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ROBERT F. AND VELDA L. ELBERT vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 79-001666 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001666 Latest Update: Jan. 21, 1980

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated and agreed that the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the Notice of Violation issued by the Department could be accepted as true without the need for any further proof. The allegations are as follows: The Department of Environmental Regulation is the administrative agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to protect Florida's air and water resources and to administer and enforce the Florida Air and Water Pollution Control Act, Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code. Respondents, Robert and Velda Elbert, own a parcel of land located at 123 Gulfview Boulevard, Hudson, Florida, adjacent to waters of the Gulf of Mexico at Yellow Point, Pasco County. Respondent, Marvin Mattix, is a resident of Pasco County whose occupation includes the construction of seawalls. The Department has previously informed Respondents Elbert that Respondents had, on the aforesaid property, violated the Florida Air and Water Pollution Control Act, Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules, Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code. The Department informed Respondents of these violations by sending Respondents official correspondence on April 3, 1979, attached as Exhibit A. On or before January 30, 1979, Respondent Elbert and Mattix constructed or caused to be constructed a seawall on submerged lands and in waters on the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to Respondents Elberts' aforesaid property, and placed fill on submerged land and in waters of the Gulf of Mexico in connection with construction of the seawall. The aforesaid seawall and associated fill was placed in waters of the State on a submerged lands in, adjacent to the continuous with the waters and shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico in an area dominated by plant species listed in Section 17-4.02(17), Florida Administrative Code, including red mangrove (rhizophora mangle) and black mangrove (avicennia germinous). Respondents' seawall construction and associated filling activity was undertaken without an appropriate and valid permit from the Department as required by Section 17-4.03 and 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.087, Florida Statutes. 8. The Department incurred costs and expenses while investigating this matter as outlined in Exhibit B. As to Paragraph 4, the parties stipulated that fill was not placed in behind the seawall because after the Elberts were advised by the Department that the fill would be illegal, they ceased further activity. The parties stipulated and agreed that Paragraphs (a), (B), (C), (D), and (E) from the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing could be accepted as true without the need for any further proof. These facts are as follows: NAME AND ADDRESS OF AFFECTED AGENCY - Department of Environmental Regulation, Twin Towers Office Building, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. (Agency's file number unknown). NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PETITIONERS - Robert F. Elbert, P. O. Box 357, Cape Canaveral, Florida 32920 and Velda L. Elbert, P. O. Box 357, Cape Canaveral, Florida 32920. DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT - There are no disputes with the material facts presented. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE ULTIMATE FACTS, THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONERS AND THE REASONS FOR ENTITLING THE PETITIONER TO RELIEF - Petitioners allege (sic) that a contract was negotiated with a local sea wall builder (Mr. Mattix) who was recommended by the bank financing the sea wall (Community Bank of Pasco). Mrs Mattix informed Mrs. Elbert that a permit was not required and our seawall was one of the last two he could build without his obtaining a permit. Both petitioners (R.F. Elbert and V. L. Elbert) met with Mr. Mattix at the building site and per Mr. Mattix's suggestion, the sea wall location was selected so that the petitioner's sea wall would be 'in line' (lined up) with the other sea walls already built on the street. This appeared to be the logical location and the sea wall was built accordingly. After the sea wall was completed and paid, the petitioners were notified, both verbally and in writing, that the sea wall was built in violation of existing environmental regulations. To that point, the petitioners were unaware of violating any rules or regulations. Had the petitioners been aware of any regulations, they definitely would have complied and assured the builder also comply. INFORMAL ACTION - No informal actions were taken by the petitioner except to talk to DER in Tampa (Mr. Resico). Mr. Resico informed the petitioners that the agency and Mr. Mattix (sea wall builder) held meetings and that Mr. Mattix informed the agency that he had misinterpreted the agency's regulations. At no time did Mr. Mattix inform the petitioner about his actions with your agency. The Elberts own a parcel of land in Pasco County adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico. They are planning to utilized the property as a retirement residence. The desired to build a seawall so that they could park a boat adjacent to their property. The bank that financed the seawall recommended that they retain Marvin Mattix to construct the seawall. The Elberts contracted with Mattix to construct it. The location for the seawall was chosen because it lined up with other seawalls near to the Elberts' property. The Elberts would have preferred the seawall be built further into the Gulf, but they were advised by Mattix that it should line up with other seawalls. Some of the other seawalls were apparently constructed without any permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation, and the Department has taken some steps to investigate the alleged violations, although no formal notices have been issued. The Elberts discussed with Mattix whether any permits from government agencies would be required, and they were advised that they would not need any permits. The builder advised the Elberts that he had approval from the Federal corps of Engineers, but the Elberts were later advised by the Corps that they had no knowledge of the project. The Elberts were not aware that they were violating any standards when they constructed the seawall. The seawall was in line with other seawalls on the street, and it will be expensive and difficult to remove it. The Elberts have been totally cooperative in their dealings with the Department of Environmental regulation, and it is apparent that they would not have taken any steps to construct the seawall without appropriate permits except for the advice of the builder. The Notice of violation issued by the Department was directed not only to the Elberts, but also to the builder, Marvin Mattix. The notice was forwarded to Mattix with a return receipt, and Mattix did not sign for the notice. Mattix did not request a hearing with respect to the allegations of the Notice of Violation. The seawall is located approximately eight feet seaward of the mean high water line adjacent to the Elberts' property. There are no seawalls directly adjacent to the Elberts' property but there is a seawall two lots down which also apparently was constructed without a permit. The Elberts' nex-door neighbor applied to construct a seawall at the same location as the Elberts' seawall but was told that a wall could not be placed that far into the water. The Elberts' property does not actually face directly into the Gulf of Mexico. It is on an estuary, and is approximately two lots down from the open waters of the Gulf. It is not a residential canal. Prior to the hearing, the Department incurred $182.60 in costs and expenses while investigating this matter.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered requiring that Robert and Velda Elbert and Marvin Mattix take the following corrective action: Within thirty (30) days of the date of the final order, they should remove the seawall and associated fill, and restore the area to its original condition; They should make payment to the Department in the amount of $182.60 to compensate the Department for expenses in tracing, controlling nd abating the violation. That enforcement action be taken first against the builder, Marvin Mattix, so that the cost of removing the seawall and restoring the area is borne by the party who caused the violation; and that only upon the failure of enforcement against Marvin Mattix should final enforcement action be taken against the Elberts. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of December, 1979. C. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. and Velda L. Elbert Post Office Box 357 Cape Canaveral, Florida 32920 Alfred W. Clark, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.57403.031403.087403.121403.161
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CASA MARINA DEVELOPMENT, INC.; ROYAL PELICAN DEVELOPMENT, INC.; AND STARDIAL INVESTMENTS, CO. vs DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 90-008051 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Dec. 20, 1990 Number: 90-008051 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1992

The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.

Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.6835.22380.06
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BRIAN BEVAN, JANE BEVAN, LISA BEVAN, AND ANDREW BEVAN vs RICHARD COWART, CLAUDIA COWART, AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 93-001314 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 05, 1993 Number: 93-001314 Latest Update: Aug. 16, 1995

Findings Of Fact By Joint Application for Works in the Waters of Florida filed January 14, 1993, Richard and Claudia Cowart requested permission to construct a concrete seawall with sloping riprap along their property, which is bordered by the Caloosahatchee River. The application describes the length of the seawall as 130 feet. The application describes the length of the riprap as "up to 130 [feet]" and the width of the riprap as five feet. The application states that the Cowarts are the record owner of the property and that Brian Bevan is an owner of adjacent property. There are seawalls for some distance on both sides of the proposed seawall, including along the property of Mr. Bevan. The seawall on the side opposite that of Mr. Bevan is indicated on the drawing accompanying the application. The drawing attached to the application depicts an existing retaining wall waterward of the approximate mean high water line and the proposed seawall landward of the approximate mean high water line. The proposed seawall would travel parallel to the river's shoreline for a distance of about 130 feet. At both ends, the wall turns away from the river and runs an additional 25-30 feet perpendicular to the river. At the southerly end of the proposed seawall, the drawing also indicates a "wetland enhancement area" where 100 one-gallon red mangrove trees would be planted. A second drawing attached to the application consists of a cross- section of the proposed activity. The cross-section drawing depicts, among other things, the riprap to be placed waterward of the proposed seawall, which is perpendicular to the surface of the water. The proposed riprap has no discontinuities. By letter to the Cowarts dated January 20, 1993, the Department of Environmental Regulation (DEP) stated that it found that the proposed activity was exempt from the need for a wetland resource permit, pursuant to Rule 17- 312.050(1)(t), Florida Administrative Code. Within a couple of months after issuance of the letter, the Cowarts constructed a seawall. Petitioners challenged the determination by filing a petition on February 4, 1993. The proposed seawall would not violate existing water quality standards, impede navigation, or adversely affect flood control.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing the petition of the Bevans and declining to award attorneys' fees and costs against them or any of them. ENTERED on October 28, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 28, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioners' Proposed Findings Petitioners filed a proposed recommended order without proposed findings of fact. To the extent that anything in the proposed recommended order may be construed to be a proposed finding of fact, it is rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Cowarts' Proposed Findings 1-11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12: rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 John L. Chaves, Assistant General Counsel Douglas H. McLaughlin, Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Brian Bevan 1200 Masanabo Lane Ft. Myers, FL 33919 Richard A. Lotspeich Landers & Parsons Box 271 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68403.813
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RICHARD GOSS vs. HARRIE E. SMITH & DER, 77-000478 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000478 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 1977

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the adjoining neighbor of Harrie E. Smith, the applicant, and runs the Coral Lagoon Resort. This is a commercial establishment which consists of rental units fronting on Bonefish Bay with an interior canal and a series of small boat docking facilities which give each unit docking space and water access. The Petitioner keeps two tame porpoises at the end of this canal which are a tourist attraction. The Petitioner's operation is tourist oriented particularly to those who come to the Keys for fishing or diving excursions. The application to the Department of Environmental Regulation is to the installation of a wooden dock which runs parallel to the Petitioner's northern boundary line. The applicant, Mr. Smith, runs a commercial boat repair facility alongside Mr. Goss' establishment and it is clear there have been misunderstandings between them in the past. The dock has been installed and as noted above, the application to the Department of Environmental Regulation is for an after-the-fact authorization. The department has indicated it intends to grant the permit as it does not see that the dock will degrade water quality or create a condition adverse to the public interest. The petition maintains that the dock will cause water quality problems in that it will encourage the docking of boats which will spill oil, gas and other contaminants into the waters and thereby degrade water quality. It should be noted that the Petitioner maintains extensive docking facilities in his establishment and could be subjected to the same argument.

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STEPHEN A. SPOETH AND OLIVE FAY MCCALL vs FRANK AND PATRICIA BAIRD AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 94-006813 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Port Richey, Florida Dec. 05, 1994 Number: 94-006813 Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1995

The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether an unpermitted seawall and an unpermitted catwalk constructed by Respondents Frank and Patricia Baird qualify for exemption from permitting under Rule 62-312.050, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Stephen A. Spoeth, and Olive Faye McCall Spoeth, reside at 14038 Pine Street, Hudson, Pasco County, Florida. Mrs. Spoeth purchased the property in 1989 prior to Petitioners' marriage and has lived at this residence since that time. Mr. Spoeth has resided at the property since 1991. Petitioners' residence is located on lot 14 in the subdivision plat. In addition to their residence (lot 14), Petitioners own another lot, (lot 10), directly across Pine Street from their residence. Lot 10 borders the end of a canal. Petitioners have constructed a 10.6 foot by 11.8 foot dock that extends approximately 16.5 feet into the canal from Lot 10. Petitioners also own property adjacent to lot 10 on the south side of the canal. Respondent, Patricia Baird, resides at 6732 Udell Lane, Hudson, Pasco County, Florida. Respondent and her husband, Frank Baird, purchased this property in 1991. Frank Baird is now deceased. Respondent owns lots 8 and 9 as identified in the subdivision plat. Respondent's residence is located on lot 8. Both lots 8 and 9 border the north side of the canal. Lot 8 has 75 feet of waterfront, and lot 9 has 70 feet of waterfront. Lot 9 abuts Petitioners' lot 10 at the end of the canal. The canal in question is a dead-end canal located in a residential community in Pasco County. The canal was artificially created on historically upland property. The canal runs east to west, is rectangular in shape, and is approximately 70 feet wide, as measured from north to south. The canal accesses into Hudson Creek which then accesses into the Gulf of Mexico. The water in the middle of the canal is generally five feet in depth; however, the depth of the water in the canal varies with tidal fluctuations. During low tides, the water over two feet in depth is shared equally between both sides of the canal channel. At normal tide flow, water at the three-foot depth level is also shared equally between both sides of the canal. Water at the five-foot depth level is slightly closer to the north part of the canal channel next to the Baird's property. Since 1991, the Bairds have constructed four structures on their property: a seawall; a fixed dock; a floating dock; and a catwalk. The seawall runs the length of the waterfront on both lots 8 and 9. A six-foot portion of the seawall was constructed on Petitioners' property (lot 10), and was subsequently removed as a result of a prior proceeding between these parties. The Baird seawall is level and flush with the adjoining seawall constructed on waterfront lot 7 that is owned by Mary-Jane Prack. The Baird seawall was constructed in accordance with generally acceptable building practices. On lot 8 the Bairds constructed a 20 foot by 16 foot fixed dock adjacent to the seawall. The fixed dock was constructed in accordance with generally accepted building practices. On lot 9 the Bairds placed an 8 foot by 12 foot floating dock with an 11.7 foot catwalk. This structure extends approximately 19.7 feet into the canal. The floating dock was constructed in accordance with generally accepted building practices. In 1993 the Bairds added a 30 foot by 18 foot by 30 foot L-shaped catwalk adjacent to the existing dock on lot 9. The catwalk was constructed in accordance with generally accepted building practices. Petitioners have one boat tied to their dock on lot 10. The Petitioners also keep a paddle boat and a canoe at that location. Prior to the construction of the Baird's catwalk, Petitioners tied their boat with the bow pointing north. This allowed the Petitioners to access water which was generally three feet in depth. Subsequent to the construction of the catwalk, Petitioners tie their boat with the bow to the south. The water in this part of the canal is shallower than on the north side, and on some occasions when the tide is extremely low, the bow of Petitioners' boat rests in mud. Such extreme low tides usually occur in the spring of the year, and generally happen seven days a year. On such occasions Petitioners experience great difficulty moving their boat into the canal. During such low tides Petitioners also have difficulty launching their paddle boat and canoe. The evidence is consistent that private boats navigate the canal. Moreover, Mary-Jane Prack testified that not only private vessels, but also commercial fishing vessels, currently use the canal on a regular basis during the day and the night. Thus, there is no question that the seawall and catwalk do not impede navigation of the canal. Water quality in the canal was not tested prior to the construction of the seawall and catwalk on the Baird's property, and there is no basis to evaluate the impact of the construction of the Baird's seawall and catwalk on water quality; however, except for the initial period of construction, the building of a seawall, fixed dock, floating dock, and catwalk in accordance with generally accepted building practices does not have an adverse effect on water quality in a residential tidal canal. The Baird seawall is level with the surrounding property and does not adversely affect runoff or flood control. The Baird catwalk is constructed to allow water flow and does not adversely affect runoff or flood control. On September 22, 1994, DEP issued a letter determining that the Baird unpermitted seawall and unpermitted catwalk met the exemption criteria set forth in Rules 62-312.050(1)(g) and (h), Florida Administrative Code. The DEP decision in this regard reversed a prior warning letter issued by DEP on December 16, 1993, to the Bairds stating that the unpermitted seawall and unpermitted catwalk were in violation of the DEP rules. The warning letter was issued by DEP under the mistaken apprehension that the canal had been constructed on sovereign state submerged land, when in fact the canal was artificially constructed on historically uplands property.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Environmental Protection issue a Final Order upholding the Department's determination that the unpermitted seawall and unpermitted catwalk located at 6732 Udell Lane, Hudson, Pasco County, Florida, meet the exemption criteria set forth in Rules 62-312.050(1)(g) and (h), Florida Administrative Code. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of June, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings: Rejected except to the extent that the bow of Petitioners' boat at extreme low tides sits in the mud. Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected as irrevelant Rejected as irrelevant Rejected Rejected Respondent Bairds' Proposed Findings: 1 - 7. Adopted and incorporated Respondent DEP's Proposed Findings: 1 - 38. Adopted and incorporated COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante General Counsel 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Stephen A. Spoeth and Olive McCall Spoeth 14038 Pine Street Hudson, Florida 34667 Edson L. Garrabrants, Jr., Esquire 6008 Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Christine C. Stretesky, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Florida Laws (2) 120.57403.813 Florida Administrative Code (2) 62-312.05062-4.040
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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION vs JACQUELINE S. FREEMAN FAMILY TRUST AND JOHN K. FREEMAN, 09-003011EF (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Jun. 03, 2009 Number: 09-003011EF Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2009

The Issue The issues are whether Respondents dredged and filled within wetlands and surface waters without a permit and, if so, what penalty and corrective action should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Trust owns the Property, and Freeman is the sole trustee of Trust and its sole beneficiary. The Property, which is located in Lake County, abuts Lake Nettie, a 45-acre lake with no outlet, under ordinary water conditions. A portion of the Property occupies wetlands and surface waters of Lake Nettie. Much of the upland abutting the lake in the vicinity of the Property is developed, although no other seawalls are visible. The shoreline in the vicinity of the Property is not heavily developed, but it bears clear signs of maintenance to control the growth of vegetation in the sandy beach. Sometime after October 29, 2003, Freeman's late mother purchased the Property, on which is located a single-family home. At the time, the Property did not have a dock or seawall. Shortly after Ms. Freeman acquired the Property, Freeman, an accountant, or his mother hired a contractor to build a dock. The dock was constructed in early 2004. Because it did not exceed 1000 square feet over water, this activity qualified for a noticed general permit, under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.475(1)(a), although the record does not reveal whether Ms. Freeman provided the notice required for this activity. Nothing in the record suggests that the construction of the dock altered the pattern of limited vegetation of the Property waterward of the wetlands line. However, nothing in the record suggests that erosion, siltation, or turbidity has been a problem at the waterward end of the Property. The only evidence touching on the issue of drainage into the lake is that, in the vicinity of the Property, runoff enters the lake by sheetflow. In 2007, by which time title to the Property had passed to the Trust, Freeman sought to add a roof to the dock that his mother had had constructed. Finding that the contractor who had built the dock was no longer in business, Freeman obtained the required local building permit and did the work himself. Shortly after completing this job, Freeman constructed the seawall, obtaining the fill from a neighbor who was excavating a basement. In connection with this dispute, Petitioner has established a wetlands line on the Property. The wetlands line is amply supported by the evidence, including careful analysis by Petitioner's representatives of the vegetation and soils, as well as hydrologic indicators, such as algal mats, that are present on the Property within the area of the Seawall Project. Based on this wetlands line, the Seawall Project is in the wetlands, so that the construction of the project constituted dredging and filling of wetlands. The waterward face of the seawall is entirely in wetlands, as are the return walls that run upland from the seawall face and the fill placed upland of the seawall face. DEP Exhibit 11, which is incorporated by reference herein, accurately depicts the wetlands line on the Property. There is some confusion in Petitioner's pleadings between the surface area of wetlands that Freeman filled and the amount of fill. The surface area of disturbed wetlands is about 500 square feet. According to Freeman, whose testimony is credited, the amount of fill was about what would be contained in a small dump truck, so it might be in the neighborhood of five cubic yards. In the NOV, Petitioner describes the corrective action that it is imposing on Respondents. Within 45 days of the NOV, "Respondent" would be required to conduct certain preliminary activities and then: 1) remove the seawall and all associated fill waterward of the wetland line; 2) place the removed fill in a contained upland location where it will not discharge into wetlands or surface waters; 3) during and after regrading, stabilize with vegetation all slopes adjacent to the restored area as soon as possible (not more than 72 hours after attaining final grade) to prevent erosion, siltation, or turbid runoff into the wetlands and surface waters; remove nuisance and exotic vegetation prior to planting; replant the restoration area with listed wetland species on three-foot centers within elevation- based zones depicted on an attached drawing; plant healthy, nursery-grown stock from a state-licensed nursery; provide receipts for all plants used in the restoration area; monitor the restoration area at four-month intervals until the restoration area contains less than ten percent coverage of nuisance and exotic species and 80 percent of the plantings have survived for at least one year and are viable, reproducing plants; submit monitoring reports to Petitioner; and allow Petitioner's representatives access to the Property at reasonable times to determine compliance with the NOV conditions. Petitioner does not seek corrective action for the addition of the roof to the dock, which resulted in the addition of about 216 square feet to the original, 1000 square-foot dock. Presumably, this decision acknowledges the relative ease of obtaining a standard general permit for a dock of no more than 2000 square feet serving a single-family home under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427(1)(a)2. For this reason, the violation arising out of the Dock Project is relatively minor. The corrective actions focus on the seawall because the violation arising out of the Seawall Project is more significant. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.475(1)(c), this activity involved 400 square feet more than the 100 square feet of dredging and filling that is allowed as a "minor system" under a noticed general permit. An individual environmental resource permit would be required for this project, and there is no reason to assume that Respondents would be able to obtain such a permit. Corrective action is therefore necessary in the form of the removal of the entire Seawall Project, including all of the fill, and the restoration of the pre-project grade. The question concerning corrective action is the extent of Respondents' liability for undertaking the planting scheme outlined above in the NOV. The record fails to establish the restorative nature of this activity because, immediately before the commencement of the Seawall Project, the shoreline in the impacted area was unvegetated. If Respondents had applied for permits for these two activities, Petitioner would have charged the fee for the proposed activity that carried the higher fee, which is the Seawall Project. The application fee would have been $600. By not applying for and obtaining this permit, Respondents wrongly obtained an economic benefit of $600. The fact that Respondents will only be allowed to keep the product of the Dock Project suggests that the final economic benefit should be based on the reduced fee associated with this activity, but, for reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, this point is irrelevant because Petitioner is not authorized to recover either application fee in this case. Two of Petitioner's representatives testified as to the cost of their investigatory services in this case. Based on the total hours expended, at their respective hourly rates, without regard to any fringe benefits, the cost of the investigation is about $1700, but, for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, this fact is also irrelevant because Petitioner is not authorized to recover these costs in this case.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.68373.414403.031403.121403.141403.16157.04157.071736.1013 Florida Administrative Code (2) 62-341.47562-343.050
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STANISLAW BUDZINSKI AND KAZIMIERA BUDZINSKI vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 97-001109 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 10, 1997 Number: 97-001109 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1997

Findings Of Fact Lior Hason is the owner of Britt's Cafe, a restaurant which occupies property owned by the Petitioner's Stanislaw and Kasimiera Budzinski. On or about December 19, 1995, Harry S. Cline, an attorney for Mr. Hason and the Budzinskis, filed an application for a variance from the City of Clearwater's Development Code, for the purpose of eliminating three required parking spaces from the front of the subject property for the construction of an outdoor cafe at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard. The Code requires one parking space per 200 square feet of gross floor area, and a variance was required to remove three existing parking spaces from the unit's parking space inventory. The matter was brought before the City's Development Code Adjustment Board at its January 11, 1996 meeting. Mr. Cline appeared at the meeting on behalf of the applicant and presented the project. No one else was present to speak in support of or in opposition to the request. However, four letters in opposition from neighboring business owners were submitted. Notwithstanding these objections, the Board determined that the applicant had substantially met all standards for approval listed in the City's Land Development Code; and upon vote of the Board, the application was approved, subject to certain conditions, by a three to two majority. Mr. Hason entered into discussions with City officials to determine what was necessary. Official City reaction was initially favorable. Mr. Hason was advised of the requirements for the project and had plans drawn which called for a deck with a 35 to 36 inch railing with landscaping around it, and with posts and lights. When the plans were submitted to the City officials, the only change suggested was to raise the railing height to 45 inches, which was done, after which the City approved the plans and the permit was granted. The deck was then constructed exactly according to the approved plans. At some time during 1996, Mr. Hason discussed with some City employees putting an awning over the deck. During these discussions, the City employees sent Mr. Hason a copy of Section 41.221(1)(c), Clearwater City Code, which provides for awnings to be removable. Mr. Hason considered the sending of this Code provision to be tantamount to a favorable reply to his inquiry, and, based on that, he finalized his plans for the installation of a removable awning. The proposed awning is designed in such a fashion as to be extendible and retractable on a frame, capable of easily being pulled up against the front of the building like a drapery. With a minimum of further effort, consisting of the removal a several bolts, the entire awning construction can be removed from the frame. Mr. Hason submitted his application for the variance to install the awning on February 2, 1997. In the interim, the City employees with whom Mr. Hason discussed the project changed their position from favoring the project to opposing it. He was ultimately advised in December 1996 or January 1997 that the awning could not be permitted because an awning could not be approved over a deck for which a permit should not have been issued and for which the issuance was a mistake. Though the Board had not yet voted on the application, no information was given to Mr. Hason as to what he could do to make the project approvable. His application, on February 2, 1997, was submitted because, Hason claims, he had been told, by someone not further identified, that applying for a variance for the awning would make everything right. The Variance Staff Report submitted to the Board by the appropriate City employees acknowledged that the frame over which Mr. Hason proposed to put the awning does not meet code because it was constructed within a required setback area from South Gulfview Boulevard, but since the frame was built pursuant to a City-issued permit, consistent with City policy, the City accepted its existence. In its final recommendation to the Board, the staff concluded that notwithstanding the encroachment into the setback area, the project "appears to comply with all standards for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe:" The staff then went on to recommend approval of the project subject to certain conditions, all of which, Mr. Hason accepts and agrees to. Nonetheless, the Board denied the permit by a vote of four to one. Mr. Hason contends that the Board vote was an attempt by the Board to get back at him because of what it perceived as his failure to comply with the conditions placed upon the issuance of the first permit and his alleged misrepresentation of the scope of his project at the time. Mr. Hason, however, categorically denies he has done anything contrary to the dictates of the City. He went back to City officials many times during the construction of the deck to make sure the project was built as required. The majority of the Board members believe, however, that the deck as constructed, goes far beyond the limited structure approved by the granting of the parking space variance in January 1996. This animosity toward the project can be seen from a review of the audio record of the February 13, 1997, Board meeting where, during a colloquy between a Board member and Mr. Hason, it appeared the member was somewhat put out by the entire situation. His analysis indicates a less than complete recollection of the matter, however. Whereas one of the conditions to the issuance of the initial permit was that the area of the outdoor cafe should not be greater than 25 percent of the indoor area of the restaurant, this member pointed out that the 69 outdoor seats were far in excess of 25 percent of the 115 or so indoor seats. This constituted a confusion of seating as opposed to area. No evidence was presented concerning whether Mr. Hason had violated the area constraint. In the main, however, while it appeared that a majority of the Board members were unhappy about the way the project developed, and expressed the opinion that the project did not conform to what they had intended to approve, there was no indication any member s vote was motivated by anything other than a sincere belief in the correctness of his position. There was no indication of any inappropriate or vindictive action by anyone on the Board or its staff. Stephen Sarnoff, a central permitting specialist with the City reviewed the plans for the initial construction and for the current application. As he recalls, the plans for the initial deck construction did not show any support beams, fans, overhead structure or latticework fencing, and the deck, as built, does not conform to the plans as submitted. City Code requirements call for a railing of from 30 to 42 inches high. The current railing of 45 inches does not conform to that standard, and Mr. Sarnoff is not aware of any request from the City that the railing be raised to that height, as Mr. Hason claims. By the same token, while there is no requirement in the ordinance that a deck be of a certain height, anything higher than 12 inches is considered a structure and a waiver is required. This deck was approved for 12 inches. A certificate of occupancy is usually issued for a deck, but in the instant case, such a certificate has not been issued because the deck, as built, is not in compliance with the 1996 approval. If it is brought into compliance, it will be approved. Sarnoff is aware of and familiar with other outdoor restaurant decks built at various locations in the Clearwater area, as indicated by Mr. Hason. Some are not within the CR-28 zone and do not come under the same standards as are applicable here. Others, which must conform to the instant requirements appear to have movable awnings which are acceptable. Still others are in a different zoning district with different set-back requirements, and some were initially denied, but were subsequently approved when they were brought into compliance with the requirements. John Richter, a senior planner for the City, was the individual who prepared the staff report on the instant project and initially recommended approval, contingent upon changes to the external appearance of the facility. He made suggestions and has discussed the project with Hason on his several visits to the property. He did discuss an awning with Hason at some point, but their discussions did not deal with its mobility. All in all, Mr. Richter concluded that the project appears to meet the standard for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe. David S. Shuford, the City's central permitting director and development code administrator indicated that the variance required for the awning, which was an integral part of the structure already built, was not automatically granted with the granting of the permit for the deck structure. Section 42.221, Clearwater City Code, was adopted to promote a more festival atmosphere in some of the outdoor tourist areas. The intent of subsection (l)(c) of that provision was to require the use of moveable items and to design structures that would meet wind requirements and not interfere with pedestrian traffic. The term "moveable" means what it says, and in Shuford's opinion, from the plans he saw, the proposed awning would not be easily moveable on a daily basis. The Clearwater City Code establishes the area in question as one where, once guidelines are developed, they will be adopted and be complied with. Mr. Shuford opines that the current deck, in the rafter area, goes beyond what was proposed at the time the project was submitted for the parking variance and was approved. This is what appears to be the source of the difficulty the Board members have with it. However, if designed to comply with the guidelines, this awning could be approved. He would agree with the conditions outlined in the staff recommendation so far as they relate to painting and architectural matters.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.69
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GROVE ISLE, LTD. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 81-002609 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002609 Latest Update: May 05, 1982

Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on the uncontested facts alleged in Petitioner's Motion For Summary Recommended Order and from the Final Orders issued in Bayshore Homeowners Association v. Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. On December 29, 1980 DER entered a Final Order on the application of Petitioner for a 90 slip marina in Biscayne Bay, Florida. The Order denied the permit because Grove Isle had not demonstrated that the project is "affirmatively in the public interest" and because the applicant had not demonstrated that it "can meet ambient water quality standards within the project area itself." In the Recommended Order on Remand the Hearing Officer had defined "existing ambient waters" to be the area in the cove between Grove Isle and the Miami mainland. The Final Order rejected that concept and held if any waters others than those contained within the immediate project site were to be considered as ambient, Petitioner must request a mixing zone as part of its application. See Section 17-4.242, (1)(a)2.b. and Section 17-4.244, Florida Administrative Code. By a letter received at the Department of Environmental Regulation on May 20, 1981, Grove Isle reapplied for the boat dock permit which was the subject of the foregoing proceedings. Petitioner's application, which was in the form of a letter from counsel, stated: May 18, 1981 Mr. Larry O'Donnell Department of Environmental Regulation Post Office Box 3858 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 RE: GROVE ISLE - Application for Boat Dock Dear Mr. O'Donnell: On behalf of Grove Isle, LTD, I am reapplying for the boat dock permit previously applied for by Grove Isle, LTD. Please consider this a short-form application. Your office designated a previous file number, DF 13-7956, to this matter. In conjunction with that application I am applying for a mixing zone, pursuant to Rule 17-4.244, for both the construction and operation of this marina. Please refer to your file on the previous application and incorporate said documents into this reapplication. I am submitting with this application: A scale drawing (one inch = 100') of the proposed facility. (which you have) A certified survey of the proposed mixing zone. (one inch = 100') An application fee of $20.00 A copy of the Final Order issued by Jacob D. Varn, former secretary of DER, on the previous application. A copy of the Notice of Intent previously issued for this project, dated 9/23/79. (which you have) As you will note from reading Mr. Varn's Final Order, he concluded that issuance of this permit was not appropriate inasmuch as the applicant had not applied for nor received a designated mixing zone. We do not necessarily agree with this order and have, in fact, appealed this decision to the First District Court of Appeal. However, in an attempt to keep this matter from becoming any more complicated, we have decided to reapply for the permit and to apply for a mixing zone. We do not concede that a mixing zone should be required for this project or that the facility will result in the release of any pollutants so as to significantly degrade ambient water quality. However, should this project, through its construction or operation, result in the release of any pollutants, I believe they would be limited to: Bottom sediments placed in suspension by the installation of the concrete piles used to support the docking facility during construction; Minimal amounts of oil and grease which may escape from the various vessels moored to the docks; The constituants of anti-fouling paint which may be applied to the hulls of the various vessels moored at the docks. Turbidity will be controlled by the use of curtains during construction. If lowered water quality occurs at all in this project it would only occur within the designated mixing zone, as per Rule 17-4.242 (2)(b) F.A.C. Please advise me should additional information be needed to process this re-application. Yours truly, /s/ KENNETH G. OERTEL On June 19, 1981, DER sent a "completeness summary letter" to Petitioner which requested the following information: Your project is in Outstanding Florida Waters. Please provide the following items demonstrating compliance with Section 17-4.242, Florida Administrative Code. Please demonstrate that this project is clearly in the public interest and that this project will not result in the degradation of ambient water quality beyond the 30 day construction period. Petitioner responded by letter dated June 22, 1981 and which was received at DER on June 25, 1981. Petitioner said in pertinent part: Dear Mr. Duke: If you would check your previous file no. DF-13-7956, I believe you will find all the information you have requested has previously been provided to your office either in that permit file or through the administrative hearings held in pursuit of this application. I think it would be more fruitful if you would communicate with Al Clark, Attorney for DER, with regard to the status of this application. As I do not wish to speak on behalf of Mr. Clark, I believe you should confirm the status of this application with him, particularly in view of our attempt to comply with Secretary Varn's Final Order which suggests the application for this mixing zone. The record reflects no further correspondence between the parties until September 23, 1981 when the Department entered a Final Order Denying Application for Permit. The Order provided that: This project was reviewed previously (DF 13-7956) and was determined not to be clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. No further evidence upon resubmittal, has been provided to clearly demonstrate that this project is in the public interest. Furthermore, the requested mixing zone exceeds that allowable pursuant to Section 17-4.244, F.A.C. and can be applied only during the construction period, pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. During the operation of this facility ambient water quality is expected to be degraded in violation of Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. This order was entered ninety-one days after DER received Petitioner's June 22, 1981 letter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the permit applied for by Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. on May 20, 1981 subject to the conditions contained in the Notice of Intent To Issue Permit dated October 23, 1979 which is a part of the record in Bayshore Homeowners Association et al., v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1982.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.60
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KATHRYN HAUGHNEY vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 90-007215 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ormond Beach, Florida Nov. 14, 1990 Number: 90-007215 Latest Update: Apr. 25, 1991

The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock and seawall by provision of reasonable assurances that the project is in the public interest.

Findings Of Fact On May 8, 1989, the Petitioner, Kathryn Haughney, applied to DER for a permit to construct a dock and seawall on the shore of the Halifax River in Volusia County. The portion of the Haughney property where the dock and seawall would be constructed is separated from the Haughney home by John Anderson Drive, which parallels the river's edge and is separated from the river by a ribbon of undeveloped property at that location and to the south. A house is located at water's edge on the lot to the north of the proposed construction site. The Haughney home itself is set well back from John Anderson drive on the side of the street away from the river. The Halifax River is classified as a Class III water body under DER rules. The particular part of the Halifax River where the Haughney property is located and where the dock and seawall are proposed is also within the Tomoka Marsh Aquatic Preserve, which is an Outstanding Florida Water under DER rules. The dock as proposed by Petitioner will be 320 square feet. DER denied the permit application on July 19, 1990, but in so doing did not deny the application on the basis of the proposed dock, which, because of its dimensions, is exempt from DER permitting requirements. The seawall as proposed is to be 137 feet long. Petitioner applied to extend it 16 feet out into waters of the state at the northern end, gradually increasing to 34 feet into waters of the state at the south end. Additionally, 5 feet of riprap would also extend out into waters of the state along the seawall's entire length. The waters of the state that would be filled by the proposed seawall contain lush wetland vegetation that provides habitat for a number of macroinvertebrate species which are part of the food chain feeding fish and wading birds such as egrets and herons. Fiddler crabs and colonies of mussels have been observed on the site. The area to be filled provides a valuable habitat for fish and wildlife. There was no mitigation offered by Petitioner to make up for the loss of habitat to be occasioned by the proposed construction. Although Petitioner asserted DER had named no "endangered species" and that the Environmental Protection Administration had not designated this area as "endangered," those federal concerns were not at issue. If such federally designated species or location designation existed in the locale, it might militate against granting this application for permit, but in the negative, it is irrelevant. A vertical seawall exists immediately north of Petitioner's shoreline. The shoreline to the south remains undeveloped. (See Finding of Fact 2). Construction of seawalls, especially those that extend out from the existing shoreline, typically causes erosion on adjacent shorelines, and additional seawalls exaggerate wave energy and can have a cumulative erosive effect. The foregoing fact is found in reliance upon the testimony of Don Medellin, an Environmental Specialist II for DER, and Barbara Bess, an Environmental Manager for DER, both accepted as experts in environmental aspects of dredge and fill permits. The assertion that actual erosion on the property to the south has already occurred was contained in a letter from Petitioner's southern neighbor (DER Exhibit 6). Petitioner's representatives objected to consideration of this exhibit as "hearsay." They are correct and current erosion to the south is not found as a fact. Nonetheless, actual erosion in a pocket on the north end of Petitioner's shoreline has been shown by the direct testimony of Emmett and Martha Haughney, who assert that their property is eroding due to the existing seawall and that Petitioner wants a permit for a seawall to alleviate this erosion. Their evidence is confirmed by the personal observations and testimony of Mr. Medellin and Ms. Bess. Further, upon their testimony, it is accepted that this minimal pocket of erosion is most likely due to the existing seawall to the north and that if the Petitioner builds a seawall to the specifications now set out in the permit application, there is potential for similar and perhaps cumulative erosion to the shoreline to the south of Petitioner's lot. Neither the city nor county involved has land use restrictions which would prohibit Petitioner's proposed seawall except that Volusia County advocates riprap requirements if this permit application were granted. In its Notice of Permit Denial, DER advised Petitioner as follows: The Department has determined that the follow- ing changes to the project may make the project permittable: The vertical seawall should be eliminated and replaced with coquina rock riprap revet- ment. The riprap should be located further landward and conform to the slope of the existing embankment. Backfilling on the north property line is acceptable provided the fill area does not extend more than 10 feet westward in the most eroded area. Accordingly, the riprap could extend to the adjacent seawall and gradually extend in a more landward direc- tion to prevent excessive elimination of the littoral zone vegetation. Whatever alternative the applicant elects to choose, the removal or elimination of littoral zone vegetation must be offset in the form of mitigation if the impacts can not be reduced any further. Finally, the agent should eliminate the use of generic drawings which must be continually revised. All drawings should reflect the existing and proposed conditions and the impacts associated with the project. Petitioner's contractor, Andy Harris, testified to other alternatives that could be used by Petitioner in constructing her seawall, but the evidence of Mr. Medellin and Ms. Bess is persuasive that the alternative measures proposed by Mr. Harris would not provide the reasonable assurances the law requires DER to obtain from Petitioner.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order affirming its July 19, 1990 Notice of Permit Denial. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-7215 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's letter to Hearing Officer (filed March 22, 1991) The first paragraph complains that a VCR was unavailable in the hearing room so that Petitioner's videotape could not be shown. Petitioner should have made arrangements for showing the tape and did not. Likewise, Petitioner never offered the tape in evidence (for viewing by the Hearing Officer afterwards in preparation of this Recommended Order). Therefore, it very properly was not considered. The next 3 paragraphs refer to the Casden letter (DER Exhibit 6), which is covered in FOF 8-9. The remaining paragraphs are rhetoric and legal argument upon which no ruling need to made under Section 120.59(2) F.S.; however, they are alluded to in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's letter to DER Counsel (filed March 25, 1991 by DER, suggesting it was Petitioner's proposed findings of fact) 1-3 For the reasons set out above, the Petitioner's videotape was not considered. The subject of erosion to the degree proved at the hearing is covered in the Recommended Order. 4-5, PS 1-3 Mere rhetoric and legal argument upon which no ruling need be made under Section 120.59(2) F.S.; covered in the Conclusions of Law to the degree appropriate. Respondent's PFOF: 1-11 Accepted as modified to reflect the greater weight of the credible and probative record evidence as a whole. That which is rejected is rejected as not proven or not persuasive. Unnecessary or irrelevant material has likewise been excluded. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas MacLaughlin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kathryn Haughney 2301 John Anderson Drive Ormond Beach, FL 32074 Emmett and Martha Haughney 2301 John Anderson Drive Ormond Beach, FL 32074 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400

Florida Laws (2) 120.57403.813
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