The Issue Whether the license of Respondent, O. Tom Macon, should be suspended, or whether other disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, O. Tom Macon, is a registered real estate salesman residing in Fort Myers, Florida, who holds License number 0054554 as a real estate salesman. On April 20, 1978, an administrative complaint was filed against the Respondent alleging that he was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction. The Respondent requested an administrative hearing. In January of 1974, Mr. James Fortiner, Dr. David Brown, and Respondent Macon purchased the Professional Arts Building in Fort Myers, Florida. The transaction was documented by a deed from the seller to the Respondent as trustee. Title was transferred to a corporation, Professional Arts Building of Fort Myers, Inc., in December of 1974. James Fortiner transferred his interest in the property to Respondent Macon, leaving the Respondent with a two-thirds interest in the property and Dr. Brown with a one-third interest. At a later date Respondent Macon obtained a $20,000.00 personal loan from a man by the name of Phil Elliott, secured by a second mortgage on the subject property. He did not secure Dr. Brown's permission to mortgage the property or tell him of the encumberance. Subsequently, Respondent Macon contracted to sell the Professional Arts Building to Jeanne L. Eveleth in February of 1976. At the closing in March of 1976, which Dr. Brown did not attend, a check for $33,433.42 was deposited to the account of the Professional Arts Building, Limited. Simultaneously, Respondent Macon paid his personal debt to Mr. Elliott out of the proceeds of the sale and satisfied the mortgage. A final statement established that Respondent Macon owed personal debts to the limited partnership in the amount of $6,972.45, and that the limited partnership owed Dr. Brown this amount of money. After the sale of the property and the payment of Respondent's personal debt out of the proceeds, there were no assets left in the corporation. When confronted with this situation, the Respondent promised Dr. Brown he would pay him the money the Respondent had used without authorization, but in November of 1976, the Respondent went into voluntary bankruptcy. At that time Respondent Macon still owed Dr. Brown the full amount due to Dr. Brown as a result of the sale of the subject property. Bankruptcy, however, has no effect on the authority of Petitioner to discipline. Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders. These instruments were considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in, or are inconsistent with, factual findings in this order they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends suspension of Respondent O. Tom Macon's license until such time as he makes full restitution to Dr. Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of July, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Harry A. Blair, Esquire Post Office Box 1467 Fort Myers, Florida 33902
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents are guilty of misrepresentation or breach of trust and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact In October 1993, Respondent Sylvester (Respondent) took his daughter, whose last name was Rodriguez by marriage, to a real estate sales office that was selling units of a new condominium building. Respondent's daughter was 42 years old at the time. Speaking to the qualifying broker for the selling broker, Respondent advised her that he was a real estate salesperson for Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc. and wanted to show a unit to his daughter. Respondent referred to his daughter by name, rather than as his daughter, and did not mention to the broker that his customer was his daughter. Respondent gave the qualifying broker his card and signed his name in a log to protect his interest in the cooperating broker's sales commission. After touring a model unit, Mrs. Rodriguez expressed sufficient interest that Respondent obtained a form contract from the qualifying broker before leaving the premises. Respondent completed the contract, but left negotiations to Respondent Mitulinsky because Respondent was going out of town. Respondent Mitulinsky is the qualifying broker for Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc. Her involvement with the transaction was limited to contact with the listing broker, transmitting prices between Mrs. Rodriguez and the seller. Respondent Mitulinsky did not disclose that Mrs. Rodriguez was Respondent's daughter. But the evidence fails to suggest that Respondent Mitulinsky was in any way aware that the seller's broker was ignorant of the relationship between Respondent and Mrs. Rodriguez. The evidence also fails to suggest that the nature and extent of the conversations between Respondent Mitulinsky and the qualifying broker were such as to support an inference of concealment of the relationship by Respondent Mitulinsky. Prior to agreeing upon a final price, the seller's qualifying broker agreed to increase the commission to be paid Respondent Lyric Group Realty, Inc. by one percentage point to three percent. The listing price for the unit was $285,000. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez submitted the contract with a price of $240,000. Following verbal negotiations, the seller returned the same contract with a price of $268,000, which the buyers accepted on October 29, 1993. A salesperson employed by the listing broker admits that she knew of the relationship between Respondent and his daughter prior to closing. After the contract was signed but prior to closing, Respondent, Mrs. Rodriguez, a home inspector, and the salesperson visited the unit. As the inspector worked, Mrs. Rodriguez and her father spoke freely, as they had in past visits, with Mrs. Rodriguez referring to Respondent as "dad" and he referring to her by her first name. The salesperson immediately informed her broker, who immediately reported the information to the seller. However, the seller elected to do nothing with the information because he was satisfied with the sales price and net proceeds. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez were purchasing the first unit to be sold at the seller's project. This makes the first transaction especially risky for both the seller and the buyers. The purchase price represented the fair market value for the unit. The unit appraised at $271,000 at the time of the sale to Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez. On January 6, 1994, the parties closed on the unit pursuant to the provisions of the contract. The $16,080 sales commission was split evenly between the listing broker and Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Real Estate enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint against all respondents ENTERED on September 30, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this September 30, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Peter Hobson, Esquire 606 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a real estate salesman should be revoked or otherwise disciplined on the ground that she is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1) (b), Florida Statutes (1979).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the charges, respondent Margaret Perry was a licensed Florida real estate salesman holding license No. 0147966. Her business address is Key Place Realty, 513 West Vine Street, Kissimmee, Florida. (Stipulation of Parties.) I. The Offer On December 12 and 13, 1980, Perry W. Ripple, Jr., and Carol C. Ripple, his wife, signed a contract to purchase a 5-acre tract, with residence, located on Hickory Tree Road, Osceola County, Florida. The contract was prepared by respondent, who had previously shown the property to the Ripples. (Testimony of Perry, P. Ripple, C. Ripple; Joint Exhibit No. 1.) On Saturday, December 13, 1980, the contract constituted only a written offer to purchase the property since Novie P. Cleveland and Pamela A. Cleveland- -the owners of the property--had not yet accepted the offer by signing the contract. Pursuant to the contract, the offer was accompanied by a $1,000 earnest money deposit and an assignment of a certificate of deposit. (Testimony of P. Ripple, Perry.) On Saturday, December 13, 1980, when respondent received the signed offer, with earnest money deposit and certificate of deposit assignment, she mailed a copy to the American Title Insurance Company and ordered title insurance. Before mailing the contract offer to the title insurance company, she typed two dates above the contract signature lines: "December 13, 1980" as the date it was signed by the buyers; 3/ and "December 15, 1980" as the date it would be signed by the sellers (the sellers had not yet signed the contract; she inserted December 15, 1980, in anticipation of their signing on that date). She used December 15, 1980, because, under the terms of the contract, that was the last day the offer could be accepted by the sellers. (Testimony of Perry, Carlyon; P-1.) II. The Acceptance At approximately 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 14, 1980, respondent telephoned the sellers, Novie P. and Pamela A. Cleveland, and arranged for them to meet her at Mr. Cleveland's office and accept the offer by signing the contract. Respondent expedited the signing of the contract because the Ripples were in a hurry to close the transaction. (Testimony of N. Cleveland, P. Cleveland, Perry.) A few minutes later, the Clevelands met respondent at the designated place and signed the contract. Although they signed the contract on December 14, 1980, respondent inadvertently failed to correct the December 15, 1980, date which she had earlier placed in the contract as the date of execution by the sellers. (Testimony of Perry, N. Cleveland, P. Cleveland; Joint Exhibit No. 1.) III. Buyers' Attempt to Withdraw Offer Later on that evening--between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on December 14, 1980--Mr. Ripple telephoned respondent at her home. He questioned her about the boundaries and size of the property and, for reasons not material here, told her that he no longer wanted to buy the property, that he wanted the earnest money deposit returned. The conversation was abrupt and heated; both parties became upset with each other. The subject of whether the contract had been accepted and signed by the sellers was not mentioned. (Testimony of Perry, C. Ripple, P. Ripple.) The critical dispute in this case is the time of Mr. Ripple's telephone call to respondent. The Ripples testified it was between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m.; respondent testified it was between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. If the Ripples' testimony is accepted, then respondent presented an offer to the sellers for acceptance after the buyers had told her they wanted to withdraw the offer and not proceed with the contract; this is the essence of respondent's alleged misconduct. If respondent's testimony is accepted, the buyers did not notify her that they wanted to withdraw their offer until after the offer was accepted by the sellers; under such circumstances, her conduct was clearly proper. Respondent's testimony on the timing of the Ripples' telephone call is accepted as persuasive; (see paragraph 7 above) the Ripples' testimony concerning the time of the call is rejected. In earlier testimony, Mr. Ripple's memory of the events in question was shown to be unreliable: [Respondent's Counsel] Q: You say you signed the contract on December the 13th, on a Saturday. [Mr. Ripple] A: Yes. Q: Isn't it true that you signed the contract at the Sun Bank in St. Cloud on Friday, December 12th, on the hood of your car or Marge's car? That's possible, yes. Q: So you were mistaken when you said you signed it on Saturday. A: Yes, I was. I probably was. (Tr. 23.) More importantly, if the Ripples' testimony is correct, respondent deliberately presented an offer for acceptance which the purchasers no longer wished to make. Assuming such conduct occurred, it is inconceivable that she would inadvertently fail to correct the date on the contract to indicate that the sellers signed on December 14, 1980 (the same day the Ripples attempted to withdraw), not December 15, 1980. The events occurred close together and timing was critical. By not changing the date, she allowed the contract to incorrectly reflect that the sellers signed the contract a day later than they actually did: the time between the buyers' attempt to withdraw and the sellers' acceptance becomes greater than it was and even more difficult for her to explain. In short, her failure to correct the date of the sellers' signing of the contract is not a mistake she would have made if, as the Department alleges, she knowingly presented an offer and completed a contract against the expressed wishes of the buyers. IV. No Damage to Parties Involved On Monday, December 15, 1980, the Ripples stopped payment on their earnest money deposit check. The sellers did not pursue any legal rights or remedies they may have had against the Ripples. Eventually, the property in question was sold to another party. There is no evidence that the Ripples or Clevelands were financially harmed as a result of the events in question. (Testimony of Perry, C. Ripple, P. Ripple, N. Cleveland.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department's administrative complaint dated October 20, 1981, be dismissed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1982.
The Issue Respondents' alleged violation of subsection 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. Inasmuch as Respondents were not represented by legal counsel at the hearing, the Hearing Officer explained their rights in administrative proceedings to James F. Catron who elected to represent himself and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a corporation registered as a real estate broker doing business at 5805 Margate Boulevard, Margate, Florida. Respondent James F. Catron is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a registered real estate broker and the active broker and officer of Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. (Stipulation) In January, 1976, Richard H. Goodwin, Jr. and Christine S. Goodwin, his wife, owned a four-unit apartment building at 7650 Southwest 10th Court, North Lauderdale, Florida, described as Lot 7, Block 13, Lauderdale North Park, Section 3. The Goodwins were having marital difficulties and decided to separate at this time and divest themselves of mutually-owned property. In a conversation with a salesman for respondents, Mr. Goodwin learned that James F. Catron was in the business of purchasing investment properties and reselling the same whereupon he would divide any profit with the former owner. Goodwin thereafter entered into negotiations with Catron for the sale of the apartment building. It was orally agreed that Catron would pay $62,700.00 for the property with a $1,000.00 down payment, and assume a first mortgage with Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County in the amount of approximately $57,400.00 and a second mortgage with Seacrest Homes, Inc., John E. Abdo, Trustee, in the approximate amount of $5,300.00. It was further agreed that Catron would pay the Goodwins 30 percent of 80 percent of any net profit realized when he resold the property. As a consequence of this agreement, the Goodwins, on January 19, 1976, executed a deposit receipt contract embodying the above terms except that it recited the receipt of $10.00 as a deposit rather than $1,000.00, and made no mention of assumption of the mortgages. However, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid to the Goodwins by Catron. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that Catron signed this contract, Catron denied it and no such contract signed by Catron was placed in evidence at the hearing. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Catron, Petitioner's exhibit 1) Mr. Goodwin, on January 19, 1976, executed a document authorizing Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. to collect rents from the tenants of the apartment building. Catron, anticipating consummation of the purchase, proceeded to collect rentals in the amount of approximately $800.00 per month for the next four and one-half months, for total collections of approximately $3,600.00. He also made some repairs to the property and paid utilities bills. The Goodwins believed that he would take steps to assume the two mortgages on the property and take over the payments thereon. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that he and his wife had executed a warranty deed and delivered it to Catron, Catron denied receipt of such a deed and it was not produced at the hearing. Accordingly, it cannot be found that such a deed was in fact executed and delivered. The rents were collected by a limited partnership called Forest Run, Limited, of which Catron was a partner. Although the February payments were made on the mortgages, they were discontinued when Catron discovered that he could not assume the second mortgage from Seacrest Homes, Inc. without payment of $1,000.00 to the trustee, Abdo. As a consequence, the Goodwins filed suit against the respondents in the Broward County Circuit Court on June 23, 1976, requesting that any agreements concerning the property be rescinded, and that an accounting be ordered and a receiver appointed to administer and manage the property in question. A receiver was appointed by the court. Thereafter, in August 1976, Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association filed suit to foreclose its mortgage on the property and obtained summary judgment in the Broward County Circuit Court on January 25, 1977. The property was thereafter sold at public sale and bought in by Southern Federal. On January 25, 1977, the suit of the Goodwins against respondents was dismissed by stipulation after the parties had reached an amicable settlement in the matter. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4)
Recommendation That the charges against the respondents, James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. 5805 Margate Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063
The Issue An Administrative complaint dated April 13, 1999, alleges that Respondent Mr. Stevens violated several provisions of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, when he failed to return an earnest money deposit to a buyer after being directed to do so by the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The issues in this proceeding are whether Mr. Stevens committed the violation and if so what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Collie E. Stevens, has been licensed in the State of Florida as a real estate broker since 1986. Prior to that year he was licensed as a real estate salesperson in Florida. In 1996 Mr. Stevens represented the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in the sale of a home in Orange County, Florida. On October 1, 1996, Doris Wright executed an Offer to Purchase and Contract of Sale for the home. When she signed the contract Ms. Wright gave the broker, Mr. Stevens, a check for $675.00 as an earnest money deposit. Mr. Stevens deposited the check into his escrow account. Later, in October or November 1996, Ms. Wright withdrew her offer to purchase the property. The VA regional office provided a notice to Mr. Stevens dated November 20, 1996, directing him to return the earnest money deposit to Ms. Wright. Mr. Stevens never returned the money to Ms. Wright although she made several requests through his secretary and made several attempts to contact him directly. Mr. Stevens alleges that he is entitled to retain at least $250.00 of the $675.00 deposit because that was the mortgage company's fee for processing Ms. Wright's mortgage application. Mr. Stevens claims that Ms. Wright authorized him to pay that fee on her behalf when she was not in town; Ms. Wright does not dispute that claim. Mr. Stevens also argues that he should be entitled to the remainder of the deposit money because Ms. Wright cancelled a listing agreement for him to sell her house. Ms. Wright disputes this claim and Mr. Stevens did not produce any contract or document evidencing such an agreement. During the pendancy of his dispute with Ms. Wright over entitlement to the deposit Mr. Stevens never notified the Florida Real Estate Commission of the dispute nor did he submit the matter to arbitration, mediation, or any court. Mr. Stevens insists that he could have worked out his differences with Ms. Wright and that he was always willing to give her $425.00, left after deducting $250.00 for the processing fee from the $675.00 deposit. In 1996, in another case, Mr. Stevens was disciplined by the Florida Real Estate Commission for culpable negligence or breach of trust, failure to give notice of his representation of a party, failure to maintain trust funds in an escrow account, and failure to preserve and make available brokerage records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order finding that Collie E. Stevens is guilty of a violation of Sections 475.25(1)(d)1. and 475.25(1)(0), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that the Florida Real Estate Commission suspend his license for two years and require him to complete a 7-hour escrow management course and a 60-hour post-licensure course, and that he pay the costs associated with this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea D. Perkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 308N Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Collie E. Stevens Son Set Free Realty, Inc. 2294 North U.S. One Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Is Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of failure to account for and deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wiedle was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number BK-0646846, and was principal broker of Escarosa Realty. Respondent's license is still active. Janice Marlene Christian is a realtor associate. She was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty from December 1998 until April 1999. Accordingly, Respondent Wiedle was Ms. Christian's registered broker during this time. Ms. Beverly Lewis is the mother-in-law of Ms. Christian's brother. Ms. Lewis came to Ms. Christian in February 1999 because she was interested in looking for and purchasing a house. On February 16, 1999, Ms. Christian facilitated an Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement (the Agreement) on behalf of Escarosa Realty with Ms. Lewis. The Agreement was on a form created by Formulator, a software company. "Florida Association of Realtors" appears on the face of the document. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement reads in pertinent part: RETAINER: Upon final execution of this agreement, Buyer will pay to Broker a non- refundable retainer fee of $0 for Broker's services ("Retainer"). Accordingly, Respondent was not entitled to any money as a retainer fee for broker services pursuant to this agreement. The agreement was signed by Ms. Lewis, Ms. Christian, and Ms. Wiedle and became effective on February 16, 1999. The specified termination date of the agreement was August 17, 1999. On or about February 27, 1999, Ms. Christian tendered an offer to sellers on behalf of Ms. Lewis, for property located at 107 Poi Avenue in Santa Rosa County (subject property). Pursuant to this offer, Ms. Lewis gave a $500.00 check dated February 27, 1999, to Ms. Christian as earnest money. The check is made out as follows: "Escarosa Realty Inc. Escrow". Ms. Lewis wrote in the memo section of the check that the check was escrow money for 107 Poi Terrace. The $500.00 check was deposited in Escarosa Realty's escrow account on March 1, 1999. Respondent accounted for the $500.00 check on the March 1999 monthly reconciliation statement for Escarosa Realty. The seller of the subject property made a counter- offer for a higher price which Ms. Lewis rejected. The testimony differs as to what happened next. According to Ms. Christian, Ms. Christian spoke to Respondent sometime after Ms. Lewis rejected the counter-offer about refunding the escrow money to Ms. Lewis. According to Ms. Christian, Respondent informed her that she did not have to give the escrow money back to Ms. Lewis yet because she had the buyer broker agreement. Ms. Christian further asserts that she filled out a written request on March 16, 1999, on a form entitled "EMD Request," which means earnest money deposit request, and gave it to Respondent who again asserted that the $500.00 did not need to be returned at that time because of the buyer brokerage agreement. Ms. Christian's testimony is consistent with Ms. Lewis's. According to Ms. Lewis, she talked to Ms. Christian about getting a refund of the $500.00 shortly after she rejected the counter-offer. She and Ms. Christian discussed the EMD form. She initially agreed that Respondent could temporarily maintain the escrow funds. However, when Ms. Lewis discovered that the financing she was seeking through the rural development program would take several months, she decided she wanted the money returned. Ms. Christian ended her contract with Escarosa Realty effective April 14, 1999. Because Ms. Christian was no longer at Escarosa, Ms. Lewis contacted Respondent by telephone on or about April 21, 1999. Ms. Lewis informed Respondent about the purchase offer and rejection of the counter-offer for the subject property. According to Ms. Lewis, Respondent initially told her she would return the money to her in the mail. When she did not receive it, Ms. Lewis again called Respondent and was told that the $500.00 would not be returned because of the buyer brokerage agreement was still in place. Ms. Lewis asserts that Respondent never told her any request for a refund of the $500.00 had to be in writing. Ms. Lewis then went to the Escarosa Realty office. Ms. Weidle was not there but Elnora Alexander was there. Ms. Alexander was also a realtor associate who was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty. Ms. Lewis explained to Ms. Alexander about the circumstances of the subject property and that she wanted her earnest money back. Ms. Alexander gave a copy of the buyer broker agreement to Ms. Lewis. After going to Escarosa Realty, Ms. Lewis had numerous other telephone conversations with Respondent about the money. Respondent denies any knowledge of the Poi Terrace failed transaction until she spoke to Ms. Lewis on the phone. She also denied ever receiving the EMD request from Ms. Christian. Respondent asserts that she repeatedly told Ms. Lewis that she would return the $500.00 if Ms. Lewis would only make a request in writing, but that Ms. Lewis refused. This assertion is not credible. It is inconceivable that after all of the efforts made by Ms. Lewis to get her $500.00 returned to her, that she would refuse to make a written request for the money. In any event, there is no dispute that Ms. Lewis made verbal requests to Respondent for the return of the escrow monies. Respondent Wiedle admits that Ms. Lewis requested the money over the telephone. Further, in an April 2, 2001 letter from Respondent to the Division of Real Estate, Respondent acknowledged that Ms. Lewis asked for a refund of the money in the beginning of May and again in early June of 1999. Clearly, if Respondent Wiedle had not previously been aware of the failed Poi Terrace transaction, she was made aware of it during the telephone conversations with Ms. Lewis. Notwithstanding Respondent's assertion that the reason she did not refund the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis was that the request was not in writing, it is clear from Respondent's testimony and from a letter she wrote to Mr. Clanton, Petitioner's investigator, that she believed the $500.00 was connected to the buyer brokerage agreement, not to any offer for purchase of property. In an undated letter from Respondent Wiedle to Mr. Clanton, Respondent wrote: Dear Mr. Clanton, This is in response to your letter dated August 17th, 1999. First Beverly A. Lewis was refunded her money on August 20, 1999 check #111. Second I would like to respond to her complaint. Beverly A. Lewis signed a Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement with EscaRosa Realty, Inc. on February 16th, 1999 with it to terminate on August 17th 1999. Beverly A. Lewis knew that her deposit was a refundable deposit after the agreement is expired not before. As the Broker of this company I had no contact with Beverly Lewis until the agent Marlene Christian was asked to leave the company. If there ever was a contract for her to purchase a house then her agent Marlene Christian never informed me of nor did she ever provide any such contract. The deposit was given to me with the Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement only. Nor did her agent Marlene ever fill out the EMD refund request form requesting a refund to be given to Beverly A. Lewis. However, The result would have been the same. I asked Beverly Lewis If she had changed her mind on purchasing a house she said no she was still going to buy a house but that she knew if she didn't buy her house through Marlene at her new company that Marlene would make life very hard on her. I told her I was sorry but that is the whole purpose in the contract was to secure your buyers from just going all over the place. . . .(emphasis supplied) Respondent refunded the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis on August 10, 1999. At hearing, Respondent volunteered that there was a previous complaint against her for failing to return money she held under a buyer brokerage agreement with a former client. In that instance, the Probable Cause Panel of the Florida Real Estate Commission found no probable cause but issued a letter of guidance to Respondent.1
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, the evidence of record and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding the Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, in that she failed to deliver escrow money upon demand, imposing a fine of $1,000.00, and placing Respondent Wiedle on probation for a period of two years. As conditions of probation, Respondent should be required to attend a continuing education course which addresses appropriate handling of escrow funds and be subject to periodic inspections and interviews by a Department of Business and Professional Regulation investigator. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Respondent met Sibley Dennis Carpenter, Jr. (Carpenter) in 1974 or 1975, in connection with a land sale that is not otherwise relevant to this matter. In the summer of 1975, Carpenter asked respondent for assistance in obtaining financing for another, separate land transaction. On that occasion, Carpenter furnished respondent an unaudited, personal financial statement, prepared by an accounting firm, which put the net worth of Carpenter and his wife at slightly less than a half million dollars. On November 19, 1975, respondent became affiliated with Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., as a real estate salesman. Because he had other irons in the fire, he only appeared at the office of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., once every month or two. Not until the spring of the following year, after he had been licensed as a real estate broker, did respondent have access to the company's books. In November of 1975, respondent met one Charles W. Van Cura, a hog farmer from Minnesota who expressed an interest in buying land in Florida, and referred Mr. Van Cura to Carpenter. Carpenter, possibly in the company of respondent, showed Mr. Van Cura certain real property belonging to Harvey H. Westphal and Margaret Westphal. Mr. Van Cura made an offer of one hundred fifteen thousand dollars ($115,000.00) for the property and deposited seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter towards the purchase price, as evidenced by a binder receipt and deposit, dated December 31, 1975, and signed by Carpenter. Respondent's exhibit No. 1. Carpenter presented the offer to the Westphals, who refused Mr. Van Cura's offer but made a counteroffer of one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00), by crossing out Mr. Van Cura's figures, substituting their own and signing their names. Both the offer and the counteroffer were "subject to receiving Federal Land Bank Loan of 70 percent of purchase price . . ." Van Cura told Carpenter he was unwilling to accept the Westphals' counteroffer. Carpenter persuaded respondent to buy the property himself, and, on January 6, 1976, Carpenter, respondent and Van Cura met in respondent's office. After some discussion, respondent drew two checks aggregating seventy- five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) to Van Cura's order. Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 6. Van Cura executed a receipt, respondent's exhibit No. 2, reciting that he had received seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) from respondent. At the time of this transaction, Carpenter could not have refunded Van Cura's deposit from the escrow account of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., because there were insufficient funds in the account. Unbeknownst to respondent, Carpenter had never deposited Van Cura's money in the escrow account. On January 30, 1976, Carpenter drew up a written offer on behalf of respondent to purchase the Westphal property for one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00). Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. The binder receipt and deposit recited that respondent "and or assigns" had deposited seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter in earnest money. Although the Westphals accepted this offer, the transaction never closed, for reasons which were not developed in the evidence. The Westphals never made demand for the seventy-five hundred dollar ($7,500.00) deposit, and respondent never got the money back from Carpenter. Respondent has since decided to "treat it . . . as a loan, or write it off." (R119) At no time did respondent relate to the Westphals the history of the earnest money deposit. In May of 1976, respondent was licensed as a real estate broker, and became secretary-treasurer of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc. Respondent and Carpenter agreed between themselves that the corporation should open an escrow account on which each could draw individually. This is reflected by a corporate resolution, dated May 4, 1976. Respondent's exhibit No. 7. Such an account was opened. When the first bank statement revealed to respondent that Carpenter had drawn improper checks against the escrow account, however, a second corporate resolution was drafted, dated July 23, 1976, respondent's exhibit No. 9, which authorized respondent, but not Carpenter, to draw against the escrow account.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. W. O. Birchfield, Esquire 3000 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue Does Petitioner, Captain Ronald G. Beermunder, have standing to bring this action? Does the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) have jurisdiction over this matter? Do the 2008 Firearms Instructor's Training Manual and the 2011 Certificate of Firearms Proficiency for Statewide Firearm License constitute agency statements that amount to a rule as defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (2014)?1/ If so, has the Division adopted the statements through the chapter 120 rulemaking procedure?
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Division licenses and regulates private investigative, security, and repossession services in Florida. §§ 493.6100 and 493.6101, Fla. Stat. Some Division licensees may bear firearms in the course of regulated activities. § 493.6115(2), Fla. Stat. A licensee who bears a firearm must also possess a Class "G" license. § 493.6115(2), Fla. Stat. An applicant for a Class "G" license must satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by statute and rule of the Department. The criteria include 28 hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a Class "K" licensee. § 493.6105(5), Fla. Stat. Additionally, each Class "G" licensee must submit proof annually that he or she has received a minimum of four hours of firearms recertification training, also taught by a Class "K" licensee during each year of the license period. § 493.6113(3)(b), Fla. Stat. Captain Beermunder has been a licensed Class "K" firearms instructor since 2009. A Brief History of the Manual, the Certificate, and Rules Over the years, the Division has prepared various versions of a Firearms Instructor's Training Manual for Class "K" instructors to use when teaching Class "G" students. The Division has also prepared various versions of a Certificate of Firearms Proficiency for Statewide Firearm License for use by Class "K" instructors to certify a Class "G" student's completion of training. In 1996, the Division, housed, at the time, at the Secretary of State, incorporated the existing versions of the manual and the certificate in Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C-3.1000(6), now rule 5N-1.100. Over the following years, the Division prepared and relied upon various updated versions of the manual and the certificate, including the 2008 version of the Manual and the 2011 Certificate. It did not adopt these versions by reference in a rule. In the euphemistic words of Mr. Wilkinson, the assistant director of the Division, who took that position in 20113/: "Well, I have to acknowledge that my predecessors were not observant in their duties to update manuals and go through the proper rulemaking process." In 2014, after Captain Beermunder began his challenges to use of the 2008 Manual and the 2011 Certificate, the Department amended rule 5N-1.134. The amendment incorporated revised versions of the manual and the certificate as permitted by section 120.54(1)(h). The rule, as amended, became effective May 21, 2014. The Division stopped relying on the 2008 Manual on May 21, 2014, upon adoption of the 2014 version. On May 20, 2014, the Division sent all Class "K" instructors an "Important Notice," along with a compact disc (CD) containing an electronic version of the 2014 Firearms Instructor's Training Manual. The notice informed instructors of the changes to the 2008 Manual and that a supply of revised 2011 Certificates would be forwarded in June 2014. On June 25, 2014, the Division issued another "Important Notice" to Class "K" instructors, along with a supply of the newly adopted 2014 Certificates. It sent a second CD because the one sent in May contained typographical errors. The "Important Notice" informed Class "K" instructors that they could continue using the 2011 Certificate until their stock of certificates ran out. If an applicant submitted the 2011 Certificate, the Division would accept it. New Criminal Statute in 2013 and Investigation of Beermunder The Legislature amended section 493.6120, Florida Statutes (2012), in 2013 to make it a third-degree felony to knowingly possess, issue, sell, submit, or offer "a fraudulent training certificate, proficiency form, or other official document that declares an applicant to have successfully completed any course of training required for licensure under this chapter." § 493.6120(5), Fla. Stat.; Ch. 2013-251, § 6, Laws of Fla. The Division began investigating several Class "K" instructors, including Captain Beermunder, for violation of the new statute. The Division turned the investigation of Captain Beermunder over to the Department of Agriculture Law Enforcement unit. Investigator Padgett issued a probable cause statement that led to the State Attorney of Santa Rosa County charging Captain Beermunder with multiple felony violations. During the Department's investigation and determination of probable cause, the Division relied upon the 2008 Manual and the 2011 Certificate, neither of which were ever adopted as rules. Before this rule challenge hearing, Captain Beermunder entered a no contest plea to nine felony counts of issuing fraudulent certificates, reserving the right to appeal the ruling on a motion in limine raising an issue of whether charges relied upon an unpromulgated rule. The Division is acting against Captain Beermunder's license on the basis of his no contest plea. The nine counts of amended information that Captain Beermunder pled no contest to in criminal case no. 13001343CFMXAX charged him, using identical language except for the differing names of the applicants and different dates in 2013, with issuing a Certificate of Proficiency for the Security Officer G-License applicants when he "knew or reasonably should have known that the certificate, form, or document was fraudulent in violation of Sections 493.6120(7) and 493.6105(5), Florida Statutes." Section 493.6105(5) states among other things: In addition to the requirements outlined in subsection (3), an applicant for a Class "G" license must satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by rule of the department, which training criteria includes, but is not limited to, 28 hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a Class "K" licensee; however, no more than 8 hours of such training shall consist of range training. Every one of the charges to which Captain Beermunder pled no contest were based upon issuing certificates of firearms proficiency fraudulently stating that the applicant had completed 28 hours of training. The Legislature established the requirement for 28 hours of training in 1997 when chapter 97-248, section 3, Laws of Florida, amended section 493.6105, Florida Statutes (1996), to raise the hours of training requirement to 28. The requirement has been in effect ever since. It was in effect when Captain Beermunder was first licensed in 2009.
