The Issue Whether the Proposed Amendment of Rule 7E-6.007, Florida Administrative Code, is arbitrary and capricious and thus constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Hialeah, Inc., operates a race track (hereinafter referred to as the "Track") located in Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner is licensed by the Respondent. In December, 1981, the Petitioner was granted permission by letter from Bob Smith, then Director of the Respondent, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, to operate Tel-A-Betting. Robert Rosenburg, Director of the Respondent after Mr. Smith, also approved Tel-A- Betting in a letter to the Petitioner. The Petitioner has continuously operated Tel-A-Betting for more than six years. The Petitioner instituted Tel-A-Betting in reliance on the Respondent's approval of Tel-A-Betting. If approval had not been granted to the Petitioner from the Respondent, the Petitioner would not have established Tel-A-Betting. Tel-A-Betting is a procedure for placing wagers on races at the Petitioner's Track. Persons utilizing this system (hereinafter referred to as "Account Holders"), open an account with the Petitioner by making a deposit of $100.00 or more with the Petitioner and paying a $25.00 fee. The funds deposited with the Petitioner are received and accounted for in accounts maintained at the Track. Once an account is opened, a plastic card which contains, among other information, an account number and an "800," toll-free, telephone number is issued to the Account Holder. Wagers may then be placed with the Petitioner by the Account Holder calling the "800" number and placing a wager with a telephone operator/pari-mutuel clerk located at the Track. The Account Holder identifies himself or herself by giving the operator the account number and a code name designated by the Account Holder when the account is opened. The account number is programmed into a computer to determine whether the Account Holder has sufficient funds in the account to make the wager. If the funds in the account are sufficient to cover the wager, the wager is entered into the computer. If the Account Holder wins the wager, the payoff is entered into his or her account. Calls to place wagers through the Tel-A-Betting program can be made from anywhere in Florida and the person making the call and wager need not be physically present at the Track to make the wager. Wagers taken through Tel-A-Betting are only made on races at the Track. Tel-A-Betting allows the Petitioner to receive wagered funds as part of its pari-mutuel pool from persons located anywhere in the State of Florida. When a wager is made through Tel-A-Betting, the operator/pari-mutuel clerk cannot establish the age or identity of the person placing the wager. The Petitioner is the only race track permit holder in the State of Florida which employs Tel-A-Betting. The Proposed Amendment of Rule 7E-6.007, Florida Administrative Code, if valid, will prohibit the Petitioner from continuing the use of Tel-A-Betting. The Respondent has not received any complaints about the use of Tel-A- Betting by minors or any other abuses. No evidence was presented that minors have made, or attempted to make, wagers through the use of Tel-A-Betting. The Respondent has not received any objections to Tel-A-Betting or complaints about unfair competition from other racetrack permit holders.
The Issue Whether the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Respondent or Division), should deny West Flagler Associate, Ltd.’s (Petitioner or West Flagler) June 30, 2015, and July 1, 2015, applications for new summer jai alai permits under section 550.0745, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering activities in Florida pursuant to chapter 550. West Flagler is the owner of pari-mutuel permits and is authorized to conduct pari-mutuel pools on exhibition sports in Miami-Dade County pursuant to chapter 550. There are seven pari-mutuel permits for pari-mutuel pools on exhibition sports in Miami-Dade County. The permitholders are South Florida Racing Association, LLC (Hialeah Park)(“SFRA”); Fronton Holdings, LLC (Miami Jai Alai); Summer Jai Alai Partnership; West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Flagler Dog Track); Calder Race Course, Inc.; Tropical Park, LLC; and West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Magic City Jai Alai). Summer Jai Alai Partnership is the holder of a summer jai alai permit. West Flagler currently possesses a summer jai alai permit in Miami-Dade County. On June 30, 2015, West Flagler filed the June Application, pursuant to section 550.0745, for a “new permit” to conduct summer jai alai in Miami-Dade County. West Flagler’s June Application was based on its conclusion that a new summer jai alai permit was available because SFRA had the smallest total pool or handle in Miami-Dade County for two consecutive fiscal years, i.e., state fiscal years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, and that SFRA declined to convert its pari-mutuel permit to a permit to conduct summer jai alai. On July 1, 2015, West Flagler filed the July Application, pursuant to section 550.0745, for a “new permit” to conduct summer jai alai in Miami-Dade County. West Flagler’s July Application was based on its conclusion that a new summer jai alai permit was available because SFRA again had the smallest total pool or handle in Miami-Dade County for two consecutive fiscal years, i.e., state fiscal years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015, and that SFRA again declined to convert its pari- mutuel permit to a permit to conduct summer jai alai. On July 14, 2015, the Division denied the June Application on the grounds that there was not a summer jai alai permit available for fiscal years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 because SFRA did not have the smallest play or total pool in Miami-Dade County for those two consecutive years. The Division maintains that West Flagler (Magic City Jai Alai) had the smallest total pool in 2012/2013 and Summer Jai Alai Partnership had the smallest total pool in 2013/2014. That basis for the denial remains the position of the Division in this proceeding. On December 7, 2015, the Division issued an amended notice of denial that modified the denial of the July Application from one based on there being no lowest handling pari-mutuel permitholder for consecutive fiscal years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015, to one based on the grounds that 1) “West Flagler is incapable of converting its summer jai alai permit to a summer jai alai permit because there would not be an actual conversion as contemplated by statute”; and 2) “West Flagler has not shown that the issuance of a summer jai alai permit to West Flagler, which already holds a summer jai alai permit, would generate an increase in total state revenue over the revenue West Flagler generates under its current, identical permit.” West Flagler’s June Application does not seek to convert its existing summer jai alai permit to a summer jai alai permit. Rather, the application is predicated upon the creation of a new summer jai alai permit when SFRA declined to convert its pari-mutuel permit to a permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton. West Flagler’s July Application does not seek to convert its existing summer jai alai permit to a summer jai alai permit. Rather, the application is predicated upon the creation of a new summer jai alai permit when SFRA declined to convert its pari-mutuel permit to a permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton. The disagreement between the parties regarding the June Application revolves around whether “simulcast export” wagers should be included in calculating a permitholder’s “play or total pool within the county” for purposes of section 550.0745(1). The Division argues that a permitholder’s total pool includes live wagers, intertrack wagers, and simulcast export wagers. West Flagler argues that a permitholder’s total pool includes only live wagers and intertrack wagers.1/ A live wager is a wager accepted at a permitted Florida facility on a race or game performed live at that facility. Permitholders derive income, in the form of a commission, on live wagers placed at their facilities. Permitholders pay taxes on live wagers. An intertrack wager is a wager accepted at a permitted Florida facility on a race or game transmitted from and performed live at, or simulcast rebroadcast from, another permitted Florida facility. Permitholders derive income, in the form of a commission, on wagers placed at other Florida facilities on races or games transmitted from the permitholder’s facilities. Permitholders pay taxes on intertrack wagers. A simulcast wager is a wager placed at a Florida facility on an out-of-state race transmitted to the Florida facility. Permitholders pay taxes on simulcast wagers. An intertrack simulcast wager is a wager placed at a Florida guest track on an out-of-state race transmitted by the out-of-state track to a Florida host track, and then re- transmitted by the Florida host track to the Florida guest track. Permitholders pay taxes on intertrack simulcast wagers. A simulcast export wager is a wager accepted at an out-of-state facility on a race or game performed live at a permitted Florida facility. Permitholders derive income, in the form of a commission, on simulcast export wagers accepted by out-of-state facilities on races or games transmitted from the permitholder’s facilities. The Division does not know the commission structure between the permitholders and out-of-state facilities. Permitholders do not pay taxes on simulcast export wagers, and the state receives no revenue from simulcast export wagers. In sum, live wagers, intertrack wagers, simulcast wagers, and intertrack simulcast wagers are those placed at Florida pari-mutuel facilities, and subject to Florida taxation. Simulcast export wagers are those placed on Florida events at out-of-state facilities, and not subject to Florida taxation. Licensed betting facilities across the country -- and generally across the world -- contract with a licensed totalisator (the “tote”)2/ by which all wagers are accounted for. Data on all wagers placed on a hosting permitholder’s event (with uncommon exceptions when an out-of-state facility receiving a hosting permitholder’s simulcast broadcast forms its own pool) are sent by the tote to the hosting permitholder to be included in its total price pool, and used to determine payouts on winning wagers. The totes also capture simulcast export wagers for use in calculating the commission paid by the guest tracks. A permitholder’s pool amounts are reported to the Division by the tote company on a daily basis. The daily tote report includes live, simulcast, intertrack, intertrack simulcast, and simulcast export wagers. The daily tote reports are reviewed by the Division’s auditing section to ensure that wagers are accounted for and paid. The Division maintains a central monitoring system by which it captures the daily amounts for all wagers from the daily tote reports, and compiles them up to produce a cumulative report. A permitholder’s pool amounts are also reported to the Division directly by the permitholder in monthly pari-mutuel reports, and annual financial statements. The monthly reports and annual financial statements are reviewed by the Division’s revenue section. Since simulcast export wagers are not taxed by Florida, the Division’s monthly report and annual financial statement forms do not include simulcast export wagers as part of the facility’s handle. Due to the combination of low overall handles, and tax credits available for net operating losses, jai alai facilities (as opposed to cardrooms operating therein) do not generate any tax revenues for the state. Thus, the only revenues derived by the state from jai alai facilities are the $40 per game daily license fees and 15-percent admission tax required by section 550.0951. The parties stipulated that the Third District Court of Appeal considered only live wagers and intertrack wagers in its analysis of whether the “smallest play or total pool within the county” included only wagers physically placed within Miami- Dade County, as reflected in the Court’s opinion in South Florida Racing Association v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, So. 3d , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11334, 2015 WL 4546935 (Fla. 3d DCA July 29, 2015).3/ If simulcast export wagers are excluded from a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, SFRA had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2012/2013 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are included in a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Magic City Jai Alai) had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2012/2013 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are excluded from a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, SFRA had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2013/2014 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are included in a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, Summer Jai Alai Partnership had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2013/2014 state fiscal year.4/ If simulcast export wagers are excluded from a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, SFRA had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2014/2015 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are included in a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, Summer Jai Alai Partnership had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2014/2015 state fiscal year. Regardless of whether out-of-state simulcast export wagers are included in the calculation of facilities’ “play or total pool,” a single pari-mutuel facility (either SRFA or Summer Jai Alai Partnership) had the smallest play or total pool within Miami-Dade County for the consecutive 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 state fiscal years. The Division did not notify West Flagler of any apparent errors or omissions in its July Application. The Division did not request that West Flagler provide any additional information with its July Application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that West Flagler Associate, Ltd.’s, June 30, 2015, and July 1, 2015, applications for new summer jai alai permits be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2016.
The Issue Whether proposed rules 61D-7.021(5)(f) and 61D-7.021(5)(g) are invalid exercises of legislative delegated authority pursuant to Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004),2 and, if so, whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Calder is a Florida corporation and a pari-mutuel permitholder permitted and licensed by the Department pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. Calder seeks to challenge proposed amendments to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.021. Specifically, Calder challenges Subsection (5)(f), as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 30, Number 32, August 6, 2004, and Subsection (5)(g), as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 30, Number 21, May 21, 2004.3 The challenged amendments shall be referred to as the "Proposed Rules." The Proposed Rules provide: For tickets cashed more than 30 days after the purchase of the ticket, the ticket may not be cashed at any type of patron- operated machine or terminal. The totalisator system must be configured to instruct patrons on how to cash the ticket. The totalisator system must have the ability to identify such tickets and indicate to a teller that the ticket falls within this category. Calder is a licensed and permitted pari-mutuel facility which sells tickets and uses totalisator machines, and the Proposed Rules would govern the operation of such facility. The Proposed Rules have the effect of directly regulating the operation of Calder's pari-mutuel facility, and, as such, Calder is substantially affected by the Proposed Rules. The parties have stipulated that Calder "may properly challenge both Proposed Rules 61D-7.021(5)(f) and 61D-7.021(5)(g)." A pari-mutuel ticket evidences participation in a pari-mutuel pool. A winning or refundable pari-mutuel ticket belongs to the purchaser and may be claimed by the purchaser for a period of one year after the date the pari-mutuel ticket was issued. An "outs" or "outs ticket" is a winning or refundable pari-mutuel ticket which is not redeemed. If a ticket remains unclaimed, uncashed, or abandoned after one year from the date of issuance, such uncashed ticket escheats to the state unless the ticket was for a live race held by a thoroughbred permitholder such as Calder, in which case the funds are retained by the permitholder conducting the race. A totalisator machine is "the computer system used to accumulate wagers, record sales, calculate payoffs, and display wagering data on a display device that is located at a pari- mutuel facility." § 550.002(36), Fla. Stat. The Department was prompted to begin the rulemaking process for the Proposed Rules by two major cases involving fraud, one Florida case and one national case. The Florida case involved two totalisator employees named Dubinsky and Thompson, who allegedly accessed outs ticket information in the totalisator's central computer system, counterfeited outs tickets based on the information, and cashed the tickets at self-service machines at two pari-mutuel wagering facilities. The fraudulent conduct involved approximately $13,000. In the Florida case the fraudulent tickets were cashed several months after the tickets were said to have been issued. The fraud came to light when the ticketholder who held the true ticket attempted to cash the ticket, but could not because the fraudulent ticket had been cashed. The national case also involved a totalisator employee who cashed fraudulent outs tickets. In the national case, the fraudulent tickets were cashed less than 30 days after the date the tickets were purportedly issued. The purpose of the Proposed Rules is to deter the cashing of fraudulent tickets. The Department received comments from AmTote International, a totalisator company, at the rule workshop held during the rulemaking process and received written comments submitted by AmTote International after the workshop, indicating that the majority of tickets are cashed within six to nine days after the date of issuance. The older a ticket gets the less likely it becomes that the ticket will be cashed, and the less likely that it becomes that the cashing of a fraudulent ticket would be revealed by the true owner attempting to cash the ticket. Staff of the Department felt that by requiring that outs tickets older than 30 days be cashed by a live person, a thief would be deterred because he would be dealing with a person rather than a machine. The only thing that the self- service machine requires to redeem a ticket is a bar code, so it would be possible to submit a ticket containing nothing but the bar code and receive a voucher which could be submitted to a teller for money.4 If the fraudulent ticket looks different in anyway from a valid ticket, a teller may be able to spot the difference and question the transaction. Calder argues that the way to deter the fraud which has occurred is to stop totalisator employees from being able to print fraudulent tickets. However, the Department is also concerned about computer hackers potentially getting into the computer system which contains the outs tickets numbers and copying the bar code which could be submitted to a self-service machine. By regulating the method of cashing outs tickets, the Department is attempting to deter fraud by totalisator employees and others who may be able to access outs tickets information which could be used in producing counterfeit tickets. During the rule making process, the Department held a workshop, received written comments from the public, and held a hearing to receive comments from the public after the Proposed Rules were first noticed. The Department considered the comments it received and modified the Proposed Rules as noticed in the Notice of Change published on August 6, 2004, to accommodate some of the comments. Calder did not submit a good faith, written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative within 21 days after the notice of the Proposed Rules was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on May 21, 2004, or after the Notice of Change was published.
Findings Of Fact On September 20, 1977, Victor Sosa, at the time an employee of petitioner, and Leroy Patten, then as now a field agent for the Department of Commerce, visited respondent's premises. A Mr. Chavez told the investigators that Jose Isidro Guillamo, respondent's sole corporate officer, was not on the premises and could not be reached. In response to Mr. Patten's questions, Mr. Chavez said he was ignorant of details about respondent's workmen's compensation insurance. Mr. Sosa asked Mr. Chavez to produce invoices reflecting purchases of alcoholic beverages. Mr. Chavez replied that most of the invoices were at an accountant's office, but joined Mr. Sosa in looking for invoices behind a counter at which customers sat. In the course of the search, Mr. Sosa noticed a clipboard hanging from a nail. The clipboard contained guest checks used as lottery slips. Nearby drawers yielded paper napkins similar employed. The search never uncovered any invoices on the premises. At no time did petitioner give respondent permission to store invoices off the premises. On September 20, 1977, and continuously until March 20, 1978, respondent did not maintain in force workmen's compensation insurance for its employees. On September 20, 1977, no notice of workmen's compensation insurance coverage was posted on the premises.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for thirty days and thereafter until respondent shall secure compensation for its employees in accordance with Section 440.38 (1), Florida Statutes (1977). DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis E. LaRosa, Esquire The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 La Dominicana Corporation d/b/a La Dominicana Restaurant c/o Jose Isidro Guillama and Mario Cartas 1416 San Marco Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, William L. Taylor, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $605.95 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. At hearing, petitioner agreed that his claim should be reduced by $300.00 to take into account a settlement offer in that amount received from Passport. By way of background, Passport's assets and liabilities were assumed by Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc. (Incentive) in June 1991, and its status as a corporation was dissolved sometime in late 1991. However, Incentive continued to sell Passport's travel certificates after the merger of the two corporations, and all travel described in those certificates was protected by Passport's bond. In response to an offer in a local newspaper for a "bargain trip" to the Bahamas, on June 25, 1991, petitioner mailed a cashier's check in the amount of $605.95 payable to Incentive Internationale Travel, a telemarketeer in Tennessee using a name almost identical to Incentive and who was operating under the auspices of Open Door, Inc. (Open Door), another telemarketeer whose business location is unknown. Open Door had purchased approximately 1,000 travel certificates from Passport for resale to the public. Passport had agreed to honor and fulfill all travel certificates sold by Open Door or its agents. The travel certificates carried the name, address and logo of Passport. During his discussions with the telemarketeer, petitioner was never told that his requested travel dates might be unavailable. Had he been so advised, he would not have purchased the certificates. After receiving his travel certificates, on September 10, 1991, petitioner mailed them with a check in the amount of $270.00 to Passport. He requested that his travel begin on Monday, November 25, 1991. That date was critical because he wished to celebrate his 50th wedding anniversary in the Bahamas. On September 30, 1991, Passport advised petitioner by letter that it could not honor his request for travel on November 25, 1991, and offered alternative dates. He was also offered the option of receiving a refund of his money. Petitioner immediately requested a refund. When petitioner received a refund of only $270.00, and not the $605.95 previously paid to the telemarketeer, he filed a complaint with the Department. On November 20, 1991, Incentive advised petitioner that because Open Door had gone out of business, and Passport had never received the $605.95 paid to the telemarketeer, it had no obligation to make a refund of the remainder of his money. Sometime later, however, Incentive sent to petitioner a check in the amount of $300.00 in an effort to settle the case. Petitioner deposited the check but claims he is still owed $305.95.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted in the amount of $305.95. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: William L. Taylor 185 Tower Lakes Lake Wales, Florida 33853 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is authorized to charge and collect interest from Respondent, Florida Gaming Centers, Inc., on the unpaid value of the outsbook for the 1995-1996 meet from August 29, 1997, the date payment of the value of the outsbook was due, to September 8, 1998, the date payment was received by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent held a permit to conduct jai alai pari-mutuel wagering, under License No. 2909-D Amended, issued by the Department. Between July 1, 1995, and June 30, 1996, inclusive, Respondent held jai alai games for the purpose of conducting pari-mutuel wagering on those games. Respondent's meet for the relevant time period ended on June 30, 1996. One year and sixty days after the end of the State of Florida's (State) fiscal year of June 30, 1996, any "out" tickets that remained uncashed escheated to the State pursuant to Section 550.1645(2), Florida Statutes. Once these tickets or the value thereof escheated to the State, Respondent was required to pay the value of such tickets, as reflected on its outsbook, to the Department no later than August 29, 1997. Pursuant to the outsbook prepared by Respondent, the value of the outs for the 1995-1996 meet was $108,221.20. Nonetheless, Respondent failed to submit to the Department the value of the balance of the outsbook within the prescribed time frame and instead held these funds. On June 2, 1998, the Department served an Administrative Complaint on Respondent, alleging that Respondent had failed to timely submit the value of the outsbook to Petitioner. By letter dated September 4, 1998, Respondent submitted to the Department a check for $109,128.60 as payment for the unpaid value of Respondent's outsbook for the 1995-1996 meet. The Department received Respondent's payment on September 8, 1998. Of the total amount Respondent paid over to the Department, $108,221.20 was credited against the unpaid value of the outsbook for the 1995-1996 meet, resulting in full payment of the outstanding outsbook value. The remaining $907.40 paid by Respondent to Petitioner was an overpayment. Petitioner alleges that Respondent is responsible for interest accrued on the unpaid value of the outsbook for the period of time that amount remained unpaid. According to the Department, the interest owed by Respondent as a result of its failure to timely remit the value of the outsbook, "shall be determined at a rate per annum . . . equal to the State's average investment rate for the preceding month to the month for which interest is being calculated." The average interest rate earned on the investment of State funds as determined by the State Treasurer and/or Comptroller" for the time period of August 1997 through August 1998, was 6.73 percent. The Department determined that the interest "shall accrue on the unpaid aggregate principal amount due the State for the month(s) from the respective due date." Based on its calculations and after deducting Respondent's overpayment of $907.40, the Department asserts that Respondent owes the Department approximately $6,573.85 in accrued interest. Respondent disputes that the Department has authority to collect interest on the unpaid amount of the outsbook and alleges the powers of the Department under Section 550.0251, Florida Statutes, do not include such authority.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that (1) an administrative fine of $1,000.00 be imposed against the Respondent for the violation Section 550.1645, Florida Statutes; and, (2) Respondent shall receive a credit of $907.40 toward payment of the administrative fine. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William P. Cagney, III, Esquire 3400 Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Eric H. Miller, Esquire Chief Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Has Respondent Try Fresh Produce, Inc. (Try Fresh) made proper accounting to Petitioner Green Grassing Company, Inc. (Green Grassing) in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Try Fresh from November 13, 1994, through December 9, 1994, by Green Grassing to be handled by Try Fresh as agent for Green Grassing on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Green Grassing was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statute, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Try Fresh was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8839 issued by the Department, supported by bond number BD 0694273 in the amount of $75,000, written by Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company with an inception date of September 23, 1994, and an expiration date of September 22, 1995. Green Grassing delivered certain quantities of agricultural products (squash) to Try Fresh during the fall and winter growing season of 1994-95. However, it is the accounting of the squash that was delivered between November 13, 1994, and December 9, 1994, inclusive, that is in dispute. It was verbally agreed between Try Fresh and Green Grassing that Try Fresh would act as Green Grassing's agent in the sale of the squash delivered to Try Fresh for the account of Green Grassing on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity of squash or size of squash delivered by Green Grassing to Try Fresh during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Try Fresh for handling the squash, including but not limited to the commission charged by Try Fresh. There is some disagreement concerning the quality of the squash delivered by Green Grassing. However, none of the witnesses had personal knowledge as to the quality of the squash delivered by Green Grassing. Upon delivering the squash to Try Fresh, Green Grassing was given a numbered delivery receipt listing Green Grassing as owner of the squash showing the number of cartons delivered, the date delivered, the initials of the employee receiving the squash and the kind and size of squash delivered. On most of these receipts there were four blank squares located just above the line for the date on the receipt. Starting from the left side of the receipt, the squares represent average, below average, poor and very poor quality, respectively. It was the responsibility of the employee receiving the squash for Try Fresh to place a check mark in one of the squares to indicate the quality of the squash upon delivery. Only the accounting for the squash from delivery receipt ticket numbers 086 dated November 13, 1994; 005 dated November 15, 1994; 017 dated November 16, 1994; 047 dated November 17, 1994; 451 dated November 18, 1994; 463 dated November 19, 1994; 500 dated November 23, 1994; 501 dated November 25, 1994; 397 dated December 5, 1994, and 329 dated December 9, 1994, is being contested in this proceeding. The delivery receipts being contested are included in Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 and Respondent's composite exhibit 1. A compilation of those delivery receipts is attached to the Complaint in Petitioner's composite exhibit 2. Once Try Fresh found a market for the squash, a pre-numbered billing invoice was prepared by Try Fresh showing its customer's name and the quantity, description and price of the squash sold. In any given sale, the quantity of the squash sold may include squash furnished by Green Grassing and other producers. Therefore, under description on the billing invoice Try Fresh would show the size and type of squash being sold, the initials of the producer, the quantity of squash being sold for that producer and the producer's receipt number for example, med. s/n GGI 68/086. In its accounting to Green Grassing, Try Fresh prepared a statement which included the delivery receipt number, the quantity of squash sold, description of the product, i.e. med, s/n squash, the price per carton of squash and the total amount for the quantity sold. The statements also noted when a certain quantity of a squash had been transferred to another ticket number or if a trouble memo number (T number) was involved in a particular sale. Payment for the squash was made by Try Fresh to Green Grassing from these statements. Sometimes payment was for only one delivery receipt while at other times for several delivery receipts for different dates. The statements are included as part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. Petitioner's composite exhibit 4 is the Florida Vegetable Report, Volume XIV, Nos. 21 - 25 and 27 - 39, dated November 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 1994 and December 1, 2, 5 - 9, 1994, which establishes prices paid during this period of time for small and medium straight neck squash. The report does not list prices paid for large straight neck squash. There is no evidence that the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh by Green Grassing during this period of time was the same quality of squash from which the prices in the report were derived. On November 13, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 32 cartons of small, straight neck squash (sm s/n squash), 145 cartons of medium, straight neck squash (med s/n squash), and 42 cartons of large, straight neck squash (lg s/n squash) to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 086 dated November 13, 1994, showing Green Grassing as owner of the squash. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 086 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 13, 1994. There is no dispute as to accounting of the 145 cartons of medium, straight neck squash reflected on delivery receipt 086. Try Fresh's statement of accounting to Green Grassing dated November 25, 1994 (page 5 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) indicates that the 32 cartons of small , s/n squash listed on receipt number 086 were transferred to receipt number 258 with the price left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. The next entry concerning these 32 cartons of squash appears on a statement dated December 2, 1994 (page 13 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) with the price left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. The next entry concerning these 32 cartons of squash appears on an undated statement (page 21 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) with reference made to trouble memo (T number 0040) with the price is left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. There is no further reference to these 32 cartons of squash (delivery receipt 086, ticket 258 or T number 0040) in the statement of accounting. There is no evidence that Green Grassing was paid for the 32 cartons of sm s/n squash as reflected by delivery receipt number 086. There is no indication on billing invoice number 065562 that the 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 were included in the 240 cartons of sm, s/n squash shipped to Georgia Vegetable Co. as was the normal practice by Try Fresh as set out in Finding of Fact 7. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to show that the 32 cartons of squash were found to be below quality by a federal inspection (Certificate No. M-460187-8) on November 17, 1994, which resulted in Try Fresh receiving a reduced price of $1.71 per carton as shown on T number 0017 (trouble memo). This amount was paid to Green Grassing as shown by statement of accounting dated December 23, 1994, (see page 28 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). However, those 32 cartons of squash were identified as transfer ticket number 259 which relates to delivery receipt number 005 dated November 15, 1994, not delivery receipt number 086 (see pages 9 and 13 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has failed to account to Green Grassing for the 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash delivered on November 13, 1994, as reflected by delivery receipt number 086. Based on the prices Try Fresh billed and was paid for sm, s/n squash by its customer (including sm s/n squash belonging to Green Grassing) during this period, a price of $8.00 per carton would be reasonable price. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing for 32 cartons of sm s/n squash at $8.00 per carton for a total of $256.00. Try Fresh's statement of accounting dated November 25, 1994, (page 5 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) shows 10 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 as being transferred to ticket number 258 with a note of trouble memo (T number 0036) with the price left open and no payment to Green Grassing. The same page of the statement shows 21 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 being dumped due to poor quality without payment to Green Grassing. The same page shows 11 cartons of lg, s/n squash being transferred to ticket number 258 without any explanation or payment to Green Grassing. These 11 cartons are accounted for at $2.00 per carton for a total of $22.00 on page 21 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. There is no evidence (testimony, trouble memo or federal inspection) to show why the 11 cartons of squash brought only $2.00 per carton when lg s/n squash from delivery ticket number 086 were billed out at $8.00 per carton on November 19, 1994 (see billing invoice number 065593). Likewise, there was no evidence as to who purchased these squash. Try Fresh's billing invoice number 065593 shows 50 cartons of lg, s/n squash being billed to G & B at 8.00 per carton which included 10 cartons of lg, s/n squash belonging to Green Grassing from delivery receipt number 086. Trouble Memo (T number 0036) shows a problem with the 50 cartons of lg, s/n squash shipped to G & B Produce on November 19, 1994, and reported on November 23, 1994, which resulted in the price being reduced to $2.50 per carton. Although sketchy, Respondent's accounting for the 10 cartons of squash on T number 0036 and the 21 cartons of squash dumped is sufficient. However, there is insufficient accounting for the 11 cartons of squash. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $6.00 per carton, the difference between the billed price of $8.00 per carton and the $2.00 per carton paid, for 11 eleven cartons of squash for a total of $66.00. On November 15, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 198 cartons of med, s/n squash and 118 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as evidence by delivery receipt number 005 dated November 15, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 005 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 15, 1994. There is no dispute as to 98 cartons of med, s/n squash and 9 cartons of sm, s/n squash. Try Fresh paid $1.00 per carton for the balance of 100 cartons of med, s/n squash listed on delivery receipt number 005 that is in dispute on February 3, 1995, by check number 2217 (see pages 35 and 36 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). However, there is no evidence to show that at the time these med, s/n squash were received by Try Fresh's customer, who allegedly reduced the price to Try Fresh, that the squash was of inferior quality and would demand a price of only $1.00 per carton when those same squash brought an average of $11.00 per carton from other Try Fresh customers. Try Fresh has failed to make a proper accounting for the 100 cartons of med, s/n squash. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing the difference of $10.00 per carton for 100 cartons of squash for a total amount of $1,000.00. The 99 cartons of sm, s/n squash reflected on delivery receipt number 005 that are in dispute were paid for by Try Fresh at the rate of $10.40 per carton for 77 cartons and $1.71 per carton for 32 cartons. Although 77 cartons were billed out at $12.00 per carton (see billing invoice number 065592), there is sufficient evidence (T number 0022) to support the reduction in price to $10.40 per carton. However, there is insufficient evidence to show the reduction in price to $1.71 per carton for the 32 cartons. Try Fresh has failed to make proper accounting for the 32 cartons. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $8.69 per carton, the difference between $10.40 per carton that was paid for the 77 cartons and the $1.71 paid for the 32 carton for a total amount of $278.08. On November 16, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 64 cartons of med, s/n squash and 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 017. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 017 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 16, 1994. On November 25, 1994, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $12.00 per carton for 21 cartons of med, s/n squash and $12.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash by check number 1447 as shown on pages 4 through of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. However, page 28 of Petitioner's composite exhibit shows a zero amount for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash reference to delivery receipt number 017. This is apparently an error, as is T number 0033 (Trouble Memo). Try Fresh also paid $12.00 per carton for the 43 cartons of med, s/n squash by check number 2009 dated January 6, 1995 (see pages 31 and 32 of Petitioner's composite exhibit number 5). There has been proper accounting by Try Fresh of the squash reflected by delivery receipt number 017. On November 17, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 93 cartons of sm, s/n squash and 161 cartons of med, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 047. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt 047 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 17, 1994. Only the accounting of the 93 cartons of the sm, s/n squash is disputed. On November 18, 1994, Try Fresh billed out 13 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 047 to Georgia Vegetable on billing invoice number 065592 at $12.00 per carton. Try Fresh was advised by Georgia Vegetable of a problem. Trouble memo (T number 0022) was prepared by Try Fresh which indicated that after working with Georgia Vegetable a price of $10.40 per carton was agreed upon. Green Grassing was paid $10.40 per carton (see page 30 of Petitioner's composite exhibit number 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of these squash. On November 19, 1994, Try Fresh billed out 80 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 047 to Phil Lucks on billing invoice number 65596 at an undetermined price (the price had been redacted on the billing invoice). Although trouble memo (T number 0032) indicates a problem (brown & decay) with 100 cartons of sm, s/n squash shipped on November 22, 1994, there was no evidence that these were the same squash billed on billing invoice number 065596. Try Fresh has failed to present sufficient evidence to show why these squash did not bring the same price the other sm, s/n squash on delivery receipt number 047 brought. Try Fresh has failed to properly account for these 80 cartons of squash. Therefore, Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $10.40 per carton for 80 cartons of squash for a total of $832.00. On November 18, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 33 cartons of lg, s/n squash, 41 cartons of med, s/n squash and 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as evidenced by delivery receipt number 451 dated November 18, 1994. The delivery receipt indicates that the squash was of very poor quality when delivered. The 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash was billed to T & M at $6.00 per carton. Although there is a trouble memo (T number 0025), it appears that Green Grassing was paid $6.00 per carton for these 20 cartons of squash. There is no evidence that these squash were of the same quality as those referenced in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time which could demand a price of $12.00 per carton as argued by Green Grassing. Furthermore, Green Grassing has produced no evidence that Try Fresh received $12.00 per carton for these squash. Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. The 33 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery ticket number 451 required re-grading by Try Fresh. After re-grading, 16 cartons were not fit for sale. The 17 cartons of lg, s/n squash remaining after re-grading were sold by Try Fresh for $6.00 per carton. This amount was paid to Green Grassing by check number 1812 dated December 23, 1994, (see pages 27 and 28 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the 33 cartons of squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. The 41 cartons of med, s/n squash from delivery ticket number 451 was invoiced at an undetermined price (priced appeared to be redacted from the invoice) on billing invoice number 065582. Trouble memo (T number 0033) indicates that the 41 cartons of med, s/n squash from billing invoice number 065582 were brown and decayed and were rejected by Lucks. Try Fresh has made proper accounting of these 41 cartons of squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. On November 19, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 54 cartons of med, s/n squash and 3 lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 463. The delivery receipt indicates that the squash were of poor quality when delivered to Try Fresh on November 19, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting of the 54 cartons of med, s/n squash. On December 2, 1994, by check number 1568, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $16.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 for a total of $400.00 (see pages 12 and 15 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). On January 5, 1995, by check number 2009, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $4.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 for a total of $100.00 (see pages 31 and 32 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). On December 2, 1994, by check number 1568, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $1.00 per carton for 7 cartons of sm, s/n squash for a total of $7.00 from delivery ticket number 463. Try Fresh has paid Green Grassing a total of $507.00 for the sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463. However, thirty two cartons of sm, s/n squash at $16.00 per carton would total $512.00. Since there is no evidence to support a price less than the $16.00 per carton paid by Try Fresh on December 2, 1994, Try Fresh owes a Green Grassing a balance of $5.00. There is sufficient evidence to show that the 3 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 were re-graded and none were salvaged. Other than the $5.00 above, Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 463. On November 23, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 16 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 44 cartons of med, s/n squash and 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 500 dated November 23, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on November 23, 1994. There is no dispute as to the 16 cartons of sm. s/n squash or the 44 cartons of med, s/n squash. The 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt 500 were sold to American Growers by Try Fresh for $4.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065628 dated November 25, 1994. Green Grassing was paid this amount by Try Fresh (see pages 19 and 23 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 500, notwithstanding the prices listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On November 25, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 18 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 68 cartons of med, s/n squash and 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 501 dated November 25, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on November 25, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting for the 18 cartons of sm, s/n squash or the 68 cartons of med, s/n squash. The 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash were sold to American Growers for $4.00 per carton by Try Fresh as reflected in billing invoice number 065628 dated November 25, 1994. Green Grassing was paid this amount by Try Fresh (see pages 19 and 23 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 501, notwithstanding the price listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On December 5, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 68 cartons of med, s/n squash and 16 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in the delivery receipt number 397 dated December 5, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on December 5, 1994. The 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash were sold on December 6, 1994, at $8.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065749 dated December 6, 1994. Sixteen cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold on December 6, 1994, to K & M South for $8.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065003 dated December 6, 1994. Twenty seven cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold to Tom Lange Co. for $10.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 9, 1994 with customer order no. 23- 4020. Twenty five cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold to G & B for $10.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 10, 1994, with customer order number 8130. Sixteen cartons of lg, s/n squash were sold to Erenbaum for $5.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 6, 1994 with customer number 9472. Although these prices are below prices quoted in the Florida Vegetable Report for December 6 - 9, 1994, for small and medium s/n squash (no prices quoted for large, s/n squash), the prices are consistent with prices Try Fresh was receiving during this same period for small, medium and large s/n squash that it handled for other producers. Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 397, notwithstanding the prices listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On December 9, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 31 cartons of med, s/n squash and 17 lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 329 dated December 9, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on December 9, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting of the 2 cartons of small and 31 cartons of medium squash. The 17 cartons of large, s/n squash were billed to Erenbaum in billing invoice number 065035 dated December 9, 1994. It appears that the price originally billed to Erenbaum's was redacted and zero per carton written on billing invoice. A federal inspection was called for and the squash were found to be below quality. This resulted in a zero return on the squash. Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 329. From a review of Try Fresh's records placed into evidence that its accounting to Green Grassing was not always in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes. Particularly, there was no record of the quality of the squash, no explanation of the adjustments to the original price, or if an explanation was given, it was not clear and no record of when payment was received by Try Fresh from the purchaser making it difficult to determine the timeliness of the accounting of the sales and payment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Try Fresh Produce Co., be ordered to pay Petitioner Green Grassing Co., Inc. the sum of $2,437.08. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1532A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted jointly by the Respondents Aetna and Naples in this case. Both Petitioner Green Grassing Co., Inc. and Respondent Try Fresh Produce, Co. elected not to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as allowed under Section 120.57(1)(b)(4), Florida Statutes. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Ragon Barnett, III 6 East Broadway Street Ft. Meade, Florida 33841 Hank Cord Post Office Box 995 Zolfo Springs, Florida 33890 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Respondent violated Subsection 112.3148(8), by failing to report a $2,606.25 gift of Disney World and Universal Studios tickets on a Quarterly Gift Disclosure Form, CE Form 9; and (2) if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the proceedings, Respondent, Alan Keen, served as chairman of the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Chapter, Part III, Florida Statutes, Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions as chairman of the Expressway Authority. See §§ 112.311(6) and 112.313, Fla. Stat. In April 2006, Respondent was contacted by a family friend, James Stanley, who resides in Costa Rica. Mr. Stanley indicated that his father-in-law was paying for the family, consisting of four children and eight adults, to travel to the Orlando area in the Fall of 2006 and requested that Respondent see if he could obtain theme park tickets for their use. Mr. Stanley called Respondent and asked him to obtain theme park tickets so that the tickets could be in-hand prior to Mr. Stanley and his family arriving in Orlando. This request was made purely for the purposes of convenience.2 Respondent has known Mr. Stanley for more than 20 years and considers to him to be a friend. Mr. Stanley described Respondent as his mentor and a close friend. Respondent and Mr. Stanley and their respective families socialize and have visited with each other in the United States and in Costa Rica. Mr. Stanley never asked for or expected Respondent to obtain free theme park tickets. In fact, it was Mr. Stanley's understanding and belief that his father-in-law, Rodrigo Esquivel, was going to pay all the costs associated with the trip. Respondent contacted Bryan Douglas, the then director of marketing for the Expressway Authority and asked Mr. Douglas if he had access to complimentary tickets to Universal Studios and Disney World theme parks.3 In response to this request, Mr. Douglas told Respondent that he did not know if he had access to complimentary tickets, but indicated that he would check. As chairman of the Expressway Authority, Respondent had no supervisory authority over Mr. Douglas and never signed any of his paychecks. Approximately two or three weeks after his initial telephone call to Mr. Douglas, Respondent requested that his personal assistant, Sherry Cooper, follow-up on whether Mr. Douglas had any success in obtaining any complimentary tickets. Respondent understood that Ms. Cooper, at the request of Mr. Douglas, had inquired of Mr. Stanley how many adult and how many children tickets were needed. In 2006, Ronald Pecora was the owner of Pecora and Blexrud, a marketing communications and public relations firm that had a contract to do work the Expressway Authority. In or about May 2006, Mr. Pecora became aware of the request for theme park tickets from Christy Payne. Ms. Payne was the representative of Pecora and Blexrud who was assigned to work with the Expressway Authority. According to Mr. Pecora, Ms. Payne reported to him that she was contacted by Mr. Douglas, the marketing director for the Expressway Authority in regard to theme park tickets. Based on the above-referenced conversation between Mr. Pecora and Ms. Payne, it was his (Mr. Pecora's) understanding that the subject theme park tickets were for Respondent. However, Mr. Pecora had no idea who would be using the theme park tickets and never spoke to Respondent about those tickets. During Mr. Pecora's conversation with Ms. Payne regarding the theme park tickets, he authorized her to purchase the theme park tickets with her corporate credit card. As a result of Mr. Pecora's authorization, a total of 12 theme park tickets having a value of $2,606.25 were purchased using the Pecora and Blexrud credit card. At the time Mr. Pecora authorized Ms. Payne to purchase the 12 theme park tickets, he anticipated being repaid for the tickets. Mr. Pecora's actions after he received the theme park tickets and the invoice for the purchase of those tickets are consistent with that belief and expectation. In mid-May 2006, the 12 theme park tickets and receipt for payment invoice ("invoice") were delivered to Mr. Pecora's business address in Winter Park, Florida. The invoice indicated that the $2,606.25 payment for the theme park tickets had been charged to Mr. Pecora's credit card.4 A few days after receiving the tickets and invoice, Mr. Pecora had one of his employees deliver the theme park tickets and the original invoice for those tickets to Keewin Properties. The reason Mr. Pecora sent the invoice to Keewin Properties, whose principal was Respondent, was so that the recipient would know how much to pay him for the tickets. At the time that Mr. Pecora had the theme park tickets and invoices sent to Keewin Properties, he knew that Respondent was the owner of that business. At or near the time Mr. Pecora directed his employee to deliver the theme park tickets and invoice for those tickets to Keewin Properties, he memorialized that transaction. In a hand-written note dated May 18, 2006, Mr. Pecora indicated that the original invoice had been sent to Keewin Properties. Mr. Pecora understood that theme park tickets were not for official business purposes of the Expressway Authority. Accordingly, he did not send the invoice for the theme park tickets to the Expressway Authority, but to Respondent's privately-owned business. On or about mid-May 2006, Respondent received the theme tickets and the invoice that were delivered to him in a small brown envelope. When he received the tickets, Respondent was surprised that Mr. Pecora was involved in obtaining the tickets because he had merely asked Mr. Douglas whether he had access to complimentary theme park tickets. However, Respondent was not surprised to have received an invoice. Upon receipt of the tickets, Respondent telephoned Mr. Stanley and advised him that he had obtained the theme park tickets and the invoice for the purchase of those tickets. Because Respondent would be in Costa Rica in a few weeks, he told Mr. Stanley that he would deliver the tickets and the invoice when he arrived in Costa Rica. As he had promised, a few weeks after speaking to Mr. Stanley, Respondent traveled to Costa Rica and, while there, personally delivered the theme park tickets and the invoice to Mr. Stanley. When Mr. Stanley received the theme park tickets and the invoice, he reviewed them. Soon thereafter, Mr. Stanley gave both the tickets and the invoice to Mr. Esquivel. Prior to giving the tickets and the invoice to Mr. Esquivel, Mr. Stanley highlighted the name of the individual printed on the invoice who was to be paid for the tickets. On or about September 23, 2006, Mr. Stanley and his family, including Mr. Esquivel, began their visit to the Orlando area. During this trip, the theme park tickets were used by Mr. Stanley's family. Respondent did not use any of the theme park tickets. Mr. Esquivel did not pay for the theme park tickets prior to the time that Mr. Stanley's family used the theme park tickets. About ten days after Mr. Stanley's family, including Mr. Esquivel, returned to Costa Rica from Orlando, Mr. Esquivel suffered a stroke. As a result of the stroke, Mr. Esquivel was hospitalized for about a week, but later returned to most of his usual activities. Respondent first learned that the theme park tickets had not been paid for in December 2006, after reading an article in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Until that time, Respondent had assumed that Mr. Stanley or his father-in-law had paid for the theme park tickets. Soon after reading the above-referenced newspaper article, Respondent called Mr. Stanley to ask if they had paid for the theme park tickets. Mr. Stanley told Respondent he believed that his father-in-law had paid for the tickets, but indicated that he would check on the matter. Upon checking, Mr. Stanley determined that his father-in-law had not paid for the tickets. Based on his personal knowledge of his father-in-law, Mr. Stanley concluded that his father-in-law simply forgot to pay for the tickets.5 Soon after discovering that Mr. Esquivel had not paid for the theme park tickets, Mr. Stanley also learned that criminal proceedings related to the theme park tickets were pending against Mr. Pecora. Therefore, Mr. Stanley, in consultation with his attorneys, decided that payment for the theme park tickets should be made after the criminal proceedings were over. About a month prior to this proceeding, Mr. Stanley received wiring instructions from Mr. Pecora's attorney. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Stanley wired the full payment for the theme park tickets to Mr. Pecora's attorney, on behalf of Mr. Pecora. Mr. Stanley's father-in-law gave him the funds which were wired to Mr. Pecora's attorney. Respondent did not file a Quarterly Gift Disclosure, CE Form 9, regarding receipt of the theme park tickets. The reason Respondent did not file a Quarterly Gift Disclosure Statement was that the theme park tickets were not for him and were not used by him. Therefore, Respondent did not believe that the tickets were a gift. Mr. Pecora, the procurer of the theme park tickets, did not consider the theme park tickets as a gift. Moreover, he never intended to make those tickets a gift.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a final order and public report finding that Respondent, Allen Keen, did not violate Subsection 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Complaint filed against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th of November, 2009.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent issued a voucher ticket without obtaining cash or cash equivalent in exchange, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.020(5)(b); had adjudication withheld on felony charges involving larceny, in violation of section 849.086(6)(g), Florida Statutes (2014); or was ejected from Gulfstream Park, in violation of section 550.0251(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint; and if so, what is the appropriate sanction.1/
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering and cardrooms in the state of Florida, pursuant to chapter 550 and section 849.086. On April 27, 2014, Mr. Havey was licensed by the Division and was working at Silks mutuels window number 607 at Gulfstream Park, a facility authorized to conduct pari-mutuel wagering and cardroom operations. At the end of the day on April 27, 2014, Mr. Havey's cash drawer did not balance. After a review of surveillance tapes and other information, Mr. Jorge Aparicio, a security director with Gulfstream Park, decided to investigate further. On May 2, 2014, when Mr. Havey returned to work, he was interviewed by Mr. Aparicio about the missing money. Mr. Havey initially stated that he accidently printed out a voucher for $5,000.00 for his friend Darren, when he had intended to punch the voucher for only $500.00. He said that Darren was supposed to give him the money at the end of the day. Later, Mr. Havey stated he really printed out the voucher for $5,000.00, placed it in his right shirt pocket, and gave the voucher to his friend Eddy inside the men's restroom for his friend to cash. Later that day, Mr. Havey prepared a written statement regarding the money missing from his cash drawer. He wrote: My friend Eddy needed 500. loan because I told he was being thriten. I offer to help Eddy by giving him 500 vocher. Eddy told me he would pay me back in a week. Eddy didn't want to come to my window #607. Eddy asked me to meet in the bathroom. I punched a $500 vocher I thought but it ended being a $5000. vocher. I gave him the vocher & never saw Eddy again. I planded on browing the five hundred from my friend to put $500. back in my money so I would balance, but[.] Mr. Aparicio testified that Mr. Havey could not give a last name or address for his friend and noted that the name of the friend given by Mr. Havey changed during the course of the interview. After the interview, Mr. Aparicio called the president of Gulfstream Park and described what had taken place. He was directed to call the police and to exclude Mr. Havey from the property indefinitely. As reflected in the Security Report, Mr. Havey was "excluded indefinitely" from Gulfstream Park on May 2, 2014. This action did not necessarily bar Mr. Havey from the park permanently, for the president could allow him to return, but he was excluded unless and until the president took further action. This "indefinite" exclusion constituted an ejection from Gulfstream Park. When Mr. Havey left the investigation room, the Hallandale Beach Police were there. Mr. Havey testified that they did not ask him a single question, but immediately placed him under arrest and handcuffed him. On August 21, 2014, Mr. Havey entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of grand theft in the third degree in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Broward County, Florida. Adjudication was withheld. He was placed on 24 months' probation, with the condition that he pay Gulfstream Park $4,500.00 in restitution within 18 months. At hearing, Mr. Havey admitted he issued a voucher ticket without receiving cash or cash equivalent in return. He also testified that he pled no contest with the understanding that if he paid $4,500.00 restitution to Gulfstream Park, the charges would be "disposed of," and his record would be clear. Clear and convincing evidence shows that on April 27, 2014, Mr. Havey issued a voucher ticket without receiving cash or cash equivalent in return; that he was ejected from Gulfstream Park on May 2, 2014; and that he pled nolo contendere to grand theft in the third degree on August 21, 2014, with adjudication withheld. Mr. Havey testified that he has been involved in pari- mutuel wagering in various parks, in dog racing, and Jai Alai for 40 years. He stated that the incident was "out of his character," that it was drug and alcohol related, and that he was not thinking clearly. He testified that he could barely remember what had happened on that "dark day" in his life. He said that he sought treatment and is now on the way to full recovery. Mr. Havey expressed remorse for his actions. Mr. Havey testified that he is now working part time at Mardi Gras Casino in Hallandale. He has performed well and has not been in any trouble there. He noted, however, that he is only making $10.00 per hour, rather than the $25.00 per hour he was making at Gulfstream Park. He lamented that it is extremely difficult to "keep a roof over your head" on only $250.00 a week and that he needed to work for a few more years. He stated that his wife should shortly be receiving money for a disability claim and that when she did so, he would pay Gulfstream Park full restitution. He testified that he hoped that the president of Gulfstream would then let him return. No evidence of prior discipline was introduced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order: (1) finding that Mr. Patrick M. Havey was in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.020(5)(b), was ejected from a pari-mutuel facility, and had adjudication withheld on a felony involving larceny; and (2) revoking his pari-mutuel occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2016.
