that the game promotion does not require an entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entering the game promotion. Tickets to enter the game promotion are given away without charge by the Club to any patron attending the facility. It is the Division's apparent position that, since Agent Lee paid a $2.00 admission fee to the track and thereafter received his game promotion ticket, that such admission fee constitutes a fee, payment or proof of purchase required as a condition precedent to entering into the subject game promotion. Since almost 75% of the patrons attending the track on the date in question entered free, and since every person entering the track on that date received, without charge, a game promotion ticket, the game promotion ticket cannot be determined to have, as a condition precedent, any fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entry into the game promotion. The "Bud Bowl '99 Sweepstakes" is a common type of game promotion used as an exemplar by the Respondent, the rules of which are depicted in Respondent's Exhibit C, in evidence. That game promotion is approved by the Florida Department of State pursuant to its authority in Section 849.094, Florida Statutes. It is a game promotion in which some but not all participants in fact pay a purchase price and, as part of the purchase, receive a game promotion ticket or piece. The rules of the game contained in Respondent's Exhibit C, reflect that of the 4,429,350, entry forms made available, approximately half are contained within specially marked packages of Anheuser-Busch beer products, which can only be obtained through purchases at stores holding alcoholic beverage licenses. However, one may also enter the "Bud Bowl '99" contest without a purchase and thus in accordance with Section 849.094(2)(e), Florida Statutes, the game promotion does not require, as a condition of entry into it, a fee, payment or proof of purchase. The Ebro game promotion did not award prizes greater than $5,000.00. Thus, unlike the "Bud Bowl '99" game promotion, it did not have to meet applicable requirements for a game promotion offering prizes in excess of such value, including registration with the Florida Secretary of State. It did, however, share the same common requirements as the "Bud Bowl '99" promotion, which is that any entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition of entering the game promotion was not required. Mr. Hess, who testified at hearing for the Respondent, paid $7.48 for a twelve-pack of Anheuser-Busch beer, which contained a "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion ticket therein. He did so without that game promotion being in violation of Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, as determined by the Secretary of State in registration of that promotion. Similarly, Agenct Lee paid $2.00 to enter the Ebro Greyhound Track, and in doing so acquired no more or no less right and opportunity to participate in the Ebro game promotion than did the majority of patrons who entered without having to pay an admission fee. The rules of the "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion submitted to or approved by the Department of State clearly reflect that approximately 50% of entry fees would be contained within Anheuser-Busch product packages which can only be obtained by purchase. The remaining 50% of the entries were made available without a purchase requirement.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative action against Personal Investments, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire 210 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bart Schneider, Esquire Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
The Issue Has Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. (Fancy Farms) made proper accounting to Petitioner Wayne Sullivan in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Fancy Farms from November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994, by Wayne Sullivan to be handled by Fancy Farms as agent for Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Wayne Sullivan was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fancy Farms was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8453 issued by the Department, supported by bond number 57 92 20 in the amount of $75,000, written by Gulf Insurance Company with an inception date of September 1, 1994, and an expiration date of August 31, 1995. From November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994 Wayne Sullivan delivered certain quantities of an agricultural product (zucchini) to Fancy Farms. It is the accounting for these zucchini (zukes) that is in dispute. It was stipulated by the parties that Fancy Farms was acting as agent in the sale of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms for the account of Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity or size of the zukes delivered by Wayne Sullivan to Fancy Farms during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Fancy Farms for handling the zukes, including but not limited to the commission charged by Fancy Farms. The agreed upon commission was ten per cent (10 percent) of the price received by Fancy Farms from its customers. There is no evidence that Fancy Farms found any problem with the quality of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Wayne Sullivan during the above period of time. Upon delivering the zukes to Fancy Farms, Sullivan was given a prenumbered delivery receipt ticket (delivery ticket) showing Wayne Sullivan as Grower number 116 and containing the following additional information: (a) date and time of delivery; (b) produce number, i.e., 37 indicating fancy zukes and 38 indicating medium zukes; (c) description of the produce, i.e., zukes, fancy; (d) a lot number containing number of delivery ticket, grower number and produce number, i.e. 2074-116-37 and; (e) the number of units of zukes received by Fancy Farm. The accounting for the zukes from the following delivery receipt ticket numbers is being contested in this proceeding: (a) 2127 dated November 8, 1994, lot nos. 2127-116-37 and 2127-116-38; (b) 22145 dated November 10, 1994, lot nos. 2145-116-37 and 2145-116-38; (c) 2181 dated November 15, 1994, lot nos. 2181-116-37 and 2181-116-38; (d) 2242 dated November 29, 1994, lot nos. 2242- 116-37 and 2242-116-38; (e) 2254 dated December 1, 1994, lot nos. 2254-116-37 and 2254-116-38; (f) 2289 dated December 7, 1994, lot nos. 2289-116-37 and 2289- 116-38 and; (g) 2313 dated December 10, 1994, lot nos. 2313-116-37 and 2313-116- 38. Once Fancy Farms found a customer for the zukes, Fancy Farms prepared a prenumbered billing invoice. Additionally, a bill of lading and load sheet was prepared and attached to the invoice. The bill of lading and load sheet would have the same number as the invoice. Basically, the invoice and bill of lading contained the customer's name and address, produce number, description of produce, number of units ordered, number of units shipped and the price per unit. The load sheet contains the customer's name, produce number, description of produce, units ordered, units shipped and the lot number for the units that made up the shipment. On numerous occasions Fancy Farms made adjustments to the selling price after the price had been quoted and accepted but before the invoice was prepared. Fancy Farms did not make any written notations in its records showing the adjustments to the price or the reasons for the adjustments to the price. Salvatore Toscano testified, and I find his testimony to be credible, that this usually occurred when there was a decrease in the market price after Fancy Farms made the original quote. Therefore, in order to keep the customer, Fancy Farms made an adjustment to the price. Sullivan was never made aware of these price adjustments. In accounting for the zukes delivered by Sullivan, Fancy Farms prepared a Grower Statement which included the delivery ticket number, the date of delivery, the lot number, grower number, produce number, description of the produce, quantity (number of units), price per unit and total due. Payment for the zukes was made to Wayne Sullivan from these statements by Fancy Farms. Sometimes payment may be for only one delivery ticket while at other times payment would be for several delivery tickets for different dates. A portion of Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 is the Florida Vegetable Report (Market Report), Volume XIV, Nos. 19, 21, 23, 31, 33, 37 and 40, dated October 28, 31, 1994, November 8, 10, 15, 29, 1994, and December 7, 12, 1994, respectively. The Market Report is a federal-state publication which reports the demand (moderate), market (steady), volume (units) sold and prices paid per unit for numerous vegetables, including zucchini, on a daily basis. The prices quoted for zucchini is for 1/2 and 5/9th bushel cartons and includes palletizing. The average cost for palletizing in the industry is 65 per carton. Fancy Farms receives and sells zukes in one-half (1/2) bushel cartons. Fancy Farms does not palletize the cartons for handling at its warehouse or for shipment. On November 8, 10, 15, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 130 units of fancy zukes and a combined total 206 units of medium zukes represented by delivery receipt ticket nos. 2127, 2145 and 218l, for a combined total of fancy and medium zukes of 336 units for which Fancy Farms paid Sullivan the sum of $1,171.00 as evidenced by the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994. Forty eight units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2127-116-37 was billed out by Fancy Farms to P. H. Lucks, Inc. for $5.00 per unit. Without an explanation, Fancy Farms reduced the price to $2.50 per unit. However, Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.00 per unit for the 48 units of fancy zukes. Five units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2145-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Thirty two units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2181-116-37 were not accounted for by invoice. Nineteen units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2242-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Where there is no invoice the price quoted in the Market Report is used to calculate the amount due Sullivan. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994, is: Lot No. 2127-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 48 units (Invoice 3814) = $ 240.00 Lot No. 2127-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 45 units (Market Report) = $ 157.50 $3.50 per unit x 35 units (Invoice 3783) = $ 122.50 Lot No. 2145-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 3818) = $ 60.00 $5.00 per unit x 38 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 190.00 Lot No. 2145-116-38: $3.00 per unit x 13 units (Invoice 3820) = $ 39.00 $3.00 per unit x 22 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 66.00 $3.00 per unit x 5 units (Market Report) = $ 15.00 Lot No. 2l81-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 32 units (Market Report) = $ 256.00 Lot No. 2181-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 86 units (Invoice 3778) = $ 301.00 Total owed to Sullivan = $1,447.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $1,171.00 Ten per cent commission = 144.70 Net due Sullivan = 131.30 On November 29, 1994, Sullivan delivered 53 units of fancy zukes and 69 units of medium zukes as represented by delivery ticket no. 2242 for a combined total of 112 units for which Sullivan was paid $472.00 by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994. The prices of $3.25 and $3.00 as indicated by invoice nos. 3941 and 3947, respectively are not indicative of the market for fancy zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $8.00 per unit for fancy zukes. Likewise, the price of $3.00 per unit for medium zukes as indicated by invoice no. 3927 is not indicative of the market for medium zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $6.00 per unit for medium zukes. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994, is: Lot no. 2242-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 53 units (Market Report) = $ 424.00 Lot no. 2242-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 69 units (Market Report) = $ 414.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 838.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 472.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 83.80 Net due Sullivan = $ 282.20 On December 1, 7, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 51 units of fancy zukes and a combined total of 87 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 138 units of fancy and medium zukes represented by delivery ticket nos. 2254 and 2289 and was paid $516.00 for these zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 15, 1994. There was no invoice for lot nos. 2254-116-37 or 2254-116-38. The Market Report established a market price of $8.00 and $6.00 per unit for fancy and medium zukes, respectively. The amount due Sullivan from the Growers Statement dated December 15, 1994, is: Lot No. 2254-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 39 units (Market Report) = $ 312.00 Lot No. 2254-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 20 units (Market Report) = $ 120.00 Lot No. 2289-116-37: $6.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 4049) = $ 72.00 Lot No. 2289-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 67 units (Invoice 3946) = $ 234.50 Total owed Sullivan = $ 738.50 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 516.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 73.85 Net due Sullivan = $ 148.65 On December 10, 1994, Sullivan delivered 27 units of fancy zukes and 18 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 45 units as represented by delivery ticket no. 2313 and was paid $211.50 for those zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by Growers Statement dated December 23, 1994. The 18 units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2313-116-38 are not covered by an invoice. The Market Report established a unit price of $6.00 for the fancy zukes. Invoice no. 4075 billed the fancy zukes at zero without any explanation. Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.50 per unit for the fancy zukes. The Market Report established a per unit price of $8.00 for the fancy zukes which is more in line with the market than is the $5.50 per unit paid by Fancy Farms. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 23, 1994, is: Lot No. 2313-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 18 units (Market Report) = $ 108.00 Lot No. 2313-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 27 units (Market Report) = $ 216.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 324.00 Less: Ten percent commission = $ 32.40 Amount received by Sullivan = $ 211.50 Net due Sullivan = $ 80.10 The net amount owed to Sullivan by Fancy Farms: From Grower Statements dated: November 25, 1994 $ 131.30 December 7, 1994 $ 282.20 December 15, 1994 $ 148.65 December 23, 1994 $ 80.10 Total owed to Sullivan $ 642.25
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Wayne Sullivan the sum of $642.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3015A The parties elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Wayne Sullivan 49 Myrtle Bush Lane Venus, Florida 33960 James A. Crocker Qualified Representative Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. 1305 W. Dr. M. L. King, Jr., Blvd. Plant City, Florida 33564-9006 Gulf Insurance Company Legal Department 4600 Fuller Drive Irving, Texas 75038-6506
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Ananta M. Dasgupta, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $531.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. In response to a mail offer, in March 1987 petitioner purchased a travel certificate from VIP Vacations (VIP), a Miami Beach telemarketeer that was reselling travel certificates previously obtained from Passport. As such, VIP was acting as an agent on Passport's behalf. The holder of the certificate was entitled to a vacation package for two persons to Hawaii for a cost of $488.00. The travel certificate carried the name, address and logo of Passport and provided that all transportation authorized by the certificate would be fulfilled by Passport. The certificate expired in one year, or at the end of March 1988. After receiving the certificate, petitioner filled out the reservation request form with three requested travel dates (the fourth week of December 1987, 1988 or 1989) and returned it to VIP in November 1987 along with a $50.00 deposit. The form and deposit were forwarded by VIP to Passport. When petitioner could not secure travel on his first selected date, and he was told the certificate expired at the end of March 1988, he requested a refund of his money. Passport then agreed to extend the certificate to December 1988 but advised petitioner it could not confirm his reservations for the second requested travel date during the fourth week of December 1988. When petitioner continued to pursue his demand for a refund, Passport declined to refund anything other than the $50.00 deposit saying the trip was solicited by VIP, and not Passport, and in any event, the certificate had by then expired. Finding Passport's response to his demand for a refund to be unacceptable, petitioner filed an action against Passport in a Wisconsin circuit court, and on April 6, 1990, he obtained a judgment in the amount of $531.00. It is undisputed that the judgment resulted from a cause of action involving Passport's activities as a seller of travel. The judgment forms the basis for petitioner's claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and he be paid $531.00 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Ananta M. Dasgupta 1009 East Hamilton Avenue Eau Claire, Wisconsin 54701 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Sundial is a limited partnership authorized to do business in the State of Florida and is a developer and builder of a condominium complex known as Sundial of Sanabel. In order to provide the purchasers of the condominium units with a means of renting their units when the units were not occupied by the owners, a second limited partnership was formed, Sundial Rental Partners Ltd., in which Sundial is the general partner and each of the condominium owners are limited partners. On August 1, 1973, a management agreement was entered into between Sundial Rental Partners Ltd. (hereafter Rental Partners) and Sundial whereby Sundial agreed to provide management services in connection with the operation of the condominium units as rental accommodations. The terms of this agreement provided that Sundial would be compensated for its management services in the amount of five percent (5 percent) of the gross revenue of the rental partners. On April 7, 1973, an Additional Facilities Lease Agreement was entered into between Sundial and Rental Partners. By this agreement, Sundial leased to Rental Partners additional facilities to be constructed by Sundial and used by the condominium unit owners, the persons who rent the condominium units from the Rental Partners and their guests. Compensation to Sundial is set forth in paragraph 3 of the agreement: Sundial Associates shall be paid an annual rental fee for the additional facilities equal to fifteen percent of the gross revenues of the Rental Partnership. Sun- dial Associates shall operate the additional facilities for its own account. All incom- ing profits shall inure to its benefit and the rental partnership shall have no interest in such incoming profits. The limited partnership agreement between Sundial and Rental Partners was amended on August 6, 1974. Paragraph 5.1 of the Amended Agreement provides that a total of five percent (5 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership shall be paid to Sundial for its management services and that fifteen percent (15 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership shall be paid to Sundial as rental payments for those additional facilities to be constructed by Sundial Paragraph 6.1 provides for a management deed to be paid to Sundial in the amount of four percent (4 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership and paragraph 6.4 provides that the partnership shall lease from Sundial the additional facilities at the rate of fifteen percent (15 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership. Paragraph 6.4 of the limited partnership agreement calls for the construction of additional facilities, the cost of which is to be some two million one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($2,150,000.00). During the tax period in question, the only facilities actually constructed were a lobby and registration area, the value of which is significantly less than the total value of the expected construction. Nonetheless, during the tax period in question, the Rental Partners have paid Sundial the full five percent (5 percent) management fee and the full fifteen percent (15 percent) rental payment. Sundial recorded receipt of these amounts in separate accounts in their financial records. Sundial received as income during the tax period in question, certain tennis court admission fees which DOR did not intend to include in its computation of the sales tax due from rental proceeds. Yet, the record reflects that the total of fifteen percent (15 percent) of gross sales was three hundred seventeen thousand three hundred ninety-three dollars and ninety-four cents ($317,393.94) while the total from tennis court admission fees was eighteen thousand four hundred ninety-seven dollars and sixty-seven cents ($18,497.67). The sum of these two figures is three hundred thirty-five thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and sixty-one cents ($335,891.61) which, when multiplied by four percent (4 percent) equals thirteen thousand four hundred thirty-five dollars and sixty-six cents ($13,435.66). This is the exact amount of the tax assessed by DOR exclusive of interest and penalties. The assessment is in error to the extent that tennis court admission fees were included in the figure purporting to reflect gross receipts of rental fees.
Findings Of Fact Background On March 12, 1991, the Department of Lottery (Department) issued Request for Proposal No. 91-007-LOT/TEN/P entitled "Request for Proposal for the Provision of Advertising and Related Services to the Florida Lottery" (hereafter "the RFP"). The deadline for submitting sealed proposals in response to the RFP was established as April 22, 1991, but extended to April 29, 1991, by Amendment 3 to the RFP. At the time of the deadline, ten proposals had been filed, including those of petitioner, Bozell, Inc. (Bozell), and intervenors, Earle Palmer Brown (EPB) and BBDO South (BBDO). By "Notice of Selection of Finalists," dated May 1, 1991, and posted at the Department's headquarters, the Department advised all bidders that: After review of written proposals submitted in response to the subject RFP, the Florida Department of the Lottery's Evaluation Committee has ranked the responsive proposals in the following order of preference: Ogilvy & Mather Earle Palmer Brown BBDO South Bozell W.B. Doner Fahlgren Martin Benito West & Company Beber Silverstein LMPM The Ad Team In accordance with Section 5.3 of the RFP, the Department intends to conduct oral presentations with the following firms for the purpose of determining final rankings: Ogilvy & Mather Earle Palmer Brown BBDO South Bozell W.B. Doner Pursuant to Florida Statute and Rule 53ER87-16, failure to file a formal written protest and the bond required by Section 287.042(2)(c), Fla. Stat., with the Secretary within 72 hours shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Here, there was no showing that any protest was timely filed to contest the Department's selection of the five finalists. The five finalists made oral presentations to the evaluation committee on May 7 and 8, 1991, and their cost proposals were opened and scored on May 8, 1991. At the conclusion of its work, the committee awarded EPB an average total score of 174.550 and Bozell an average total score of 171.150; 200 points was the maximum total possible. By notice dated Wednesday, May 8, 1991, at 8:07 p.m., the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Negotiate a Contract" ranking the top five firms in the following order of preference: (1) EPB, (2) Bozell, (3) Ogilvy & Mather; BBDO; and (5) W.B. Doner. Bozell filed its formal written protest and petition for formal administrative hearing with the Department of Monday, May 13, 1991, at 4:29 p.m. The Request for Proposals The RFP consists of the original RFP issued by the Department, three amendments, and the Department's response to various written questions submitted by potential bidders. Pertinent to this case, the RFP provided: SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION Introduction. This Request for Proposal ("RFP") has been issued by the Florida Department of Lottery ("Lottery") to obtain sealed proposals from qualified firms for the provision of advertising and related services to the Florida Lottery. This RFP, and all other activities leading toward the execution of a contract per this RFP, are conducted under the Lottery policies set forth in Rules 53ER87-10 through 53ER87-19, Florida Administrative Code, and Chapter 24, Fla. Stat. The Lottery considers it in the best interest of the State of Florida to procure the commodities/services described herein through a competitive process. All responding firms should read and be familiar with the Florida Public Education Lottery Act [Chapter 24, Fla. Stat.] to ascertain an understanding of the purposes and requirements placed on the Lottery. A copy of Chapter 24, Fla. Stat., is attached to this RFP. This proposed purchase is a Major Procurement as defined in Section 24.103, Fla. Stat. (1989). Glossary of Terms. * * * Responsive Proposal - Refers to a proposal which contains, in the manner required by this RFP, all documentation, drawings, information, plans, materials, certifications and affirmations, regardless of which section of the RFP sets forth the particular requirements. * * * Questions About This RFP. * * * If revisions to this RFP are necessary after the closing date for submitting proposals, the revisions will be provided to only those Respondents who have submitted Responsive Proposals and have met the basic requirements of this RFP. Such Respondents will then have the opportunity to modify their proposals in conformance with the revisions. Timetable The following timetable will be strictly adhered to in all actions relative to this procurement. * * * All proposals will be opened by Lottery employees at 2:00 p.m. on April 22, 1991 [extended to April 29, 1991, by Amendment 3] in the Purchasing Office at the aforesaid Lottery Headquarters. The public may attend the opening but may not review any proposals submitted. The evaluation process will begin immediately following the proposal opening. The Evaluation Committee will rank the proposals in order of preference based on the evaluation of the technical proposals in accordance with the criteria specified herein. Notice of selection of finalists shall be posted at the Lottery's headquarters. If more than five Responsive Proposals are submitted, at least the five top firms which have submitted Responsive Proposals will be selected for oral presentations to be made in Tallahassee, Florida, at the Lottery's Headquarters. Oral presentations are tentatively scheduled for the week of April 29, 1991 [extended to the week of May 6, 1991, by Amendment 3] . . . . The Evaluation Committee will score the oral presentations and then open and score the cost proposal. The final rankings will be determined based on the evaluation of the technical proposals, oral presentations and cost proposals. Notice of Intent to negotiate with the highest ranked firm will be posted at the Lottery's headquarters. If negotiations with the highest ranked firm are not successful, the Lottery may negotiate with the other listed firms in descending order of rank. Upon successful conclusion of negotiations with a Respondent, a Notice of Award of Contract will be posted at the Lottery's headquarters. * * * 1.12. Proposal Submission. It is the Respondent's responsibility to ensure that its proposal is delivered by the proper time at the place of the proposal opening.... * * * 1.14 Correction or Withdrawal of Proposal. A correction to, or withdrawal of, a proposal may be requested within 72 hours after the proposal opening time and date. Requests received in accordance with this provision may be granted by the Lottery upon proof of the impossibility to perform based upon an obvious error. The Lottery, in its sole discretion, will determine whether a bid may be corrected or withdrawn. Interpretations/Disputes. Any questions concerning conditions and specifications of this RFP shall be directed in writing to the Issuing Officer in the manner provided in Sections 1.8 and 1.9 of this RFP. Inquiries must reference the bid number and the date of proposal opening. No interpretation shall be considered binding unless provided in writing by the Lottery. Any prospective Respondent who disputes the reasonableness or appropriateness of the terms, conditions, and specifications of this RFP shall file a formal written protest in appropriate form within 72 hours of the availability of answers to questions as provided in Section 1.9 of this RFP. Any Respondent who disputes the Lottery's Notice of Selection of Finalists, Notice of Intent to Negotiate, or Notice of Award of Contract, shall file a formal written protest in appropriate form within 72 hours of the notices. Any person who files a formal written protest shall, at the time of filing the formal written protest, post a bond as set forth in Section 287.042(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Failure to file both a protest and bond within the time prescribed in Rule No. 53ER87-16, Florida Administrative Code, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Fla. Stat. Legal Requirements. Applicable provisions of all federal, state, county, and local laws and administrative procedures, regulations, or rules shall govern the development, submittal and evaluation of all proposals received in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which may arise between persons submitting a proposal hereto and the Lottery. Lack of knowledge of the law or applicable administrative procedures, regulations or rules by any Respondent shall not constitute a cognizable defense against their effect. * * * Purpose and Overview. A. In accordance with Chapter 24, Fla. Stat., the Florida Department of the Lottery has been charged with the responsibility "to operate the state lottery . . . so as to maximize revenues in a manner consonant with the dignity of the state and the welfare of its citizens." The Contractor will support the Lottery in its mission by providing the advertising services set forth in Section 2.2. The goal of these services is to maximize the sale of tickets, enhance the public image and visibility of the Lottery, and assist in communicating the intent that Lottery proceeds enhance education . . . . Scope of Services. The Contractor shall be the principal advisor and provider to the Lottery for the following advertising and services: Development of strategic advertising plan; Creative strategy, creation and production of all advertising (including television, radio, print, transit and outdoor); Placement of all print, radio, television, transit and outdoor advertising at the lowest competitive rate; Coordination of and contracting for televised broadcasts of lottery drawings; Ticket design; Creation and production of point-of- sales material; Media plans; Educational, promotional and other related activities as directed. The Technical Proposal. The objective of the technical proposal is to demonstrate the Respondent's understanding and proposed method of rendering the requested services. Each Respondent shall provide a written statement of the firm's understanding of the services requested herein as well as a detailed written plan outlining how the firm proposes to go about providing the services set forth in Section 2.2. At a minimum, the technical proposal shall consist of the following information and materials: * * * E. Firm Qualifications. At a minimum, each Respondent must provide the following information which demonstrates the Respondent's ability to provide the services requested: * * * 4. Resumes not to exceed one page each in length of all personnel who would be assigned major roles in the fulfillment of the work obligation outlined in Section 2.2, with a statement identifying the percentage of time, calculated annually, of each person who will work on the Lottery account. * * * 12. Certified financial statements in customary form for the last three (3) fiscal years including an auditor's report. Certified financial statements must be the result of an audit of the Respondent's records in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by a certified public accountant . . . . * * * 18. List of type and number of additional employees that may be needed if awarded contract. * * * 33. Disclosure information required by and listed in Section 24.111, Fla. Stat. * * * Section 3: INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM RESPONDENT 3.1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. * * * D. Technical proposals must include the following information, be limited to not more than 100 pages (not including cover sheet, table of contents, divider pages, creative materials or resumes) and be presented in the following sequence: * * * Vendor Information Form (Attachment B). * * * Performance bond commitment letter required by Section 6.6. All material or information required to be submitted as part of the technical proposal required by Section 2.3. * * * 13. Any other material or information required by this RFP. * * * 3.4 Use of Subcontractors. If a Respondent proposes to use one or more subcontractors, the proposal must identify the contemplated subcontractor(s) and the scope of the subcontractor's services, and must include evidence of each subcontractor's ability to fulfill its respective duties on behalf of the Respondent. Respondent must also provide the information required by Section 24.111(2), Fla. Stat., for each subcontractor as if the subcontractor were itself a vendor. * * * 3.6 Additional Information and Comments. Respondent shall not submit with their written proposals material beyond that which is covered in the 100-page technical proposal (not including cover sheet, table of contents, divider pages, creative materials or resumes), plus creative comps and samples, resumes of key personnel and the separate cost proposals. The Lottery reserves the right to request additional information from a Respondent in order to make a thorough review and fair comparison of all proposals submitted.... Section 4: MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS Terms. The Lottery has established certain mandatory requirements which must be included as part of any proposal. The use of the terms "shall," "must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in this RFP indicate a mandatory requirement or condition. The words "should" or "may" in this RFP indicate desirable attributes or conditions, but are permissive in nature. Deviation from, or omission of, such a desirable feature will not by itself cause rejection of a proposal. 4.2 Non-responsive Proposals. Proposals which do not meet all material requirements of the RFP or which fail to provide all required information, documents, or materials will be rejected as non- responsive. Material requirements of the RFP are those set forth in Section 3.1 and without which an adequate analysis and comparison of proposals is impossible. The Lottery reserves the right to determine which proposals meet the material requirements of the RFP and to accept proposals which deviate from the requirements of the RFP in a minor or technical fashion as determined by the Lottery. SECTION 5: PROPOSAL REVIEW AND CRITERIA FOR SELECTION 5.1. Proposal Submission. Only proposals submitted in the time frame stated herein and with the content required above will be reviewed and considered by the Lottery. A copy of Chapter 24, Florida Statutes, was attached to the RFP, and Section 24.111, Florida Statutes, was specifically referenced in Sections 2.3.E.33 and 3.4 of the RFP. The vendor information form itself referenced the requirements of Section 24.111(2), Florida Statutes. In accordance with RFP Section 1.8, EPB submitted the following question, among others, to the Department: "Does Attachment B [Vendor Information Form] need to be completed by all company officers?" The Department answered "Yes, see question #8, BBDO Atlanta, letter dated March 26, 1991." The referenced answer to BBDO Atlanta emphasized that "a vendor information form must be completed by each person listed in the instructions on the form [all officers, all directors, all owners, all partners, all trustees, all stockholders holding five percent or more, executive director and chairman of the board]." Even section 1.27 of the RFP required that vendor information forms be submitted to the Department prior to or at the time of submitting the proposal. Responsiveness of proposals Under the terms of the RFP, Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the Department was not to consider and evaluate non-responsive proposals. Non-responsive proposals are defined by Section 4.2 of the RFP as follows: Proposals which do not meet all material requirements of this RFP or which fail to provide all required information, documents, or materials will be rejected as non- responsive. Material requirements of the RFP are those set forth in Section 3.1 and without which an adequate analysis and comparison of proposals is impossible. The Lottery reserves the right to determine which proposals meet the material requirements of the RFP and to accept proposals which deviate from the requirements of the RFP in a minor or technical fashion as determined by the Lottery. At the time it submitted its proposal, EPB did not submit the vendor information forms required by subsections 2.3E33, 3.1 and 3.4 of the RFP and by Section 24.111(2), Florida Statutes, for at least three of its corporate officers or directors (Sally Brown, Louise Smoak, and Robert Morse), and did not submit any vendor information forms for its designated subcontractor, Premier Maldonado & Associates. The Department, through its counsel, first requested submission of these forms from EPB on May 8, 1991, the date on which the Notice of Intent to Negotiate was posted. EPB did not supply the missing forms for Premier Maldonado & Associates until May 14, 1991, and for the three corporate officers or directors until on or about May 29, 1991. The RFP required that the vendor information forms be submitted with the proposal, and Section 24.111(2), Florida Statutes, provided in mandatory language that: The Department shall investigate the financial responsibility, security, and integrity of any person who submits a bid proposal or offer as part of a major procurement. Any person who submits a bid proposal or offer as part of a major procurement must, at the time of submitting such bid proposal or offer, provide the following: A disclosure of the vendor's name and address and, as applicable, the name and address of the following: If the vendor is a corporation, the officers, directors, and each stockholder in such corporation, except that in the case of owners of equity securities of a publicly traded corporation, only the names and addresses of those known to the corporation to own beneficially 5 percent or more of such securities need be disclosed. If the vendor is a trust, the trustee and all persons entitled to receive income or benefit from the trust. If the vendor is an association, the members, officers, and directors. If the vendor is a partnership or joint venture, all of the general partners, limited partners, or joint ventures. If the vendor subcontracts any substantial portion of the work to be preformed to a subcontractor, the vendor shall disclose all of the information required by this paragraph to the subcontractor as if the subcontractor were itself a vendor. (Emphasis added) The Department, at hearing offered proof that it did not consider the language of the RFP or Section 24.111(2), Florida Statutes, to require that all such forms be submitted at the time the proposal is submitted, and that it had been the Department's policy to allow bidders to submit additional forms after bid submission. The articulated rationale for such policy is that based solely on the proposals or, stated differently, absent investigation, the Department is unable to assure itself that forms for all required individuals are submitted with any proposal. Accordingly, the Department considers the omission of such forms a technical deficiency that can be cured up to the point of contracting, and limits its investigation to the successful bidder. While the Department may find it difficult, absent investigation, to assure itself that the vendor information mandated by section 24.111(2) is submitted with the proposal, the mandate of section 24.111(2) and the RFP is clear and unequivocal: such information "must" be submitted with the proposal. Notably, under the provisions of the statute and RFP, the onus is on the bidder, the party privy to such information, to assure that its disclosure is complete and where, as here, its disclosure is not complete its bid is non-responsive, since it is at variance with the mandate of section 24.111(2) and the RFP. Importantly, under the requirements of section 24.111(2), the Department is precluded from contracting with any bidder who fails to submit the required vendor information. Accordingly, a successful bidder who, wittingly or unwittingly, failed to make the required disclosure (such as EPB in the instant case) could subsequently decline to provide the Department with the information and thereby effectively withdraw its bid, contrary to the provisions of section 1.14 of the RFP. Such renders the failure to submit the required information at the time of bid submittal a material defect, since it accords such bidder an advantage not enjoyed by other bidders that submitted the required information. In accordance with subsection 3.1D9 of the RFP, each bidder was required to submit with its technical proposal the performance bond commitment letter required by section 6.6 of the RFP. Section 6.6, as amended by Amendments 1 and 3, provided, in pertinent part: The successful Respondent shall be required, at the time of executing the Contract with the Lottery, to post an appropriate performance bond or other security acceptable to the Lottery in the amount of $2.5 million . . . The other acceptable forms of security are: irrevocable letter of credit; Certificate of Deposit assigned to the Lottery (which must be obtained from a financial institution having its principal place of business in the State of Florida) . . . . Respondents must submit with their proposal evidence that they will be able to provide the performance bond or other security. Such evidence may include, but is not limited to, a letter from an authorized agent of a bonding company committing to provide the performance bond or indicating that the bond underwriter is processing a request to provide the bond and stating unequivocally that the bond will be available upon execution of the Contract. At the time it submitted its proposal, EPB submitted an April 25, 1991, letter addressed to it from Sovran Bank as evidence of its ability to provide the required security. That letter provided: As follow up to our conversation yesterday, the company can restrict its revolving line of credit by $2,500,000 (Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars) for a Letter of Credit of the same amount. The alternative is to apply for the Letter of Credit as a separate facility. The particular terms and conditions of the Letter of Credit would be worked out at the time of application . . . . While of the opinion that the Sovran letter evidenced EPB's ability to provide the required security, the Department likewise felt that the letter failed to evidence any commitment on EPB's part to restrict its line of credit to secure the subject letter of credit. Accordingly, it requested additional information from EPB, and by letter of May 1, 1991, EPB responded: This is to clarify the language in the Sovran Bank letter of April 25, 1991, included as Page 9 in Earle Palmer Brown's Proposal . . . Should Earle Palmer Brown be a successful respondent we will, at the time of executing the contract with the Lottery, either restrict our revolving line of credit with Sovran Bank by $2,500,000.00 for an irrevocable letter of credit, or will provide the Lottery with a surety bond for a like amount. The letter of May 1, 1991, adds more confusion than enlightenment regarding EPB's commitment to provide a letter of credit. Clearly, under the provisions of subsection 6.6 of the RFP, EPB's bare assurance that it would, alternatively, provide the Department with a surety bond was not acceptable evidence of its ability to provide such bond. As importantly, by phrasing its proposal as an alternative, to be exercised at its discretion, EPB lent confusion to the issue of what form of security it would provide. Notwithstanding, the requirement of the RFP was that the bidders "submit with their proposals evidence that they will be able to provide the . . . security," and the letter of April 25, 1991, while perhaps sparse, is facially adequate in that regard. Notably, the proof in this case confirms that EPB does have an adequate credit line with Sovran Bank which could be so restricted for a $2.5 million irrevocable letter of credit. In accordance with section 2.3E12 of the RFP, each bidder was required to submit with its technical proposal "certified financial statements in customary form for the last three (3) fiscal years including an auditor's report." In response to a question submitted pursuant to section 1.8 of the RFP, which asked: "If a company does not have certified financial statements for the last three years as required by Section 2.3.E.12 of the RFP, will it be disqualified from submitting a proposal?", the Department answered: "No. Although the absence of certified financial statements would render the proposal nonresponsive." At the time EPB submitted its proposal, it submitted certified financial statements for fiscal years 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989. As EPB's fiscal year is the calendar year, its auditors had not yet completed their audit for fiscal 1990 by the response deadline. When EPB's certified financial statement for its fiscal 1990 became available on May 14, 1991, it promptly delivered a copy to the Department. While the RFP required financial statements for the last three fiscal years, the Department understood that a bidder's ability to provide such statements would depend on when its fiscal year closed. In this regard, it is common for an independent audit to require up to six months following the close of a fiscal year. Here, EPB was faced with exactly such a dilemma, specifically disclosed such dilemma in its proposal, and provided the financial statements for the last four fiscal years that were available to it. Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Department departed from the essential requirements of law when it declined to declare EPB's proposal non- responsive for its failure to include a certified financial statement for fiscal 1990, and accepted, as satisfying the requirements of the RFP, financial statements for the last three fiscal years that were reasonably available to EPB. In accordance with the RFP, each bidder was to identify all personnel who would be assigned major roles in the fulfillment of work under the contract. Pertinent to this case, subsection 2.3E provided: At a minimum, each Respondent must provide the following information which demonstrates the Respondent's ability to provide the services requested: * * * 4. Resumes not to exceed one page each in length of all personnel who would be assigned major roles in the fulfillment of the work obligation outlined in Section 2.2, with a statement identifying the percentage of time, calculated annually, of each person who will work on the Lottery account. * * * 18. List of type and number of additional employees that may be needed if awarded contract. At the time EPB submitted its proposal, it identified twenty-four key positions in account service, creative, media and several other categories. As to the management supervisor, the employee is identified as "selected," and as to an account executive and public relations supervisor, the employee is identified as "TBD" (To Be Determined). All other positions were identified with specific individuals and resumes were included for each. Here, Bozell contends that EPB's proposal is non-responsive because EPB did not name and include resumes for the foregoing three positions. Such contention is, however, unpersuasive. Section 2.3E18 clearly contemplated that some bidders would have to hire additional personnel if awarded the contract, and EPB complied with that section of the EPB by identifying such positions. Accordingly, EPB's proposal was not at material variance from the RFP in this regard. Although the Department's "Notice of Selection of Finalists," dated May 1, 1991, discussed supra, purported to rank the "responsive proposals" in order of preference, the proof demonstrates that the evaluation committee, who was charged with such responsibility, did not, by consensus or otherwise, ever determine the responsiveness of any proposal. Here, for the reasons heretofore set forth, EPB's proposal was non-responsive to the RFP, and the committee's failure to address the issue of responsiveness prior to scoring the proposals, for reasons discussed infra, materially affected the fairness of the evaluation process. Bozell's proposal was, however, responsive to the RFP. 2/ The evaluation committee Pursuant to Rule 53ER87-13(5)(i)(2), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 5.3 of the RFP, the Secretary of the Department appointed an evaluation committee, consisting of six members, to evaluate the proposals which were received from interested firms. Regarding the composition of such committee, the Department advised all prospective bidders, in response to a question posed pursuant to Section 1.8 of the RFP, that: The Evaluation Committee will be comprised of Lottery staff and volunteers from a cross- section of Florida business and academic communities. Subsequently, by notice of April 16, 1991, the Department advised all prospective bidders that the members of the evaluation committee would be as follows: Bernard Edwards Deputy Secretary Marketing Department of the Lottery Tallahassee, Florida Ben Johnson Newspaper Columnist Homles Beach, Florida Robert W. McKnight Assistant Secretary Department of Lottery Tallahassee, Florida Richard Mizerski Professor Tallahassee, Florida John Ruchalski Retired Businessman Jupiter, Florida Alan Sawyer Professor Gainesville, Florida Of the six committee members, only two, Bernard Edwards and Robert W. McKnight, were employees of the Department. No objection to the composition of the committee was lodged until the filing of the subject protest; however, there was likewise no point of entry provided by the Department to challenge the composition of the committee. Robert W. McKnight, who chaired the committee, has been employed by the Department as Assistant Secretary since March 4, 1991, and in such capacity has been responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Department. Mr. McKnight holds a B.S. and M.B.A. degree in business administration, with concentrations in advertising, and has in excess of fifteen years experience in marketing. Throughout the course of such employments, as well as his tenure as a Florida legislator, he has had the opportunity to monitor or supervise the work of advertising agencies employed to advance his products or person. Bernard Edwards, currently Deputy Secretary for Marketing of the Department, has been with the Department since 1988. During that tenure, he has filled, at various times, all three deputy secretary positions (operations, administration and marketing), and has participated in the advertising operations of the Florida lottery. Prior to his employment with the Department, Mr. Edwards was Executive Director of the Washington, D.C., lottery, and from 1983 to 1987 Deputy Executive Director of the Pennsylvania State lottery. During the course of such employments, Mr. Edwards has acquired significant experience in the marketing of lottery products, and the advertising incident thereto. Alan Sawyer is a Professor of Marketing and Chairman of the Department of Marketing of the University of Florida in Gainesville, and holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University in marketing. In addition to his teaching and research, Dr. Sawyer has worked with the Federal Trade Commission, as well as numerous other clients, on advertising matters, including matters of advertising deception, and is a recognized expert in advertising and marketing. Ben Johnson is a Doctoral Teaching Associate and Adjunct Professor at the University of South Florida where he teaches upper division and graduate College of Education courses in methods of teaching English, reading, and learning skills. In addition to teaching, Mr. Johnson has, for some years, been researching the lottery operations of various states. As a consequence of the knowledge he has gained concerning those operations he has written a book, The Lottery Book, scheduled for publication in September 1991, which provides general information for players of various state lotteries, and has a nationally syndicated newspaper column called "The Lottery Column" wherein he answers readers' questions regarding lottery operations. From such experience, Mr. Johnson has developed a knowledge of lottery operations, as well as an appreciation for effective lottery marketing and advertising. John Ruchalski, currently retired, holds a degree in business and marketing, and has 35 years of retail management experience. Of those years, 17 were spent as Senior Vice President of Burdines, three as Chief Executive Officer of Bullock's, and two as president of Bloomingdale's. Mr. Ruchalski's past activities have also included service as president of the Florida Chamber of Commerce and chairman of the board of the Florida Retail Federation. In all, the proof shows that Mr. Ruchalski has a strong marketing background, and a familiarity with the advertising needs incident to such operations. The final member of the committee, Richard Mizerski, is a Professor of Marketing at Florida State University, and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Florida in Economics and Business Administration, with a major concentration in marketing and a minor concentration in advertising. Dr. Mizerski, like Dr. Sawyer, has, in addition to his teaching and research, extensive consulting experience in marketing and advertising, and is a recognized expert in the field. Overall, the proof demonstrates that the composition of the evaluation committee was appropriate for the work it was tasked to do, and that it had adequate time to perform an appropriate evaluation. Each committee member had experience and knowledge in marketing, and advertizing incident thereto, and lent to the evaluation process common and diverse experiences in such areas which helped provide a balanced consideration of the proposals. As importantly, each was shown to be committed to the integrity of the process, and complied with the provisions of Section 286.011, Florida Statutes, by assuring that all committee meetings at which official acts were to be taken were conducted publicly, and by not discussing any matter pertaining to their evaluations with any other member except during meetings that had been properly noticed. Market research data Prior to reviewing the proposals, one or more of the committee members requested information from the Department that would accord them insight into the program area. In response to such request, the Department provided each committee member with the market research data it had available. Such data provided demographic insight into Florida lottery marketing operations. At hearing, Bozell complained that it was never informed that the market research data had been provided to the committee, and offered proof, if credited, that had it known such fact it would have drafted its proposal differently. Such proof was not, however, persuasive, nor was the provision of such information to the committee inappropriate. Here, the proof demonstrates that the data provided by the Department was a matter of public record, and many of the committee members, through their research and training, were already familiar with it prior to their appointment. Bozell, as the current provider of advertising services to the lottery, was very familiar with the data, its subcontractor had complied it, and Bozell used it extensively in its proposal. In sum, Bozell was not disadvantaged by the provision of such data to the committee, and it was not treated any differently than any other bidder in this regard. As importantly, the provision of such information to the committee to lend insight into the program area for which services were being sought was quite appropriate to the evaluation process. Technical proposed evaluation Section 2.3 of the RFP describes the items required to be submitted with a firm's technical proposal, and was designed to assess a firm's understanding and proposed method of rendering the services requested by section 2.2 of the RFP. It provides that, "at a minimum," the proposal shall contain the information and materials requested by subsections 2.3A through 2.3E. Subsection 2.3A required submittal of a proposed advertising approach for the Florida lottery which addresses a three-year summary outline advertising plan, to include recommendations for advertising and promotion, and a proposed one-year timetable for advertising, showing development of creative, production, approval, placement and run-time. Subsection 2.3B required comprehensive artistic representations consisting of a detailed media plan for an eight-week Florida lottery instant game within a $1,250,000 budget; a name, ticket design and prize structure for the instant game; a 30-second radio spot for the instant game; a print ad for newspaper or magazine placement for the game; and a point- of-sale example for the game. Subsection 2.3C required one complete advertising campaign representative of the firm's work, including budget, creative strategy, positioning, media strategy and execution, and post-buy analysis. Subsection 2.3D required creative samples previously produced by key members of the proposed creative team consisting of TV ads, radio ads, print ads, outdoor campaigns, and point-of-sale samples. Finally, subsection 2.3E, entitled "firm qualifications," required, "at a minimum," information concerning 33 specific items, "which demonstrates the [firm's] ability to provide the services requested." Among the items for which information was required were the following: 3. Brief and concise statement of Respondent's advertising philosophy, taking into consideration the following points and others that you may feel are appropriate: Method the Respondent uses for developing advertising. How the Respondent currently measures the effectiveness of its advertising. * * * Evidence of any work done for a state, multi-state, national or provincial lottery. Information regarding any advertising or other experience with state agencies and other governmental entities. * * * 12. Certified financial statements in customary form for the last three (3) fiscal years including an auditor's report . . . . * * * 29. Discussion of contributions that your firm could make toward the growth of the Lottery. Section 5.4 of the RFP set forth the general criteria by which a firm's response to subsections 2.3A-E would be evaluated. Such general criteria were the overall qualifications, experience and abilities of the firm, its staff, and contractors to provide timely and professional advertising and related services, determined by evaluating the information contained in subsection 2.3E; and, the relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of the firm's proposed plans directed toward subsections 2.3A-D of the RFP. Such section concluded: "The evaluation worksheet for the technical proposal is attached as Attachment F." Attachment F to the RFP set forth the specific criteria by which a firm's response would be evaluated. That attachment provided as follows: This evaluation considers information submitted in the technical proposal. Emphasis is placed on the firm's qualifications and ability to do the work, which is addressed in the Technical Proposal. A total of 80 points is obtainable. The Technical Proposal shall be evaluated in accordance with the following criteria: Overall Ability - 40 points maximum Do the resumes of the account team support the Respondent's competency to provide the services required by Section 2.2? Proposed Account Team: Is the team make-up appropriate for the work? Do the team members have experience with comparable work? Are there any sub-contracted firms involved? Are minority sub-contractors utilized? Are the hours assigned to the various team members for each task appropriate? Has the Respondent provided advertising services of the scope required in the past? Experience of the Respondent and staff providing advertising service within the State of Florida. Experience of the Respondent and staff in providing Lottery, pari- mutuel, or other gaming related advertising. Financial stability of the firm and financial capability to provide the entire scope of services. Experience of the firm in providing advertising services to accounts in excess of $10 million. Experience of the firm in placing large volumes of electronic media in all media markets in Florida. Based on 1-3, award points, as follows: 20-30 points for exceptional experience 10-20 points for average experience 0-10 points for minimal experience Has the Respondent provided advertising services to other state or governmental entities? If the work was acceptable, award up to 3 points. If the firm has not done such work, award zero points. Does the Respondent possess unique abilities which would make a noticeable (positive) impact on the project? If the answer is yes, award up to points and note reasons. If the answer is no, award zero points. Does the team composition and each member's percentage of involvement, the use of subcontractors (if any), office location, and/or information contained in the proposal indicate that the Respondent will meet time and budget requirements? If the answer is yes, award up to points and note reasons. If the answer is no, award zero points. Does the Respondent's current workload make it likely the Respondent can provide timely and complete service? If the answer is yes, award up to 2 points and note reasons. If the answer is no, award zero points. Advertising approach and creative samples required by Sections 2.3A-D = 40 points The relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of the firm's proposed plan for providing the requested services required by Section 2.3(A). Value: 10 points The relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of the comprehensive artistic representations required by Section 2.3(B). Value: 10 points The relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of the advertising campaign required by Section 2.3(C). Value: 5 points The relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of samples required by Section 2.3(D). Value: 15 points The criteria for evaluating the creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of above items B-1 through B-4 are as follows: Creativity Were the ideas and approach exciting and interesting? Did the samples evoke positive and appropriate emotions? Did the samples capture and hold attention? Did the samples demonstrate fresh and original thought or were they banal and mundane? Approach Was the approach germane and appropriate? Was the approach unified and integrated? Was the approach clear, direct and unambiguous? Quality Were images crisp, sharp, and distinct except where the intention is clearly otherwise? Was the production professional? Was sound free of distortion and visual free of unnecessary clutter? Thoroughness Did the advertising show an appropriate consideration for all facets of the market? Was the advertising comprehensive and balanced? Did the advertising use a full range of tools and techniques to ensure maximum penetration and retention? By memo to all committee members, entitled "Instructions and Timetable for Evaluation Committee Members," and again at the commencement of their deliberations, all committee members were advised that they must evaluate the proposals based on the criteria set forth in the RFP, and to utilize their own individual expertise in applying the criteria. In this regard, the proof demonstrates that the members of the committee abided such directive, and scored the proposals based on the established criteria, except as hereinafter discussed, as applied through their own background and experience. 3/ At the commencement of their deliberations, the committee members agreed that the format they would follow in evaluating the technical proposals would be to first review all the proposals, and then score the proposals individually. This procedure was followed although, not unexpectedly, some members made preliminary assessments as they progressed through the various proposals. Upon completion of their review, the members then scored each proposal and, as appropriate, made adjustments to preliminary assessments they had made based on the perspective they had acquired after their review of all the proposals. Here, Bozell complains that the RFP did not permit the scoring of proposals relative to each other but, rather, required that the proposals be evaluated and scored solely by applying the criteria independently to each proposal, and that the failure of all committee members to so evaluate the proposals is a fundamental flaw in the evaluation process. Bozell's complaint is not, however, persuasive. Here, the RFP required, among other things, a determination of the relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of a firm's plans for providing the services requested by subsections 2.3A-D of the RFP. Under such circumstances, considering the subjective nature of the evaluation, it would not be unreasonable to assign points based on relative merit. And, considering the fact that the proposals were not scored until all proposals had been reviewed that, more likely than not, is what was done by each committee member, consciously or subconsciously. As importantly, each member of the committee scored the proposals independent of any other member of the committee, and was consistent with the approach he took as to each firm's proposal. 4/ Accordingly, it cannot be concluded, based on the proof in this case, that the evaluation process was fundamentally flawed because of the manner in which points were awarded. However, because points were awarded on a relative basis, the inclusions of non-responsive proposals in the evaluation process could have materially affected the scoring of proposals and the Department's failure to exclude non-responsive proposals from the scoring process, as required by section 5.1 of the RFP, was a material departure from the requirements of the RFP. Bozell also complains that Mr. Johnson evaluated the technical proposals in light of his knowledge about the success of other states' lottery advertising. The application of such expertise to the criteria contained in the RFP was, however, appropriate, as discussed supra. As noted by Mr. Johnson: . . . That's my frame of reference against which I measured all of the companies. I could tell that some of the companies really didn't know what they were talking about, because they were suggesting things that were failing in other states. And I was aware of that from my general information background. [Tr. 471] As heretofore noted, selection of committee members with knowledge of the program area, and the exercise of that expertise in applying the criteria, is most appropriate to a reasoned evaluation of a proposal. Finally, with regard to the evaluation of the technical proposals, Bozell offered proof that some committee members failed to apply specific criteria mandated by the RFP, or otherwise scored the proposals in a manner at variance with that called for by the RFP. In this regard, the proof demonstrates that while proposals were to be evaluated, at least in part, based on the different games and formats that were presented in the technical proposals (see subsection 2.3B of the RFP), Mr. Ruchalski did not do so because he had no knowledge upon which to base a decision. Regarding subsections A5-8 of Attachment F (the scoring criteria), Mr. Johnson did not award points in the manner mandated by each subsection. Finally, notwithstanding that an evaluation of the overall ability of the applicant, as set forth in section A of Attachment F to the RFP, required an examination of the "financial stability of the firm and financial capability to provide the entire scope of services," no evaluation of the financial integrity and responsibility of any of the firms was made, and such criteria were not applied in the evaluation process. 5/ In its proposed recommended order, the Department suggests that it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require a detailed financial review by the agency at the initial bid analysis stage since, ultimately, only one firm will be awarded the contract, and because security and financial investigations will be done before a contract is awarded. While such may be the case, it was the Department's election to provide for an analysis of financial stability and capability as part of the review criteria. Oral presentation evaluation The second phase of the evaluation process was the scoring of the oral presentations. Pertinent to this case, section 5.3 of the RFP provided: . . . The oral presentations must be made by the account service, creative and media personnel who would work on the account. There will be no limitation on the information and materials pertinent to this RFP which may be utilized . . . . Section 5.5 of the RFP provided that presentations would be scored based on the following general criteria: Understanding of services requested -- up to 20 points, account team -- up to 25 points, responsiveness to questions -- up to 15 points, and overall impression -- up to 20 points. Finally, Attachment G to the RFP provided that the evaluation relative to the account team would be scored as follows: Account Team = 25 points maximum Did the proposed account team participate? Creativity, quality, uniqueness demonstrated by account team? Respondent's advertising philosophy demonstrated, long term image building? Did account team members prepare samples submitted? EPB's oral presentation was made by Jeb Brown, the chief executive officer of EPB; Craig Davis, the president of EPB's Florida operations; Mike Knaisch, account group head; Kandi Kirkland, account supervisor; Bruce Ayers, media director; Scott Mackey, associate creative director; Pat Hanlon, creative director; Tom Hall, chairman of EPB; and Jeff Tucker, president of public relations. Each of the presenters were identified by EPB as key personnel to be assigned to the Florida lottery account, except Jeb Brown and Tom Hall. As part of its oral presentation, EPB utilized a video tape, which presented favorable comments by the head of the Virginia lottery concerning EPB's performance for it. Addition-ally, EPB included in such video a character it utilizes for the Virginia lottery, "Lady Luck," who also said "nice things" about EPB. Here, Bozell complains that the participation of Jeb Brown and Tom Hall, in the oral presentation, as well as the use of the video which included comments by the head of the Virginia lottery and "Lady Luck," was improper under the provisions of the RFP because they were not members of the account team. Such compliant is, however, unpersuasive. While section 5.3 of the RFP did require that the oral presentation be made by the account, creative, and media personnel who would work on the account, it did not expressly preclude others from participating, and the RFP placed no restrictions on the information and materials pertinent to the RFP that could be utilized. Accordingly, EPB's oral presentation was not at variance from the RFP and, if it were, it was not shown to be a significant deviation. As heretofore noted, the evaluation relative to the account team allowed an award of up to 25 points, and required, among other things, a determination of whether the account team participated; the creativity, quality and uniqueness demonstrated by the account team; and whether the account team members prepared the samples that were submitted. The committee members did not, however, make any specific inquiry regarding whether the account team participated or prepared the samples, although the bidders generally made it a practice to introduce the account team members, but assumed such to be the case for purposes of scoring the presentations. Here, Bozell contends that the committee's failure to expressly inform itself as to whether the account team participated and prepared the samples, as opposed to indulging the assumption that they did, constitutes a significant failing in the evaluation process. However, Bozell failed to demonstrate, at hearing, that the committee's assumption was misplaced. Finally, Bozell offered proof that Dr. Sawyer awarded Bozell 21 points and EPB 22 points for "overall impression," when 20 points were the maximum contemplated by the RFP. Such error was, however, inadvertent, it simply being the intention of Dr. Sawyer to award EPB one more point than Bozell, and was harmless since it did not affect the overall outcome. Cost proposal evaluation Section 5.6 of the RFP provided the criteria for evaluation of the cost proposals and provided that: Finalists' cost proposals will be given points based on an evaluation of the proposed compensation and the experience and qualifications of the proposed staff. A maximum value of 40 points was established for this part of the evaluation. The cost proposals, which the committee members were to evaluate, were contained in a "sealed cost proposal envelope" and were, pursuant to subsection 2.4B of the RFP, to contain: The cost proposal shall include a calculation of the Respondent's proposed compensation for undertaking and completing all phases of the services requested and outlined in this RFP. The cost proposal shall be prepared in the same format as illustrated on Attachment "E" and shall be completed as follows: The Respondent shall provide an aggregate gross salary by work category and position classification for all personnel who will work on the Lottery's account. The aggregate gross salary shall include only that portion of each individual staff member's time that will be attributable to the Lottery account. The portion of time proposed in the cost proposal shall match the labor hour percentages proposed for each individual as required in Section 2.3(E)(4). The Respondent shall also include a proposed multiplier of the type described in paragraph A above. The Respondent shall multiply the aggregate gross salary by the multiplier and the product shall be included in the cost proposal. The Respondent shall also include, in the sealed cost proposal envelope, resumes for all personnel whose salary, or portion thereof, was included in the calculation of the proposed aggregate gross salary resumes shall be included regardless of whether the resumes have also been included in the technical proposal envelope. While the RFP contemplated that all three sections of the proposal (technical, oral presentation, and cost) would be evaluated and scored independent of each other, and that the evaluation of the cost proposal would be limited to an evaluation of the information contained in the "sealed cost proposal envelope," not all committee members so limited their evaluation. Rather, some committee members utilized the knowledge they had gleaned from evaluating the technical proposals and oral presentations, as well as the scores they had assigned during the course of those evaluations, to assist them in assessing the qualifications and experience of the proposed personnel and weighing the firms' proposed compensation. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how any committee member could ignore the knowledge he had acquired during the course of his evaluations that was reflective of the quality and experience of the proposed staff, any more than he could ignore the expertise he had acquired through his life experiences, in evaluating the cost proposal. Notably, the RFP, as it related to the cost proposals, provided that "the portion of time proposed in the cost proposal shall match the labor hour percentages proposed for each individual as required by section 2.3(E)(4)" of the RFP [the key personnel], and the committee had, as part of their evaluation of the technical proposal, previously evaluated the proposed account team, as well as the relative creativity, approach, quality and thoroughness of their proposals relative to subsections 2.3A-D of the RFP. At the oral presentation, the committee had an opportunity to put faces with names, and broaden their knowledge of the individuals involved. Accordingly, when it came time to evaluate the cost proposals, which involved a consideration of staffing and salary, the members of the committee had certainly formulated opinions regarding the quality of the staff proposed by the respective firms, and balanced that opinion against the proposed compensation to derive the most cost effective proposal. While it may seem unreasonable to restrict the committee to the bare resumes and costs set forth in the cost proposal, as the basis for their evaluation, the reasonableness of the provisions the Department formulated are not at issue in this proceeding. Accordingly, it is concluded that by going beyond the information contained within the cost proposal, the members of the committee materially deviated from the requirements of the RFP. This conclusion prevails, since those bidders who were favored in the evaluation of the technical proposals or oral presentation were, by the consideration of the opinions derived from such evaluations, accorded an unfair advantage over other bidders.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which rejects all bids, and that a new invitation to bid be extended. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of July 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent's teacher's certificate should be suspended or revoked or other appropriate action taken for alleged violations of Chapter 231, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 6B, Florida Administrative Code, as set forth in the Petition herein. At the commencement of the hearing, Petitioner moved to amend paragraphs 1 and 2 to reflect a correct date of May 5, 1977, in lieu of the date May 5, 1978, stated therein. There being no objection, the Motion was granted and the Petitioner so amended.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Thomasena W. Owens, holds a Florida Teaching Certificate and has been employed in the Duval County Public School System at Ribault High School, Jacksonville, Florida, since 1979, as a cosmetology teacher (testimony of Respondent). On May 5, 1977, Respondent conducted a fashion show with her students at the high school auditorium for the purpose of raising funds to defray expenses of graduating students to take examinations before the State Board of Cosmetology. Prior to this time, Respondent obtained permission from school authorities to conduct the fund raising activity. Written school policy required that tickets for such events must be prenumbered consecutively by the printer and that a report of tickets sold and funds received must be prepared by the person in charge of the activity (testimony of Davis, Respondent, Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 4). On April 12, 1977, Respondent's husband, Herbert Owens, ordered the printing of 500 tickets for the sum of $15.00 in the name of Ribault High School - Cosmetology Department, at Bill Kight's Copy Center, Jacksonville, Florida. He later received the tickets from the Copy Center without paying for the same and delivered them to his wife's office at the school. The tickets were unnumbered. Prior to ordering the tickets, Respondent had not submitted a request for purchase approval to the School principal as was required under written school policies (testimony of Thrift, Harms, Davis, H. Owens, Petitioner's exhibit No. 1-2, 4,5). The ticket price for the fashion show was one dollar. Prior to the event, there was an undetermined number of advance ticket sales. The school auditorium has an audience capacity of approximately 700 persons. Tickets were sold at the door at the night of the performance by Emily James, a School clerical employee. The door was the only available entrance to the auditorium. During the course of ticket sales immediately before the performance, some four or five individuals entered the auditorium with passes. Although the auditorium was not completely full, at least 500 persons were present during the show. A short time before the performance had concluded, Mrs. James turned over the cash receipts and unsold tickets in a box to Respondent. On June 9, 1977, Respondent executed a form titled "Report of Monies Collected," which reflected that she had turned in $103.00 in cash to the School bookkeeper on May 5, 1977. It further reflected that 300 tickets had been printed and that 176 tickets were turned in on June 9th. It further showed that the cash balance due of $21.00 had been turned in by Respondent on the same date. The form was countersigned by the school bookkeeper. (Testimony of James, Feagin, Davis, Respondent's exhibit No. 1). In August, 1977, the bookkeeper for Bill Knight's Copy Center noted that the invoice for the tickets had not been paid by the high school. She called Mr. Owens for an explanation. He stated that the reason why the bill had not been paid was that only 300 tickets had been ordered and that in order to pay for the work, he needed another invoice, dated April 12, 1977, showing 300 tickets at the price of $15.00. The revised invoice was picked up by Mr. Owens. It was not until February 14, 1978, that the High School paid the bill for the tickets. (Testimony of Harms, H. Owens, Davis, Petitioner's exhibit No. 2, 6- 8). Respondent received a satisfactory job performance evaluation from the school principal in 1977, although the principal had expressed concerns to her for previous irregular business transactions. Respondent received an unsatisfactory overall evaluation in 1978, which the principal explained was due to the fact that "I wanted to register with Ms. Owens my objections to the fund raising business . . . and I chose this method to do that." Although the principal stated that Respondent expressed positive qualities of demonstration and enthusiasm in her classes, she was concerned about her ability to impart knowledge to students. (Testimony of Davis, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). Both Respondent and her husband testified at the hearing. Respondent disclaimed any knowledge of the ticket purchase and attributed all events concerning the transaction to her husband. However, when she was interview by Petitioner's security investigator in August, 1978, she told him that she had ordered the tickets and that her husband had picked them up. She also stated to him that, after discovering that she had been billed for 500 tickets even though she had ordered only 300, she went to the printers the next day and obtained a corrected invoice. In a subsequent interview about a week later, Respondent told the investigator that the corrected invoice had been mailed to her and that her husband had paid for the tickets and picked them up. At the hearing, Respondent testified that her husband had ordered that tickets because she was "busy." Although she had told the investigator that there had been advance ticket sales, at the hearing Respondent testified that she could not remember if there had been such sales. Her testimony indicated that students had counted the tickets before the performance and placed them in stacks of 25 each and that there were only 300 tickets. She further testified that Mrs. James had handed her a locked bag containing the door ticket sale receipts and unsold tickets, had placed the bag in the truck of Respondent's care, and that Respondent turned the money over to the bookkeeper the next day without knowing what was in the bag. She denied keeping any of the sales receipts or any wrong doing. She admitted that she was aware of school procedures to be followed in purchasing materials, but said that the principal an bookkeeper had authorized her to purchase the tickets. Her husband testified that he had ordered 300 tickets from the printer and picked them up when they were ready, but did not pay for them at that time. He admitted having the conversation with the printer's bookkeeper and requesting a revised invoice to reflect that only 300 tickets had been printed and delivered. He testified that he told his wife that he had paid for the tickets because he did not want her to have any "foul-ups" with the principal in regard to the bill being paid. He further testified that he viewed the crowd attending the fashion show and that there were approximately 200 spectators present. In view of the inconsistencies and conflicts of the above testimony of Respondent and Mr. Owens between themselves and with the testimony of other witnesses, the demeanor of all witnesses, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction in question, the testimony of Respondent and her husband as summarized above in pertinent respects, is not deemed credible. Based on the foregoing findings, it is further found that Respondent failed to properly account either for funds received for the sale of 200 tickets, or otherwise to satisfactorily account for the disposition of 200 missing tickets.
Recommendation That Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of August, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: David Holder, Esquire 110 North Magnolia Tallahassee, Florida Kenneth Vickers, Esquire 437 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1979.
The Issue Whether the respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice of Intent to Impose Administrative Fine, and, if so, the amount of the fine which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the administration of sections 501.012-.019, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for registering health studios. The Division of Consumer Services carries out this function. Mr. Beattie and his brother, Tim, are owners of the Paradise Gym, a health studio located at 1236 South Dixie Highway, Coral Gables, Florida. The gym has been in business since 1976 and in its present location for over six years. The Department contacted the Paradise Gym several times in 1992 regarding the statutory requirement that it register as a health studio. The gym continued to operate without being registered, however. In the spring of 1993, the Department obtained an injunction from the circuit court in Dade County, Florida, barring the gym from operating until it registered with the Department. On July 9, 1993, the Department conducted an on-site undercover investigation at the Paradise Gym and found that it was operating as a health studio in violation of the injunction. After the Department scheduled a contempt hearing, the Paradise Gym finally submitted a completed registration application. The gym was registered with the Department on December 6, 1993, and assigned registration number 02370. The annual registration for the Paradise Gym expired on December 6, 1994. The Department sent the Paradise Gym a registration packet enclosed with a letter dated October 24, 1994. The packet contained a registration form, and the letter contained instructions to send the completed form to the Department "together with a copy of the membership contract currently in use and the annual registration fee of $300." (Emphasis in original.) The Department did not receive a response to the October 24 letter. In a letter dated December 2, 1994, the Department notified the Paradise Gym that it must send the completed registration form and other documents within fifteen days of the date of the letter. The December 2 letter contained the warning that the gym must immediately cease "all non-exempt activities" until it came into compliance with the statutes governing health studios. The Department did not receive a response to the December 2 letter. On January 24, 1995, an employee of the Department telephoned Mr. Beattie and was told that the registration packet would be sent by January 27, 1995, and that the application had not been mailed sooner because the gym's offices had flooded and suffered serious damage. The Department did not hear from Mr. Beattie until February 20, 1995, when it received the Paradise Gym's Application for Registration; Affidavit of Exemption from the requirement that a bond, Certificate of Deposit, or letter of credit be posted; and check in the amount of $300 for the annual registration fee. These documents were signed by Mr. Beattie on February 6, 1995. The gym's membership contract was not included with the registration materials, and the Department sent a letter to the Paradise Gym dated February 21, 1995, stating that the Department could not process the application for registration until it received a copy of the contract. The Department received no response to the February 21 letter. In a letter dated March 21, 1995, the Department notified Mr. Beattie that the application for registration of the Paradise Gym was denied because the Department had not received a copy of the gym's membership contract. The letter contained a Notice of Rights and was sent via certified mail. The letter was received at the Paradise Gym, and the return receipt signed, on March 27, 1995. The Department did not receive a response to the letter, either in writing or by telephone, and the denial became final agency action 21 days after it was received at the gym. On May 5, 1995, an investigator for the Department conducted an on- site undercover inspection of the Paradise Gym. The inspection revealed that the gym was operating as a health studio and was offering memberships payable annually or by down payment and monthly installments. On June 13, 1995, the Department issued the Notice of Intent to Impose Administrative Fine at issue in this case and sent it to Mr. Beattie via certified mail. The notice included an offer to settle the matter upon payment of an administrative fine of $3500. The Department did not receive a response to the notice and did not receive a return receipt indicating that the notice had been delivered. In late July, 1995, Douglas Jennings, an employee of the Department, telephoned Mr. Beattie to inquire about his failure to respond to the notice. Mr. Beattie stated that he had not received it, and Mr. Jennings sent him a copy via certified mail. The notice was received at the Paradise Gym on August 3, 1995, and the Department granted the request for hearing dated August 21, 1995. On September 19, 1995, Mr. Jennings received a telephone call from Mr. Beattie in which he asked if the Department would drop the fine; on September 22, 1995, the Department received a copy of a document bearing the logo of the Paradise Gym and entitled "Waiver and Release from Liability and Indemnity Agreement." The contents of this document were substantially different from the contents of the document of the same title submitted in 1993 with the gym's initial application for registration, although the consumer disclosures required by statute remained the same. At hearing, Mr. Beattie explained his failure to submit the Paradise Gym's membership contract until September 22, 1995. He asserted on the one hand that there was no "membership contract" for the gym, just a waiver of liability, and on the other hand that the Department had a copy of the Waiver and Release from Liability and Indemnity Agreement he provided in 1993 with the gym's original application for registration. He did not explain why the Paradise Gym continued to operate after being notified in December 1994 that the gym could not continue operating until it had registered with the Department or why the gym continued to operate after March 21, 1995, when its application for registration was denied. The Department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Paradise Gym operated as a health studio without being registered with the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding that the Paradise Gym violated section 501.015(1) by operating without being registered with the Department and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $100. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of April 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Nevin Zimmerman violated the Florida Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution, and Section 112.320, the Commission is empowered to serve as the guardian of the standards of conduct for the officers and employees of the state. Pursuant to Sections 112.324 and 112.317, the Commission is empowered to conduct investigations and to issue a Final Order and Public Report recommending penalties for violations of the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees (Code of Ethics). Respondent Zimmerman is subject to the Code of Ethics. Mr. Zimmerman, during times pertinent, as a partner in the law firm of Burke and Blue, P.A., was the County Attorney, along with Les Burke, for Bay County, Florida, and was a reporting individual, as that term is used in the Code of Ethics. Mr. Zimmerman was required to file annual financial disclosures with the Bay County Supervisor of Elections, as provided by Section 112.3145(2)(c). He is currently an attorney in private practice. As County Attorney, Mr. Zimmerman was ultimately responsible for addressing Bay County's legal needs. He had associates in his firm that helped him in this regard. He became the primary contact in the Burke and Blue firm for Bay County in the middle 1980's. On or about August 31, 1999, the Bay County Commission was addressing the problem of inmate overcrowding in its county correctional facilities, which were operated by CCA. On or about that time, the County correctional facility exceeded capacity by about 352 inmates. The Bay County Commissioners decided to address the issue. The Bay County Commission directed County Manager Jonathan A. Mantay and his staff to study the problem and to recommend courses of action. As a result of the study, two possible courses of action were recommended. One possible course of action was the adoption of the "Lifeline" program operated by CCA in Nashville, Tennessee, which CCA claimed would reduce recidivism by teaching inmates life skills and addressing drug abuse, among other things. CCA's corporate headquarters is located in Nashville. The other possible course of action was to emulate the program operated by Sheriff Joe Arpaio, of Maricopa County, Arizona. Sheriff Arpaio's program consists of housing inmates in tents that are sufficiently primitive that inmates, after having had the tenting experience, avoid repeating it either by not committing crimes in Maricopa County, or by committing them elsewhere. In order to evaluate the two courses of action, the Bay County Commission decided that three commissioners and certain staff should travel to the two sites and evaluate the programs. Mr. Zimmerman, Chief of Emergency Services Majka, and County Manager Mantay, were among those who were designated to travel to Nashville and Phoenix. County Manager Mantay specifically desired that Mr. Zimmerman participate in the trip. Mr. Zimmerman believed that if he could convince CCA to pay travel expenses, he should do it so he could save the taxpayers' money. His "marching orders" for many years was that if there was an opportunity to require a third party to pay an expense, then the third party should pay rather than Bay County. That policy is reflected in a variety of Bay County ordinances including the requirement that developers pay for the cost of permitting. The third party payor policy was implemented in a 1997 trip where Westinghouse, a vendor, was required by the County Commissioners to pay for the commissioners' and County staff's trip to Vancouver, B.C., and Long Island, New York, to evaluate the transfer of the resource recovery facility to another vendor. In that instance, after researching the law surrounding the policy, Mr. Zimmerman prepared a written opinion which stated that it was legally permissible to require Westinghouse to fund the trip. This policy was set forth in a letter by Mr. Zimmerman dated October 30, 1997, which informed the County Commissioners that all expenses in connection with their travel, and with the travel of staff, would be funded by Westinghouse. He further stated that, "[it] is our opinion that the payment of these necessary expenses are not 'gifts,' as that term is defined in State law." It was Mr. Zimmerman's understanding that the County Commissioners desired that CCA pay for the trip. Prior to the trip Mr. Zimmerman called Brad Wiggins, the Director of Business Development for CCA, on February 6, 2000, and inquired if CCA would pay for the airline tickets to Nashville. Mr. Zimmerman told Mr. Wiggins, that having CCA pay the air fare, ". . . was the County's preferred way of doing things, and, in fact, that's when he recounted the story of the County taking some trips to New York and maybe some other places." Mr. Wiggins was not authorized by CCA to approve the payment of travel expenses for customers or others. He forwarded Mr. Zimmerman's request to James Ball, his supervisor. Subsequently, Mr. Wiggins happened upon the CEO of CCA, a Dr. Crants, while walking about the Nashville headquarters of CCA. Dr. Crants directed Mr. Wiggins to fund the trip. Ultimately, as a result of these conversations, CCA paid Trade Winds Travel, Inc., of Panama City, Florida, for the cost of the air travel for the entire Bay County contingent to Nashville, and thence to Phoenix, and back to Panama City. The evidence is not conclusive as to whether it was the intent of CCA to fund the trip beyond Nashville, but they paid for the cost of the airfare for the entire trip. Mr. Zimmerman did not learn that the airfare for the Phoenix trip was funded by CCA until the inception of the Commission's investigation. The request for the payment and the request to visit CCA in Nashville was driven by Bay County's needs, not by the needs of CCA. Bay County was one of CCA's most valued customers, however, and CCA was motivated to respond to their request. This was especially true because one of CCA's first contracts to provide correctional services was with Bay County. The Burke and Blue law firm made arrangements for the trip. Mr. Zimmerman did not involve himself in the detailed planning. His firm does not customarily use Trade Winds Travel, Inc., which indicates that the tickets were acquired directly by CCA. Someone from the Burke and Blue firm made hotel reservations in Phoenix. Their firm name appears on the San Carlos Hotel receipt, although the expense was charged directly to Bay County. Mr. Zimmerman was indubitably aware that CCA was paying for all of the expenses in connection with the Nashville leg of the trip. On Thursday, February 24, 2000, Messrs. Zimmerman, Majka, and Mantay, traveled with Bay County Commissioners Danny Sparks, Richard Stewart, and Carol Atkinson, and television reporter Carmen Coursey, by commercial air, to Nashville, Tennessee. On Saturday, February 26, 2000, they traveled to Phoenix, Arizona, and they returned to Panama City on Tuesday, February 29, 2000. The trip was authorized by the Bay County Commission subsequent to several public discussions concerning the need for an on-site visit to Nashville and Phoenix. There was a legitimate public purpose for the trip. As noted above, Channel 13 television news reporter, Carmen Coursey accompanied the officials. It is clear that there was nothing about the trip that was accomplished sub rosa. The airfare was paid by CCA directly to Trade Winds Travel, Inc. CCA did not ask for or receive reimbursement from either Bay County or the travelers. The cost of Mr. Zimmerman's airfare for the entire trip was $1,257. It was reasonable for Mr. Zimmerman to believe that a commercial air trip of that distance would exceed $100. Upon arrival in Nashville, Mr. Zimmerman, and the other travelers were greeted by Mr. Wiggins, who transported them to the Downtown Courtyard Marriott Hotel in a van. The cost of the transportation was paid by CCA and CCA neither asked for nor received reimbursement from Bay County or the travelers. The value was not established. Mr. Zimmerman did not know who paid for the ground transportation. The travelers ate dinner, February 24, 2000, as a group that evening. Someone paid for Mr. Zimmerman's dinner, but the record does not indicate that CCA paid for it. On Friday, February 25, 2000, Mr. Zimmerman and the other travelers toured the Davidson County (Tennessee) Correctional Facility from 9:00 a.m. until noon. They ate lunch provided by CCA, at the CCA corporate headquarters. That afternoon they met with Mr. Wiggins and other representatives of CCA. They discussed the possibility of CCA providing "Lifeline" and "Chances" programs operated by CCA, to Bay County. That evening, at CCA's expense, Mr. Zimmerman and the other travelers were transported by CCA to a dinner that was paid for by CCA. CCA neither asked for, nor received reimbursement from Bay County or the travelers. Mr. Zimmerman was aware that CCA paid for the food consumed that day. Mr. Zimmerman and the other travelers stayed two nights at the Marriott at a cost of $224.24. The cost of the hotel was paid by CCA, and CCA neither asked for nor received reimbursement from Bay County or the travelers. Mr. Zimmerman learned from Mr. Wiggins that CCA had paid the hotel bill, but there is no evidence of record that he knew the amount, or that it was an amount more than $100. However, it is found that Mr. Zimmerman reasonably believed that the aggregate cost of the flights, food, and lodging exceeded $100. On Saturday, February 26, 2000, Mr. Zimmerman and the other travelers departed for Phoenix by air and observed Sheriff Arpaio's program the following Monday morning. They also toured the Phoenix Fire Department. The travelers, with the exception of Mr. Zimmerman, stayed at the San Carlos Hotel. On Tuesday, February 29, 2000, they all returned to Panama City. Bay County originally contracted with CCA to operate their detention facilities on September 3, 1985. This contract had a term of 20 years; however, it was amended on September 16, 1996, to reflect an expiration date of September 24, 1999. Other extensions followed. An amendment dated June 18, 2000, provided that "CCA shall operate the 'Lifeline Program' through September 1, 2001." On May 15, 2001, the contract was extended to September 30, 2006. Mr. Zimmerman did not derive any person financial benefit as a result of CCA paying the lodging expenses in Nashville or as a result of CCA paying for his airfare, because Bay County would have reimbursed his expenses if CCA had not paid. At no time has he attempted to reimburse CCA for the cost of the trip. Mr. Zimmerman did not receive per diem or any amount in excess of the actual cost of the trip. The entity receiving a benefit from the trip was Bay County. It is found as a fact that the cost of the travel to Nashville and back to Panama City, and the cost of the food, transportation, and hotel in Nashville, totaled more than $100 and Mr. Zimmerman reasonably believed that the cost, when aggregated, was more than $100. Mr. Zimmerman did not file a CE form 9, Quarterly Gift Disclosure in conjunction with this trip. It was not uncommon for Mr. Wiggins and other CCA officials to appear before the Bay County Commissioners on behalf of CCA, or to otherwise interact with representatives of CCA. Brad Wiggins was a lobbyist, as that term is defined in Section 112.3148(1)(b)1., and others interacted with Bay County on behalf of CCA and they were lobbyists also. During times relevant, Bay County did not maintain a lobbyist registration system.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a Final Order and Public Report finding that Nevin Zimmerman did not violate Section 112.3148(4) or (8), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the complaint filed against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire Advocate for the Florida Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Albert T. Gimbel, Esquire Gary E. Early, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32319-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32319-5709
The Issue At issue is whether respondent committed the offenses alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility of regulating, permitting, and inspecting, inter alia, amusement devices and attractions, and the prosecution of administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 616.242, Florida Statutes, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Dodge City Kiddie and Pony Rides, Inc., is a Florida corporation, with its principal place of business at 16330 Southwest 147th Avenue, Miami, Dade County, Florida.2 Respondent owns, operates, and rents temporary amusement devices and attractions which are subject to inspection, testing and permitting by the Department, pursuant to Section 616.242, Florida Statutes. Such devices consist primarily of small "kiddie" rides, although respondent does own, operate and rent larger amusement devices such as the Super Slide. These amusements are principally provided for private events, such as birthday parties, company picnics and school carnivals, which are not open to the general public and at which no admission is charged. Occasionally, however, respondent provides amusement devices for "fund raiser type carnival" events that are open to the general public. Industry regulation Prior to July 1, 1992, Section 616.091(2), Florida Statutes, prohibited the operation of temporary amusement devices, such as those operated by respondent, without a "permit" and a "certificate to operate." At the time, there was apparently some disagreement as to whether the law was intended to cover companies, such as respondent, who engaged in the rental of amusement devices or attractions to predominantly small private events. Indeed, as discussed more fully infra, the Department apparently interpreted the law at the time as not requiring permits or inspections of amusements operated by companies, such as respondent. Moreover, the requirement that the Department inspect each device after setup, incident to the issuance of a "certificate to operate," was apparently impractical given the number of such events and the Department's limited personnel.3 Consequently, effective July 1, 1992, Chapter 92-291, Section 91, Laws of Florida, created Subsection 616.0915(24), Florida Statutes, now codified at subsection 616.242(24).4 That subsection expressly addressed the permitting and inspection requirements placed on rental companies, such as respondent, as follows: This subsection establishes permitting and inspection procedures for companies engaged in the rental of amusement devices and amusement attractions. All companies engaged in the rental of amusement devices and amusement attractions shall make application to the department for permits to operate pursuant to this section. Once the annual inspection is completed and the application is approved, amusement devices and amusement attractions owned or operated by rental companies shall be subject to inspection and regulation as specified in paragraphs (b) and (c). Rental companies operating amusement devices or amusement attractions singularly, or jointly with an amusement device or amusement attraction company, at a public event are subject to onsite inspections and issuance of a certificate to operate, pursuant to this section, at that particular event when there are at the event more than three amusement devices or amusement attractions or any combination of both, or when the capacity of any amusement device or amusement attraction at the event exceeds eight persons. Any amusement device or amusement attraction used at a private event for which no admission is charged must comply with all requirements of this section. However, such amusement device or amusement attraction does not have to be inspected by the department at the time of setup. With such amendment, the Legislature clearly expressed its intent that all amusement devices operated by companies, such as respondent, must comply with the "permit" requirements of section 616.242, but were excused or exempt, under certain circumstances, from the requirements for a "setup" inspection and a "certificate to operate" at each event. The violations From November 6, 1993, through February 10, 1996, on 136 separate occasions (separate days or events), respondent rented and operated a temporary amusement device or attraction known as Dinomania that was not permitted as required by law, and that had not undergone the inspection required for permitting. Additionally, the Dinomania had not undergone an onsite inspection following setup and had not been issued a certificate to operate; however, the proof demonstrates, more likely than not, that its use on each occasions was at a private event for which no admission was charged. On January 22, 1995, respondent rented and operated five temporary amusement devices or attractions that were not permitted as required by law, and that had not undergone the inspection required for permitting. The devices or attractions were also not inspected following setup and had not been issued a certificate to operate; however, again, the occasion was most likely a private event at which no admission was charged. On May 3, 1996, Department inspectors, at respondent's request, appeared at respondent's premises to permit a temporary amusement known as a "Super Slide," USA ID Number 264. At the time, inspection revealed certain defects or deficiencies, and an "Imminent Danger - Stop Operation Order" ("red tag") was issued and attached to the attraction. The order provided: The above identified amusement device or amusement attraction is not in compliance with Section 616.242(5)(h) F.S., manufacturer's specifications or ASTM Standards. The amusement device or amusement attraction failed to pass inspection for the above reasons and must be reinspected by the department prior to opening to the public. Subsection 616.242(5)(h), further provides: "[s]uch order may not be removed until the device or amusement attraction is made safe, and may be removed only by the department." On May 18, 1996, respondent, pursuant to a contract with Midway Ford, rented and operated the Super Slide, USA ID Number 264, at 8155 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida. At the time, the Super Slide was not permitted, had not been reinspected by the Department, and someone, other than the Department, had removed the "red tag." The Super Slide had also not been inspected following setup and had not been issued a certificate to operate before operations began; however, although the event was open to the public, the proof failed to demonstrate that there were "three or more amusement devices or amusement attractions or any combination of both, or . . . the capacity of any amusement device or amusement attraction at the event exceeds eight persons." Respondent's defense In response to the showing that respondent rented and operated an unpermitted amusement device or attraction on 136 separate occasions (separate dates or events) between November 6, 1993, and February 10, 1996, as well as five unpermitted amusement devices or attractions at Florida Bible Church on January 22, 1995, petitioner contends it should be excused for such conduct or, stated differently, the Department should be estopped from pursuing such violations, because various Department inspectors had told respondent's principal, Mr. Stevens, on a number of occasions between 1993 and August 1995, that amusement devices and attractions rented or operated for private events did not have to be permitted or inspected. Consequently, according to Mr. Stevens, in reliance on that information, he took no action to permit the amusement devices or attractions he used for private events until August 9, 1995, when he claims the inspectors first advised him that all amusement devices or attractions had to be permitted. The Department denies that any representations suggesting that amusement devices or attractions rented or operated for private events did not require permitting, and contends there is no excuse for respondent's omissions. Regarding the events of August 9, 1995, the proof demonstrates that on that date Department inspectors made an unannounced inspection of the amusement devices and attractions present at respondent's business location. At the time, a number of items were found to lack current annual inspections or permits and were "red tagged." According to respondent's principal, Mr. Stevens, he protested the Department's action at the time because the equipment was destined for private, as opposed to public events, and he felt it unfair that he was just being advised that all equipment, whether for public or private use, required a permit. According to Mr. Stevens, he could not secure the required inspections and permits until October 1995, and the Department's action would seriously affect his business. Therefore, according to Mr. Stevens, the Department removed the "red tag" and acquiesced in his operation until the end of October 1995. At that time, according to Mr. Stevens, his amusement devices and attractions were properly permitted. The Department denies that it removed the "red tags" and acquiesced in respondent's operation of unpermitted equipment at private events until the end of October 1995, and further denies respondent was in compliance thereafter. Addressing first respondent's compliance post-October 1995, the parties' stipulation and the proof demonstrate otherwise. Rather, the proof demonstrates that from November 5, 1995, through February 10, 1996, on 13 separate occasions (separate days or events) respondent rented and operated a temporary amusement device or attraction (the "Dinomania") that was not permitted as required by law, and that had not undergone the inspection required for permitting. Also, on May 18, 1996, respondent operated the Super Slide at Midway Ford without a current permit. Given the proof, there is no explanation or excuse for respondent's conduct regarding those events. With regard to respondent's contention that Department inspectors had advised its principal at various times during the years 1993 to August 1995 that amusement devices and attractions destined for private events did not require permitting, as well as its contention that the Department acquiesced in such use through October 1995, it is found that such assurance or conduct post-July 1, 1992, is most unlikely, given the clear wording of the statute regulating those events. Consequently, considering that factor and the testimony, respondent's contention, and the proof offered to support it, is rejected as unpersuasive.5 Notwithstanding, the proof did demonstrate that prior to the amendment of July 1, 1992, the law was apparently not so clear, and the Department apparently interpreted the law as exempting operators, such as respondent, since Mr. Lowell Parrish, then the Department's Chief, Bureau of Fair Rides Inspecting, advised Mr. Stevens that permits were not required for private events. With the change in the law, and Mr. Ronald Safford's appointment as Bureau Chief in December 1992, however, permits have been required. Given such proof, and Mr. Steven's apparent sincerity regarding his understanding (until August 9, 1995) of the requirements placed on his operations, a likely explanation for respondent's failure to perceive a need to permit its amusements is misunderstanding. For example, it is possible that inspectors advised Mr. Stevens that the Department did not need to inspect amusements destined for private events. Such advice was accurate, as to setup inspections, but Mr. Stevens may have erroneously assumed, consistent with the practice under the former law, that inspection and permitting was also not required. Whether such was or was not the source of Mr. Stevens understanding is, however, speculative. Moreover, if it occurred, Mr. Stevens reliance or assumption was not well founded.6 In this regard, it is observed that since at least 1991 the Department, on an annual basis, has provided all traveling amusement operators, including respondent, with permit application forms, a copy of Section 616.242, Florida Statutes, and a copy of Rule 5F-8, Florida Administrative Code. While Mr. Stevens acknowledges receipt of such materials, he frankly admits he never read the law. Such failure by the owner of a regulated business, evidences recklessness or indifference. Moreover, the provision of section 616.242 relating to respondent's business, subsection (24), is brief, and no reasonable person could read it and fail to grasp its requirements.7 In response to the showing that respondent rented and operated a Super Slide on May 18, 1996, at Midway Ford that had not been reinspected by the Department following the attachment of an "Imminent Danger - Stop Operation Order" ("red tag"), respondent concedes such conduct violated the provisions of subsection 616.242(5)(h), Florida Statutes. [Respondent's proposed recommended order, at conclusions of law, paragraph 7.]8 However, with regard to the additional violation claimed, that the Super Slide was operated without a current permit, respondent contends it is not guilty of such violation because the Department was without authority to deny its permit on May 3, 1996, the day of the inspection. To support its argument, respondent points to the provisions of subsection 616.242(4)(d), which provides: Permits and certificates to operate shall be issued to the owner of an amusement device or amusement attraction when: Written application has been made to the department. The amusement device has passed all required inspection. The liability insurance or bond has been met in the amount prescribed. Here, respondent contends it had applied for the permit renewal, the amusement device had passed all "required inspections" [i.e., it had been inspected by a professional engineer and a nondestructive test had been performed, as required by subsection 616.242(5)(c)], and the required insurance or bond had been posted. Consequently, respondent concludes the Department was compelled to issue the permit, notwithstanding the perceived deficiencies, and it should not be considered guilty of having operated the equipment without a permit on May 18, 1996. Having considered respondent's argument, it must be concluded that it is without merit. First, the equipment was not shown to have "passed all required inspections," simply because an affidavit of annual inspection by a professional engineer was presented, as well as evidence of a nondestructive test. Subsection 616.242(5)(c) requires that the inspection performed by the professional engineer "shall, at a minimum, comply with the requirements of the department." Such requirements include the following provisions of Chapter 5F-8, Florida Administrative Code: 5F-8.0051 Inspection Standards. For an amusement attraction or amusement device to comply with ASTM Committee F-24 Standards each component or element of the amusement attraction or amusement device must comply with ASTM Committee F-24 Standards. The amusement attraction or amusement device shall not fail to pass inspection solely because a nonessential or ornamental component is inoperative or in disrepair. 5F-8.006 Issuance of Permits. Permits shall be issued when the provisions of s. 616.242(4)(d), Florida Statutes, and this chapter have been met. Here, the amusement device was found not to comply with section 616.242(5)(h), manufacturer's specifications or ASTM Standards. Consequently, the Department was not obligated to permit the equipment. Indeed, it would be rather incongruous to compel the Department to permit equipment it had found on inspection to "present[] an imminent danger" where the purpose of subsection 616.242 is to "guard against personal injuries in the . . . use of amusement devices."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered adopting the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and imposing an administrative fine against respondent in the sum of $23,500.DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1997.
