The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, holding license number ME 81249. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was board-certified in family medicine. The Respondent held no board certification at the time of the administrative hearing, and, according to his response to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, the family medicine certification expired in July 2007. On February 8, 2006, the Respondent prescribed hydrocodone (10/325, generic Norco, 10mg.) to Patient M.R. through an internet service called ERMeds.com. On June 26, 2006, the Respondent prescribed hydrocodone (Hydro/APAP 10/325, generic Norco, 10/325) to Patient M.R. through the internet service called ERMeds.com. Hydrocodone is a Schedule II controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Hydrocodone/APAP is hydrocodone combined with acetaminophen, and the combined drug is a Schedule III controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Both hydrocodone and hydrocodone/APAP have high potential for abuse and addiction. The prescriptions issued to Patient M.R. contained the Respondent's identification including address and DEA number on the prescription form, as well as the Respondent's electronic facsimile signature. The Respondent had no contact with Patient M.R. either before or after the prescription was issued to Patient M.R. The Respondent conducted no health evaluation of Patient M.R. The Respondent did not obtain or review any medical information related to Patient M.R. The Respondent testified during deposition that a physician's assistant for whom the Respondent was the supervising physician was responsible for gathering and reviewing medical information from the patient. According to the Respondent's response to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, the physician's assistant obtained patient history, including current medications and complaints, and the "information was available to Respondent at the time the prescriptions were authorized." According to the Respondent's response to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, a completed medical questionnaire was available for the Respondent's review. There is no evidence that the Respondent reviewed any information or questionnaire regarding the patient's medical history or complaint either before or at the time the prescriptions were authorized. The Respondent did not know and never met the physician's assistant and was unable to recall the last name of the physician's assistant. There is no evidence that the Respondent had any discussion with any physician's assistant related to Patient M.R. either before or at the time the prescriptions were authorized. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Bernd Wollschlaeger, M.D., a Florida-licensed physician holding board certification in family practice. Dr. Wollschlaeger testified that a physician must evaluate a patient, take a patient's medical history, review any available medical records, and document the findings and diagnosis in a contemporaneous record prior to issuing a prescription for hydrocodone to a patient. Based upon the Respondent's deposition testimony and the responses to the Petitioner's First Request for Admissions, it is clear that the Respondent failed to evaluate Patient M.R. in any respect prior to issuing the prescriptions for hydrocodone to the patient. The Respondent reviewed no medical history or records related to Patient M.R. The Respondent failed to diagnose any medical condition that would support prescribing hydrocodone to Patient M.R. The Respondent failed to document any medical information related to Patient M.R. in any written record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order finding Gerard Romain, M.D., in violation of Subsections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(q), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), and imposing a penalty as follows: a reprimand; a three-year period of probation, the first year of which shall include a prohibition on issuing prescriptions for Schedule II and III controlled substances; an administrative fine of $20,000.00; and such additional continuing education and community service requirements as the Department of Health determines appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Elana J. Jones, Esquire Ephraim D. Livingston, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Dale R. Sisco, Esquire Stacy Estes, Esquire Sisco-Law Post Office Box 3382 Tampa, Florida 33601-3382 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the proposed amendments set forth in the Notice of Proposed Rule published on May 15, 2013, in the Florida Administrative Register, Vol. 39, No. 95, pages 2609 through 2610 and modified by the Notice of Change, published on March 12, 2015, in the Florida Administrative Register, Vol. 41, No. 49, pages 1236 through 1237, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority,1/ and, if so, whether costs and attorney’s fees should be assessed against Respondent and paid to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petition Petitioners have challenged the Notice of Proposed Rule and Notice of Change as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The petitions request that a formal hearing be conducted, a final order be entered determining that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, award petitioners’ costs and attorneys’ fees, and provide such other relief as deemed necessary. The Parties Petitioner Fernandez is a Florida resident and patient with ongoing medical issues that requires him to request and obtain his medical records from his attending or treating physicians from time to time. Petitioner Dax J. Lonetto, Sr., PPLC, is a Florida-based law firm. Dax Lonetto is a Florida-licensed attorney and sole shareholder of the Lonetto PPLC law firm. Eighty-five to 90 percent of Mr. Lonetto’s practice involves social security disability benefits, and the remainder of his practice involves veteran’s benefits and other basic personal injury claims.6/ In order to pursue and obtain social security benefits or veteran’s benefits for clients, Mr. Lonetto must first obtain his clients’ medical records. Petitioner FJA is a statewide, not-for-profit, professional association of approximately 2,500 plaintiff trial attorneys. FJA’s purpose is engaging in advocacy efforts on behalf of its membership, strengthening and upholding Florida’s civil justice system, and protecting the rights of Florida’s citizens and consumers. Paul D. Jess is a Florida-licensed attorney who serves as the general counsel and deputy executive director for FJA. Mr. Jess provided no documentary evidence to support the position that most physician “offices or vendors would charge the maximum [amount] permitted [by the rule].” Mr. Jess admitted that FJA is not “directly injured by this price hike as an association or as a corporation,” because FJA does not order medical records. However, Mr. Jess testified that for the majority of FJA’s members, ordering medical records is a routine practice on behalf of their clients. Further, Mr. Jess believed that a majority of FJA members would be adversely impacted by this proposed rule, based on the increased costs in obtaining their clients’ medical records. Petitioner FCAN is a Florida not-for-profit grassroots organization dedicated to advocating for the rights of Florida consumers. William Newton served as the corporate representative for FCAN. Mr. Newton previously relinquished the full-time executive director’s position and now currently works part-time as FCAN’s deputy director. FCAN currently has about 7,000 individual members. FCAN is a nonpartisan organization which represents Florida consumers in four major issue areas: utilities, insurance, health care, and the environment.7/ With respect to the health care area, FCAN stands for affordable and available health care for everyone, with a focus on trying to improve accessibility, as well as to control the price of health care. Mr. Newton did not know how many of FCAN’s 7,000 members would be affected by the proposed rule change; however, he believed that “almost all of them would be” because they go to the doctor. The Board regulates the practice of medicine in Florida pursuant to chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes, and is the agency that is proposing the rule amendments at issue. Intervener BACTES is a release of information (ROI) provider that contracts with physicians in Florida and throughout the country to process and fulfill requests for medical records received by such physicians. William Bailey founded BACTES and served as its CEO from 1991 until July 2013, when he assumed a consultant status with the provider. Mr. Bailey confirmed that BACTES is currently operating in Florida with three offices located in Orlando, Ft. Myers, and Jacksonville. BACTES has no plans to discontinue doing business in Florida.8/ Intervener HealthPort is also an ROI provider that contracts with physicians in Florida and throughout the country to process and fulfill requests for medical records received by such physicians. Kyle Probst, HealthPort’s counsel and director of government relations, confirmed that HealthPort engaged Cynthia Henderson to approach the Board regarding making changes to the rule to “clear up some apparent confusion about how medical records should be billed in the state of Florida.” Intervener FMA is a professional association dedicated to the service and assistance of allopathic and osteopathic physicians in Florida. Approximately 20,000 licensed Florida physicians are members of the FMA. The parties agreed there are approximately 75,000 physicians licensed and regulated by the Board. Not all 75,000 Florida licensed physicians are currently practicing in Florida. The Statute and Current Rule Section 456.057(17), Florida Statutes, provides: A health care practitioner or records owner furnishing copies of reports or records or making the reports or records available for digital scanning pursuant to this section shall charge no more than the actual cost of copying, including reasonable staff time, or the amount specified in administrative rule by the appropriate board, or the department when there is no board. Section 458.309(1) provides in pertinent part: The board has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of this chapter conferring duties upon it. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-10.003 is the Board’s rule governing the costs of reproducing medical records. The rule was first adopted on November 11, 1987, as rule 21M-26.003. It was transferred to rule 61F6-26.003, then to rule 59R-10.003, amended on May 12, 1988, amended on March 9, 2009, and then finally transferred to rule 64B8-10.003. The rule currently provides: Costs of Reproducing Medical Records. Recognizing that patient access to medical records is important and necessary to assure continuity of patient care, the Board of Medicine urges physicians to provide their patients a copy of their medical records, upon request, without cost, especially when the patient is economically disadvantaged. The Board, however, also recognizes that the cost of reproducing voluminous medical records may be financially burdensome to some practitioners. Therefore, the following rule sets forth the permitted costs for the reproduction of medical records. Any person licensed pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S., required to release copies of patient medical records may condition such release upon payment by the requesting party of the reasonable costs of reproducing the records. For patients and governmental entities, the reasonable costs of reproducing copies of written or typed documents or reports shall not be more than the following: For the first 25 pages, the cost shall be $1.00 per page. For each page in excess of 25 pages, the cost shall be 25 cents. For other entities, the reasonable costs of reproducing copies of written or typed documents or reports shall not be more than $1.00 per page. Reasonable costs of reproducing x- rays, and such other special kinds of records shall be the actual costs. The phrase “actual costs” means the cost of the material and supplies used to duplicate the record, as well as the labor costs and overhead costs associated with such duplication. Specific Authority 456.057(18),9/ 458.309 FS. Law Implemented 456.057(18) FS. History-New 11-17-87, Amended 5-12- 88, Formerly 21M-26.003, 61F6-26.003, 59R-10.003, Amended 3-9-09. This rule was first created in 1987 and was effective in May 1988. In pertinent part, that first rule provided that chapter 458 licensees could condition the release of copies of patient medical records “upon payment . . . of reasonable costs of reproducing the records.” The rule then defined “reasonable costs of reproducing copies . . . [should] not be more than” a $1.00 for the first 25 pages and 25 cents per page in excess of 25 pages. In 2009, the rule was revised to allow patients and governmental entities to get copies of medical records at that same rate. For all other entities the “reasonable costs of reproducing copies . . . [should] not be more than $1.00 per page.” Over the course of 26 months, the Board had access to as much information as the Board staff and interested parties could provide it. The Board heard testimony in no fewer than nine public hearings.10/ The proposed rule language was dissected and discussed on multiple levels, and the Board devoted countless hours to listening to and evaluating those comments. Rule Development In June 2012, the Department of Health (Department) and the Board received an email correspondence on behalf of HealthPort requesting clarification on the costs for reproducing electronic medical records. That correspondence, the current rule 64B8-10.003, and the applicable statutes were placed on the agenda for the Board’s August 2012 Rules/Legislative Committee (RLC or Committee) meeting. At the August RLC meeting, the Committee discussed the requested action and heard from an attorney representing HealthPort. The Committee voted to table the item and seek additional information. The Board commenced rulemaking to amend rule 64B8-10.003 in early October 2012. At the RLC meeting on October 11, 2012, the Committee voted unanimously to recommend noticing this proposed change for rule development. The Board’s counsel was to draft language for a proposed rule change to be presented at the next RLC meeting. On October 30, 2012, a Notice of Development of Rulemaking (Notice) was published in the Florida Administrative Register. The Notice listed the “PURPOSE AND EFFECT: [as] The Board proposed the development of rule amendments to address the cost of reproduction of medical records which are stored in an electronic format.” At the November 2012 RLC meeting, the Committee received a draft rule proposal, excerpts of the October RLC meeting report, and materials from the October meeting. The Committee heard from various speakers on the proposed rule language. One Committee member suggested that the RLC would benefit from knowing what other state medical boards allowed physicians to charge. Another suggested the Board staff look at a different charge for paper versus electronic production. Following the discussion, the Committee approved two motions: one to move to one rate (but undecided on what that rate would be); and the second to have then Executive Director, Alison Dudley, “come back to [the RLC] with the aspects of what costs are elsewhere so that [the RLC could] make that decision about what that rate and particular medium” is, in order to move forward. The Board’s staff prepared a survey that was sent to administrators in medicine via a web portal, asking the following specific questions: Does your board have a rule or law that outlines what a physician can charge for medical records? Flat rate or per page? Does that law or rule delineate different charges for paper medical records versus electronic medical records? What are the charges? Does the law or rule delineate different charges for producing the medical records on paper versus on a CD? What are the charges? Does the law or rule contemplate charges for other services such as diagnostic tests or X-rays? What are the charges? Does your law or rule define “electronic medical record?” If so, what is that definition? Can you share your law and/or rule with us? Thank you for your responses. Of the 50 or so administrators contacted, the Board staff received 13 responses. Those responses were provided to the RLC for review. At the January 31, 2013, RLC meeting, the agenda included multiple items for the Committee’s consideration: the transcript from the November 29, 2013, RLC meeting; excerpts of the RLC report dated December 2012; an email from Ms. Henderson; a 2003 White paper; the costs charged by Florida Clerk of Courts, Florida hospitals, and other Florida health care boards; costs charged by other state medical boards; and all the materials presented at the prior meetings. The Committee received testimony from individuals regarding their understanding of how the proposed changes to the rule would or could affect their patient/clients. As a result of those comments and the RLC’s discussion, the Committee voted to have draft language prepared that included one fee for any records release with the following specific language: “stored and delivered in any format or medium.” The draft language was to be presented at the next RLC meeting. At the April 4, 2013, RLC meeting, the Committee agenda included excerpts from its January meeting, draft language, and an article regarding the federal Health Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements. The Committee heard from individuals again and considered the various recommendations regarding the appropriate language for the proposed rule. The draft language presented at this RLC meeting, in the underline/strike-through method, provided the following: Costs of Reproducing Medical Records. Recognizing that patient access to medical records is important and necessary to assure continuity of patient care, the Board of Medicine urges physicians to provide their patients a copy of their medical records, upon request, without cost, especially when the patient is economically disadvantaged. The Board, however, also recognizes that the cost of reproducing voluminous medical records may be financially burdensome to some practitioners. Therefore, the following rule sets forth the permitted costs for the reproduction of medical records stored and delivered in any format or medium. Any person licensed pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S., required to release copies of patient medical records may condition such release upon payment by the requesting party of the reasonable costs of reproducing the records. For patients and governmental entities, the reasonable costs of reproducing copies of written or typed documents or reports shall not be more than the following: For the first 25 pages, the cost shall be $1.00 per page. For each page in excess of 25 pages, the cost shall be 25 cents. (2)(3) The For other entities, the reasonable costs of reproducing copies of written or typed documents or reports shall not be more than $1.00 per page. (3)(4) Reasonable costs of reproducing x-rays, and such other special kinds of records shall be the actual costs. The phrase “actual costs” means the cost of the material and supplies used to duplicate the record, as well as the labor costs and overhead costs associated with such duplication. Additionally, the Committee discussed the anticipated financial impact that the proposed changes would have on small businesses, including whether or not a statement of estimated regulatory costs (SERC)11/ was necessary. The Department staff could not say whether the proposed change would increase the Department’s cost in excess of $200,000 a year. Following the discussion, the Committee voted to table the SERC decision until additional information could be brought before the Board and the proposed draft rule language was approved. The full Board met on April 5 and approved the RLC report which included the approval of the draft rule language. Additionally, the Department staff reported that, after conferring with other staff in Tallahassee, the Department did not feel that the cost associated with the draft rule language would exceed $200,000 a year in the aggregate. The Board voted that a SERC was not required. Between the October 2012 Notice and the May 2013 publication of the proposed rule changes, the RLC met in noticed public meetings discussing the potential rule revision. The rule record is clear that the proposed changes were discussed extensively by Committee members with input from attorneys, residents, association representatives and corporate representatives. On May 15, 2013, a Notice of Proposed Rule (using the proposed language found in paragraph 26 above) was published in the Florida Administrative Register, Vol. 39, No. 95. The purpose for the proposed rule was to provide a single fee for reproducing medical records. The Board received a request for a hearing and numerous comments from the public on the proposed changes. The rule hearing was scheduled for the next available Board meeting. On August 2, 2013, the Board held a public hearing on the proposed rule in Deerfield Beach. The Board agenda included: the proposed rule 64B8-10.003; the rule hearing request; the rule hearing notice; a summary of the issue for Board consideration submitted by Ms. Henderson; copies of the notices sent regarding the hearing; meeting reports from the RLC meetings held on August 2, 2012, October 11, 2012, November 29, 2012, January 31, 2013, and April 4, 2013; and over 60 written comments. At the Board meeting over 15 people addressed the Board, expressing either opposition to or support of the proposed changes. As a result of the testimony received, the Board chair directed that the public rule hearing be transcribed and the transcript be sent to the RLC for its consideration and determination. At the Orlando RLC meeting on October 3, 2013, the Committee conducted a rule hearing on the proposed rule language. The RLC’s agenda included: draft proposed language for the rule; a draft RLC meeting report; a transcript from the August 2, 2013, rule hearing; an article regarding Florida doctors and medical records; and additional comments from seven different sources. The Committee was charged to consider the testimony from the August 2013 public rule hearing, as well as the testimony from this rule hearing to make recommendations to the full Board. The Committee heard testimony from individuals who either opposed or supported the proposed rule. The Committee members asked questions of the various presenters, and provided education to those presenters and attendees as to the multiplicity of medical practices, attendant issues, and personal experiences in dealing with medical records requests. The Committee agreed that the rule should be as set forth in the draft rule language. The Committee also agreed that there might be an “adverse impact” on small businesses, and that a SERC should be prepared. In November 2013, Board staff distributed a survey to 1,41912/ Florida-licensed physicians seeking responses to the following questions: Do you handle the copying of your medical records with your own staff? If yes continue to 1a. If no, go to Question 2. Yes. No. 1a. Do you have a designated staff person who only handles the review and copying of medical records? If yes, continue to 1b. If no, continue to 1c. Yes. No. 1b. How much do you pay this person on a monthly basis, including any benefits that are provided? 1c. How much do you spend on special equipment and supplies (copier, paper etc.) for the copying of medical records annually? If you send your medical records for copying by a service, how much do you pay each month for this service? On average, how many requests for copies of medical records do you receive each month? The Board staff received 28 responses from the 1,419 surveys sent out. Of those 28 responses, 27 handled the copying of medical records in-house. Twelve practitioners had a designated staff person to review and copy medical records, while 15 did not. Fifteen declined to provide how much their personnel were paid. There was a wide range of pay for the others. The costs associated for special equipment and supplies to provide copies of medical records ranged from $120 to $20,000 per month. Only one practitioner responded that medical records were sent out to a copying service. The number of medical record requests varied from one to more than 600 per month. The next public hearing was held in Orlando on December 6, 2013. The Board materials included: the hearing notice for December 6, 2013; proposed rule language; the transcript of the October 3, 2013, meeting; section 164.524, Access of Individuals to Protected Health Information; new comments received; the survey results; and material from the previous public hearings and meetings. The Board considered the testimony from the public hearings that had been held on August 2 and October 3. Each speaker was afforded the opportunity to express their position and comments received were either “opposed” or “supported” the proposed rule changes. Following the testimony, the Board voted to change proposed subsection (2) by adding the following language, which is underscored: [t]he reasonable costs of reproducing copies of written or typed documents or reports shall not be more than $1.00 per page, but shall not exceed actual costs. Thereafter, the Board again revisited the question of whether a SERC was necessary. The Board considered whether the newly revised language would adversely affect, or was likely to directly or indirectly increase regulatory costs to any entity in excess of $200,000 in the aggregate in Florida within one year of the implementation of the rule. The Board determined that a SERC was necessary. On February 6, 2014, the RLC met in Kissimmee for another public hearing on the proposed rule amendments. The Committee was to consider changes authorized by the Board during its December meeting. The agenda materials included: draft language of the rule; additional correspondence; and the materials from the prior meetings/hearings. If the draft rule language was approved, two questions had to be addressed: would the proposed rule have an adverse impact on small businesses; and would the proposed rule be likely to directly or indirectly increase regulatory costs to any entity in excess of $200,000 in the aggregate in Florida within one year after its implementation? Testimony was received from several individuals. Following the testimony, the Committee members had a discussion about the terms “actual costs” versus “reasonable costs.” The Committee voted to revise the draft rule language to “reasonable costs” and approved a “Notice of Change” to be published. The Committee also determined that the amendment would not have an adverse impact on small businesses, nor was it likely to directly or indirectly increase regulatory costs in excess of $200,000. On April 3, 2014, the RLC held another public hearing in Deerfield Beach on the proposed rule. There remained some inconsistencies in the changes that were approved and the Committee reconsidered the proposed rule language. The material in the RLC’s agenda included: materials presented at previous meetings including correspondence; draft changes to the rule; the hearing notice; an article regarding electronic records; an excerpt of the February 2014 meeting; and the transcript of the February 2014 meeting. The Committee received testimony from several speakers who pointed out concerns about the proposed rule, and provided alternatives to it. After the testimony, the Committee voted to have new language prepared addressing those concerns and, in some instances, incorporated alternative suggestions. Additionally, the Committee understood that an additional public hearing would be necessary, and that the SERC might need to be revised. On June 5, 2014, the RLC met in Tampa for another public hearing to consider the revised draft rule language. The agenda included: the hearing notice; the proposed draft language; a proposed SERC; multiple written comments; transcripts from prior RLC and Board meetings where the proposed rule was discussed; and RLC meeting reports. The Committee voted to table the discussion of the proposed rule until another hearing could be held in South Florida. On October 9, 2014, the RLC met in Deerfield Beach and held a rule hearing regarding the revised rule language. The Committee received additional testimony from concerned individuals. The Committee voted to accumulate all the comments and present everything to the full Board at the December 2014 meeting. In October 2014, Ms. Dudley was asked to speak at the Capital Medical Society in Tallahassee. Ms. Dudley took the opportunity to hand out the survey (found in paragraph 34) to the participants. Although she received four additional responses to the survey, the audience was not physicians, but staff who primarily handled the medical records for medical offices. On December 4, 2014, the RLC met in St. Petersburg for an additional rule hearing on the proposed rule language. The Committee was to review all the comments submitted. The RLC’s agenda material included: the hearing notice; the suggested changes to the draft proposed rule from March and May 2014; the excerpt of the RLC meeting report in October 2014; multiple correspondence from concerned individuals; survey responses from physician offices (including the four additional surveys); materials from the prior hearings and RLC meetings; and the proposed SERC. At the beginning of this rule hearing, the Board’s executive director provided a suggested revision to the proposed rule by adding a new paragraph: “(4) Accessing medical records through patient portals does not constitute the reproduction of medical records.” Testimony was received from various individuals regarding the proposed rule language. The Committee reviewed all the comments submitted. The Committee determined that a SERC should be prepared. The Board held another rule hearing on the proposed rule language on February 6, 2015, in Stuart. The agenda material included: the hearing notice; the draft changes; the excerpt of the RLC meeting; survey responses from physician offices; newly received written comments; a proposed SERC; and materials presented at the previous hearings and meetings. The Board heard testimony from several individuals who either opposed or supported the proposed rule language. The Board reviewed the changes to the proposed rule and the proposed SERC, and heard testimony from presenters. Based on that testimony, the Board members further discussed the proposed rule language and voted to modify it again. After the proposed rule language discussion, the Board then addressed whether it believed, with the latest revision to the draft rule, that a SERC was necessary. The Board voted to accept the SERC as presented. On February 17, 2015, the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) wrote the Board regarding the SERC and inquired as to whether the draft rule would require legislative ratification. As a result of the JAPC inquiry on March 4, 2015, the Board held a telephonic conference meeting. The Board heard from three individuals regarding whether the proposed rule required legislative ratification and the status of the SERC. The Board determined that the rule would require legislative ratification and the SERC needed to be revised. The Board approved the following changes to the proposed rule (the initial paragraph and sections (1) and (2) are found in paragraph 26 above): (4) Reasonable costs of reproducing x- rays, and such other special kinds of records shall be the actual costs. The phrase “actual costs” means the cost of the material and supplies used to duplicate the record, as well as the labor costs and overhead costs associated with duplication, plus postage. Accessing medical records through patient portals does not constitute the reproduction of medical records. On March 12, 2015, the Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Register, and the four petitions were filed. Following the filing of the petitions at DOAH, the parties requested a continuance to allow the Petitioners the opportunity to present their lower-cost alternatives to the Board. At the April 10, 2015, Board meeting, the Board addressed an allegation that the Board had failed to consider five lower-cost regulatory alternatives (Alternatives). The Board had not considered the Alternatives because they had not been filed for the Board’s consideration. Once the Alternatives were filed, they were placed on the next available Board agenda. The first Alternative was to leave the rule in its current state. After hearing from interested parties, the Board determined that it had evaluated the issues around the rule and the costs during the prior hearings and meetings. The Board agreed that the status quo was not viable for a variety of reasons. The Board voted to reject this Alternative. The second Alternative asked that the medical record holder only be allowed to charge the actual cost of copying, including reasonable staff time consistent with section 457.057(17). The Board discussed that through the multiple public hearings it had determined that it would be impossible to determine the actual charge for copying. The actual cost for an urban multi-partner physician would be different than a solo practitioner’s office in a rural location. The Board voted unanimously to reject this Alternative. The third Alternative asked the Board to conduct an evaluation or study regarding what the actual costs of copying are for medical record holders based on the type of request, type of medical record, the format of the record, and the format of the record to be delivered. The Board discussed what it had heard about in the prior meetings: other states allowed higher levels of reimbursing; and hospitals charged $1.00 per page as authorized by statute. The Board attempted to obtain the data sought but was unsuccessful in obtaining any significant response. Further, the Board does not have the statutory authority to require physicians to respond to any data or survey requests. The Board voted unanimously to reject this Alternative. The fourth Alternative asked the Board to eliminate the per-page price and impose a restriction that the prices could not exceed the maximum price authorized by HIPAA. The Board did not concur that HIPAA set an exact amount, and trying to determine the costs for each practitioner in each type of practice would be frustrating to all involved. The Board voted unanimously to reject this Alternative. The fifth Alternative asked the Board to keep the current rule, but separate the costs for electronic versus digital copies. The Board discussed the movement towards all electronic medical records, but paper records and other records will still exist. The Board determined that there is a need for the proposed rule to address the current circumstance. The Board voted unanimously to reject this Alternative. Those opposed to the alleged increase testified there was no basis for the change, that the proposed change quadrupled the price for patients and governmental entities, and that it was arbitrary and capricious, especially with respect to electronic records. These opponents fail to recognize changes in medicine. HIPAA brought patient confidentiality and the need to maintain that confidentiality into sharp focus. Medical practitioners are required to ensure that confidential patient information is not disseminated to unauthorized persons. Physicians must pay to have medical records copied, whether it is done “in-house” or by an ROI provider. Labor costs have increased and the tedious review to ensure that confidential information remains confidential is time-consuming and costly. Medical practices can be quite varied in type, size, sophistication, location, and much more. Petitioners’ claim that the proposed rule should be the “actual cost” to the practitioner is impracticable. A general practitioner in a rural solo practice, who receives one request for medical records, might be able to ascertain the “actual cost” to produce that one medical record. A specialist in an urban multi-partner practice group, who receives multiple requests for medical records, would find it nearly impossible to ascertain the “actual cost” to produce each requested medical record without extensive business record-keeping. This proposed rule retains the suggestion that physicians “provide their patients with a copy of their medical records, upon request, without cost, especially when the patient is economically disadvantaged.” Physicians provide medical records, free of charge, to subsequent or specialty physicians to ensure care. However, physicians are not in the business of repeatedly producing medical records. Those in favor of the proposed rule testified that the cost to physicians for reproducing medical records has not increased in years. The stringent HIPAA requirements placed an additional requirement on health care providers to ensure that private individual health data is kept confidential. The process to release medical records is not simply to pull a paper, digital or electronic medical record, copy it, and send it out the door. The process, as explained, takes valuable time from practitioners and their staff. In a simplified fashion once the request is made: staff must verify the requester’s identity and right to obtain the copy; the request must be logged into a HIPAA log; staff must locate and retrieve the medical record in whatever format it is in; staff must redact confidential information; staff must review for specific health treatment records (mental health, alcohol or drug treatment, HIV status) that cannot be provided pursuant to statute; a copy may need to be made or a paper copy may need to be scanned to an electronic disc; and the practitioner must review it to make sure it can be provided as requested. It is a time-consuming process.
Findings Of Fact Findings based on stipulation Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 459, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 0001228. Respondent's last known address is 577 N.E. 107th Street, Miami, Florida 33161. Findings based on evidence at hearing On November 5, 1990, patient N. S. initially presented to the Respondent's office for a physical examination for the purpose of obtaining health insurance with Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida. During the course of the initial visit, when the Respondent became aware of where N. S. and her mother lived, it was obvious to him that N. S. lived in an expensive residential area and was probably a person of substantial financial means. Patient N. S. subsequently presented to the Respondent and received treatment from him for a variety of complaints on the following dates: November 14 and 27, 1990; December 10 and 20, 1990, January 7, 23, and 28, 1991, March 5, 1991, and April 15, 1991. Patient N. S. paid for all of the treatments and laboratory tests on the dates the treatments and tests took place. At the request of the Respondent, the checks written by patient N. S. to pay for services provided by the Respondent were made out to "cash." One day in early January of 1991, the Respondent contacted the patient N. S. by telephone at her home and asked her to loan him $8,000.00 or $8,500.00. The Respondent told the patient N. S. he needed the money because he was three months behind in making payments on the mortgage on his office-house, and because the mortgage was going to be foreclosed if he failed to pay the past due amounts in the next couple of days. In the course of this conversation the Respondent also remarked to N. S. that he would not be able to help her get well if the mortgage were to be foreclosed and he were to lose his office. Patient N. S. initially refused to loan any money to the Respondent. During the course of the next two days, the Respondent made numerous repeated pleas to N. S. for a loan. Ultimately, N. S. agreed to loan the Respondent a total of $1,000.00. The loan was to be repaid within sixty days and was without interest. On January 11, 1991, patient N. S. wrote a personal check to the Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00. Thereafter, the Respondent cashed the check. The patient N. S. made the $1,000.00 loan to the Respondent because she wanted the Respondent to be able to continue to treat her and not have his office repossessed. The Respondent did not timely repay the $1,000.00 loan. Shortly after the due date, the patient N. S. asked the Respondent on several occasions to repay the loan. On April 15, 1991, the patient N. S. sent a certified letter to the Respondent requesting repayment of the loan. On July 2, 1991, the patient N. S. sent the Respondent another certified letter requesting repayment of the loan and advising the Respondent that if the loan was not repaid by July 12, 1991, she intended to send complaints to the Department of Professional Regulation and to the Internal Revenue Service. During March and April of 1991, the Respondent was ill. Towards the end of April the Respondent was hospitalized and underwent surgery. The surgery was followed by several weeks of recuperation. During this period the Respondent had very little income and it was not possible for him to repay the loan to the patient N. S. On July 24, 1991, the patient N. S. sent yet another certified letter to the Respondent. In the letter of July 24, 1991, the patient N. S. requested that the Respondent provide her with various specified documents related to his treatment of her, including "my complete medical records." The patient N. S. sent a copy of the July 24, 1991, letter to the Department of Professional Regulation. On that same day, the patient N. S. signed and mailed to the Department of Professional Regulation a Uniform Complaint Form complaining about the Respondent. On August 29, 1991, the Sunshine Messenger Service delivered to the patient N. S. a letter from the Respondent dated August 28, 1991, which read as follows: Enclosed is the sum of $1000 in return for the check you loaned to me. I'm sorry that it took as long as this date to return same. Your request for your records, etc. are being copied and will be mailed very soon. Sorry for the delay. Hope you are in good health. The letter was accompanied by two postal money orders payable to the patient N. S., each in the amount of $500.00. On September 16, 1991, Petitioner's investigator Schaublin spoke by telephone with the Respondent and at that time advised him of the Complaint that had been filed against him by his patient N. S. Investigator Schaublin advised the Respondent that two principal issues were being investigated: (1) his request and receipt of a loan that was not timely repaid, and (2) his failure to provide medical records requested by the patient. During the telephone conversation of September 16, 1991, the Respondent agreed to meet with the investigator at the investigator's office on September 25, 1991, and to bring with him at that time the medical records of the patient N. S. On September 25, 1991, the Respondent went to the investigator's office and delivered to the investigator a set of medical records for the patient N. S. The records appeared to be facially complete. The investigator handed the Respondent a subpoena for the records at the time the records were delivered to the investigator. At some time between the Respondent's receipt of the July 24, 1991, request for records and his delivery of records to the investigator on September 25, 1991, the Respondent discovered that two pages were missing from the records of the patient N. S. The missing pages consisted of the Respondent's progress notes regarding the treatment of the patient N. S. The Respondent conducted an extensive, but unsuccessful, search for the two missing pages. Upon concluding that he was unlikely to find the missing pages, the Respondent contacted an attorney and requested advice as to what he should do under the circumstances. The attorney advised the Respondent that he should do the best he could to reconstruct the missing records from his memory and from whatever other information was still available. The Respondent did his best to follow the advice he had received from the attorney. In an effort to verify dates, the Respondent called the pharmacy to which he had called in prescriptions for the patient N. S. With the information he had at hand, and based on his memory of his treatment of the patient N. S., the Respondent reconstructed the two missing pages of progress notes. In the process of reconstructing the progress notes, the Respondent made some inadvertent mistakes regarding the dates on which certain office visits took place. Other than the mistakes as to some of the dates, the reconstructed records accurately and sufficiently describe the Respondent's treatment of the patient N. S. The Respondent's records of his treatment of the patient N. S. do not contain a notation that the progress notes are reconstructed notes. When the Respondent delivered medical records to the Petitioner's investigator on September 25, 1991, he did not tell the investigator that two pages of the records had been reconstructed. Upon review of the medical records delivered by the Respondent, the investigator noted that some of the dates in the progress notes did not match dates with other documents in the investigator's possession and also noted that the progress notes looked like they had all been written at the same time. On September 27, 1991, the investigator contacted the Respondent by telephone and brought these apparent irregularities to the Respondent's attention. During the telephone conversation of September 27, 1991, the Respondent told the investigator that he had reconstructed the progress notes after being unable to find the missing notes. This was the first time the Respondent had mentioned to the Petitioner that the subject medical records contained two reconstructed pages. On October 4, 1995, the Respondent sent copies of his records to the patient N. S., along with a letter addressed to the patient N. S. The letter read as follows: Sorry for the delay in mailing your records. I have diligently looked thru your file and in the office and at home for the medical records missing that are the two written pages that I have reconstructed to the best of my ability as to dates. The billing ledger was also in the chart and has not been found. In order to recreate the bills for tax purposes, I could help you if I had the dates and amounts from photocopies of the cancelled checks. The Respondent did not destroy any medical records regarding the patient N. S. The Respondent did not falsify or attempt to falsify any medical records of the patient N. S. The documents of which official recognition has been taken reveal that the Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action by the Petitioner. The most significant instances of prior disciplinary action were DPR Case No. 0052390, in which the Respondent stipulated to the imposition of disciplinary action on the basis of violations related to the improper prescription of controlled substances, and DPR Case No. 89-008659, in which the Respondent stipulated to the imposition of disciplinary action on the basis of a violation related to exploitation of a patient for financial gain by borrowing money from a patient. At the time of the Respondent's treatment of the patient N. S., the Respondent was still serving the term of probation imposed in DPR Case No. 0052390.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six of the Administrative Complaint; Finding the Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing a penalty consisting of all of the following: (a) an administrative fine in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), (b) suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of ninety (90) days, (c) placing the Respondent on probation for a period of one (1) year following the suspension, and (d) restricting the Respondent's practice by prohibiting him from entering into any financial arrangements with patients other than those arrangements reasonably necessary to assure payment for osteopathic medical services provided by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March 1996 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March 1996. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 10: Accepted in substance, but with a few unnecessary details omitted and with a few details modified in the interest of clarity. Paragraph 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 16 through 20: Accepted in substance, but with a few unnecessary details omitted and with a few details modified in the interest of clarity. Paragraph 21: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 22: Rejected as irrelevant. Findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 and 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted in part and rejected in part. Accepted that the Respondent and N. S. had a physician-patient relationship during the relevant time period. The notion that the Respondent and N. S. also had a business venture relationship is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. N. S. made suggestions to the Respondent as to how he could improve his practice, but there was no joint business venture relationship. Paragraph 4: First sentence accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; there was no business relationship. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 6 and 7: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 8 through 12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the second sentence and the last sentence. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Metzger, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Michael J. Doddo, Esquire 100 Southeast 12th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 William H. Buckhalt, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues contained herein, the Respondent was a licensed medical doctor in Florida having been issued license number ME 0041256. Respondent was awarded his medical degree by the University of Tennessee in 1977. He came to southwest Florida in January, 1983 starting his practice in August of that year. He thereafter applied for and was granted privileges at Lee Memorial Hospital and practiced in Lee County until January, 1985 when he moved to Collier County. In January, 1985, Dr. Heiss notified Lee Memorial Hospital that he was moving his practice and that he no longer needed privileges at that facility. This was partly in response to a letter from the hospital asking him to resign which was, at least in part, based on his failure to keep his medical records current. He admits that prior to that time, he had received some notices involving incomplete records at the hospital and went in to work on them as best he could. However, due to his own medical problem which involved a prolonged throat infection that left him tired and weak, he could not accomplish much. This medical problem lasted for several months and when he was feeling better, he tried, to the best of his ability, he claims, during the summer of 1985, to complete the incomplete records. He went to the hospital and worked on some of them, but in late 1986, when he checked with clerical personnel in the medical records section, he was told his records were complete, and coincidentally, he stopped getting delinquency notices. Under the procedure in effect at Lee Memorial Hospital for correcting incomplete records in 1984, once a week, Ms. Lindahl, the assistant manager of the records section, would go through the files to determine which records were delinquent. If dictation was needed, the chart would be declared delinquent in 15 days. If only the signature was missing, the doctor was give 45 days to correct it. When the record was declared delinquent, medical records personnel would send a weekly reminder letter to the physician setting a one week suspense for correction and indicating that if the correction was not made, the doctor's hospital privileges could be suspended. These temporary suspensions, however, were not being enforced. According to Ms. Lindahl, in 1985, Dr. Heiss was identified and placed on the delinquent list 35 times. Because of this, he would have been sent 35 letters. In January, 1985, at the time Respondent left Lee Memorial Hospital, he left incomplete 84 charts. Because of the volume of incomplete records left by Respondent, the hospital Medical Records Committee, on May 2, 1985, authorized Ms. Lindahl to transfer these incomplete records to the permanent records section of the archives, a procedure that would not normally have been done with incomplete records. This transfer was accomplished in August, 1985. After Respondent left the hospital, in January, 1985, up to March, 1985, Ms. Lindahl contacted him both at home and at his new office both by phone and by letter on several occasions, and asked him to come in and complete his records. Each of the letters sent indicated those charts, by name, which needed completion. After the charts were transferred to permanent records in August, 1985, until February, 1987, Ms. Lindahl did not make any further effort to contact Dr. Heiss, nor did he contact her. However, she was informed by the Hospital Administrator that Dr. Heiss was to come in and work on the records. Therefore, she pulled these records for him and, in fact, the Respondent did, on some occasions, come in at night to work on them. Ms. Lindahl agreed to pull records for him as needed but advised him that she could not and would not pull all his incomplete records at one time. Charts are placed on microfilm after a period of years. Some of Respondent's charts were microfilmed before he completed them. However, the hospital made arrangements for him to complete these records as well in an effort to accommodate him. Once the records were placed on microfilm, it was more difficult for Dr. Heiss to complete them since, initially, there was no dictating equipment available in the microfilm reading area. However, it could have been done by Respondent taking notes from the film and thereafter dictating those notes in the records room where dictating equipment was available. However, that was not necessary, since the hospital set up a booth with dictating capability in it for him in the microfilm reading area. An Administrative Complaint was filed against Dr. Heiss in October, 1985, because of his incomplete files. The matter was referred to the Board of Medicine in February, 1987, after a stipulated settlement was reached between the Respondent and Counsel for the Board. On February 11, 1987, the Board of Medicine entered a Final Order which approved and adopted the stipulation entered into between Respondent and counsel for the Board on December 23, 1986. Paragraph 4 of the stipulated Disposition in this case provided that prior to the stipulation being presented to the Board, Respondent would complete all incomplete hospital records that he was responsible for at Lee Memorial Hospital. Dr. Heiss contends that at that time, he understood his medical records to be complete, based upon his inquiry to personnel in the medical records section at the hospital. He indicates he made several inquiries of at least two separate employees who told him they could find no record of any incomplete files charged to him. Once his incomplete records were transferred to permanent storage, they were deleted from the computer and a routine inquiry would not have disclosed them. However, Ms. Lindahl had in her possession a complete list of his still incomplete records and a simple inquiry to her, the person in charge, would have given him the correct information. Dr. Heiss did not check with Ms. Lindahl, who worked days even though he admits he may have been in the hospital for other reasons on several occasions during the day. He would usually come in during the evenings, and on one occasion, spoke with Mr. Shuler, the night records custodian, who checked the computer and found no record of the doctor's delinquency. Mr. Shuler, however, advised Dr. Heiss to check with Ms. Lindahl. Dr. Heiss states he believed that the Stipulation he worked out with counsel for the Board in response to the initial Complaint, took care of the problem. When he went before the Board in February, 1987, he had checked with medical records at the hospital and had been told his status was clear. This check was not with Ms. Lindahl, however. When he did so, he found he did have unfinished records. It was at that time, after the stipulation was signed, that he began to bring the records current. Dr. Heiss admits that during the period 1985 - 1986, believed there were some medical records that were incomplete but because they had been filed in the permanent records section, he believed his responsibility for them was fulfilled. As a practicing physician, he relies upon the medical records section to tell him what records need to be completed. When he was advised by that agency that he was no longer delinquent, he felt satisfied. This argument is specious and without merit. Respondent admits he did not make any attempt to work on the records from January to July, 1986. He contends that from July, 1986 to January, 1987, he called the hospital several times to check on his records but could get no indication he had files undone. It was not until after the Board meeting in February, 1987, when Mr. Shuler told him to speak with Ms. Lindahl, that he determined he did have some medical records incomplete. Notwithstanding, he knew he had some dictation that was incomplete and some matters were unsigned and in his opinion, it is more a question of semantics, (what the term, "incomplete" meant), and not knowing what he had to do. He contends he dealt in good faith with the hospital and with the Board of Medicine and was surprised to find out that he was not in good standing. This argument as well, is unbelievable. Dr. Heiss contends he relied on what he was told by the people at medical records but at no time until after he entered into the Stipulation with the Board of Medicine in 1987 did he contact Ms. Lindahl even though he knew she was the one who was in charge of delinquencies and was still employed by the hospital. It was incumbent upon him as the physician to contact the person in charge, especially in light of his suspicion that certain records were incomplete, and not rely on phone calls to anyone who answered. This does not constitute reasonably prudent action or the actions of a reasonable man. It cannot reasonably be claimed that Dr. Heiss' actions were based on an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. As a physician, he should have assumed that the Board wanted and required all records to be completed and it was his responsibility to insure that the records were, in fact completed. This he failed to do. On March 20, 1987, Respondent still had 53 charts incomplete of the 84 charts he had left incomplete when he departed the staff of Lee Memorial Hospital. These 53 charts were completed by November, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a medical doctor in Florida be suspended for ninety days and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of January, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2674 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. BY THE PETITIONER 1 & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. Accepted 4 - 8 Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. 11 - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17 - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23 & 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. 25. Argument rather than Finding of Fact. 26 & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. BY THE RESPONDENT No submittal. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director DPR, Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Susan Branson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dan E. Batchelor, Esquire Post Office Box 1899 Bonita Springs, Florida 33923
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Martin Kasner was licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0031141 on August 24, 1977. At all time pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent maintained an office at 1911 North Andrews Avenue, Wilton Manors, Florida 33311. There is no evidence that Petitioner has ever been the subject of prior disciplinary action by the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine ("the Board"). On June 7, 1988, Detective Robert Trawinski of the Broward County Sheriff's Office visited Respondent's office in an undercover capacity posing as a new patient identifying himself as Robert Conti. Detective Trawinski had never previously worked in an undercover capacity in a doctor's office. Prior to Detective Trawinski's June 7, 1988 visit to the Respondent's office, Detective Trawinski met with Sergeant Clukey of the narcotics division of the Broward County Sheriff's Office and Mel Waxman, an investigator for the Petitioner. Detective Trawinski was instructed to try to obtain a prescription for Valium from the Respondent without giving any valid medical purpose. Valium or Diazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance that is not an analgesic, but is a potent tranquilizer and skeletal muscle relaxant which can have adverse effects on sensorium. It is indicated for the management of anxiety disorders or for the short-term relief of the symptoms of anxiety. Individual patients taking Valium can become dependent on the drug and withdrawal from addiction to the drug can lead to potentially life-threatening health problems. Detective Trawinski was not advised as to all of the potentially acceptable medical purposes for which Valium could be used. He understood his instructions to mean that he should not voice any complaint of pain. Prior to seeing the Respondent during this first visit, Detective Trawinski filled out a medical questionnaire in Respondent's office using the fictitious name Bob Conti. In filling out the questionnaire, Detective Trawinski did not state any specific medical complaints. The patient's blood pressure was taken by a nurse in the office and recorded at 150/84. That reading tends to confirm the patient's subsequent complaint of anxiety. During the June 7, 1988 visit, Detective Trawinski advised Respondent that he was having problems performing sexually and was experiencing some anxiety as a result of job and family problems. Detective Trawinski also advised the Respondent that he had previously obtained prescriptions for Valium from a doctor up north and the drug had helped calm him down. Detective Trawinski advised the Respondent that the Valium he had previously been taking relaxed him and alleviated many of the symptoms of which he was complaining. During this first visit, the Respondent took a limited medical history from the patient including questions regarding possible alternative sources of the patient's complaints such as diabetes and thyroid problems. The patient denied a history of any such possible alternative causes for his symptoms. During the first visit, the Respondent made preliminary overtures towards conducting a physical examination of the patient. However, the detective told the doctor he did not want a physical. Respondent advised the Petitioner that he should consider having a blood work-up, but the Respondent indicated that because the tests were so expensive, the patient could wait until he had the money. At the conclusion of the June 7, 1988 visit, the Respondent issued a prescription to Detective Trawinski for 30 ten milligram Valium tablets with the ability to refill the prescription three times. The patient was advised to take two Valium per day as needed and one at night as a sleeping pill. At the time of the first visit, Detective Trawinski did not know the therapeutic use for Valium and was not advised of the appropriate use for Valium by his superiors. In actuality, a prescription for Valium was not inappropriate for the patient given his high blood pressure, complaints of anxiety and minor sexual dysfunction which could have been related to anxiety. Detective Trawinski returned for a second visit to the Respondent's office seventeen days later on June 24, 1988 at which time the patient's blood pressure was recorded at 164/80 which could reflect anxiety on the part of the patient. During this second visit, the Respondent questioned the patient regarding his appetite and medical history. Detective Trawinski denied a history of thyroid trouble, hayfever, etc. The Respondent conducted a limited physical examination of the patient checking his lungs and his heart rate. During the June 24 visit, Detective Trawinski advised the doctor that, while he still had some anxious moments, the prescription for Valium was helping him. The Respondent asked the patient whether he had any Valium left. The patient responded that he did not have any and also advised the Respondent that he was taking the Valium as directed and was not sharing them with anyone else. At the conclusion of the second visit, the Respondent provided the patient with a prescription for 50 Valium tablets with two refills. While the medical records of Detective Trawinski's first and second visit are sketchy at best, the Valium prescriptions issued on these two occasions do not fall beneath the standard of a reasonably prudent physician under the circumstances. The third visit by Detective Trawinski to Respondent's office took place twelve days later on July 6, 1988. During that visit, the detective advised the Respondent that the reason the Valium were going so quickly was because he was sharing the prescription with his wife. Detective Trawinski attempted to obtain from Respondent a separate prescription for Valium for his wife. Detective Trawinski offered to pay Respondent the amount of an additional office visit if Respondent would issue a prescription in his wife's name. However, Respondent refused to accept the additional money or issue a prescription in the wife's name without seeing her. The Respondent stated that he would need to take a medical history and conduct a physical examination prior to prescribing anything for the patient's wife. The Respondent advised Detective Trawinski that his wife should not be taking prescription drugs without having seen a doctor and that, although the prescription seem to be working for him, it may not necessarily be good for his wife. The Respondent advised the patient that, while his wife could take a few of his Valium until she could make an appointment to see the doctor, an appointment should be made as soon as possible and that no one should take prescription medication without being seen by the doctor. Notwithstanding the cautionary statements to the patient regarding sharing the drug, at the conclusion of the third visit, Respondent increased the patient's prescription for Valium from 50 tablets to 100 tablets with 1 refill. In fact, Respondent originally made out the prescription for 50 tablets. However, after being advised that the patient was sharing the pills with his wife, the prescription was increased to 100 tablets. By increasing the prescription in this manner, the Respondent was excessively prescribing a controlled substance and fell below the standard of care expected in this community of a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar circumstances. On July 13, 1988, Detective Trawinski returned to Respondent's office with Deputy Somerall of the Broward Sheriff's Office posing as his wife, Jeanette Conti. Upon arriving at the doctor's office, Deputy Somerall was weighed and her blood pressure was taken. In addition, the doctor performed a limited physical examination including listening to her heart and lungs with a stethoscope. The Respondent took a limited medical history from Deputy Somerall and she stated that she was suffering from stress and that Valium seemed to relieve it. Deputy Somerall advised the Respondent that she had been taking some of the Valium prescribed for her purported husband. In response to questioning by the Respondent, Deputy Somerall stated that she took the Valium on an as needed basis and it did not cause her to be drowsy and seemed to relieve the stress and anxiety she sometimes experienced towards the end of the visit, the Respondent indicated he would issue a separate prescription for Valium for Deputy Somerall and stated that he did not want her taking pills from her husband without her seeing a doctor first. The Respondent issued a prescription in the name of Jeanette Conti for 30 ten milligram Valium tablets with two refills permitted. During the July 13, 1988 visit, the Respondent inquired of Detective Trawinski whether his prescriptions were holding out. After Detective Trawinski indicated that he needed additional prescriptions, the Respondent issued a new prescription in the name of Bob Conti for 100 ten milligram Valium tablets. No refills were indicated. During this fourth visit, Detective Trawinski told the Respondent that he had tried some Percodan and had enjoyed it. He indicated that the drug had helped him to perform sexually and requested the doctor to issue him a prescription for that drug. Percodan is a Schedule II Controlled Substance which is used to relieve moderate to severe pain. It is an opiate narcotic and can be addictive. At the conclusion of this fourth visit, the Respondent issued a prescription to Detective Trawinski for 30 Percodan tablets. The prescription did not provide for any refills. No valid medical reason was provided for the issuance of the Percodan prescription. While Respondent contends that the patient had previously complained of back pain and a prescription for Percodan was issued for that reason, no competent evidence was presented to establish that Detective Trawinski had ever made a serious complaint about back pain. Therefore, the Respondent fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent physician in this community by issuing the Percodan prescription. Likewise, the issuance of additional prescriptions for Valium in the name of Bob Conti was excessive when considered together with the previous prescriptions issued. Pharmacists in Broward County will sometimes contact a physician to advise him if a patient is attempting to refill a prescription sooner than it should be refilled. The Respondent was never contacted by any pharmacist or advised that his patients were attempting to refill their prescriptions sooner than they should and there is no indication that the Respondent was ever advised that all of the refills allowed under the prescriptions were obtained by the patient. Patients often overlook the ability to refill a prescription and return to the doctor for a new prescription. The Respondent specifically advised Detective Trawinski during one of the visits that he could get the prescriptions refilled without returning to see the doctor. This statement indicates that the Respondent assumed that the patient had not sought all the refills of the earlier prescriptions. While the Respondent might have assumed that the patient had not sought all the refills provided, the Respondent should have been more cautious about issuing so many prescriptions with refills permitted within such a short period of time. However, at no time was the Respondent informed or led to believe that the patient was selling the drugs to others. Although both patients were seen by the doctor and issued prescriptions during the July 13 visit, they were only charged Respondent's typical rate for a single visit, $30.00. On July 19, 1988, both Detective Trawinski and Deputy Somerall returned to the Respondent's office. During this visit, Deputy Somerall advised Respondent she had taken some of the Percodan prescribed for her purported husband and requested a prescription of her own. Deputy Somerall told the Respondent that she was using the drug as an aphrodisiac. Detective Trawinski advised the doctor that he was taking four Percodan per day because it made him feel good. Detective Trawinski advised Respondent that he did not have any Percodan remaining because he had used it during a party with another couple. The Respondent lectured both patients about the dangers of Percodan and told them that the drug was habit forming and should not be taken for recreational purposes. Respondent expressed surprise that the drug was serving as an aphrodisiac for the patients. While Respondent indicated he was reluctant to issue a new prescription for Percodan, he stated that the drug seemed to be providing some benefits to the patients and ultimately issued a prescription in the name of Bob Conti for an additional 30 Percodan tablets. Respondent would not issue a prescription for Percodan in the name of Jeanette Conti. Furthermore, when Detective Trawinski inquired about making an appointment for his brother-in-law to see the Respondent, the Respondent replied that if the intention was to obtain Percodan, he did not want to see the patient. However, he indicated he would be willing to see the brother-in-law if he was simply seeking a prescription for Valium. At no time did the Respondent adequately inform the patients regarding the synergistic effects of the use of Percodan and Valium nor did he adequately explain the risks associated with combining these drugs with alcohol or other substances. Moreover, Respondent failed to explore the possibility that the prescriptions he issued were increasing or exacerbating existing dependency by these Patients on the drugs involved. On July 25, 1988, Detective Trawinski returned to Respondent's office and requested that his prescriptions be renewed. The patient denied any medical complaints and there is no indication that any physical examination was conducted by Respondent. In response to Respondent's inquiries, Detective Trawinski indicated that he was following the Respondent's previous advice and use of the Percodan was "under control." At the conclusion of the July 25 visit, Respondent issued a prescription in the name of Bob Conti for 30 Percodan "for pain" and 50 Valium tablets. One refill was provided for the Valium prescription. No refills were indicated for the Percodan prescription. No valid medical reasons were provided for the prescriptions that were issued following the July 25 visit. There is no evidence indicating any pecuniary gain by the Respondent for writing any of the prescriptions in question. The only remuneration received by Respondent was his typical $30.00 office charge per visit. The written medical records which the Respondent maintained fail to adequately justify the course of treatment of the patients known to Respondent as Bob and Jeanette Conti (collectively referred to as the "Patients"). The records do not reflect repeated evaluation of the persistent symptoms or adequate evaluation and follow-up of the results of medication, either as to effectiveness or possible side effects such as dependency. Respondent's record-keeping with regard to the Patients falls below the acceptable standard. The records fail to include an adequate patient history and initial assessment of the Patients. It is impossible to determine from these records what medicines the patients had taken in the past, what reactions they had to such medications, what medical procedures they had in the past or other important information regarding the Patient's background. In several instances, the Respondent's only notation of treatment is a listing of medications prescribed. His remaining notations are not acceptable to explain or justify the treatment program undertaken, especially with respect to the prescriptions for Percodan. The Respondent's medical records for patient Bob Conti contain a very limited patient history and general background information. For this patient's first two visits, there is a brief notation which includes the patient's blood pressure and weight. On the first three visits, there is a diagnosis of "chronic anxiety" without any further discussion. On the final three visits, only the medication prescribed is noted. The patient's records for these three last visits contain no statements of medical diagnosis, assessment or treatment plan. It is not possible to determine from Bob Conti's medical records the reason that Percodan was prescribed. The Respondent's medical records on the patient Jeanette Conti are similar to those previously described for patient Bob Conti. The office visit notes list no patient complaints or symptoms and no medical diagnosis or comprehensive assessments. While Respondent's counsel suggested that Respondent intended to supplement the medical records with additional information at a later date, no competent evidence was presented to support this claim. The Respondent was examined and tested by a psychiatric expert Dr. Klass. The results of the psychiatric examination indicate that the Respondent is not corrupt, but that he is corruptible, i.e., easily manipulated and overly compliant.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order which finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Count One, Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint, dismisses Counts Two and Five, imposes an administrative fine in the amount $5000.00 and suspends Respondent's license for a period of two years followed by a three (3) year term of probation during which time Respondent's prescribing practices should be closely monitored. DONE and ORDERED this 3 day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3 day of May, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact can be isolated, they are addressed below. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4-33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23, 24, 26, 29, 31 and 32. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is covered in Findings of Fact 34-37. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. The second sentence is adopted in part in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34-37. Rejected as irrelevant. No evidence was presented to establish that the Respondent intended to further supplement the medical records. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4-7 and 12. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is covered in Findings of Fact 6-10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 27. Rejected as irrelevant and because it is merely a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 27. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13-15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17 - 19. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20-23, 25, 26, and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30-33. Rejected as constituting argument and a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument. Rejected as constituting argument. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. 30. (SIC) Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Harrison, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 C. Craig Stella, Esquire Attorney at Law 200 S. Andrews Avenue Suite 300 Mercede City Center Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Kenneth E. Easely General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jose Raul Suarez has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida since January 12, 1961. He conducts his practice at the Flagler Medical Clinic, 965 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida. (Testimony of Manresa, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On August 27, 1979, one Ronald Gudger was arrested by Miami police for possession of a stolen credit card. During the pendency of the criminal proceeding, Gudger informed police officials that Respondent had issued false prescriptions for drugs to himself and to others. On September 10, 1979, Gudger was released and placed in a pretrial intervention program. Subsequent to his release, Gudger told city detectives further details concerning his prior relationship with Respondent, including the fact that Respondent had previously provided him with written prescriptions for Preludin, Placidyl, and Percodan on various occasions in 1979. He also indicated to the officers that Respondent was desirous of obtaining a Betamax video recorder. Gudger had been introduced to Respondent by an individual named "Pete." During the course of some ten to fifteen visits to Respondent, Gudger never received a physical examination or informed Respondent that he had a weight problem or any other medical reason for needing the drugs. However, Respondent had asked him questions once for his records. On only one occasion did he pay Respondent a $10.00 office visit fee. On one occasion, he had promised to give Respondent a "stereo" in exchange for prescriptions for drugs. Although he obtained the prescriptions from Respondent, he was not able to get the stereo. (Testimony of Manresa, Lopez, Gudger (Deposition-Petitioner's Exhibit 7) Rabin, Petitioner's Exhibit 6) Pursuant to an arrangement with Miami narcotics detectives Luis M. Lopez and George Manresa, Gudger became a paid confidential informant for the police department. On September 12, 1979, Lopez and Gudger went to Respondent's office planning to offer Respondent a Betamax in exchange for drug prescriptions. The officers had obtained a Betamax from county sources and it was in the trunk of an unmarked police car parked in a lot in back of Respondent's office. At the time, Manresa conducted surveillance of the parking lot from a van in which he also monitored communication equipment designed to record any conversations in Respondent's office from a transmitter which had been hidden on the person of Lopez. Another police officer had camera equipment. At about 1:00 p.m., Lopez and Gudger entered Respondent's office. Gudger informed the receptionist that they had a Betamax that the Doctor wanted which had been stolen the previous night. In approximately an hour or an hour and a half, when all the patients had left the office, the receptionist told Gudger he could see Respondent. Gudger told Respondent that he had a Betamax waiting for him in return for $100.00 and some prescriptions. Respondent stated that he was short of cash. Gudger informed Respondent that "Louie" was in the outer office and was a friend of his. Respondent asked "Is he cool?" and Gudger said "Yes." Gudger brought Lopez into the office and introduced him to Respondent as the "guy with the Betamax." Lopez told Respondent he had the Betamax , which was "hot," in the trunk of his automobile which was parked behind the office. Respondent stated "It's no problem." They told Respondent that they would take prescriptions for the machine and Respondent asked how they wanted to do it. Lopez gave Respondent list of several names and addresses and told him that he had a brother named Luis Lopez. Lopez identified himself with a false identification card in the name of Luis Trigo. Respondent then proceeded to write six prescriptions for Placidyl 750 mg and Preludin 75 mg in the amounts of 30 each. Two prescriptions were in the name of Luis Lopez, two in the name of Lazaro Luis Trigo, one in the name of Ronald Gudger, and another in the name of Rhonda Gudger, his wife. Lopez asked Respondent to write one prescription for a different date than September 12 and Respondent dated one of the Trigo prescriptions for September 13. While writing the prescriptions, Lopez remarked to Gudger that he was really going to get "high" that night with the pills, and Respondent merely smiled when hearing this statement. Respondent told them that when filling the prescriptions, they should dress neatly and comb their hair so that they would not call attention to themselves. Be also told them not to go to the Golden Pharmacy in North Miami because the police had been checking it and it was "hot." Respondent told Lopez that he would fill out a patient card on him for his records, but did not do so at that time. Lopez told Respondent that he did not want to have a physical examination and Respondent replied that he didn't need one. He told the men to put the prescriptions in their pocket as they left the office so that they would not be noticeable, and said that he would meet them in back for the Betamax. Gudger and Lopez then left the office and went to the parking lot. Respondent followed soon thereafter. Lopez drove his automobile so its trunk was near the trunk of Respondent's car . He opened the trunk and showed the Betamax to Respondent and asked him if that was what he wanted. Respondent said it was perfect because it was a two-hour cassette type and told him to put it in the trunk of his automobile. At that time, the other police personnel in the vicinity came to the scene and arrested Respondent who was thereafter charged with possession and dealing in stolen property and sale of controlled substances. Respondent was later tried on the criminal charges and found not guilty by jury verdict. Patient records obtained from Respondent during the course of discovery in that proceeding reflected both Ronald Gudger and Rhonda Gudger as patients who both suffered from depression and insomnia. In addition, the records indicated that Rhonda Gudger desired to lose weight. Ronald Gudger's card reflected that he had sought treatment on four occasions from May to August 1979, at which time Preludin and Valium had been prescribed, and that on an additional visit he had been issued a refill of Preludin since he had lost his prescription. (Testimony of Manresa, Rabin, Lopez, Igoe (deposition), Gudger (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), Petitioner's Exhibits 2-6, 8) Placidyl is a trade name for Etchlorvynol, a Schedule IV controlled substance under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Preludin is the trade name for Phenmetrazine, a Schedule II controlled substance under Chapter 893. Placidyl depresses the central nervous system and is customarily prescribed for insomnia. Preludin is used for appetite suppression, anorexia, and narcolepsy. It is excitatory and produces adrenaline-like effects. Both drugs can be used safely if properly administered after a thorough medical history and physical evaluation has been made by a physician, but should never be prescribed without interviewing the patient and arriving at an informed diagnosis of his condition. In the opinion of an expert medical authority, it would be an unacceptable medical practice to prescribe such drugs to persons whom a physician had never seen. In the vernacular of drug abusers, Placidyl is termed a "downer" and Preludin an "upper." (Testimony of Palmer, Stonis) Respondent testified at the hearing substantially as follows: Ronald and Rhonda Gudger had been his patients whom he had treated for legitimate complaints in 1979. He had prescribed Preludin to Ronald Gudger for conditions of depression, insomnia and obesity, to serve as an anti-depressant and "mood elevator." He had seen Rhonda on June 8, 1979, and prescribed Preludin for her obesity. He saw Gudger on September 12, 1979, at which time Gudger requested that he be given a refill prescription of Preludin and also Placidyl, claiming it was good for his sleep. He also asked Respondent to refill his wife's prescription because she, was doing well on the medication. Respondent claimed that he wrote both prescriptions and told Gudger that he owed $10.00 from his last visit and $10.00 for the present visit, at which point Gudger stated that he had no money but would sell Respondent a Betamax. Respondent then informed Gudger that he did not want anything stolen and Gudger told him that it was "cool" and that he needed money. Respondent stated that he would have to see it. Gudger asked him to see his friend and thereafter brought Lopez into the office. Lopez asked for Preludin stating that he had used it before as a mood elevator. Respondent asked Lopez questions concerning his medical history and was going to perform a physical examination, but Lopez objected stating that he did not need one. Respondent then wrote the prescriptions for Lopez, at which time Lopez told him that he had a 29 year old brother who also took the same medicine and asked for prescriptions for him. Respondent wrote the prescriptions for the brother because he had patients waiting and Lopez had told him the brother was in good health and "strong as an ox." Respondent then went to the parking lot behind his office to obtain a prescription pad and also to see the Betamax which he had agreed to purchase from Gudger if it worked properly and they could agree on a price. He denied that Lopez had told him that the Betamax was "hot." Respondent issued the prescription for Gudger's wife because he trusted him when he stated that his wife had done well on the drug and that she needed a refill of the prescription. He had issued the prescriptions to Lopez because he had said he was in perfect health and just felt "down" and had difficulty sleeping at night. (Testimony of Respondent) Two local physicians and a nursing supervisor testified at the hearing as to their observations that Respondent provided his patients with excellent care. A number of letters were received in evidence from fellow physicians in Miami attesting to Respondent's good reputation as an ethical and professionally capable physician in the community. Also, Respondent's work with the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station in Miami was praised in a letter from the station's commanding officer. A nursing administrator for Multicare, Inc. in Miami also provided a letter concerning Respondent's concern for patients' needs in the Medicare program and his efforts to prevent mismanagement of Medicare funds. A high school principal wrote a letter concerning Respondent's treatment of his family and his services to schools and other community activities in the Miami area. (Testimony of Serratta-Noges, Lameles, Cruz, supplemented by Respondent's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That the State Board of Medical Examiners issue a Final Order suspending the license of Respondent Jose Raul Suarez to practice medicine for a period of one year, pursuant to subsection 458.331(1)(q) and (2), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julian Mark, Esquire Suite 500 - Security Trust Bldg. 700 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue An administrative complaint dated June 20, 1997, alleges that Respondent, Dr. Jeri-Lin Furlow Burton, committed various violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, the Medical Practice Act. The issues in this proceeding are whether those violations occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Dr. Burton is and has been at all material times a licensed medical physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME: 0042559. Dr. Burton is a general practitioner and has been a physician for 21 years. At all relevant times she was practicing in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The Department of Health (agency) is the state agency now charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida. Patient J.M. In 1996 J.M. lived in Melbourne, Florida, in an apartment complex frequented by Dr. Burton. Dr. Burton's former husband and a friend, L.V., both lived at the complex and she visited, provided some medical care to them, and sometimes brought them groceries. J.M. knew Dr. Burton was a physician. On February 15, 1996, J.M. awakened feeling awful. At the urging of her boyfriend, J.T., and accompanied by J.T., J.M. visited Dr. Burton at her office. According to Dr. Burton's treatment sheet notes, J.M. presented with complaints of a sore throat and migraine headaches associated with nausea and vomiting. Dr. Burton performed a brief physical examination, but not a neurological examination. J.M.'s temperature and blood pressure are documented, but not her pulse, weight, or respiration. Dr. Burton recorded that J.M. had a history of migraine headaches for years and was sometimes sick in bed for days. Dr. Burton performed a streptococcus screen, which was negative. For a first visit there should have been a more complete history in the records of this patient. Moreover, any complaint of serious headache, and especially a migraine headache, should have prompted Dr. Burton to perform and record a neurological examination. Dr. Burton diagnosed J.M.'s immediate problem as an upper respiratory infection with pharyngitis. Dr. Burton prescribed Inderal to prevent migraine headaches and Bactrim D.S., an antibiotic. Dr. Burton also gave J.M. some samples of Imitrex, which relieves migraine headaches. These prescriptions were appropriate and were justified by the medical record of the February 15, 1996, visit. There were subsequent prescriptions, however, that were not justified by Dr. Burton's medical notes for her patient, J.M. On March 12, 1996, Dr. Burton prescribed 30 Percocet for J.M.'s headache. The office note merely recites the date and the complaint that the headache was not getting relief from the Imitrex which usually produced good results. The next office note is dated March 21, 1996, and states only that patient needs refill of medications for headaches. "Again 'sick' headaches in bed. Written RX Percocet(30)." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7) On April 19, 1996, Dr. Burton again prescribed a refill of 30 Percocet for J.M. The office note merely reflects this fact. On May 10, 1996, Dr. Burton noted that she gave J.M. samples of Imitrex, 25 milligrams, No. 9. On none of the occasions noted after the initial visit in February 1996 was any examination described. Dr. Burton explained at the hearing that these were occasions when she saw J.M. at the apartment complex, generally in the evenings. Imitrex is a non-narcotic medication that works on progestagen. It is effective in approximately 90 percent of cases. When J.M. complained that it did not work, Dr. Burton did not pursue that complaint further with a neurological examination and detailed history; instead she simply prescribed Percocet, an inappropriate narcotic. (Roxicet, reflected in the pharmacy records for J.M., is a generic substitute for Percocet.) Inexplicably on the final occasion noted in J.M.'s chart, Dr. Burton switched back to Imitrex. The records by Dr. Burton are thoroughly void of any explanation for her course of treatment of J.M.'s headaches. Patient D.W. According to Dr. Burton, D.W., born March 5, 1953, was a long-standing patient, having first seen Dr. Burton in 1990 when Dr. Burton was employed by a walk-in clinic. The records of those visits are not part of the record in this case. The walk- in clinic has closed. The documented chronology of Dr. Burton's treatment of D.W. commences with D.W.'s visit to Dr. Burton's new private practice office in October 1995. D.W. presented to Dr. Burton's office on October 17, 1995, with complaints of Crohn's Disease (an autoimmune disease that affects the intestinal tract and causes severe abdominal pain, inflammation, bleeding, and in some instances infection and perforation of the intestinal tract), headache, and weight loss. There is no documentation of physical examination or an objective finding other than D.W. was in no acute distress (NAD). Dr. Burton prescribed three vials of Stadol NS (nasal spray) with two refills and one hundred tablets of Fioricet. On November 1, 1995, Dr. Turse, a gastroenterologist, evaluated D.W. Dr. Turse reviewed prior records from a Dr. Klein, which dated back to April 1995, revealing an extensive work-up including a normal upper gastro-intestinal endoscopy, bisopsies that were negative, an unremarkable colonoscopy, a normal abdominal and pelvic ultrasound, and a negative sigmoidoscopy. Dr. Turse noted that Dr. Klein suspected that the patient's problem might be psychogenic. Dr. Turse performed two studies, an endoscopy study, and a gastric emptying study. In a report dated November 16, 1995, Dr. Turse indicated that the EGD with mucosal biopsy revealed minimal findings and that he wanted to rule out gastroparesis/gastric motility disorder. Dr. Turse followed up with a gastric emptying study, which was normal. These studies allowed Dr. Turse to rule out Crohn's disease and gastroparesis in this patient. In a letter dated December 4, 1995, Dr. Turse advised Dr. Burton that the EGD was unremarkable and the gastric emptying study was normal, and despite an extensive work-up, there was no explanation for patient D.W.'s chronic recurrent vomiting. This doctor then indicated that his main impression was gastric motility disorder. On November 6, 1995, D.W. presented to Dr. Burton complaining of headaches. The medical records do not reflect a physical examination or that any lab studies were performed. Dr. Burton's "diagnoses" were a headache, Crohn's Disease, and nausea and vomiting. She prescribed Stadol NS No. 20 (twenty), Lortab 7.5 No. 100 (one hundred) and Fioricet No. 500 (five hundred). From December 5, 1995, through December 19, 1996, D.W. presented to Dr. Burton's office multiple times with various complaints of headache, diarrhea, nausea, and vomiting. Dr. Burton continued to diagnose gastroparesis and Crohn's disease without additional testing or consultation. At this time, it is clear that Dr. Burton had Dr. Turse's letter of December 4, 1995. While it was not inappropriate for her to continue with the diagnosis of Crohn's disease or gastroparesis, a general practitioner receiving a patient with Crohn's disease or gastroparesis would perform a physical examination with a minimum of a rectal exam. A stool test should also have been done to determine if the patient was experiencing blood, parasites, or infection in the intestines. These tests were not done. On December 27, 1995, D.W. presented to Dr. Burton with complaints of a headache. She was tearful, upset, and plucking her hair. Dr. Burton diagnosed Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and prescribed one hundred tablets of Anafranil 5mg, and Buprenex. On March 8, 1996, D.W. presented to Dr. Burton with gastrointestinal complaints. She reported a history of two episodes of anorexia and Dr. Burton's diagnosis reflects "r/o (rule out) anorexia." On July 12, 1996, Dr. Burton prescribed Wellbutrin to D.W. She had already prescribed Prozac to D.W. on June 27, 1996. Documentation of numerous office visits from October 17, 1995, through December 19, 1996, for D.W. do not contain a complete history and physical examination, or physical findings and assessment. Several of the records, such as the July 12, 1996, record, contain no physical findings whatsoever; others contain merely a temperature reading. Dr. Burton continued to indicate Crohn's disease and gastroparesis as the working diagnoses. She continued to prescribe narcotics like Lortab in high doses for this patient and Donnatrol, Lomotil, and Bentyl, all of which will slow down the motility of the digestive tract. D.W. had a motility problem with her digestive tract. To prescribe medications that slow down the digestive tract further is contra-indicated and can make the patient subject to a perforation of the colon or a systemic infection called septicemia which can be life-threatening. Dr. Burton prescribed significant amounts of Lortab and Fioricet, which contain acetaminophen. Large doses of acetaminophen can be toxic to the liver. She did not perform any liver tests on D.W. Dr. Burton prescribed Xanax, a tranqulizer and Wellbutrin, an anti-depressant, to D.W. in a short period of time. It is not appropriate to prescribe a tranquilizer with an antidepressant in a depressed patient. Dr. Burton also prescribed Prozac and Wellbutrin in the same month. Wellbutrin and Prozac can lower the seizure threshold in people and the former can increase the effect of the latter. It is inappropriate to prescribe these drugs together so close in time. Dr. Burton failed to practice medicine within the acceptable level of care in that she failed to perform an adequate or complete history, physical examination, and assessment of D.W. related to multiple complaints. Dr. Burton failed to perform a rectal exam or a stool test; in addition, she failed to perform a liver test. She also fell below the acceptable standard of care by prescribing medications that slow down the digestive tract and are contra-indicated for a patient with either Crohn's disease or gastric motility disorder. She fell below the standard of care by prescribing Stadol, a narcotic antagonist, with the amount of narcotics prescribed for this patient. Dr. Burton failed to keep written records justifying the course of treatment in that she failed to document a detailed history, physical examination, assessment of physical findings, and plan of treatment for D.W. She consistently prescribed controlled substances for Patient D.W. without performing a complete physical assessment to determine need and she prescribed medications that had the potential to exacerbate some of D.W.'s previous known conditions. Patient C.W. C.W., born March 9, 1955, was D.W.'s husband and also a long-term patient of Dr. Burton. The records of his visit commence with his visit to Dr. Burton's office on October 26, 1995, with complaints of backache and headaches. Dr. Burton's records note a history of three back surgeries, one with insertion of Harrington rods (rods surgically placed along the spine to correct curvature) and recent epidural block. Dr. Burton's office records of C.W. do not contain reports of the surgeries, CTs, or Magnetic Resonance Imaging. There is no documentation of a physical examination or findings other than blood pressure. Dr. Burton diagnosed C.W. with headache, back pain, and depression and prescribed multiple medications including but not limited to: two hundred tablets of Lortab 7.5mg, one hundred tablets of Zoloft, one hundred tablets of Xanax 2mg, six units of Stadol NS, fifty tablets of Imitrex 50mg, ten units of injectable Imitrex, and 100 M.S. Contin 30mg, a narcotic. Prior to his visit with Respondent, C.W. was treated by a Dr. Weiss from December 3, 1992, through October 1995. Dr. Weiss' records, the majority of which were not obtained by Dr. Burton until shortly before the final hearing in this case, did substantiate the prior back surgeries and problems. Dr. Weiss also prescribed Lortab, a narcotic analgesic, for this patient. However, Dr. Weiss indicated in his reports that he either dropped the dosage on the Lortabs or he cancelled the prescriptions completely. As an example, in his report of August 31, 1993, it is noted that patient tried again for Lortab No. 60 but Dr. Weiss said it was too soon. Contained in Dr. Weiss' reports is a report from Dr. Hynes. Dr. Hynes treated C.W. on June 28, 1994, and commented that Patient C.W. was on Lortabs for three years and that the patient recognized that there probably was an addiction problem. This doctor strongly recommended an inpatient pain program. Dr. Burton did not have this record from Dr. Hynes or Dr. Weiss' records, other than a note giving C.W. a disability rating, when Dr. Burton treated him. A reasonably prudent physician would not prescribe the amount of narcotics that Dr. Burton has done in this case without documentation establishing the patient's history. During the period of about October 26, 1995, through December 9, 1996, C.W. presented to Dr. Burton on approximately sixteen occasions with complaints of back pain. Dr. Burton diagnosed chronic back pain and "failed back syndrome" and continued to prescribed Lortabs and other narcotics during this time period. There is no documentation of referral for orthopedic or neurological consultation, and inadequate documentation of physical assessment or clinical evaluation for treatment. There is no documentation concerning a referral to a pain management program. In her note of November 6, 1995, Dr. Burton indicated that C.W. took five tablets of MS Contin at once with no relief. Dr. Burton had indicated in her October 26, 1995, report, less than 2 weeks earlier, that she had warned the patient to take only one a day. Based on this history, C.W. was non-compliant with medication and Dr. Burton should have realized there may be a problem. On April 1, 1996, C.W. presented to Dr. Burton with complaints of weight loss and increased sleeping. Respondent prescribed several medications including Wellbutrin. From October 26, 1995, through December 9, 1996, C.W. received the following medications, among others, prescribed by Dr. Burton in the following approximate amounts: Lortab 7.5 1100 tablets Lortab 10 500 tablets Xanax 2mg 30 tablets Ritalin 20mg 10 tablets Imitrex 50mg 100 tablets Fioricet 900 tablets Duragesic 100mg 5 patches Methadone 10mg 40 Despiramine 25mg 30 Stadol NS 60 Vials Dr. Burton failed to practice medicine within the acceptable level of care in that she failed to perform an adequate or complete history, physical examination, and assessment of C.W. related to complaints of chronic back pain. Dr. Burton failed to practice medicine within the acceptable level of care when she failed to refer C.W. for neurological consultation and physical or pain management therapy of any kind. She failed to practice medicine within the acceptable standard of care for C.W. by consistently prescribing controlled substances in excessive quantities that are addictive without documenting the risks and by not attempting to decrease the dosage or detoxify the patient. Dr. Burton failed to maintain medical records documenting a detailed history, complete physical examinations, and assessments of physical findings of C.W. She failed to obtain records of prior surgeries or diagnostic evaluations to supplement C.W.'s record. Dr. Burton's medical records do not justify the course and scope of treatment of this patient. Weighing the Evidence The testimony of Drs. Rafool and Stein on behalf of the agency was competent and credible. Both reviewed all of the medical records provided by Dr. Burton to the agency and pharmacy records obtained independently by the agency. They also received some law enforcement records which have been excluded from this proceeding as hearsay. Both experts relied appropriately and substantially on Dr. Burton's medical records, or lack thereof, in rendering their opinions of her violations. Both experts explained their conclusions with specific examples and discussions of various office visits of the patients at issue. It is difficult to assess the credibility of Dr. Burton's expert witness, Dr. Centrone, a neurosurgeon. Like the other experts, he reviewed Dr. Burton's records, but he also reviewed detailed statements provided to him by Dr. Burton, which were prepared in the course of this proceeding and not contemporaneously with the office notes. Dr. Centrone, without detailing any basis, concluded that Dr. Burton properly treated the patients at issue. The testimony of J.M. regarding finding prescription bottles, in her name and provided by Dr. Burton, among the abandoned possessions of her former live-in boyfriend was unspecific and confusing and an inadequate basis for finding that Dr. Burton illegally provided drugs to the boyfriend, J.T., through prescriptions written to J.M. Likewise, J.M. never plainly contradicted Dr. Burton's explanation of her encounters with J.M. subsequent to the one office visit in February 1996. J.M. insists that she never returned to Dr. Burton's office, but Dr. Burton's notes do not state that she did return. Instead, as Dr. Burton explained, the notes reflect more casual encounters at the apartment complex and Dr. Burton's prescriptions for continued migraine complaints. Although the agency failed to prove alleged fraud by Dr. Burton, it did prove that Dr. Burton failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. For each patient at issue Dr. Burton consistently responded with prescriptions of controlled substances in inappropriate amounts or combinations. Her testimony that the patients had intractable pain, that she often provided free medical treatment to poor or uninsured patients, and that she had many patients, "nuts", that had been "dumped by every doctor in town," is not a valid defense. Moreover, the explanations in Dr. Burton's written statements offered at hearing and in her testimony regarding her treatment do not obviate the serious deficiencies in her medical records for J.M., D.W., and C.W. Those records provide a sketchy statement of complaint, diagnosis (often no more then "headaches," "back pain," or "failed back syndrome"), and a listing of medications prescribed (sometimes as many as 6 for a single visit). Rarely is there any evidence of an examination or any written justification for prescriptions. The agency's evidence, primarily Dr. Burton's own records, clearly establishes that she failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patients at issue. In a Final Order dated June 10, 1995, in DOAH Case No. 93-3096, Dr. Burton was disciplined by the Board of Medicine for failure to maintain appropriate medical records. In a consent order entered in Case No. 96-02493, Dr. Burton agreed to a fine and other conditions, after she was charged with violating the Board's order in the prior case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: that the Board of Medicine enter its final order finding that Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(m),(q), and (t), Florida Statutes (1995), and imposing discipline of a 2-year suspension, $2,000 fine and 2-year probation under appropriate conditions to be established by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Terrell, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Health Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 George Ollinger, Esquire 100 Rialto Place, Suite 700 Melbourne, Florida 32940 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast, Bin A023 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
