The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Department is the state agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine in Florida. At all times material to the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been a licensed physician, in the State of Florida, license number ME 0027088. Respondent is board certified in three areas of specialty: gastroenterology, radiology, and internal medicine. Respondent is on the staff of several hospitals in the Palm Beach County region. From March 28, 1986, until April 4, 1986, Respondent treated Goldie Marshak. At the time of such treatment, Mrs. Marshak was a seventy-one year old in good health. Mrs. Marshak had been referred to Respondent by Dr. Neil Katz. Dr. Katz was Mrs. Marshak's regular physician who had unsuccessfully treated her for persistent gas and burping. In accordance with Mrs. Marshak's health plan guidelines, Dr. Katz had referred her to Respondent, a specialist in similar disorders, for additional diagnosis. The referral form indicated Mrs. Marshak suffered from persistent stomach pain and gas. Attached to the referral were the results from a prior upper GI series which established there were no abnormalities of the upper gastrointestinal tract. Respondent first met with Mrs. Marshak on March 28, 1986. At the initial visit Mrs. Marshak completed a form which identified her current problem as "burping and rectal gas as soon as I eat. Some pain upper chest that has diminished." In addition, Mrs. Marshak supplied a social history, a past medical history, drug allergy, operations, injury, hospitalizations, family history, immunizations, and a general review of systems. No other records prepared on that date were retained. There are no records from which it can be determined what physical examination, if any, Respondent gave to Mrs. Marshak on March 28, 1986. Apparently, after reviewing the referral form and discussing her symptoms with Mrs. Marshak, Respondent elected to schedule her for a procedure called a flexible sigmoidoscopy. After conferring With Dr. Katz, whose consent was required for health plan purposes, the procedure was set to be performed April 3, 1986. Mrs. Marshak was given instructions regarding preparations required in order for the examination to be performed. When Mrs. Marshak returned to Respondent's office on April 3, 1986, she had successfully followed the instructions and was ready for the proposed procedure. Mrs. Marshak was given an authorization form which she signed in the presence of Marina Harmon. Mrs. Harmon was an unlicensed employee who assisted Respondent by escorting patients to the procedure room, having them sign the authorization form, and by explaining the procedure to be performed. The authorization form signed by Mrs. Marshak authorized Respondent to perform a flexible sigmoidoscopy. The form did not disclose risks or inherent dangers regarding the procedure but did provide the following: The motive and purpose of the diagnostic procedure, possible alternative methods, the risks and possible consequences involved, and the possibility of complications have been fully explained to me. I acknowledge that no guarantee or assurance has been made as the results that may be obtained. I also specifically authorize the physician, or his designee, to perform such additional procedures or render such treatment as he may, in his professional judgement deem necessary in the event any unforeseen condition arise during the course of the consented-to- diagnostic procedure that would put the patient's (my) well-being in jeopardy. A flexible sigmoidoscopy is a procedure whereby an instrument is inserted into the rectum and is then passed up the colon the desired distance. The length the instrument is extended specifies what the procedure is called. A flexible sigmoidoscopy involves looking into the rectum and the sigmoid colon only. A colonoscopy looks into the digestive tract beyond an anatomical portion of the colon called the splenic flexure. A left-sided colonoscopy involves looking into the lower digestive tract beyond the sigmoid colon but not beyond the splenic flexure. In terms of length, the flexible sigmoidoscopy would be the shortest procedure of the three described. On April 3, 1986, Respondent performed a colonoscopy on Mrs. Marshak which resulted in a perforation of her colon. This perforation would have occurred regardless of the procedure performed since the tear was located approximately twenty centimeters into the colon. During and following the procedure, Mrs. Marshak complained of extreme pain. Respondent presumed the pain to be that typically experienced during the procedure. The pain which continued after the instrument was removed, Respondent attributed to trapped gas within the colon which would be passed naturally in the hours following the procedure. Respondent sent Mrs. Marshak home for rest and advised her that the procedure had not revealed any abnormal condition in the area examined. Once home, Mrs. Marshak continued to have pain and discomfort. Her husband, Kalman Marshak, telephoned Respondent's office to advise of his wife's continued suffering. Respondent did not speak with either of the Marshaks' but did telephone a prescription for Tylenol with Codeine to their pharmacy. Mr. Marshak picked up the drug and administered it to his wife as directed. Codeine is an improper drug to prescribe for a patient who may be retaining gas since it inhibits parastoltic activity of the bowel. Respondent should have discussed the patient's symptoms with her to ascertain whether or not the pain suffered warranted further examination or emergency treatment. Despite the drug, Mrs. Marshak's pain continued through the night. On the morning of April 4, 1986, Mr. Marshak again telephoned Respondent's office to advise them of his wife's discomfort. The Marshaks were given an appointment for three o'clock that afternoon. The delay in setting the appointment or referring the patient for emergency treatment was inappropriate. At the time of her revisit, Mrs. Marshak had a distended abdomen with some tenderness. Respondent took x-rays of the area and reinserted the colonoscope a very short distance in an effort to expel what Respondent believed to be trapped gas in the colon. The procedure did not relieve Mrs. Marshak's pain and she was advised to go to the hospital for further treatment. Subsequent to Mrs. Marshak leaving the office, Respondent read the x-rays and discovered the perforation. Respondent immediately telephoned the emergency room to advise the physician on duty of Mrs. Marshak's condition and her need for attention. The perforation required surgery which resulted in Mrs. Marshak having to wear a colostomy bag for several months. Afterwards, a second surgery restored her colon to allow normal elimination. At the time of the final hearing, Mrs. Marshak had completely recovered from the perforation. On April 8, 1986, Respondent prepared a letter to Dr. Katz which outlined the treatment given to Mrs. Marshak. Any notes or other records used to prepare the letter were destroyed. The x-rays taken at Respondent's office on April 4, 1986, were lost and were, therefore, unavailable. According to Respondent, the missing x-rays were very similar to the ones taken at the hospital when Mrs. Marshak arrived on April 4, 1986. The Respondent did not obtain a consent form or written authorization for the procedure performed on April 4, 1986. The reinsertion of the instrument into the rectum was inappropriate since the x-rays clearly showed the perforation. Other than the letter written to Dr. Katz, Respondent did not maintain any medical records for the treatment he gave to Mrs. Marshak on March 28, April 3, and April 4, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order which finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I and IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint, dismisses Counts II and III, imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $1000, places Respondent on probation for a period of two years, and requires Respondent to attend such continuing education courses as may be deemed appropriate by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3397 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are accepted. To the extent paragraph 11 describes a colonoscopy as "more invasive" the paragraph is accepted. However, as to all of the examinations performed (colonoscopy, flexible sigmoidoscopy or left-sided colonoscopy) the basic description is similar. Consequently "more extensive explanation "is not required. Thus the balance of paragraph" is rejected as contrary to the evidence. Paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 13 is accepted. Paragraph 14 is accepted however it must be noted that such explanations given by Harmon are in supplement to those given by Rothenberg. Paragraph 15 is accepted but is unnecessary. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are accepted, however, see note above re: paragraph 14. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are accepted. Paragraph 20 is rejected as argument, irrelevant and immaterial. Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 are accepted. Paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 are accepted with the note that the communications addressed were with Respondent's office. There is no evidence that Respondent personally spoke with Mr. Marshak to determine the patient's condition. Paragraph 29 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. It was inappropriate to delay the revisit until 3 o'clock, but there is no evidence Respondent made that decision. Based upon the testimony, The more appropriate course would have had Respondent discuss the situation directly with the patient (or her husband) and to schedule the revisit as soon as possible or have the patient go to the hospital. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraphs 31, 32, and 33 are accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as repetitive and unnecessary. Paragraph 35 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant immaterial and assuming facts not in evidence. Paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43 are accepted. Paragraphs 44, 45, 46, and 47, are rejected as argumentative or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 48 and 50 are rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 49 is accepted. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 12 the area of the perforation was between 15- 25 centimeters according to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence as to "reread." That paragraph with the word "read" for "reread" would be accepted. Paragraphs 16, 17, 18, and 19 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Branson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Charles A. Nugent, Jr., Esquire Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth & Romano Servico Centre-Suite 300/400 1601 Belvedere Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Dong Hack Koo, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0027494. Koo was so licensed at all times material to the Amended Administrative Complaint. At all times material to this cause, Koo maintained an office at 121 East 8th Street, Jacksonville, Florida, 32206. On July 10, 1985, Diane Rabideau, an Investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation, inspected Koo's offices and found them to be unclean, with evidence of roach eggs present under a sink. Rabideau also found a rectal speculum and two vaginal speculums lying on a sink. Koo told Rabideau that the rectal speculum and the two vaginal speculums had been used. No evidence was presented to indicate how long the speculums had been on the sink. If such instruments are not cleaned quickly and properly following use, there is a high chance of spreading infection to the next patient to use the instrument. Such instruments should be placed in a cleansing solution and scrubbed, then wrapped and sterilized. It is the community practice to clean such instruments as soon as possible after use. According to Dr. Rosin, any physician who performs abortions in an unclean office with instruments lying around that have not been properly cleaned, has practiced below the community standard of care. However, no evidence was presented to show that Koo performed abortions under such circumstances. Koo does perform first trimester abortions in his office. It was not disputed that abortions are a medical and surgical procedure which can be dangerous. Emergency situations can arise during abortions and these emergencies require the presence of emergency equipment such as suction and the ability to start an intravenous medication. Koo does maintain suction equipment and intravenous solutions in his office. However, when possible he immediately transfers emergency patients to another facility. Koo does perform abortions in his office without the presence of an assistant to aid in emergency situations. According to Dr. Rosin, the standard of care in the community requires that an assistant be present during an abortion to assist the physician should an emergency situation arise. Additionally, according to Dr. Rosin, a physician who performs abortions without emergency equipment or without an assistant has failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. When Rabideau visited Koo's office on July 10, 1985, she obtained a sampling of drugs kept by Koo for dispensing to patients. The sampling revealed that a majority of the drugs had expired. However, no evidence was presented that this is a violation of Florida Statutes. Rabideau also found that Koo maintained a number of Schedule III, IV, and V, controlled substances in his office which he dispensed to patients. In dispensing these controlled substances, Koo used the instructions for use which are printed on the packaging. He also, at times, taped a small piece of paper to the packaging with his telephone number and the name of the patient. Koo did not completely label these controlled substances, which he dispensed, with his name and address, the date of delivery, directions for use, the name of the patient, and a warning concerning the transfer of the substance. Koo maintains no inventory of the scheduled controlled substances which are kept in his offices and dispensed to his patients. On August 6, 1985, Diane Rabideau again visited Koo's office. While Rabideau waited, a female patient by the name of Mary Green was seen by Koo and left with a prescription. Rabideau then asked Respondent to present the medical records on the patient, Mary Green. Koo was unable to present any medical records for the patient which he had just seen and to whom he had just dispensed medication. Koo's office procedure regarding patient medical records is to record histories and examination results on the patient medical records during the patient's visit. These medical records are kept in individual folders under the name of each patient. When a patient presents for treatment, the medical records for that patient are pulled and given to the doctor. After each visit, the patient's medical records are refiled. On or about March 16, 1986, pursuant to a subpoena from the Department of Professional Regulation, Koo provided the original medical records on ten (10) abortion patients. These original medical records were examined by John F. McCarthy, a questioned documents expert for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. McCarthy's examination by electrostatic detection apparatus revealed that numerous indentations on the records superimposed with information from other records. For example, Exhibit 6 contained indentations from the writing on the face of Exhibit 10. Further, McCarthy found indentations on Exhibit 6 resulting from the writing on Exhibit 8. Thus, Exhibit 8 was on top of Exhibit 6 when it was prepared. Exhibit 8, however, is dated July 24, 1985, and Exhibit 6 is dated May 29, 1985. McCarthy's expert opinion is that at the time the various documents were prepared, they were on top of each other. It is therefore found that Exhibits 1-10, the original medical records on the ten named abortion patients, were not prepared at the time Koo saw the patients, but were instead all prepared at the same time, in response to the subpoena. It therefore must be found that the records were fabricated by Koo in response to the Department's subpoena. Prior to performing an abortion, a physician needs to verify whether the patient has Rh positive or negative blood type. The physician cannot rely on patients' representations that the Rh factor is positive or negative, but most obtain independent verification. This is because patients know that if they have Rh negative blood, they must receive a shot which is expensive. Koo relied on the patients' statements in ascertaining the Rh factor and did not obtain independent verification. In Dr. Rosin's expert opinion, the failure of a physician to obtain independent verification of the Rh factor poses a potential for harm to the patient and such failure is a failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment that is recognized in the medical community.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order finding Dong Hack Koo, M.D., GUILTY of violating Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and therein SUSPEND his license to practice medicine for a period of six (6) months during which he be required to successfully complete continuing education courses in maintaining, controlling, dispensing, labeling, and inventorying controlled substance, and in maintaining adequate patient records to justify the course of treatment. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1066 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1 (1) ; 2 (2); 3 (3); 4 (4); 5 (4); 6 (4); 7 (4); 8 (5); 9 (6); 10 (6); 11 (9); 12 (7); 13 (8); 14 (9); 15 (10); 16 (11); 17 (11); 18 (12); 19 (13); 20 (13); 21 (15); 22 (14); 23 (14); 24 (16); 25 (16); 26 (16); 27 (16); 28 (17); 29 (18); and 30 (19) That portion of proposed finding of fact 12 which concludes that Respondent does not maintain emergency equipment in his office is rejected as unsupported by the competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Shope, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dong Hack Koo, M.D. 121 East 8th Street, Suite 7 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive DIRECTOR Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The administrative complaint charged Respondent in Count I with violating Section 458.331(1)(t), F.S., failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, and in Count II with violating Section 458.331(1)(m), F.S., failure to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was a licensed medical physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME004552. On October 24, 1988, Patient #1, a 67 year old female, presented by wheelchair at the Physicians Referral Center (PRC) emergency room of the Marion Community Hospital in Ocala, Florida. Respondent was on duty there at that time. Patient #1, arrived at the emergency room at approximately 1:50 a.m. complaining of gas, no bowel movements for three days, feeling weak, and a highly elevated blood sugar of 412 as of 5:00 p.m. the evening before. Patient #1 was accompanied by her husband, who provided some of the foregoing information. Alicia Ables, R.N., attended Patient #1 when she arrived, took her vital signs which appeared to be within normal limits, and noted in the patient medical records, at the bottom of the nurse's notes, that the patient had heart problems, diabetes, kidney problems, and was taking medications. The nurse attached to the patient's medical records a list of the patient's current medications which had been provided by the husband. These medications included Isordil, Trental, Ascriptin, Lasix, Lanoxin, Depyridamole, Capoten, Riopan Plus, Mylicon 800, Pilocarpine eye drops, Tylenol and Humulin N-100, 30 units in the morning and 6 units in the evening. Humulin N-100 is a low level prescription for insulin diabetic maintenance. Mylicon is an anti-gas preparation. The foregoing history was on the patient chart when Respondent saw the patient a few minutes later. Respondent saw the patient at approximately 2:10 a.m. At that time, only the patient, her husband, and Respondent were present in the examining room. No nurse was present in the examining room with them, but Ms. Ables testified that the absence of a nurse during a rectal examination of a female patient occurred occasionally if not regularly at PRC. Nurse Ables was not present in the examination room at the time of the examination and is without knowledge of the extent of Respondent's examination of Patient #1. The patient, who is now deceased, did not testify. The patient's husband did not testify. The only person who was present in the examining room on October 24, 1988 who did testify was Respondent, and his testimony is unrefuted that he performed a routine examination of the patient's chest, abdomen, and skin, that he also performed a rectal examination during which he found the patient's rectal vault "empty," and that he concluded that there was no fecal impaction but some retention of gas. He concluded that a soap suds enema was not warranted, given the patient's condition. He stated that despite believing that the patient had some retention of gas, he considered her to be "fixated" in her mind on the gas problem. When the Respondent examined the patient on October 24, 1988, he contemporaneously noted on her chart that her chief complaint was accumulation of gas, that she wanted a soap suds enema, and that she had spoken earlier with Dr. Sunkavalli, who had referred her to the emergency room. Dr. Sunkavalli was the patient's primary treating physician. Respondent also noted on the chart at 2:25 a.m. on October 24, 1988 that Dr. Sunkavalli would follow the patient as an outpatient. He also wrote down that he diagnosed her as having "gas retention fixation." He ordered Mylicon 80 to be administered to her. She was not given a soap suds enema, was not admitted to the hospital, and was not transferred to another hospital. Respondent did not order any laboratory tests or x-rays. Administration of the Mylicon 80 was noted on the patient's chart by a nurse other than Ms. Ables at 2:40 a.m. That nurse also noted on the patient records that Patient #1 was discharged home at 3:00 a.m., in stable condition. None of the typically observable symptoms of ketoacidosis in the patient were observed or noted by Respondent or by Ms. Ables while the patient was at PRC. Patient #1 was admitted to Citrus Memorial Hospital six and one-half hours after being discharged from Respondent's care. Three hours after her admission to Citrus Memorial, the patient died. After autopsy, the principal pathologic diagnosis and cause of death was listed as "marked three vessel artherosclerosis with large, old myocardial infarction." The gross summary reads, "Death of this 67-year old, white female was due to marked three vessel arteriosclerosis secondary to arteriosclerotic heart disease. A contributing factor was diabetic acidosis." There was also evidence of a gastro-intestinal bleed. When Patient #1's death became an issue the next day, Respondent was unable to recall the patient or his examination and treatment of her. The Respondent reviewed the emergency room records and spoke with Ms. Ables in order to recall the care he had rendered to the patient. Respondent prepared an addendum to the patient's medical records three days after he actually examined Patient #1. Only at that late date, October 27, 1988, did Respondent document a history, document that he had made a physical examination, and document that he had had a telephone consultation with Dr. Sunkavalli on October 24, 1988 while the patient was in the emergency room, and further document that he and Dr. Sunkavalli had concurred at that time in treating the patient with Mylicon. Adding the addendum was deemed appropriate under the circumstances by Marion Community Hospital personnel, and Petitioner's expert did not specifically find that adding it was inappropriate or improper. Respondent had not documented the telephone consultation with Dr. Sunkavalli or a history or physical examination of Patient #1 at the time he examined her on October 24, 1988. Neither on the date of examination/treatment nor in his later addendum did Respondent ever document that he had performed a rectal examination on Patient #1. In his testimony at formal hearing, Respondent explained and supplemented his October 27, 1988 addendum notation of a telephone conversation with Dr. Sunkavalli on October 24, 1988 to add that Dr. Sunkavalli was aware at that time of Patient #1's elevated blood sugar reading the previous evening but, hearing Respondent's examination results, Dr. Sunkavalli had recommended no further tests and had said nothing to disagree with Respondent's assessment and treatment of the patient and that while Respondent had not deferred to Dr. Sunkavalli, he had relied on the consultation. Dr. Sunkavalli was not called to corroborate or refute Respondent's testimony on this score. Jack Kareff, M.D., was accepted as an expert in emergency room medicine. He opined that, under similar circumstances, and particularly with an elderly diabetic patient, the minimal acceptable level of care, skill, and treatment of a reasonably prudent similar physician would have been to examine Patient #1's abdomen, perform a rectal examination, and perform a dipstick of urine for both glucose (sugar) and acetone. Dr. Kareff also expressed the opinion that the rectal examination should have been made to eliminate the chance of fecal impaction and that such rectal examination should have included treating a sample of fecal matter found in the rectal vault with a paper reagent to determine if there were occult blood in the patient's stool so as to rule out gastro-intestinal bleeding. Dr. Kareff testified that there is sufficient fecal matter for such a test in the rectal vault 99% of the time. He conceded that an enema might not be warranted and could be potentially traumatic, given such a patient's condition. Dr. Kareff indicated that the urine dipstick test should be done to ensure that the patient was not headed for diabetic ketoacidosis. The urine dipstick test proposed as a minimal requirement by Dr. Kareff was also described by him as actually "problematic" in that he admitted that such a dipstick test can "fool you" occasionally because not enough aceto acetate is formed to tell the patient's true condition. According to Dr. Kareff, ketoacidosis may take anywhere from 2 hours to several weeks to develop in a diabetic. On the foregoing information, the efficacy of a dipstick test was not established. Because he believed that Respondent had not done the abdominal examination, rectal examination with stool testing, and urine dipstick test, Dr. Kareff further opined that Respondent had fallen below the acceptable level of care, skill and treatment as recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances. In forming his foregoing opinions, Dr. Kareff had not had the benefit of hearing Respondent's unrefuted testimony that Respondent had, in fact, performed a rectal examination, determined that there was no fecal impaction, and found the patient's rectal vault empty. Accordingly, the record is devoid of Dr. Kareff's opinion, if any, as to what should have or could have been done as regards a fecal test when the patient's rectal vault is "empty." Dr. Kareff's opinions assumed and relied on some material contrary to the facts established in this proceeding. Dr. Kareff's opinion also relied upon much uncorroborated hearsay evidence, such as the agency's investigative report. These reliances and assumptions on Dr. Kareff's part detract from the weight and credibility of his opinion on minimal professional treatment, and therefore that opinion is not persuasive. The parties have stipulated that Respondent's medical records were inadequate. This stipulation and Dr. Kareff's opinion that Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment are accepted.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 458.33(1)(t), F.S. and dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Finding that Respondent is guilty under Count II of the Administrative Complaint of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), F.S., failure to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results; and Reprimanding Respondent for the single violation, fining him $1000.00, and requiring him to complete one basic level continuing medical education course in record keeping responsibilities and techniques within one year of the entry of the final order. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-5014 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1-12 Except as to subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative material, accepted. 13-14 Rejected because it is largely subordinate to the facts as found in FOF 18-21. 15 Rejected as a conclusion of law but also for the reasons set forth in FOF 18-19. Respondent's PFOF: 1 Covered in the preliminary statement, the FOF, or the Conclusions of Law. Accepted as covered in the rulings on Petitioner's PFOF. Rejected as legal argument. 4-6, 20-21, 37-38, 44, 46-48 Accepted but subordinate to the facts as found. 7-8 Covered in FOF 3-4. 9 Accepted with time adjustment per greater weight of the evidence. 10-11, 13-18, 22-24, 39-40, 45, 49-63, 66 Except as to subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative material, accepted. 12 Accepted, except as to characterization "necessary". 19 Covered in FOF 17. 25 Covered in FOF 8. 26-28 Covered in FOF 18-21. 41-42 Covered in FOF 18-21. 29, 31 Rejected as irrelevant. 30 Covered in FOF 15. 32-36, 67 These proposals are irrelevant, out of context, or misleading as stated, since Dr. Kareff did not specifically advocate a soap suds enema and Respondent did not feel it was warranted. To the extent necessary, the subject matter is covered in FOF 7-9, 14-17, and 18-22. 43 Covered in FOF 7. 64-65, 68 Rejected as unnecessary and/or unproven. COPIES FURNIISHED: Louis Kwall, Esquire Gross and Kwall, P.A. 133 North Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 34615 Susan E. Lindgard, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, holding license number ME 81249. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was board-certified in family medicine. The Respondent held no board certification at the time of the administrative hearing, and, according to his response to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, the family medicine certification expired in July 2007. On February 8, 2006, the Respondent prescribed hydrocodone (10/325, generic Norco, 10mg.) to Patient M.R. through an internet service called ERMeds.com. On June 26, 2006, the Respondent prescribed hydrocodone (Hydro/APAP 10/325, generic Norco, 10/325) to Patient M.R. through the internet service called ERMeds.com. Hydrocodone is a Schedule II controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Hydrocodone/APAP is hydrocodone combined with acetaminophen, and the combined drug is a Schedule III controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Both hydrocodone and hydrocodone/APAP have high potential for abuse and addiction. The prescriptions issued to Patient M.R. contained the Respondent's identification including address and DEA number on the prescription form, as well as the Respondent's electronic facsimile signature. The Respondent had no contact with Patient M.R. either before or after the prescription was issued to Patient M.R. The Respondent conducted no health evaluation of Patient M.R. The Respondent did not obtain or review any medical information related to Patient M.R. The Respondent testified during deposition that a physician's assistant for whom the Respondent was the supervising physician was responsible for gathering and reviewing medical information from the patient. According to the Respondent's response to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, the physician's assistant obtained patient history, including current medications and complaints, and the "information was available to Respondent at the time the prescriptions were authorized." According to the Respondent's response to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, a completed medical questionnaire was available for the Respondent's review. There is no evidence that the Respondent reviewed any information or questionnaire regarding the patient's medical history or complaint either before or at the time the prescriptions were authorized. The Respondent did not know and never met the physician's assistant and was unable to recall the last name of the physician's assistant. There is no evidence that the Respondent had any discussion with any physician's assistant related to Patient M.R. either before or at the time the prescriptions were authorized. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Bernd Wollschlaeger, M.D., a Florida-licensed physician holding board certification in family practice. Dr. Wollschlaeger testified that a physician must evaluate a patient, take a patient's medical history, review any available medical records, and document the findings and diagnosis in a contemporaneous record prior to issuing a prescription for hydrocodone to a patient. Based upon the Respondent's deposition testimony and the responses to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, it is clear that the Respondent failed to evaluate Patient M.R. in any respect prior to issuing the prescriptions for hydrocodone to the patient. The Respondent reviewed no medical history or records related to Patient M.R. The Respondent failed to diagnose any medical condition that would support prescribing hydrocodone to Patient M.R. The Respondent failed to document any medical information related to Patient M.R. in any written record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order finding Gerard Romain, M.D., in violation of Subsections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(q), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), and imposing a penalty as follows: a reprimand; a three-year period of probation, the first year of which shall include a prohibition on issuing prescriptions for Schedule II and III controlled substances; an administrative fine of $20,000.00; and such additional continuing education and community service requirements as the Department of Health determines appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Elana J. Jones, Esquire Ephraim D. Livingston, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Dale R. Sisco, Esquire Stacy Estes, Esquire Sisco-Law Post Office Box 3382 Tampa, Florida 33601-3382 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues contained herein, the Respondent was a licensed medical doctor in Florida having been issued license number ME 0041256. Respondent was awarded his medical degree by the University of Tennessee in 1977. He came to southwest Florida in January, 1983 starting his practice in August of that year. He thereafter applied for and was granted privileges at Lee Memorial Hospital and practiced in Lee County until January, 1985 when he moved to Collier County. In January, 1985, Dr. Heiss notified Lee Memorial Hospital that he was moving his practice and that he no longer needed privileges at that facility. This was partly in response to a letter from the hospital asking him to resign which was, at least in part, based on his failure to keep his medical records current. He admits that prior to that time, he had received some notices involving incomplete records at the hospital and went in to work on them as best he could. However, due to his own medical problem which involved a prolonged throat infection that left him tired and weak, he could not accomplish much. This medical problem lasted for several months and when he was feeling better, he tried, to the best of his ability, he claims, during the summer of 1985, to complete the incomplete records. He went to the hospital and worked on some of them, but in late 1986, when he checked with clerical personnel in the medical records section, he was told his records were complete, and coincidentally, he stopped getting delinquency notices. Under the procedure in effect at Lee Memorial Hospital for correcting incomplete records in 1984, once a week, Ms. Lindahl, the assistant manager of the records section, would go through the files to determine which records were delinquent. If dictation was needed, the chart would be declared delinquent in 15 days. If only the signature was missing, the doctor was give 45 days to correct it. When the record was declared delinquent, medical records personnel would send a weekly reminder letter to the physician setting a one week suspense for correction and indicating that if the correction was not made, the doctor's hospital privileges could be suspended. These temporary suspensions, however, were not being enforced. According to Ms. Lindahl, in 1985, Dr. Heiss was identified and placed on the delinquent list 35 times. Because of this, he would have been sent 35 letters. In January, 1985, at the time Respondent left Lee Memorial Hospital, he left incomplete 84 charts. Because of the volume of incomplete records left by Respondent, the hospital Medical Records Committee, on May 2, 1985, authorized Ms. Lindahl to transfer these incomplete records to the permanent records section of the archives, a procedure that would not normally have been done with incomplete records. This transfer was accomplished in August, 1985. After Respondent left the hospital, in January, 1985, up to March, 1985, Ms. Lindahl contacted him both at home and at his new office both by phone and by letter on several occasions, and asked him to come in and complete his records. Each of the letters sent indicated those charts, by name, which needed completion. After the charts were transferred to permanent records in August, 1985, until February, 1987, Ms. Lindahl did not make any further effort to contact Dr. Heiss, nor did he contact her. However, she was informed by the Hospital Administrator that Dr. Heiss was to come in and work on the records. Therefore, she pulled these records for him and, in fact, the Respondent did, on some occasions, come in at night to work on them. Ms. Lindahl agreed to pull records for him as needed but advised him that she could not and would not pull all his incomplete records at one time. Charts are placed on microfilm after a period of years. Some of Respondent's charts were microfilmed before he completed them. However, the hospital made arrangements for him to complete these records as well in an effort to accommodate him. Once the records were placed on microfilm, it was more difficult for Dr. Heiss to complete them since, initially, there was no dictating equipment available in the microfilm reading area. However, it could have been done by Respondent taking notes from the film and thereafter dictating those notes in the records room where dictating equipment was available. However, that was not necessary, since the hospital set up a booth with dictating capability in it for him in the microfilm reading area. An Administrative Complaint was filed against Dr. Heiss in October, 1985, because of his incomplete files. The matter was referred to the Board of Medicine in February, 1987, after a stipulated settlement was reached between the Respondent and Counsel for the Board. On February 11, 1987, the Board of Medicine entered a Final Order which approved and adopted the stipulation entered into between Respondent and counsel for the Board on December 23, 1986. Paragraph 4 of the stipulated Disposition in this case provided that prior to the stipulation being presented to the Board, Respondent would complete all incomplete hospital records that he was responsible for at Lee Memorial Hospital. Dr. Heiss contends that at that time, he understood his medical records to be complete, based upon his inquiry to personnel in the medical records section at the hospital. He indicates he made several inquiries of at least two separate employees who told him they could find no record of any incomplete files charged to him. Once his incomplete records were transferred to permanent storage, they were deleted from the computer and a routine inquiry would not have disclosed them. However, Ms. Lindahl had in her possession a complete list of his still incomplete records and a simple inquiry to her, the person in charge, would have given him the correct information. Dr. Heiss did not check with Ms. Lindahl, who worked days even though he admits he may have been in the hospital for other reasons on several occasions during the day. He would usually come in during the evenings, and on one occasion, spoke with Mr. Shuler, the night records custodian, who checked the computer and found no record of the doctor's delinquency. Mr. Shuler, however, advised Dr. Heiss to check with Ms. Lindahl. Dr. Heiss states he believed that the Stipulation he worked out with counsel for the Board in response to the initial Complaint, took care of the problem. When he went before the Board in February, 1987, he had checked with medical records at the hospital and had been told his status was clear. This check was not with Ms. Lindahl, however. When he did so, he found he did have unfinished records. It was at that time, after the stipulation was signed, that he began to bring the records current. Dr. Heiss admits that during the period 1985 - 1986, believed there were some medical records that were incomplete but because they had been filed in the permanent records section, he believed his responsibility for them was fulfilled. As a practicing physician, he relies upon the medical records section to tell him what records need to be completed. When he was advised by that agency that he was no longer delinquent, he felt satisfied. This argument is specious and without merit. Respondent admits he did not make any attempt to work on the records from January to July, 1986. He contends that from July, 1986 to January, 1987, he called the hospital several times to check on his records but could get no indication he had files undone. It was not until after the Board meeting in February, 1987, when Mr. Shuler told him to speak with Ms. Lindahl, that he determined he did have some medical records incomplete. Notwithstanding, he knew he had some dictation that was incomplete and some matters were unsigned and in his opinion, it is more a question of semantics, (what the term, "incomplete" meant), and not knowing what he had to do. He contends he dealt in good faith with the hospital and with the Board of Medicine and was surprised to find out that he was not in good standing. This argument as well, is unbelievable. Dr. Heiss contends he relied on what he was told by the people at medical records but at no time until after he entered into the Stipulation with the Board of Medicine in 1987 did he contact Ms. Lindahl even though he knew she was the one who was in charge of delinquencies and was still employed by the hospital. It was incumbent upon him as the physician to contact the person in charge, especially in light of his suspicion that certain records were incomplete, and not rely on phone calls to anyone who answered. This does not constitute reasonably prudent action or the actions of a reasonable man. It cannot reasonably be claimed that Dr. Heiss' actions were based on an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. As a physician, he should have assumed that the Board wanted and required all records to be completed and it was his responsibility to insure that the records were, in fact completed. This he failed to do. On March 20, 1987, Respondent still had 53 charts incomplete of the 84 charts he had left incomplete when he departed the staff of Lee Memorial Hospital. These 53 charts were completed by November, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a medical doctor in Florida be suspended for ninety days and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of January, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2674 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. BY THE PETITIONER 1 & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. Accepted 4 - 8 Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. 11 - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17 - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23 & 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. 25. Argument rather than Finding of Fact. 26 & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. BY THE RESPONDENT No submittal. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director DPR, Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Susan Branson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dan E. Batchelor, Esquire Post Office Box 1899 Bonita Springs, Florida 33923
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Martin Kasner was licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0031141 on August 24, 1977. At all time pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent maintained an office at 1911 North Andrews Avenue, Wilton Manors, Florida 33311. There is no evidence that Petitioner has ever been the subject of prior disciplinary action by the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine ("the Board"). On June 7, 1988, Detective Robert Trawinski of the Broward County Sheriff's Office visited Respondent's office in an undercover capacity posing as a new patient identifying himself as Robert Conti. Detective Trawinski had never previously worked in an undercover capacity in a doctor's office. Prior to Detective Trawinski's June 7, 1988 visit to the Respondent's office, Detective Trawinski met with Sergeant Clukey of the narcotics division of the Broward County Sheriff's Office and Mel Waxman, an investigator for the Petitioner. Detective Trawinski was instructed to try to obtain a prescription for Valium from the Respondent without giving any valid medical purpose. Valium or Diazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance that is not an analgesic, but is a potent tranquilizer and skeletal muscle relaxant which can have adverse effects on sensorium. It is indicated for the management of anxiety disorders or for the short-term relief of the symptoms of anxiety. Individual patients taking Valium can become dependent on the drug and withdrawal from addiction to the drug can lead to potentially life-threatening health problems. Detective Trawinski was not advised as to all of the potentially acceptable medical purposes for which Valium could be used. He understood his instructions to mean that he should not voice any complaint of pain. Prior to seeing the Respondent during this first visit, Detective Trawinski filled out a medical questionnaire in Respondent's office using the fictitious name Bob Conti. In filling out the questionnaire, Detective Trawinski did not state any specific medical complaints. The patient's blood pressure was taken by a nurse in the office and recorded at 150/84. That reading tends to confirm the patient's subsequent complaint of anxiety. During the June 7, 1988 visit, Detective Trawinski advised Respondent that he was having problems performing sexually and was experiencing some anxiety as a result of job and family problems. Detective Trawinski also advised the Respondent that he had previously obtained prescriptions for Valium from a doctor up north and the drug had helped calm him down. Detective Trawinski advised the Respondent that the Valium he had previously been taking relaxed him and alleviated many of the symptoms of which he was complaining. During this first visit, the Respondent took a limited medical history from the patient including questions regarding possible alternative sources of the patient's complaints such as diabetes and thyroid problems. The patient denied a history of any such possible alternative causes for his symptoms. During the first visit, the Respondent made preliminary overtures towards conducting a physical examination of the patient. However, the detective told the doctor he did not want a physical. Respondent advised the Petitioner that he should consider having a blood work-up, but the Respondent indicated that because the tests were so expensive, the patient could wait until he had the money. At the conclusion of the June 7, 1988 visit, the Respondent issued a prescription to Detective Trawinski for 30 ten milligram Valium tablets with the ability to refill the prescription three times. The patient was advised to take two Valium per day as needed and one at night as a sleeping pill. At the time of the first visit, Detective Trawinski did not know the therapeutic use for Valium and was not advised of the appropriate use for Valium by his superiors. In actuality, a prescription for Valium was not inappropriate for the patient given his high blood pressure, complaints of anxiety and minor sexual dysfunction which could have been related to anxiety. Detective Trawinski returned for a second visit to the Respondent's office seventeen days later on June 24, 1988 at which time the patient's blood pressure was recorded at 164/80 which could reflect anxiety on the part of the patient. During this second visit, the Respondent questioned the patient regarding his appetite and medical history. Detective Trawinski denied a history of thyroid trouble, hayfever, etc. The Respondent conducted a limited physical examination of the patient checking his lungs and his heart rate. During the June 24 visit, Detective Trawinski advised the doctor that, while he still had some anxious moments, the prescription for Valium was helping him. The Respondent asked the patient whether he had any Valium left. The patient responded that he did not have any and also advised the Respondent that he was taking the Valium as directed and was not sharing them with anyone else. At the conclusion of the second visit, the Respondent provided the patient with a prescription for 50 Valium tablets with two refills. While the medical records of Detective Trawinski's first and second visit are sketchy at best, the Valium prescriptions issued on these two occasions do not fall beneath the standard of a reasonably prudent physician under the circumstances. The third visit by Detective Trawinski to Respondent's office took place twelve days later on July 6, 1988. During that visit, the detective advised the Respondent that the reason the Valium were going so quickly was because he was sharing the prescription with his wife. Detective Trawinski attempted to obtain from Respondent a separate prescription for Valium for his wife. Detective Trawinski offered to pay Respondent the amount of an additional office visit if Respondent would issue a prescription in his wife's name. However, Respondent refused to accept the additional money or issue a prescription in the wife's name without seeing her. The Respondent stated that he would need to take a medical history and conduct a physical examination prior to prescribing anything for the patient's wife. The Respondent advised Detective Trawinski that his wife should not be taking prescription drugs without having seen a doctor and that, although the prescription seem to be working for him, it may not necessarily be good for his wife. The Respondent advised the patient that, while his wife could take a few of his Valium until she could make an appointment to see the doctor, an appointment should be made as soon as possible and that no one should take prescription medication without being seen by the doctor. Notwithstanding the cautionary statements to the patient regarding sharing the drug, at the conclusion of the third visit, Respondent increased the patient's prescription for Valium from 50 tablets to 100 tablets with 1 refill. In fact, Respondent originally made out the prescription for 50 tablets. However, after being advised that the patient was sharing the pills with his wife, the prescription was increased to 100 tablets. By increasing the prescription in this manner, the Respondent was excessively prescribing a controlled substance and fell below the standard of care expected in this community of a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar circumstances. On July 13, 1988, Detective Trawinski returned to Respondent's office with Deputy Somerall of the Broward Sheriff's Office posing as his wife, Jeanette Conti. Upon arriving at the doctor's office, Deputy Somerall was weighed and her blood pressure was taken. In addition, the doctor performed a limited physical examination including listening to her heart and lungs with a stethoscope. The Respondent took a limited medical history from Deputy Somerall and she stated that she was suffering from stress and that Valium seemed to relieve it. Deputy Somerall advised the Respondent that she had been taking some of the Valium prescribed for her purported husband. In response to questioning by the Respondent, Deputy Somerall stated that she took the Valium on an as needed basis and it did not cause her to be drowsy and seemed to relieve the stress and anxiety she sometimes experienced towards the end of the visit, the Respondent indicated he would issue a separate prescription for Valium for Deputy Somerall and stated that he did not want her taking pills from her husband without her seeing a doctor first. The Respondent issued a prescription in the name of Jeanette Conti for 30 ten milligram Valium tablets with two refills permitted. During the July 13, 1988 visit, the Respondent inquired of Detective Trawinski whether his prescriptions were holding out. After Detective Trawinski indicated that he needed additional prescriptions, the Respondent issued a new prescription in the name of Bob Conti for 100 ten milligram Valium tablets. No refills were indicated. During this fourth visit, Detective Trawinski told the Respondent that he had tried some Percodan and had enjoyed it. He indicated that the drug had helped him to perform sexually and requested the doctor to issue him a prescription for that drug. Percodan is a Schedule II Controlled Substance which is used to relieve moderate to severe pain. It is an opiate narcotic and can be addictive. At the conclusion of this fourth visit, the Respondent issued a prescription to Detective Trawinski for 30 Percodan tablets. The prescription did not provide for any refills. No valid medical reason was provided for the issuance of the Percodan prescription. While Respondent contends that the patient had previously complained of back pain and a prescription for Percodan was issued for that reason, no competent evidence was presented to establish that Detective Trawinski had ever made a serious complaint about back pain. Therefore, the Respondent fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent physician in this community by issuing the Percodan prescription. Likewise, the issuance of additional prescriptions for Valium in the name of Bob Conti was excessive when considered together with the previous prescriptions issued. Pharmacists in Broward County will sometimes contact a physician to advise him if a patient is attempting to refill a prescription sooner than it should be refilled. The Respondent was never contacted by any pharmacist or advised that his patients were attempting to refill their prescriptions sooner than they should and there is no indication that the Respondent was ever advised that all of the refills allowed under the prescriptions were obtained by the patient. Patients often overlook the ability to refill a prescription and return to the doctor for a new prescription. The Respondent specifically advised Detective Trawinski during one of the visits that he could get the prescriptions refilled without returning to see the doctor. This statement indicates that the Respondent assumed that the patient had not sought all the refills of the earlier prescriptions. While the Respondent might have assumed that the patient had not sought all the refills provided, the Respondent should have been more cautious about issuing so many prescriptions with refills permitted within such a short period of time. However, at no time was the Respondent informed or led to believe that the patient was selling the drugs to others. Although both patients were seen by the doctor and issued prescriptions during the July 13 visit, they were only charged Respondent's typical rate for a single visit, $30.00. On July 19, 1988, both Detective Trawinski and Deputy Somerall returned to the Respondent's office. During this visit, Deputy Somerall advised Respondent she had taken some of the Percodan prescribed for her purported husband and requested a prescription of her own. Deputy Somerall told the Respondent that she was using the drug as an aphrodisiac. Detective Trawinski advised the doctor that he was taking four Percodan per day because it made him feel good. Detective Trawinski advised Respondent that he did not have any Percodan remaining because he had used it during a party with another couple. The Respondent lectured both patients about the dangers of Percodan and told them that the drug was habit forming and should not be taken for recreational purposes. Respondent expressed surprise that the drug was serving as an aphrodisiac for the patients. While Respondent indicated he was reluctant to issue a new prescription for Percodan, he stated that the drug seemed to be providing some benefits to the patients and ultimately issued a prescription in the name of Bob Conti for an additional 30 Percodan tablets. Respondent would not issue a prescription for Percodan in the name of Jeanette Conti. Furthermore, when Detective Trawinski inquired about making an appointment for his brother-in-law to see the Respondent, the Respondent replied that if the intention was to obtain Percodan, he did not want to see the patient. However, he indicated he would be willing to see the brother-in-law if he was simply seeking a prescription for Valium. At no time did the Respondent adequately inform the patients regarding the synergistic effects of the use of Percodan and Valium nor did he adequately explain the risks associated with combining these drugs with alcohol or other substances. Moreover, Respondent failed to explore the possibility that the prescriptions he issued were increasing or exacerbating existing dependency by these Patients on the drugs involved. On July 25, 1988, Detective Trawinski returned to Respondent's office and requested that his prescriptions be renewed. The patient denied any medical complaints and there is no indication that any physical examination was conducted by Respondent. In response to Respondent's inquiries, Detective Trawinski indicated that he was following the Respondent's previous advice and use of the Percodan was "under control." At the conclusion of the July 25 visit, Respondent issued a prescription in the name of Bob Conti for 30 Percodan "for pain" and 50 Valium tablets. One refill was provided for the Valium prescription. No refills were indicated for the Percodan prescription. No valid medical reasons were provided for the prescriptions that were issued following the July 25 visit. There is no evidence indicating any pecuniary gain by the Respondent for writing any of the prescriptions in question. The only remuneration received by Respondent was his typical $30.00 office charge per visit. The written medical records which the Respondent maintained fail to adequately justify the course of treatment of the patients known to Respondent as Bob and Jeanette Conti (collectively referred to as the "Patients"). The records do not reflect repeated evaluation of the persistent symptoms or adequate evaluation and follow-up of the results of medication, either as to effectiveness or possible side effects such as dependency. Respondent's record-keeping with regard to the Patients falls below the acceptable standard. The records fail to include an adequate patient history and initial assessment of the Patients. It is impossible to determine from these records what medicines the patients had taken in the past, what reactions they had to such medications, what medical procedures they had in the past or other important information regarding the Patient's background. In several instances, the Respondent's only notation of treatment is a listing of medications prescribed. His remaining notations are not acceptable to explain or justify the treatment program undertaken, especially with respect to the prescriptions for Percodan. The Respondent's medical records for patient Bob Conti contain a very limited patient history and general background information. For this patient's first two visits, there is a brief notation which includes the patient's blood pressure and weight. On the first three visits, there is a diagnosis of "chronic anxiety" without any further discussion. On the final three visits, only the medication prescribed is noted. The patient's records for these three last visits contain no statements of medical diagnosis, assessment or treatment plan. It is not possible to determine from Bob Conti's medical records the reason that Percodan was prescribed. The Respondent's medical records on the patient Jeanette Conti are similar to those previously described for patient Bob Conti. The office visit notes list no patient complaints or symptoms and no medical diagnosis or comprehensive assessments. While Respondent's counsel suggested that Respondent intended to supplement the medical records with additional information at a later date, no competent evidence was presented to support this claim. The Respondent was examined and tested by a psychiatric expert Dr. Klass. The results of the psychiatric examination indicate that the Respondent is not corrupt, but that he is corruptible, i.e., easily manipulated and overly compliant.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order which finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Count One, Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint, dismisses Counts Two and Five, imposes an administrative fine in the amount $5000.00 and suspends Respondent's license for a period of two years followed by a three (3) year term of probation during which time Respondent's prescribing practices should be closely monitored. DONE and ORDERED this 3 day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3 day of May, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact can be isolated, they are addressed below. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4-33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23, 24, 26, 29, 31 and 32. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is covered in Findings of Fact 34-37. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. The second sentence is adopted in part in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34-37. Rejected as irrelevant. No evidence was presented to establish that the Respondent intended to further supplement the medical records. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4-7 and 12. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is covered in Findings of Fact 6-10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 27. Rejected as irrelevant and because it is merely a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 27. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13-15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17 - 19. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20-23, 25, 26, and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30-33. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument. Rejected as constituting argument. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. 30. (SIC) Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Harrison, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 C. Craig Stella, Esquire Attorney at Law 200 S. Andrews Avenue Suite 300 Mercede City Center Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Kenneth E. Easely General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
