The Issue Whether Petitioner had a contractual obligation, which it breached, to employ Respondent during the 2009-2010 school year, and, if so, what damages should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact The following is a verbatim recital of the Joint Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties on June 8, 2012: Lurana Hillard (Respondent) was employed by the St. Lucie County School District (Petitioner) as a Program Specialist for School Psychology and School Psychologists beginning in the 2005/2006 school year. Respondent was a participant in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") and its Deferred Retirement Option Program (hereinafter "DROP"). Respondent's initial 60-month period of DROP was from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2007. In January 2007, Respondent signed a document requesting to extend her participation in DROP beyond the initial 60- month period. A true and correct copy of the Form is attached as Exhibit B.[1/] Barbara Casteen is the Director of Student Services and Respondent's supervisor. On January 12, 2007, Barbara Casteen sent Steve Valencia, Director of FTE/Position Control, an email with a copy to Respondent regarding DROP extension. A true and correct copy of that email is attached as Exhibit A.[2/] On January 16, 2007, DROP Extension forms [sic] prescribed by the Florida Retirement System were executed by Respondent and Steve Valencia. A true and correct copy of the Form is attached as Exhibit B. Mr. Valencia had the authority, as the Superintendent's designee, to execute the form advising that that the School Board stipulates that the Respondent was eligible to participate in DROP beyond the initial 60- months. On January 23, 2007, at a regularly scheduled School Board meeting, the Board approved the Personnel Agenda which included DROP extension for Respondent.[3/] Attached is a true and correct copy of the Personnel Agenda for the January 23, 2007 meeting and minutes from the same.[4/] The Board has taken no subsequent formal action regarding Respondent's DROP status. On May 26, 2009, Barbara Casteen sent Respondent a letter advising that she would not recommend her for reappointment for the 2009-2010 school year. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit C. On June 30, 2009, Respondent signed a Notification of Separation from Employment Form. A true and correct copy of that Form is attached as Exhibit D. On July 29, 2009, the School Board approved Respondent's retirement. A true and correct copy of a letter from Shelby Baker, Personnel Records Specialist and Employer Notification of Employment Termination are attached as Exhibit E. Respondent initially submitted a letter of resignation pursuant to the DROP statute dated June 30, 2007. Based on request to extend DROP, Respondent submitted another letter of resignation dated June 30, 2010 pursuant to the DROP statute. Respondent received from FRS a Revised Notification of DROP Extension Benefits which is attached as Exhibit F. Attached is a true and correct copy of the FRS DROP Termination Notification as Exhibit G. Apart from the documents referred to herein, Respondent was issued no documents by the St. Lucie County School Board reflecting her employment status during the period of her DROP extension. The body of the January 12, 2007, email from Ms. Casteen to Mr. Valencia attached to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts as Exhibit A (1/12/07 Email) read as follows: I am approving the DROP extension for Lurana Hillard for 3 years from 7/1/07 to 6/30/10. If you need any further information, please feel free to contact me. The "Form" attached to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts as Exhibit B is a completed Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Division) form--Form DP-EXT (05/05) (DROP Extension Form)--signed in January 2007, by Ms. Hillard and by Mr. Valencia, as the Superintendent's "designee".5/ On this completed and signed DROP Extension Form (Executed Extension Form or Form), Ms. Hillard indicated that her "DROP begin date" was July 1, 2002; that her "DROP termination and resignation date" was June 30, 2007; and that she was "requesting to extend [her] DROP participation through 6/30/10 with the approval of [her] employer." The "Employer Certification" section of the Form contained the following statement made to the Division by Mr. Valencia, as the Superintendent's designee: This is to certify that the St. Lucie County School Board (agency name) has rescinded the resignation of the above named member whose position meets the definition of an instructional position. The agency has approved a new termination date of 6/30/10. This agency stipulates that this member is eligible to participate in the DROP beyond 60 months and the member will continue working in a regularly established position as a School Psychologist.[6/]
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of St. Lucie County issue a Final Order declining to award Ms. Hillard the relief requested in her Petition. S DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2012.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether St. Lucie County School Board (School Board) Rules 6.16 and 6.50*+ are invalid exercises in delegated legislative authority as defined by sections 120.52(8)(c), (d), and (e).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Jones is currently an employee of the St. Lucie County School Board, and has a professional service contract pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. Her status with the School Board is “suspended without pay,” for reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding. As a classroom teacher, Ms. Jones is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board of St. Lucie County and the Classroom Teachers Association. On June 13, 2017, the School Board suspended Ms. Jones without pay and on July 27, 2017, a Petition for Termination in Termination I was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing. At that point, while Ms. Jones remained an employee of the School Board, she received no pay and no benefits from the School District. She began to look for other employment to support herself and her family. Ms. Jones applied to and was offered a job to work as a music teacher by the Somerset Academy St. Lucie (Somerset). Somerset is a charter school in St. Lucie County sponsored by and located within the geographical bounds of the School District and the jurisdictional bounds of the School Board. Ms. Jones did not submit an application for leave and the School Board did not approve a request for leave of absence in order for Ms. Jones to work at Somerset. By letter dated August 28, 2017, Superintendent Gent notified Ms. Jones of his intent to recommended to the School Board that she be terminated for grounds in addition to the already-existing suspension, i.e., for violating the School Board’s Rules 6.16(1); 6.301(2), (3)(b)(i), (3)(b)(xix), and (3)(b)(xxix); and 6.50*+. That letter became the basis for the Termination II proceeding. The factual basis for pursuing the second termination proceeding was that Ms. Jones was working at Somerset without having applied for and received approval for a leave of absence from the School Board. The merits of the School Board’s allegations in this second proceeding are no longer relevant in terms of Ms. Jones’ employment with the School Board, as the School Board, through counsel, has represented that the School Board no longer intends to pursue the allegations in Termination II. The allegations are relevant and informative, however, in establishing the School Board’s interpretation of its rules and establishing Ms. Jones’ standing to challenge the validity of those rules. The evidence presented at hearing established that Ms. Jones has standing to bring this rule challenge. School Board rule 6.16 is entitled “Dual employment,” and provides as follows: No person may be employed to work in more than one position in the school system except upon the recommendation of the Superintendent and approval of the School Board. No employee shall accept other employment that might impair the independence of his or her judgment in the performance of his or her duties. Rule 6.16 lists as its statutory authority sections 1001.41, 1012.22, and 1012.33, Florida Statutes, and lists sections 1001.43 and 1012.22 as the laws implemented. No reference to authority granted by the Florida Constitution is identified. School Board Policy 6.50*+ is entitled “Leave of Absence,” and provides in pertinent part: Leave of absence. A leave of absence is permission granted by the School Board or allowed under its adopted policies for an employee to be absent from duty for a specified period of time with the right to return to employment upon the expiration of leave. Any absence of a member of the staff from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. Length of Leave and Pay. Generally, no leave or combination of leaves, except military leave or Workers’ Compensation Leave, will be granted for a period in excess of one year. Illness-in-line-of- duty leave may not be extended beyond the maximum medical improvement date or a maximum of two (2) years from the date of injury, whichever is the earliest date. Leave may be with or without pay as provided by law, regulations of the State Board, and these rules. For any absence that is without pay, the deduction for each day of absence shall be determined by dividing the annual salary by the number of days/hours for the employment period. Employment leave. A leave shall not be granted to any employee to accept other employment unless the leave is to accept employment at a charter school as provided in paragraph (5) below. Accepting employment while on a leave of absence cancels the leave automatically. The person on leave will be notified that he or she must return to work with the School Board immediately, resign or be terminated. The Superintendent shall develop procedures to implement leave provisions. Charter School Leave. An employee may be granted leave to accept employment at a charter school in St. Lucie County in accordance with the following provisions: Teachers. Teachers may apply for leave to work at a charter school. The School Board will not require resignation of teachers desiring to work at a charter school. Teachers granted such leave by the School Board are not required to be on a continuing or professional services contract and shall not be subject to the seven (7) continuous years’ service requirement. Should a teacher on leave elect to return to work at the District, the teacher shall return to the teacher’s former position or a comparable position for which the teacher is qualified. * * * Method to Request Leave. An application to request leave to accept employment in a charter school shall be submitted using the procedures specified in Policy 6.501(1). For ten month instructional personnel, an application to request leave to accept employment at a charter school shall be submitted to the principal at least forty-five (45) days prior to the first day of work for the school year . . . . Insurance and Retirement Benefits. It shall be the sole responsibility of the charter school site to provide insurance and retirement benefits to charter school employees . . . . * * * Notice of Intent to Return. Employees on charter school leave shall give the School Board written notice of their intent to return at least sixty (60) days prior to the beginning of the semester they wish to return. Requirement for Annual Renewal. Charter school leave must be renewed annually. It is the sole responsibility of the employee on leave to submit an annual written letter notice of leave to the Superintendent or designee, and a copy of the annual written letter notice of leave to the employee’s school principal or immediate supervisor, as applicable, on or before April 1 of each year if they wish to renew their charter school leave for the following school year. Employees who do not submit the required annual leave form on or before April 1st will be considered to have voluntarily terminated their employment, and will no longer be eligible for any benefits or other consideration under this leave policy. (Emphasis supplied.) 11. Rule 6.50*+ lists sections 1001.41, 1012.22, and 1012.33 as its statutory authority, and lists sections 1001.43, 1002.33(12)(e), 1012.22, 1012.61, 1012.63, and 1012.66 as the laws it implements. No reference to authority granted by the Florida Constitution is identified. Rule 6.50*+ provides that if a teacher working for the School Board wishes to work at a charter school within St. Lucie County, that teacher must apply for permission to do so. However, the definition of a leave of absence in the first paragraph of rule 6.50*+ specifically provides that a leave of absence allowed under the rule is for a specified period of time “with the right to return to employment upon the expiration of leave.” By its terms, the rule does not appear to encompass those employees whose status is “suspended without pay,” given that those employees who are suspended without pay do not necessarily have the right to return to employment upon expiration of leave. Rule 6.50*+ also provides that an application for charter school leave shall be provided to the teacher’s principal at least 45 days before the beginning of the school year. For teachers on suspension without pay or who are not assigned to a particular school, there is no principal to whom the application can be given. The rule does not specify an alternative. Instead, Mr. Clements stated that it would be up to Ms. Jones (and presumably, anyone in her circumstance) to ask where to submit an application for charter school leave. The School Board interprets rule 6.50*+ as applying to all employees, regardless of their status. Rule 6.50*+ does not indicate what criteria would be used for determining if an employee’s application for leave should be granted. Mr. Clements testified that the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. He also testified that had Ms. Jones applied for charter school leave, he would not have recommended that her request be approved, because as a teacher on unpaid suspension, she is not in good standing with the School District. Nothing in rule 6.50*+ alerts Ms. Jones, or any other teacher in her circumstances, that her suspension without pay would be a basis for disapproval of an application for charter school leave. Nothing in the rule alerts any applicant of the criteria to be considered for the grant or denial of a requested leave of absence. The consideration of a staff member’s current disciplinary status is not an unreasonable consideration for the Superintendent or for the School District. It is not, however, included in the rule as a basis for deciding whether a request for charter school leave should be approved or denied.
The Issue Whether the School Board of Dade County has cause to terminate Respondent's employment on the grounds that Respondent was "willfully absent from duty without leave," within the meaning of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges filed in the instant case? If not, what relief should Respondent be afforded?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent was employed as a teacher by the Dade County School Board during the 1988-89 school year on an annual contract basis. His employment commenced on August 31,1988. At all times he was assigned to the ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) program at Carver Middle School. The principal of Carver Middle School, and Respondent's immediate supervisor, was Samuel Gay. Simine Heise was one of Gay's assistant principals. In Gay's absence, Heise served as acting principal. At around 12:00 p.m. on Monday, January 30, 1989, following a meeting with Gay, Respondent became physically ill at school. He left school for the day after notifying Gay and securing his authorization. Respondent was placed on sick leave for the remainder of the school day. At no time thereafter did Respondent report back to work. Various substitute teachers covered Respondent's classes during the period of his absence. Effective April 20, 1989, he was suspended by the School Board and it initiated action to terminate his employment on the ground that he had been willfully absent without authorization. During the period of his absence, Respondent was under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Adolfo M. Vilasuso. He was suffering from depression, insomnia, stress, anxiety and stress- induced gastrointestinal distress. He was treated by Dr. Vilasuso with psychotherapy and medication. Respondent's condition was primarily the result of personal problems involving his son and former wife. He was obsessed by these matters. He paid very little attention to anything else, including his teaching responsibilities. Although he was physically able to report to work, he was so distracted and preoccupied by his personal problems that he could not effectively discharge his teaching duties. The School Board requires that, in order to continue to obtain sick leave, a teacher absent because of illness must contact his immediate supervisor or the supervisor's designee by 2:00 p.m. of each day of absence and give notice that he will be out sick the following day. Teachers are advised of this "2:00 p.m. notification" requirement in the teacher handbook, a copy of which Respondent had received prior to his absence. Throughout the period of his absence, Respondent was capable of understanding and complying with this requirement. A teacher who complies with the "2:00 p.m. notification" requirement, but has exhausted all of his accrued sick leave credits, will automatically be placed on authorized leave without pay for illness for a maximum of 30 days, without the necessity of formal School Board approval. The leave will be extended beyond 30 days only if the teacher submits an appropriate application for an extension, accompanied by a "statement from [the teacher's] physician explaining why such [extended] leave is necessary." After leaving school on January 30, 1989, Respondent did not contact any member of the Carver Middle School administration or its staff concerning his absence until Saturday, February 11, 1989, when he telephoned Principal Gay's secretary, Maria Bonce, at her home and left a message with her daughter that he would not be at work the following Monday. On February 15, 1989, Dr. Vilasuso telephoned Carver Middle School and spoke with Assistant Principal Heise. Dr. Vilasuso told Heise that Respondent was under his care. He was vague, however, regarding the nature of Respondent's illness and he did not indicate when Respondent would be able to return to work. On February 21, 1989, not having heard anything further from either Respondent or Dr. Vilasuso, Principal Gay sent Respondent the following letter: The purpose of this communication is to determine your intentions for the balance of this school term. You've been absent from your teaching position at Carver Middle School since 12:00 a.m [sic] on January 30, 1989. On Saturday, February 11, you called my secretary, Mrs. Bonce, indicating you would return to work next week. On February 15, an individual identifying himself as your doctor called Carver Middle School and spoke to the assistant principal, Mrs. Heise. When he was requested [to provide information] about your illness, medical status and your ability to return to work, he stated he would not give further information without your approval. Until now we have not heard from you since February 11 when you contacted Mrs. Bonce at home. Also, the phone number and address we have on record obviously are no longer yours, therefore, I am unable to ccntact you. In addition to the above, we have no lesson plans, roll books, grade books for your students. It has been reported to me by custodial staff that you are frequently observed in the building after duty hours yet you have failed to communicate with me personally or the assistant principal or speak with your department head or the assistant principal for curriculum. I must call your attention to the contract between Dade County Public Schools and UTD and the teacher handbook which has information whiih addresses teachers' absences. You are clearly in violation of these documents. Finally, may I remind you of a memorandum given to you on January 27. A written response was due to me on February 1st. In addition, a conversation for the record was scheduled for February 1st. That conference will be held. You simply need to tell me when. I must remind you that failure to comply with district and local rules can result in non-reappointment for the 1989-90 school year. After receiving the letter, Respondent, on Thursday, February 23, 1989, telephoned Carver Middle School and spoke with Gay. Although he did not indicate to Gay when he was going to return to school, he did leave Gay with the impression that his condition was improving. Respondent also intimated during the telephone conversation that Gay would be receiving a letter from Dr. Vilasuso concerning Respondent's illness. The following Monday, February 27, 1989, at around 9:00 p.m., Respondent telephoned Secretary Bonce at her home and told her that he would be absent from school the remainder of the week due to illness. On Wednesday, March 8, 1989 Respordent telephoned Gay at school. He told Gay that he wanted to apply for sick leave and asked how he would go about doing so. Gay responded that he had referred Respondent's case to the School Board's Office of Professional Standards and that therefore the matter was "out of his hands" and Respondent would have to contact that office. On no occasion other than during the foregoing telephone conversations of February 11, 23 and 27, 1989, and March 8, 1989, did Respondent communicate with Gay or any member of Gay's administrative staff concerning his absence. Respondent's failure to so communicate with either his immediate supervisor or anyone on his immediate supervisor's administrative staff was willful. On March 28, 1989, Dr. Joyce Annunziata, the head of the School Board's Office of Professional Standards, sent Respondent a letter, which provided in pertinent part as follows: The Office of Professional Standards has been advised that you have been absent without authority from your duties as an employee in the Dade County Public Schools. During this period you did not obtain authorized leave from your supervisor. Florida Statute 231.44 provides: Any District school board employee who is willfully absent from duty without leave shall forfeit compensation for the time of such absence, and his employment shall be subject to termination by the school board. Your absence without authorized leave constitutes willful neglect of duty and subjects your employment with the Dade County Schools to immediate termination. Please be advised that unless you provide within five days from receipt of this letter a written notification to the Office of Professional Standards, 1444 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 215, Miami, FL 33132, of your resolution of your unauthorized leave status, your termination will be submitted to the School Board for final action at its meeting of April 19, 1989. Respondent received Dr. Annunziata's letter on April 10, 1989. He did not provide the Office of Professional Standards with the requisite "written notification" within five days of his receipt of the letter. Accordingly, the matter was considered by the School Board at its April 19, 1989, meeting. Thereafter, Respondent submitted to the Office of Professional Standards a written request for leave without pay for illness. The request sought leave for the period from February 8, 1989, through June 19, 1989. Although the form on which Respondent made his request noted that a "[d]octor's statement indicating diagnosis [and] length of time required for leave" was required, no such statement accompanied Respondent's request. A letter from Dr. Vilasuso concerning Respondent's condition was subsequently received by the Office of Professional Standards on April 28, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Dade County enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment as an annual contract teacher pursuant to Section 231.44, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of January, 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3231 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: School Board's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First, second and third sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Fourth and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: To the extent that it suggests that Respondent "never" complied with the "2:00 pm. notification requirement," it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Second sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it suggests that Respondent was absent without authorization during a portion of the period from January 30, 1989, to April 19, 1989, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it suggests that he was absent without authorization during the entire period, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is irrelevant and immaterial. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Rejected because it is a summary of testimony, rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Rejected because it is a summary of testimony, rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected because it is a summary of rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is a summary of testimony, rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument than a finding of fact. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument than a finding of fact; Remaining sentences: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it suggests that a teacher need not comply with the "2:00 p.m. notification" requirement to obtain authorized leave for illness and that Respondent was on such authorized leave during the first 30 days of his absence. Otherwise, they have been accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire School Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Jaime C. Bovell, Esquire 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 William DuFresne, Esquire 2929 Southwest Third Avenue, Suite One Miami, Florida 33134 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Joseph A. Fernandez Superintendent of Schools Dade County School Board School Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the School Board of Pinellas County (School Board) should accept the Petitioner's recision of her resignation from her position as a high school teacher and reinstate her to her former position on the ground that her resignation was given under legal duress.
Findings Of Fact During the 1992/1993 school year, the Petitioner, Deborah Green, taught high school in the GOALS (drop-out prevention) program at Dixie Hollins High School. In January, 1993, she applied for a year of medical leave of absence due to stress and stress-related symptoms. The School Board approved leave starting January 27, through June 11, 1993. Shortly after going on medical leave, the Petitioner was notified that a student had made serious accusations against her. One of the accusations was that the Petitioner freely told the student details about her romantic relationship with a Michael Miller, who was married and the principal of another Pinellas County high school. She contacted the student to find out what the accusations were and met with her principal and the student and his mother to discuss the accusation. At the meeting, the student recanted. The Petitioner left for Dallas, Texas, shortly after her leave began, but she continued to receive telephone messages locally through her friend and former housemate. Not long after the Petitioner left for Dallas, the student who had accused her, and then recanted, again accused the Respondent, alleging that he had recanted because the Petitioner had asked him to lie for her. When this happened, the principal of Dixie Hollins referred the matter to Stephen Crosby, Director of Personnel Services for the Pinellas County Schools. Crosby called the Petitioner at her local telephone number and left a message. When the Petitioner returned the call from Dallas, Crosby explained that he was investigating serious charges that had been made against her and that, as always in such circumstances, it was important for him to meet with her about them as soon as possible. The Petitioner declined, stating that she was not emotionally, mentally, or physically prepared at the time to handle the situation or the stress of the situation. She insisted that her meeting with Crosby be postponed. As an accommodation to the Petitioner, Crosby agreed to postpone the meeting, and the two agreed to meet on March 1, 1993. On or about February 28, 1993, on a return trip to Pinellas County, the Petitioner visited her school and left a written message for Crosby to tell him that she still was unable to meet with him and would not attend the scheduled March 1, 1993, meeting. Crosby did not get the message until the morning of the scheduled meeting. On receipt of the message, Crosby turned to the School Board's legal office for advice on how to proceed. Based on the advice of counsel, Crosby sent the Petitioner a letter stating that he viewed the delay in the interview until March 1 to be an unusual accommodation, since teacher interviews normally are conducted as soon as he becomes aware of the charges. He wrote that, since the Petitioner would not meet on March 1, as they had agreed, he would have to proceed exclusively on the basis of his interviews of students and others. In accordance with normal procedures, he also advised her that, unless she chose to resign by March 12, 1993, he would be recommending to the School Superintendent that he recommend to the School Board that the Petitioner be dismissed. On March 3, 1993, the Petitioner received Crosby's March 1 letter and wrote back in response to offer her resignation, effective June 11, 1993. In the Petitioner's own written words, she resigned "for my personal sanity and for the credibility of Michael Miller." Crosby processed the Petitioner's resignation to be considered at the March 24, 1993, School Board meeting. It is standard operating procedure to process resignations before their effective dates, if possible, so that replacement personnel can be hired. The School Board accepted the Petitioner's resignation (among others) at its March 24, 1993, meeting. The Petitioner tried unsuccessfully several times after March 24, 1993, to contact Crosby by telephone to rescind her resignation. She was unable to speak to him but was told that the School Board already had accepted her resignation and that it was too late to rescind it. In April, 1993, the Petitioner learned that the Florida Education Practices Commission of the Florida Department of Education also was investigating the allegations against her, notwithstanding her resignation. On or about June 3, 1993, the Petitioner returned to Pinellas County and met with a lawyer about getting her teaching position back and about defending her teacher certificate. On June 8, 1993, the lawyer wrote a letter to the School Board Attorney (which was received on or before June 11, 1993) purporting to rescind the Petitioner's resignation. It was not proven that the Petitioner had no choice but to resign from her position as a teacher between March 1 and March 12, 1993, due to her emotional, mental and physical condition at the time. As a result of her long-standing membership in the local teachers' union, the Pinellas Classroom Teachers Association (PCTA), the Petitioner knew that dues-paying members of the PCTA may be entitled to the services of an attorney, free of charge, in a teacher dismissal proceeding. She claimed that she did not know she still was entitled to free legal counsel after going on medical leave of absence as of January 27, 1993, and ceasing to pay union dues while on leave. However, there was no evidence that she inquired as to the availability of paid counsel until after the effective date of her resignation. Had she done so in a timely fashion, she would have learned before her resignation was accepted that she was entitled to the services of an attorney, free of charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the School Board of Pinellas County enter a final order dismissing the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6074 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-5. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven. Third sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that she spoke to Crosby more than once. Explaining the discrepancies between her testimony and his is problematic. But some of the telephone conversations she supposedly had with Crosby would have been on weekends (e.g., January 16 and 23, 1993), giving rise to a question as to the accuracy of her testimony. In addition, the Petitioner's own evidence suggested that her condition during this time period impaired her thought process and memory. Perhaps the Petitioner is counting unsuccessful attempts to contact Crosby as actual conversations with him. Rejected as not proven that the Petitioner acted on the advice of her physician in cancelling the March 1, 1993, meeting with Crosby. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven. Second sentence, rejected as not proven that she resigned "under protest because of her inability to participate in the investigation due to her medical condition"; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven. See 7., above. (Some of the telephone conversations she supposedly had with Crosby during this time period would have been during the spring school holidays when all school offices were closed.) Second sentence, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected in part as not proven as to "rational decisions with respect to her employment"; otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 4.-7. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 8.-20. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. 23.-26. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. (As to 25., the referee appeared to be referring to Green's medical leave of absence.) COPIES FURNISHED: Mark F. Kelly, Esquire Kelly & McKee, P.A. P. O. Box 75638 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Keith B. Martin, Esquire Assistant School Board Attorney Pinellas County Schools Administration Building 301 Fourth Street SW Largo, Florida 34649-2942 Dr. J. Howard Hinesley Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street SW Largo, Florida 34640-3536 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether the Petitioners have standing to institute a rule challenge proceeding under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Whether a school board may delegate the authority to suspend an employee without pay to the superintendent in specific instances for a limited period of time.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, COLLIER COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter CCEA) is the instructional bargaining unit for teachers in the Collier County School District. The Petitioner, COLLIER SUPPORT PERSONNEL-NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter CSP-NEA) is the certified bargaining agent for the non-instructional employees of the Collier County School District. The above mentioned Petitioners are affiliates of the Petitioner, FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (hereinafter FTPNEA). As a result of collective bargaining agreements which allow the Petitioners CCEA and CSP-NEA to represent specific categories of employees of the school district, sixty five to seventy per cent of these employees are represented by these associations.. The Respondent SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, (hereinafter SCHOOL BOARD) has a rule that delegates the authority to suspend employees wholly or partially without pay to the superintendent. Under Rule No. R-18/81, such a suspension cannot exceed a period of three days, and the superintendent's authority is limited to five situations which have been specifically set forth in the body of the rule. A suspension is authorized only if the superintendent finds that the employee has: a) been absent without leave, b) been insubordinate, c) endangered the health or well-being of a fellow employee or of a student or students, d) willfully neglected duty, e) been intoxicated, consumed an alcoholic beverage, or used a controlled substance (unless prescribed by a physician,) while working. The rule cites Sections 230.23 and 230.33, Florida Statutes, as the authority for the implementation of this delegation process. The rule was adopted can December 17, 1981. Rule No. R-18/81 requires that any employee suspended by the superintendent under this rule be given all due process rights under the Florida Statutes, including those authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act. Pursuant to Rule No. R-18/81, the superintendent has suspended at least two employees in 1988. One of these employees is Mr. Robert Koy, who is represented by the Petitioner, CSP-NEA, in a proceeding currently before the Division of Administrative Hearings in which the employee's substantial interests are being determined. The process and procedures utilized by the Respondent SCHOOL BOARD in its suspension of employees without pay falls within the general scope of interests and activities of all of the Petitioners in this case. A substantial number of the members of the Petitioners CCEA and CSP- NEA are substantially affected by the challenged rule as it involves the disciplinary procedures used by the Respondent SCHOOL BOARD to manage its employees. Such procedures are included in the agreement between the Collier County Public Schools and the Petitioner CSP-NEA, which is in effect from October 1, 1987 through June 30, 1990. This agreement has been admitted into evidence in this proceeding. The relief sought by all of the Petitioners in this proceeding is that Rule No. R-18/81 be declared invalid. This relief is an appropriate remedy for each of the Petitioners to seek on behalf of its members in a rule challenge proceeding.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Steve E. Montgomery, committed the violations alleged in the Second Amended Notice of Specific Charges and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Steve Montgomery has been employed with the School Board since May 13, 1988. He last held the position of a Plumber II Journeyman in Miami-Dade County Florida. Montgomery's job description and the maintenance employee's handbook mandated that he maintain a valid driver's license and Certificate of Competency in order to remain employed by the School Board. During the hearing, Montgomery admitted that he was aware that he had to maintain such minimum qualifications for his job. Montgomery started a pattern in 2003 of his driver's license getting suspended and then being reinstated again. Montgomery admitted during hearing that his driver's license had been suspended at least four times. Each time, the School Board notified Montgomery that his license was not valid and provided him five working days to get a valid license. Montgomery was placed in an alternative work assignment whenever he did not have the valid credentials. The School Board kept a record of the occurrences in Montgomery's personnel file. The file contained a December 15, 2003, memorandum entitled "FAILURE TO MAINTAIN QUALIFYING DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY JOB DESCRIPTION" directing Montgomery that his license was suspended and/or revoked and detailing that his job description requires that he maintain a valid State of Florida Class D license as one of the minimum qualifications of the position. The memorandum also stated that Montgomery had five days until December 22, 2003, to present evidence of a valid license. A May 24, 2004, memorandum almost identical to the one dated December 15, 2003, except for the deadline dates, was also in Montgomery's personnel file. The memorandum provided a deadline of June 1, 2004, to present evidence of a valid driver's license and indicated that, if there was a failure to satisfy the requirement in the allotted time period, a Conference-for-the Record ("CFR") would be scheduled to discuss the matter further. A July 26, 2005, memo identical to the two previous memorandums except for the dates was also in Montgomery's personnel file. The memorandum gave a deadline of August 2, 2005, to present evidence of a valid driver's license. Mr. Palacio personally gave the invalid driver's license memorandums to Respondent and verbally notified Montgomery of the requirement to get a valid license. Montgomery signed the memorandum dated September 15, 2005, entitled "FAILURE TO MAINTAIN QUALIFYING DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY JOB DESCRIPTION." As in the previous memos, it stated: Attached please find a report dated September 15, 2005 that indicates your driver's license has been suspended and/or revoked. Your official job description requires you to maintain a valid State of Florida CDL Class D* driver's license as one of the minimum qualifications of this position. (Effective July 1, 2005, Class D licenses were converted to Class E.) You are advised that this requirement is a condition of your continued employment with Miami-Dade County Public Schools. Without a valid driver's license you are no longer qualified to perform the requirements of your position with the District. Effective immediately, you are being placed on an alternate work assignment. Accordingly, you are directed to present evidence of this required license to your Satellite Director or designee within five (5) working days from the date of this memorandum, which will be September 23, 2005. Until such time, you are not authorized to operate any District vehicle or motorized equipment that requires possession of a driver's license. If you fail to satisfy this requirement within the allotted time period, a Conference-for-the-Record will be scheduled to address this matter further. Please review your Maintenance Operations handbook (Trades Chapter, Page 4) for further details. A CFR was held with Montgomery on September 30, 2005, because he did not obtain a valid driver's license by September 23, 2005. Montgomery was provided a copy of the job description for plumber II and the September 15, 2005, memorandum. At the CFR, Montgomery was again informed that maintaining his valid driver's license is a minimum qualification of his position and that "Without a valid driver's license, you are no longer qualified to perform the requirements of your position with the District." Montgomery signed the summary of the CFR on October 3, 2005. On October 13, 2005, the School Board notified Montgomery by memorandum that he had failed to maintain his Certificate of Competency and it had expired on August 31, 2005. Montgomery signed the memorandum and was instructed to present a valid certificate no later than October 17, 2005, at 8:00 a.m. Montgomery was aware that it was his responsibility to know when his qualifying documents expired and keep them valid as a minimum requirement for his job. A CFR was held on February 11, 2006, regarding Montgomery not possessing a renewed Certificate of Competency and a valid driver's license. At the CFR, Montgomery produced a renewed certificate but did still did not have a valid license. On May 4, 2006, Montgomery still did not have a valid driver's license and Mr. Palacio recommended Montgomery's termination. In Palacio's memorandum, the grounds for such discipline were as follows: Mr. Montgomery is in violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties, members of the non-instructional staff shall maintain all certifications, licenses and job requirements as a condition of employment. Failure to do so shall warrant disciplinary action. On May 9, 2006, Mr. Brown and the maintenance officer signed a memo entitled Recommendation for Termination Mr. Steve E. Montgomery Employee # 169252 Plumber II, Region Maintenance Center II providing grounds for disciplinary measures inasmuch as Montgomery was unable to produce a valid Florida's driver's license, a condition of employment. The memo stated: As a Plumber II, Mr. Montgomery must maintain all certifications, licenses and job requirements. Failure to comply with minimum job requirements warrants dismissal. Montgomery let the Certificate of Competency expire again on August 31, 2007. Subsequently, on September 17, 2008, another CFR was held with Montgomery notifying him of the recommendation for suspension and termination because Montgomery's license and Certificate of Competency were not valid. During the CFR, Montgomery did not offer any explanation as to why his license was still suspended or submit proof of his Certificate of Competency but only commented he "will have [both] soon."4 Montgomery also did not complain about any working conditions during the CFR. At a regularly scheduled meeting on January 14, 2009, the School Board suspended Montgomery without pay and initiated dismissal proceedings against him from all employment with Miami-Dade County Public Schools for just cause, including, but not limited to: violation of School Board Rules 6Gx13-4A-1.21 Responsibilities and Duties, 6Gx13-4A-1.213 Code of Ethics, and Sections 1001.32(2), 1012.22(1)(f), 1012.40, and 447.209, Florida Statutes. Montgomery's license was suspended at the time of his suspension and termination. Likewise, Montgomery's Certificate of Competency had still not been renewed at the time of his suspension and termination. No other School Board employee had his/her license suspended as many times as Montgomery with an expired Certificate of Competency at the same time. Further, the School Board has disciplined employees by termination for having a suspended driver's license. Montgomery had a valid Florida driver's license and a renewed valid Certificate of Competency at the hearing. On August 20, 2009, the School Board filed its Second Amended Notice of Specific Charges charging Respondent with violating School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties, School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.213, Code of Ethics, and State Board Rules 6B-1.001 and 6B-1.006 by failing to maintain a valid driver's license and Certificate of Competency.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Miami-Dade County School Board, enter a final order that: (a) dismisses Count I; (b) finds Respondent in violation of Count II as charged; and (c) upholds Respondent's suspension without pay and termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, by pleading guilty to a charge of organized scheme to defraud, in violation of Sections 817.034(4)(a)1. and 777.011, Florida Statutes, committed a “specified offense” under Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and forfeited all rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documents presented as evidence at the hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a retired physical education teacher who is a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Dr. McCoggle entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) on or about August 1, 2003, and ended his participation in DROP on June 3, 2005. Respondent is the agency responsible for managing, governing, and administering the FRS. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner was employed by the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (MDCPS or the school district) as a high school physical education teacher and coach. After ending his participation in DROP in June 2005, Petitioner was issued a warrant for his DROP-accumulated funds, but payment of the warrant was stopped. On July 18, 2005, Petitioner was charged with certain crimes, based on events that occurred while he was a physical education teacher. Specifically, a Miami-Dade County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging Petitioner with one count of grand theft, first degree, in violation of Sections 812.014(1)(2)(a) and 777.011, Florida Statutes, and one count of a scheme to defraud, as defined in Subsection 817.034(3)(d), that constituted organized fraud in violation of Sections 817.034(4)(a)1. and 777.011, Florida Statutes (2005). On November 17, 2005, an amended information filed to supersede the indictment provided: WILLIAM L. McCOGGLE, from on or about JANUARY 1, 1999 to on or about MARCH 31, 2004, in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully and feloniously engage in a scheme to defraud as defined by s. 817.034(3)(d), Fla. Stat., by engaging in a systematic, ongoing course of conduct with intent to defraud one or more persons, to wit: MIAMI-DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises or willful misrepresentations of a future act, and did thereby obtain property, to wit: U.S. COINS OR CURRENCY, of an aggregate value of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) or more, the property of MIAMI-DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, as owner or custodian, in violation of s. 817.034(4)(a)1 and s. 777.011, Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. (Emphasis added.) On November 18, 2005, a plea agreement between Petitioner and the State was filed, in which Petitioner pled guilty to the one count in the amended information and the circuit court entered a judgment adjudicating Petitioner guilty. After notice of the guilty plea and judgment, Respondent’s legal office reviewed grand jury and court documents, determined that Petitioner had been convicted of a specified offense under Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and recommended the termination of Petitioner’s rights and benefits under the FRS. On September 6, 2006, Respondent notified Petitioner, by letter, of the forfeiture of his FRS rights and benefits. On September 25, 2006, Petitioner timely sought an administrative review of the agency action. The legal action taken against Petitioner resulted from his involvement, for at least a decade, in arranging for teachers to receive academic credit for state and school district-required teacher certification and recertification. According to the grand jury and Petitioner, he entered into agreements with accredited post-secondary educational institutions for Petitioner on his own, at first, and then through his organization, Move on Toward Education and Training (MOTET), to provide courses to teachers and for the colleges to provide them transcripts. The grand jury found that teachers came to Dr. McCoggle at the high school where he was teaching, after regular school hours and on Saturday mornings, and paid him to sign-up for classes. Dr. McCoggle’s use of school facilities was authorized. Teachers from Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties participated in the program. The grand jury also found that the transcripts were fraudulently obtained because there were no classes, no tests, no homework, no assignments, and that no teachers attended any classes. As counsel for the Respondent summarized the issues in this case, in his Proposed Recommended Order, any public employee (undisputed) who is convicted of a specified offense (disputed) committed prior to retirement (undisputed) shall forfeit all rights and benefits under any public retirement system of which he or she is a member (undisputed). The evidence supports Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea to a scheme to defraud was not related to the performance of his official duties as a physical education teacher and coach. Petitioner notes that defrauding a public employer is not a "specified offense" unless the fraud is job- related. The grand jury's final report that was introduced as Respondent's Exhibit 1 and the Petitioner's testimony support a conclusion that he charged the teachers fees but took no money directly from the school district. Petitioner notes that a theft is a "specified offense" only if the victim is the public employer. It is the position of the school district that, by pleading guilty to a scheme to defraud, Petitioner pled guilty to theft, and that he committed the theft by assisting teachers in getting paid public funds of the MDCPS to which they were not entitled.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order requiring William L. McCoggle to forfeit all rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Emily Moore, Esquire Florida Education Association 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated "for being absent without approved leave," as recommended in the Superintendent of Schools of the School District of Palm Beach County's Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the School District. Systemwide testing programs in the School District are coordinated by the School District's Department of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability (DREA). At all times material to the instant case, Marc Baron headed DREA. DREA operates a test distribution center. Cherie Boone is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, in charge of the DREA test distribution center. Ms. Boone supervises four employees. As their supervisor, she is "responsible for [among other things, their] time and attendance." Respondent is employed as a materials handling technician with the School District. At all times material to the instant case, he was assigned to work in the DREA test distribution center under the direct supervision of Ms. Boone. As a materials handling technician employed by the School District, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1227 (NCF&O) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School District and NCF&O (NCF&O Contract). Article 7 of the NCF&O Contract discusses "employees['] contractual rights." It provides as follows: SECTION 1. Probationary Employees All newly hired or rehired employees may be subject to a probationary period of ninety (90) workdays. Employees who have not completed such period of employment may be discharged without recourse. Probationary employees shall not be eligible for any type of leave except accrued sick leave, annual leave, or short term unpaid leave (due to illness) not to exceed five (5) days. SECTION 2. Permanent Employees Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the NFC&O Contract addresses the subject of "[m]anagement [r]ights." It provides as follows: NCF&O and its members recognize the responsibility of the District to operate and manage its affairs in all respects in accordance with its responsibilities as established by law and as delegated by the State Board of Education; and the powers of authority which the District has not officially agreed to share by this agreement, are retained by the District. It is the right of the District to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the District to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, provided, however, that the exercise of such rights shall not preclude employees or their representatives from raising grievances, should decisions on the above matters have the practical consequences of violating the terms and conditions of this agreement in force. The District has the sole authority to determine the purpose and mission and the amount of the budget to be adopted by the School Board. The District and NCF&O agree that the District has and retains unaltered, its legal right to select, assign, reassign, or relocate any of its employees, and to carry out its mission under the law and State Board of Education Regulations, unless otherwise specifically enumerated herein. Except to the extent it has been done prior to May 26, 1998, no bargaining unit work which would result in the loss of jobs by members of the bargaining unit, shall be contracted out without prior consultation with the Union. It is understood that changes under this Article may not be arbitrary and capricious, and it is agreed that the District has those rights which are enumerated within Florida Statute 447; however, nothing herein shall relieve the parties of their ability to request impact bargaining. Among the "rules and procedures" that the School District, through the School Board, has established in exercising its "[m]anagement [r]ights" are School Board Directive 3.27 and School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: School Board Directive 3.27 * * * Resignations. If employees desire to be released from their employment contract the following procedures are to be followed: * * * c. When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employee stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. * * * Suspension/Termination. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes.[2] * * * Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. * * * 6. When a recommendation for suspension and termination is made, the procedures listed in School Board Policy 3.27 shall be followed. * * * School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80 A leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, or allowed under its adopted policies, for an employee to be absent from duty for specified periods of time with the right of returning to employment on the expiration of the leave. All absences of School Board employees from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the School Board and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. No leave except military leave shall be granted for a period greater than one (1) year. A new leave application may be filed and granted at the expiration of leave, but automatic renewals of leave shall not be allowed. Leave may be with or without pay and provided by law, rules of the State Board of Education, School Board policy, and negotiated contracts. If the terms of the collective bargaining agreement differ from this Policy, the language of the employee's agreement will take precedence. The following types of leave are available for School District employees: Leave for personal reasons Annual leave for 12-month personnel Sick leave Catastrophic leave Injury or illness in-line-of-duty leave Sabbatical leave Temporary military leave Regular military service leave Professional leave and extended professional leave Charter school leave Voluntary/extended military leave Leave of absence for the purpose of campaigning for political office Personal leave including maternity/ recovery and child care Paid Leaves * * * c. Sick Leave * * * iv. An employee requiring more than thirty (30) working days of paid leave for recovery may be required to submit medical evidence at reasonable intervals supporting the need for additional leave. * * * Sick leave claims shall be honored as submitted by the employee for personal illness, as well as illness or death of father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child or other close relative or member of the employee's own household. Sick leave without pay may be granted for employees who have used all accumulated sick leave, but who would otherwise qualify for sick leave. The Superintendent may require a doctor's statement of verification of illness. A request to the Superintendent for a verification of claim may be initiated by the principal or supervisor. * * * Unpaid Leaves * * * e. Personal Leave -- An employee requesting short-term or long-term personal leave shall make written application to the supervisor, stating reasons for such leave. The Board shall satisfy itself in terms of the need of the requested leave. Personal leave may be used to extend a leave of absence due to sickness when that sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave for the duration of up to one (1) calendar year when supported by doctor's statements verifying the necessity of the extended leave. An employee requesting return to duty who has served efficiently and exhibited those qualities called for in the position held prior to such leave will be given every consideration for reemployment provided the conditions of employment have been met and the request is supported by a doctor's statement certifying that his physical condition is satisfactory to return to normal duties. * * * Article 17 of the NCF&O Contract, as noted in Article 7 of the contract, deals with the "[d]iscipline of [e]mployees." It provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee’s personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph #7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee’s personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless there is another reasonably related act by that same employee within a twenty-four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension without pay shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Article 18 of the NCF&O Contract describes the grievance procedure available to bargaining unit members who allege a "misapplication or misinterpretation of the agreement." The described procedure consists of an "informal level" and four formal "levels," the final one being "arbitration before an impartial arbitrator, using the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services." Pursuant to Section 4B. of Article 18, "if NCF&O decides to withdraw its support of an alleged grievance, the individual may continue to process the claim on his/her own, so long as all costs are borne by that individual"; however, according to Section 4E. of Article 18, "[a]grievance, once [actually] withdrawn, may not be reopened without the mutual written agreement between the [School District] and [the] NCF&O." "[L]eave [w]ithout [p]ay" is the subject of Article 25 of the NCF&O Contract, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Personal Leave of Absence Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent. An employee granted an unpaid leave of absence shall be returned to his/her former classification if the leave is less than ninety (90) days, notwithstanding the layoff provisions contained in this agreement. An employee granted a leave of absence and who wishes to return before the leave period has expired, may submit a request to return to the principal/department head. An employee granted a leave of absence in excess of ninety (90) days will be permitted to return to work provided there is an opening in the same job classification in the work unit. If the former position is not available, the employee, upon written request, shall be listed as an eligible applicant for a period of six (6) months. Group Life and Hospitalization Insurance coverage may be continued for a period equal to the authorized leave of absence, provided full premium payments, including the Board's payment, are kept current by the employee. SECTION 2. Return from Leave Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal.[3] This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent.4 Section 2 of Article 35 of NCF&O Contract protects employees from "[h]arassment." It provides as follows: No employee shall be subjected to or be part of: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive, lewd or suggestive comments. Also includes the creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. Verbal or physical abuse is submitted to by an employee. An adverse decision is made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. Verbal or physical abuse. An adverse decision shall not be made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. There came a time when Respondent claimed, in a Level One grievance filed under the NCF&O Contract, that he was a victim, at the hands of Ms. Boone, of the "[h]arassment" proscribed by Section 2 of Article 35 of the contract. The grievance was filed (with the support of NCF&O) on or about April 8, 2004, several weeks following an incident in which Ms. Boone "yell[ed]" at Respondent for returning "a little bit late[]" from a delivery run. It contained the following "[g]rievance [s]tatement" and description of the "[r]elief [s]ought": Grievance Statement: (Include Date of Occurrence) Mr. Ellis fe[e]ls that he is working in a hostile work environment. He had meeting with the Dept. Head to express his feelings. On March 31, the employee was issued a written reprimand when there has never been any discipline for the employee. Relief Sought: The reprimand is withdrawn from all personnel files. All intimidation of the employee to cease immediately. Ms. Boone, on behalf of the School District, responded to the grievance by providing Respondent with the following written "disposition": After careful consideration of all available information, it has been determined that there has not been a violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining procedures. The grievance was not pursued beyond Level One. Since March 16, 2004, Respondent had not been reporting to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent. On or about April 5, 2004, Respondent submitted a request for leave of absence without pay for the period from April 5, 2004, to July 5, 2004. The type of leave without pay he requested was personal leave. By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mr. Baron advised Respondent that Respondent's request was being denied. In his letter, Mr. Baron wrote: You were absent without approved leave on April 5, 2004, April 6, 2004, and April 8, 2004. On Monday, April 5, 2004, you reported your intended absences and requested personal leave of absence starting April 5, 2004 through July 5, 2004. Pursuant to Article 25, Section 1, of the Agreement between The School District of Palm Beach County and National Conference of Firem[e]n & Oilers, "Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent." Your request for personal unpaid leave is denied. You are directed to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2004. Continued unapproved absences will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent did not return to work on April 12, 2004, as directed. The matter of Respondent's unauthorized absences was then "turn[ed] . . . over to [the School District's] personnel [office]" to "deal with." The personnel office decided to ask the School Board to terminate Respondent's employment for his having been absent without authorization. Before the School Board took any action, Respondent submitted another request for leave of absence without pay. The type of leave without pay he requested this time was sick leave. On the request form, Respondent indicated that he wanted the leave period to begin on April 16, 2004, "but there was no end date" written in anywhere on the form. Without an "end date," the form could not be processed. Sherry Kleinman, a School District analyst assigned to the personnel office (whose job duties include processing "all the leaves of absence for School [District] employees"), telephoned Respondent and "asked him what end date he wanted" her to place on the form for him. During their telephone conversation, Ms. Kleinman and Respondent "agreed upon" a May 17, 2004, "end date." Ms. Kleinman inserted this "end date" in the appropriate space on the form and then completed processing Respondent's leave request. Respondent was granted leave without pay for the period starting April 16, 2004, and ending May 17, 2004. Moreover, the personnel office "pulled" its recommendation that the School Board terminate Respondent for his having been absent without authorization. Respondent did not report to work at any time following the expiration of his authorized leave on May 17, 2004, nor did he seek an extension of this leave. There has been no showing made that there were extenuating circumstances present preventing Respondent's timely return to work; nor has it been shown that the issue of whether such extenuating circumstances existed has ever been presented to the Superintendent for determination. Personnel office staff attempted to reach Respondent by telephone to encourage him to seek an extension of the authorized leave that had expired. These efforts were unsuccessful. Upon being advised of the situation by Ms. Kleinman, NCF&O business agent Carolyn Killings, who had helped Respondent in filing his "[h]arassment" grievance, offered to try to contact Respondent, but she too was unable to "reach him." By letter dated June 14, 2004, Ernie Camerino, the assistant director of the personnel office, advised Respondent of the following: You were recently notified by your supervisor of your failure to return to work. As a result of such action, Personnel is currently processing your involuntary resignation from employment with the School District. Please be advised that I will recommend at the July 21, 2004 meeting of the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, your involuntary resignation. Subsequent to the July 21, 2004 Board meeting you will have fifteen (15) days to file an appeal under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. Unless a timely request for an administrative hearing (DOAH) is made within fifteen (15) days stated herein pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes the District will consider this matter closed. This action is taken in accordance with Section 1001.42 and 1001.51, Florida Statutes. Failure to timely request an administrative hearing shall waive all rights to request a DOAH hearing on such matters and shall be subject only to appeal rights under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. You have a choice of filing a grievance or requesting a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Questions regarding the appeals process should be referred to the District's Legal Department. If you find this letter inconsistent with the action taken above, you may contact Mr. Camerino immediately at . . . to resolve this matter prior to School Board Action. By letter dated July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the School District's legal department that he was "requesting an appeal" of Mr. Camerino's "involuntary resignation" recommendation. On August 23, 2004, the same day the Superintendent filed his Petition for Involuntary Resignation recommending that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment, the School District referred Respondent's appeal to DOAH.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment based on his failure to return to work following the expiration of his leave without pay on May 17, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2005.
