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TOM GALLAGHER, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ANTHONY ZEFIRETTO, 02-001373PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Apr. 05, 2002 Number: 02-001373PL Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
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CAROLYN HENKE vs AMERON HOMES, INC., 18-003532 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebastian, Florida Jul. 09, 2018 Number: 18-003532 Latest Update: Feb. 06, 2019

The Issue Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.

Findings Of Fact On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work. The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was $198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552. Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015. Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges. Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include: Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract. Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost (above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately $2,000). Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel. Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway. Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately $1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation. General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away. Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.) Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a man. Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/ Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/ Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf. Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs. Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons. Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way. Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of $170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract. In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following: Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost. Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore, Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.) Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner $2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased. Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material. Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality. Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost. Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost. General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found. Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.) Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower. Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.

USC (3) 2 U.S.C 360142 U.S.C 360242 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.34760.35760.37
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FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS ON BEHALF OF BAHIYYIH WATSON vs CHRISTINA VIERING, 10-009371 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 05, 2011 Number: 10-009371 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Christina Viering, discriminated against Petitioner, Bahiyyih Watson, on the basis of Watson's race and/or religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bahiyyih Watson ("Watson") is a light-skinned Black American3/ female. Watson is an adjunct professor at Valencia Community College, where she teaches cultural anthropology. Watson holds a Ph.D. in anthropology. Watson practices the religion known as Yoruba, which has a tradition of Orishas and places a great emphasis on ancestors. The religion emphasizes African traditions and a respect for elders as well. At all times relevant hereto, Watson was residing in a house at 1830 Dover Road, Winter Park, Florida (the "House"). The House is owned by Respondent, Christina Viering ("Viering"). The House is a three-bedroom house in a residential neighborhood. It has a dining room, living room, kitchen and sun room, each of which was considered a common area for all residents. On August 2, 2008, Watson and Viering entered into a legal document erroneously entitled, "Assignment of Lease" (hereinafter the "Lease"), which called for Viering to rent a room in the House. The Lease has a term of six months, i.e., from August 30, 2008, until February 28, 2009. Viering identified the Lease as a month-to-month lease, but there is no language in the Lease to confirm that description. There is a document attached to the Lease entitled, "Tenant Policies," setting forth various issues relating to the Lease. The attachment contains a provision which states: "MONTH TO MONTH LEASE TERMINATING WITH PROPER NOTICE. WHEN TERMINATING YOUR LEASE, A 30 DAY WRITTEN NOTICE IS REQUIRED." The provision does not explain how it would be interpreted in contravention of the plain language of the Lease. There is nothing in the Lease specifying a particular room for Watson, but the parties testified that Watson occupied the bedroom with a bath, presumably the master suite. The Lease did not identify a specific room for Viering. Viering testified that she resided at the House during the term of the Lease between her and Watson, but did not sleep there every night. Watson said Viering never slept at the House while she, Watson, was there. One neighbor who lived across the street said she believed Viering lived at the House during the time Watson lived there. Another neighbor said she never saw Viering's car at the House overnight and only rarely during the day. The greater weight of the evidence suggests that Viering was at the House only sporadically and probably did not reside there as a residence. At the time Watson signed the Lease, she was working as an adjunct professor at Valencia Community College. She was in the process of submitting an application, including extensive paperwork, to become a tenured professor at the University of South Florida. The application process was intense and required considerable concentration and attention to detail to complete. The application was the most important matter in Watson's life at that time. One of her reasons for selecting the House as a residence was because it was on a quiet street and appeared to be a place where she could work without major distractions. Viering was made aware of this situation. On or about March 17, 2008, another resident, Abbey Nichols, moved into one of the other bedrooms in the House. On October 17, 2008, yet another resident, Kristen Bryan, moved into the third bedroom. Both of the two new tenants were young (twenty-ish) Caucasian women who were of the Christian faith. Each of the new tenants entered into an agreement identical to the Lease, but with different dates of residency. The two new tenants were not inclined to help Watson clean or maintain the House. Viering testified that she slept overnight at the House only two or three times a month. When she slept there, she slept in the Florida room at the rear of the House. The washer and dryer were located in the Florida Room. Again, Watson does not remember Viering ever staying overnight at the House, taking her meals there, or otherwise treating it as her place of residence. Landlord-Tenant Disputes Almost immediately upon Watson taking residence in the House, she and Viering began to have disputes about various and sundry issues. For example: Watson complained that Viering was moving her personal belongings around; Viering said she only moved items off the kitchen table so that she could wash the tablecloth. Watson said that Viering had thrown away some of Watson's kitchenware; Viering said she threw away a styrofoam cup when she was cleaning the kitchen. The disputes soon escalated. On September 17, 2008, less than one month into the six-month lease, Viering sent Watson a notice to vacate the premises within 30 days. The parties must have worked out an agreement, however, because Watson remained in the House after the proffered termination date. The relationship between Viering and Watson, however, did not improve. They continued to disagree about things and communication between the two seemed quite strained. On or about November 8, 2008, Viering went to the House to check on a leak which had been reported. A neighbor from across the street, Ms. Wilson, accompanied her as she looked around the House. Viering testified under oath that while doing the inspection, she noticed mail in Watson's room that appeared to belong to Viering. When she inspected the mail and determined that it belonged to her, Viering was concerned about possible identity theft. Viering then went to the local post office and requested an address change so that her mail would not go to the House. Wilson remembers the event somewhat differently: She says that Viering said she (Viering) believed Watson had some of her mail and wanted to go into the room to check. Watson saw Viering take some mail that she claimed belonged to her, but Watson never personally identified the names on the letters. Watson denies ever having mail that belonged to Viering. The only certain fact concerning this situation was that Viering did go into Watson's room and retrieved some mail. It is not certain who the mail belonged to or whether Viering identified the mail as hers before going into Watson's room. Plumbing Problems Two days later, one of the tenants reported to Viering that the plumbing at the House was stopped up. Viering told the tenants that it was their responsibility to call a plumber and get the stoppage cleared up. She took this stance because, some ten years prior, some of Viering's tenants had flushed items down the toilet, causing a back-up in the plumbing. Viering believed her current tenants had done the same. One of the young tenant's fathers then called Viering and suggested that the plumbing problem could be caused by roots growing into the pipes, and, if so, then the problem would be the landlord's responsibility. Viering agreed then to call the plumber herself. Jamaal Crooks, a plumber working for Bryan Plumbing, came to the House on November 14, 2008, to work on the problem. He went into the House, but only into the hallway bathroom. He did not enter Watson's room or the bathroom in her room. Crooks then went outside and used a cable to reach inside the main sewer line. He pulled three tampons out of the line, thus, clearing the blockage. Crooks could not say if there were more tampons in the line at that time, but the ones he removed were sufficient to allow the sewage to flow. Crooks apparently gave Viering a bill for his services at that time. The amount on the bill was $178.00. Viering demanded that Watson pay the bill or that she at least pay her one-third share. Viering did not believe she should share in the cost, because she was not staying at the House on a permanent basis. That testimony contradicts her statements that she was at the House regularly and that it was her residence at that time. Watson refused to pay the bill, because she did not feel responsible for the stoppage. Some six days later, Bryan Plumbing issued another invoice in the amount of $178.00. The invoice included a note that said, "Tenant refused to pay bill. Christina was present the whole time." It is unclear from the testimony why this invoice was issued if a bill had been presented on the day of service. Viering ultimately paid the plumbing bill and asked each of her tenants to pay a portion of it. Watson said the plumbing worked for only four or five hours after Crooks left the premises. Viering says the plumbing was working for up to a week. It is clear the plumbing problem was not totally resolved. When a tenant would attempt to shower or flush the toilet, sewage would back up into the bathtub and shower stall. The tenants were afraid to drink water from the faucet because they did not know if it was contaminated or not. As will be discussed below, the two Caucasian tenants left the House soon after the November 14, 2008, plumbing issue. Watson, who could not afford to move and had no friends or family with space to accommodate her, remained at the House. There was no working toilet, so Watson had to find other means of performing daily hygiene. She would bathe as well as possible at local stores or gas stations. She would drive to stores to use their restrooms. At night when the stores were closed, she would reluctantly go into the backyard and dig a hole to use as a latrine. By that time she was becoming physically ill from all the stress. When she needed to vomit, she would have to use the hole in the ground for that purpose as well. Watson endured this situation for almost three weeks before finally finding another place to live. On December 19, 2008, a little over a month after the initial plumbing problem, Crooks came back to the House to fix the plumbing again. By that time, all three tenants, including Watson, had already moved out of the House. Although Crooks had no independent recollection of being at the House on that date, he identified a written statement he had made on that date saying he had "found more tampons in line [sic]." Crooks could not say if the tampons were left over from the prior visit, but inasmuch as the plumbing was not working in the interim, that is probable. Notices to Vacate On November 12, 2008, just two days after receiving her initial notice about the plumbing problem, Viering gave all three tenants a Lease Violation Warning setting forth certain alleged violations and giving the tenants three days to come into compliance. Two days later, on the day the plumbing was initially fixed, Viering gave each tenant a 30-day notice to vacate the premises. The basis for the notices, as set forth in another letter from Viering to the tenants, was that a police officer had advised her that she should evict the three tenants. Viering said that action was "radical" and that she opted for a 30-day notice of termination of the Leases instead. On the same day she gave the tenants the 30-day notice, she gave each of them a seven-day notice which specified lease violations. The notice to Bryan set forth the following violations: Failure to maintain plumbing Failure to pay share of utilities and repairs Unauthorized guests on property Unauthorized overnight guests Harassment by unauthorized guests Disturbing the peace Failure to maintain sanitary conditions The notice to Nichols set forth very similar violations, to wit: Failure to maintain premises in a sanitary manner Negligent use of plumbing Failure to pay plumbing repair Unauthorized guests on the property Unauthorized overnight guests on the property Destruction of property belonging to the landlord or permitting another person do so The notice given to Watson contained the following alleged violations: Failure to maintain plumbing Failure to comply with payments due [sic] Share of utilities to be paid Share of repair to plumbing Disposal of garbage in sanitary manner Maintaining the premises in sanitary condition Unauthorized overnight guests on a regular basis Harassment to me by yourself and guests On the same date that Viering gave the tenants their seven-day notices and 30-day termination notices, she gave Watson two additional letters: One was a letter advising Watson that her security deposit amount was being increased by an additional $100.00; the second was a demand to have Viering's dresser (which Watson was using) ready to be picked up on the upcoming weekend. Religious Controversy The rash of notices on November 14, 2008, indicates some irrationality on Viering's part. It also indicates that the landlord-client relationship was not working effectively. On that same day, Watson called the police to report Viering for harassment. While waiting for the police, Watson went into the backyard to avoid contact with Viering. Viering, however, came into the backyard and confronted Watson. Watson remembers Viering coming toward her with something in her hand, raised above her head. Viering was chanting some incantations and acting bizarre. Viering remembers only that she wanted to talk to Watson and was going to use her cell phone to videotape Watson as she talked. As she approached Watson, she recited the Lord's Prayer to cover herself with God's protection.4/ On November 15, 2008, one day after the aforementioned notices, Viering posted a Notice of Non-Renewal at the House, advising Nichols that her lease would not be renewed and that Nichols must vacate the premises no later than December 1, 2008. On that same day, Viering cut out cross-shaped designs from some magazines and posted them around the House. Viering did so as a part of her Christian religious beliefs, thinking there was "evil" in the House and hoping to eradicate it. When Watson took the crosses down because she considered them offensive, Viering made replacement crosses. Watson says Viering used paper from Watson's room to make the crosses; Viering says she used liner paper from her dresser and a Home Depot catalogue. The crosses were placed on various windows around the House. Watson states that she sent Viering a letter complaining that the crosses were traumatizing to her as a black woman. Viering does not remember any complaint from Watson about the crosses. Watson's written missive to Viering on this subject could not be produced. Watson says she also left voice messages on Viering's telephone. Viering said that she does not remember any such message, but since Watson sent her so many text and emails that were harassing in nature, Viering would frequently delete messages before reading them. The following day, Sunday, November 16, 2008, Viering returned to the House and put up wooden crosses in the front flower beds. She also painted black crosses on each slat of the privacy fence behind the House and on some windows in the House. The crosses were accompanied by messages such as, "The pure white light of Christ" and other inspirational sayings from Viering's Christian literature. The black crosses were crudely painted using a paper towel because Viering could not find a paint brush. Watson arrived home after dark and found the large cross in the front yard and the crosses painted on all the windows, which frightened her, so she asked a male neighbor to accompany her into the House to make sure no one was there. Inside the House, there were numerous crosses painted on windows and doors. All of this made Watson extremely frightened, so she called the police. She was told that unless the crosses were on fire, they could not investigate. Additional Disputes On November 17, 2008, Viering provided additional notices to the tenants: Watson was advised that her bedroom would be inspected, that she should return all items that were not her property, and that she should remove her property from the common areas of the House. Bryan received yet another Notice of Termination, effective immediately. Both Bryan and Nichols moved out of the House shortly thereafter. At some point, Watson remembers receiving a written notice telling her to vacate within seven days. The reason for the notice was that Viering had gotten into a confrontation with a black woman outside the House and presumed that the woman was Watson's friend. In fact, the woman was the mother of one of Bryan's friends.5/ Viering had borrowed a bicycle off the front porch of the House. The bike belonged to a young man who was visiting Bryan, and he thought someone had stolen the bike. The young man's mother accosted Viering for taking the bike without asking. That altercation appears to have been the genesis of the notice to Watson. On November 19, 2008, Watson contacted the Seminole County Sheriff's Office and filed a complaint against Viering. The complaint was for harassment and violation of landlord- tenant laws. Watson also contacted every state agency she could think of to seek some sort of redress from the conditions she was living in. She called, by her account, the Public Works department, the Utilities Commission, Health and Safety, and Sanitation, to name a few. None of the agencies acknowledged jurisdiction over the matter. On December 9, 2008, Viering received a letter from a local television station stating that a consumer had filed a complaint alleging denial of basic services by Viering. Thereafter, the television station broadcasted a consumer human-interest story concerning Watson's plight. At some point in time, Watson filed a Petition for Temporary Injunction against Viering, claiming some sort of violence by Viering. The Injunction proceeding was dismissed on January 6, 2009, when Watson failed to appear at the court hearing on the matter. By that date, Watson was no longer residing at the House. On or about November 30, 2008, Watson had vacated the House, ending the relationship between herself and Viering. Watson alleges discrimination based on her race due to the fact that she received more notices than the other (Caucasian) tenants from Viering. However, Watson was the longest serving tenant and had the most interaction with Viering, so there is no way to establish discrimination based solely on the number of notices. Watson alleges religious discrimination based on the bizarre behavior of Viering, such as placing crosses and religious sayings around the House, chanting the Lord's Prayer or other incantations, and referencing evil in the House. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Viering was aware of Watson's religion, Yoruba. Although Viering was in Watson's room on occasion and must have seen Watson's shrines, there is no evidence that Viering was aware of what the shrines stood for. Watson claims discrimination based on the fact that Viering was less tolerant of her than of the white, Christian tenants. The other tenants did not testify at final hearing, so it is impossible to compare their treatment to Watson's. Viering clearly acted in a very strange and unusual fashion. She was not a pleasant landlord. However, her actions appear to be based on her own personality and demeanor, rather than on any intent to discriminate based on race or religion.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Bahiyyih Watson in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2011.

USC (1) 42 USC 3617 CFR (1) 24 CFR 100.400 Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.23760.34760.35760.37
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ELVIRA WILLIAMS vs VENICE COVE APARTMENTS, 04-002860 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Aug. 13, 2004 Number: 04-002860 Latest Update: Jan. 20, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of housing discrimination against Respondent based on her race and disabilities, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is African-American, although the record fails to disclose any physical or mental disability. Due to her pending eviction at an apartment complex known as the Tennis Club in Fort Lauderdale, Petitioner visited the Venice Cove apartment complex, also in Fort Lauderdale, in the summer of 2002. Deciding that she liked Venice Cove, Petitioner applied for a one bedroom apartment on September 16, 2002. In accordance with its customary practice, Respondent obtained a credit report and learned that Petitioner owed a utility payment, possibly a cable television box. Respondent advised Petitioner that she would have to satisfy this debt to rent an apartment, and Petitioner did so. At some point, Petitioner decided that she wanted a two bedroom/two bathroom apartment, and Respondent tentatively assigned her a unit of this type, pending final approval of her application to lease. Petitioner changed her preferences for type of apartment several times. Respondent was able to accommodate immediately all but one of these preferences. In early December, Petitioner mentioned to Respondent's representative that she was being evicted from the Tennis Club. This is the first time that Petitioner disclosed any eviction to Respondent. Examining the file, Respondent's representative realized that she had failed to order the more thorough credit report that Respondent had been using since November 2002. This report would reveal evictions, among other things. Respondent's representative ordered the more thorough credit report, which revealed that Respondent had been evicted three times. Respondent's policy precluded renting to a person with this rental history, and Respondent's representative promptly informed Petitioner that she was denying Petitioner's application. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent denied Petitioner's application on the basis of Petitioner's race or any disability from which she may suffer.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elvira Williams 1515 Northwest 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Kristine A. Sawyers Law Offices of Lowenhaupt & Sawyers 7765 Southwest 87th Avenue Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33173

Florida Laws (5) 120.569760.20760.23760.35760.37
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GREGG ALLEN HINDS vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 91-003370 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 28, 1991 Number: 91-003370 Latest Update: Nov. 04, 1991

The Issue Whether Petitioner meets the qualifications prescribed by Chapter 475, Florida Statutes for licensure as a real estate salesman?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a 1986 graduate of Florida State University. He has a degree in urban politics and real estate. In November, 1989, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in Palm Beach County Circuit Court to two counts of burglary of a dwelling, one count of petty larceny, and one count of dealing in stolen property. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was placed on five years probation, which, the court specified, was not subject to "early termination." In addition, Petitioner was ordered to pay $360.00 in restitution and $265.00 in court costs. These crimes were all committed in June, 1989, after Petitioner had returned to Palm Beach County from a two or three-month vacation in Colorado. The two counts of burglary involved the same dwelling: the townhouse that Petitioner had lived in, with others, prior to his Colorado vacation. The lease to the townhouse, which was in the name of one of his roommates, had expired before his return from vacation. Contrary to the instructions of the landlord, Petitioner entered the dwelling on at least two separate occasions after coming back from Colorado in order to retrieve personal belongings that remained in the townhouse. The stolen property involved in the dealing in stolen property charge was a stereo that belonged to Petitioner's friend. Petitioner tried to pawn the stereo for $45.00. The petty theft charge involved the taking of ten CD's that were on top of a CD player located in a bar in the vicinity of the townhouse. Since these incidents, Petitioner has not run afoul of the law. Petitioner presently owns and operates the South Florida Adventure Club, a business which plans and organizes social activities for single professionals. In his spare time, he serves as an advisor to two youth groups. Petitioner is still on probation. He has paid in full the restitution ordered by the court. His court costs, however, have not yet been paid in full. He still owes $50.00.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not qualified for licensure as a real estate salesman because of his criminal record and denying his application for licensure based upon such a finding, without prejudice to Petitioner filing a subsequent application supported by a showing that, "because of the lapse of time and subsequent good conduct and reputation, or other reason deemed sufficient, it appears . . . that the interest of the public and investors will not likely be endangered by granting" the application. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of September, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Respondent: 1. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. 2-4. Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 5. First sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 6-10. Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony. 11. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the case than a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg Allen Hinds 2016 Broward Avenue # 3 West Palm Beach, Florida 33407-6112 Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street Suite 107, South Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 475.17475.25
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RED COATS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 92-004310BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jul. 15, 1992 Number: 92-004310BID Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1992

Findings Of Fact On April 24, 1992, the Respondent issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) pertaining to the provision of housekeeping services at South Florida State Hospital. Petitioner and Intervenor submitted responses to the RFP. After all responses were received, Respondent convened an evaluation committee to evaluate the responses. The evaluation committee recommended that Intervenor be awarded the contract. Petitioner's response was ranked by the evaluation committee as the second best response. Following the publication of the results of the evaluation committee, Petitioner filed a bid protest and asserted several grounds in support of its protest. At the formal hearing, the Petitioner abandoned all grounds except for the assertion that Intervenor had failed to disclose as a part of its financial information the existence of a tax lien. Petitioner asserted that the failure to disclose the tax lien should result in either the contract being awarded to it or the return of the matter to the evaluation committee for reevaluation. A Notice of Tax Lien was filed by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes and was in the amount of $1,900.00. Intervenor paid the amounts secured by the said lien on May 12, 1992, which was before the responses were due to the RFP on June 5, 1992. The RFP requires certain financial information of the bidders, but it does not require bidders to list tax liens that may have been filed against it. There is no evidence that Intervenor failed to provide the financial information required by the RFP or that the information was inaccurate or incomplete. Petitioner failed to establish that the existence of this tax lien would have had any bearing on the evaluation of the responses. There was no evidence that Intervenor gained an unfair advantage over Petitioner or any other bidder by failing to disclose this tax lien in its response to the RFP. There was no evidence that Intervenor acted in bad faith or that it tried to misrepresent its financial condition.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's bid protest. DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4310BID The Petitioner did not file a post-hearing submittal. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Intervenor. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 30 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The testimony of Ms. Diaz as to whether the amount of the tax lien was included in this figure was equivocal. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. When the Department of Labor and Employment Security satisfied the lien of record is not relevant to the issues presented by this matter. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 24 are rejected as being unnecessary to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerry Gordon, Esquire 1413 South Howard Avenue Suite 202 Tampa, Florida 33606 Colleen A. Donahue, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 10 Legal Office Room 513 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885 Stephen G. Murty, Esquire Jay R. Tome, Esquire Murty and Tome, P.A. 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 R. S. Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.57287.012287.057
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SHELLEY M. WRIGHT vs SERVITAS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, 17-002512 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 26, 2017 Number: 17-002512 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.37
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. ROBERT C. CHANNELL, D/B/A CHANNELL POOLS, 77-000056 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000056 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1990

Findings Of Fact Robert C. Channell is a registered pool contractor holding License No. RP0024653 issued by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. A copy of the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit finding that Robert C. Channell had violated Section 501.204, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to Chapter 501, Florida Statutes, was introduced to prove that he had violated Section 468.112(2)(a), Florida Statutes. An order of contempt was also introduced to show that Robert C. Channell had violated the Court's original injunctive order. Robert Berndt contracted with Robert C. Channell for the construction of a pool at his residence. Subsequently, employees of Robert C. Channell cleared trees from the back of Berndt's residence and construction of a pool was begun by excavation of a hole in Berndt's backyard. Eli Jackson indicated that he had contracted with Robert C. Channell to build a pool at Tyrone Mobile Home Park which Jackson owned. Robert Channell did not apply nor obtain a building permit for the construction of pools at the residence of Robert Berndt or at the Tyrone Mobile Home Park. Robert Thomas indicated that he had inspected the pool constructed at Tyrone Mobile Home Park and determined that no permit had been obtained for construction of said pool, and further that the pool was constructed to residential standards. From the location of the pool it was clearly for the use of residents of Tyrone Mobile Home Park. There were eighty (80) or more families residing in Tyrone Mobile Home Park. On September 30, 1976, Robert C. Channell's license as a pool contractor in Hillsborough County had expired and was not renewed by the county. Subsequently, Channell contracted to build a pool for Randall Harris, who obtained the permit to construct a pool as owner of the property. Although Harris did some work on the pool, Channell was paid $7,200 to remove trees, work on the pool and construct a fence. Electrical work was done by an electrical contractor. Berndt complained that Channell was slow in starting his pool and did not receive many extras for which he had contracted with Channell. The delay in construction was the apparent result of Channell's attempts to finish projects underway in compliance with the requests of Mr. Shaw, the Building and Zone Director of Hillsborough County. Eli Jackson, the owner of Tyrone Mobile Home Park, and Randall Harris were both pleased with the pools Channell constructed for then.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board revoke the license of Robert C. Channell until he has reestablished himself as a licensed pool contractor in Hillsborough County, Florida. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Bearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David Linn, Esquire Post Office Box L386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Robert C. Channell 309 Jennal Place Tampa, Florida 33612 Mr. J. K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211

Florida Laws (1) 501.204
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CHRISTOPHER CASTELLIO, SR. vs ALACHUA COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 10-001848 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Apr. 08, 2010 Number: 10-001848 Latest Update: Feb. 09, 2011

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon Petitioner’s race or handicap in providing housing assistance. Whether Respondent, in providing housing assistance, failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner’s physical disability.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner and his family have been in subsidized housing for many years. Most recently, housing assistance has been provided by the Alachua County Housing Authority, first through the Tenant Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) program and, currently, through Section 8 subsidized housing. At the time of the administrative hearing, Petitioner and his family were still in Section 8 housing administered by Respondent. Under the TBRA program, the Castellio family was required to meet regularly with Housing Authority staff and their affiliates. They also had to meet certain performance standards relative to employment searches and maintenance of the household. Petitioner’s family was often unable to meet those performance standards-–particularly with respect to employment and payment of electrical bills. Because of his interactions with Respondent's staff, Petitioner had earned the reputation of being loud, demanding, and physically imposing. In one incident, Petitioner tried to prevent one of Respondent's workers from mowing his yard by physically blocking the lawn mower, even though such maintenance was required under the government program and was also an issue of local code enforcement. More than one of Respondent's staff reported that Petitioner would raise his voice when he was in Respondent's Housing Authority office. Some of Respondent's staff were intimidated by Petitioner. Because of this, the director of the Alachua Housing Authority, Gail Monahan, was tasked with dealing with Petitioner and the Castellio family. The pertinent part of Petitioner's Complaint states: My name is Christopher S.A. Castellio. My wife's name is Ethelyn L. Reese-Castello. We are the proud parents of five children which ages are 5, 7, 9, 11, and 16. Our 16 year old is living in Bend, Oregon with his uncle who has more resources to provide for him. Approximately for two years now, my family and I have lived on Section 8 through the Alachua County Housing Authority here in Gainesville, Florida. We have to report to the Executive Director of the Alachua County Housing Authority, Ms. Gail Monahan, every Wednesday of every week in order to report progress of trying to become self supporting and financial independent. During this time I have been humiliated in front of my wife, Ms. Monahan's office staff, other customers and patrons and, most humiliating, in front of my own kids. Ms. Gail Monahan has absolutely no compassion, professionalism, or moral conduct. Ms. Gail Monahan has called me everything but a child of God. In front of my kids, she has called me a lying sack of s-t, a sorry son of a b--h, a con artist, a--hole, and an f--wad. One day I just walked into her office and the first thing she said was, "hay you little s--tbird, what have you done s--ted out today." I served 6 years in the United States Marine Corps during Desert Storm from 1986 until 1992. While serving I injured my knee in Kuwait. I returned to the states where I underwent knee surgery. I was honorably discharged several months later. Ms. Monahan says I'm lying about my service, despite my service and medical records. Right now I am in constant pain in both my knees and my back. I have taken two MRI's for both knees and my doctor says that I desperately need a total right knee replacement and a basic left knee operation based on my MRI's. Ms. Monahan also says that's a lie. And she refuses to look at any doctor's reports. She said I probably faked them. Ever since I've been meeting with Ms. Monahan she has always had something discrimitory [sic], degrading, intimidating, and threaten [sic] to say to me. She always threatens to take our housing away from us, like she's doing right now, if we don't do exactly what she says to do. I do believe that she is prejudice [sic] against me because I am a very, very light-skinned black man with red hair and freckles. I do look like a white man to most people and my wife is very dark skinned African American. We have done everything she has told us to do but still she says that we have done nothing. She does not take into consideration the bad economy and that jobs are very hard to come by and that more and more people are being laid off every day. So she is going to make a family with 4 small children become homeless just because I can't work because of my back and my knees and because my wife couldn't find a job in today's economy. By the way, my wife has finally found a job working at Wal-mart. We finally received a letter from Ms. Monahan informing us of the termination of tenant based rental assistance. In the allotted time of seven working days, I have answered her letter in writing, requesting a hearing to appeal her decision. As of the date of this letter, I have not received anything or any notice of any hearing from Ms. Monahan. I will fax you a copy of both letters. Our move out date has been set as December 31st, 2009. Consistent with his Complaint, Petitioner testified that Ms. Monahan, the director of the Alachua County Housing Authority treated him badly, believed he was lazy, and questioned whether he suffered from a physical disability. In further support of the allegations, Petitioner’s wife, Ms. Reese-Castellio, testified that Gail Monahan was “mean” to their family. According to Ms. Reese-Castellio, Ms. Monahan called Petitioner a liar, said that he “didn’t give a damn” about his family, and suggested to her that she should consider leaving Petitioner. At the final hearing, Ms. Monahan admitted that she did not respect Mr. Castellio because he did not appear to be making any effort to support his family. She denied, however, that she cursed at him, and testified that she never discriminated against Petitioner or his family. While it is clear that there was personal animosity between Petitioner and Ms. Monahan, the evidence was insufficient to show that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or his family. On cross-examination, Ms. Reese-Castellio disclosed that Ms. Monahan's remarks were only directed toward Petitioner, and that Ms. Monahan did not use racial epithets or otherwise give any indication that she was discriminating against Petitioner or his family because of race, handicap, or any other impermissible factor. Petitioner's wife further testified that she had no complaints about any of the other staff members at the Housing Authority. Likewise, Petitioner failed to provide evidence that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent has ever acted in a discriminatory manner toward him or his family based on race, ethnicity, handicap, or any other impermissible basis. Further, the evidence presented at the final hearing did not show that either Petitioner or his family have ever been denied housing assistance by Respondent. In fact, the evidence revealed that Petitioner and his family’s housing benefits administered by Respondent have never been interrupted or denied, and that the Castellio family has been treated at least as well, if not better, than other housing clients served by Respondent. In addition to administering basic housing benefits under TBRA and the Section 8 program, Respondent arranged to pay over $1,300 to repair Petitioner’s family car, paid for utilities when the Castellios were unable to do so, and provided bus vouchers and other transportation for the family on a regular basis. Respondent’s decision to provide these additional benefits was made by Ms. Monahan. At the final hearing, both Petitioner and his wife confirmed that Respondent had provided additional assistance and that Gail Monahan had control over these additional benefits. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Reese-Castellio offered an explanation for why Ms. Monahan would go “above and beyond” the requirements of subsidized housing in order to assist the Castellio family. Ms. Monahan, in her credible testimony, explained that she had considerable compassion for Ethelyn Castellio and the Petitioner’s children, and that her compassion led her to offer extensive support for the Castellio family beyond simple housing assistance. Although Petitioner testified that the family was rejected as potential tenants at an apartment complex known as “Eden Park” after initially being accepted by the private landlord, and said that he believed that Gail Monahan had something to do with the rejection, Petitioner offered no evidence to support that belief. Ms. Monahan stated that neither she nor anyone from the Housing Authority spoke to anyone at Eden Park regarding the Petitioner or his family. She explained that tenants are responsible for locating suitable housing which is then inspected and approved by the Housing Authority. The credible testimony of Ms. Monahan, together with Petitioner's own testimony and admissions, demonstrated that Respondent did not interfere in the Eden Park situation, and never delayed inspections or unreasonably rejected any housing benefits for the Castellio family. In addition, while indeed, as alleged in the Complaint, Respondent issued a letter informing Petitioner that his family's rental assistance was scheduled to be terminated, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that the letter was issued in error, and that it was withdrawn. Finally, while the Commission states on page 5 of its Determination of no cause dated February 16, 2010, that “Complainant alleged he requested a reasonable accommodation, and Respondents denied his request,” a plain reading of the Complaint, quoted in paragraph 7, above, does not reveal that Petitioner ever alleged that Respondent failed to accommodate his disability. Moreover, the applications Petitioner and his family filed in 2008 and 2009 to obtain housing assistance from the Respondent state that the family was not seeking any accommodations on account of disability and that no one in the family suffered from any physical handicap. At the final hearing, Petitioner confirmed that the family never asked Respondent for accommodation based on any physical disability and reported in their applications that no member of the family was handicapped or required an accommodation.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2010.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.68760.01760.11760.20760.23760.35760.37
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ELAINE WILLIAMS vs TALLAHASSEE MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE, 20-001764 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 09, 2020 Number: 20-001764 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a patient transporter. On December 27, 2018, Petitioner sustained a back injury while on the job. Petitioner reported the injury to Lora Vitali, Director of Colleague Health, Respondent’s employee healthcare department. Ms. Vitali instructed Petitioner to take the rest of the day off work and treat the injury with ice and ibuprofen. On December 28, 2018, Petitioner returned to Colleague Health and reported that she was still in pain. Colleague Health nurse, Monica Hubmann, arranged massage therapy and pain medication for Petitioner and instructed her to report back to Colleague Health on Monday, December 31, 2018, for further evaluation. Petitioner presented to Colleague Health on December 31, 2018, and reported that she was still in pain. Nurse Hubmann referred Petitioner to Dr. Spencer Stoetzel, who evaluates and treats Respondent’s employees who are injured on the job. Dr. Stoetzel is employed by North Florida Sports Medicine & Orthopaedic Center, not Respondent. At Dr. Stoetzel’s direction, Petitioner received regular treatment, including both physical and occupational therapy, until March 25, 2019. Petitioner was on workers’ compensation leave from work during her treatment. On March 25, 2019, Dr. Stoetzel cleared Petitioner to return to work with no restrictions and a 0% impairment rating. Based on Dr. Stoetzel’s conclusion, Ms. Vitali released Petitioner to return to work effective March 26, 2019. Ms. Vitali informed Petitioner of her release to work on March 25, 2019. Petitioner’s supervisor placed Petitioner on the work schedule after she was released to return to work, but Petitioner did not return to work as scheduled, and did not return any one of several telephone calls from her supervisor. Therefore, Respondent discharged Petitioner for job abandonment. Petitioner disputes her dismissal for job abandonment because she maintains that she was unable to work due to continuing pain. Petitioner disputes Dr. Stoetzel’s conclusion that she could return to work beginning March 26, 2019. Petitioner testified that Dr. Stoetzel told her that, based on the results of magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”), she had a lumbar tear in the L4-L5 region, yet the discharge summary excluded the results of the MRI. The discharge summary refers only to a “[l]umbar sprain or strain with discrepant pain as well as radicular symptoms [pain radiating down the leg].” In the discharge summary, Dr. Stoetzel concludes, “There is really nothing further I have to offer.” Petitioner testified that her pain is continuous, has increased in severity, and prevents her from wearing shoes, driving, doing household chores, and caring for her children. Ms. Pride testified that her daughter is in constant pain and that Ms. Pride has assumed care of her grandchildren during the day when Petitioner’s husband is at work. Petitioner maintains that she has been unable to work due to her injury from December 27, 2018, through the date of the final hearing. Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of discrimination on the basis of her race, sex, or in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. With regard to age discrimination, Petitioner testified that Dr. Stoetzel once commented that her back pain was due to her age. Petitioner’s PRO includes no references to discrimination based on her age, sex, race, or in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Tallahassee Memorial HealthCare, Inc., did not discriminate or retaliate against Petitioner, and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief in Case No. 2019-18837. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2020. Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Elaine Williams 411 Earline Hobbs Road Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerald D. Bryant, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 2nd Floor 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Stephanie Clark, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Suite 200 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.103 DOAH Case (4) 11-531619-630720-17642019-18837
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