The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the provider, Medilab, was overpaid for medicaid claims as alleged in the letter dated November 3, 1993.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. At all times material to this case, Medilab was a medicaid provider. Medilab enrolled as a physician group provider on or about October 2, 1991. Medilab was not enrolled with the Florida Medicaid program as a diagnostic lab. At all times material to this case, Medilab was owned and operated by Roberto Rodriguez and Jorge Nunez. Mr. Rodriguez handled the administrative duties for Medilab while Mr. Nunez operated the diagnostic portion of the business. Medilab operated several machines for diagnostic evaluations as ordered by a physician. Such machines produced documentation which was then evaluated by another physician. Dr. Carmouze did not perform the service nor interpret the diagnostic results. When Medilab applied for a provider number to enroll in the Medicaid program it represented that services were to be provided by Dr. Arnoldo Carmouze. It was further represented that Dr. Carmouze would treat or supervise treatment of patients on behalf of the Medilab "group." On or about January 11, 1992, Medilab received its group provider number along with a copy of the Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook. Medilab was notified that it could begin billing for services beginning October 2, 1991. Subsequently, the Agency performed an audit of Medilab for the period October 2, 1991 through August 31, 1992. Li-Hsiang Wu, a computer systems project analyst employed by the Agency, generated a random sample of Medicaid recipients by using a computer program to calculate the total number of Medicaid recipients for which claims were submitted during the audit period. Then Medilab's provider number and the dates of the audit were used to generate the total number of Medicaid recipients for whom claims were submitted by Medilab for the audit period. Once the total number of recipients was identified, Ms. Wu generated a list of forty-three recipient numbers which were selected by the computer from the total number claimed by Medilab for the period searched. Mr. Allen then requested and obtained from Medilab the medical records for the same forty-three randomly selected Medicaid recipients. The medical records were first reviewed by Phyllis Stiver, the Agency's registered nurse consultant. Once Ms. Stiver completed her initial review, Mr. Allen requested additional records from Medilab. Specifically, documentation for the office visit and records that established the necessity for the tests performed by Medilab were requested for each of the forty-three recipients. Medilab subsequently submitted additional records to the Agency which were also reviewed by Ms. Stiver. Ms. Stiver determined that based upon her review of the forty-three records, Medilab had violated Medicaid rules and policy as follows: Medilab failed to have all of the medical records signed by a physician and dated; and Medilab failed to document in the medical records to show that certain diagnostic tests were performed. After Ms. Stiver completed her review of the records, Dr. Sullenberger reviewed each of Medilab's medical records for the forty-three patients. Dr. Sullenberger determined, and it is found, that the majority of the tests performed by Medilab were not medically necessary based upon the symptoms documented for each patient, the prior patient histories established by the records, and the absence of other, less expensive testing that would normally be utilized to determine a medical condition. Virtually all of the patient records reviewed recited the same medical complaints: chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitation, numbness or tingling in extremities, and dizziness. Only five of the forty-three patients were over 49 years of age. The ages of the majority of the forty-three were under 50. That age group is rarely afflicted by the types of medical conditions which the Medilab equipment was used to detect. The symptoms and medical histories recited in the medical records did not justify the tests performed by Medilab for the following patients (recipients identified in this record as numbers 1 through 43): 1, 2, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, and 41. With the exception of the electrocardiogram, the symptoms and medical histories recited in the medical records did not justify the tests performed by Medilab for the following patients (recipients identified in this record as numbers 1 through 43): 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 42, and 43. With regard to recipient 8, except for the electrocardiogram and the abdominal ultrasound, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 10, except for the electrocardiogram and the Doppler echocardiogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 14, except for the electrocardiogram and the echocardiogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 28, except for the mammogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. None of the services or testing performed by Medilab were supervised by a physician. Two physicians, Dr. Pozo and Dr. Pereira, radiologists, read the diagnostic results but were not on site to perform or supervise the tests on a daily basis. Dr. Pozo did not supervise the services that were provided at Medilab. Dr. Pereira, who is deceased and whose testimony was not available, did not supervise the services that were provided at Medilab. According to Mr. Nunez, Dr. Pereira had someone from his office courier the tests results and his interpretations to and from the Medilab facility. Dr. Pereira may have visited the facility on occasion but was not there during its full hours of operation. Dr. Carmouze, the treating physician and representative for Medilab's physician group, did not supervise the services at Medilab. Dr. Carmouze treated over 95 percent of the total patients referred to Medilab yet Dr. Carmouze never billed the Medicaid program for the patients' office visits. For the audit period, of the 493 different patients Medilab billed Medicaid for, Dr. Carmouze is the only treating physician identified by the records. The Medicaid Physician's Handbook, supplied to Medilab at the time of its enrollment, specified that to be reimbursable the services performed by a physician group provider had to be medically necessary and supervised by a physician. The Medicaid Provider Agreement required Medilab to keep complete and accurate medical and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered for five years. All tests performed by Medilab were documented with a physician's order for same. Medilab submitted for review all medical and fiscal records it maintained in its attempt to fully justify and disclose the extent of the services it rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Program Integrity Office, issue a final order charging Medilab for the full amounts paid for the audit period as the services rendered were not supervised by a physician and were, therefore, not "physician services." Additionally, the Agency should impose an administrative fine in an amount not to exceed $5,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0096 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, and 12 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 7 is accepted as to the general statement but is rejected as to the amount claimed. Paragraph 8 is rejected as a mischaracterization of testimony; it is accepted Dr. Sullenberger, on further reflection and in an effort to be consistent, gave Medilab the benefit of doubt and modified disallowed items. Paragraph 9 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 10 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 11 is rejected as contrary to weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. That Dr. Carmouze never charged for the alleged office visits that generated the referral for tests was the relevant fact. Paragraph 15 is accurate but is irrelevant in light of the stipulation. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 36, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, and 53 are accepted. Paragraphs 37, 38, 40, 42, and 47 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as hearsay not supported by direct evidence. Paragraph 45 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 51, the first sentence is accepted; the remainder rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Heidi E. Garwood Agency for Health Care Administration 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building B, Room 271 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Monte K. Rassner Rassner, Rassner, Kramer & Gold, P.A. 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue, Suite PH-B South Miami, Florida 33143 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Utopia Home Care, Inc. (Utopia or Petitioner), is entitled to payment of $38,432.71 for the services it provided to Medicaid recipients during the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Utopia was an authorized Medicaid provider in the State of Florida. Pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement, Utopia was authorized to provide home and community-based services to Medicaid recipients. The Agency is charged with the administration and oversight of the Medicaid Program and funds throughout the State of Florida. One of the Agency's responsibilities is to monitor the provision of Medicaid services and make payments to providers for services which have been appropriately provided and for which claims have been correctly processed. During the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2000 (the audit period), Utopia rendered services to Medicaid recipients who receive home care services through the Medicaid Program. The cost of these services, for which Utopia has not received payment, is $38,432.71. There is no dispute that these services were authorized and provided by Utopia. Robert Fritz is vice president of Utopia and works in Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office. In or about February 2002, while Mr. Fritz was participating in an accounts receivable project, he discovered that Utopia had not been paid for some of the services it had provided to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. Mr. Fritz contacted the Agency soon after he discovered that Utopia had not received payment for the services it rendered during the audit period. Over a period of several months, Utopia, through Mr. Fritz, provided the Agency with documentation that the services were authorized and had been invoiced at or near the time the services were provided. Additionally, at the request of the Agency, Utopia completed numerous 081 Forms, Request for Payment Forms for the Florida Medicaid Program, to establish a baseline as to what claims were unpaid. Utopia completed the 081 Forms for the services which were provided during the audit period and for which it had not received payment in or about February 2002. In addition to the completed 081 Forms, dated February 2002, Utopia also provided to the Agency documentation generated from Utopia's computer system in Florida. The documents, created by the computer system on a weekly basis, included payroll checks for employees and invoices for services rendered. As part of Utopia's contractual requirements with the lead agency, which oversees the Medicaid Program at the local level, a monthly Medicaid Expenditure Tracking Report (Expenditure Tracking Report) is created by Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office. The Expenditure Tracking Report lists anticipated expenditures from the Medicaid system to Utopia for services rendered in a particular month. Many of these documents were provided to the Agency in seeking to establish that the services had been provided during the audit period and to obtain payment for the services. The documents created by Utopia's computer system and discussed in paragraph 6 above were created at or near the time services were rendered. Due to the documentation provided by Utopia, the Agency stipulated that Utopia provided authorized services to Medicaid recipients and that the cost of these services was $38,432.71. Nonetheless, the Agency has refused to pay Utopia for the services because the claims were not filed in accordance with Medicaid procedures, as established in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, Non-Institutional 081 (Reimbursement Handbook). Based on the Agency's review of its records, it determined that Utopia had not filed the claims within 12 months of the services being rendered. The procedures for filing claims for Medicaid payments are outlined in the Reimbursement Handbook, which is referenced and incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-8.200(6). Also, for purposes of this case, the Reimbursement Handbook sets forth the applicable Medicaid requirements for processing claims. The Reimbursement Handbook, pages 6-2 and 6-3, provides in relevant part the following: Medicaid providers should submit claims timely so that any problems with a claim can be corrected and the claim resubmitted before the filing deadline. * * * A clean claim for services rendered must be received by the agency or its fiscal agent no later than 12 months from the date of service. * * * The date electronically coded on the provider's electronic transmission by the Medicaid fiscal agent is the recorded date of receipt for an electronic claim. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Consultec was the company responsible for receiving claims from and paying those claims to Medicaid providers in the State of Florida. The Reimbursement Handbook indicates that the processing time for claims "under normal circumstances" is within 10 to 30 days after the claim is filed. The Reimbursement Handbook also provides that a "remittance voucher" is mailed each week if Consultec processed any claims or put any claims in "Suspend" status. With regard to the remittance voucher, the Reimbursement Handbook, page 8-4, states in relevant part the following: The remittance voucher plays an important role in communications between the provider and Medicaid. It tells what happened to the claims submitted for payment--whether they were paid, suspended, or denied. It provides a record of transactions and assists the provider in resolving errors so that denied claims can be resubmitted. The provider must reconcile the remittance voucher with the claim in order to determine if correct payment was received. Utopia filed all its claims electronically. Therefore, to determine whether Utopia was entitled to payment for services rendered during the audit period, the Agency searched its data warehouse. The data warehouse allows the Agency to review claims that have been electronically filed and the status of those claims. Based on the Agency's review, which compared claims filed by Utopia in February 2002 for services rendered during the audit period, the Agency found that 36 claims had been submitted by Utopia and paid and 108 claims had not been paid. With regard to the 108 claims that were not paid, the Agency found no evidence that the claims had ever been filed. Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office provided the services in question. Staff members in that office generate and enter data into the computer system that creates the documents described in paragraph 6 above and provide billing information to the local lead agency. Utopia provides this information to the local lead agency, Neighborly Senior Services (Neighborly), pursuant to a contractual arrangement which authorizes Utopia to provide services to Medicaid recipients. Utopia's staff at the St. Petersburg, Florida, office prepares and compiles billing information regarding the services it has provided and electronically transmits the information to Utopia's corporate office in Kingsburg, New York. The practice of Utopia is that the corporate office in New York then finalizes the billing information and transmits the claims to the entity designated by the Agency to process and pay claims. At all times relevant to this proceeding, that entity was Consultec. Once the St. Petersburg, Florida, office transmits the billing information to the corporate headquarters in New York, it has no further responsibility or control over the billing information sent to Medicaid. Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office also has no responsibility to reconcile the services actually billed to Medicaid by the corporate office with the services provided in Florida. At this proceeding, no evidence was presented to establish that Utopia's corporate office in New York ever filed claims for the services during the audit period for which no payment has been made. Likewise, Utopia never provided the Agency with documentation or evidence that claims for the services provided during the audit period were ever filed within 12 months of the services being provided. Similarly, no such evidence was ever produced at this proceeding. The Reimbursement Handbook provides for exceptions to the 12-month time limit if the claim meets one or more of the following conditions: (1) original payment voided, (2) court or hearing decision, (3) delay in recipient eligibility determination, (4) agency delay in updating eligibility file, (5) court ordered or statutory action, and (6) system error on a claim that was originally filed within 12 months from the date of service. Upon consideration of the applicable provisions of the Reimbursement Handbook, the Agency properly determined that Utopia did not file the claims within 12 months from the date of the service and that none of the conditions were present which warranted granting an exception.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order finding that the disputed claims were not filed within the required 12-month period and denying reimbursement of those services. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Robert C. Fritz Utopia Home Care, Inc. 215 Second Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact On September 13, 1984, Santa Fe Healthcare Systems, Inc. (Santa Fe), d/b/a Alachua General Hospital, applied for a certificate of need (CON) to establish a Medicare-certified home health agency in Alachua, Levy and Bradford Counties. This application was identified by HRS as CON Action No. 3452. On March 29, 1985, Upjohn Healthcare Services, Inc. (UHCS), timely petitioned for a formal administrative hearing to challenge the granting of any portion of the CON application of Santa Fe to establish home health agencies in Alachua, Levy and Bradford Counties. Petitioner, Personnel Pool of North Central Florida, Inc. (Personnel Pool), was initially a party to this proceeding. Personnel Pool applied for a CON to establish a Medicare certified home health agency to serve Lake, Alachua, Citrus, Levy, Marion, and Sumter Counties in District III. Personnel Pool's application was identified by HRS as CON Action No. 3450, and was reviewed in the same batching cycle as Santa Fe's application. That proceeding was designated DOAH Case No. 85-1455 and consolidated with these cases. On October 23, 1985, however, Personnel Pool filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal by which it voluntarily dismissed its petition in DOAH Case No. 85- 1455. APPLICATION Santa Fe Healthcare Systems is a parent corporation with three divisions. The first division, called Genesis Hospital System, operates four affiliated hospitals: Leach General Hospital (AGH), Bradford Hospital (BH), Williston Memorial Hospital (WMH), and Calhoun Hospital (CH). The second division, Santa Fe Management Services, provides a variety of services, including financial, design and construction, risk management, and other related services to affiliates. The third division is called Wellness, Inc., operating a variety of properties including a personnel registry, urgent care centers, physicians' office buildings, and Shared Services, Inc., a for profit corporation, which comprises a pharmacy, a collection service bureau, a delicatessen, a laundry, a microfilming service, and several other support services. Santa Fe proposes to receive Medicare certification for its existing operational hospital-based home health delivery system, which is not now certified to receive Medicare reimbursements. This home health delivery system has one office which is located on campus at AGH in Gainesville. Santa Fe proposes to provide all types of home health services on a 24- hour a day, 7 days a week basis. If the home health agency obtains Medicare certification, it will become a department of AGH for Medicare cost reporting purposes. Santa Fe intends to staff its home health agency with dedicated employees of its affiliated hospitals and, as necessary, by part-time employees of the hospitals who are under- utilized as hospital staff, under principles of "variable staffing." Santa Fe proposes to serve the following mix of patients by payor class: 80%-Medicare 6%-Medicaid; 6% -Indigent and Bad Debt and 8%-Private Pay. Santa Fe proposes to serve patients regardless of their ability to pay for home health services. Santa Fe intends to subsidize the provision of home health services to indigent patients through the reimbursements it receives from providing home health services to Medicare patients, and through a transfer of funds from its affiliated hospitals to Santa Fe's home health agency. See paragraphs 17 through 21 below. At the present time, Santa Fe is providing home health care to patients eligible for Medicare reimbursement free of charge without seeking reimbursement from Medicare. There was no evidence of the losses incurred by Santa Fe in this endeavor. Santa Fe does not anticipate that it will be able to bill or get later reimbursement for the care provided to these Medicare eligible patients, even if it becomes Medicare certified. MEDICARE/MEDICAID REIMBURSABLE HOME HEALTH Medicare is a federally-funded health program for the elderly and for certain disabled persons only. In order for a provider of Medicare home health services to be reimbursed, the provider must serve Medicare eligibles who: (a) are referred by order of a physician (b) are home bound (c) require skilled care (skilled nursing, physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy) and (d) require skilled services only on a part- time, intermittent basis. Medicare does not reimburse for custodial care (such as provided by a nursing home or adult congregate living facility) or for acute care services (such as services to the acutely ill usually provided by a hospital). Medicare provides reimbursement only for skilled nursing, physical therapy, speech therapy, home health aide, and medical social services. Medicare presently reimburses home health agencies, whether hospital-based or free-standing, on a cost reimbursement basis, subject to an aggregate cost reimbursement limitation or cap. As long as the Medicare home health agency does not exceed the cap it gets paid all of its costs for allowable expenditures. If it exceeds the cap, then it only gets paid at the cap. A cap is figured for each service (skilled nursing, home health aide, physical therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, and medical social services). Previously, all of the costs incurred for providing these services were added together and compared against an aggregate reimbursement limit or cap. If aggregated costs were below the aggregate cap, the provider was paid its costs, and was only penalized for the amount by which it exceeded the aggregate cap. However, starting with fiscal years beginning after July 1, 1985, the Medicare program has eliminated the aggregate cap and will apply only the cap for each type of home health services. If a provider's cost exceeds the cap for each service the provider will only receive the cap for such service. The Medicare program recognizes that the cost of providing home health services through a hospital-based home health agency generally is higher because overhead of the hospital is allocated to the home health agency. (In fact, AGH's allocation of overhead to Santa Fe's home health delivery system will he less than the allocation of overhead from UHCS' national and regional offices to its home health agencies in Alachua, Bradford, and Levy Counties.) Medicare thus could reimburse Santa Fe's home health agency at a ten percent increment above the cost caps established for non-hospital home health providers. In contrast to Medicare, the Medicaid program provides reimbursement to providers only for skilled nursing services and home health aide services to patients who meet strict income and asset limitations. No reimbursement is provided for physical therapy, medical supplies or ancillary costs of providing reimbursable services. Instead of the cap system applicable to Medicare reimbursement, only a fixed fee determined in advance is provided for Medicaid services. Accordingly, a provider can expend costs in excess of reimbursement to serve Medicaid eligible patients. Recent changes in the Medicare reimbursement for hospital care have resulted in a prospective payment system. This system is commonly referred to as the diagnostic related grouping system (DRG). Under that system a hospital is not reimbursed for its costs. Rather the hospital receives for in- patients a predetermined reimbursement covering all costs related to providing patient care for the diagnosis of the patient, based on the historical costs for serving such a patient in the geographic area where the hospital is located. If the length of stay of the patient is such that the cost of providing care exceeds the Medicare reimbursement provided under the applicable DRG system, the hospital experiences a loss for its service to that patient. If the patient's stay is shorter than the average duration for that DRG, however, the hospital's costs usually are less than the Medicare reimbursement for the patient, and the hospital experiences a windfall gain. DRG reimbursements are fixed amounts regardless of length of stay. COST CONSIDERATIONS Santa Fe's home health delivery system operates as a cost and revenue center within the Santa Fe system separate from the centers mentioned in paragraph 3 above. If certified under the Medicare program, it will be a separate revenue center for Medicare reimbursements. In its amended application, Santa Fe projects a loss in its first twelve months of operation amounting to $20,267. Santa Fe projects a loss of $30,409 for the second twelve months of operation. However, these losses will be more than offset by savings to the affiliated hospitals from discharging its Medicaid and indigent patients from the hospitals at an earlier date because home health services can be provided at a lower cost. In any event, with more than $7 million of earnings from its combined operations for the year ending September 30, 1985, Santa Fe can easily cover any reasonable losses that the proposed home health agency might incur during the first two years of operation. In addition, Santa Fe will shift a portion of its administration, supervisory, dietary, maintenance, and housekeeping costs from AGH to the new home health agency. These items are commonly identified overhead expenses. Santa Fe will shift some of the existing costs of AGH's administrator and assistant administrator's salary and fringe benefits to the home health agency. Santa Fe will also shift some of the costs of salaries for supervisory health care personnel to the home health agency to the extent that these supervisors provide guidance to the staff of the home health agency. AGH will hire additional staff to handle home health billing. This cost will also be borne by the home health agency. Approximately 95% of the overhead of AGH which Santa Fe intends to shift to its Medicare home health agency does not represent new or additional costs. Rather, that portion will represent costs which Santa Fe is presently incurring in the operation of AGH. In the first twelve months of operation AGH will allocate approximately $150,000 of its existing overhead to the home health agency. In the second twelve months of operation AGH will allocate $175,000 of its existing overhead to the Santa Fe home health agency. Santa Fe's hospitals will have to subsidize the Santa Fe home health agency between $75,000 and $90,000 for provision of services to indigents and for additional costs associated with treating Medicaid patients. Santa Fe will ask Medicare to reimburse the overhead allocated from AGH to the Santa Fe home health agency up to the cap. See paragraph 12 above. Because of the reimbursement of the portion of the overhead allocation from the affiliated hospitals to the proposed home health agency, approval of any portion of Santa Fe's proposal probably will increase the cost to Medicare for Medicare reimbursable home health services in Alachua, Bradford and Levy Counties. NEED CONSIDERATIONS UHCS is the only existing provider of home health services licensed by HRS to provide Medicare home health services in Alachua, Bradford and Levy Counties within HRS District III. UHCS is also licensed to provide home health services in Dixie, Gilchrist, Marion, Lafayette, Putnam, Union and Suwannee Counties in District III. UHCS operates a parent agency office located in Alachua County (Gainesville), with licensed subunit offices in Bradford (Starke), Levy (Chiefland), and Putnam (Palatka) Counties. UHCS operates a separate licensed and Medicare certified parent home health agency in Marion County. UHCS operates a private-sector home health business without a CON, which is separate from its licensed home health agencies and subunits. UHCS provides skilled nursing, physical therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, home health aide and medical social services to patients in their homes. UHCS also provides intermittent skilled care to private pay patients through its licensed home health agency; and provides homemaker, live-in companions, and one-time RN visits through a separate private sector business. UHCS provides services twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Its offices are open from 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. It provides an answering service whenever the office is closed. The administrator, director of professional services, and supervisors are always on call. UHCS provides quality assurance programs to exceed the Medicare, Medicaid and licensure standards for home health care. These programs include: quarterly utilization review of medical records corporate quarterly quality assurance: ongoing client record audit supervisory visits employee evaluations; and consultations from UHCS' advisory council. UHCS has a field staff of seven registered nurses at its Gainesville office to provide skilled nursing visits in the homes of patients who reside in Alachua County. The staff presently contains two fewer RN's than it contained twelve months prior to the final hearing. As of September 1, 1985, UHCS also had eliminated one occupational therapist from its direct patient care staff. UHCS has not replaced the two RN's or occupational therapist because UHCS has experienced a decline in the number of visits and patients served during the twelve month period preceding the final hearing. Without increasing its present RN field staff and direct-patient care staff, UHCS could increase its delivery of home health services in Alachua County by between twenty and twenty-five percent. By adding one additional clinical supervisor UHCS could increase its delivery of home health services in Alachua by an additional fifty percent, over and above the twenty to twenty-five percent excess capacity mentioned above. UHCS actively seeks to find patients in need of the types of home health services which it delivers. UHCS utilizes patient coordinators, all of whom are RN's, to make its services known in Alachua, Bradford and Levy Counties. The coordinators visit each of the hospitals in these counties to distribute Medicare home health guidelines and to ascertain whether there will be discharges from these hospitals who will need home health services. UHCS receives referrals from hospitals, physicians and other health care providers. Approximately thirty-five percent of its referrals from Alachua County come from hospitals. Alachua General Hospital provides nineteen percent of those referrals. The number of referrals to UHCS for home health services for patients residing in Alachua County has decreased during the past twelve months prior to the final hearing. The quality of home health services delivered by UHCS in Alachua, Bradford and Levy Counties was not questioned in this proceeding. In terms of quality of care, Santa Fe and AGH readily refer patients who are eligible for Medicaid and Medicare home health services to UHCS. UHCS has the same access to information about patients referred to it by AGH as Santa Fe's home health delivery system, to the extent that AGH permits UHCS access. UHCS takes advantage of the access provided by AGH in preparing patients referred to it for home care. At all times relevant to this proceeding, no patients residing in Alachua, Bradford and Levy Counties who were qualified to receive Medicare or Medicaid reimbursable home health services have been unable to receive services from UHCS. AGH's social services department (which performs discharge planning functions for the hospital) has had no problem placing patients in need of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursable home health services. Santa Fe hospitals having been able to obtain these services from UHCS for all patients residing in Alachua, Bradford and Levy Counties. Santa Fe does not propose to meet any need for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursable home health services which is not already being met by UHCS in Alachua, Bradford or Levy Counties. Santa Fe only proposes to serve patients of physicians that are members of the medical staff of its hospitals (AGH, BH and WMH). Since April 5, 1985, HRS has employed a uniform methodology contained in proposed Rule 10-5.11(14), Florida Administrative Code, for determining the need for additional home health agencies in Florida. Although that rule has been challenged in another proceeding, HRS has adopted the need methodology as a matter of department policy. HRS now utilizes that need methodology as its policy without exception in reviewing all applications for certificates of need to establish home health agencies in Florida. The methodology in the HRS proposed rule projects a need for sixteen home health agencies in HRS District III for the relevant planning horizon (1987). Because of dated factors in the methodology, the need projected under the methodology is incorrect and actually should be 17. Although HRS listed in its State Agency Action Report only sixteen licensed home health agencies and one CON approved home health agency for District III, the following agencies are also licensed to provide Medicare home health services in District III: (a) UHCS is licensed to operate a subunit in Palatka, Putnam County, District III (b) UHCS is licensed to operate a subunit in Starke, Bradford County, District III; and (c) Central Florida Home Health Services, Inc. Volusia/Seminole/Lake is licensed to provide home health services in Lake County, District III. The Leon County subunit was added in early 1984 the Putnam County subunit in November 1984 and the Bradford County subunit in March 1985. The evidence was not clear whether these three subunits apparently underwent certificate of need review. UHCS opened at least the most recent of these three subunits in a conscious effort to keep out competition. The subunits added a clinical supervisor and a clerical person to staff the new subunit offices the same nurses and home health aides previously based in Levy, Bradford and Putnam Counties continued to work there but out of the subunit offices. Under present uniform policy of HRS, each of these offices sensibly is counted against the gross need for additional Medicare licensed home health agencies in District III in order to determine if there is a net need or surplus. As defined in Rule lOD-68.02(19), Florida Administrative Code, a subunit of a home health agency is a semi-autonomous agency. It is incapable of sharing administration, supervision and services on a daily basis with the parent home health agency. Rule lOD-68.04(2), Florida Administrative Code, requires that subunits be separately licensed whenever the subunits "are operated outside of the county of the parent agency or operate as autonomous subdivisions." Since 1977 HRS has required that subunits of home health agencies must receive a CON before they can be separately licensed. Rule 10-5.04(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a CON must be obtained, not only for the establishment of a new home health agency, but also for the establishment of a new subunit of an agency. It was not proved that any of the subunits in District III are not meeting the need in the counties where they are located to the contrary, the evidence suggests that the subunits are meeting the existing need with excess capacity to spare. Accordingly, the inventory of licensed and CON approved Medicare home health agencies in HRS District III exceeds the need projected for licensed home health agencies in that district for 1987, the relevant planning horizon, by four agencies. Although the HRS' uniform need policy and the need methodology employed by the Local Health Council for District III project approximately the same number of persons in need of home health services, these methodologies differ as to how they would allocate agencies to meet the projected need. The HRS' home health methodology does not permit a subdistrict determination of need, while the District III methodology defines each county within District III as a subdistrict for home health services, and then assesses a need for one agency for each multiple of 800 persons in need, up to a maximum of four agencies. In comparison with the HRS methodology, the District III methodology allows more Medicare home health agencies to serve the same number of patients identified as needing Medicare home health services. The District III methodology would assess the need for an additional agency in Alachua County but no need for additional agencies in Bradford or Levy County. The HRS methodology assumes that agencies will it compete across county lines and that a methodology like the District III methodology can and will result in "false competition." The rationality of this aspect of the HRS methodology as a general rule was not persuasively established in this case. As a general rule, it would seem more rational to foster some type of competition at some level of activity in order to help depress Medicare costs (especially under the new reimbursement system described in paragraphs 15 and 16 above) and improve quality of services rather than allow certain providers to gain a monopolistic-type hold on parts or all of the service area. Such an approach seems even more appealing in light of the evidence in this case that UHCS recently placed at least one subunit in the service district in a conscious effort to keep out competition. But Santa Fe did not prove on the facts of this case that it is time to place a new agency in Alachua to compete with UHCS despite the HRS methodology and the facts in evidence that UHCS can more than adequately meet the need for home health services in Alachua County within the relevant planning horizon. ACCESS CONSIDERATIONS Through UHCS' parent agency and subunit offices the residents of Alachua, Bradford, and Levy Counties have geographic access to all Medicare and Medicaid reimbursable home health agencies. The Local Health Council for District III determined that, in those cases where the area for proposed service is one where residents do not have access to home health care due to financial barriers, the council would recommend approval of an additional home health agency if its need methodology shows no need for an additional Medicare agency. The Local Health Council for District III also recommended that county government assume responsibility for paying for home health services for indigent clients. In addition, the council recommended that volunteer organizations provide funding for home health services to medically indigent patients. The council established that home health agencies should provide an amount of uncompensated charitable home health care equivalent to at least one percent of the preceding fiscal years' gross revenue for any given home health agency. UHCS does not accept patients who cannot pay all of their bills for home health services either in cash, by Medicare or by a combination of cash and Medicaid (or, presumably, Medicare if applicable.) Therefore, no Medicare certified home health agency serves the medically indigent in Alachua, Levy or Bradford County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying in its entirety the application of Petitioner in Case No. 85-1501, Santa Fe Healthcare Systems, Inc., for a certificate of need for a home health agency to serve Alachua, Levy and Bradford Counties, CON Action No. 3452. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. Lawrence Johnston Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1986. APPENDIX Rulings on UHCS' Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in part rejected in part as unnecessary. See Finding 1. Accepted. See Finding 1. Rejected as conclusion of law. Accepted in part; rejected in part as unnecessary. See Finding 2. 5 and 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted. See Finding 3. Accepted, except the existing home health delivery system is not a home health agency as defined by statute. See Conclusions of Law. See Finding 4. Covered by Finding 5. Covered by Finding 6. Covered by Finding 6. 12-38. Covered by Findings 7-33, respectively. 39. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 40-42. Covered by Findings 34-36. 43-46. Rejected in part as cumulative and in part as subordinate. 47-51. Covered by Findings 37-41. Covered by Finding 42. Covered by Finding 43. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 55-56. Covered by Finding 44 and 45. 57. Rejected in part as immaterial (HRS can condition the CON by its Final Order in this case), in part as being legally incorrect (HRS can enjoin violations of representations upon which a CON is granted) and in part as unnecessary and cumulative (that Santa Fe is now operating a hospital based home health delivery system). 58-59. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. HRS determinations to date are preliminary and subject to change based on the evidence. 60-62. Rejected in part as cumulative and in part as conclusions of law. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. (Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are unnumbered. For purposes of these rulings, they have been assigned consecutive numbers for each paragraph). The first sentence is rejected as unsupported by the evidence; the balance is covered by Finding 3. Covered by Findings 4 and 6. Covered by Finding 17. Covered by Finding 17. Covered by Findings 24 and 46. Covered by Findings 4 and 6 (partly cumulative). Rejected as cumulative. Covered by Findings 3738. Covered by Finding 39. (Rejected in part as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence.) Rejected as cumulative. Covered by Finding 44. HRS' Proposed Findings of Fact. There were none. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Andrews, Esquire, Scruggs & Carmichael P. O. Drawer C One Southeast First Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Robert P. Daniti, Esquire Carson & Linn, P.A. 253 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harden King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and. Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The PROVIDER received the Final Audit Report that gave notice of PROVIDER'S right to an administrative hearing regarding the alleged Medicaid overpayment. The PROVIDER filed a petition requesting an administrative hearing, and then caused that petition to be WITHDRAWN and the administrative hearing case to be CLOSED. PROVIDER chose not to dispute the facts set forth in the Final Audit Report dated August 15, 2013. The facts alleged in the FAR are hereby deemed admitted, including the total amount of $14,569.69, which includes a fine sanction of $2,419.26. The Agency hereby adopts the facts as set forth in the FAR including the amount of $14,569.69 which is now due and owing, from PROVIDER to the Agency.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came before me for issuance of a Final Order on a Final Audit Report (“FAR”) dated August 15, 2013 (C.1. No. 13-1386-000). By the Final Audit Report, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA” or “Agency”), informed the Respondent, Amwill Assisted Living, Inc., (hereinafter “PROVIDER’), that the Agency was seeking to recover Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $12,096.28, and impose a fine sanction of $2,419.26 pursuant to Sections 409.913(15), (16), and (17), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59G- 9.070(7)(e), Florida Administrative Code, and costs of $54.15 for a total amount of $14,569.69. The Final Audit Report provided full disclosure and notice to the PROVIDER of procedures for requesting an administrative hearing to contest the alleged overpayment. The PROVIDER filed a petition with the Agency requesting a formal administrative hearing on or about September 5, 2013. The Agency forwarded PROVIDER'S hearing request to the Division of Administrative Hearings (Division) for a formal administrative hearing. The Division scheduled a formal hearing for November 22, 2013. On November 12, 2013, the PROVIDER filed a Motion with the Administrative Law Judge, requesting AHCA vs. Amwill Assisted Living, Inc. (AHCA C.I, No.: 13-1386-000) Final Order Page 1 of 4 Filed January 2, 2014 10:59 AM Division of Administrative Hearings withdrawal of their Petition for Formal Hearing, and the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File on November 12, 2013, relinquishing jurisdiction of the case to the Agency.
The Issue The issue is whether a rule which requires that staff be directly employed by or under contract with a Medicaid home health agency, and that such agencies issue either W-2 or 1099 tax forms to individuals on their staffs, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Las Mercedes is a licensed home health agency. From July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006 ("the audit period"), Las Mercedes was also an enrolled Medicaid provider of home health care services. Services were provided through so-called "staffing agreements" with twenty-two companies. Las Mercedes, together with the patient's physician, determined the scope, duration, and plan of care, and it controlled, coordinated, and evaluated the services provided. Las Mercedes established the policies and procedures for submitting progress and clinical notes, scheduling visits, periodic patient evaluation, and the payment for services. (See Stipulation of Facts filed October 6, 2009, in DOAH Case No. 08-5653MPI.) Respondent AHCA is the state agency responsible for administering the joint federal-state Medicaid Program in Florida. It is responsible for, among other things, reimbursing providers for services to Medicaid recipients. In an Amended Final Audit, AHCA determined that Las Mercedes was overpaid $878,843.93 in Medicaid funds between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006. The allegation was based on the undisputed fact that Las Mercedes did not issue W-2s or 1099 tax forms to the individuals who provided home health care, but instead issued 1099s to the twenty-two staffing companies. As a result, AHCA concluded that the staff was not employed by or under contract with Las Mercedes as required by Rule. The Rule Challenge The challenged Rule is a provision from the Florida Medicaid Home Health Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, which is incorporated by reference by Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.130. On page 1-8 of the Florida Medicaid Home Health Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, July 2008 edition, the Rule is as follows: Home health services are provided by qualified health care professionals who are directly employed by or under contract with a home health agency that is enrolled in the Medicaid Home Health Services Program. Employed or contracted means that the home health agency provides a W-2 or 1099 tax form for the individual. The home health agency must ensure that all staff (employed or contracted) who provide home health services are qualified and licensed. By contrast, Subsection 400.462(9), in establishing licensure requirements for home health agencies has the following definition of a direct employee: "Direct employee" means an employee for whom one of the following entities pays withholding taxes: a home health agency; a management company that has a contract to manage the home health agency on a day-to-day basis; or an employee leasing company that has a contract with the home health agency to handle the payroll and payroll taxes for the home health agency. AHCA agrees that the Medicaid Rule excludes employee staffing agreements that are permitted by the licensure statute. Las Mercedes asserts that the Rule is an invalid exercise of AHCA's delegated legislative authority because: (1) it is ultra vires; (2) the definition of "employed by or under contract with" is in irreconcilable conflict with the definition of "direct employee" in Subsection 400.462(9), Florida Statutes; and (3) it is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, unenforceable. Las Mercedes also claims that the Rule exceeds the authority granted to AHCA by federal law. It interprets the law as requiring that the licensure standard apply equally to the Medicaid and non-Medicaid providers. That view is based on the language in 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(33)(B), which is, in relevant part, as follows: [A state plan for medical assistance must provide] that, except as provided in section 1919(g) [42 USCS § 1396r(g)], the State or local agency utilized by the Secretary for the purpose specified in the first sentence of section 1864(a) [42 USCS § 1395aa(a)], or, if such agency is not the State agency which is responsible for licensing health institutions, the State agency responsible for such licensing, will perform for the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the plan approved under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] the function of determining whether institutions and agencies meet the requirements for participation in the program. The "agency utilized by the Secretary, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a)" refers to the following: Use of State agencies to determine compliance by providers of services with conditions of participation. The Secretary shall make an agreement with any State which is able and willing to do so under which the services of the State health agency or other appropriate State agency (or the appropriate local agencies) will be utilized by him for the purpose of determining whether an institution therein is a hospital or skilled nursing facility, or whether an agency therein is a home health agency. (Emphasis added.) In Las Mercedes' view of the federal law, the qualifications for being licensed and being a Medicaid provider are expected to be the same. It appears that nothing prohibits that from being the case. Las Mercedes also asserts that the Rule conflicts with 42 C.F.R. § 447.204, which states: The agency's payments must be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the plan are available to recipients at least to the extent that those services are available to the general population. In this record, however, Las Mercedes presented no evidence regarding payments or, as Las Mercedes implies, the extent to which Medicaid services may or may not be adequate without the use of the staffing arrangements permitted under Subsection 400.462(9), Florida Statutes. Las Mercedes also argues that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious. AHCA, it says, cannot articulate a valid reason why licensed home health personnel must receive a tax form directly from a Medicaid provider. Further, Las Mercedes asserts, the Rule is not logically related to the stated purposes of ensuring health, welfare, and safety, and avoiding waste, fraud, and abuse. The Agency's Explanation for the Rule AHCA is responsible for the licensure of home health agencies pursuant to Part III of Chapter 400, Florida Statutes, more specifically Sections 400.461 through 400.5185, known as the "Home Health Services Act." Florida Administrative Code Rules in Chapter 59A-8 implement the provisions of the Home Health Services Act by setting minimum standards for licensure. To be enrolled as a Medicaid provider, a home health agency must not only be licensed, but also must have entered into a Medicaid provider agreement, a voluntary contract between AHCA and the agency. See § 409.907, Fla. Stat. The provisions related to Medicaid are found in Sections 409.901 through 409.920, Florida Statutes. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.130, including the language that is challenged, cites as enabling statutes Sections 409.905, 409.908, and 409.9081, Florida Statutes, not the licensure provisions in Chapter 400. AHCA contends that challenged Rule is a logical, rational imposition of higher standards than the minimum standards for licensure on those home health agencies that are also Medicaid providers. Its purpose is to ensure health, safety, and welfare of Medicaid recipients, and to curb waste, fraud and abuse. To that end, AHCA maintains that the Rule allows it to exercise greater oversight over the Medicaid program. AHCA concedes that a violation of the challenged Rule would not in and of itself result in any action to deny or revoke a license, although exclusion from the Medicaid program would result in revocation or denial of a license.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 409.913, Florida Statutes, by failing to retain required Medicaid records, thereby incurring a $10,000 fine according to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Medicaid Provider of Assistive Care Services in Oakland Park, Florida. Annie Mathew is a registered nurse who manages Respondent's facility. Respondent was obligated, pursuant to the Medicaid Provider Agreement executed in June 2008, to comply with applicable Medicaid laws, administrative rules, and Medicaid handbooks. The Agency is the state agency charged with the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida. Within the Agency, the Inspector General ensures the integrity of the Medicaid program by conducting investigations of providers to ensure compliance with all Medicaid rules. On December 7, 2011, the Agency conducted an unannounced on-site inspection of the medical records retained by Respondent. Mr. Cedeno and Ms. Hollis-Stancil conducted the investigation, reviewing ten recipient files. The investigators found that nine of the recipient files did not contain a proper service plan; one recipient did not contain a service plan at all, and had an outdated health assessment. Respondent did not use the Medicaid form found in the Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook for service plans; instead, Respondent used a form created by Respondent, which contained some, but not all, of the components addressed in the Medicaid form. The investigators noticed that the facility was clean and in good condition. At the hearing, Respondent admitted to not using the Medicaid form for service plans, and agreed that not all of the components addressed in the Medicaid form were addressed in the form created by Respondent. Specifically, the service plan must contain the expected outcome for the resident, and identify who is going to provide specific services to the resident. Respondent's forms did not reflect this information. As to one recipient, recipient S.V., the file did not contain a current health assessment. The health assessment found in the file had expired in September 2011, three months prior to the inspection in December 2011. All ten counts against Respondent are supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that pursuant to rule 59G-9.070(7)(e), the Agency for Healthcare Administration fine Respondent $10,000 for ten first offense counts of failure to comply with the Medicaid rules. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2013.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid payments made to Cape Memorial Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Cape Coral Hospital (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes Medicaid as a collaborative federal-state program in which the state receives federal funding (also known as “federal financial participation” or “FFP") for services provided to Medicaid- eligible recipients in accordance with federal law. The Florida statutes and rules relevant to this proceeding essentially incorporate federal Medicaid standards. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid provisions relevant to this proceeding. Section 409.902, Florida Statutes (2015)1/, states that the Petitioner is the “single state agency authorized to make payments” under the Medicaid program. The referenced statute limits such payments to “services included in the program” and only on “behalf of eligible individuals.” The Respondent is enrolled in the Florida Medicaid Program as a Medicaid Hospital Provider. The Respondent's participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of a Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Respondent's Medicaid Provider Agreement requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to undocumented aliens. Eligibility for Medicaid services is restricted to United States citizens, and to specified non-citizens who have been lawfully admitted into the United States. Pursuant to section 409.902(2)(b), Medicaid funds cannot be used to provide medical services to individuals who do not meet the statutory eligibility criteria "unless the services are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition" or are for pregnant women. The cited statute further provides that such services are “authorized only to the extent provided under federal law.” The relevant federal law (42 U.S.C. section 1396b(v)(3)) defines an "emergency medical condition" as: medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. The Florida definition of “emergency medical condition” set forth at section 409.901(10)(a) mirrors the federal definition. Pursuant to section 409.904(4), the Petitioner can make payments to a Medicaid provider on behalf of "a low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services" for “the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." The Florida Medicaid program requirements relevant to this proceeding were identified in the Florida Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160(2),), and in the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-5.020.) The applicable Florida Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook provided as follows: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Similar provisions were contained in the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Section 409.913 requires that the Petitioner monitor the activities of Medicaid providers and to “recover overpayments.” The Petitioner’s Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (BMPI) routinely conducts audits to monitor Medicaid providers. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to include “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” The BMPI conducted a review of the Respondent's claims for services rendered to undocumented aliens during the period January 1 through December 31, 2006. The Respondent provided all documentation requested by the Petitioner necessary to review the claims addressed herein. As to each claim, the designated reviewing physician made a determination, based on the medical records, as to whether the claim was related to an emergency medical condition, and, if so, when the emergency medical condition was alleviated. Based on the evidence, and on the testimony of the physicians identified herein, the determinations of the physicians are fully credited as to the existence of emergency medical conditions and as to when such conditions were alleviated. CLAIM #1 Dr. Thomas Wells reviewed Claim #1, which involved a length of stay from March 31 through April 10, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Wells determined that an emergency medical condition existed on March 31, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of April 6, 2006. CLAIM #3 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #3, which involved a length of stay from May 27 through June 12, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on May 27, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of May 28, 2006. CLAIM #4 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #4, which involved a length of stay from January 15 through January 20, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on January 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of January 17, 2006. CLAIM #5 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #5, which involved a length of stay from March 4 through April 10, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on March 4, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of March 7, 2006. CLAIM #6 Dr. Steve Beiser reviewed Claim #6, which involved a length of stay from June 15 through June 18, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Beiser determined that an emergency medical condition existed on June 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of June 16, 2006. CLAIM #7 Dr. Thomas Wells reviewed Claim #7, which involved a length of stay from June 15 through July 6, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Wells determined that the emergency medical condition existed on June 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of June 28, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding a Medicaid overpayment of $57,350.67 related to the six claims identified herein. Pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner is entitled to recover certain investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of appropriate costs if the parties are unable to agree. Within 30 days after entry of the final order, either party may file a request for a hearing on the amount. Failure to request a hearing within 30 days after entry of the final order shall be deemed to indicate that the issue of costs has been resolved. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2016.
