The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner, St. Lucie County School Board (Petitioner or the School Board), has just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent, Renya Jones (Respondent or Ms. Jones).
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Renya Jones, is employed by the School Board of St. Lucie County, Florida. She has been employed by the School Board since the 2004-2005 school year, most recently as a music teacher at Village Green Environmental Studies School. Respondent has a professional services contract pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. As a classroom teacher, she is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board and the Classroom Teachers Association. When Respondent was hired by the School Board, she participated in an orientation process whereby she received training on a variety of School Board policies, including the Code of Ethics/Professional Competency and the Drug-Free Workplace Policy. On July 28, 2004, she signed a New Employee Orientation Verification of Training form indicating that she had received training in the areas listed (including those named above), and that she had received a copy of the St. Lucie County School Board New Employee Handbook. Respondent also submitted to pre-employment drug screening on July 30, 2004. On May 8, 2017, Respondent was a music teacher at Village Green Environmental Studies School, also referred to as Village Green Elementary (Village Green). The contractual hours for teachers at Village Green during the 2016-2017 school year were from 7:45 a.m. to 3:20 p.m. There were clubs that met in the morning before classes began at approximately 8:30 a.m., and those teachers working with clubs were required to report earlier so that they were present when the clubs were to start. Respondent was the teacher working with the chorus club, which would require her to be present early. When teachers arrive at school, they normally sign in at the front desk. Cynthia Garcia is the executive secretary to the principal at Village Green. During the 2016-2017 school year, the principal was Ucola Barrett-Baxter. Ms. Garcia typically arrives at school before anyone else and sits at the front desk as teachers sign in, as opposed to sitting in her office, adjacent to Ms. Barrett-Baxter’s. On May 8, 2017, Ms. Garcia was present when Respondent signed in at sometime between 7:30 and 7:50 a.m. Ms. Garcia asked Respondent if she was alright, because her appearance was different than normal. While Respondent was usually dressed professionally and wore make-up, that morning she was wearing no make-up and her wig was not on straight. Respondent replied that she was running a little behind and was a little messed up, and still needed to put on her make-up. Ms. Garcia testified that Respondent was different than when she usually signed in, and described her as a bit “giddy,” flailing her arms and laughing. Actavis McQueen is a fourth-grade teacher at Village Green. As she approached her classroom on May 8, 2017, Respondent called to her in the hallway a little after 8:00 a.m. Ms. McQueen described Respondent as giggly and loud, and when Ms. McQueen approached Respondent, she noticed that Respondent was not properly dressed for work. For example, her wig was twisted, she was not wearing make-up as she usually does, her stomach was showing under the tank top she was wearing, and she was wearing flip flops or slides instead of shoes. Most importantly, Ms. McQueen could smell the strong odor of alcohol. Respondent was loud and laughing, saying that the children would not recognize her without her make-up. Students were starting to come in for practice on the school play, and Ms. McQueen did not want the students to see Respondent in her current condition, so Ms. McQueen told students that there would not be a rehearsal that day. She told Respondent to go to her office in the back of her classroom and fix herself up. Ms. McQueen was shocked by Respondent’s appearance, and after telling Respondent to go to her office, Ms. McQueen headed toward the school office. On her way, she ran into Verna Brown at the cafeteria. The chorus room that served as Respondent’s classroom is adjacent to or behind the cafeteria, and can be entered from the cafeteria area by way of the stage. Verna Brown2/ is a health paraprofessional employed at Village Green. On this particular morning, she was on duty in the cafeteria for those students eating breakfast. Ms. McQueen approached her and told Verna Brown that she had spoken to Respondent, and it appeared that Respondent had been drinking. Ms. McQueen reported that Respondent smelled of alcohol and asked Verna Brown to go check on Respondent, because Ms. McQueen was uncertain what to do. Verna Brown went to Respondent’s class, and when she arrived, two other staff members were in Respondent’s room, so she closed the door and said she would come back, which she did once the others left the room. Like Ms. McQueen, Verna Brown could smell alcohol and observed that Respondent’s eyes were swollen and red, her hair was “wild,” and her stomach was showing. Respondent indicated that she had been to a party. Verna Brown was concerned for Respondent’s well-being and told Respondent she needed to get herself together. While she was talking to Respondent, students were trying to come into the room through the stage, and were asking Respondent questions about rehearsal. Respondent told them there would be no rehearsal that morning and to come back at 3:00 p.m. Verna Brown was trying to keep the students from seeing Respondent because she did not want them to see her in that condition. Verna Brown asked Respondent if Respondent needed her to call someone to come get her, but Respondent indicated that she had a rental car, and left out the back door.3/ Despite having signed in upon her arrival at Village Green, Respondent did not sign out when she left. Verna Brown was not authorized to arrange for a substitute for Respondent, but told her she would speak with Ms. Garcia about one. No substitute was ever procured. Verna Brown returned to the cafeteria and confirmed to Ms. McQueen that she also smelled alcohol on Respondent. Ms. McQueen went to the office accompanied by Sherri Brown, the media specialist, in search of the principal, Ucola Barrett- Baxter. Ms. Garcia advised Ms. McQueen that Ms. Barrett-Baxter was at student drop-off duty, and Ms. McQueen told Ms. Garcia that she needed to speak to her about a staff member. Ms. Garcia asked if it was Respondent, and went to the drop-off area to advise Ms. Barrett-Baxter of Ms. McQueen’s need to see her. Ms. Garcia believed that Ms. McQueen was very upset about Respondent and took over Ms. Baxter-Barrett’s duties at the student drop-off area so that Ms. Barrett-Baxter could speak with Ms. McQueen. Ms. Barrett-Baxter found Ms. McQueen at the media center, where Ms. McQueen advised her that she had seen Respondent and that Respondent appeared to be drunk and smelled like alcohol. Ms. Barrett-Baxter asked where Respondent could be located, and was told that she had already left the campus. Ms. Barrett-Baxter immediately called Aaron Clements, the director of Employee Relations, and explained the situation. Upon learning that Ms. Barrett-Baxter had not seen Respondent personally and that Respondent was no longer at the school, Mr. Clements advised Ms. Barrett-Baxter that at that point, there was nothing that could be done. As noted above, Sherri Brown is a media specialist at Village Green. At Ms. McQueen’s request, she accompanied Ms. McQueen to the office to find Ms. Barrett-Baxter. She and Verna Brown were both concerned about whether Respondent made it home safely, and she tried to call Respondent. Respondent did not answer her phone when Sherri Brown called, and she and Verna Brown received permission from Ms. Barrett-Baxter to leave campus and drive by Respondent’s home to make sure she had arrived. Once they saw the rental car Respondent had been driving parked at her home, they returned to campus. Respondent returned Sherri Brown’s call at about 10:17 a.m., and stated that she had left early due to an unidentified emergency. Sherri Brown told Respondent to contact Ms. Barrett-Baxter before she came back to work, and not to come back to the school. Sherri Brown relayed the telephone conversation with Respondent to her media assistant, Mary Bergerman, and told Ms. Bergerman that she needed to go to the office and report the contact with Respondent. Ms. Bergerman had heard Sherri Brown’s side of the telephone conversation and confirmed that Sherri Brown had told Respondent not to return to the school, as opposed to advising her that she needed to come back. When Sherri Brown arrived at the office, Ms. Barrett- Baxter was in a meeting with a parent. She stepped into Ms. Garcia’s office to relay the message that Respondent was going to contact the principal, and while she was there, Respondent entered the office behind her. Sherri Brown said hello to Respondent and returned to the library. She covered Respondent’s classes for the day, and she and a co-worker covered the rehearsal that afternoon. While Ms. Barrett-Baxter was in the parent conference, at approximately 10:24 a.m., she received a text from a number she did not recognize. She responded, “I’m in a meeting. Who’s calling,” to which Respondent responded, “Jones I’m there in 5 minutes.” Respondent arrived in the office while Ms. Barrett- Baxter was still in the parent conference, so she went in Ms. Garcia’s office to wait. After somewhere between ten and 30 minutes, the parent conference concluded, and Respondent went in Ms. Barrett-Baxter’s office. Ms. Barrett-Baxter testified that Respondent is normally well put together in terms of make-up and hair, but when she came in the office she looked disheveled, and noticeably different from her normal appearance. She could detect the smell of alcohol and her eyes were puffy and red. Respondent told her she had gone home to clean up a little bit, and Ms. Barrett-Baxter replied that it did not work, because she could smell the alcohol from across the desk. She told Respondent that she would have to contact the district office, and left Respondent in her office while she went to Ms. Garcia’s office to call Mr. Clements. Sometime that day, she also completed a Human Resources Reporting Form and emailed it to Mr. Clements. The Reporting Form summarized the reports she had received regarding Respondent’s apparent intoxication and what she had observed when meeting with Respondent before calling Mr. Clements. Reasonable suspicion existed to warrant testing for drugs and alcohol based upon Respondent’s appearance, behavior, and the smell of alcohol emanating from her person and noted by nearly every person with whom she came in contact. Mr. Clements advised that he would send someone from security to transport Respondent for testing. Ms. Barrett-Baxter had Respondent go sit in the conference room in the office area to wait for transport, and resumed her other duties. Ken Rodriguez is a security officer for the St. Lucie County School District (School District) and a retired police officer from New York City, and he has worked at the School District for the last nine years. He arrived at Village Green between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m. Once he arrived, he went to the conference room where Respondent was waiting. He identified himself to Respondent and explained that he would be transporting her to the district office where she would meet with Aaron Clements, who would explain to her the procedures that were going to take place. Mr. Rodriguez asked Respondent about any personal affects she might have, and then asked someone in the office to retrieve her purse for her. Upon receiving the purse, Respondent placed it on the table and started looking for something. From his vantage point standing by the table, he could see a large ziplock bag of capsules in her purse, as well as a box of box cutters. He did not search her purse, but asked her about the bag of capsules, and Respondent told Mr. Rodriguez that they were vitamins. Mr. Rodriguez took her explanation at face value, but advised her that he was going to hold onto both the bag of capsules and the box cutters as a safety measure while she was transported, and return them to her when they were finished. Mr. Rodriguez and Respondent arrived at the School District offices sometime after noon. Mr. Rodriguez directed Respondent to sit in the reception area while he went in to see Mr. Clements. Mr. Rodriguez reported to Mr. Clements that he had taken possession of the capsules and the box cutter as a safety measure and gave them to Mr. Clements, and then brought Respondent in to meet with him. Mr. Rodriguez did not sit in on the meeting between Mr. Clements and Respondent. Mr. Clements advised Respondent that she was going to be taken to the lab for drug/alcohol testing, and now would be the time for her to tell him if the pills were something illegal or would cause her to have a negative result from the test, and she again stated that they were vitamins. Mr. Clements reiterated that they were sending her for drug and alcohol testing, and she indicated that she understood. She was provided with the standard forms related to testing that are used for all employees being tested, and she signed them. Respondent did not ask Mr. Clements any questions, and appeared to understand what she was told. Mr. Clements is not the medical resource officer for St. Lucie County Schools. The medical resource officer is identified on the form for drug testing, along with his telephone number. No evidence was presented to indicate that Respondent asked to speak to the medical resource officer or was prohibited from doing so. The School District typically tests for both drugs and alcohol on a reasonable suspicion test. While there may be reasonable suspicion that someone is under the influence of either drugs or alcohol, without the testing, it is difficult to know for sure the source of the influence. After meeting with Mr. Clements, Respondent was provided with a St. Lucie Public Schools Drug & Alcohol Testing notification form that identifies the time Respondent left the School District and instructs her to report to the identified testing location no later than 30 minutes from receiving the form. Respondent and Mr. Clements both signed this form at 1:10 p.m. Mr. Rodriguez drove Respondent to Absolute Testing/Consulting (Absolute Testing), where he provided the paperwork to a technician, Gina Dinello, who took her back for testing while he waited in the reception area. Absolute Testing provides alcohol testing to St. Lucie County using a breathalyzer, and provides drug testing using a urine sample. Ms. Dinello holds the appropriate certifications to conduct the breathalyzer test and to collect the urine sample for the drug test. The sample for the urine test is obtained on premises and then transported to a laboratory for processing. The breathalyzer that Absolute Testing uses is DOT- certified, and is calibrated in accordance with DOT standards. Ms. Dinello took Respondent into the back room at Absolute Testing, and explained how the procedure for the breathalyzer works. She showed Respondent the documents related to the test, and Respondent signed them. With breathalyzer tests, where there is a positive test result, it is standard procedure to wait 15 minutes and then have the person being tested blow into the breathalyzer a second time. The theory is that, by waiting the 15 minutes, any extraneous influence, such as mouthwash, that might have affected the first test would have dissipated by the second test. Respondent cooperated with the first administration of the breathalyzer test, which resulted in a reading of .186 at 1:40 p.m. Once she learned the results of the first test, however, she did not want to wait for the second administration. Ms. Dinello asked Mr. Rodriguez to help explain the process to her, and he did so, telling her that a second test was a standard part of the process. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Dinello explained to Respondent that she had a right to refuse the test, but her refusal would be documented. Respondent then consented to the second administration, which resulted in a reading of .191 at 1:56 p.m. After the breathalyzer test was complete, Ms. Dinello explained that Respondent needed to provide a urine sample for the drug test. Respondent declined to do so, saying she had already blown the breathalyzer test, so there was no point to proceed with the urine test. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Dinello explained again that if she chose to refuse the test, the refusal would be documented and reported to the School District. Respondent refused to submit, and Ms. Dinello submitted paperwork to that effect. Mr. Rodriguez was not informed of the results of the breathalyzer test. When the testing was finished, he took Respondent to her home, returned her belongings to her, and she walked into her home. He did not allow her to drive her car home, which remained at Village Green, because he believed that she could still be under the influence of alcohol. He testified that when he transported her to the testing facility, he could smell the heavy odor of alcohol on her, and he did not believe she was physically capable of driving home. Respondent was paid a salary for May 8, 2017, and had not requested annual or sick leave. She was on duty when she arrived at the school that morning, and she remained on duty, despite the fact that she chose to go home without signing out for the day. On May 9, 2017, Respondent received a letter by hand- delivery notifying her that she was under investigation for having a breath alcohol level of .186 and .191 while at her work location, and for refusing the drug test. She was placed on temporary duty assignment. While on temporary duty, Respondent received all of her pay and benefits. Moreover, Respondent was paid for the entire term of her contract for the 2016-2017 school year, from August 12, 2016, through June 30, 2017. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Clements provided to Respondent a Meeting Notice, scheduling a meeting regarding the charges that she refused the drug test and had unacceptable breath alcohol test results. Respondent acknowledged receiving the notice in writing and attended the meeting with her union representative. The purpose of the meeting was to provide Respondent with “due process” and give her the opportunity to provide any information she might choose regarding the allegations against her. On May 15, 2017, Respondent received written notice of a second meeting, to be held on May 22, 2017. The purpose of this meeting was to provide Respondent the results of the School District’s investigation. Respondent and her representative attended this meeting as well. On May 22, 2017, Rafaal Sanchez, Jr., Mr. Clements’ supervisor and executive director of Human Resources for the School District, recommended to Superintendent Gent that Respondent’s employment be terminated. Superintendent Gent accepted Mr. Sanchez’s recommendation and by letter dated May 22, 2017, notified Respondent of his intent to recommend to the School Board that her employment be terminated, as well as the procedure available to her to contest that recommendation. The letter also advised Respondent that if she chose to request a hearing, the superintendent would recommend that she be suspended without pay pending the outcome of the hearing. That same day, counsel for Respondent wrote to Superintendent Gent regarding the allegations against Respondent. He advised the superintendent that Respondent was relieved of duty on May 8, 2017, and was later called and told to return to Village Green, and that she voluntarily complied with this directive. He also contended that she was not presented with any drug testing policies and she had no knowledge of the consequences of failing to submit to the drug test at that time. As a result of this letter, Mr. Clements opened a second investigation to see whether anyone had told Respondent to return to school. At that time, he gathered statements from staff members, who had seen Respondent at school on the morning of May 8, 2017, and ultimately closed the investigation as unsubstantiated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the School Board finding that Respondent’s conduct as identified in the Findings of Fact constitute just cause for terminating her position as a teacher. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013 are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has been charged with “DUI Manslaughter/Failed to Render Aid” and “Vehicular Homicide/Failed to Give Information or Render Aid” in Palm Beach County, Circuit Court Case No. 502010CF005829AXXXMB. The prosecution in the criminal case intends to offer the results of a blood alcohol test performed on blood collected from the Petitioner as evidence at the trial. The Petitioner has moved to exclude the blood alcohol test results from the trial based, in part, on the method used to collect his blood for forensic testing. The Respondent is the state agency responsible for implementing the “Implied Consent” blood alcohol testing program, including the adoption of rules. The Respondent has adopted such rules which are set forth in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 11D-8. The Petitioner has asserted that the Respondent’s “Implied Consent” rules are insufficient to ensure the scientific reliability of the blood alcohol test results to be offered against him in the criminal trial. On March 21, 2014, the circuit court judge presiding in the criminal trial entered an Order Granting State’s Motion to Invoke the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, which specifically directed the Petitioner to file a petition challenging rule 11D-8.012 with the Division of Administrative Hearings. On April 24, 2014, the Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule, challenging rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013 as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The parties stipulated that the Petitioner is substantially affected by, and has standing to challenge the validity of, rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013. Rule 11D-8.002 provides the following relevant definitions: (2) Accuracy - the nearness of a measurement to a known concentration. * * * (4) Agency - a law enforcement agency other than the Department, or an entity which conducts breath tests or submits blood samples for alcohol testing pursuant to these rules, or a civilian entity performing such duties on behalf of a law enforcement agency. * * * (7) Alcohol - ethyl alcohol, also known as ethanol. * * * Analyst - a person who has been issued a permit by the Department to conduct blood alcohol analyses. Approved Blood Alcohol Test - the analyses of two separate portions of the same blood sample using a Department- approved blood alcohol test method and a Department-approved procedure, with results within 0.010 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL), and reported as the blood alcohol level. * * * Blood - whole blood. Blood Alcohol Level - the alcohol concentration by weight in a person’s blood based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL). * * * (19) Department - the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. * * * (22) Methods - types of alcohol analyses approved by the Department to conduct chemical or physical tests of blood or breath. * * * (24) Permit - when issued by the Department, certifies that the holder has met all necessary qualifications, remains in full compliance with these rules and is authorized to perform all related duties. A permit is issued only to a qualified applicant and remains valid and in full effect until determined otherwise by the Department. Rule 11D-8.012 The Petitioner has asserted that rule 11D-8.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule does not establish a venipuncture procedure regulating needle gauge and tourniquet usage by which blood is obtained for the purpose of performing a blood alcohol test. At the same time, the Petitioner asserts, and the Respondent agrees, that the Respondent lacks statutory authority to adopt such a rule. Rule 11D-8.012 provides as follows: Blood Samples - Labeling and Collection. Before collecting a sample of blood, the skin puncture area must be cleansed with an antiseptic that does not contain alcohol. Blood samples must be collected in a glass evacuation tube that contains a preservative such as sodium fluoride and an anticoagulant such as potassium oxalate or EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid). Compliance with this section can be established by the stopper or label on the collection tube, documentation from the manufacturer or distributor, or other evidence. Immediately after collection, the tube must be inverted several times to mix the blood with the preservative and anticoagulant. Blood collection tubes must be labeled with the following information: name of person tested, date and time sample was collected, and initials of the person who collected the sample. Blood samples need not be refrigerated if submitted for analysis within seven (7) days of collection, or during transportation, examination or analysis. Blood samples must be otherwise refrigerated, except that refrigeration is not required subsequent to the initial analysis. Blood samples must be hand-delivered or mailed for initial analysis within thirty days of collection, and must be initially analyzed within sixty days of receipt by the facility conducting the analysis. Blood samples which are not hand-delivered must be sent by priority mail, overnight delivery service, or other equivalent delivery service. Notwithstanding any requirements in Chapter 11D-8, F.A.C., any blood analysis results obtained, if proved to be reliable, shall be acceptable as a valid blood alcohol level. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. Commercially available kits, generally containing glass evacuation tubes, a non-alcohol skin wipe, and a 21-gauge needle assembly, may be used to collect samples for blood alcohol testing. The Respondent’s rules do not require usage of such kits, and the components of the kits are commonly available where blood collection is performed. The Legislature identified the persons authorized to collect samples for blood alcohol testing in section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which states as follows: Only a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician, acting at the request of a law enforcement officer, may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances therein. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood shall not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes. The Petitioner asserts that the gauge of the needle used to puncture a vein for blood collection and improper application of a tourniquet during the collection process can result in “hemolysis” of blood and an inaccurate blood alcohol test result. As noted above, rule 11D-8.002(14) defines “blood” to mean “whole blood.” Whole blood is comprised of four components, including white cells, red cells, platelets, and plasma. Hemolysis is the release of the contents of red blood cells (hemoglobin) into blood plasma. Hemolysis can occur from a variety of causes, including, but not limited to, the manner of collection (regardless of the gauge of the needle used to puncture the vein), improper agitation of a sample in the collection tube, and storage of a sample. All blood alcohol testing performed by forensic laboratories in Florida is conducted through “gas chromatography headspace analysis.” Extensive testimony was presented at the hearing as to the process of gas chromatography headspace analysis. The reliability and accuracy of the gas chromatography headspace analysis process is not at issue in this proceeding. Gas chromatography headspace analysis involves the removal and testing of a subsample of the blood sample contained in a collection tube. A subsample taken from a sample that exhibits hemolysis contains all of the components present at the time of collection and is whole blood. The evidence fails to establish that hemolysis alters the concentration of alcohol within a subsample taken from a sample of whole blood. The evidence fails to establish that hemolysis affects the results of a blood alcohol test performed on whole blood by gas chromatography headspace analysis. Rule 11D-8.013 Rule 11D-8.013 governs the issuance of permits to analysts conducting blood alcohol tests, including a requirement that analysts define the method and procedures to be followed in conducting the tests. The Petitioner has asserted that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule does not explicitly require analysts performing a blood alcohol test to identify and/or exclude an “unreliable” blood sample from the testing process. Essentially, the Petitioner argues that samples exhibiting hemolysis or coagulation should not be analyzed for alcohol content. Rule 11D-8.013 provides as follows: Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst. The application for a permit to determine the alcohol level of a blood sample shall be made on a form provided by the Department and shall include the following information: Name and address of applicant; A copy of state license if licensed, or college transcript; Name and address of employer and laboratory facility where applicant performs analyses; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, A complete description of proposed analytical procedure(s) to be used in determining blood alcohol level. Qualifications for blood analyst permit - To qualify, the applicant must meet all of the following requirements: Department approval of analytical procedure(s). All proposed analytical procedures will be reviewed and a determination of approval will be made by the Department; Satisfactory determination of blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Department using the proposed analytical procedure. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing, acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, Meet one of the following: Possess a clinical laboratory license in clinical chemistry as a technologist, supervisor or director, under Chapter 483, F.S.; or Be a licensed physician pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S.; or Complete a minimum of 60 semester credit hours or equivalent of college, at least 15 semester hours of which must be in college chemistry. The department shall approve gas chromatographic analytical procedures and enzymatic analytical procedures based on alcohol dehydrogenase which meet the following requirements: Includes the approved method used and a description of the method, and the equipment, reagents, standards, and controls used; Uses commercially-prepared standards and controls certified by the manufacturer, or laboratory-prepared standards and controls verified using gas chromatography against certified standards. For commercially-prepared standards and controls, the manufacturer, lot number and expiration date must be documented for each sample or group of samples being analyzed. For laboratory-prepared standards and controls, date, person preparing the solution, method of preparation and verification must be documented; A statement of the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range; Uses a new or existing calibration curve. The new calibration curve must be generated using at least three (3) standards: one at 0.05 g/100mL or less, one between 0.05 and 0.20 g/100mL (inclusive) and one at 0.20 g/100mL or higher, and must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher. The existing calibration curve must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher; Includes the analysis of an alcohol- free control, and the analysis of a whole blood or serum control. The whole blood or serum control may be used to satisfy the control requirement(s) in paragraph (d); A gas chromatographic analytical procedure must discriminate between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol and employ an internal standard technique; An enzymatic analytical procedure based on alcohol dehydrogenase must use the procedure recommended by the instrument manufacturer/test kit vendor for whole blood alcohol analysis, and the enzyme used must have sufficient selectivity to provide negligible cross-reactivity towards methanol, acetone and isopropanol. The permit shall be issued by the Department for a specific method and procedure. Any substantial change to the method, analytical procedure, or laboratory facility must receive prior approval by the Department before being used to determine the blood alcohol level of a sample submitted by an agency. The Department shall determine what constitutes a substantial change. An analyst shall only use a Department- approved procedure to determine the blood alcohol level of samples submitted by an agency. Approval of blood alcohol analysis methods and procedures shall be based on rule requirements in effect at the time they were submitted for approval. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3) 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b), (e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. Analysts submit the procedures referenced in the rule in the form of written “standard operating procedures” (SOP) filed with the Respondent. No SOP was admitted into the record of the hearing. As set forth above, the evidence fails to establish that hemolysis affects the results of a blood alcohol test performed on whole blood by gas chromatography headspace analysis. A subsample taken from a sample that exhibits hemolysis contains all of the components present at the time of collection and is whole blood. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that a sample exhibiting hemolysis should be excluded from testing. Notwithstanding the requirement in rule 11D-8.012 that glass evacuation tubes containing a preservative and an anticoagulant be used in the collection process, a collection tube containing a blood sample submitted for testing can, on occasion, include coagulated blood. Coagulation can occur for a variety of reasons, including the type of needle used in the collection process or the failure to mix the sample properly with the anticoagulant contained in the tube. Rule 11D-8.002(15) defines “blood alcohol level” as “the alcohol concentration by weight in a person’s blood based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL).” The entire sample in a collection tube containing a portion of coagulated blood contains all of the components that were present in the “whole blood” of the subject from whom the blood was collected. However, coagulation causes some of the blood components to solidify. Alcohol (ethanol) is water-soluble. Coagulation alters the ratio of liquid to solid in the sample and can increase the concentration of alcohol in the liquid portion of the sample. The evidence fails to establish that the mere presence of coagulation inevitably precludes the withdrawal of a subsample that properly reflects the components of the whole blood contained in the collection tube. Because gas chromatography headspace analysis uses a subsample of the liquid portion of the sample, the accuracy of the blood alcohol level reported by the subsample is related to the degree of coagulation present in the sample.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be issued an air construction permit authorizing its Crystal River steam generating plant Units 1 and 2 to co-fire a five to seven percent blend of petroleum coke with coal.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), is an investor-owned public utility engaged in the sale of electricity to approximately 1.2 million customers. Among others, it operates the Crystal River Power Plant consisting of five electric-generating units in Citrus County, Florida. Units 1, 2, 4, and 5 are coal-fired, while Unit 3 is a nuclear unit. Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DEP), is a state agency charged with the statutory responsibility of regulating the construction and operation of business enterprises in a manner to prevent air pollution in excess of specified limits. Among other things, DEP issues air construction permits for a limited period of time to undertake and evaluate initial operations of a business enterprise; long- term approval subsequently is available under an air operation permit. As a part of this process, and pursuant to federal law, DEP engages in a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) review to determine if non-exempt alterations to major facilities result in net emission increases greater than specified amounts. Under certain conditions, however, the use of alternative fuels or raw materials are exempted from PSD review. Intervenor, Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. (LEAF), is a non-profit Alabama corporation licensed to do business in the State of Florida. It is a public interest advocacy organization whose corporate purposes include securing environmental and health benefits from clean air and water. Intervenor, Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club), is a public interest advocacy organization incorporated in California and doing business in Florida. Its corporate purposes include securing the environmental and health benefits of clean air and water. On December 26, 1995, FPC filed an application with DEP for an air construction permit authorizing it to burn a blend of petroleum coke and coal in its existing coal-fired Units 1 and 2 at the Crystal River Power Plant in Citrus County, Florida. In the application, FPC did not address PSD review since it believed it qualified for an exemption from PSD permitting under Rule 62- 212.400(2)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. That rule exempts from PSD review the [u]se of an alternative fuel or raw material which the facility was capable of accommodating before January 6, 1975, unless such change would be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition which was established after January 6, 1975. After reviewing the application, DEP issued an Intent to Deny on June 25, 1996. In that document, DEP stated that [a]ccording to information in Department files, both Units 1 and 2 operated on liquid fuel prior to January 6, 1975. Very substantial modifications of the boilers and pollution control equipment were implemented thereafter by [FPC] to convert the units to coal-firing mode. Therefore the project does not qualify for the exemption from PSD review claimed by the company. Contending that it was entitled to an exemption from PSD review and therefore a permit, FPC filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on October 4, 1996. In its Petition, FPC generally alleged that petroleum coke is a product with characteristics very similar to coal; Units 1 and 2 were capable of accommodating coal and petroleum coke as of January 6, 1975; and contrary to the statements in the Intent to Deny, any boiler modifications and pollution control improvements to those units were minor and not substantial. The Permitting Program The PSD program is based on similar PSD requirements found in the federal Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended (the Act). The permitting program is a federally required element of DEP's State Implementation Plan (SIP) under Section 110 of the Act. DEP has fulfilled the requirement of administering the federal PSD program by obtaining approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of state PSD regulations that meet the requirements of federal law. The requirements of the SIP are found in Chapters 62-204, 62-210, 62-212, 62-296, and 62-297, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 62-212 contains the preconstruction review requirements for proposed new facilities and modifications to existing facilities. Rule 62-212.400, Florida Administrative Code, establishes the general preconstruction review requirements and specific requirements for emission units subject to PSD review. The provisions of the rule generally apply to the construction or modification of a major stationary source located in an area in which the state ambient air quality standards are being met. Paragraph (2)(c) of the rule identifies certain exemptions from those requirements. More specifically, subparagraph (2)(c)4. provides that a modification that occurs for the following reason shall not be subject to the requirements of the rule: 4. Use of an alternative fuel or raw material which the facility was capable of accommodating before January 6, 1975, unless such change would be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition which was established after January 6, 1975. The rule essentially tracks verbatim the EPA regulation found at 40 CFR 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(e)1. Therefore, in order to qualify for an exemption from PSD review, FPC must use "an alternative fuel . . . which [Units and 2 were] capable of accommodating before January 6, 1975." In addition, FPC must show that "such change would [not] be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition which was established after January 6, 1975." Contrary to assertions by Respondent and Intervenors, in making this showing, there is no implied or explicit requirement in the rule that FPC demonstrate that it had a subjective intent to utilize petroleum coke prior to January 6, 1975. The Application and DEP's Response In its application, FPC proposes to co-fire a five percent (plus or minus two percent) blend of petroleum coke with coal, by weight. It does not propose to make any physical changes to Units 1 and 2 to utilize petroleum coke. Also, it does not request an increase in any permitted air emission rates for the units because it can meet its current limits while burning the proposed blend rate of petroleum coke with coal. The application included extensive fuel analysis and air emissions data obtained from a DEP-authorized petroleum coke trial burn conducted from March 8 until April 4, 1995. Although it is not proposing to make physical changes to the plant, FPC applied for the air construction permit in deference to DEP's interpretation that such a permit is required when a permittee utilizes an alternative fuel. After completing his initial review, the DEP supervisor of the New Source Review program acknowledged in a memorandum to his supervisor that FPC was "entitled to a permit" but suggested that FPC be asked to "change their minds." Before the permit was issued, however, DEP changed its mind and issued an Intent to Deny on the ground that prior to January 6, 1975, Units 1 and 2 were not capable of accommodating coal or a blend of petroleum coke with coal. The Units Unit 1 has a generating capacity of 400 MW and commenced operation as a coal-fired plant in October 1966. It fired coal until March 1970, fuel oil until October 1978, and then again fired coal from June 1979 to the present. Unit 2 has a generating capacity of 500 MW and commenced operations as a coal-fired plant in November 1969. It fired coal until September 1971, fired fuel oil from December 1971 until October 1976, and then again fired coal from December 1976 to the present. Original equipment installed during the initial construction of Units 1 and 2 included the following: the barge unloader, which removes coal from barges that deliver coal from New Orleans; the stacker/reclaimer, which stacks the coal into piles and then reclaims the coal by directing it from the coal piles to conveyors that deliver it to the units; the crusher house, which has two crushers that crush the coal on the way to units down to nuggets no larger than three-quarters of an inch in diameter; the silos, which store the crushed coal; the feeders, located below the silos, which regulate the flow of coal from the silos to the pulverizers; the pulverizers, which grind the coal in preparation for combustion and then direct the pulverized coal to the burners, which are located on the corners of each unit's boiler; and the boilers, where the fuel is combusted, imparting heat to water contained in the waterwalls and thereby producing steam for electrical generation. The foregoing equipment was reflected in the plant's construction specifications and remains in operation, on site, at the plant. Components and parts of this equipment have been maintained, replaced, and repaired periodically. The original operations manual for the barge unloader, stacker/reclaimer, crushers, and conveyor systems are still kept and utilized on site. The primary fuel utilized in Units 1 and 2 is coal, although these units also co-fire from one to five percent number fuel oil and used oil. The combustion of fuel in Units 1 and 2 results in air emissions. As a result of changing regulatory requirements, there have been substantial improvements to the units' air pollution control capabilities since original construction. Existing Air Permits Unit 1 currently operates under Air Operation Permit Number A009-169341. Unit 2 operates under Air Operation Permit Number A-009-191820. Both permits were amended by DEP on October 8, 1996. Although each air operation permit contains an expiration date that has been surpassed, the permits remain in effect under DEP's regulations during the pendency of the agency's review of FPC's applications for air operation permits under the new Title V program found in Chapter 62-213, Florida Administrative Code. The air operation permits governing Units 1 and 2 contain mass emission rate limitations of 0.1 pounds/million (mm) British thermal units (Btu) or particulate matter (PM), and 2.1 pounds/mmBtu for sulfur dioxide. These mass emission rate limitations restrict the amount of each pollutant (measured in pounds) that is to be released into the atmosphere per million Btu of heat energy by burning fuel. The PM limitation is applicable to Units 1 and 2 under state regulations originally promulgated in 1972. The sulfur dioxide limitation was established in 1978 as a result of a PSD air quality analysis performed in conjunction with the permitting of Units 4 and 5. Prior to 1978, sulfur dioxide limits promulgated early in 1975 imposed a limit of 6.17 pounds/mmBtu on coal-fired operations at Units 1 and 2. Because Units 1 and 2 were subjected to a PSD air quality impact analysis along with Units 4 and 5, the units' sulfur dioxide emission limits were reduced from 6.17 to 2.1 pounds/mmBtu. The 2.1 pounds/mmBtu sulfur dioxide emission limitation applicable to Units 1 and 2 was set with the intention of assuring no adverse air quality impacts. The sulfur dioxide impacts associated with Units 1, 2, 4, and 5, after collectively being subjected to PSD air quality review, were much lower than the sulfur dioxide impacts previously associated with only Units 1 and 2. Is Petroleum Coke an Alternative Fuel? Petroleum coke is a by-product of the oil refining process and is produced by many major oil companies. The oil refineries refine the light ends and liquid products of oil to produce gasoline and kerosene, resulting in a solid material that resembles and has the fuel characteristics of coal. Both historically and presently, it has been common- place for electric utilities to rely on petroleum coke as fuel. For example, during the period 1969 through 1974, regular shipments of petroleum coke were sent to various electric utility companies throughout the United States to be co-fired with coal. In addition, DEP has issued permits for Tampa Electric Company to co-fire petroleum coke with coal. In 1987 and again in 1990, the EPA promulgated air- emission regulations which specifically define "coal" as including "petroleum coke." DEP has incorporated these regulations by reference at Rule 62-204.800(7)(b) 3. and 4., Florida Administrative Code. Given these considerations, it is found that petroleum coke constitutes an alternative fuel within the meaning of Rule 62-212.400(4)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. Were the Units Capable of Accommodating the Fuel? Petroleum coke and coal are operationally equivalent. Petroleum coke can be handled, stored, and burned with the existing coal handling equipment at Units 1 and 2. The barge unloader, stacker/reclaimer, storage areas, conveyors, silos, crusher house, pulverizers, and burners, all installed prior to 1975, can handle petroleum coke. The equipment comprising Units 1 and 2 does not require any modification in order to burn a blend of petroleum coke with coal. Also, there will be no net impact on steam generator design or operation, and there will be no decline in performance or adverse impacts to the boilers. FPC could have co-fired petroleum coke with coal historically without making physical alterations or derating the units. Similarly, petroleum coke can be fired in Units 1 and 2 now without alterations or derating. These findings are further supported by Petitioner's Exhibits 35 and 36, which are reference books published in 1948 and 1967 by the manufacturer of the equipment installed at Units 1 and 2. They confirm that prior to 1975, petroleum coke was suitable for the manufacturer's boilers and pulverizers. Unrebutted testimony demonstrated that Units 1 and 2 could have co-fired petroleum coke with oil during the oil-firing period. Even when Units 1 and 2 fired oil instead of coal for a period of time in the 1970s, the coal-handling equipment remained in existence on-site and available for use, and both units remained readily convertible to their original, coal-firing modes. Because the plant remained capable of accommodating coal, it also remained capable of accommodating petroleum coke. In light of the foregoing, it is found that co-firing petroleum coke with coal at Units 1 and 2 could have been accomplished prior to January 6, 1975. Are there Post-January 6, 1975, Prohibitions? There is no evidence to support a finding that a federally enforceable permit condition was establshed after January 6, 1975, that prohibits co-firing petroleum coke with coal. I. Miscellaneous By letters dated February 14 and June 2, 1997, the EPA Region IV office replied to inquiries from DEP regarding the instant application. The conclusions reached in those letters, however, were based on a misapprehension of the facts in this case. Therefore, the undersigned has not credited these letters. To prove up its standing, LEAF introduced into evidence a copy of its articles of incorporation and a brochure describing the organization. In addition, it asserted that the air quality for its members would be "at risk" if Units 1 and 2 did not meet PSD standards and air emissions were "increased." Intervenor Sierra Club proffered that a substantial number of members "live, work, or recreate in the vicinity of the Crystal River Units 1 and 2, and in the area subject to the air emissions by those units," and that those members "would be substantially affected by the proposed exemption."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting the application of Florida Power Corporation and issuing the requested air construction permit. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 James S. Alves, Esquire Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6526 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Gail Kamaras, Esquire 1115 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6327 Jaime Austrich, Esquire Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 F. Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which, on the basis of facts alleged in a First Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent. It is alleged that Respondent violated Section 386.204, Florida Statutes, “by and through Section 386.207(3), Florida Statutes,” by allowing patrons to smoke in an enclosed indoor workplace.
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to the fourteen paragraphs of findings of fact which follow. Petitioner is the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Respondent is Old Cutler Oyster Company, Inc., d/b/a Old Cutler Oyster Company. Respondent holds license number 22-20655, Series 4-COP, issued by Petitioner. Michael Pace is the President of Respondent and holds 100 percent of the stock of Respondent. Lisa Tyrell was the manager and person in charge at Respondent’s licensed premises on July 9, 2003. Ms. Tyrell is currently employed by Respondent as a manager. Ms. Tyrell called Michael Pace on the telephone, then gave the receiver to Fernandez (Special Agent), who explained to Mr. Pace that violations of the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act were occurring on the licensed premises. On July 9, 2003, Special Agent Fernandez issued an Official Notice of Warning to Ms. Tyrell as a result of observing patrons smoking which, he claimed, was in violation of the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act. On August 15, 2003, Special Agent Fernandez issued a Notice to Comply to Mr. Pace and told him that he had thirty days to comply with the notice or administrative charges would be filed. The notice alleged a violation of the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act by “allowing patron to smoke cigarettes on 4-COP SRX licensed premises.” Special Agent Fernandez visited the licensee a third time on September 18, 2003. At all times material hereto, Respondent held a valid retail tobacco products dealer permit issued by Petitioner. At no time did Special Agent Fernandez observe any of Respondent’s employees smoking within Respondent’s business premises. No patron received a citation for violating the Florida Clear Indoor Air Act. On July 9, on August 15, and on September 18 of 2003, Special Agent Fernandez observed patrons smoking tobacco products within Respondent’s licensed premises.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case dismissing the First Amended Administrative Complaint and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") should issue an air construction permit authorizing Oleander Power Project, L.P. ("Oleander"), to build and operate an electrical power plant in Brevard County, Florida, that includes five combustion turbines and two fuel oil storage tanks (the "Project").
Findings Of Fact Oleander seeks an air construction permit to build and operate an electrical power plant in Brevard County, Florida. Oleander provided reasonable assurances that the Project will comply with all of the conditions and emissions limitations prescribed by DEP in the Draft Permit. The Project received adequate review from the state agency responsible for regulating the Project. DEP reviewed Oleander’s application, requested and received additional information concerning the Project, and independently verified the impacts assessments contained in the application. The Project received adequate review from Brevard County. Oleander executed a Stipulated Settlement Agreement with Brevard County (the "Brevard County Agreement") in which Oleander agreed to comply with restrictions concerning the Project’s hours of operation, minimum buffers, noise, odor, vibrations, traffic, and other issues. The Brevard County Agreement provides additional assurances that the Project will not adversely impact the public. Members of the public received adequate notice of the Project and had sufficient opportunity to make public comments. On March 3, 1999, DEP held a public meeting in Brevard County to receive public comments regarding Oleander’s application. On March 26, 1999, DEP issued its Public Notice of DEP’s intent to grant the Draft Permit to Oleander. On April 8, 1999, DEP’s Public Notice was published in Florida Today. On May 13, 1999, DEP held a second public meeting in Brevard County to receive public comments concerning Oleander’s application. Members of the public had an opportunity during the administrative hearing to enter their comments on the record. The Project includes the construction and operation of five 190 megawatt ("MW") combustion turbines that will be used to generate electricity. The Project also includes the construction and use of two fuel oil storage tanks, two water storage tanks, an administrative building, a stormwater management system, and other associated and ancillary facilities. The Project is a "peaking" power plant. It will operate only during times of peak demand caused by hot or cold weather or storm events. The Draft Permit authorizes Oleander to operate the Project’s combustion turbines for a maximum of 3,390 hours per year, or approximately 39 percent of the available hours in a year. During the remainder of the year, the combustion turbines will not operate and will not have any airborne emissions. Based on the historical experience of other peaking power plants in Florida, the combustion turbines are expected to operate less than 800 hours per year. Oleander’s combustion turbines will be the most advanced turbines used in Florida for peaking service. Oleander’s turbines will be more efficient, in terms of emissions and producing power, than the turbines currently used at other peaking plants in Florida. The Project will use General Electric ("GE") Frame 7FA combustion turbines. These turbines are capable of complying with the emission limits and requirements in the Draft Permit. Oleander will hire staff or train their own staff to operate the Project in compliance with the Draft Permit. Oleander’s parent company already has a training program for its plant operators. Oleander has operated similar projects successfully. The primary fuel for the power plant will be natural gas. Natural gas is the cleanest burning of all fossil fuels. In the event that natural gas becomes unavailable, the Draft Permit authorizes use of low sulfur distillate fuel oil ("fuel oil") for the equivalent of 1,000 hours of full-load operations per year. Fuel oil contains a maximum of 0.05 percent sulfur, is 35 to 50 percent more expensive than natural gas, and imposes economic incentives for Oleander to minimize the use of fuel oil. Water needed for the Project will be provided by the City of Cocoa. Oleander will not install any on-site wells to supply water to the Project. All of the wastewater from the Project will be sent by pipeline to the City of Cocoa’s wastewater treatment plant. The Project will not discharge any industrial wastewater on-site. The Project will be built on a site that is located northeast of the intersection of Interstate 95 ("I-95") and State Road ("SR") 520 in unincorporated Brevard County (the "Site"). The Site contains approximately 38 acres of land. The Site is appropriate for use as an electrical power plant. The Site already is zoned for industrial purposes. The surrounding areas are primarily zoned for industrial uses. An existing electrical substation is located on the north side of the Site. An existing electrical transmission line corridor is located on the west side of the Site. Townsend Road is located on the south side of the Site. An existing natural gas pipeline is located nearby, on the west side of I-95, and can provide gas for the Project. Residential, commercial, and industrial development within a three kilometer radius of the Site is minimal. The Project will be compatible with those industrial and commercial land uses that are located in the area near the Site. The closest residential areas are more than 1,400 feet from the Site. The Site is compatible with the closest residential neighborhoods. The Site and adjacent off-Site areas provide a significant buffer to the closest residential areas. The Site can be developed without causing adverse impacts on residential areas. Combustion turbines currently operate at many locations in diverse population centers in Florida. For example, combustion turbines are operated within 800 feet of the Shands Hospital at the University of Florida, within 1,200 feet of Cinderella’s Castle at Disney World’s Magic Kingdom, and near the Lake Worth High School. Combustion turbines also are located near several residential neighborhoods in the state. DEP and Oleander evaluated the Project in accordance with requirements prescribed in DEP’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") program. As part of the PSD review, a determination was made of the Best Available Control Technology ("BACT"). A BACT determination involves a case-by-case analysis of those air pollution control technologies that are feasible and can achieve the maximum emission reductions. A BACT determination also requires an analysis of the costs, environmental impacts, and energy impacts associated with the use of each one of the proposed control technologies. A BACT determination results in the establishment of an emission limit for each pollutant of concern. In this case, DEP determined the appropriate BACT limits for the Project’s emissions of carbon monoxide ("CO"), oxides of nitrogen ("NOx"), sulfur dioxide ("SO2"), sulfuric acid mist ("SAM"), volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"), particulate matter ("PM"), and particulate matter less than ten microns in diameter ("PM10"). (PM and PM10 are referred to herein as "PM/PM10.") BACT emission limits applicable to the Project are set forth in the Draft Permit, and are incorporated by reference in this Recommended Order. DEP determined that when the Project operates on natural gas, BACT for NOx is an emission limit of 9 parts per million ("ppm"), corrected to 15 percent oxygen. This emission limit is based on the use of dry low NOx ("DLN") combustion technology utilized in the combustion turbines included in the Project. The proposed NOx emission limit of 9 ppm is the lowest emission limit in Florida for simple cycle peaking power plants and sets the standard for similar facilities throughout the United States. DEP determined that when the Project operates on fuel oil, BACT for NOx is an emission limit of 42 ppm, corrected to 15 percent oxygen. This emission limit is based on the use of DLN and wet injection technology. Wet injection technology involves the injection of either water or steam directly into the combustor to lower the flame temperature and thereby reduce the formation of NOx. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") provided comments to DEP concerning the Project. In their comments, the USFWS suggested that the NOx emission limit should be 25 ppm when the Project is operating with fuel oil. However, the USFWS’ suggestion was based on the USFWS’ misreading of the provisions of other PSD permits. When read correctly, those permits establish the same NOx emission limit when firing fuel oil that DEP established in this case, i.e., 42 ppm. In its BACT determination, DEP considered whether a selective catalytic reduction ("SCR") system should be used to reduce the Project’s NOx emissions. SCR is an add-on NOx control system in which ammonia is injected into the exhaust gases of a combustion turbine. The exhaust gases are then exposed to a catalyst where the ammonia and the NOx react to form nitrogen and water. SCR does not represent BACT in this case and should not be required for the Project. The use of SCR would impose excessive costs on the Project, adversely impact the Project’s energy efficiency, and cause increased emissions of particulate matter and ammonia. BACT for CO and VOCs is based on the Project’s use of an advanced combustor design, i.e., DLN technology, and good combustion practices. The use of an oxidation catalyst for CO removal is not required because an oxidation catalyst is not cost effective for the Project. BACT for PM/PM10, SO2, and SAM is based on good combustion practices and the use of clean low sulfur fuels. The PSD program establishes separate ambient air quality standards for Class I and Class II areas defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-204.360(4). (Unless otherwise stated, all references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) The Project is located in a Class II area. The Project’s impacts on ambient air concentrations will be below all applicable PSD standards ("increments") prescribed in Rule 62-204.260(2) for Class II areas. The nearest PSD Class I area is the Chassahowitzka Wildlife Refuge (the "Refuge"). The Refuge is approximately 180 kilometers from the Site. An analysis of the Project’s impacts on the Refuge is not required because the Refuge is more than 150 kilometers from the Site. The impacts from the Project on the closest Class I area are expected to be insignificant within the meaning of Rule 62-204.200(29). DEP does not require Oleander to evaluate the cumulative impacts caused by the Project and other major sources of air pollution in the relevant Class II area. However, Oleander evaluated the Project’s impacts together with the impacts of the Florida Power & Light Cape Canaveral Plant, the Orlando Utilities Commission’s Indian River Plant, and the Orlando Utilities Commission’s Stanton Energy Center. The Project itself will not have any measurable effect on the ambient conditions resulting from the operation of all of these sources. DEP has adopted primary and secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards ("AAQS") in accordance with requirements adopted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Primary standards are designed to create an adequate margin of safety for the protection of the public health, including the health of the young, the old, and those with respiratory diseases such as asthma. Secondary standards are designed to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects of air pollution. AAQS are reviewed every five years by scientists and physicians in light of the most recent scientific studies and data. In Brevard County, existing air quality is better than levels allowed under AAQS. Brevard County is classified as an attainment area. Oleander analyzed the Project’s potential impacts on ambient air quality in Brevard County in compliance with the applicable DEP requirements for such an analysis. Oleander’s analysis was based on conservative assumptions intended to over- estimate impacts from the Project. For example, the analysis assumed that the Project would operate continuously throughout the entire year, even though the Project’s annual operations will be limited to a maximum of 3,390 hours. In addition, Oleander assumed that the Project would use fuel oil for the entire year, even though the Project will be limited to firing fuel oil for a maximum of 1,000 hours per year. The Project’s maximum impacts on ambient air quality will be 0.6 percent or less of the applicable AAQS for each criteria pollutant. Oleander's analysis demonstrates a wide margin of safety for public health and welfare. The Project’s maximum potential impacts are less than the EPA "significant impact" levels. Consequently, the Project’s impacts are deemed insignificant from a regulatory perspective, and more detailed analyses of the Project’s impacts on ambient air quality are not required under applicable PSD requirements. The Project is not expected to cause any meaningful impacts on air quality in any neighborhood in Brevard County. In all neighborhoods, the Project’s impacts on air quality will be insignificant. Similarly, the Project’s impacts on soils, vegetation, wildlife, and visibility will be insignificant. The Project also will not cause any significant growth-related air quality impacts. The cumulative impacts from the Project and other sources of air pollution in the area will be insignificant. When all of these sources are considered together, the maximum impact from their combined emissions will be 50 percent or less of the applicable AAQS. The PSD program does not require Oleander to perform any ambient air quality monitoring for any pollutant prior to the time that construction of the Project commences because the Project’s air quality impacts will be less than the applicable DEP de minimis levels. Pre-construction monitoring for ozone is not required unless a facility will have VOC emissions equal to or greater than 100 tons per year. The Project’s maximum potential VOC emissions will be 64 tons per year. Therefore, the Draft Permit does not require Oleander to install any ozone monitors. DEP maintains two ambient air quality monitors in Brevard County to measure ozone concentrations. DEP also has ambient air quality monitors for ozone in Volusia, Seminole, Orange, Osceola, and St. Lucie Counties. The ambient air quality data from DEP monitors demonstrate that the ozone concentrations in Brevard County are below the applicable AAQS. Further, the data demonstrate that ozone is a regional issue because the ozone levels in the region tend to rise and fall at the same time and to the same degree. A requirement for Oleander to install an additional monitor in Brevard County would be unnecessary and unjustified. The impacts from the Project on ozone and other ambient air quality parameters are so small that the impacts could not be measured with an additional monitor. An additional monitor in Brevard County would provide no meaningful benefits when assessing whether Brevard County is meeting the AAQS for ozone and would cost between $75,000 and $100,000 a year to install and operate. Emissions from the Project will not cause any significant impact on the water quality of water bodies in Brevard County. There will be minimal, if any, "fallout" of particles into nearby waters, including the St. Johns and Indian Rivers. The maximum amount of nitrogen that could be deposited annually as a result of airborne NOx emissions from the Project is 0.0007 grams per square meter ("g/m2"). By comparison, the current nitrogen deposition rate from other sources in the area is 0.4 g/m2. Thus, the Project’s impact on nitrogen deposition in the area will be only a fraction of the deposition that is occurring already. Airborne emissions from the Project will not cause or significantly contribute to a violation of any ambient air quality standard or PSD increment. The Project complies with all applicable DEP air quality requirements, including the applicable policies, rules, and statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: DEP enter a final order granting Oleander’s application for an air construction permit for the Project, subject to the conditions and limitations contained in the Draft Permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Office of General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Clarence Rowe 418 Pennsylvania Avenue Rockledge, Florida 32955 David S. Dee, Esquire Landers & Parsons 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. Douglas Beason, Assistant General Counsel Scott A. Goorland, Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Sloan Construction Company, Inc. (Sloan) has applied to the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) for a permit to relocate its drum mix asphalt plant, a source of air emissions, from its current site in Flagler County to Brevard County. The issue in this proceeding is whether that permit should be granted. More specifically, it must be determined whether the proposed activity will meet applicable statutory and regulatory standards. An ancillary issue regarding Respondent, Sloan's entitlement to attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., F.S. is addressed in a separate order entered this same date.
Findings Of Fact Sloan Construction Company, Inc., (Sloan) is a highway contractor doing business in the southeastern United States. It operates asphalt plants in South Carolina and in Florida; in addition to the portable plant at issue here, its Florida plants, permitted by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) are in Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and Orlando. On December 9, 1991, Sloan applied to DER to relocate its portable asphalt plant from Flagler County to Brevard County. The company has a contract with the Florida Department of Transportation for work on I-95 and on A-1-A in Brevard County and needs the plant for that work. This same plant was initially permitted by DER's southwest district office on November 9, 1989 for operation in Highlands County. Pursuant to subsequent permits the plant moved to Lake County in 1990, and to Flagler County in 1991. Each time it was moved, the relevant DER district office reviewed the air pollution impact before granting the permit. The permit will expire in November 1994. A consent order was entered in December 1990 between Sloan and DER regarding violations in May and June 1990. The violations described in the consent order were that visible emissions exceeded 20% opacity, and the metal tanks serving as the scrubber final settling basin were low on water with large amounts of particle flotation. The company paid a fine of $7,750 and made the DER-required changes in its maintenance and operation. The company monitors its own system and makes necessary repairs and improvements when problems are anticipated. When the scrubbers fail to operate properly, they are shut down and fixed. The scrubbers do not involve water discharge as they are a closed circuit system. This permit application is not requesting approval to discharge into the waters of the state. For this permit DER requires annual stack testing to determine whether the plant is meeting air emission limitations for particulates (.04 grains per dry standard cubic foot) and opacity (20%). Sloan retains an engineering consultant, Bottorf and Associates, to conduct those tests. The last stack test, May 1991, indicates that the emissions meet the standards. It is anticipated that this same plant will perform just as well in Brevard County. However, a proposed condition of the new permit is that another stack test be performed within 20 days of commencement of operation, in order to assure that equipment is functioning properly after the move. A condition of the existing permit is that unconfined emissions of particulate matter from vehicular movement, loading, construction or demolition be controlled by paving of traffic areas and the sprinkling of stockpiles with water. Sulphur dioxide is considered to be the pollutant of greatest concern in a facility such as this. Sulphur dioxide is generated from the burning of fuel containing sulphur. The applicant has agreed to reduce sulphur content of its fuel from 1.8% to .5%, and to reduce its sulphur dioxide emission limit from 96 tons per year to 26 tons per year. No DER rule requires air pollution source modelling for an asphalt plant or other minor source (defined as less than 100 tons per year of a single pollutant emission). However, because of the proximity of the proposed facility to the existing Orlando Utilities Commission (OUC) power plant, and public concern about sulphur dioxide emissions in the area, DER air permitting engineer, John Turner, ran SCREEN models to predict the combination of emissions from this proposed facility and other sources in the area. The total projected sulphur dioxide ambient air level from the SCREEN models run by John Turner for the Sloan facility at 26 tons per year included four other local sources, and included a more specific model for the nearby OUC plant, which model considered additional sources. John Turner's modelling yielded 241.63 micrograms/ cubic meter on a 24 hour basis. The ambient air quality standard is 260. John Turner's modelling yielded a conservative estimate, that is, it most likely over-predicted sulphur dioxide levels. The model assumed no reduction in sulphur dioxide from aggregate in asphalt plant dryers; tests actually reflect a 70-89% reduction, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assumes a 50% reduction when no tests are available. The model assumed all sources would be operating 24 hours a day, when they actually operate for a more limited period. Moreover, the model assumed all sources would be operating at the same time at their maximum permitted rates. Turner's assumptions also assumed worst case meteorological conditions, such as wind inversions, that would combine plumes from two sources in opposite directions. In the OUC model used by Turner a worst case sulphur dioxide background of 44 was assumed when the normal background level would be much lower. "Downwash" is the effect of wind hitting a large, generally flat, structure or impediment, rising to go over the top and then dropping---an effect which would cause a pollution plume to drop to the earth more quickly. The County's expert conceded that John Turner's modelling was conducted properly, but criticized the model for failing to consider downwash. John Turner and his supervisor, Allen Zahm, did consider downwash but they suggest that it would lower, not raise, the ambient air level, as downwash tends to retain the concentration closer to the stack. The County's expert stated that he did not know that downwash would actually occur on the site. As provided in the permit conditions, the applicant intends to use "on specification" used oil for fuel. "On-specification" used oil must meet standards not to exceed certain allowable levels for arsenic, cadmium, chromium and other substances. There is no allowable level of PCB; that is, the standard level is zero. The sulphur and heavy metal content of the fuel is monitored through certificates of quality required by DER. Sloan has complied with the permit requirements as to its fuel quality. The proposed site for the facility is in Delespine, north of Cocoa in Brevard County, near Highway U.S. 1 and near the Indian River Lagoon. The plant will be approximately 700 meters southwest of an existing mid-sized power plant, OUC, and approximately a mile northwest of a Florida Power and Light Company power plant. Adjacent to the site is a large residential community, Port St. John, with approximately 18,000 residents. The community has expanded rapidly as a result of the availability of affordable housing, and it includes a mix of elderly citizens and young families with children. The residents are genuinely and sincerely concerned for their health and safety and the character of their neighborhoods. They provided anecdotal testimony of increased respiratory problems and negative environmental impacts which they attribute to the power plants and other industrial uses in the area. They are concerned about increased traffic and problems of evacuation in the event of an emergency. They are worried that the traffic and emissions from the proposed facility will cause special problems for students at the nearby elementary schools. As real and sincere as those concerns are, they do not overcome the substantial evidence presented by the applicant that the proposed permit meets the specific requirements of the responsible state agency. The citizens' concerns are classic land use issues, which through zoning and land use regulation, are the jurisdiction of their local governments.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that the Department grant Sloan's application to amend its operating permit for its asphalt plant (Permit No. 167794) with the change in permit conditions as noticed by the Department (Sloan Ex. #27), and with the condition, as stipulated, that the stack for air emissions from the facility will be 42.5 feet in height above ground level. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Petitioners #92-1801 Thomas Lanham Asst. County Attorney Brevard County Attorney's Office Building C, Suite 346 2725 St. Johns Street Melbourne, FL 32940 #92-1802 Joseph & Katherine Tidwell 4000 Delespine Road Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1803 Carol L. Harris 6040 Gilson Avenue Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1804 Harry S. Rice 931 Galleon Street Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1805 Joseph F. DeBarry 950 Galleon Street Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1806, 92-1807, 92-1813 (Counsel for Port St. John Homeowners Assn., Jessie Fleming, & Don L. Williams) F. Michael Driscoll, Esquire 1530 S. Federal Highway Rockledge, FL 32955 #92-1808 Bea Polk 101 River Park Blvd. Titusville, FL 32780 #92-1809 Russell Harris 6040 Gilson Avenue Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1811 Opal Hall 7655 South U.S. 1 - Lot 17 Titusville, FL 32780 #92-1812 John Ferguson 7020 Song Drive Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1814 First Baptist Church of Port St. John Joseph E. Tidwell 4000 Delespine Road Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1815 David & Rhonda Tidwell 4530 Robert Street Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-1816 Felicia Cardone, et al. 7230 N. U.S. Hwy. 1, #106 Cocoa, FL 32927 #92-2471 James M. Shellenberger, et al. Sunrise Village Condominium 7040 N. U.S. Hwy. 1, Unit #101 Cocoa, FL 32927 Respondents (for Sloan Construction Company, Inc.) F. Alan Cummings, Esquire Michael Riley, Esquire P.O. Box 589 Tallahassee, FL 32302 (for DER) Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire DER-Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary DER-Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel DER-Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2006),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Penansky has been licensed as an A.R.N.P. in Florida, having been issued license number ARNP1302962 in 1982. From 1993 through August 2006, Ms. Penansky was employed as an A.R.N.P. at the Dover Clinic of Suncoast Community Health Centers, Inc. (Suncoast). She was the primary certified nurse midwife at the facility and saw the obstetric/gynecology patients. During 2004, Carmen Laguerra, who was the office manager at the Dover Clinic, smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath at work and observed Ms. Penansky’s hands trembling. A couple of times, Ms. Laguerra observed that Ms. Penansky was having trouble walking at work and would put her hand on the walls to support herself. Ms. Penansky came to work at times with bruises on her arms and face. In the fall of 2004, the coordinator of medical records at the Dover Clinic asked Ms. Laguerra to observe Ms. Penansky in the medical records room. Ms. Laguerra observed Ms. Penansky murmuring to herself. Prior to 2004, Ms. Penansky had demonstrated a quiet demeanor. In 2004, Ms. Laguerra observed a change in Ms. Penansky’s demeanor. Ms. Penansky became more outspoken and opinionated. In 2004, Yolanda Guzman, the supervisor of nurses at the Dover Clinic, noticed the smell of alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and body while at work. Ms. Guzman also noticed that Ms. Penansky’s hands were trembling and that Ms. Penansky’s speech was not clear. Ms. Guzman observed bruises on Ms. Penansky’s arms and face. Ms. Guzman reported her observations to Ms. Laguerra and to Subhakrarao Medidi, M.D., who was the associate medical director at the Dover Clinic. Dr. Medidi smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath one time in 2004. On multiple occasions, he observed Ms. Penansky’s hands shaking. After receiving patient complaints, Dr. Medidi confronted Ms. Penansky about the smell of alcohol. Ms. Penansky denied the use of alcohol, claiming that the smell resulted from the use of mouthwash. Dr. Medidi also recalled one time, in particular, when Ms. Penansky came to work with bruises. George Hammond, the chief administrative officer at Suncoast, met with Ms. Penansky to discuss the observations of employees at the Dover Clinic. Ms. Penansky denied the use of alcohol at work. He directed Ms. Penansky to get a blood- alcohol test. She did as directed, and the result of the test was negative. Mr. Hammond directed Ms. Penansky to contact the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN), which is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Nursing. IPN is an independent program that monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired nurses. IPN oversees random drug screens and provides for the exchange of information between treatment providers, evaluators, and the Department. Ms. Penansky contacted IPN and was referred to Martha E. Brown, M.D., for an evaluation. As part of the evaluation, Ms. Penansky underwent a drug test, which was negative for drugs and alcohol, but was considered dilute. When a drug test is dilute, it usually means that the individual tested consumed a significant amount of fluids prior to the test. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that she averaged drinking almost every day, but had stopped drinking about ten days prior to the evaluation. As a result of abstinence, Ms. Penansky told Dr. Brown that she felt better and was able to stay up later and get up earlier. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that her brother had a problem with alcohol and had not had a drink in 20 years. In a report dated November 8, 2004, Dr. Brown opined that there was suspicion for Ms. Penansky having a substance abuse problem. She recommended that Ms. Penansky enter into an abuse contract with IPN for two years with a one-year review. Ms. Penansky entered into an IPN contract in December 2004. Her participation in the program included random drug screening, joining a support group, attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and being evaluated by her supervisor. During her participation in the program, she was tested for alcohol 17 times, and each time the test was negative. Ms. Penansky completed the program in one year. While Ms. Penansky was participating in the IPN program, employees at Suncoast observed positive changes in her. Ms. Penansky’s appearance and mood improved, and the tremors in her hands disappeared. On July 31, 2006, Ms. Penansky was involved in an automobile accident. As a result of the accident, she sustained some bruises to her body, which were visible to employees at the Dover Clinic. In August 2006, while Ms. Penansky was at work, Ms. Guzman again smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and noticed Ms. Penansky’s hands were shaky, and her speech was not normal. Ms. Laguerra also smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky while Ms. Penansky was at work during the same time period. In August 2006, Dr. Medidi noticed that Ms. Penansky’s hands were shaking again. Ms. Penansky denies that she had alcohol on her breath at work in either 2004 or 2006. However, both Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra testified credibly that they smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and that the smell was different from the smell that would come from the use of mouthwash, which has a medicinal smell. Additionally, Ms. Penansky testified that in 2006 she was not using the mouthwash prior to going to work because she felt that in 2004 her fellow employees had mistaken the smell of the mouthwash for the smell of alcohol. Thus, the smell could not have come from mouthwash in 2006 because Ms. Penansky was not using it. Ms. Penansky commenced a change in her eating habits in which she had lost 50 pounds. In 2006, she was still losing weight, but not at a very rapid pace. At the final hearing, there were some allegations that the odor that Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra smelled was a result of a release of ketones due to Ms. Penansky’s diet. However, the smell caused by ketones is a “sweet smell,” which is different from the smell of alcohol. Another allegation at the final hearing was that the smell could be a result of Ms. Penansky’s periodontal disease, but the smell that would result from a periodontal disease would be different from the smell of alcohol. Neither Ms. Guzman nor Ms. Laguerra had any conflict with Ms. Penansky that would cause them to make false allegations against her. In fact, both Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra were highly complementary of Ms. Penansky’s work, aside from the use of alcohol and the hand tremors. The evidence is clear and convincing that in 2004 and in 2006, Ms. Penansky came to work at the Dover Clinic with alcohol on her breath while she was practicing as the primary midwife at the facility. In August 2006, the observations of Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra were made known to the management at Suncoast. Suncoast elected not to require Ms. Penansky to undergo a drug screening to determine whether she had ingested alcohol. On August 3, 2006, Ms. Penansky was terminated from her position with Suncoast for her use of alcohol and directed to contact IPN. After Ms. Penansky was terminated from Suncoast, she went to work for a private physician. Her employment was uneventful, and she continued in his employ until the Department suspended her license by emergency order. Ms. Penansky did not contact IPN, and Suncoast filed a complaint with the Department. An investigation ensued. The Department required Ms. Penansky to be evaluated. In January 2007, Ms. Penansky was again evaluated by Dr. Brown. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that she had returned to drinking occasionally after she completed her program with IPN, but denied drinking on the job or drinking in large amounts. A drug screen was performed on Ms. Penansky, and the result was negative. Dr. Brown diagnosed Ms. Penansky with alcohol abuse, "rule out alcohol dependency." Credibly, Dr. Brown opined that Ms. Penansky appeared “to be either in denial or minimizing the impact alcohol has had on her life and the problems she has had at work with others smelling alcohol on her breathe [sic] multiple time [sic].” It was Dr. Brown’s opinion that in order for Ms. Penansky to be able to practice with reasonable safety and skill that she should minimally complete an intensive outpatient program and have monitoring through IPN. Ms. Penansky was also evaluated by Raymond A. Johnson, M.D., who came to the conclusion that Ms. Penansky did not have an addiction and alcohol problem. He felt that she was safe to practice nursing without treatment or monitoring by IPN. In his report dated January 22, 2007, he stated that Ms. Penansky used mouthwash multiple times a day because of periodontal disease, and he concluded that the use of the mouthwash was the reason for the smell of alcohol on her breath. His argument loses plausibility based on Ms. Penansky’s testimony at final hearing that she was not using the mouthwash in 2006 prior to going to work so that people would not mistake the smell of mouthwash for the smell of alcohol. Dr. Johnson had a psychological evaluation performed on Ms. Penansky by Nicholas Anthony, Ph.D. In his report, Dr. Anthony stated that Ms. Penansky told him that her brother was no longer allowed to use alcohol because he had been diagnosed with diabetes. Based on Ms. Penansky’s representations, he concluded that she did not have a family history for addiction. Ms. Penansky’s account of her brother’s abstinence differed when she related her family history to Dr. Brown. She did not tell Dr. Brown that her brother had stopped drinking because he was a diabetic. At the final hearing, she did not mention that her brother refrained from drinking because of diabetes. At the final hearing, Ms. Penansky testified: Well, what he [her brother] told me, in fact, what he told the whole family was, at one point he said he just felt like he was drinking too much and decided to stop. That was it. He never said anything about being an alcoholic. He never said he was diagnosed by a physician. He made a personal choice. Dr. Anthony tested Ms. Penansky using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI), The Rorschach, and the Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI). The Rorschach, otherwise known as the “ink blot” test, is not commonly used in the field of addiction psychiatry to look at substance abuse diagnoses. In the field of psychiatry, alcohol abuse and alcohol dependency are considered Axis I, or primary, diagnoses. The MMPI and the MCMI are more accurate and effective in diagnosing other Axis I disorders such as psychosis than in diagnosing substance abuse or dependency. This is due to the fact that individuals with substance abuse or dependency problems often attempt to present themselves in the best possible light when answering the test questions. The test results themselves for these individuals are often invalid because the test either misses the substance abuse or dependency diagnosis or identifies the individual’s denial or minimization tendencies. The Adult Clinical Interpretive Report for Ms. Penansky’s MMPI test states: [Ms. Penansky] approached the test items in a somewhat defensive manner. Her overcautious approach to the items suggests that she is concerned with making a good impression and is reluctant to disclose much about her personal adjustment. Interpretations of the clinical and content scale profiles should allow for her possible minimization of problems. The Adult Clinical Interpretive Report for Ms. Penansky’s MCMI test states: Unless this patient is a well-functioning adult who is facing minor life stressors, her responses suggest an effort to present a socially acceptable appearance or a resistance to admitting personal shortcomings. Inclined to view psychological problems as a sign of emotional or moral weakness, the patient may protectively deny any unseemly traits or symptoms. This probably reflects either a broad-based concern about being appraised unfavorably by others or an active suspicion of the arcane motives of psychological inquiry. Her MCMI-II scores have been adjusted to compensate for her defensiveness, but the overall profile may remain partially distorted. An interpretation based on standard interpretive procedures is likely to be reasonably valid but may fail to represent certain features of either the patient’s disorders or her character. The BR scores reported for this individual have been modified to account for the defensiveness suggested by the prominence of Personality Patterns Scale 7 (Compulsive). Dr. Anthony interpreted the results of Ms. Penansky’s test scores as being negative for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependency. Dr. Johnson relied on Dr. Anthony’s interpretation of test results in forming his opinion that Ms. Penansky was negative for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependency. Dr. Brown reviewed the Adult Clinical Interpretive Reports of the MMPI and the MCMI performed on Ms. Penansky by Dr. Anthony and opined that the tests are bordering on invalid and that, given Ms. Penansky’s defensiveness on the test in answering questions, she would not use the test results as a total basis for concluding that Ms. Penansky did not have a problem with alcohol. Given Dr. Johnson’s reliance on the use of mouthwash as the explanation for the smell on alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath, the lack of credibility in Ms. Penansky’s account of her family history, and the defensive answers given by Ms. Penansky on her psychological testing, Dr. Johnson’s opinion concerning Ms. Penansky’s alcohol abuse lacks credibility. Current and former employees of Suncoast highly regarded Ms. Penansky’s work. Her evaluations were very good. She worked very hard, and the quality of her work was excellent. However, alcohol abuse can affect a nurse’s judgment and ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. Alcohol may slow concentration and thinking and thereby cause a nurse to miss a diagnosis or symptom while treating a patient. Alcohol abuse may cause tremors, such as those experienced by Ms. Penansky. Although Ms. Penansky’s alcohol abuse may not have resulted in patient harm, it does not mean that it will not result in harm in the future. It is not necessary to wait for a patient to be harmed to determine whether a nurse can practice with reasonable skill and safety by reason of use of alcohol.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that B.J. Penansky, A.R.N.P., violated Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $250; requiring her to undergo an IPN evaluation; suspending her license until such time as she undergoes an IPN evaluation; requiring compliance with all IPN recommendations, if any; and placing her on probation for three years with direct supervision. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed as an Installer A-Installation, Service and Repair of LP Gas Appliances and Equipment in the state of Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was an Independent Contractor working for Peoples Gas Systems, Inc. (Peoples Gas) pursuant to an Agreement For Contracted Work dated April 16, 1990, executed by the Respondent and Peoples Gas on May 9, 1990. Under this agreement the work to be performed by the Respondent, among other things, was to turn on gas for customers of Peoples Gas using procedures found in Peoples Gas Safe Job Procedure Manual. On January 31, 1991 in accordance with the above referenced agreement, and pursuant to a written work order from Peoples Gas, Respondent proceeded to the residence of Steven J. and Debra J. Fernaays, Jr. located at 4336 20th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida for the purpose of conducting a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LP Gas) service which consisted of turning the gas on at the residence. The gas had been turned off by Peoples Gas in August 1990 at the request of the previous owners. Upon arriving at the Fernaays' residence at 2:15 p.m. the Respondent: (a) determined what gas appliances were in the home; (b) determined that all gas valves to the stove burners and oven were closed and that the stove had no pilot lights (stove had electronic ignition); (c) determined that the gas valve to the water heater was closed; (d) determined that the main valve on the outside tank was closed (at this point it was discovered that there was no test-tee located in back of the regulator for use in performing the manometer test); (e) loosened the nut on the first coupling to the rear of the regulator to remove the bonnet (a bonnet is a plug-like device used to prevent gas from escaping a tank after a "turn-off"). There was no bonnet in place so the nut was retightened on the coupling; (f) turned on the gas by opening the main valve and heard the system "lock-up", but did not hear the regulator "singing" (which indicates that the system is filled with gas and there are no noticeable gas leaks in the system); (g) attempted to light the burners on the stove but could not because there was no gas getting to the stove, so the stove burners were turned off and the main valve at the tank was turned off; (h) followed the gas line from the tank checking each coupling until the bonnet was located and removed, retightened all couplings that had been loosened; (i) turned the gas back on at the tank, heard the system "lock-up" but did not hear the regulator singing. Checked all couplings around the tank, those on the lines going to the house and inside the house up to the water heater for leaks with soapy water but no leaks were found; (j) lit the pilot light and main burner on water heater and found the flame height and color to be normal which indicated proper gas pressure at water heater; (k) checked the balance of fittings inside the house that were visible for leaks with soapy water but found no leaks; (l) lit all stove burners and oven and found flame height and color to be normal which indicated proper gas pressure at the stove; (m) advised Debra Fernaays, who was present in the house during the "turn-on", that the control knob on the oven valve was missing and that she should not use oven until it was replaced. Also, brought Debra Fernaays' attention to the odor of the gas that had escaped while purging the lines of air so she could recognize the odor of the gas in the event of a leak and; (n) went outside to write ticket. After clearing nose of gas odor came back in the house to make a "sniff-test" but did not detect any odor of gas. The Respondent then left the Fernaays' residence at approximately 3:00 p.m. Within a few minutes (4-5) of leaving the Fernaays' residence, Respondent contacted Peoples Gas to advise the service department that he had not performed the water manometer test on the gas system at the Fernaays residence because there was no test tee. Respondent was placed on hold and because the telephone was not covered and there was a hard rain, he hung-up. Respondent then proceeded to find another telephone out of the rain which took approximately 20-30 minutes. This time Respondent was put through to Robert Louth, Service Manager Supervisor thereupon Respondent explained what he had done to check the gas system at the Fernaays but had not performed the water manometer test because of the missing test-tee, and asked for instructions. Louth advised Respondent that the matter would be taken care of the next morning. The telephone conversation between Louth and Respondent occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 31, 1991 and at approximately 6:30 p.m. that same day the Fernaays' residence was destroyed by an explosion as a result of gas leaking from the system and being ignited. The Fernaays were in the home at the time of the explosion and both suffered burns to their bodies as a result of the explosion. The Respondent always carried two manometers in his service truck and had those manometers with him when he arrived at the Fernaays' residence on January 31, 1991 but because the type work Respondent had contracted for with Peoples Gas did not require him to carry extra fittings, such as a test tee, he did not have a test tee with him on that day. This was the first instance that Respondent could remember where he did not perform a manometer test in connection with numerous turn-ons for Peoples Gas. The procedures used by the Respondent in turning on the gas at the Fernaays's residence on January 31, 1991 was in accordance with the Peoples Gas Safe Job Procedural Manual. The method used by the Respondent to check for gas leaks in the Fernaays' gas system is not as accurate as the manometer test for testing a gas system for gas leaks, particularly where small or minor leaks are concerned. However, the Respondent's method is an acceptable and appropriate method that is acceptable within the industry just as the test described in Appendix D, b.(2), Suggested Method For Checking Leakage, of NFPA No. 54, 1988 edition adopted by Rule 4B-1.001, Florida Administrative Code, and incorporated by reference in Rule 4B-1.023, Florida Administrative Code, which is also not as accurate as the manometer test described in Appendix D, b.(1), NFPA No. 54, 1988 edition where there may be small or minor leaks but it is a suggested method under the rule for checking gas leakage. During the evening of January 31, 1991 after the explosion and again during the day of February 1, 1991, Martin Brett employed by the Department as an LP Gas Inspector, several employees from Peoples Gas (Department has filed an Administrative Complaint against Peoples Gas in this matter) and Bill Buckley, owner S.E.A., Inc. were involved in rummaging through the debris at the site of the Fernaays' residence and extracting the different parts of Fernaays' gas system, particularly the piping, which was ultimately delivered to the S.E.A. warehouse by either S.E.A. or Peoples Gas. After delivery of the pipe to the S.E.A. warehouse, S.E.A. attempted to reconstruct the configuration of the pipe lines as they existed before the explosion. Under this reconstructed configuration there was a gas pipe line of approximately 1/2 inch in diameter that terminated in either the closet or in the ceiling of the area around the closet that was not capped. It was the Department's contention, based on the reconstructed configuration, that this pipe was uncapped at the time of turn-on by Respondent and that it was the gas leaking from this uncapped line that eventually ignited and destroyed the Fernaays' home. There was insufficient evidence to show that Brett or anyone from the Department exercised any control over the removal, transporting, storing or reconstruction of the configuration of the pipe. Neither Bill Buckley as an individual or as the owner of S.E.A. nor the employees of Peoples Gas were working for the Department in regard to removing, transporting, storing or reconstructing the pipe. None of the employees of Peoples Gas, Bill Buckley or Martin Brett testified at the hearing in regard to the removal, transporting, storing or reconstructing the pipe. The only witness called by the Department to testify was Edgar Lee Martin, Jr., employed by the Department as an LP Gas Inspector/Supervisor, who did not become involved in the investigation until February 5, 1991, which was after the removal, transporting, storing and reconstruction of the pipe had been completed. Martin relied solely on what he heard from Brett and Buckley in reaching the conclusion that there was an uncapped gas line pipe in the Fernaays' gas system on January 31, 1991 at the time of the turn-on, and it was gas leaking from the uncapped pipe that ignited and destroyed the Fernaays' home. Roger Owens, the Respondent's expert witness in the area of analysis of explosions caused by gas, opined that assuming there was a "lock-up" of the system and no singing of the regulator after the "lock-up" at the time Respondent turned on the gas at the Fernaays on January 31, 1991 and that the flames were of proper height when the stove burners and water heater were lit, there could not have been such a significant leak (open pipe 1/2 inch diameter) at the time of the turn-on by Respondents as alleged by the Department. There was insufficient evidence to show that the configuration of the gas lines as reconstructed by S.E.A., Inc. was of the same configuration as existed in the Fernaays' gas system on January 31, 1991 at the time Respondent turned on the gas at the Fernaays' residence. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to show that there were any fittings within the gas line configuration as existed in the Fernaays gas system on January 31, 1991 that Respondent failed to check for leaks. There was insufficient evidence to show that there was an open fitting in the Fernaays' gas system at the time Respondent turned on the gas on January 31, 1991 as indicated by the reconstructed configuration of the gas lines by S.E.A., and as alleged by the Department. The uncontroverted testimony of Respondent that when he turned the gas on for the second and last time he heard the system "lock-up", and although close enough to hear the regulator "sing", did not hear the regulator sing is credible. This testimony along with the testimony of Roger Owens supports the position that there was no leaks in the system at the time Respondent turned the gas on at the Fernaays' residence on January 31, 1991, and specifically no open fitting of approximately 1/2 inch in diameter in the system as alleged by the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint against the Respondent, Norman J. Smith. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following contributes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120- 59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Other than that the Respondent did not perform a manometer test which is adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 8, proposed finding of fact 3 is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6 except for that portion concerning an "uncapped pipe" which is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence is the record. Not stated as a finding of fact but what the expert witness testified to, however, see Findings of Fact 4, 10 and 17. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Respondent's proposed finding of fact are set out in unnumbered paragraphs which shall be referred in this Appendix as numbers 1 through 19. Covered in the Preliminary Statement, otherwise unnecessary as it goes to the credibility of the witness rather than being a finding of fact. - 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. 7. - 8. More of an argument than a finding of fact, otherwise subordinate, or unnecessary, or not material or relevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 7 and 8. - 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. 16. - 17. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Not stated as a finding of fact by what Martin testified to, otherwise unnecessary or subordinate or not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Zala L. Forizs, Esquire Blasingam, Forizs & Smiljanich, P.A. P.O. Box 1259 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is in violation of section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2020),1 by being unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety; and, if so, the appropriate penalty. 1 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2020 version of the Florida Statutes. See McClosky v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 115 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)(stating that a proceeding is governed by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the acts alleged to constitute a violation of law).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the entire record of this proceeding, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department of Health, Board of Nursing, is the state agency charged with regulating nursing in the State of Florida, pursuant to chapters 456 and 464, Florida Statutes. Mr. Kemp is a combat veteran who participated in Operation Desert Storm. In 2004 or 2005, he earned a nursing degree from Virginia College and became licensed in the State of Florida as a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”). Mr. Kemp suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety, and depression. Three or four years ago, Mr. Kemp participated in an outpatient, substance abuse treatment program in Gulf Breeze, Florida. He successfully completed the program but was diagnosed with alcohol abuse disorder. During the Summer of 2020, Mr. Kemp was employed as the Assistant Director of Nursing at a healthcare facility called The Waterford at Creekside (“Creekside”). Belinda Kaye Bass was Creekside’s Director of Nursing and had known Mr. Kemp for approximately 10 years due to previously working with him at Southern Oaks Nursing Home. On approximately Tuesday, June 30, 2020, Mr. Kemp called Ms. Bass to tell her that he was having issues with his father. Mr. Kemp did not report for work the next day, and Ms. Bass became concerned when she was unable to reach him by telephone.3 Because she was already scheduled to leave Creekside’s campus for business purposes on July 2, 2020, Ms. Bass decided to visit Mr. Kemp’s home that morning in order to check on him. Mr. Kemp was at home that morning and had been drinking liquor prior to Ms. Bass’s arrival. At some point during her visit, she was alone in a room of the house and noticed a box containing a bottle of morphine on the floor. Upon picking it up, she discovered that the morphine belonged to a Creekside resident. When Mr. Kemp returned to the room, Ms. Bass asked him about the morphine, and he responded by telling her to leave and accused her of attempting to set him up. Ms. Bass thought that Mr. Kemp was acting paranoid and seemed impaired.4 Ms. Bass returned the morphine to Creekside and called the police. The seal on the morphine bottle was intact, and the police declined to pursue charges against Mr. Kemp. Creekside fired Mr. Kemp on July 3, 2020, for “gross misconduct.” Pursuant to its authority under section 464.018(1)(j), the Department ordered Mr. Kemp to undergo an evaluation of his mental and physical condition.5 Part of that evaluation was a phosphatidyl ethanol (“PEth”) test 3 Mr. Kemp testified that he had told an unidentified person in authority at Creekside on approximately June 30, 2020, that he was resigning because his workload was excessive. Ms. Bass was unaware of Mr. Kemp’s resignation, and her testimony on this point is credited. 4 Mr. Kemp denied that Ms. Bass found a resident’s medication in his home and asserted that Ms. Bass and his ex-wife were conspiring against him. Mr. Kemp’s testimony on this point is not credited. 5 Section 464.018(1)(j) subjects LPNs to discipline for “[b]eing unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or chemicals or any other type of material or as a result of any mental or physical condition. In enforcing this paragraph, the department shall have, upon a finding of the State Surgeon General or the State Surgeon General’s designee that probable cause exists to believe that the nurse is unable to practice nursing because of the reasons stated in this paragraph, the authority to issue an order to compel a nurse to submit to a mental or physical examination by physicians designated by the department. If the nurse refuses to comply with such order, the department’s order directing such examination may be enforced by filing a petition for enforcement in the circuit court where the nurse resides or does business.” of Mr. Kemp’s blood. PEth levels are used to determine if someone drinks heavily or engages in binge drinking. A “normal” or “healthy” PEth level is 20 nanograms per milliliter. Mr. Kemp’s blood contained 317 nanograms per milliliter, and that amount is 15 to 16 times what is considered to be a healthy level. Mr. Kemp’s evaluation also consisted of a two-hour assessment by Dr. Jordan Iserman6 on November 2, 2020. Dr. Iserman considered Mr. Kemp’s PEth test result to be an indication of “pretty serious heavy binge drinking.”7 Dr. Iserman also evaluated Mr. Kemp based on the criteria for severe alcohol use disorder set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fifth Edition (“the DSM-5”).8 If a person satisfies at least two of the 11 criteria set forth in the DSM-5, then that person is thought to suffer from severe alcohol use disorder. Dr. Iserman thought that several of the DSM-5 criteria applied to Mr. Kemp, but two seemed particularly applicable to Mr. Kemp. For example, the DSM-5 indicates that one sign of severe alcohol use disorder is that the person in question has given up important social, occupational, or recreational activities. Dr. Iserman believes that criterion applies to Mr. Kemp because he was “more than comfortable just deciding he wasn’t going back to work.” Also, rather than giving Creekside a two weeks’ notice, he just stopped coming to work. 6 Dr. Iserman is licensed to practice medicine in Florida and is a board-certified psychiatrist and addictionologist. He has been qualified to render opinions regarding addiction medicine in at least 50 other legal proceedings, and the undersigned found him to be qualified to render opinion testimony regarding addiction medicine and related disorders. 7 In addition, a test of Mr. Kemp’s hair indicated that he had been using marijuana. 8 Using the criteria set forth in the DSM-5 to diagnose severe alcohol disorder is an accepted practice in addiction medicine. The DSM-5 also identifies “tolerance” as an indicator of severe alcohol use disorder. In other words, someone with an alcohol use disorder requires markedly increased amounts of alcohol in order to achieve intoxication. Dr. Iserman believes this criterion applies to Mr. Kemp because his PEth test indicated he has a high tolerance for alcohol. As for why someone with depression, PTSD, and severe alcohol use disorder would be unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety, Dr. Iserman explained that alcohol use disorder exacerbates the symptoms of PTSD: Well, actually when you talk about someone with post-traumatic stress disorder, that is a very troubling syndrome whereby the person is continuously revisited by traumatic, sometimes near-death experiences, that have transpired in the past or they had seen a loved one shot and killed in front of them, something tremendous like that. And these people have terrible problems resting, sleeping, they become emotionally numb, they don’t want to have anything to do with people. And so clearly, and many times what they will reach for first is some alcohol because that’s going to numb them up. All right? But that only makes the depression and the anxiety from the post-traumatic stress disorder worse because the hallmark symptom of alcohol withdrawal is anxiety. So you’re sort of – it’s a downward spiral here with one acting on the other, each one acting on the other, to make them both worse. As for how alcohol use disorder affects someone suffering from depression, Dr. Iserman explained that: if you’re already depressed and then you’re drinking alcohol, you’re only – you can only expect that you’re going to intensify the level of depression that you had previously. And you know, does that push a person to the point where they – they’re not in their right mind and they decide to blow their brains out or drive their car into a tree or whatever it is? Certainly could. Dr. Iserman also described how severe alcohol use disorder and depression can impact an LPN’s ability to safety administer medication to patients: Well, if you go back to, you know, how alcohol impairs a [person’s] coordination, focus, and everything like that, I mean, LPNs are passing out medications to different individuals, some of them with morphine and things like that. They could very easily make a medication error and give the wrong person someone else’s medication which could have very serious if not lethal effects on the person that they gave it to by mistake. And it clearly would impair their ability to think clearly, focus, concentrate, not to mention the physical repercussions. * * * Well, if depression is – again, if it’s controlled, then they should be able to perform their chosen profession. Okay? If it’s not, depressed people don’t have a lot of motivation, they don’t have a whole lot of – it can affect them cognitively, emotionally, physically. It will totally destroy motivation, willingness to be [sic] significantly focused in on what it is that they’re supposed to do. They don’t have the motivation. They don’t have the energy. They don’t have [the] oomp to, you know, exert that type of energy. In sum, Dr. Iserman opined that Mr. Kemp is unable to practice nursing with a reasonable degree of skill and safety. Mr. Kemp testified that he has substantially curtailed his alcohol consumption since the PEth test described above. He asserts that he stopped drinking liquor in February or March of 2021 and has since restricted his alcohol consumption to 32 ounces of beer three or four days a week. As for why he supposedly made this change, Mr. Kemp explained that: I was going through a lot, and I noticed that I was drinking a little too much. I was a caregiver for my mom. My mom had passed, my nephew had passed. So, yeah – and I was going through a divorce. So yeah, I noticed that I was drinking too heavy and I talked to some of my family members, and they told me that I need[ed] to slow it down, and that’s what I did. Mr. Kemp’s assertions that he has curtailed his alcohol consumption and restricted himself to beer did not change Dr. Iserman’s opinion that Mr. Kemp is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety: A: Well, because as I indicated before, it doesn’t really make any difference about, you know, what the source of the alcohol is. If he says all I’m drinking is beer, well, how much beer is he drinking? Okay? And, you know, I suppose you could go back and do another PEth test, but the fact remains that the behavior hasn’t changed. Okay? I mean, this is not an individual, number one, who sees himself as having a problem and so, therefore – you know, that’s the great thing about substance abuse, denial. I didn’t do that. I don’t have a problem. You know, [why] are you coming at me with this stuff? Okay? It allows them to basically continue to go ahead, you know, act out, you know, mistreat[ing] other people plus themselves, or whatever it is that they do, and basically not be bothered by it all. And if they’re in denial, they’re not going to do anything about it. Q: In your experience, do people with alcohol abuse disorder tend to minimize their reports of how much alcohol they drink? A: Oh, routinely. Q: Okay. At his deposition, Mr. Kemp stated that he drinks a quart of beer at a time three to four times a week. If Mr. Kemp’s reports are true, would your opinion that Mr. Kemp is not able to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients change? A: No. Q: Why not? A: Well, again, I would say using myself as an example, I know that if I put away a quart of beer three to four times a week, I would not be doing very well. Any by the way, there’s an unwritten rule, if you talk to somebody and you ask them how [much] they drink – now, this is not scientific, and I can’t show it to you in a book. It goes with, you know, experience with this stuff. Whatever [a] person tells you that they drink, double it and you might be at the lower end of what they’re really doing. Mr. Kemp underwent additional testing on June 15, 2021, and a second PEth test returned a result of 243 nanograms per milliliter. That result and other results (or lack thereof) from a second round of testing also had no impact on Dr. Iserman’s opinion regarding Mr. Kemp’s ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety: Q: Based on Mr. Kemp’s [second] PEth test results, has your opinion that Mr. Kemp is not able to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients changed? A: No. Q: Is the PEth test result consistent with someone who drinks a quart of beer three to four times a week? A: I’m thinking he’s drinking more than that. Q: Did – you mentioned that Mr. Kemp also tested positive for an ETG test; is that correct? A: Ethyl glucuronide. And actually, when we did the original hair test, he came up positive for marijuana. Now, when we sent him back for the updated PEth test and the urinalysis, we also sent [him] back for another hair test. He arrived there freshly shaven, so there was no hair to test. However, we also have what are called nail tests. Okay? And they can sometimes trace these things back even further. Mr. Kemp refused that test. Q: Okay. And what does that indicate to you? A: Well, it would indicate that if I had nothing to hide or anything to be concerned about, you know, my fingernails will grow back. I don’t know why I would refuse that test. * * * Q: Did [Mr. Kemp] take a urinalysis on June 15, 2021 as well? A: Yes. Q: And was that positive? A: For ethyl glucuronide, yes. * * * Q: Does it show – does it tell you how – when the last time someone consumed alcohol? A: Unlike the phosphatidyl ethanol, the hair testing, the nail testing, and things like that which can go back – nails can go back sometimes almost a year, okay, but ethyl glucuronide does not hang around that long. It is probably going to be gone I would say within a week. Q: So that positive test would mean that Mr. Kemp had consumed alcohol in the last week, for instance? A: Recently. I mean, he would have to have had something recently. As for a treatment recommendation, Dr. Iserman would refer Mr. Kemp to the Interventional Project for Nurses (“IPN”), which could lead to an in-patient treatment program of at least 30 days. After completion of such a program, Dr. Iserman would recommended toxicology monitoring, peer meetings such as those in a 12-step program, psychiatric treatment, and participation in a nurses’ support group. The findings set forth above amount to clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Kemp is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Amanda M. Godbey, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Walter Lindsey Kemp, Jr., pro se 855 Limoges Way Pensacola, Florida 32505
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order: (a) finding Walter Lindsey Kemp, Jr., L.P.N. violated section 464.018(1)(j); (b) imposing a $250 fine; and (c) suspending Mr. Kemp’s licensed practical nursing license until such time that he enters into a monitoring contract with IPN and complies with any and all terms and conditions imposed by IPN.9 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2021. Amanda M. Godbey, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Kristen M. Summers, Esquire Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Walter Lindsey Kemp, Jr. 855 Limoges Way Pensacola, Florida 32505 Deborah McKeen, BS, CD-LPN Department of Health Bin D-02 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Department of Health, Board of Nursing 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 9 Section 456.072(4) provides that “[i]n addition to any other discipline imposed through final order, or citation, entered on or after July 1, 2001, under this section or discipline imposed through final order, or citation, entered on or after July 1, 2001, for a violation of any practice act, the board, or the department when there is no board, shall assess costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case.”
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.011, 1D-8.012, 11D-8.013, and 11D-8.014 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: FDLE is the state agency responsible for the regulation of blood analysts who conduct blood testing for purposes of the driving and boating under the influence and related provisions of Chapters 316, 322, and 327, Florida Statutes. § 316.1932(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Among FDLE's enumerated powers under the Alcohol Testing Program (the "program") are the authority to approve the "type" of blood test utilized and the authority to "specify techniques and methods" for blood testing utilized under the driving and boating under the influence and related provisions of Chapters 316, 322, and 327, Florida Statutes. § 316.1932(1)(a)2.n., and o., Fla. Stat. Petitioner, William Lane, has been charged with DUI manslaughter and is awaiting trial on that charge in the 18th Judicial Circuit, in and for Brevard County, Florida. Petitioner was subjected to a blood alcohol test that purported to be conducted in compliance with Sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes. FDLE has not contested the standing of Petitioner to initiate this proceeding. Petitioner has challenged Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.011, 11D-8.012, 11D-8.013, and 11D-8.014 as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.1 Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.011 provides: 11D-8.011 Approval of Blood Alcohol Test Methods. The Department approves the following test methods for determining blood alcohol level: Alcohol Dehydrogenase (Enzymatic). Gas Chromatography. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10-31-93. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.012 provides: 11D-8.012 Blood Samples - Labeling and Collection. Before collecting a sample of blood, the skin puncture area must be cleansed with an antiseptic that does not contain alcohol. Blood samples must be collected in a glass evacuation tube that contains a preservative such as sodium fluoride and an anticoagulant such as potassium oxalate or EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid). Compliance with this section can be established by the stopper or label on the collection tube, documentation from the manufacturer or distributor, or other evidence. Immediately after collection, the tube must be inverted several times to mix the blood with the preservative and anticoagulant. Blood collection tubes must be labeled with the following information: name of person tested, date and time sample was collected, and initials of the person who collected the sample. Blood samples need not be refrigerated if submitted for analysis within seven (7) days of collection, or during transportation, examination or analysis. Blood samples must be otherwise refrigerated, except that refrigeration is not required subsequent to the initial analysis. Blood samples must be hand-delivered or mailed for initial analysis within thirty days of collection, and must be initially analyzed within sixty days of receipt by the facility conducting the analysis. Blood samples which are not hand-delivered must be sent by priority mail, overnight delivery service, or other equivalent delivery service. Notwithstanding any requirements in Chapter 11D-8, F.A.C., any blood analysis results obtained, if proved to be reliable, shall be acceptable as a valid blood alcohol level. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10-31-93, Amended 7-29-01. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013 provides: 11D-8.013 Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst. The application for a permit to determine the alcohol level of a blood sample shall be made on a form provided by the Department and shall include the following information: Name and address of applicant; A copy of state license if licensed, or college transcript; Name and address of employer and laboratory facility where applicant performs analyses; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, A complete description of proposed analytical procedure(s) to be used in determining blood alcohol level. Qualifications for blood analyst permit - To qualify, the applicant must meet all of the following requirements: Department approval of analytical procedure(s). All proposed analytical procedures will be reviewed and a determination of approval will be made by the Department; Satisfactory determination of blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Department using the proposed analytical procedure. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing, acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, Meet one of the following: Possess a clinical laboratory license in clinical chemistry as a technologist, supervisor or director, under Chapter 483, F.S.; or Be a licensed physician pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S.; or Complete a minimum of 60 semester credit hours or equivalent of college, at least 15 semester hours of which must be in college chemistry. The department shall approve gas chromatographic analytical procedures and enzymatic analytical procedures based on alcohol dehydrogenase which meet the following requirements: Includes the approved method used and a description of the method, and the equipment, reagents, standards, and controls used; Uses commercially-prepared standards and controls certified by the manufacturer, or laboratory-prepared standards and controls verified using gas chromatography against certified standards. For commercially-prepared standards and controls, the manufacturer, lot number and expiration date must be documented for each sample or group of samples being analyzed. For laboratory-prepared standards and controls, date, person preparing the solution, method of preparation and verification must be documented; A statement of the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range; Uses a new or existing calibration curve. The new calibration curve must be generated using at least three (3) standards: one at 0.05 g/100mL or less, one between 0.05 and 0.20 g/100mL (inclusive) and one at 0.20 g/100mL or higher, and must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher. The existing calibration curve must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher; Includes the analysis of an alcohol- free control, and the analysis of a whole blood or serum control. The whole blood or serum control may be used to satisfy the control requirement(s) in paragraph (d); A gas chromatographic analytical procedure must discriminate between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol and employ an internal standard technique; An enzymatic analytical procedure based on alcohol dehydrogenase must use the procedure recommended by the instrument manufacturer/test kit vendor for whole blood alcohol analysis, and the enzyme used must have sufficient selectivity to provide negligible cross-reactivity towards methanol, acetone and isopropanol. The permit shall be issued by the Department for a specific method and procedure. Any substantial change to the method, analytical procedure, or laboratory facility must receive prior approval by the Department before being used to determine the blood alcohol level of a sample submitted by an agency. The Department shall determine what constitutes a substantial change. An analyst shall only use a Department- approved procedure to determine the blood alcohol level of samples submitted by an agency. Approval of blood alcohol analysis methods and procedures shall be based on rule requirements in effect at the time they were submitted for approval. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3) 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b), (e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10- 31-93, Amended 4-1-94, 2-1-95, 1-1-97, 11-5- 02, 12-9-04. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.014 provides: 11D-8.014 Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst: Renewal. Permits to conduct blood alcohol analyses shall remain valid until otherwise suspended or revoked by the Department. In order to remain qualified for such permit, an analyst must satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level of at least two (2) proficiency samples provided by the Department each annual quarter. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories. An analyst, who is in good standing, may elect to not participate in one proficiency test cycle each calendar year. The analyst must notify the Department in writing, of his/her election prior to the date the proficiency test results must be reported to the Department. Upon notification by the Department that an analyst has failed to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level on any set of proficiency samples, the analyst shall be required to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level of a second set of five proficiency samples provided by the Department. Upon notification by the Department that an analyst has failed to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level on a second set of proficiency samples, the analyst shall not perform any duties authorized by the analyst’s permit until the analyst satisfactorily determines the blood alcohol level of a subsequent set of proficiency samples provided by the Department. This section shall not preclude the Department from taking further action in accordance with Rule 11D-8.015, F.A.C. Failure to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level of any six (6) sets of proficiency samples provided by the Department within a twelve (12) month period shall result in revocation of the blood analyst permit. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10- 31-93, Amended 1-1-97, 11-5-02. Subsections 316.1932(1)(a)2. and (f)1., Florida Statutes, cited as specific authority for all four rules, provide: (2) The Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law Enforcement is responsible for the regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program is responsible for the regulation of the individuals who operate, inspect, and instruct on the breath test instruments utilized in the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program is further responsible for the regulation of blood analysts who conduct blood testing to be utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program shall: Establish uniform criteria for the issuance of permits to breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Have the authority to permit breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Have the authority to discipline and suspend, revoke, or renew the permits of breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Establish uniform requirements for instruction and curricula for the operation and inspection of approved instruments. Have the authority to specify one approved curriculum for the operation and inspection of approved instruments. Establish a procedure for the approval of breath test operator and agency inspector classes. Have the authority to approve or disapprove breath test instruments and accompanying paraphernalia for use pursuant to the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. With the approval of the executive director of the Department of Law Enforcement, make and enter into contracts and agreements with other agencies, organizations, associations, corporations, individuals, or federal agencies as are necessary, expedient, or incidental to the performance of duties. Issue final orders which include findings of fact and conclusions of law and which constitute final agency action for the purpose of chapter 120. Enforce compliance with the provisions of this section through civil or administrative proceedings. Make recommendations concerning any matter within the purview of this section, this chapter, chapter 322, or chapter 327. Promulgate rules for the administration and implementation of this section, including definitions of terms. Consult and cooperate with other entities for the purpose of implementing the mandates of this section. Have the authority to approve the type of blood test utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. Have the authority to specify techniques and methods for breath alcohol testing and blood testing utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. Have the authority to approve repair facilities for the approved breath test instruments, including the authority to set criteria for approval. Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede provisions in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The specifications in this section are derived from the power and authority previously and currently possessed by the Department of Law Enforcement and are enumerated to conform with the mandates of chapter 99-379, Laws of Florida.[2] * * * (f)1. The tests determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or breath shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules of the Department of Law Enforcement. Such rules must specify precisely the test or tests that are approved by the Department of Law Enforcement for reliability of result and ease of administration, and must provide an approved method of administration which must be followed in all such tests given under this section. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood does not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes. Subsection 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes, cited as specific authority for Rule 11D-8.0133, provides: (b) A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose. The Department of Law Enforcement may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the department. Any insubstantial differences between approved methods or techniques and actual testing procedures, or any insubstantial defects concerning the permit issued by the department, in any individual case, shall not render the test or test results invalid. Subsection 316.1934(3), Florida Statutes, is cited as specific authority for Rule 11D-8.013.4 Section 316.1934, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: 316.1934 Presumption of impairment; testing methods.— It is unlawful and punishable as provided in chapter 322 and in s. 316.193 for any person who is under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired or to the extent that the person is deprived of full possession of normal faculties, to drive or be in actual physical control of any motor vehicle within this state. Such normal faculties include, but are not limited to, the ability to see, hear, walk, talk, judge distances, drive an automobile, make judgments, act in emergencies, and, in general, normally perform the many mental and physical acts of daily life. At the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving, or in actual physical control of, a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties were impaired or to the extent that he or she was deprived of full possession of his or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 and this section are admissible into evidence when otherwise admissible, and the amount of alcohol in the person's blood or breath at the time alleged, as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, or by chemical or physical test of the person's breath, gives rise to the following presumptions: If there was at that time a blood- alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.05 or less, it is presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. If there was at that time a blood- alcohol level or breath-alcohol level in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08, that fact does not give rise to any presumption that the person was or was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired but may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. If there was at that time a blood- alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher, that fact is prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. Moreover, such person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher is guilty of driving, or being in actual physical control of, a motor vehicle, with an unlawful blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level. The presumptions provided in this subsection do not limit the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. A chemical analysis of a person's blood to determine alcoholic content or a chemical or physical test of a person's breath, in order to be considered valid under this section, must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose. Any insubstantial differences between approved techniques and actual testing procedures or any insubstantial defects concerning the permit issued by the department, in any individual case do not render the test or test results invalid. The Department of Law Enforcement may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to termination or revocation in accordance with rules adopted by the department. . . . For purposes of this proceeding, the remaining provisions cited as specific authority for or as laws implemented by the challenged rules are redundant to the provisions set forth above.5 11. Sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes, are collectively referred to as the implied consent law. See Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783, 789 n.4 (Fla. 1992). In Robertson, the Court, citing its earlier analysis in State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1980), discussed the implied consent law and its relation to earlier common law evidentiary principles as to the admissibility of expert testimony in a DUI prosecution. The implied consent law "includes an exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of blood-test results taken contrary to its core policies." Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 789. However, "this exclusionary rule does not prohibit the use of all evidence obtained contrary to the implied consent law, but only such evidence obtained in a manner that is contrary to the core policies of the statute: ensuring scientific reliability of the tests, and protecting the health of test subjects." Id. at 789 n.5. Prior to the adoption of the implied consent law, scientific tests for intoxication were admissible if a proper predicate established that (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was performed by a qualified operator with the proper equipment, and (3) expert testimony was presented to explain the meaning of the test. Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 789. The Court explained the implications of this common law rule: This predicate had to be established in each and every case. If the state failed to do so, the evidence was not admissible. Moreover, when the state attempted to establish the necessary predicate, the defense enjoyed an opportunity to rebut all of this evidence. If the defense introduced sufficient evidence to rebut any one of the elements of the predicate, then once again the expert evidence was not admissible. Perhaps most significantly of all, the former procedure required the trial court to be the arbiter of what often was a dispute over arcane scientific principles. Id. (citation omitted). The implied consent law altered this practice by creating a presumption that the evidence is admissible, provided the state shows that the person conducting the test was properly licensed and has substantially complied with the governing regulations. "In other words, the state's burden of establishing a predicate is simplified in the sense that the state no longer has to guess what factors a particular trial judge will require the state to prove before admitting the test results; nor is the trial court required to wade into a morass of arcane scientific challenges and counterchallenges. If the state follows the HRS[6] 'checklist,' then the trial court's determination that the predicate has been established is clothed in a presumption of correctness." Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 789. In the instant case, Petitioner contends that the challenged rules do not provide a "checklist" in the area of blood alcohol testing sufficient to entitle the state to the presumption of correctness under the implied consent law. According to Petitioner, Robertson dictates that blood alcohol tests conducted under the challenged rules are not entitled to any presumption of correctness, and must be subjected to the three-step common law test for admissibility. Petitioner complains that the rules do not provide a checklist at all. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.011 simply approves alcohol dehydrogenase and gas chromatography as test methods for determining blood alcohol level, without setting forth a procedural checklist by which a judge could verify that the testing has been conducted in a scientifically reliable manner. In fact, the challenged rules do not prescribe a specific step-by-step procedure for the conduct of blood alcohol testing. Rather, blood alcohol permit applicants are required to propose analytical procedures that comport with the requirements set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3). If the application is approved by FDLE, then a permit is issued that allows the analyst to conduct testing only for the specific method and procedure described in the application, and only in the specific laboratory facility named in the application. Any substantial changes in the test method, analytical procedure, or in the laboratory facility itself must be approved by FDLE. Fla. Admin. Code R. 11D-8.013(4). Petitioner takes the position that in order to be consistent with the statutes as interpreted by Robertson, FDLE's rules must impose a uniform, step-by-step procedure for the administration of alcohol dehydrogenase and gas chromatography blood alcohol testing. FDLE takes the position that imposing such a procedure on every laboratory in the state would be absurdly expensive, scientifically unnecessary, and is not required by the governing statutes. Gas chromatography is the only test method currently used in Florida laboratories. "Headspace analysis" is the general procedure employed.7 Laura Barfield, the manager of the Alcohol Testing Program, explained that gas chromatography is a separation technique used to analyze blood samples for their alcohol (specifically, ethanol) content. Gas chromatography separates a compound into its individual components, using gas as the mode for separation. Petitioner's toxicology expert was Lawrence W. Masten, a former professor of toxicology at the University of Mississippi and currently a toxicology consultant. Dr. Masten explained the method in layman's terms. A small sample of blood is diluted with an internal standard, which is a chemical (usually a molecule similar to ethyl alcohol) of a known concentration. The diluted sample is placed into a vial, sealed, then heated to a constant temperature. The air sample in the head space above the heated liquid is analyzed in the gas chromatograph to derive findings as to the level of alcohol in the blood sample. Dr. Masten explained that the internal standard is included so that a ratio may be established between the molecules of alcohol in the blood sample and those in the standard. The inclusion of an internal standard also makes it less important to precisely measure the volume of the blood sample. Bruce Goldberger is a forensic toxicologist and is the director of toxicology at the University of Florida College of Medicine. In 1999-2000, Dr. Goldberger chaired a committee of scientific and legal experts who made recommendations to FDLE resulting in the current form of the challenged rules. Dr. Goldberger testified that the committee discussed the procedures needed to produce a reliable and accurate result from a gas chromatograph. He believed that the most important aspect of the rules is the requirement that the procedure be able to differentiate between ethanol and other volatiles in the specimen. Dr. Goldberger also cited the specific criteria for the calibration and control of the method as important factors in ensuring the reliability of tests performed pursuant to FDLE permits. Dr. Goldberger explained that, because there is the possibility of other alcohols in the blood specimen, the testing method must be able to differentiate between ethanol, which humans consume in alcoholic beverages, and acetone, isopropanol, methanol, and any other possible interferent. Dr. Goldberger agreed with Dr. Mastin on the importance of requiring the use of an internal standard. Dr. Goldberger testified that the use of an internal standard is always necessary in modern day quantitative analysis. While acknowledging the difficulties that these concepts pose to laymen, Dr. Goldberger stated that anyone trained in the area of quantitative analysis would understand the role of an internal standard. He explained that Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(f) does not prescribe one specific internal standard because there are two such standards that are commonly used throughout the world, and that either one, n-propanol or butanol, is accepted by scientists in the field of forensic toxicology. Dr. Goldberger testified that different laboratories may use different standards without affecting the accuracy and reliability of their tests, provided their testing methods are validated and provided the lab where the chemist is performing the test employs the calibrators and controls that are noted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013. Dr. Goldberger believes that it would be poor science to write rules that "get down to the nitty-gritty of a method." The rules should not prescribe the precise chemical composition of the internal standard, the temperature used to heat samples, or the column8 used. Different laboratories have different equipment, and the rules should provide some leeway to allow the analysts to perform their work in their own setting. As an example, Dr. Goldberger cited Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(c), which addresses the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range. Dr. Goldberger noted that the range varies between laboratories, and even from day to day within a single lab. In Dr. Goldberger's lab, the range may be linear from 0.01 to 0.5 one day, and from 0.01 to 0.4 the next day. This variability is why the lab runs calibrators to verify the range, and includes the current range on the worksheet along with the testing data. Dr. Goldberger concluded that the variations make it impossible for FDLE to require a specific number for the range. As another example, Dr. Goldberger cited Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(d), which discusses the constitution and use of a calibration curve. Calibration curves also vary from lab to lab, and the rule allows for that variation. Dr. Goldberger stated that it would be possible to specify an exact concentration, but it would not be good practice and could not be done without retooling the labs. Dr. Goldberger conceded that it would be possible to develop a detailed checklist in a rule, but asserted that to do so would not be good science. If the rules dictated every aspect of the equipment and procedures to be used in the lab, then nearly every lab in the state would have to retool and purchase new gas chromatographs. The expense would be prohibitive and unnecessary in scientific terms. Dr. Goldberger asserted that there is no need for a detailed checklist in the rules because the labs performing blood alcohol testing in Florida all use validated methods and are adequately calibrated and controlled. The data verifying the labs' methods, calibrations and controls is available for expert review. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.014 establishes a proficiency testing program, requiring every analyst to undergo quarterly testing to make sure their work is satisfactory. Dr. Goldberger testified that he has worked in several labs during his 25-year career. The methods employed in each lab were essentially the same. The instruments vary from lab to lab, but the technique is the same. Some technological improvements have been made in newer gas chromatographs, but have not altered the essential techniques of gas chromatography, which have not changed in 30 to 40 years. Dr. Goldberger stated that, while a layman might not be able to look at the rules and know all the steps necessary to perform a valid blood alcohol analysis, an analyst would. Further, persons reviewing the analyst's work in the lab would know the steps because each analyst is required to file with FDLE a "standard operating procedures" ("SOP") document that is several pages long and minutely details the procedures used by the analyst. Dr. Goldberger testified that "SOP" is a term of art in the industry. He acknowledged that the challenged rules do not employ that term, but testified that the language in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(2)(a) requiring FDLE approval of "analytical procedure(s)" is understood to mean that applicants must file their SOPs. The SOP is the "analytical procedure" to be approved by FDLE. The SOP contains all the analytical parameters necessary to perform gas chromatography, including the temperature, column, and column length. The SOP sets forth the steps employed by the analyst. Dr. Goldberger gave examples of the initial steps in a typical SOP: step one would call for removing the batch of specimens from the refrigerator, step two would be a review of the specimen identification information on the tubes, and step three would call for preparation of the dilution standard for that day's work. As the analysis goes forward, the analyst prepares a worksheet documenting each step in the process. The worksheet is used as part of the validation process for that batch and also for the calibration and control of that batch. An expert reviewing the analyst's work can combine the SOP, the worksheet and the raw data of the analysis to reconstruct exactly what occurred in the lab. Thus, Dr. Goldberger concluded that a "checklist" of sorts is provided under the challenged rules by way of each analyst's analytical procedure, which FDLE initially approves and periodically reviews. Dr. Goldberger concluded that the current standard of practice in forensic toxicology labs is to use head space gas chromatography for the analysis of blood alcohols. The standard of practice allows for differences in methodology from one lab to another, assuming the methodology is performed correctly. These variations do not prevent a qualified analyst from knowing what is required to conduct a gas chromatograph blood alcohol analysis. Ms. Barfield, the manager of the Alcohol Testing Program, testified as to the program's duties. The program grants permits only to the analysts, not to laboratories. Approximately 66 analysts are currently permitted in Florida, and 11 Florida labs are used for this work. Some analysts hold two permits, because they use two different analytical procedures and a separate permit is required for each procedure. A potential applicant may obtain an application from the program's office or download it from the program's web page. The application requires the applicant to identify her employer, the lab facility to be used, and at least one agency for which the analyst will perform blood alcohol analysis. The applicant must identify the method to be used and must include a copy of her SOP. Once filed, the SOPs are maintained by the Alcohol Testing Program as a public record. The program releases permitting and proficiency test information upon request. Ms. Barfield stated that the "method" referenced by the rules is the type of test, i.e., gas chromatography or alcohol dehydrogenase. The "procedure" contemplated by the rule is the SOP, the actual set of steps that the blood sample will go through when that analyst performs a blood alcohol analysis. Ms. Barfield testified that this "procedure" equates to the statutory term "method of administration" found at Subsection 316.1932(1)(f)1., Florida Statutes. The "method of administration" is spelled out at Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(a)-(g). Ms. Barfield personally reviews the applications for blood alcohol analyst permits. When reviewing an application and its accompanying analytical procedures, Ms. Barfield uses Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013 as a checklist to ensure that all requirements have been met. She checks off each requirement of the rule that the application meets. If the proposed procedure discriminates between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol, she gives it a check. If it uses an internal standard, it gets a check. If it employs appropriate levels of standards and controls, it gets a check. The steps described in the analytical procedure become requirements of that analyst's permit and must be performed each time the analyst conducts a blood alcohol analysis. Ms. Barfield also gives proficiency tests pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(2)(b). In a proficiency test, the applicant must use the proposed procedure to correctly determine the blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Alcohol Testing Program. Ms. Barfield testified that the rules do not prescribe the specific steps to be used in the analytical procedure because there are many different laboratories and many different ways to achieve an accurate and reliable blood alcohol result. As an example, she described her own procedure in comparison to that of the lab at the University of Miami: I'm in the FDLE laboratory and I'm using a PerkinElmer gas chromatograph . . . and I'm going to prep my samples, meaning taking the blood vial that I receive, and I'm going to aliquot for a sample 50 microliters of that blood and put it in the correct container to be able, to be analyzing it. The head space gas chromatography has a special little container. You do not stick the blood vial on the autosampler. Anyway, you're aliquoting 50 microliters, and I'm going to do that twice because my procedure says I have to do it twice and the rule says I have to do it twice, and . . . I'm going to dilute it with n-propanol internal standard and I'm going to dilute it with a thousand milliliters of internal standard, and my n-propanol internal standard is at a .02 concentration. I put it on the gas chromatograph, and it's a head space autosampler, and I'm going to heat that bottle up to 60 degrees [Celsius] in order for equilibriation to occur between the alcohol in the blood and the alcohol in the head space above it, and I'm going to inject my needle into that. I'm going to leave the needle in there .02 seconds. I'm going to withdraw for .05 seconds. I'm going to put it on a transfer line that's 90 degrees C, and I'm going to run it through a gas chromatograph whose column on the inside is heated up to 55 C, and I'm going to detect it with a flame ionization detector. That's all great. That's the steps. That's the FDLE laboratory. We get a good result, a valid, reliable result. . . . The University of Miami, they use a Hewlett- Packard gas chromatograph. It has an autosampler on it, too, and to prep their samples, they don't have an automatic sampler to get the blood out where they can automatically sample 50 microliters and dilute it with 1,000 milliliters of internal standard. They're going to use pipettes. They're going to manually do it. Their sample size is 500 milliliters of blood. They automatically pipette their 500 milliliters of blood, put it in the special container for the autosampler. They're only diluting with 500 milliliters of internal standard, and their internal standard concentration is a .04. They seal off their bottle. They put it on the autosampler. They decide to equilibrate for 22 minutes at 50 C. The other lab was at 60. Their transfer line is-— they're going to inject for .05 seconds and withdraw for .05 seconds, and they're going to use their transfer line heated to 85 Celsius, and their gas chromatograph was heated to 50 Celsius, and they use a flame ionization detector, because most everybody does. Those are all little different parameters, right, but I just described two procedures, and the end result is they get the same answer. All the little minute things are laboratory-specific for the equipment that they have, everything from how they pipette the sample out of [the] blood tube to how they analyze it and the temperatures and the pressures and the operating parameters, transfer line temperatures, things like that, those are all individualized to a laboratory, and just because they're different doesn't make it wrong. To further go along with the description of their method and the overall requirements of the procedure that we're looking at, I proficiency test the analysts from the University of Miami. They're using different temperatures. They're doing things a little bit differently. Granted, everything's about-— generally, it's the same, but the temperatures are different and things like that. I proficiency test them before I even give them a permit, and both of their procedures provide accurate and reliable results, and that's why it's not detailed down to the minutia in that particular section [of the rule], because there are differences that can occur in the grand scheme that don't affect the overall end result. Ms. Barfield agreed that it would be possible to write a rule to encompass every detail for each of the labs, but stated that it is not scientifically necessary to enact such a rule. She further stated that such a rule would not be feasible because it would require every lab to have the same equipment and procedures, from pipetting the blood sample to the gas chromatograph to the autosampler to the same gases, operating at the same temperatures. Ms. Barfield testified that it would not be feasible to impose the same criteria for every procedural step in every lab without incurring an enormous outlay of money. She noted that a gas chromatograph alone costs around $50,000. Ms. Barfield acknowledged that Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.003(2) specifically approves two, and only two, instruments for the conduct of breath tests: the Intoxilyzer 8000 and the Intoxilyzer 5000. FDLE rules also call for the Alcohol Testing Program to register and conduct validation inspections of particular breath testing machines. Fla. Admin. Code R. 11D-8.004. When questioned as to why FDLE did not regulate gas chromatographs in the same manner, Ms. Barfield replied that any comparison between breath and blood testing is "apples to oranges." There is no need for the rules to identify "approved" gas chromatographs because all of the commercially available machines do the job for which they are designed. Breath testing is complicated by the fact that law enforcement personnel are operating scientific equipment; having a multitude of different testing instruments could jeopardize accuracy. It is preferable to train all breath test operators on the same equipment. In contrast, the gas chromatographs used in blood testing are being operated by professional analysts who have their own standards of practice. Thus, there is no need to standardize the equipment used in blood testing. Ms. Barfield failed to note that Subsection 316.1932(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, states: "The Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law Enforcement is responsible for the regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments." (Emphasis added.) The statute charges the program with responsibility for the regulation of persons who operate, inspect and instruct on the breath test instruments, and for analysts who conduct blood testing, but nowhere does it specifically authorize the Alcohol Testing Program to regulate blood testing instruments. The apparent lack of statutory authority to regulate the gas chromatographs used by blood testing labs convincingly supplements Ms. Barfield's more practical reasons for the lack of a rule on this subject. Dr. Masten testified for Petitioner that it is possible to create a checklist for performing a gas chromatographic analysis of blood alcohol content. He also stated that a checklist such as those used by quality assurance auditors might be a desirable way to standardize operations and lessen the potential for error. However, Dr. Masten also conceded that alternate methods can achieve reliable, accurate results, and that proficiency testing can assure such results. Two analysts in different labs may use variations on the gas chromatography method, such as different temperatures and pressures during the testing. Dr. Masten knew of differences in instrumentation between FDLE's labs in Tallahassee and Orlando. However, if each analyst passes proficiency testing, then each analyst's processes are validated. Dr. Masten testified that there are a number of different manufacturers of gas chromatograph instruments, which vary in terms of their capacity but otherwise achieve reliable results in blood testing. Different gas chromatographs use different materials in their columns. There are also several internal standards that are acceptable. Dr. Masten defined a methodology as a set of specific conditions, some of which are columns, temperature, pressure of the gas flow or rate of the gas flow, and the type of machine. These are all different parameters that are normally addressed in the SOP. Reasonable scientists can disagree as to certain parameters, such as the amount of dilution. Dr. Masten stated that the prime criterion for any set of conditions is to prove they work. Because gas chromatography has so many variables, there is a large matrix of different conditions that potentially achieve correct results. These conditions vary from lab to lab, and to a lesser degree from analyst to analyst within a lab. If an analyst's method is validated, it can be used to reach an accurate and reliable test result. The greater weight of the expert testimony at the instant hearing established that a perfectly uniform manner of performing either gas chromatography or the alcohol dehydrogenase analysis would not be scientifically sound nor economically feasible. Dr. Goldberger reasonably opined that a defendant is provided with the equivalent of the "checklist" desired by Petitioner: the SOP, the analyst's worksheet, and the raw data of the analysis provide a reviewing expert with all the necessary information to contest the analyst's work. The fact that all SOPs are not perfectly uniform in accordance with the idealized rules envisioned by Petitioner is less important than the fact that all SOPs and analysts' test results are available as public records and may be reviewed for their accuracy and reliability. The evidence at hearing established that blood alcohol testing is dissimilar to breath testing. Specific instruments must be approved for breath testing because law enforcement personnel operate the instruments. Uniformity of equipment helps to simplify the permitting process and helps to ensure accuracy in testing. Also, Ms. Barfield at least suggested that there may be breath instruments on the market that are themselves unreliable. In contrast, the expert testimony at hearing established that all commercially available gas chromatographs perform their intended functions, and that blood alcohol analysts are trained professionals able to operate according to their labs' SOPs, without detailed, step-by-step instruction imposed by FDLE rules. The evidence established that Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.011 and 8.013 substantially comply with their statutory authorities. Test methods are established by Rule 11D-8.011. Methods of administration are found in the uniform permitting criteria set forth in Rule 11D-8.013(3)(a)-(g). Dr. Goldberger testified at length regarding the development of the rules, and Ms. Barfield described the application of the rules during the permitting process and in the laboratory. Both of these experts agreed that it would be poor science to require every analyst in the state to perform testing according to the standards of a single laboratory. The science of gas chromatography in blood alcohol testing simply does not require such rigidity.9 The challenged rules reasonably set forth permitting criteria and proficiency testing that insure the scientific reliability of the blood alcohol testing carried out by analysts operating under permits issued by the Alcohol Testing Program of FDLE. No evidence was offered by either party regarding the necessity to specify the types or amounts of preservatives and anticoagulants that must be contained in the glass evacuation tubes used to collect blood samples. No evidence was offered by either party as to the necessity to specify a range of temperatures for the refrigeration of blood samples collected pursuant to the implied consent law.
