The Issue Whether Respondent, Andrew T. Edgemond, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed against Respondent's land surveyor's license.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Board of Professional Surveyors and Mappers, with the responsibility to license, regulate, and discipline land surveyors in the State of Florida. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number LS 0002347. Respondent was initially licensed as a land surveyor in 1971 and has practiced land surveying in Plant City, Florida for more than twenty years. On or about March 22, 1989, Respondent was contacted by a client who requested that Respondent prepare a survey specifying the location of certain mono form boards. Mono form boards are temporary structures and are not fixed improvements, although they may be used to indicate where fixed improvements will be located. The client indicated that the survey was needed immediately because the client was to have a slab of concrete poured before the next morning. Prior to conducting the survey, Respondent asked his client for a legal description of the property on which the form boards were located. The client provided Respondent with a copy of a building permit which contained a reference to a preliminary plat. Respondent then went to City Hall in Plant City, Florida where he obtained a preliminary plat which included the property on which the form boards were located. After leaving the City Hall, Respondent went to his office to determine where the property was located. In researching the files in his office, Respondent found a boundary survey which included a property line which was coincident with the property the client had asked him to survey. Having obtained the building permit, preliminary plat, and the boundary survey, Respondent went into the field to measure the location of the form boards. Upon returning to his office, Respondent prepared a survey which indicated the location of the mono form boards. The survey, dated March 22, 1989, was signed and sealed by Respondent. On the survey was the following: "SPECIFIC PURPOSE SURVEY" "FOR BUILDING PERMIT PURPOSES ONLY" The survey drawing contained a preliminary description as follows: PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTION Lot 22 of WALDIN LAKE UNIT 55 as per "Preliminary Plat" on file in City Engineers office, City of Plant City, Florida. Respondent made the decision to designate the survey a specific purpose survey after he reviewed Rule 21HH-6.002, Florida Administrative Code. After reviewing the various types of surveys outlined in the rule, Respondent concluded that a survey done solely to provide a client with the location of mono form boards that were already in place came within the definition of a specific or special purpose survey. A specific or special purpose survey is one that is performed for specified purposes and does not come within the definition of other types of surveys outlined in Rule 21HH-6.002, Florida Administrative Code. The specific purpose survey allows the surveyor to perform a survey that meets the client's particular need. However, a specific purpose survey may not be used to circumvent the law and must conform to the minimum technical standards. The Department's position is that a specific purpose survey was inappropriate in the instant case. Moreover, even if a specific purpose survey was appropriate, the Respondent's survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards. With regard to the type of survey performed by Respondent, the Department's expert witness, Lewis Kent, testified that Respondent's use of the specific purpose survey in this case was improper. Although this was his opinion, Mr. Kent candidly admitted that he was not sure what Respondent was requested to do by the client. Mr. Kent further testified that standard practice requires that boundary surveys be performed prior to new construction. Apparently, Mr. Kent believed that the situation in this case involved new construction. Based on that belief, he concluded that Respondent was obligated to perform a boundary survey. Notwithstanding this conclusion, no authority was cited for this proposition. In fact, evidence was presented that the Plant City Building Department did not require a boundary survey as a condition of issuing a building permit for commercial projects, such as the proposed project of Respondent's client. At one point, Mr. Kent stated that the Respondent was required to perform a boundary survey of the entire 1,539.523 acre tract, even though the tract had already been surveyed. During the course of his testimony, Mr. Kent retreated from this position and indicated that Respondent was not obligated to retrace the entire tract, but should have retraced enough of the tract to tie his survey to a legal corner. Notwithstanding the Department's position that the specific purpose survey was inappropriate in this case and that Respondent should have performed a boundary survey, its expert witness testified that a boundary survey was not the only way to locate the mono form boards. During his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Kent indicated that perhaps the type of survey that Respondent should have performed was a "construction layout survey" as that term is defined in Rule 22HH-6.002 (6)(c), Florida Administrative Code. In regard to the second allegation, the Department asserted that even if the survey was appropriately designated a specific purpose survey, the survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards. Specifically, the Department alleged that Respondent's specific purpose survey failed to include an adequate legal description and a legend which included abbreviations used in the drawing. According to the Department's expert witness, the legal description on Respondent's specific purpose survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards in that the description on the face of the survey referred only to a preliminary plat, which by its very nature is subject to change. However, at the time Respondent prepared the specific purpose survey, the subdivision had not yet been platted. The Department's position is that the minimum technical standards required that the survey include a phrase describing the legal metes and bounds, and show the location of the mono form boards in relation to a boundary line. According to the Department's expert, as presently drawn, another surveyor could not reproduce this survey without first obtaining a copy of the preliminary plat referred to on the survey. Richard Hinson, the expert witness for Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida since 1982. During that time, Mr. Hinson has performed several hundred boundary surveys in Plant City, Florida and over a hundred surveys for building permit purposes. The testimony of Mr. Hinson conflicted directly with the testimony of Mr. Kent. It was Mr. Hinson's testimony that in the instant case, a specific purpose survey is appropriate. Based on what Respondent's client requested, a measurement showing the location of the mono form boards, the survey was appropriately designated a specific purpose survey. The Department asserted that, at a minimum, Respondent was obligated to do a boundary survey of Lot 22. However, in this situation, a boundary survey of preliminary Lot 22 would have made no difference in the location of the mono form boards because Lot 22 did not exist when Respondent prepared the survey. With regard to the preliminary description on the survey, based on Mr. Hinson's opinion, the specific purpose survey prepared by Respondent meets the minimum technical standards. While the survey does not recite or go back to a corner for the description, the description given is that it relates to the preliminary plat. With respect to the use of a specific purpose survey, Mr. Hinson's opinion was that, in this case, it was appropriate for Respondent to perform a specific purpose survey to measure the location of form boards. This opinion was based on two factors, both of which were present in this case. First, prior to performing the survey, the surveyor must have reviewed the following: a boundary survey, a building permit with a legal description describing Lot 22 according to a preliminary plat, and a copy the preliminary plat showing Lot 22. Second, the surveyor must have determined that the preliminary plat was rendered out of the boundary survey. In this case, prior to performing the specific purpose survey, Respondent utilized a boundary survey of the tract, which included Lot 22 as shown on the preliminary plat, and determined that the preliminary plat was rendered from that survey. After assuring himself that the preliminary plat was rendered from the boundary survey which he reviewed, Respondent went to the site and proceeded to measure and draw the location of the mono form boards in his field notes. Respondent's survey shows Lot 22 and notes that this is a preliminary description based on a preliminary plat. The preliminary plat is referenced on the survey. The drawing, which depicts the location of the mono form boards, measures the distance from the boundary of Lot 22 to Old Sydney Road and to Sydney Road. The drawing also measures the distance of the mono form boards from the boundary lines of Lot 22. The accuracy of these measurements were undisputed by the Department. Based on Mr. Hinson's opinion, Respondent's decision to designate the survey in the instant case as a specific purpose survey was appropriate. Also, with respect to the preliminary description that appears on the face of the survey, the survey meets the minimum technical standards. The specific purpose survey prepared by Respondent fails to meet the minimum technical standard set forth in Rule 21HH-6.003(5), Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that the abbreviations used on the drawing be noted within a legend on the face of the drawing. In this case, the abbreviations used on the survey are not noted on a legend or anywhere else on the survey. No evidence was presented to indicate that the specific purpose survey performed by Respondent inaccurately depicted the location of the mono form boards. Neither was evidence presented which even claimed to indicate that the survey prepared by Respondent failed to comply with the client's request. Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida for twenty-four years, and there is no evidence that he has been subjected to disciplinary action on any prior occasion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Land Surveyors and Mappers, enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 472.033(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $250.00 RECOMMENDED that Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1159 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Statutes, (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4-5. Accepted. 6. Accepted and incorporated. 7-9. Accepted. 10. Rejected as statement of rule. 11. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 12. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 13. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 14. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 15. Rejected as argument. 16. Accepted and incorporated. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 20. Rejected as argument. 21-22. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Accepted except at time of survey the lots were preliminary. Rejected as argument. 26-27. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 28. Accepted except statement that Respondent was obligated to retrace part of the survey is rejected. 29-31. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Accepted. 34-35. Rejected as argument. 36. Accepted. 37-40. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 41. Accepted. 42-43. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. 46-48. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated. Unsupported by record evidence. 3-7. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 1-3 of page 2. Rejected as conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Miriam S. Wilkinson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mark W. Reagan, Esquire P.O. Box 321028 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32932 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's applications for two outdoor advertising permits, dated June 1, 1999, and received by the Respondent on June 10, 1999, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for, among other things, issuing permits and regulating outdoor advertising structures and signs along the state highway system, the interstate system, and the federal-aid primary system. Section 479.02, Florida Statutes (1999). In the applications received by the Department on June 10, 1999, AK Media sought permits for two signs to be attached to one monopole, one sign to be facing north and one sign to be facing south. The applications stated that the proposed location of the monopole is the west side of State Road 7/U.S. 441, 2.4 miles north of Atlantic Avenue in Palm Beach County, Florida, and approximately 57 feet from the State Road 7 right-of-way. AK Media has leased the proposed site from its owner. As a required part of the applications, AK Media submitted two Florida Department of Transportation forms executed on April 12, 1999, by Jon Mac Gillis, Principal Site Planner for Palm Beach County. The current zoning of the proposed site was identified on the form as "CG Commercial General," and the designation of the proposed site on the future land use map was identified as "SA", that is, "Special Agriculture." It was further indicated on the form executed by Mr. Gillis that, within the "SA" designation, commercial and industrial uses were the "predominate uses allowed within 660' of the highway adjacent to the proposed site." On May 26, 1999, Palm Beach County issued a Special Permit allowing AK Media to register the proposed billboard. In its Notice of Denial of Application, the Department identified one basis for denying AK Media's applications as follows: Site is in un-permittable land use designation. Pursuant to Section 479.111, Florida Statutes, outdoor advertising signs must be located in commercial or industrial zoned or unzoned areas. Section 479.01(3) defines "commercial or industrial zone" as an area "designated predominately for commercial or industrial use under the future land use map of the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163." The land use designation for the subject site is SA. The Palm Beach County, Florida, Official Zoning District Map in effect at the time of the hearing identified the zoning of the proposed site of the outdoor advertising signs as "CG" (Commercial General). The Future Land Use Atlas of Palm Beach County in effect at the time of hearing designated the proposed site of the outdoor advertising signs as "SA" (Special Agriculture). Palm Beach County's 1989 Comprehensive Plan, as revised December 13, 1999, was in effect at the time of the hearing. "Special Agriculture Uses" are defined therein in pertinent part: The following land uses and intensities are allowed in areas designated Special Agriculture where permitted by the terms of the Unified Land Development Code: Fruit and vegetable markets and terminals for farm products; Agricultural production uses including, but not limited to, produce packing plants, poultry and egg production, nurseries, growing, livestock, kennels, training centers and potting soil manufacturing; Agriculturally related services such as feed and grain stores and farm implement sales and service and fueling areas restricted solely to agricultural activities; Mining, subject to the limitations; Uses and structures accessory to a permitted use; and Limited residential uses as described below, farm labor quarters and camps; caretaker's quarters, such as for pump houses; dwelling quarters and farm residences for bona fide farm operations; or dwelling units allowed as alternative use. The Palm Beach County Comprehensive Plan defines "Commercial Agricultural Development" as follows: "Agriculture conducted for commercial purposes within the Agricultural Production Plan Category North of L-8 Canal and East of the North Tieback Canal, the AG Reserve Plan Category, and those activities classified as special agriculture." In concluding that AK Media's applications should be denied, the Department's field inspector confirmed the "SA" designation on the Palm Beach County future land use map but disregarded the certification of the Principal Site Planner for Palm Beach County that the proposed site was zoned "GC" and that predominately commercial uses were allowed within areas designated "SA" in the future land use map. The proposed site of the outdoor advertising signs is designated for commercial use in Palm Beach County's future land use map, albeit commercial use related to agriculture, and the site is zoned General Commercial, as shown on Palm Beach County's current zoning map. The proposed site is, therefore, located within a commercial zone.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order granting the applications of AK Media, Inc., for permits to erect outdoor advertising signs on the site identified in the applications. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2000.
The Issue Whether or not Respondent has violated Sections 472.033(1)(a), and (h), and 455.227(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rules 21HH-2.001(3) and 21HH-6.003, Florida Administrative Code, by failure to comply with a valid Final Order of the Board of Professional Land Surveyors.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Board of Professional Land Surveyors, with the responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455 and 472, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times material to the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent Bertin C. Tash was licensed as a professional land surveyor in the State of Florida, holding license number LS 0002292. By Final Order entered December 31, 1985, the Board of Professional Land Surveyors issued a Final Order in case number 0049353 (previously DOAH Case No. 85-0285), a prior disciplinary action against Respondent. Among other terms of that Final Order, Respondent was placed on probation for twenty-seven months and further was required during the course of that twenty-seven month probation to: ... submit 25 surveys representative of his land surveying practice which shall be accompanied by field notes and record plats to the board for its review. Additional information regarding the surveys may be requested. Five surveys shall be submitted within three months from the filing of this final order; thereafter, five surveys shall be submitted at six month intervals during the period of probation. Respondent shall attend the first available continuing education seminar in his area on the minimum technical standards within 12 months from the filing of this order or as soon after as possible. Evidence of Respondent's attendance and successful completion of the course shall be furnished to the board through the proctor or instructor of the continuing education course... (Emphasis supplied.) It is noted that although the "certificate of service" for the copy of the Final Order admitted in evidence as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is unsigned, Respondent admitted receipt thereof, that no appeal was taken therefrom, and that he understood the terms of the Final Order. Twenty-seven months from December 31, 1985 would fall on April 1, 1987. Twelve months from December 31, 1985 would fall on January 2, 1986. Respondent initially complied with the Final Order by submitting two sets of five surveys, the second in December, 1986. However, some type of dispute arose between Respondent and the Board's monitor of Respondent's probation about whether the monitor could require corrections to be done by Respondent to those surveys already submitted and about whether or not Respondent could be required to submit his field notes for the surveys. Respondent seems to have resisted the clear language of the Final Order (see emphasized language in Finding of Fact No. 4, supra) upon a personal belief that these requirements were unconstitutional, invaded his privacy, or exposed him to ethical charges by his clients. There is nothing in the record, to support this ideation of Respondent, and eventually, Respondent altered his position. Respondent did not submit any further surveys until November, 1988 after the instant case was already in progress, at which time he had modified some of his views with regard to field notes. He then attempted to comply with the Final Order by submitting corrected surveys. However, in error, he sent these surveys not to the Board, but to the attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation where they were retained. This submittal was considerably beyond the April 1, 1987 probationary period and whether considered corrections of the second five surveys or an additional five surveys would not constitute the twenty-five surveys required by the prior Final Order. The Respondent failed to complete a seminar on minimum technical standards between the entry of the Final Order on December 31, 1985 and the date of formal hearing on December 14, 1988. Petitioner submitted proof that such courses were available in West Palm Beach, Respondent's hometown, on May 20, 1987, and in adjoining Broward County on May 21, 1988. Clearly, neither of these courses was available to Respondent during the probationary time frames set out in the Final Order and Findings of Fact Nos. 4 and 5 supra. Petitioner submitted no proof of the availability of other such courses during the appropriate time frames, but it appears undisputed that these were the only qualifying courses "in his area" and that the Board would have accepted Respondent's late completion of either course as his compliance with the continuing education requirement in the Final Order. The Board even went so far as to reserve space for Respondent at the May 21, 1988 course in Broward County. Respondent's testimony that he was too ill to attend the May 30, 1987 course is unrefuted. Respondent's testimony that he had, no private means of transportation to the May 21, 1988 course is also unrefuted but he did not show unavailability of public transportation. Moreover, Respondent testified that until the date of formal hearing, he had resisted, upon grounds of his personal ethical ideation, the concept of learning from, or submitting himself to critiques by, any local professionals who conducted continuing education seminars in land surveying.
Recommendation That the Board of Professional Land Surveyors enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of two counts of violating Section 472.003(1)(h) Florida Statutes, and imposing a three-month suspension of Respondent's license, subject to an extension of such suspension to a maximum of one year or until Respondent completes the continuing education course required by the prior Final Order, whichever comes first, and imposing thereafter three years' probation to follow immediately upon the lifting of the suspension, during which three years' probation Respondent shall be required to submit an appropriate number of surveys to be determined by the Board for review by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3108 The following constitute specific rulings upon the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF) pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 are all accepted. Respondent's PFOF: PFOF 1 discusses the nature of several exhibits and objections ruled upon in the course of formal hearing, does not constitute a relevant or material proposed fact and is not dispositive of any issue at bar. The same subjects are addressed within the RO at FOF 3-4 and 8 to the degree they impinge on this proceeding. PFOF 2 is rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 8 to the degree it comports with the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. PFOF 3 is accepted in part in FOF 6. The remainder of the proposal is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, and not comporting with the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. PFOF 4,5,7 and 8 are rejected as mere argument of position or legal argument. PFOF 6 is accepted in part in FOF 7. The remainder of the proposal is rejected as immaterial or mere argument of position or legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bertin C. Tash 5100 Spruce Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33407-2846 Allen Smith, Jr. Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32299-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Narcisco J. Ramirez, held land surveyor license number LS0002779 issued by petitioner, Department of professional Regulation, Board of Professional Land Surveyors. Respondent currently operates a land surveying firm known as South Atlantic Services of Florida, Inc. located at 7350 Southwest 41st Street; Miami, Florida. Respondent received a two year degree in civil engineering from City College of San Francisco in 1969 and has worked for various firms as a land surveyor in the Miami area since 1971. He has been a registered land surveyor in Florida since July, 1975. In March, 1984, respondent was contacted by a real estate salesman and requested to perform a "boundary survey" and "sketch" of a parcel of land owned by one M. P. Smith McNiely. The land in question involved various lots, including Lots 23, 25-30, 34-36 and 38 located in a subdivision known as DeSoto Heights which lies adjacent to Southwest 304th Street, Southwest 105th Terrace, and Southwest 168th Street in Dade County, Florida, just north of the City of Homestead. The property was to be sold, and the survey was intended to assist the seller in determining a sales price on the property. Ramirez interpreted the request to mean that only a "preliminary sketch" would be initially done, and if requested by the owner, a "complete survey" would be performed at a later date. He was paid $650 for the initial work, and expected an additional fee of $2,500 to $3,000 for the complete survey. According to Ramirez, a preliminary sketch is not as accurate as a complete survey, has substantially less information, may contain errors, and does not require a certification by the surveyor that it meets all required professional standards of surveying. Ramirez assigned the field work to an employee named Roberto Collado, who no longer lives in Florida. The field work consisted of determining the property corners, and providing a sketch to the real estate salesman. Ramirez did not certify that minimum technical standards had been met but did sign and seal the drawing on March 22, 1984. At the same time he provided the following certification: I HEREBY CERTIFY: that the attached sketch of survey represents a recent survey made under my direction, and is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. There are no encroachments unless shown thereon. Ramirez also added the following in bold lettering: NOTE: BOUNDARY SURVEY ONLY. No elevations secured or any other featured at the owners representative s request. A short time later, Frank Makowski, also a registered land surveyor and a former professional colleague of Ramirez some ten years earlier was contacted by an attorney (David Liebman) who was handling the sales transaction of McNiely's property. The closing was being held up because Ramirez's survey reflected a house sitting on both lots 36 and 37. Makowski was requested to verify the encroachment onto lot 36, and to ascertain the true location of the property boundaries. Makowski initially contacted Ramirez and requested a copy of his sketch and field notes. These were supplied by Ramirez, who gave no indication to him that the work was only "preliminary" in nature. Makowski then sent out a field team to survey the property. It found that the west boundary on the Ramirez survey was actually thirty-three feet off, which caused the purported encroachment on lot 36. The sketch made by Ramirez was deficient in a number of respects as established by uncontradicted expert testimony. To begin with, the parties have stipulated that the survey did not comply with the minimum technical standards for land surveying as set forth in Chapter 21HH- 6, Florida Administrative Code. These include Rules 21HH- 6.03(1), (2), (4), (6)-(8), (12), (18)-(20), and 21HH- 6.06(1), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the administrative complaint. For example, it contained no certification, did not reflect all bearings and angles, and monumentations were not set. In short, the Ramirez survey technique and procedure was not in conformance with the procedure required by generally accepted and prevailing standards of land surveying. Moreover, even though it was identified as a "boundary survey;" expert testimony established that the project was indeed a survey within the meaning of the term and it had to meet such technical standards or plainly provide a disclaimer to indicate that such standards were not met. In September, 1983, respondent was engaged by an engineering firm to "secure ground elevations along the above property (Southwest 168th Street and Southwest 192nd Avenue, Dade County) and then relate said elevations to a Dade County Bench Mark," and to "prepare a sketch of survey showing said existing ground elevations." For this he was to be paid $150. The property was owned by Alfred and Linda Wilson. Ramirez first obtained by telephone a bench mark on September 30, 1983; from the Dade County Surveying Department and then sent a field crew to complete the task. The bench mark he selected was across a canal and some three-quarters of a mile from the property in question in an area with heavy undergrowth. This made an accurate measurement more difficult to perform. The accuracy of vertical control surveys (elevations) is essential since this determines whether a parcel of land must have fill added in order to install a septic tank and well. It also affects the flood insurability of a home. Such surveys are subject to the minimum technical standards of the profession, as adopted by agency rules, unless the survey is a "specific purpose survey." In that event the same must be clearly stated on the face of the survey. In this case Ramirez, merely noted on the face of the sketch: "preliminary sketch, only elevations are included in this sketch of survey, no horizontal distances were measured nor controls set and distances shown along the sketch are for location purposes only." He also certified that "the elevations shown refer to a National Vertical Geodetic Datum of 1929, Bench Mark, were secured by us under my direction and are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." Ramirez considered the project to be a "special purpose sketch" and therefore did not believe he had to certify that minimum technical standards had been met. Indeed, he conceded that such standards had not been met in preparing the documents. Makowski was requested to perform a survey on the Wilson property on June 12, 1984 to verify the accuracy of Ramirez s survey. He found the actual elevations to be approximately two feet lower than those reflected on Ramirez's sketch. 2/ The accuracy of Makowski's findings was corroborated by a survey previously performed by another surveyor in 1979. That survey, which is a public record on file with the Dade County Subdivision Control Department, indicated that because of the property's low elevation, fill was required to meet flood criteria. Through the testimony of Makowski and another expert land surveyor, James E. Beadman, it was established without contradiction that Ramirez's work failed to comport with minimum technical standards of the land surveying profession. For example, Ramirez had insufficient field notes, he used too few turning points, and did not perform a loop closure. Further, there is no bench mark description or certification by Ramirez on the survey, and Ramirez used a Linker rod to transfer elevations from one bench mark to another in contravention of accepted standards. Had Ramirez desired to qualify his elevation survey in accordance with agency rules, he should have identified his survey as a topographic survey and indicated that improvements were not located. By calling it an elevation survey, Ramirez did not change its true character of being a topographic survey. Rule 21HH-6.06, Florida Administrative Code, requires that when a survey is not performed, a surveyor should "state that such sketch is not a survey" on the face of the sketch. All other surveys must meet minimum technical standards, and by signing and sealing the drawings, a surveyor certifies as such. Ramirez justified his work in the McNiely project as being simply preliminary in nature. If he conducted a complete survey at a later time, he would then obtain more information, and correct any errors present on the initial drawings. Similarly, he viewed the Wilson survey as a special purpose sketch," and one not requiring compliance with minimum technical standards. Ramirez has performed hundreds of surveys in the past fifteen years; and there is no evidence of any formal disciplinary action having been instituted against him for negligence or misconduct. Both surveys were eventually performed in an accurate manner by Makowski. There were no complaints filed against Ramirez by either client. The complaint herein stems from Makowski who reported the alleged violations to petitioner after reviewing Ramirez's work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as set forth in the conclusions of law portion of this orders and that he be fined $1000 and placed on two years probation. All other charges should be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 7th day of August, 1985.
The Issue Have the Intervenors timely challenged the Hamilton County adoption of its comprehensive plan under the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes? If allowed to pursue their challenge, what is their burden of proof? Is it pursuant to Section 163.3184(9), Florida Statutes, (1991), the "fairly debatable" standard? Is it pursuant to Section 163.3184(10), Florida Statutes, (1991) the "preponderance" standard? Did Hamilton County (the County) fail to adopt its comprehensive plan within sixty (60) days from the receipt of written comments from the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as required by Section 163.3184(7), Florida Statutes (1991)? If it did, was that failure jurisdictional thereby voiding the adoption process? Within the adopted plan, is Policy V.2.13 requiring special permits for hazardous and bio-medical waste treatment facilities and for their placement in areas designated agricultural and located with the rural area of Hamilton County, consistent with plan adoption requirements set forth in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, (1991), Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, the State Comprehensive Plan set forth in Chapter 187, Florida Statutes (1991) and the North Central Florida Regional Policy Plan? Within the adopted plan is Policy 1.15.1 prohibiting the disposal of medical, bio-hazardous, hazardous or solid waste by incineration or by other methods which produce air pollution, other than by facilities permitted, legally sited and operated as of July 23, 1991, consistent with plan adoption requirements set forth in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (1991), Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, the State Comprehensive Plan as set forth in Chapter 187, Florida Statutes, and the North Central Regional Policy Plan? More particularly must these policies meet and do they meet the requirements for surveys, studies and data set forth in Section 163.3177(6)(a),(8) and (10)(e), Florida Statutes (1991) and Rule 9J-5.005(2), Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact In December, 1990, Hamilton County prepared a proposed comprehensive plan. That proposal was submitted to the Department in accordance with Section 163.3184(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Within the Conservation Element of the proposed plan the County included Policy V.2.13, which stated: The County shall only allow hazardous and bio-medical waste treatment facilities as special permits within areas designated agricultural and located within the rural area of the County. Further, the County's land development regulations shall include conditions for such approval of a hazardous and bio-medical waste treatment facility as a special permit regarding the location, site design, buffer requirements, access to principal arterials and major intersections, requirements for appropriate public facilities, and require- ments which consider wind currents in relationship to population centers, which will direct any incinerated materials or noxious odors from these population centers. In no case shall a hazardous or bio-medical waste treatment facility be located within an Environmentally Sensitive Area as designated within this Comprehensive Plan. Policy V.2.13 was associated with Objective V.2 which states: The County shall include within the land development regulations, by 1992, provisions for the conservation, appropriate use and protection of the quality and quantity of current and projected water sources, water recharge areas and potable water wells. There was no specific data and analysis in the proposed plan directed to Policy V.2.13. Other policies associated with Objective V.2 addressed water issues. In the data and analysis which the County submitted to DCA with its proposed comprehensive plan the County did identify known pollution problems. This included a reference to point discharges for wastewater, non-point sources of water pollution, point air pollution sources and non-point sources of air pollution. None of the known activities were associated with hazardous and bio- medical waste treatment facilities. The data and analysis associated with the Conversation Element in the proposed plan also identified watersheds, wetlands, lakes, flood prone areas, and current water sources. The data and analysis further discussed the circumstances related to watersheds, wetlands, rivers, lakes, flood prone areas and air quality as the County perceived the existing conditions for those topics. Finally, the data and analysis spoke to the issue of projected water needs. No mention was made concerning how the aforementioned data and analysis would be considered in granting special permits for hazardous and bio-medical waste treatment facilities. On April 14, 1991, DCA transmitted its comments to the County concerning the proposed comprehensive plan and supporting data and analysis, together with its objections and recommendations for modifications to the proposed comprehensive plan. This activity was in accordance with Section 163.3184(6), Florida Statutes. The report that was transmitted is known as the "ORC" Report. The County received the ORC Report on April 22, 1991. The ORC Report made a number of objections to the objectives and policies set forth in the Conservation Element to the proposed comprehensive plan and recommendations for modifications to the same. The ORC Report specifically objected to Policy V.2.13 wherein the DCA stated: Policy V.2.13 does not describe the 'special permits' concerning hazardous and bio-medical waste treatment facilities within agricultural areas, does not define the extent of the buffers, and does not prohibit these facilities in conser- vation areas. The general recommendation to improve Policy V.2.13, among policies found within the Conservation Element, was to this effect: Provide data and analysis to support the above- referenced policies. Revise the policies to identify the specific implementation programs or activities that will be undertaken by the County to achieve the goal and objectives with which the policies are associated. Eliminate or define all conditional and vague language. Revise the Future Land Use Map to support the revised policies. The County then held two public hearings related to the adoption of a comprehensive plan. See Section 163.3184(15), Florida Statutes (1991). The first public hearing was held on June 18, 1991. At that time no decision was reached to adopt a comprehensive plan. The public hearing was adjourned. On July 23, 1991, the County reconvened the public hearing related to the comprehensive plan adoption. Following the second public hearing associated with the plan adoption, the County in the person of its Board of County Commissioners who had conducted the public hearings, adopted a comprehensive plan for Hamilton County. The adopted comprehensive plan was transmitted to DCA on July 30, 1991. The transmittal letter supporting the adopted comprehensive plan noted that the comprehensive plan was adopted on July 23, 1991. The transmittal letter pointed out the changes to the adopted comprehensive plan which were not reviewed by DCA when DCA considered the proposed comprehensive plan. As with the proposed comprehensive plan, the County submitted data and analysis with the adopted comprehensive plan pointing out the data and analysis accompanying the adopted comprehensive plan which had not been reviewed by the DCA when it considered data and analysis supporting the proposed comprehensive plan. Within the conservation element to the adopted comprehensive plan Objective V.2 remained as set forth in the proposed comprehensive plan. Certain policies associated with Objective V.2 had changed. However, Objective V.2. and its associated policies set forth in the adopted comprehensive plan continued to address water issues. In particular, Policy V.2.13 did not change with the plan adoption. Additional data and analysis submitted by the County supporting the Conservation Element to the adopted comprehensive plan deleted the Suwannee River State Park as a conservation area. Specific references were made to Jumping Gully Creek, Swift Creek, Hunter Creek and the Withlacoochee River and activities associated with those water bodies. However, as with the proposed plan it was not explained how the County intended to use the original and additional data and analysis in deciding special permit issues for hazardous and bio-medical waste treatment facilities. When the County adopted its comprehensive plan it added an objective and a policy that had not been included with the proposed comprehensive plan in the category of objectives and policies for both urban development areas and rural areas in the Future Land Use Element. New Objective I.15 stated: Residential areas shall be protected from uses which cause or result in greater than average noise, hazards or odors. The associated Policy I.15.1 stated: No medical, bio-hazardous, hazardous, or solid waste shall be disposed of by incineration or by any other method which produces air pollution emissions subject to permitting by the Department of Environmental Regulation within Hamilton County, unless the use or facility was permitted and otherwise legally sited and operated as of July 23, 1991. The supporting data and analysis which the County provided the Department with the adopted comprehensive plan did not address Objective I.15 nor Policy I.15.1, with the exception that residential land use projections are described. The adopted plan provided specific information concerning future residential land use. That description was supported by a residential land use need methodology and analysis of future residential land use needed. As with the proposed plan, the adopted plan included a reference to industrial land use within the Future Land Use Element. In both the proposed plan and the adopted plan in Policy 1.3.1 it was stated: Lands classified as industrial consist of areas used for the manufacturing, assembly processing or storage of products. Industrial development may be approved in areas of the County not designated industrial on the Future Land Use Plan upon submission and approval of a development plan which shall include at the least: an industrial site plan; traffic plan; and traffic impact studies; provisions for the construction and maintenance of a wastewater treatment system meeting requirements of the State of Florida for that use; and a submission of a Future Land Use Plan Map amendment to Industrial classification. Industrial uses shall be limited to an intensity of less than or equal to 1.0 floor area ratio. The data and analysis associated with industrial land use which had been provided with the proposed comprehensive plan remained consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan when describing the methodology for identifying projected industrial land use. The comments in the data and analysis supporting the proposed and adopted plans indicated: Projecting the need for additional acreage for industrial use cannot be approached using a methodology similar to those used for residential and commercial Future Land Use needs. This is due to the fact that there is no direct relationship between population and industrial location. The additional future acreages for industrial location are anticipated to occur on a site specific basis as needed at the time industrial activities are proposed. Within the adopted comprehensive plan, Future Land Use Element related to urban development areas and rural areas is found the general industrial land use classification. The general industrial land use designations are located in the central area of the county to the southwest of the City of Jasper along County Road 249. There is an additional limited industrial land use classification within the urban development area and rural area category. It identifies industrial opportunities at interchanges on Interstate 75. At these interchanges, upon submission of a site plan that comports with development standards, with due regard for safety and adequate access, light industrial development is allowed which does not require an air emission permit from the State of Florida. Industrial land use designations as well as other land use designations were based upon an analysis of the amount and character of undeveloped land in the county, reliable population projections and growth patterns anticipated for the area, together with the availability of the public services to accommodate the projected population. The adopted comprehensive plan includes a Future Land Use Map and Map Series found within the Future Land Use Element of the adopted plan which depicts industrial land use. Intervenors' property carries a general industrial classification in the future land use designation in the adopted plan. Intervenors' property is not located on the Interstate 75 corridor and therefore would not be considered for this special industrial land use classification. The North Central Florida Regional Planning Council (the Council) assisted the County in preparing its proposed and adopted plans. The Council staff were engaged in that process as early as 1986. From that point forward the Council staff conducted field surveys relating to land use, compiled data from existing data sources and reviewed population projections and growth patterns in Hamilton County. The Council staff compiled information concerning public facilities, recreational and solid waste facilities, information relating to physical capacity for those facilities and information concerning the financing of capital projects. In anticipation of the requirements set forth in Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, the Council staff conducted field surveys of existing land use to determine the character of undeveloped land in the county. The staff reviewed the population projections of the University of Florida Bureau of Business and Economic Research. These activities were designed to assist the County in analyzing the amount of land necessary to accommodate projected growth and the availability of public services. The Council staff was responsible for preparing the proposed plan statement related to goals, objectives, and policies. The staff also prepared the Future Land Use Plan Map. The documents prepared by the Council staff were subject to review and workshops were held to consider those matters. Modifications were brought about through public comments presented at the workshops. The Council staff prepared an evaluation, appraisal and review report to examine the success of previously adopted comprehensive plans. Following the conduct of workshops the public sessions for plan adoption were held on June 18, and July 23, 1991. As representative for the County, the Council staff invited the Department to send representatives to attend the public hearing sessions. The Department was represented at those sessions. In the public hearings related to the plan adoption, there was considerable public testimony expressing concern about health and environmental impacts involved with the incineration of bio-medical waste. In particular, remarks were made about air emissions of mercury and dioxins and the disposal of ash residue from the incineration process. Documents were also presented by members of the public who opposed waste incineration. One document was from the United States Environmental Protection Agency, entitled Seminar-Medical and Institutional Waste Incineration: Regulations, Management, Technology, Emissions and Operations. Another document was entitled Hazardous Waste News #82, June 20, 1988, identified as a weekly news and resource for citizens fighting toxins. A third document was entitled "Facts" related to definitions within Section 403.703, Florida Statutes and observations from the author of this document concerning Intervenors intended operations of a bio-medical incineration facility in Hamilton County. Finally, there was a document from the Hamilton County School Board calling for a buffer zone between any school in the county and facilities which incinerated or otherwise disposed of substances through incineration or other disposal means which would create air emissions from the destruction of solid waste, hazardous substances, bio-hazardous waste and biological waste as defined within Section 403.703, Florida Statutes. The Hamilton County School Board also expressed a desire to completely prohibit the incineration or other disposal of those substances which were generated outside Hamilton County. The EPA document spoke in terms of the emissions from incinerators as being particulate and gaseous emissions. The particulate emissions being constituted of char and soot and minerals in the form of metals, silicates and salts. The gaseous emissions referred to in the EPA document were constituted of combustible emissions such as hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, PCDD and PCDF and noncombustible emissions, such as nitrogen oxides, HCLs, hazardous compounds such as POHCs, products of incomplete combustion such as dioxins, and uncondensed volatile metals in excess air. Dr. Ralph Dougherty, an expert in environmental mass spectrometry, analytical chemistry and the chemistry of waste incineration, provided expert testimony concerning the significance of some of the information provided to the County in its public sessions. This testimony was presented at the administrative hearing. Dr. Dougherty did not attend the public hearing associated with the plan adoption. Dr. Dougherty in addressing the waste stream that is created by bio- medical waste described how the incineration process in destroying polyvinyl chloride, PVC plastic, saran wrap and neoprene converted those materials to chlorinated organics such as dioxin. As Dr. Dougherty established, dioxins are very hazardous substances. Kenneth Krantz appeared for the Intervenors at the public sessions for the plan adoption. At that time Basic Energy Corporation was known as TSI Southeast, Inc. (TSI). He provided written information to the county commissioners concerning the TSI bio-medical waste disposal business intended to be located in Hamilton County. TSI took no issue with Objective I.15 which was adopted on July 23, 1991. Intervenors proposed different text for policy I.15.1 and requested adoption of two additional policies I.15.2 and I.15.3 which would place some restrictions on solid waste disposal but would allow an opportunity for operating the TSI facility in the county. Information provided by Krantz in the public sessions indicated that TSI intended to operate a business to incinerate solid, bio-medical and solid municipal waste, together with a waste recycling area, Pelletizer area and turbine-generator area. Krantz addressed the county commissioners concerning county building permit information about the facility, permitting by the St. Johns River Water Management District and the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation. Information was provided concerning square footage for buildings within the overall TSI facility. Information was provided by TSI concerning the intended pollution control systems as being constituted of fabric filters and dry-lime injection systems, together with a detailed description of pending permit applications before the Department of Environmental Regulation for additional incineration units. Information provided by TSI addressed the expected constituents of the air emissions to include carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, organics such as dioxide, sulphur dioxide, hydrogen chloride and particulate matter. A site location map and schematic showing the flow within the waste stream was also provided. TSI also provided information at the public sessions about the Intervenors anticipated emissions rates for two previously permitted units and the third and fourth units that were being considered by the Department of Environmental Regulation. This data about emission rates included a comprehensive listing of anticipated emissions by pollutant type to include projected measurements of omissions for units one and two which would deal with medical waste combustion and units three and four which would deal with medical waste combustion and possibly refuse-derived fuel (RDF). As commented on by members of the public who appeared at the public sessions for adopting the plan, information provided by the Intervenors verified that significant amounts of pollutants would be discharged into the air through Intervenors' operations. TSI provided information concerning the modeling that was done to measure concentration levels for the expected pollutants. Information was provided concerning the incineration process and the manner in which calculations were made concerning expected emissions levels. Information was provided concerning anticipated annual and short term emission rates for the four units intended to be operated by the TSI. The technical information about the intended TSI facility was through documents that appeared to be from an engineering consulting firm. All information provided in the public sessions that has been described was properly available to the county commissioners when adopting the plan. The information provided at the public sessions which has been described was not presented to the Department with the adopted plan. As stated, on July 30, 1991, the County submitted its plan to the Department to determine if the adopted plan was in compliance with the requirements of law. See Section 163.3184(8), Florida Statutes (1991). On September 12, 1991, DCA issued a notice of intent to find the adopted plan, not "in compliance". See Section 163.3184(10), Florida Statutes (1991). Pursuant to that provision, DCA filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings setting forth the reasons for its decision to find the adopted plan not "in compliance". That petition was filed on September 23, 1991. The DCA took no issue with Policies I.15.1 and V.2.13. On February 20, 1992, Intervenors petitioned to intervene in the not "in compliance" case. As identified in the statement of issues, the Intervenors were and continue to be opposed to the adoption of Policies I.15.1 and V.2.13. On March 17, 1992, an order was entered which granted the Intervenors leave to intervene. Intervenors own property in Hamilton County. As contemplated by Section 163.3184(16), Florida Statutes (1993), DCA and the County engaged in settlement discussions. This culminated in a stipulated settlement agreement executed by DCA and County on November 24, 1993. The stipulated settlement agreement is referred to in the statute as a compliance agreement. Intervenors did not join in the settlement. On January 18, 1994, the County adopted the remedial amendments, referred to in the statute as plan amendments pursuant to a compliance agreement called for by the compliance agreement. The remedial plan amendments were submitted to the Department for consideration. On March 10, 1994, DCA issued a cumulative notice of intent addressing the compliance agreement amendments and the plan. DCA gave notice that it attended to find the plan and remedial comprehensive plan amendments/compliance agreement amendments "in compliance" with Sections 163.3184 and 163.3187, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding that the Intervenors did not submit further pleadings within 21 days of the publication of the cumulative notice of intent, the Intervenors were allowed to proceed with their challenge to the plan that was not the subject of the compliance agreement leading to the compliance agreement amendments.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding the Hamilton County comprehensive plan to be "in compliance" with the exception that Policy V.2.13 is only "in compliance" in its latter sentence, the remaining language in Policy V.2.13 is not "in compliance". DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1995. APPENDIX "A" CASE NO. 91-6038GM The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact finding by the parties: Intervenors' Facts: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 2 is contrary to facts found. The remaining sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 3 is rejected in its suggestion that there is a perpetual ban on bio-hazardous waste incineration. It is otherwise not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Intervenors' Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 7 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 8 is not relevant. Paragraphs 9 through 12 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 14 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that the date of adoption was January 18, 1994. Paragraphs 15 through 22 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 is not relevant. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 constitutes legal argument. Paragraph 26 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 27 through 31 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 32 through 38 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 39 and 40 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 41 is rejected to the extent that it is suggested that it constitutes agency policy. Paragraphs 42 through the first phrase in 49 are subordinate to facts found. The latter phrase in Paragraph 49 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 50 through 58 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 59 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 60 through 75 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 76 through 82 are rejected as not constituting allowable analysis of data presented in support of the plan adoption. Paragraphs 83 and 84 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 85 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 86 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 87 through 91 are rejected to the extent that it is suggested that some lesser standard is involved with consideration of data for optional plan elements as opposed to mandatory plan elements. See Section 163.3184(8), Florida Statutes (1991) and Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes (1993). Paragraph 92 is acknowledged but did not form the basis for fact finding in the recommended order. Paragraph 93 is rejected as intended to interpret Policy I.15.1 as an absolute prohibition against waste incineration in the County. Paragraph 94 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 95 through 102 are not relevant. Paragraphs 103 through 105 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 106 through 108 are subordinate to facts found with the exception of the rejection of Policy V.2.13 in part. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Jordan, Esquire Terrell L. Arline, Esquire Suzanne Schmith, Certified Legal Intern Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 John H. McCormick, Esquire Post Office Box O Jasper, FL 32052 William L. Hyde, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli and Stewart, P.A. 515 North Adams Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Donald J. Schutz, Esquire Suite 415 535 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Linda L. Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters contained herein, Respondent was licensed as a professional land surveyor in Florida and held license No. LS 0002934. On October 9, 1984, the Petitioner, Board of Professional Land Surveyors, after an informal hearing at which Respondent was present, entered a Final Order finding that he had, in several instances in the practice of professional land surveying, failed to perform in accordance with the minimum technical standards for land surveying and ordered his license to be suspended for 6 months; that he pay a $500.00 fine within 30 days of the Order; and that he submit a series of surveys and field notes for the review of the Board over a period of time subsequent to the reinstatement of his license. Respondent contends he agreed to an informal hearing because of recommendations from a representative of the Department of Professional Regulation's, (DPR), local investigative office. However, he was present at the hearing, was afforded an opportunity to present matters in his behalf, and through counsel, filed an appeal to the 4th District Court of Appeals of the Final Order in question which appeal, he subsequently dismissed. Respondent failed to pay the $500.00 fine on time as required. He contends this was because he had appealed the Final Order and was only one month late. Respondent also failed to file the required sets of surveys after the reinstatement of his license. The first was 6 months late and he cannot give a reason for that other than he was in mild shock as he felt he was a victim of "judicial error." His attorney was appealing the Final Order and he didn't pay attention to the dates. The 4th set of surveys was due in February, 1987 and has not been submitted as of this date. He contends it was not his intention to drag his feet in these submissions. After receiving the reviewer's criticisms of his earlier submissions, he felt they were not in keeping with the minimum standards and he requested clarification. He claims this is the reason for the delay but this excuse is not persuasive. His comment that he failed to pay attention to the dates for compliance with the requirements of the Final Order seems to be somewhat indicative of his attitude toward the practice of land surveying as will be seen from the evidence as discussed below. Consistent with the Board's Order, however, Respondent submitted several surveys which were considered to be of poor quality. The first set was returned with numerous negative comments and the third set was returned for further preparation and correction to prevent "further disciplinary action." The second set was considered to be "in substantial compliance with the terms of the [Board's] Final Order." Specifically identified for comment were surveys done by the Respondent for Mark and Betty Sivik, Carolyn Riddle, Eugenio Gonzalez, Teresa and Dane Curry, and Silvia Garcia. As to the individual surveys, the following discrepancies were noted: Sivik field notes showed no measurements made by Respondent. field notes showed no angles turned by Respondent. field notes showed no relationship to fractional corners. Riddle field notes show no E-W measurement by Respondent. field notes show no angles turned by Respondent. no plat was submitted with the survey. Gonzalez field notes do not show complete measurements by Respondent. field notes do not show angles turned by Respondent. field notes do not show relationship to fractional corners. field notes show a fence on three sides but the survey does not. Curry field notes do not show angles turned by Respondent. there is a .9 foot discrepancy as to one line between field notes and the survey with no explanation. as a result of this it cannot be determined if the survey is accurate. Garcia measurements to corners shown in field notes are not shown on survey. Respondent did not submit a plat without which it cannot be determined if the survey is complete or accurate. (Without the appropriate field notes, there is no way to tell if the survey is accurate, complete, or in accord with the legal description of the property.) In respect to all of the above surveys, none states on its face the type of survey it is. Respondent contends, in this regard, that his use of the letters "P.L.S.", (Professional Land Surveyor) after his signature indicates all are land surveys. This is not sufficient identification since professional land surveyors do various different types of surveys including land surveys, topographical surveys, reestablishment surveys, and the like. Respondent takes exception to the Board reviewer's comments about and approach to his surveys. As to the issue of angles, he contends that the minimum standards applied by the Board require only that the minimum angles shall be listed and do not require that all angles be turned in the field. He contends that the angles in question were a matter of record in his office. Mr. Cole, the Boards expert, agrees, stating it is not necessary to turn every angle but enough should be turned to insure an accurate description of the property and to verify the actual angles. There are other ways of verifying angles than turning them, but in Respondent's field notes, there was insufficient evidence to show any type of verification of the angles done by others previously. As to the discrepancies between field measurements and the legal descriptions in some cases, Respondent nonetheless contends they are all within standards. Respondent's approach here is somewhat cavalier. Any discrepancies which exist must be shown. The purpose of a survey is to show the current status of the property and it is improper and ineffective to rely solely on the previous record. To list discrepancies does not clutter up the survey nor is it likely to confuse. A failure to show them could well create major problems for a future user of the survey. The .9 foot discrepancy, described by the Respondent as well within the 1:5,000 error standard, is incorrectly described. It is more like an error of 1:200 and is, therefore, not insignificant. It should have been commented on. The survey done for the Currys can readily be classified as a topographical survey as it describes elevation in at least two places. Therefore, it should have been identified as a topographical survey on the face of it, but this is a minor discrepancy. The fence running across the back of the Gonzalez property should have been identified as such by the use of appropriate x's on the survey. It was not. Respondent has been in the private practice of surveying since he passed the state examination in February, 1976. He feels that the Board's case is based on the use of a hypothetical survey to establish standards against which his work was compared. The minimum standards set out in the statute are what, he feels, should control as they speak for themselves. He has always tried, throughout his years in practice, to protect his clients, and to his knowledge, his work has never cause anyone to lose money. He defines precision as the way that a line or angle is measured and accuracy as the manner in which the finished drawing portrays that there are or are not problems in the subject of the survey. With regard to the attack on his field notes, Respondent contends that the minimum standards merely call for field notes. Their sufficiency is determined by the standards of the practice in the community. He believes his notes contain measurements, calculations and ancillary information sufficient to show the required identifying information. The laws that govern surveyors' performance require many factors to be considered such as encroachment, senior rights, acquiescence and adverse possession, and the Respondent urges that in the interest of simplicity for the benefit of the users of the survey, it is necessary to reduce the quantity of evidence on the survey to the minimum necessary to allow it to be used effectively, not for the convenience of the state examining board. If there are no problems, then there is nothing else to show and his backup office records are adequate. Though Respondent feels the Board's criticisms of his notes are irrelevant, the better weight of the evidence is that they are not. Though Respondent contends his work in all cases exceeds the requirement for error, (1:5,000; 1:7,500; and 1:10,000 as appropriate), the error in the Curry survey shows his possible lack of understanding of the rules. He considers himself to be a mixture of the textbook and practical surveyor applying his extensive practical field experience to the textbook requirements. The evidence indicates, however, he does not always do so with the required degree of accuracy and skill. Respondent agrees with the 20 minimum standards set out in Rule 21HH- 6.003. They relate to all surveys and, he believes, should be followed. They constitute the community standard and a failure to follow them would be a failure to follow the community standards. His quarrel is not with the rule but with the agency's interpretation and alleged expansion of its own rule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a registered land surveyor be suspended for one year and that upon reinstatement his license be placed on probation for five years under such terms and conditions as imposed by the Board as will insure current and continuing review of his activities within the profession. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the proposals of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact (FOF). 1. Accepted in FOF 1. 2. Accepted in FOF 2. 3 - 7. Accepted in FOFs 2 and 4. 8. Accepted. 9 - 11. Incorporated in FOF 4. 12, 13. Accepted. 14, 15. Incorporated in FOF 4. 16. Incorporated in FOF 5. 17, 18. Accepted. 19, 20. Incorporated in FOF 5. 21 - 30. Incorporated in FOF 6. 31 - 33. Accepted. 34. Incorporated in FOF 7. 35 - 37. Incorporated in FOFs 8 and 9. 38, 39. Incorporated in FOF 16. 40. Redundant to Proposed FOF 2. COPIES FURNISHED: ALLEN R. SMITH, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DIVISION OF LAND SURVEYORS 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 DAVID R. TERRY, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 KENNETH O. HART 3198 RIDDLE ROAD WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA 33406 VAN POOLE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JOSEPH A. SOLE, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 ================================================================= AMENDED AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, DOAH CASE NO. 87-2158 vs. DPR CASE NO. 0078982 KENNETH O. HART, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Brevard County's 1999 Comprehensive Plan Amendments B.12, B.13, and B.14 (the Plan Amendments) are "in compliance."
Findings Of Fact General Besides the introduction of the Plan Amendments themselves and a few other documents, Petitioners case-in-chief consisted of examination of Susan Poplin, a Planning Manager for DCA, as an adverse witness, and the testimony of Petitioner, Charles F. Moehle. Most of Poplin's testimony was directly contrary to the positions Petitioners were seeking to prove. Moehle's testimony consisted primarily of conclusions and statements disagreeing with the Plan Amendments. Petitioners provided no data or analysis in support of Moehle's statements and conclusions. Often, Moehle's testimony did not identify specific errors allegedly made by the County. Much of Moehle's presentation was disjointed and difficult to understand. Petitioners also challenged several items which should have been challenged following prior amendments to the County's Plan. For example, Poplin testified that all of the wetland provisions in the challenged Conservation Element B.12 amendments were part of a prior plan amendment and were not changed by the Plan Amendments. See Findings of Fact 7-8, infra. Standing Petitioners' allegations of standing are in paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition for Formal Review: EFFECT ON PETITIONERS' SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS Petitioner, MODERN owns property in Brevard County, the value of which will be reduced by THE AMENDMENT. Additionally, petitioners MODERN and MOEHLE own property in Brevard County and pay property taxes in Brevard County. Additionally, THE AMENDMENT will cause property tax receipt's of Brevard County to decline because of the reduction in value caused to MODERN'S, MOEHLE'S, and other similarly situated property in the county. Additionally, THE AMENDMENT will cause MODERN'S and MOEHLE'S property taxes to increase due to the additional government employees required to implement and enforce THE AMENDMENT and due to the fact that the property taxes imposed upon property which are not effected [sic] by THE AMENDMENT will necessarily increase in order to offset the loss of property tax revenue from private property which is devalued as a result of THE AMENDMENT. MOEHLE and MODERN have appeared before the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners at public meetings and hearings as well as communicating (verbally and in writing) with their growth Management/Planning & Zoning Departments concerning these matters for several years. In an attempt to prove Petitioners' standing, Moehle testified that he has been a resident of Brevard County since 1958. He also testified that he is President of and owns a substantial interest in Petitioner, Modern, Inc. He testified that both he himself and Modern own real property in Brevard County, and that, as such, both are taxpayers. Moehle also testified that he is "affected by these regulations." He gave no specifics as to how he is affected. He also did not testify that Modern was affected. Before concluding his brief testimony on standing, Moehle asked the ALJ if he had to "ramble on some more" about standing and was asked whether he submitted "oral or written comments, comments, recommendations or objections to the County between the time of the transmittal hearing for the Plan amendment and the adoption of the Plan amendment." Moehle answered: I submitted during the whole period of this - I attended a number of hearings that I knew about during this whole process and I would say that, yes, I did, but not all hearings. Some were questionable - some of my problems or some of the meetings that the action was taken on. So they do have my comments, they've had my comments from me on various issues complete back before and including the Settlement Agreement. The evidence was that all hearings and meetings relating to the "Settlement Agreement" to which Moehle referred in his testimony occurred prior to the transmittal hearing for the Plan Amendments at issue in this case on November 30, 1999. The referenced "Settlement Agreement" was the Stipulated Settlement Agreement entered into in May 1997 to resolve DOAH Case No. 96-2174GM. The County amended its Comprehensive Plan to implement the Stipulated Settlement Agreement on August 24, 1999, by Ordinance 99-48. By Ordinance 99-52, adopted October 7, 1999, the remedial amendments were clarified to include the correct Forested Wetlands Location Map. Ordinance 99-49 and 99-52 both state that the plan amendments adopted by them "shall become effective once the state planning agency issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance in accordance with Florida Statutes, Section 163.3184(9), or until the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the amendment to be in compliance in accordance with Florida Statutes, Section 163.3184(10)." The stated "Justification" for Policy 5.2 of the B.12 Plan Amendments at issue in this case was: "The above language was part of a stipulated settlement agreement between DCA and the County. This agreement became effective after the transmittal of the 99B Plan Amendments." Apparently for that reason, the B.12 Plan Amendments at issue in this case, specifically under Objective 5 and Policies 5.1 and 5.2, underlined the wetland provisions previously adopted by Ordinance 99-48. This underlining may give the misimpression that these wetlands provisions were being amended through adoption of Ordinance 2000-33. To the contrary, those amendments already had been adopted, and all hearings on those amendments already had occurred prior to transmittal of the Plan Amendments at issue in this case. Other than testifying that he attended hearings and made submittals "before and including the Settlement Agreement," Moehle did not specify when he attended, or what if anything he said or submitted. Nor did he offer any testimony or evidence that he appeared on behalf of Modern. No minutes or other evidence were produced for the record showing his appearance or comments, recommendations or objections. To the contrary, Petitioners' evidence indicates that Moehle was not one of the individuals who offered public comment at either the transmittal hearing on November 30, 1999; the Land Use Citizens Resource Group meeting on November 4, 1999; or the Local Planning Agency Adoption Meeting on May 15, 2000. Paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition, also alleged: that the value of property owned by Modern will be reduced; that the Plan Amendments will cause property tax receipts to decline because of a reduction in the value caused to Petitioners' property; and 3) that the Plan Amendments will cause Petitioners' property taxes to increase due to additional government employees required to implement and enforce the Plan Amendments and due to an increase in taxes for properties not directly affected by the Plan Amendments. None of these allegations were supported by record evidence. Notice Petitioners' allegation of improper notice is contained in paragraph 7.I. of the Amended Petition: Petitioners allege that THE AMENDMENT is subject to the notice requirements of Florida Statute subsections 163.3161(18), 163.3181, 163.3184(15), 125.66(2), and or 125.66(4) and that Respondent COUNTY has failed to comply with said statutes. (Several other paragraphs of the Amended Petition also allege inadequate notice. See Findings of Fact 19, 28, 44, 50, 54, 63, 65, and 76, infra.) Petitioners filed copies of the applicable advertisements. Moehle testified that the type was "wrong" and the size was "wrong" - the exact nature of the alleged error was not stated. But review of the advertisements for the transmittal and adoption hearings reveals that both are two columns wide, and the headline appears to be in a very large, bold type. Other than Moehle's general complaint about the type being "wrong," there was no testimony or other evidence that the type is not 18-point. Other aspects of the advertisements do not appear to be challenged by Petitioners. The advertisements themselves show that the transmittal hearing was held on November 30, 1999 (a Tuesday) and that the advertisement was run on November 22, 1999, eight days prior to the day of the hearing. They also show that the adoption hearing was on May 16, 2000 (a Tuesday). The advertisement for the adoption hearing was run on May 10, 2000, six days prior to the meeting. The proof of publication shows that the advertisements were not in a portion of the newspaper where legal notices or classified ads appear and that the Florida Today is a newspaper of general circulation. The evidence also included advertisements for local planning agency hearings and meetings relating to the Plan Amendments other than the transmittal and adoption hearings. These other advertisements appear to have been published in legal ad sections, and the type is smaller than that used for the transmittal and adoption hearings. It appears that Moehle was referring to these advertisements when he said the type and size was "wrong." Species and Wetlands Preservation Versus Promoting Infill Development Paragraph 7.IV. of the Amended Petition alleges: The challenged provisions of the THE AMENDMENT, as set forth herein below, violate the legislative intent and spirit of Fl. Stat. Ch. 163, Part II because they place species and wetland preservations over the stated policy goal of promoting infill and development in areas which have concurrency and infrastructure available. The challenged provisions promote leap frog development by making the development of parcels of private property which have concurrency and appropriate infrastructure but also have any quantity of listed species habitat or wetlands unusable. Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3177(10)(h), 163.3177(11). No evidence was offered supporting the claim that species and wetland preservation were "placed over" the goal of promoting infill. Nor was there any evidence provided by Petitioners to show that leapfrog development or urban sprawl was caused by protecting wetlands. To the contrary, Poplin's testimony discussed urban sprawl and leapfrog development in terms of impacts to services and facilities. She clearly stated: "[T]here are no set priorities. We look at each individual local government on a case by case basis. . . . So . . . [it] depends on the context in which its based [sic] in the plan." Poplin also testified that the County had levels of service in place for facilities and services pursuant to Rule 9J-5.0055(1)(a), and that the County's Plan and the subject Plan Amendments have level of service standards which meet the requirements of Rule 9J- 5.0055(2). Poplin also testified that the County had a Capital Improvements Element which was in compliance with Rule 9J- 5.0055(1)(b). She also testified that there was coordination of the various comprehensive plan elements as required by Section 163.3177. Thus, she concluded, the conservation and capital improvements (infrastructure) elements interacted properly. There was no evidence to the contrary. Section 163.3177(10)(h) states that it is the intent of the Legislature to provide public services concurrently with development. Section 163.3177(11) discusses the legislative intent to have innovative planning to address urbanization, protection of environmentally sensitive areas, land use efficiencies in urban areas and conversion of rural land uses. No evidence of any kind was presented regarding these provisions. Certainly, no data and analysis showing failure to meet these statutory provisions were presented by Petitioners. Listed Species Definition Paragraph 8.I.A.2 of the Amendment Petition states: Listed Species definition - pg 11. This change should not be made because the updated Glossary of the Comprehensive Plan was not made available timely for public review and public comments per the hearing and notice requirements of Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3161(18), 163.3181, 163.3184(15), 125.66(2) and or 125.66(4). Prior to the Plan Amendments, the Conservation Element had a Directive entitled "Wildlife." The "Wildlife" directive stated in part: "Development projects should avoid adverse impacts to species listed as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern." The directive also included a definition of the term "listed species": "those species which are listed as either endangered, threatened or as species of special concern." The Plan Amendments deleted these provisions. The stated Justification for deleting the first provision was: "Objective 9 embodies the intent of this directive." The stated Justification for deleting second provision was: "'Listed species' have been defined in the updated Glossary of the Comprehensive Plan." As in several other places in the Amended Petition, Petitioners complain about lack of notice and an opportunity for a hearing as to the updated Glossary. Actually, it appears that the Glossary was not updated along with the Plan Amendments. For that reason, there were no Glossary changes to be noticed. Although the Glossary was not updated to provide the definition of the phrase "listed species," as indicated in the Justification for deleting it from the Directives, the phrase is commonly used to refer to species are listed as threatened or endangered under various state and federal regulations. Rule 9J-5.013(1)(a)5. requires identification and analysis of natural resources including "species listed by federal, state, or local government agencies as endangered, threatened or species of special concern." Species that are federally listed as endangered or threatened (50 C.F.R., Section 17.11) fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in accordance with the Endangered Species act of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. Section 1531, et. seq.). Listed and unlisted bird species, other than waterfowl and game birds, are also federally protected by the Migratory Bird Act (16 U.S.C. Section 703 et. seq.). The bald eagle has additional federal protection under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C. Section 668- 668d). Marine animals (including whales, dolphins, and the West Indian Manatee) are also protected by the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. Section 1361 et. seq.) In addition, 24 species of vertebrates are listed by the State as endangered, threatened or species of special concern and are under the jurisdiction of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Chapter 39, Florida Administrative Code. Both snook and Atlantic sturgeon receive further state protection under Chapter 46, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Endangered and Threatened Species Act, 1977, also protects species listed as endangered, threatened or species of special concern under Chapter 372, Florida Statutes (2000). Chapter 372, Florida Statutes (2000), provides additional protection for the American alligator as defined in the Alligators/Crocodilla Protection Act. Sea turtles and the West Indian manatee are further protected by the State through the Marine Turtles Protection Act (Chapter 327, Florida Statutes (2000)) and the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act (Chapter 327, Florida Statutes (2000)). Petitioners did not prove beyond fair debate that the phrase "listed species" cannot be understood without a specific definition within the comprehensive plan. Conservation Element Policy 8.5, Protection Of Vegetative Communities Paragraph 8.I.B. of the Amended Petition states: Policy 8.5 - pg 41. This change should not be made because the justification is not correct. These referenced lists were not made available to the public at the relevant public hearing for review and comment in violation of the requirements of Fl. Stat. Section 163.3184. The modification goes beyond the stated intent to merely improve readability and clarify the existing policy in that it actually modifies existing policy. . . . (The last clause was stricken. See Preliminary Statement.) Again, there were no changes to the Glossary to be noticed for hearing. Before the Plan Amendments, Policy 8.9 of the Conservation Element provided that the County would develop a program for the protection of vegetative communities from inappropriate development by 1992. The former provision was replaced with Policy 8.5, which revises the action date to 2002 and states that the County shall protect vegetative communities from inappropriate development. G1 and G2 vegetative communities, as contained in the Florida Natural Areas Inventory, were added to S1 and S2 communities (which were already in the Plan) for consideration for protection. Poplin testified that the G1 and G2 categories were defined by the Florida Natural Areas Inventory and were synonymous with the S1 and S2 categories which were already defined in the Plan. The adopted "Justification" for new Policy 8.5 itself indicates that the addition of the G1 and G2 categories "did not add additional vegetative communities that may be considered for protection." In other words, nothing actually changed as to the vegetation (or types of vegetation); only the nomenclature or titles of categories changed. Conservation Element, Objective 9 and Policy 9 Species of Special Concern, Crucial/Critical Habitat Paragraph 8.I.C.,D., and E. of the Amended Petition states: Objective 9 and Policy 9, including sub- sections A, B, C, D, E, of 9.2 (species of special concern, crucial/critical habitat) - pg 43. Species of special concern should not be added. It was discussed at a properly advertised public hearing and its addition was rejected. It was added back at a subsequent and not properly noticed workshop meeting and did not allow proper public input. It is unjustifiably onerous to the regulated public as added, in violation of Fl. Stat. 120.52(8)(g). Crucial habitat should not be allowed to [be] substituted for critical habitat because the new glossary of definitions was not completed timely to allow public review and comment. The resource maps to be used are not identified or indicated that they have been created beyond "draft" status or had proper notice, public review or comment. The reduction from 5 acres to 1 acre in 9.2.C was improperly added at a workshop subsequent to the properly noticed public hearing at which this item was disposed of with public hearing and comment and leaving the size of 5 acres. The provision that the "acquisition of land by the Brevard County Environmentally Endangered Lands Program shall be voluntary, and shall not include the use of eminent domain" should not be removed in Policy 9.4 (pg. 45). These new provisions do not meet the requirements of Fl. Stat. Sections 120.58(8) and 120.525, Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3161(18), Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3181, Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3184(15), Fl. Stat. Sections 125.66(2), and or Fl. Stat. Sections 125.66(4). (The identified sentence and references were stricken. See Preliminary Statement.) Again, there were no changes to the Glossary to be noticed for hearing. As to "crucial habitat," amended Policy 9.2 of the Conservation Element requires that an ordinance be developed by 2002 requiring a "crucial habitat" review at the pre-application stage of certain projects. Previously, the plan required development of an ordinance in 2004 requiring a "critical habitat" review in those situations. Apparently, "critical habitat" was defined in the pre-amendment Glossary. (Neither the Glossary nor the rest of the County's Comprehensive Plan prior to the Plan Amendments was put in evidence.) No regulations regarding "crucial habitat" were in effect as of final hearing. A definition of the term "crucial habitat" might well be desirable. (Apparently, an amendment to the Glossary to include such a definition is being considered by someone--it is not clear from the evidence by whom.) But it is possible to use dictionary definitions of "crucial" and "habitat" to derive a useful meaning of the term "crucial habitat" used in Policy 9.2 of the Conservation Element. Petitioners did not prove beyond fair debate that the term "crucial habitat" cannot be adequately understood without a specific definition in the comprehensive plan. "Species of special concern" is a phrase used by Rule 9J-5.013(1)(a)5. in describing natural resources to be identified and analyzed in a local government's conservation element. The "resource maps" mentioned in paragraph 8.I.C., D., and E. of the Amended Petition are not new to the County's Comprehensive Plan. Prior to the Plan Amendments, Policy 10.2.A. stated that the County's Office of Natural Resources Management must "develop resource maps showing potential areas for critical wildlife habitat for threatened and endangered wildlife species." Amended Policy 9.2.A. requires that Office to "use resource maps which show potential areas of crucial wildlife habitat for threatened and endangered wildlife species and species of special concern." While the descriptions of these maps were changed by the amendment, the general manner in which they are identified is the same. It was not proven beyond fair debate that the amendments cannot be adequately understood without identification in a more specific manner or reference to maps already completed. Petitioners' next complaint in paragraph 8.I.C., D., and E. of the Amended Petition was that the threshold for required crucial habitat review in Policy 9.2.C. of the Conservation Element should not have been changed from five-acre projects to one-acre projects. Petitioners' primary argument was that the County discussed this change at a workshop. The only evidence in support of this argument was Moehle's testimony: "[T]he changes that show up in here were rejected in those previous hearings so the public has the impression well, that item is done and settled. Then all of a sudden at a workshop it shows up when nobody - they are not necessarily -- you can't obtain the advance agenda for that and you find a notice in the paper from time to time." In fact, the workshops were noticed in the newspapers. In addition, the transmittal and adoption hearings were noticed. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. As for Petitioners' request for reinstatement of the language regarding voluntary acquisition of environmentally endangered lands, former Policy 10.4 addressed development of an acquisition program; amended Policy 9.4 addresses a continuation of that program. The Justification explains that the amendments were "intended to reflect the achievement of this policy as a result of the EELs [Environmentally Endangered Lands] Program." There was no evidence to support the argument that removal of the voluntary acquisition language in any way changes the EELs Program or creates a compliance issue. Conservation Element Policy 9.13, Species of Special Concern Paragraph 8.I.G. of the Amended Petition stated: Policy 9.13 - species of special concern, habitat rarity, pg 48. This change is inconsistent with the same Florida Statutes and for the same reasons as I.C, I.D, I.E (A, B, C, E, E) and I.F above. Policy 9.13 contains a requirement to develop model management plans for species of special concern dependent on habitat rarity and loss rates. The amendment to former Policy 10.13 merely changes the target date (from 1990 to 2002) and adds "species of special concern" to the other resources sought to be addressed by the model management plans. The provision does not establish new regulations. It merely calls for future action in the development of model management plans. Again, there was no evidence to support the argument that these changes created a compliance issue. See Findings of Fact 32-33, supra. Scrub Habitat Map Paragraph 8.I.H. of the Amended Petition stated: Appendix - List of Maps, pg 52. The Scrub Habitat Map should not be included because it is part of the Scrub Habitat Study done in Brevard County which was not adopted/accepted as a final map by the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners. The map is a "draft" map done over 5 years ago, not finalized, and not accurate. Objections at public meetings, with Brevard County Staff, and with the outside consultants preparing the map have never been addressed on the map. Among the inaccuracies are hundreds (maybe thousands) of acres on government lands. The map is wholly deficient and incorrect to become an official map representing the scrub habitat of Brevard County. It doesn't come close to accurately depicting the scrub situation of Brevard County. The map is not supported by competent substantial evidence, has not been officially adopted by the County Commission, the requisite public notices have not been held. Any policy or regulation based upon the map would be equally erroneous and would result in unnecessary regulatory costs, and would be arbitrary or capricious and would be based upon inadequate standards. At final hearing, Moehle testified: "The scrub habitat map as included in the amendments does not include the best available information which information has been available for a number of years." But the Scrub Jay Habitat map Petitioners sought to use to prove this contention (Petitioners' Exhibit 6) was not admitted into evidence because it was not authenticated. The Scrub Habitat Map apparently added to the Appendix of Conservation Element maps through the B.12 Plan Amendments does not appear to map scrub on federal lands. (At least, no scrub is indicated in the extensive federal lands on the map.) But there was no competent evidence as to the significance of the failure to map scrub habitat on federal lands. (Nor did Petitioners cite to any authority for the proposition that excluding federal lands outside the County's jurisdiction is a violation of Chapter 163 or Rule 9J-5.) While Petitioners never clearly articulated their concerns about the Scrub Habitat Map, it appeared that they might have had concerns about the impact of the map on protection of scrub jays. Specifically, Petitioners seem to contend that some scrub jays will not be protected as a result of the map's omission of scrub on federal lands. But, in that regard, amended Conservation Element Policy 9.2. in the B.12 Plan Amendments provides for the development of an ordinance by 2002 that would provide, among other things, that if any endangered or threatened species or species of special concern are found on a project site, or there is evidence that such a species is onsite, the relevant state and federal agency permits would have to be obtained and documented prior to issuance of a building or construction permit. Once adopted, these regulations would protect scrub jays wherever the birds exist. Another apparent concern was that the Scrub Habitat Map allegedly was over 5 years old. Meanwhile, other maps allegedly have been or are in the process of being developed. But Petitioners' evidence was insufficient to prove beyond fair debate that the Scrub Habitat Map was not the best available data at the time of adoption of the Plan Amendments. Land Use Element, Administrative Policies Paragraph 8.II. of the Amended Petition states: Comprehensive Plan Amendment 1999B.13 The Administrative Policies 1 thru 8 (pg iv) which have been proposed for inclusion in the future Land Use Element by the County Attorney and added by a April 29, 2000 workshop were not timely provided for public review and comment by a properly noticed hearing in violation of the notice requirements of Florida Statutes subsections 163.3161(18), 163.3181, 163.3184(15), 125.66(2) and 125.66(4). They are over- broad, too general in nature, vague, and fail to establish adequate standards for county staff decisions, and vest unbridled discretion in the county staff in violation of Florida Statute 120.54(8). Detailed examples of this include: In Administrative Policy 1 - Brevard County zoning officials, planners and the director of planning and zoning should not be arbitrarily, capriciously, and without adequate defined standards be recognized as expert witnesses. Standards with detailed qualifications should be developed and included for each category of expert before this provision is considered for adoption. In Policy 2 (page iv) county staff recommendation should not automatically be considered expert testimony without qualifications. Page 1 under DIRECTIVES. The Future Land Use paragraph should not be deleted until sufficient emphasis has been placed in the requirement to ensure that sufficient land uses are available to support the anticipated population. It has not been at this time, in violation of Florida Statutes subsections 163.3177(2), 163.3177(3)(a), 163.3177(6)(a) and 163.3177(6)(f). As to 8.II.A., the evidence indicated that the advertisements were published in the time frames required and according to the standards set out by statute. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. Furthermore, Petitioners failed to establish that the Administrative Policies 1-8 were unavailable at the public hearing or that the Board of County Commissioners was not authorized to consider those policies. The language of the last sentence of paragraph 8.II. should have been stricken with similar provisions at the beginning of the final hearing because of its reliance on Section 120.54(8), which addresses rulemaking activities and not the compliance requirements of Chapter 163. There was no competent, substantial evidence to support any of the other allegations in paragraph 8.II.A. As to 8.II.A.(iii), there was only Moehle's statement regarding the lack of land availability while he was questioning Poplin. Poplin testified that the County should provide an adequate amount of different land uses to accommodate a variety of people and activities. She also testified that the County had provided more than enough residential land to accommodate projected populations. Poplin noted that the County's EAR (Evaluation and Appraisal Report) included or referenced several sources indicating that the County has more than enough land to meet their residential and non-residential needs through the planning time frame. In fact, she testified that land allocated for residential use is over 170 percent of the land necessary for the County's projected population. In explaining the "right-sizing" undertaken in the Plan Amendment, Poplin testified that two major changes have occurred since the adoption of the original County Plan. First, the County sold a substantial amount of land to the water management district; this land is now designated as Conservation. Secondly, some developments have been built to less than their full potential. Poplin testified: "My understanding of the County's actions is that this right sizing is to recognize areas that have developed and maybe have developed at lower densities. So by revising the densities on the map, they're recognizing this." Finally, Poplin testified that the future land use map (FLUM) and the policies proposed in the subject Plan Amendment are consistent with previous actions, previous development patterns, and previous purchases that have occurred within the County. As for Section 163.3177(2), cited by Petitioners at the end of paragraph 8.II.A.(iii) of the Amended Petition, the statute requires coordination of the land use elements. Poplin testified that the County has adequate facilities and services to provide for the land use plan proposed in its FLUM. Section 163.3177(6)(f) requires a housing element. There was no evidence that these elements do not exist in the County's comprehensive plan. Land Use Element Policy 1.1, Residential Land Use Designations Almost all of Paragraph 8.II.B. of the Amended Petition was stricken. See Preliminary Statement. Only the title and last sentence remained: Residential Land Use Designations, Policy 1.1 (reduced densities - pg 14). Property owners (including PETITIONERS) whose land use/zoning classification is no longer in compliance with the comprehensive plan amendment have not been notified as required by Florida Statutes subsection 125.66. Petitioners themselves provided evidence establishing that the statutory notice was properly given. See Findings of Fact 12- 14, supra. Land Use Element Policy 1.2, Public Facilities and Services The last sentence of Paragraph 8.II.C. of the Amended Petition was stricken. See Preliminary Statement. The remaining allegation was: Public Facilities and Services Requirements, Policy 1.2 (page 15). In subsection E, the prohibition by use of the words "shall not" are too harsh, restrictive, and confiscatory and should be replaced "shall not be required at the expense of the County." But the language of Criterion F under Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policy 1.2 already states what Petitioners seek. Simply stated, Petitioners want the policy to state that private parties were not prohibited from building additional public facilities. The second sentence of the policy states: "This criterion is not intended to preclude acceptance of dedicated facilities and services by the county through . . . other means through which the recipients pay for the service or facility." Finally, the language of Criterion F under Policy 1.2 existed elsewhere in the Comprehensive Plan prior to the Plan Amendments; it is not new. The Plan Amendments simply changed the location of the language in the Plan. Land Use Policies 1.31 and 1.4 Paragraph 8.II.D. of the Amended Petition stated: Residential 30, Policy 1.31 and Residential 15, Policy 1.4 (pgs. 16, 18). In subsections 1.31.A.1.3 and 1.4.A. respectively, the limitation of this designation to east of Interstate 95 is arbitrary, capricious and is not supported by substantial evidence. It imposes excessive regulatory costs upon regulated property owners. It is confiscatory and fails to recognize the vested rights of property owners. There are areas west of Interstate 95 just as suitable and qualifying as areas east of Interstate 95. This policy fails to recognize existing or new infrastructure which services areas west of I-95 and is therefore inconsistent with other policies. New policy 1.4 is similar and related and also limits densities west of Interstate 95 under all circumstances. This change and any other related restrictions to all areas west of I-95 should be eliminated. FLUE Policies 1.3 (the proper number, not 1.31) and 1.4 deal with residential densities. Pertinent to Petitioners' complaint, Residential 30, allowing up to 30 units per acre, is located east of Interstate 95; generally, maximum residential density west of Interstate 95 is 15 units per acre in Residential 15, except where "adjacent to existing or designated residential densities of an equal or higher density allowance." Petitioners presented no evidence in opposition to these residential densities or designations or the data and analysis supporting them. To the contrary, Poplin testified that there was adequate data and analysis to support the changes. See Finding of Fact 47, supra. The other issues raised, such as excessive regulatory costs, relate to Section 120.52, Florida Statutes (2000), standards and are not at issue in the proceeding. Land Use Policy 2.8, Community Commercial Designation Paragraph 8.II.E. of the Amended Petition stated: Locational and Development Criteria for Community Commercial Uses, Policy 2.8 (pg 38). Subsection B regarding community commercial complexes should not be limited to 40 acres at an intersection for properties that have existing land use or zoning designations compatible to the new Community Commercial designation. The same is true for the limitations of subsections, C, D, and E. These new limitations are confiscatory, fail to recognize existing land use and zoning and vested rights of property owners, are arbitrary, capricious, are not supported by competent substantial evidence, enlarge existing regulations without justification. They impose additional regulatory costs on regulated property owners when the goal of Florida Statutes Chapter 163 could be met by less restrictive and costly regulatory alternatives. Other provisions of Policy 2.8, Table 2.2, Policy 2.9, Policy 2.10 that exceed the present regulation of properties having existing land use or zoning designations or actual use should not be allowed for the same reasons. Additionally, many of these amendments were added at a April 29, 2000 workshop without complying with applicable public notice requirements. Public review and input as to these elements was therefore lacking. The plain language of Criterion B under FLUE Policy 2.8 demonstrates that the restrictions have been relaxed, not increased. Previously, Criterion C under Policy 2.8 stated: "Sites for community commercial complexes should not exceed 20 acres." The letter designation of the criterion was changed, and the criterion was amended to read: "Community commercial complexes should not exceed 40 acres at an intersection." The Justification for the change states: "Site size has been enlarged to 40 acres maximum at an intersection. Previously, this criterion could be interpreted to permit a maximum of 80 acres at an intersection (20 acres at each corner). Forty acres has been chosen as this is the DRI threshold for commercial development." On its face, the purpose of amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8 was twofold: to enlarge the site size restriction from 20 to 40 acres; and to clarify that the restriction (now 40 acres) was meant to apply to all community commercial regardless whether they are located at intersections; locating a project on different sides of the street at an intersection was not supposed to double, triple, or even quadruple the maximum site size. Petitioners' position that amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8 shrinks maximum allowable the site size is based on Moehle's assumption that 80-acre projects were permitted at intersections under prior to amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8. But there was no competent, substantial evidence to support Moehle's assumption. Petitioners also seem to contend that the phrase "at an intersection" is imprecise, leading to uncertainty that undermines the required residential allocation analysis. But it is at least fairly debatable that no more precise definition is necessary. Contrary to Moehle's speculation, it is not reasonable to construe the phrase "at an intersection" to also mean "at an indeterminate distance away from an intersection." Petitioners also took the position that "folding" previous land use classifications into Community Commercial greatly expanded the practical effect of the acreage limitation in amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8. Petitioners' evidence did not explain their position in any detail or specificity. It is possible that they had reference to Criterion D under Policy 4.5 prior to the Plan Amendment, which allowed "regional commercial centers to incorporate up to 100 acres." If so, under the B.13 Plan Amendments, amended Policy 2.12 addresses regional commercial centers by requiring their location in a new Development of Regional Impact (DRI) future land use designation. The Justification for this change was: "With the proposed establishment of a Development of Regional Impact (DRI) land use category, regional uses will no longer be permitted in a commercial future land use designation. Review in accordance with Chapter 380, F.S. standards is intended to simplify readability and maintain consistency with state statutes." Reading amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8 together with amended Policy 2.12, commercial complexes larger than 40 acres are not prohibited under the Plan Amendment; they just have to be developed in a DRI land use category under Chapter 380 DRI standards. The reasonableness of these amendments is at least fairly debatable. Meanwhile, Poplin specifically testified that the data and analysis provided by the County were adequate to support the residential and nonresidential changes, including Community Commercial and Neighborhood Commercial changes. No contrary evidence was provided. Policies 2.9 and 2.10 allow minimal extensions of commercial boundaries. No evidence was presented addressing these items. The clear evidence was contrary to Petitioners' claim of notice violations. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. Transitional Commercial Activities Paragraph 8.II.F. of the Amended Petition states: Transitional Commercial Activities - Community Commercial - General Tourist Commercial (TU-1) - Highway Transient Tourist (TU-2). Existing properties with Mixed Use Land Use Designations and General Tourist Commercial (TU-1) and Highway Transient Tourist (TU-2) zoning classifications have not been protected with their existing regulation constraint in the transformation into the new Neighborhood Commercial and Community Commercial Regulations as has been asserted by the COUNTY in the revised objective and policies in the provisions covering these classifications as asserted by the COUNTY. Either proposed changes should conform or the changes should not be made. The same objections and changes are made for the new confiscatory provisions of the COUNTY for existing Industrial Land Use Designations and Zoning classifications under Industrial Land Uses (Objective 3, Policy 3, pg 55). The same objections and challenges are made for new confiscatory provisions of Agricultural Land Uses (pg 67) for existing Land Use Designations and densities of lands including reductions of densities to 1 unit per 5 acres by changes from a residential classification (including existing recorded subdivision plats). Many new items of the above were made at the April 29, 2000 workshop and proper public notices, review, and comment was not available. Petitioners failed to demonstrate any impact on actual development as a result of these future land use designation changes. No defect in notice was established by the evidence. Rather, the evidence indicated that all advertising requirements were met. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. Finally, Poplin testified that the majority of land uses remained the same based on existing uses, and that all changes were supported by data and analysis. Future Land Use Maps Update Paragraph 8.III.A. of the Amended Petition states: Comprehensive Plan Amendment 1999 B.14. The Future Land Use Maps Update Report - The Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps are not consistent with the existing FLUM and RDG maps. There are corrections and amplifications needed before they are acceptable. The COUNTY did not either have available or make available to the public for review and comment the map(s) as transmitted to DCA at any properly noticed Public Hearing. It was asserted by the COUNTY that no Land Use Designations, Zoning, or Density Allocation changes, were being made to property owners. That is not true. Some specific examples are Sections 3 & 15, located within Township 22 South, Range 34 East, which were changed from Residential to Agriculture Use (density from 1 unit per acre to 1 unit per 5 acres) and Sections 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14 within Township 22 South, Range 34 East, from density of 1 unit per acre to 1 acre per 2.5 acres. The FLUM Report explains that the FLUM series was converted from graphic format to computerized geographic information system (GIS) format; as a result, the Residential Density Guidelines (RDG) map series could be combined with the FLUM series. Petitioners failed to establish any facts demonstrating that the new GIS FLUM series was not available or discussed at properly noticed public hearings. As to notice, see Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. There was no evidence of errors on the GIS maps. Petitioners complained that the GIS maps are unusable because they are too hard to read, especially because they were black and white. But actually the FLUM series is in color. There was no competent, substantial evidence that the color maps were too hard to read or unusable. Petitioners generally complained about residential density reductions but failed to present any competent, substantial evidence as to what supposedly was wrong with those reductions. Petitioners seem to believe that they should be able to obtain all information regarding their property from the Comprehensive Plan. There is no regulation cited by Petitioners requiring that the maps be of sufficient detail to enable someone to determine all possible uses of property based solely on a review of the maps. As a practical matter, additional site-specific information is nearly always necessary. In addition, GIS maps are computerized maps which are merely referenced by the Plan. The GIS system must ultimately be consulted regarding site-specific information. Poplin testified that the GIS updating of the FLUM and RDG map series was done primarily to streamline and consolidate the two previously separate maps. Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, Poplin testified that the conversion from two graphic maps to the GIS maps was a very positive change. Mixed Use District Conversion Paragraph 8.III.B. of the Amended Petition stated: Under the MIXED USE DISTRICT CONVERSION (pg 1) - Mixed Use District (MUD) land use designation and zoning classification of General Tourist Commercial (TU-1) or Highway Tourist Commercial (TU-2) existing classifications were not listed as being reclassified (to be designated as Community Commercial). Petitioners base this contention solely on the FLUM Update in the B.14 Plan Amendments. Petitioners' contention ignores FLUE Policy 2.7 in the B.13 Plan Amendments, one of the operative policies relating to the conversion from MUD. Policy 2.7 states which uses are allowed under the Community Commercial designation. Subparagraph "c" lists "Tourist Commercial uses" as being a use under Community Commercial. In their response to the motion for involuntary dismissal, Petitioners finally acknowledged Policy 2.7 but still maintain that it cannot be determined whether TU-1 and TU-2 zoning will be classified as Community Commercial or as Neighborhood Commercial. In making this argument, Petitioners ignore FLUE Policy 2.5, another operative policy in the B.13 section of the Plan Amendment, relating to the conversion from MUD. Policy 2.5 lists "[d]evelopment activities which may be considered within Neighborhood Commercial" and omits any "tourist commercial" development activities. Based on the evidence, it seems clear that both TU-1 and TU-2 zoning will be classified as Community Commercial, and not as Neighborhood Commercial. Petitioners' allegations that they were omitted from the MUD conversion are incorrect. More About the Glossary Paragraph 8.I.V. of the Amended Petition stated: Glossary, Definitions, Thresholds, Maps relating to Comprehensive Plan Amendments 1999 B.12, 1999 B.13 and 1999 B.14. Revised Glossary. A new Glossary and definitions was never completed and made available to the public before any properly noticed Public Hearing to properly allow public review, input, comment, etc. Incomplete or inaccurate data on thresholds and maps relating to Comprehensive Plan Amendments 1999 B.12, 1999 B.13 and 1999 B.14 were also not available. As previously found, the Glossary was not amended, and it would be inappropriate to advertise the Glossary for changes. There is no requirement that a glossary be included in a comprehensive plan. When a glossary is included, not every word in a comprehensive plan must be included. Forested Wetlands Location Map At final hearing, Petitioners asserted that the Forested Wetlands Location Map referred to and incorporated by reference in Policy 5.2.F.3. of the Conservation Element was not the best available data. This issue was not raised in the Amended Petition, and consideration of the merits of the assertion has been waived. In addition, as previously found, the language of Policy 5.2.F.3. was adopted prior to the Plan Amendments at issue in this case. See Finding of Fact 8, supra. On the merits of the argument, three forested wetlands maps were offered into evidence (as Petitioners' Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.) Only Petitioners' Exhibit 2 was admitted into evidence. Petitioners' Exhibit 2 reflects the Forested Wetlands Location Map incorporated by reference as part of the County's comprehensive plan. Without Petitioners' Exhibits 3 or 4 being in evidence, or any other evidence on the issue, Moehle's testimony was insufficient to prove beyond fair debate that the Forested Wetlands Location Map incorporated by reference as part of the County's comprehensive plan was not the best available data at the time of incorporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order dismissing the Amended Petition and finding that Brevard County's Plan Amendments B.12, B.13, and B.14 are "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eden Bentley, Esquire Brevard County Attorney's Office 2725 St. Johns Street Viera, Florida 32940 Andrew S. Grayson, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Charles F. Moehle Modern, Inc. Post Office Box 321417 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32932 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
