The Issue Whether Respondent, Guy Hendricks, III, R.Ph., is subject to discipline pursuant to Subsection 465.016(1)(e), Florida Statutes, for violating Rule 64B16-28.120(2), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Respondent, Guy R. Hendricks, III, R.Ph., is a Florida-licensed registered pharmacist, so licensed in 1972; he was licensed as a consultant pharmacist in 1974. Registered pharmacists typically dispense medications at a community pharmacy, for example, Eckerds and Walgreen's. Consulting pharmacists oversee a pharmaceutical distribution system in a long-term care nursing home facility with a Class I institutional permit. In addition to his employment at the Arbors in Orange Park (the Arbors), Respondent is engaged in the development of "cutting edge consultant computer programs" and "research and development in the field of software platforms which will lead to a fully integrated consultant software package." (Respondent's vita, Petitioner's Exhibit 2) On August 1, 1996, Respondent became the consulting pharmacist for the Arbors. The AHCA survey, which is the genesis of the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint in this case, was conducted later that same month. The Arbors is a sub-acute care facility which has a Class I institutional pharmacy permit. Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code rules restrict the type of medicinal drugs and drug preparations allowed in Class I institutional pharmacies. One of the consulting pharmacist's responsibilities is to see that the applicable Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code rules are followed within the Class I institutional pharmacies, subject to pharmacist's control. The Arbors utilized a Baxter SureMed Dispensing Machine (SureMed machine) which is a computerized dispensing machine that stores medications and allows the pharmacist to track when medications are taken from the machine, by whom they are taken, what dosage is dispensed, and to whom the medication is administered. It has a complete computerized tracking system. It is a "modern tool of pharmacy" used to provide a high level of pharmaceutical care for nursing home residents. Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code rules require that nursing homes, such as the Arbors, provide "reasonable and consistent quality of life for residents" and that "reasonable efforts be made to accommodate the needs and preferences of residents to enhance the quality of life in a nursing home." Florida Administrative Code rules allow the Arbors to adopt policies and procedures regarding drugs to meet the needs of residents and to maintain an Emergency Medical Kit(s), the contents of which shall be determined by the facility's medical director, director of nursing, and pharmacist, and "it (the medical kit) shall be in accordance with facility policy and procedures"; the "emergency medical kit" may contain medicinal drugs and drug preparations which are not otherwise allowed within Class I institutional pharmacies. Respondent testified that the SureMed machine was being used as one of the Emergency Medical Kits of the Arbors. The drugs contained in the SureMed machine were determined by the Arbors staff before Respondent was employed as consulting pharmacist. During the August 27-28, 1996, AHCA Survey, the surveyor concluded that the SureMed machine was being used inappropriately by the Arbors. The survey revealed that the SureMed dispensing unit was used as an emergency medication kit. Review of the SureMed Policy and Procedure stated "Medications stored in SureMed are intended for emergency stat orders, late admission first dose, new orders and missing doses" (part of Petitioner's Exhibit 5) contrary to the approved use of medicinal drugs used in facilities with a Class I Institutional Pharmacy Permit. An inventory list provided by the facility revealed in excess of 300 medications in the SureMed unit and this unit had been accessed 22 times in the 24 hours prior to surveyor review. Further review of the usage log revealed that an unsampled resident received Norixin from the SureMed unit on 8/26/96 at 23:04, 8/27/96 at 22:21 and 8/28/96 at 22:21 instead of receiving a resident specific labeled medication from the provider pharmacy. Respondent suggests that a "typographical error" may have occurred in the facility's SureMed policy and procedure in that, if the word "not" is inserted after the words "emergency stat orders," the policy and procedure would conform to the limitations proscribed for Class I institutional permitees. While this explanation is plausible, it is not accepted as credible. This portion of the Arbors' SureMed policy and procedure, referenced by the AHCA surveyor, does not follow Florida law. If the foregoing policy and procedure language is the only language considered, the surveyor's conclusions may be justified; however, the surveyor failed to note the following language which immediately follows the quote from the same SureMed policy and procedure. "SureMed is not intended to be a routine source of medication. The pharmacy must be informed of all new admissions, new orders, refill orders, and missing doses." When a nursing home resident is first admitted to the Arbors, the admittee does not bring medications but brings new prescription orders which must be filled by the provider or back-up pharmacy. Home Care Pharmacy in Orlando, Florida, provides medications to the Arbors; it is 140 miles from Orlando to Orange Park. Deliveries are made two times a day. There were occasions in 1996 when patients were out of medication or Home Care Pharmacy was not delivering as ordered. While the Arbors has only a Class I institutional permit which limits drugs readily available to residents, the facility accepts residents who are "sub-acute" care patients, for example, patients with chronic disease, post-surgical patients, and patients with "super" infections, all of whom require continuity of pharmaceutical therapy. Frank May, a registered pharmacist and certified HCFA surveyor for AHCA, testified that while the Arbors' SureMed policy and procedure were "out of compliance," nevertheless, it was appropriate to "take a drug out of the machine or out of the emergency medication kit if it cannot be provided by the provider pharmacy or if that provider pharmacy is a long way off or by a back-up pharmacy in a timely manner for the next dosage of that medication." May also testified that "there is nothing wrong" with utilizing the SureMed machine as an emergency medical kit or maintaining drugs, otherwise not permitted in a Class I institution permit, in the machine. May further testified that without examining each instance wherein the SureMed machine was accessed immediately prior to the AHCA survey, it would be impossible to determine whether or not an "emergency" existed warranting the use of the particular drug obtained from the SureMed machine. May testified that in 1996, the use of automated drug dispensing machines was becoming very prominent in nursing homes; and problems, such as addressed in this case, were "fairly prevalent." Respondent maintains that the facility's use of the SureMed machine was on a bona fide emergency basis only. The Arbors' SureMed policy and procedure were changed immediately following the August 1996 survey. Respondent sent AHCA a July 20, 1997, letter in response to the AHCA licensure investigation in which he identified the SureMed machine as a "computerized emergency system," a "modern tool of pharmacy," and "our only solution" "to treat our residents' sub acute conditions" when "some local pharmacies . . . could not provide medications." The SureMed machine was removed from the Arbors in November 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the charges against Respondent in the Amended Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Guy Hendericks, III Post Office Box 4173 Sebring, Florida 33871 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 John Taylor, R.Ph., Executive Director Board of Pharmacy Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the provider, Medilab, was overpaid for medicaid claims as alleged in the letter dated November 3, 1993.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. At all times material to this case, Medilab was a medicaid provider. Medilab enrolled as a physician group provider on or about October 2, 1991. Medilab was not enrolled with the Florida Medicaid program as a diagnostic lab. At all times material to this case, Medilab was owned and operated by Roberto Rodriguez and Jorge Nunez. Mr. Rodriguez handled the administrative duties for Medilab while Mr. Nunez operated the diagnostic portion of the business. Medilab operated several machines for diagnostic evaluations as ordered by a physician. Such machines produced documentation which was then evaluated by another physician. Dr. Carmouze did not perform the service nor interpret the diagnostic results. When Medilab applied for a provider number to enroll in the Medicaid program it represented that services were to be provided by Dr. Arnoldo Carmouze. It was further represented that Dr. Carmouze would treat or supervise treatment of patients on behalf of the Medilab "group." On or about January 11, 1992, Medilab received its group provider number along with a copy of the Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook. Medilab was notified that it could begin billing for services beginning October 2, 1991. Subsequently, the Agency performed an audit of Medilab for the period October 2, 1991 through August 31, 1992. Li-Hsiang Wu, a computer systems project analyst employed by the Agency, generated a random sample of Medicaid recipients by using a computer program to calculate the total number of Medicaid recipients for which claims were submitted during the audit period. Then Medilab's provider number and the dates of the audit were used to generate the total number of Medicaid recipients for whom claims were submitted by Medilab for the audit period. Once the total number of recipients was identified, Ms. Wu generated a list of forty-three recipient numbers which were selected by the computer from the total number claimed by Medilab for the period searched. Mr. Allen then requested and obtained from Medilab the medical records for the same forty-three randomly selected Medicaid recipients. The medical records were first reviewed by Phyllis Stiver, the Agency's registered nurse consultant. Once Ms. Stiver completed her initial review, Mr. Allen requested additional records from Medilab. Specifically, documentation for the office visit and records that established the necessity for the tests performed by Medilab were requested for each of the forty-three recipients. Medilab subsequently submitted additional records to the Agency which were also reviewed by Ms. Stiver. Ms. Stiver determined that based upon her review of the forty-three records, Medilab had violated Medicaid rules and policy as follows: Medilab failed to have all of the medical records signed by a physician and dated; and Medilab failed to document in the medical records to show that certain diagnostic tests were performed. After Ms. Stiver completed her review of the records, Dr. Sullenberger reviewed each of Medilab's medical records for the forty-three patients. Dr. Sullenberger determined, and it is found, that the majority of the tests performed by Medilab were not medically necessary based upon the symptoms documented for each patient, the prior patient histories established by the records, and the absence of other, less expensive testing that would normally be utilized to determine a medical condition. Virtually all of the patient records reviewed recited the same medical complaints: chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitation, numbness or tingling in extremities, and dizziness. Only five of the forty-three patients were over 49 years of age. The ages of the majority of the forty-three were under 50. That age group is rarely afflicted by the types of medical conditions which the Medilab equipment was used to detect. The symptoms and medical histories recited in the medical records did not justify the tests performed by Medilab for the following patients (recipients identified in this record as numbers 1 through 43): 1, 2, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, and 41. With the exception of the electrocardiogram, the symptoms and medical histories recited in the medical records did not justify the tests performed by Medilab for the following patients (recipients identified in this record as numbers 1 through 43): 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 42, and 43. With regard to recipient 8, except for the electrocardiogram and the abdominal ultrasound, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 10, except for the electrocardiogram and the Doppler echocardiogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 14, except for the electrocardiogram and the echocardiogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 28, except for the mammogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. None of the services or testing performed by Medilab were supervised by a physician. Two physicians, Dr. Pozo and Dr. Pereira, radiologists, read the diagnostic results but were not on site to perform or supervise the tests on a daily basis. Dr. Pozo did not supervise the services that were provided at Medilab. Dr. Pereira, who is deceased and whose testimony was not available, did not supervise the services that were provided at Medilab. According to Mr. Nunez, Dr. Pereira had someone from his office courier the tests results and his interpretations to and from the Medilab facility. Dr. Pereira may have visited the facility on occasion but was not there during its full hours of operation. Dr. Carmouze, the treating physician and representative for Medilab's physician group, did not supervise the services at Medilab. Dr. Carmouze treated over 95 percent of the total patients referred to Medilab yet Dr. Carmouze never billed the Medicaid program for the patients' office visits. For the audit period, of the 493 different patients Medilab billed Medicaid for, Dr. Carmouze is the only treating physician identified by the records. The Medicaid Physician's Handbook, supplied to Medilab at the time of its enrollment, specified that to be reimbursable the services performed by a physician group provider had to be medically necessary and supervised by a physician. The Medicaid Provider Agreement required Medilab to keep complete and accurate medical and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered for five years. All tests performed by Medilab were documented with a physician's order for same. Medilab submitted for review all medical and fiscal records it maintained in its attempt to fully justify and disclose the extent of the services it rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Program Integrity Office, issue a final order charging Medilab for the full amounts paid for the audit period as the services rendered were not supervised by a physician and were, therefore, not "physician services." Additionally, the Agency should impose an administrative fine in an amount not to exceed $5,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0096 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, and 12 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 7 is accepted as to the general statement but is rejected as to the amount claimed. Paragraph 8 is rejected as a mischaracterization of testimony; it is accepted Dr. Sullenberger, on further reflection and in an effort to be consistent, gave Medilab the benefit of doubt and modified disallowed items. Paragraph 9 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 10 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 11 is rejected as contrary to weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. That Dr. Carmouze never charged for the alleged office visits that generated the referral for tests was the relevant fact. Paragraph 15 is accurate but is irrelevant in light of the stipulation. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 36, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, and 53 are accepted. Paragraphs 37, 38, 40, 42, and 47 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as hearsay not supported by direct evidence. Paragraph 45 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 51, the first sentence is accepted; the remainder rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Heidi E. Garwood Agency for Health Care Administration 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building B, Room 271 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Monte K. Rassner Rassner, Rassner, Kramer & Gold, P.A. 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue, Suite PH-B South Miami, Florida 33143 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent, a Medicaid provider, committed the violations alleged in the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a provider with the Florida Medicaid Program and has had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was subject to all applicable federal and state laws, regulations, rules, and Medicaid Handbooks. Respondent is required to comply with the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (the General Handbook). The General Handbook requires a provider to have medical documentation that justifies the necessity of services provided to a recipient. The General Handbook advises that sanctions may be imposed if appropriate documentation is not kept. Respondent is an "Assistive Care Services" provider under the Florida Medicaid Program and is required to comply with the "Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitation Handbook" (ACS Handbook). The ACS Handbook requires that each recipient of Assistive Care Services from the Florida Medicaid Plan have a RSP, and provides, in relevant part (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 39): Every [Assistive Care Services] recipient must have a service plan completed by the [Assistive Care Services] service provider. . . . The ALF [is] responsible for ensuring the service plan is developed and implemented. The ACS Handbook further requires (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 40): The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services (AHCA-Med Serv [sic] Form 036) must be completed within 15 days after the initial health assessment or annual assessment, be in writing, and based on information contained in the health assessment. . . . The ACS handbook further provides (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 40), that both the recipient (or the recipient's guardian or designated representative) and the ALF administrator (or the person designated in writing by the administrator) must sign and date the RSP. The RSP is considered complete as of the last date signed by either party. The provider (in this case Respondent) is responsible for timely completing the RSP for each Medicaid recipient in its facility. Inspector Marie Josue conducted an on-site visit to Respondent's premises on February 1, 2011. At the time of that inspection, Respondent reviewed a sample of ten RSPs for ten residents who received Assistive Care Services from the Florida Medicaid Program. Two of those ten RSPs had been timely signed and dated by the resident (or the resident's guardian or designee) and by Respondent's administrator (or the administrator's designee). The remaining eight RSPs had been timely signed and dated by the resident (or the resident's guardian or designee), but each had not been signed or dated by Respondent's facility administrator (or the administrator's written designee). Each RSP pre-dated February 1, 2011, by more than 15 days. The respective health assessments that formed the basis for each RSP occurred between March 23 and December 25, 2010. Respondent subsequently provided Ms. Josue with certain records that she had requested, including copies of the eight RSPs at issue in this proceeding. When she reviewed those records, Ms. Josue discovered that Respondent's administrator had signed and dated each previously unsigned RSP on February 1, 2011. Those signings by the administrator were untimely. Ms. Josue forwarded the results of her investigation to Mr. Dozier with a recommendation that Respondent be sanctioned for violating the provisions of section 409.913(15)(e), Florida Statutes, by the imposition of a $1,000.00 fine for each of the eight violations pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e). When she made her recommendation, Ms. Josue understood that the cited rule required a minimum fine of $1,000.00 per violation. Mr. Dozier accepted that recommendation and prepared the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011. Mr. Dozier consulted with two of his fellow administrators before concluding that the fine recommended by Ms. Josue was appropriate. He testified that he could have charged Respondent with violating section violating section 409.913(15)(d), which could have resulted in an administrative fine in the amount of $20,000.001/ Mr. Dozier considered an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000.00 to be more appropriate. Based on services provided to Medicaid patients pursuant to approved RSPs, Respondent submits claims to the Florida totaling between $6,450.00 and $9,200.00 per month. Petitioner routinely pays those claims. Each RSP at issue in this proceeding complied with the ACS Handbook except for the failure of the facility administrator (or designee) to timely sign the eight RSPs. RSPS are the guides to the services that will be provided by Respondent and reimbursed by the Medicaid Program by Petitioner. The requirement that the administrator (or designee) sign each plan is an effort to combat fraud. There was no evidence that the failure to sign the eight plans at issue in this proceeding was more than an error. Specifically, there was no evidence of fraud. There was no allegation that the lack of the administrator's signature on the eight plans at issue had any effect on the care provided to the eight Medicaid patients. Ms. Pace has been Respondent's administrator for over 13 years. Ms. Pace is familiar with RSPs and the rules and regulations governing the Florida Medicaid Program. Ms. Pace knew that the RSPs must be completed within 15 days of the assessment by a physician. Ms. Pace knew that the patient (or designee) and the administrator (or designee) must sign the RSP for it to be complete. Ms. Pace acknowledged that the eight RSPs at issue in this proceeding were not signed by anyone on behalf of the provider until February 1, 2010. Ms. Pace had designated a subordinate to sign the eight PSAs at issue in this proceeding on behalf of the provider. She had no explanation why those RSPs were not timely signed by anyone on behalf of the provider.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding La Hacienda Gardens, LLC, guilty of the eight violations of section 409.913(15)(e) alleged in the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011. It is further recommended that the final order impose administrative fines in the amount of $1,000.00 per violation for a total of $8,000.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2012.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent was overpaid by the Medicaid program as set forth in Petitioner's Final Audit Report dated May 18, 2009, for the period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006.
Findings Of Fact AHCA audited certain of Nationwide's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006, hereinafter the audit period. Nationwide was an authorized Medicaid provider of home health services to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. During the audit period, Nationwide had been issued Medicaid provider number 650065000. No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Nationwide had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA (Agreement). No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Nationwide received payment for services to Medicaid recipients, including for the services that are being disputed in the Amended FAR. The Agreement provided, among other things, that the submission of Medicaid claims by Nationwide for payment constituted a certification that the services were provided in accordance with state and federal laws, as well as rules and regulations applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medicaid provider handbooks issued by AHCA. Pursuant to the federal Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contracted with Catapult Consultants, LLC (Catapult) to conduct several audits in Florida in cooperation with AHCA's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI). MPI's primary responsibility is to audit healthcare providers who participate in the Florida Medicaid Program and to ensure that Medicaid providers are only reimbursed for services that are in accordance with Florida Medicaid handbooks and rules. Catapult conducted the audit on Nationwide. MPI oversaw and reviewed Catapult's audit of Nationwide. Nationwide was noticed by CMS that Catapult would be conducting an audit on Nationwide for the audit period. MPI provided Catapult with a list of sample claims to be audited. Catapult requested from Nationwide (a) documentation and complete medical records for the recipients of the service, and (b) dates of service in the sample claims. Catapult reviewed the documents and records received from Nationwide to determine (a) what services were provided, and (b) whether the services were provided in compliance with Medicaid policies and procedures. Catapult prepared a draft audit report and provided it to CMS. CMS reviewed the draft audit report and forwarded it to MPI for review. On July 7, 2008, CMS sent a Preliminary Audit Report (PAR) to Nationwide. The PAR included seven findings and identified an overpayment of $367,097.10 for claims that, in whole or part, were not covered by Medicaid. Nationwide was requested, among other things, to provide a response, including additional documentation, i.e., documentation not previously provided, that Nationwide wanted considered. Nationwide responded and provided additional documentation for Catapult to consider. Catapult, in cooperation with MPI, reviewed the additional documentation. Catapult completed a final audit report and provided it to CMS for review. CMS reviewed the final audit report and forwarded it to MPI. On May 18, 2009, MPI issued the FAR. The FAR included four findings: Finding No.1, Inadequate Information in the Treatment Plan; Finding No. 2, Services Billed Without a Valid Plan of Care (POC); Finding No. 3, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse; and Finding No. 4, Maintaining Records. The FAR identified and demanded repayment of an overpayment of $326,866.72 and imposed a fine of $2,500.00, totaling a repayment of $329,366.72. Subsequently, Nationwide again submitted additional documentation. On January 7, 2010, MPI issued an Amended FAR which included three findings: Finding No. 1, Services Billed Without a Valid POC; Finding No. 2, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse; and Finding No. 3, Maintaining Records. The Amended FAR identified and demanded repayment of an overpayment of $31,765.20 and imposed a fine of $2,500.00, totaling a repayment of $34,265.20. The Amended FAR and the work papers associated with the audit, which were in the form of a spreadsheet containing contemporaneous notes of the auditor, were admitted into evidence. Only claims included and considered in the FAR were included and considered in the Amended FAR. Finding No. 1, Services Billed Without a Valid POC Three sub-findings were included in Finding No. 1, Services Billed Without a Valid POC: Sub-Finding No. 1, POC Not Signed by a Physician; Sub-Finding No. 2, Rubber Stamp Used for the Physician's Signature; and Sub-Finding No. 3, Billed for Hours Outside the POC Authorization. Eighteen claims, considered overpayments by AHCA, were associated with Finding No. 1. One of the 18 claims, claim 351, was associated with Sub-Finding No. 1. The POC for claim 351 was signed by a nurse practitioner, not a physician, in violation of the Medicaid handbook. Nationwide does not dispute that claim 351 is an overpayment. Seven of the 18 claims were associated with Sub- Finding No. 2: claims 6, 12, 46, 71, 120, 189, and 219. Nationwide disputes that the claims were overpayments. All of the seven claims were for the same recipient of the services provided, T. S. T. S.'s attending physician, Carlos Diaz, M.D., approved the care for T. S. Dr. Diaz admitted that the signatures on the POCs were rubber stamped; and that the POCs were rubber stamped either by him or the nurse practitioner, but that he was not always present with the nurse practitioner when she stamped the POCs. Also, Dr. Diaz did not initial the rubber stamped signatures. Ten of the 18 claims were associated with Sub-Finding No. 3: claims 281, 298, 119, 72, 145, 167, 176, 274, 210, and Only claim 2 is disputed by Nationwide as an overpayment. Regarding claim 2, Nationwide billed for services that were rendered after the date that the recipient of the services was discharged by Nationwide.1 Finding No. 2, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse The basis for Finding No. 2, Too Many Hours Billed by Private Duty Nurse, is that more hours were billed than were supported by the documentation. Fourteen claims were associated with Finding No. 2: claims 333, 381, 388, 669, 27, 47, 701, 52, 6, 18, 36, 44, 500, and 82. Only claims 333, 27, 47, 701, 6, 18, 36, and 44 are disputed by Nationwide as overpayments. Regarding claim 333, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. As to claim 27, Nationwide billed for 12 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 11.5 hours of service. Regarding claim 47, Nationwide billed for 12 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 11 hours of service. As to claim 701, Nationwide billed for 15 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 14 hours of service. Regarding claim 6, Nationwide billed for 12 hours of service. Nursing notes indicate that the recipient of the service received radiation therapy for two hours. The evidence demonstrates 10 hours of service. As to claim 18, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. Regarding claim 36, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. As to claim 44, Nationwide billed for seven hours of service. The evidence demonstrates 6.5 hours of service. The private duty nurses were LPNs. Private duty nurses are paid an hourly rate. No evidence was presented that payment was authorized for a portion of an hour. For total service hours that were one-half of an hour, AHCA rounded down to the nearest hour. As a result, claims 333, 18, 36, and 44 were rounded to six hours of service; and claim 27 was rounded to 11 hours of service. The evidence demonstrates that claims 333, 18, 36, and 44 were appropriately rounded to six hours of service; and claim 27 was appropriately rounded to 11 hours of service. Finding No. 3, Maintaining Records Three claims were associated with Finding No. 3: claims 622, 30, and 507. Nationwide failed to maintain records to support the services provided. Nationwide does not dispute that the three claims were overpayments. Accuracy of the Formula No dispute exists as to the accuracy of the formula used to calculate the total overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Nationwide Healthcare Services, Inc., received overpayments from the Medicaid program in the amount of $31,765.20 for the audit period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006; imposing a fine of $1,500.00; and requiring Nationwide Healthcare Services, Inc., to repay the overpayment of $31,765.20, plus a fine of $1,500.00, totaling $33,265.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2011.
The Issue Whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services should grant petitioners' applications for certificates of need for the establishment of Medicare certified home health agencies in Hillsborough and Polk Counties, Florida.
Findings Of Fact HRS thereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact set forth in the recommended order except for the last sentence of paragraph 32 and paragraph 33. See discussion in ruling on exceptions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of laws, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order granting and issuing CON Nos. 3605 and 3606 to Medical Personnel Pool. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1986.
The Issue Whether Nursing Quality Services, Inc. (Respondent), a Medicaid provider, was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program in the amount of $8,154.02, and, if so, whether Respondent must pay to the Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner) the amount of the alleged overpayment, a penalty in the amount of $1,630.80, costs in the amount of $43.94, and any applicable interest.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a provider with the Florida Medicaid Program and has had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Relevant to this proceeding, Respondent is a home health services provider, providing nursing services to residents of assisted living facilities (ALFs). Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was subject to all applicable federal and state laws, regulations, rules, and Medicaid Handbooks. Respondent is required to comply with the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Respondent is also required to comply with the Home Health Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Coverage Handbook). Home health services are billed in units of service. Each unit of service has a billing code that generates a specified Medicare payment to the provider. The two billing codes at issue in this proceeding are T1030 and T1031. A billable unit of service is generated under these codes when either a registered nurse or a licensed practical nurse goes to an ALF and provides a qualified service to a resident of the ALF. Tab 6 in Petitioner's exhibit book contains relevant excerpts of the Coverage Handbook, which was last revised in July 2008. Relevant to this proceeding, the Coverage Handbook reflects the following reimbursement information under the bulletin heading "Home Health Visits for Multiple Recipients at One Location" with emphasis added by the undersigned: Home health visit services provided to two or more recipients with individual residences at a single location are reimbursed as one visit for each individual receiving a home health service at that location (for example, visits at an assisted living facility). Home health visit services provided to two or more recipients sharing a residence at a single location (for example, visits at a group home) are reimbursed as follows: For the first recipient, Medicaid reimburses the service at the established Medicaid visit rate; For the second recipient, Medicaid reimburses the service at 50 percent of the established Medicaid visit rate; and For any additional recipients, Medicaid reimburses the services at 50 percent of the established Medicaid visit rate. The Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI) has generated a memorandum that reflects its understanding of the coverage and limitations set forth in the Coverage Handbook. Key to this proceeding, the memorandum states the following as to services provided to a resident of an ALF with emphasis added by the undersigned: MPI further understands that residence in an assisted living facility would not justify an automatic authorization for a 100 percent reimbursement of the established Medicaid reimbursement rated for home health services. Providers will be given the opportunity to submit documentation demonstrating individual residence at a single location for MPI review and subsequent decision-making as to applicable reimbursement policy. Should the documentation substantiate an individual residence at a single location for the recipient(s) in question, the reimbursement for home health services would be allowed at 100 percent of the established Medicaid reimbursement rate appropriate for the date of service. As part of a larger audit of Medicaid providers, Petitioner audited Respondent based on billings submitted by Respondent and paid by Petitioner. Taking information reflected by Respondent's billings, Petitioner prepared a PAR, which was dated January 23, 2012, and signed by Ms. Fante. The PAR cited the Coverage Handbook, statues, and rules Petitioner relied upon and attached a detailed audit report reflecting that Respondent was overpaid $8,154.02. All of the services at issue in this proceeding were billed and paid at 100 percent of the established Medicaid visit rate for identical units of service (either T1030 or T1031) generated at the same facility location on the same date whether or not it was the first recipient (the so-called anchor recipient), a second recipient, or an additional recipient. Respondent's billings provided the respective address for each of the three ALFs at which these recipients resided, but the billings do not document that each recipient maintained an individual residence in that ALF. Consequently, after payment for the anchor recipient at 100 percent of the Medicaid reimbursement rate, Respondent should have been paid at 50 percent of the reimbursement rate for identical units of service to the other recipients at the same address on the same day. The payments at 100 percent of the billing rate for units of service that should have been reduced to 50 percent of the billing rate constituted overpayments. Petitioner established that the amount of the overpayment totaled $8,154.02. The PAR was not final agency action. Respondent was advised of the following options: Pay the identified overpayment in this notice within 15 days of the receipt of this letter. Under this option, amnesty will be granted, sanctions will not be applied and costs will not be assessed. If you wish to submit further documentation in support of the claims identified as overpayments, you must do so within 15 days of receipt of this letter. Any additional documentation received will be taken under consideration and you will be notified of the results of the audit in a final audit report. Under this option, a final audit report will be issued and will include application of sanctions, the assessment of costs, and hearing rights. If you chose not to respond, wait for the issuance of the final audit report. Under this option, a final audit report will include the application of sanctions, the assessment of costs, and inform you of any hearing rights that you may wish to exercise. The PAR was sent to Respondent via Federal Express using the following address: 8300 SW 8 Street, Suite 107, Miami, FL 33144. Ms. Creel testified, credibly, that the foregoing was the address of record for Respondent at the time the PAR was sent to Respondent. The Federal Express receipt reflects that the PAR was delivered on January 25, 2012 at 9:41 a.m., and signed for by someone named "M. Mejia." The receipt reflects that the PAR had been delivered to "Receptionist/Front Desk." Mr. Fernandez testified, credibly, that he never received the PAR because Respondent had moved its offices from Suite 107 to Suite 103 in the same building. While that evidence is accepted, Ms. Creel established that Respondent's office of record with Petitioner had not been updated at the time the PAR was sent to Respondent. Respondent did not respond to the PAR. Petitioner prepared a "Final Audit Report" (FAR), which was dated March 2, 2012, and signed by Ms. Fante. The FAR asserted that Respondent owed $8,154.02 as the overpayment, a fine in the amount of $1,630.80, and costs in the amount of $43.94, for a total of $9,828.76, plus applicable interest. The FAR was sent to Respondent by Federal Express at the same addressed that had been used for the PAR. The Federal Express receipt reflects that the FAR was delivered on March 8 at 9:28 a.m. and signed for by "M. Mejia." The receipt reflects that the PAR had been delivered to "Receptionist/Front Desk." The FAR advised as follows: Pursuant to section 409.913(25)(d), F.S., the Agency may collect money owed by all means allowable by law, including, but not limited to, exercising the option to collect money from Medicare that is payable to the provider. Pursuant to section 409.913(27), F.S., if within 30 days following this notice you have not either repaid the alleged overpayment amount or entered into a satisfactory repayment agreement with the Agency, your Medicaid reimbursements will be withheld; they will continue to be withheld, even during the pendency of an administrative hearing, until such time as the overpayment amount is satisfied. Pursuant to section 409.913(30), F.S., the Agency shall terminate your participation in the Medicaid program if you fail to repay an overpayment or enter into a satisfactory repayment agreement with the Agency, within 35 days after the date of a final order which is no longer subject to further appeal. Pursuant to sections 409.913(15)(q) and 409.913(25)(c), F.S., a provider that does not adhere to the terms of a repayment agreement is subject to termination from the Medicaid program. Finally, failure to comply with all sanctions applied or due dates may result in additional sanctions being imposed. The FAR provided Respondent an explanation of its right to request an administrative hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120. Mr. Fernandez received the FAR. Promptly thereafter, Mr. Fernandez called Ms. Creel to discuss the assessed overpayment, fine, and costs. Mr. Fernandez told her that he had not receive the PAR, and asserted that there was no overpayment because each recipient of the payments at issue lived in an ALF. Ms. Creel answered his questions as to the type documentation Respondent could submit to document there was no overpayment, but she explained to him that she had no authority to extend any of the deadlines set forth in the FAR. Respondent thereafter requested a formal administrative hearing, the matter was referred to DOAH, and this proceeding followed. As noted above in the Preliminary Section, Respondent offered no exhibits at the formal hearing. While Mr. Fernandez had visited each of the three ALFs at issue in this proceeding, he knew nothing about the living quarters of any of the recipients. The term "individual residence" is not defined in the Coverage Handbook, by rule, or by statute. Consequently, the plain meaning of the phrase is used in finding that there was no evidence that any of the recipients maintained an individual residence at the location of his or her ALF.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Nursing Quality Services, Inc., was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program in the principal amount of $8,154.02. It is further recommended that the final order require Nursing Quality Services, Inc., to repay the Florida Medicaid the amount of $8,154.02, together with applicable interest and cost in the amount of $43.94. It is further recommended that no administrative fine be imposed. S DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2012.
