The Issue Whether Respondent, an insurance agent licensed in Florida, violated specified Florida Statutes and agency rules in the sale of an annuity to two senior citizens, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact The Parties At all times relevant, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as an annuity, health, and life insurance agent in Florida. Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing and regulating insurance agents and taking disciplinary action for violations of the laws and rules it administers. Background Annuities This case arises from Respondent's sale of an Allianz Life Insurance of North America equity indexed annuity ("Allianz annuity") to Robert and Frances Wexler in June 2004. An annuity is a contractual arrangement under which an insurance company, in exchange for a premium, agrees to pay the owner a specified income for a period of time. Annuities generally are classified as "fixed" or "variable." Under a fixed annuity, the benefit is paid according to a predetermined interest rate. Under a variable annuity, the premium is invested on the owner's behalf, and the amount of the benefit, when paid, reflects the performance of that investment. Fixed annuities can be either "immediate" or "deferred." Under an immediate fixed annuity, the insurer begins paying the benefit upon purchase of the annuity. Under a deferred annuity, the premium is allowed to grow over time until the contract "matures" or is "annuitized" and the insurer begins paying the benefit. The Allianz annuity that Respondent sold to the Wexlers is a fixed deferred annuity. The Allianz annuity at issue also is an equity index annuity. This means that the insurer pays a benefit to the insured based on a premium that earns interest at a rate determined by the performance of a designated market index. The premium is not invested in the market for the owner's account; rather, the interest rate rises or falls in relation to the index's performance, within predetermined limits. Equity index annuities typically are long-term investments. Owners of equity index annuities have limited access to the funds invested and accumulating in their accounts, although some equity index annuities, such as the Allianz annuity at issue in this case, permit yearly penalty-free withdrawals at set percentages. The accrued interest generally is not taxed until the funds are withdrawn or the benefit is paid under annuity. The purchaser may incur substantial surrender charges for canceling the contract and withdrawing his or her funds before a specified date. Some equity index annuities identify a date——often many years in the future——on which the insurer will "annuitize" the contract if the purchaser has not already opted to do so. This date is sometimes called the "maturity date." The benefit payable under the annuity is determined based on the account's value as of the maturity date, and the payments to the owner of the annuity begin at that time. The Wexlers Robert Wexler was born in 1930. He was 73 years old in 2004, when Respondent sold him the Allianz annuity at issue in this case. His wife, Frances Wexler, was born in 1932, and she was 71 years old at the time. Both Wexlers finished high school and took some college courses. They married after Mr. Wexler joined the Air Force. While in the Air Force, Mr. Wexler studied electronics, which ultimately led to his career in that field in the private sector. He worked for IBM, Univac, and General Electric before retiring in 1994. Mrs. Wexler worked for a small family-owned printing firm for over 26 years, and retired in 1997. The Wexlers raised three children, and they lived in the same home in Pennsylvania for 40 years. While living in Pennsylvania, the Wexlers saved money by using Mrs. Wexler's salary to pay their living expenses and saving most of Mr. Wexler's earnings in a retirement account. They never bought annuities, but did trade stocks, which resulted in financial loss. For many years, the Wexlers visited Florida as "snowbirds" and eventually purchased a condominium in a gated community in Deerfield Beach, Florida. In 1998, the Wexlers sold their home in Pennsylvania, liquidated the stocks they owned, and bought a larger condominium in the same gated community. They moved permanently to Florida in 1998, with approximately $500,000 in liquid assets. The 2002 Aviva Annuity Respondent met the Wexlers in 2002, when he worked for the Cornerstone Financial Group ("Cornerstone"). Cornerstone had mailed out cards to persons 65 years old and older and the Wexlers sent in a reply card with boxes checked indicating interest in learning about Cornerstone's products. Based on that contact, Respondent arranged an in-home appointment with the Wexlers. At that time, the Wexlers informed Respondent that they had three financial investment goals: safety of their invested principal; long-term growth of their investment; and at some point years in the future, having a fixed income stream for the rest of their lives. The Wexlers consider themselves "conservative" financial investors, and they live off of their monthly social security and retirement pension checks. Being able to take money out of an annuity to cover routine living expenses was not a high priority for the Wexlers. They were more interested in leaving their investment alone and allowing it to grow, and they communicated this information to Respondent. Based on this information, Respondent sold the Wexlers an Aviva3/ equity index annuity. The Wexlers paid a $60,000.00 premium. The annuity was issued on June 11, 2002, and had a maturity date of June 11, 2031. The policy allowed partial withdrawal beginning immediately, without charge, of up to ten percent of the value of the account on the prior certificate anniversary date. If the insured withdrew more than that amount, a withdrawal charge was assessed, with the amount4/ of the withdrawal charge decreasing over a ten-year period, so that starting in year 11, there was no withdrawal charge. Pursuant to this withdrawal charge schedule, if the Wexlers withdrew all of their money from the policy——in effect, "surrendering" the policy——before the ten-year withdrawal charge period had expired, they would be assessed charges according to the withdrawal charge schedule. Under such circumstances, withdrawal charges are referred to as "surrender charges." The Aviva policy allocated the premium to three investment strategies. Specifically, 50% was allocated to the Annual Equity Index Strategy ("AEIS"), which is the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 index excluding dividend income. The AES investment strategy had a minimum guaranteed interest rate of zero percent. The remaining 50% of the premium was invested equally in the Investment Grade Bond Index Strategy (IGBIS") and the Guaranteed One-Year Strategy ("GOS"). The IGBIS strategy was tied to the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Index, and, at the time, had a minimum guaranteed interest rate of two percent per year. The GOS investment strategy had a four percent per year current interest rate and a two percent minimum guaranteed interest rate per year. No evidence was presented about how the Aviva policy would have performed to date had the Wexlers not surrendered the policy. The 2004 Allianz Annuity In June 2004, Respondent paid the Wexlers another visit. At that time, Respondent was with Global Financial Group and was marketing different products. Respondent met with the Wexlers to discuss an Allianz annuity that, in his view, had "better" features than the Aviva annuity he sold them two years earlier. The evidence establishes that Respondent spent at least an hour or more reviewing the Allianz annuity with the Wexlers. In Mr. Wexler's own words, Respondent spent time "explain[ing] it, patiently talking about it." Mr. Wexler nonetheless claimed5/ at hearing that Respondent did not provide a comparison of the Alliance and Aviva policies. Respondent testified that he did provide such a comparison, and the undersigned finds his testimony more persuasive. Mr. Wexler testified that Respondent told them that surrendering their Aviva annuity and moving their funds into the Allianz annuity would cause them to incur a substantial surrender charge,6/ but that they would recoup the charge through a bonus provided by the Allianz annuity. Respondent credibly testified that he told the Wexlers that the bonus would be available if they annuitized the policy. Mr. Wexler did not recall Respondent discussing the specifics of annuitizing the Allianz policy with him, and Respondent confirmed that he did not extensively discuss annuitization with the Wexlers. This was because Mr. Wexler told Respondent that they had liquid assets and were not interested in immediately generating an income stream from the annuity, but instead were interested in leaving their investment alone to grow over time. Using information provided by Mr. Wexler, Respondent filled out paperwork, consisting of the Application for Annuity and Authorization to Transfer Funds, required for the Wexlers to surrender their Aviva annuity and purchase the Allianz annuity. According to Mr. Wexler, Respondent selected the type of product (here, the 10% Bonus PowerDex Elite Annuity) on the Application for Annuity form, and also selected the percentage of funds to be allocated into specific investment strategies on a Supplemental Application form. Respondent testified that he always fills out the forms for his clients, and he credibly testified that he reviewed the selected strategies with the Wexlers. Mr. Wexler executed the "Agreements and Signatures" section of the Application for Annuity.7/ This section states in pertinent part: It is agreed that: (1) All statements and answers given above are true and complete to the best of my knowledge; . . . (5) I understand that I may return my policy within the free look period (shown of the first page of my policy) if I am dissatisfied for any reason; and (6) I believe this annuity is suitable for my financial goals. Respondent provided the Wexlers with a copy of a Statement of Understanding regarding the Allianz annuity. This document explained the key aspects of the annuity in substantial detail. Mr. Wexler executed the Statement of Understanding, confirming that he received a copy of that document, and that he reviewed and understood key aspects of the annuity. The document states in pertinent part: I received a copy of this Statement of Understanding. The agent has answered my questions. I have also reviewed the 10% Bonus PowerDex Elite Annuity consumer brochure. I understand that any values shown, other than the Guaranteed Minimum Values, are not guarantees, promises, or warranties. I understand that I may return my policy within the free look period (shown on the first page of the policy) if I am dissatisfied for any reason. The Wexlers paid a premium of $58,125.01 for the Allianz annuity, and invested an additional $8000.00, for a total investment of $66,125.01. As a result of surrendering the Aviva policy to purchase the Allianz annuity, they incurred a surrender charge of $5,726.89. The Allianz annuity, Policy No. 70097189, was issued on July 16, 2004. Once the Allianz annuity was issued, Respondent delivered it to the Wexlers and reviewed it with them. Respondent again informed the Wexlers of the 20-day free look period during which they could return the annuity and obtain a full refund of the premium. Mr. Wexler did not read the annuity and "stashed it away." The Allianz annuity had been approved by Petitioner for sale to investors, including senior investors, when Respondent sold the annuity to the Wexlers in 2004. Respondent credibly testified that Mr. Wexler did not tell him that he had purchased annuities from other agents, and Mr. Wexler could not clearly recall8/ whether he had provided Respondent information regarding his other annuities purchases. Respondent earned a commission of $6,281.92 on the sale of the Allianz annuity to the Wexlers. Comparison of the Aviva and Allianz Annuities The parties agree that annuities are intended to be long-term investments. Beyond that, there is substantial disagreement regarding whether the Allianz annuity was, in reality, a "better" investment than the Aviva annuity for the Wexlers. Respondent maintained that the Allianz policy had several advantages over the Aviva policy. Petitioner asserts that the Allianz annuity either had some substantial disadvantages, or, at best, did not offer any significant advantages over the Aviva policy. Respondent testified that a key reason for introducing the Allianz policy to the Wexlers was that it had a higher index-tied earnings cap than the Aviva policy, so it could earn more than the Aviva policy. Petitioner asserts, and a review of the policies confirms, that the Aviva policy had a higher cap rate——specifically, 15% for the first year with a 10% minimum guaranteed index cap rate thereafter for the Aviva policy, as compared to 12% for the first year, with a guaranteed five percent minimum thereafter for the Allianz policy. Thus, the Aviva policy provides greater potential for index-tied earnings than the Allianz policy. The evidence shows that Respondent provided the Wexlers inaccurate information on this policy term. Respondent maintained that the Allianz annuity had a 100% participation rate, as compared to only a 60% participation rate for the Aviva policy, so that under the Allianz policy, the Wexlers would keep 100% of any gains due to increases in the S&P Index, whereas under the Aviva policy, they would keep only 60% of those gains. Petitioner disputes that the Aviva policy contained a limit on participation rate. A review of the policies shows that they both state a 100% participation rate in the selected investment indices; however, under the Aviva policy, there is a "certificate charge" that is deducted when calculating the owner's index earnings. Whether this deduction is expressed as a "lower participation rate" or considered a "fee," the fact remains that under the Aviva policy, the owner got to keep less money from his or her index investment. Accordingly, it is determined that Respondent accurately informed the Wexlers on this point. Respondent claimed, and apparently communicated to the Wexlers, that there was no risk in the Allianz investment, because gains resulting from the investment allocation indices were locked in so the Wexlers would never lose their invested principal or any gains they realized on the investment indices. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that the Allianz policy embodied substantial risk because negative index adjustments were deducted from the policy's current value. Although Petitioner is correct regarding the policy's current value, Respondent is correct regarding the effect of negative index performance on the annuity's high water value. The policy's annuitization value is the greater of these two values, so the high water value is likely more important for investors like the Wexlers, who wish to leave their investment alone rather than annuitize in the short term. Although the Wexlers' investment value under the Allianz annuity may have declined in years 2008 and 2009 due to poor S&P Index performance (which also would have affected the value of the Aviva policy, had the Wexlers still owned it), the annuitization value of the policy was not negatively affected by the poor performance of that index. In light of Respondent's understanding of the Wexlers' investment goals, his representations on this point were reasonable and not materially inaccurate. The Allianz policy provided a ten percent bonus for money invested for the first five years, and the bonus was accessible if either the policyholder annuitized the policy or as a death benefit to the policy's beneficiary. By contrast, the Aviva policy offered no bonuses after the first year. Petitioner characterizes the Allianz bonus as an "ephemeral" feature because of the limits on its availability. However, the credible evidence establishes that Respondent informed the Wexlers about these limitations, and that they were aware of them when they purchased the annuity. Under the Aviva policy, the Wexlers could annuitize at any time before the policy's maturity date. Under the Allianz policy they could only annuitize after five years, could not withdraw more than 5% of the account value of the annuity on an annual basis, and could not withdraw more than 25% of the account value over the life of the annuity. Notwithstanding, the credible evidence establishes that Respondent told the Wexlers about the annuitization limits of the Allianz policy, and they were aware of these limitations when they purchased the policy. Both policies imposed surrender charges for withdrawal of funds before the maturity date. Under the Aviva policy, withdrawal charges applied during the first ten years; under the Allianz policy, surrender charges could be incurred for the lifetime of the policy pursuant to a formula and terms established in the policy. This information is clearly stated in the policy's contract summary, and Respondent credibly testified that he fully reviewed the annuity with the Wexlers before he sold it to them, and again when he delivered it to them after issuance. Both annuities had death benefit features. The Allianz annuity provided that if the owner died, the accumulation value9/ would be paid to the beneficiary over a five-year period. The Aviva annuity provided that if the annuitant was less than 75 years old on the contract date, the death benefit would be the greater of the account value or the guaranteed account value.10/ On balance, the policies' death benefits features were similar, and there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent touted the Allianz annuity as having a superior death benefit to induce the Wexlers to purchase the annuity. The Allianz annuity featured a nursing home benefit that allowed withdrawal of the policy's full annuitization value over a five-year period if the insured was admitted to a nursing home for 30 or more days. However, the Wexlers already had insurance coverage providing assisted living benefits. Respondent acknowledged that the Allianz policy nursing home benefit was of relatively little value to the Wexlers. The evidence is insufficient to prove that Respondent represented this feature as a substantial advantage in inducing the Wexlers to purchase the Allianz annuity. Ultimate Findings of Fact Regarding Alleged Statutory and Rule Violations For the reasons explained in detail below, the undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(5), (7), (9), or (13); 626.9541(1)(a)1, (1)(e)1, or (1)(l); or 626.621(6); or rules 69B-215.210 or 69B-215.230.11 Alleged Violations of Section 627.611 Section 626.611 sets forth violations for which suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license is mandatory. Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating sections 626.611(5), (7), (9), and (13). These offenses require a finding that the licensee had intent to commit the act constituting the offense. See Beckett v. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 982 So. 2d 94, 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Bowling v. Dep't of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Here, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show intent on Respondent's part with respect to any of the alleged violations of section 627.611. Although Respondent provided inaccurate information to the Wexlers on a material term——the comparative index earnings caps, which affect how much the Wexlers could earn through the policies' investment strategies——the evidence does not establish that Respondent intentionally misinformed the Wexlers on this policy term. To that point, Respondent accurately represented all other material terms of the Allianz policy to the Wexlers. The undersigned finds this probative in determining that Respondent's misstatement was made unintentionally, rather than willfully or knowingly. See Munch v. Dep't of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., 592 So. 2d 1136, 1143-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)(to find an offense of "misrepresentation," an intentional act must be proven). Section 626.611(5) makes the willful misrepresentation of any insurance policy or annuity contract or the willful deception with regard to any such policy or contract a ground for suspending or revoking an agent's license. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent willfully misrepresented any aspect of the Allianz or Aviva policies to the Wexlers or willfully deceived them regarding the policies. Respondent credibly testified that he reviewed the key terms of the Allianz policy with the Wexlers, and there is no persuasive evidence in the record to the contrary. Although Respondent did inaccurately represent the Allianz policy as having greater index-tied earnings potential than the Aviva policy, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent willfully misrepresented this information to the Wexlers, or willfully deceived them, to induce them to purchase the policy. Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(5). Section 626.611(7) makes the demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance a ground for suspending or revoking an agent's license. Again, a finding of intent on the licensee's part is required to find a violation of this subsection. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent intended to provide incorrect, misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent information to the Wexlers to induce them to purchase the Allianz policy. As such, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a demonstrated lack of fitness or untrustworthiness on Respondent's part to engage in the business of insurance, in violation of section 626.611(7). Section 626.611(9) makes fraudulent or dishonest practices in conducting business under an insurance agent license grounds for suspension or revocation of the license. As previously discussed, although Respondent provided incorrect information to the Wexlers regarding the comparative investment strategy caps for the Allianz and Aviva annuities, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent intended to do so. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(9) by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the sale of the Allianz policy to the Wexlers. Section 626.611(13) provides that willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of, Petitioner's orders or rules, or any willful violation of any provision of the Florida Insurance Code constitutes a basis for suspending or revoking an insurance agent license. Again, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent willfully violated its rules or orders, or willfully violated the Florida Insurance Code, in connection with the sale of the Allianz annuity to the Wexlers. Although Respondent did provide incorrect information on a key term——the comparative investment strategy caps, which affected the annuities' comparative earnings potential——the persuasive evidence in the record does not support a finding that Respondent willfully did so. Thus, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(13). Alleged Violations of Section 626.9541 Section 626.9541 is entitled "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices defined." This statute defines the types of acts that constitute unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the insurance industry, but it does not independently authorize disciplinary action. Werner v. Dep't of Ins., 689 So. 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Petitioner has charged Respondent with engaging in acts set forth in section 626.9541(1)(a)1., specifically, that he knowingly made, issued, circulated, or caused to be made, issued, or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which misrepresents provides that making any estimate, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any insurance policy. As discussed above, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent knowingly engaged in any of these acts. Thus, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts as provided in section 626.9541(1)(a)1. Petitioner also charged Respondent with engaging in acts defined in section 626.9541(1)(e)1. This section requires, as a predicate for the imposition of discipline, a finding that the licensee knowingly made false material statements through a variety of actions described in that provision. Again, the evidence does not establish that Respondent knowingly engaged in any of these acts. Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts as provided in section 626.9541(1)(e)1. Petitioner has charged Respondent with "twisting," which is defined in section 626.9541(1)(l) as knowingly making any misleading representation or incomplete or fraudulent comparisons or fraudulent material omissions of or with respect to any insurance policies for the purposes of inducing, or tending to induce, any person to surrender, terminate, or convert any insurance policy or to take out a policy of insurance in another insurer. Again, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent knowingly committed any of the acts described in this statute. Thus, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in twisting under section 626.9541(1)(1), Florida Statutes. Alleged Violation of Section 626.621 Section 626.621 sets forth violations for which suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license is discretionary.12/ Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating section 626.621(6) by engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited by part IX of chapter 626, or having otherwise shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest. For the reasons previously discussed, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent engaged in any actions that could be considered unfair methods of competition or deceptive acts or practices under chapter 626, part IX. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in acts under section 626.621(6) that justify the suspension or revocation of his insurance agent's license. Alleged Violations of Agency Rules Petitioner charged Respondent with violating rule 69B- 215.210. This rule provides that the business of life insurance13/ is a public trust in which all agents of all companies have an obligation to work together in serving the best interests of the insuring public, by understanding and observing the laws governing life insurance by letter and in spirit by presenting accurately and completely every fact essential to a client's decision, and by being fair in all relations with colleagues and competitors and always placing the policyholder's interests first. The rule implements section 626.797, entitled "code of ethics," which directs Petitioner to adopt a code of ethics to "govern the conduct of life agents in their relations with the public, other agents, and the insurers," and to establish standards of conduct to avoid the commission of acts that would constitute grounds for suspension or revocation under sections 626.611, 626.621, and unfair trade practices and unfair methods of competition under chapter 626, part IX. The rule must be interpreted and applied consistent with the law it is implementing. As previously discussed, the violations of sections 626.611, 626.621, and 626.9541 with which Respondent was charged all require that he have intent to commit the act constituting the violation. The persuasive evidence does not establish that Respondent had the requisite intent necessary to find a violation of rule 69B-215.210.14/ Petitioner also charged Respondent with violating rule 69B-215.230. Rule 69B-215.230(1) makes unethical the misrepresentation of the terms of any policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised by that policy. This rule implements sections 626.797 and 626.9541(1)(a) and (b), violations of which require a showing or willful or knowing misrepresentation. Further, "misrepresentation" requires that an intentional act be proven for a violation to be found. See Walker v. Dep't. of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., 705 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). As previously discussed, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent knowingly or willfully provided incorrect information or misstatements to the Wexlers regarding the Allianz policy. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rule 69B-230.210(1).15/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2012.
Findings Of Fact On September 8, 1987, the Department of Insurance received a letter dated September 1, 1987, from Joseph F. Kinman, Jr., which stated: Another insurance agent (Daniel Bruce Caughey) from Pensacola, Florida and his incorporated agency (Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc.) are refusing to forward premium payments on to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite a final judgment for such amounts here in Hillsborough County Circuit Court. Enclosed is a copy of the Final Judgment entered August 13, 1987, as well as a copy of the Complaint. We represent Jordan Roberts & Company, as well as Poe & Associates, Inc. here in Tampa, Florida. In approximately August of 1982, Daniel Bruce Caughey and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. wherein Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to collect premiums on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and in turn, Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to receive commissions. Mr. Caughey signed an Individual Guarantee Agreement on October 21, 1983, guaranteeing that Brokerage Agreement with Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Mr. Caughey and the Agency failed to forward the insurance premiums collected on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite repeated demands and inquiries. Finally, a lawsuit was filed against Mr. Caughey and the Agency in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Hillsborough County in December of 1986. Final judgment for Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. against Mr. Caughey and the Agency was entered on August 13, 1987, for an amount of $6,595.94. Mr. Caughey and his Agency have unlawfully withheld monies belonging to an insurer, Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and, accordingly, appear to be in violation of Florida Statutes 626 et seq. Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. has a judgment for unpaid insurance premiums against Mr. Caughey and the Agency, however, Mr. Caughey and the Agency refuse or fail to pay over to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. premium funds rightfully belonging to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. Accordingly, we would respectfully request that your office conduct an investigation of Mr. Caughey and the Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Enclosed with this letter were copies of the complaint and final judgment in the circuit court case, Case No. 86-21454. As found in the main administrative case, Case No. 89-2651: In Count 1, JORO's complaint [in Case No. 86-21454] alleges the existence of a brokerage agreement between JORO and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc., entered into "[o]n or about April 27, 1982"; execution and delivery of respondent's guarantee "[o]n or about October 21, 1983"; and the agency's indebtedness "for premiums on policies underwritten by [JORO] for the sum of $20,975.36." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In Count II, the complaint also alleges execution and delivery of a promissory note "[o]n or about October 21, 1983," without, however, explicitly indicating its relationship (if any) with the guarantee executed the same date. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The final judgment does not specify which count(s) JORO recovered on. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Attached to the complaint are copies of the promissory note, executed by "CAUGHEY INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., By: D B Caughey Vice President"; the guarantee, executed in the same way; and the brokerage agreement, executed on behalf of Caughey Insurance Agency by "William C. Caughey, President." Although the Individual Guarantee Agreement names respondent as guarantor in the opening paragraph, the corporation is shown as guarantor on the signature line. The complaint does not allege and the judgment does not recite that respondent personally failed to remit premiums but says he is responsible as an officer of the agency. Without any further investigation, as far as the record shows, the Department of Insurance filed a complaint amended on April 24, 1989, to allege, inter alia, that "[o]n or about August 19, 1982 Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. . . . requir[ing] Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. to remit premiums, unearned commissions and additional premiums to Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc."; and that respondent "personally guaranteed the [agency's] obligation under this agreement in" writing, but "failed to remit five thousand five dollars and forty-four cents due under th[e] agreement" for which sum Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. obtained judgment. After a formal administrative hearing, a recommended order was entered on April 2, 1990, recommending dismissal of the administrative complaint, because "ambiguities in the court papers do not clearly and convincingly rule out the possibility that the court's judgment rests on the dishonored promissory note . . . [rather than] a breach of respondent's [here petitioner's] fiduciary responsibilities." In its final order, the Department dismissed the administrative complaint; Daniel Bruce Caughey was the prevailing party in that case. The parties have stipulated that "Daniel B. Caughey qualifies as a small business party as defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes." The parties also stipulated that the "total value of the reasonable attorney's fees and costs at issue is $2,830."
