The Issue Whether petitioner's employment from January 13, 1975 to January 24, 1977, was creditable service for purposes of calculating retirement benefits under applicable statutes and rules? Whether respondent is estopped to deny that this period of employment amounted to creditable service, where respondent's personnel twice advised petitioner it was, and petitioner continued working for Escambia County for some three years in reliance on this advice?
Findings Of Fact 12 In late 1974, Escambia County operated under the CETA program which was operated by the county under three separate programs known as Title I and Title II, and then later under Title VI. Title I was an on-the-job training program which provided training to individuals in jobs that were in addition to the regular employment positions already maintained by the County. Title II was an employment program for targeted groups of persons. At the beginning of the Title II program, the County paid retirement contributions on behalf of some of those participants. However, when it was advised that this was improper, it stopped such payments and refunded those contributions to some of the participants. Title VI was a program to employ as many people as possible. The positions were funded with Federal grant money and were considered public service employment positions for a limited tern. The County administered the program which eventually included about 300 participants. Payment of all CETA participants was made from a special sub-account (set up for this purpose) of the salary account. Mr. Wayne Peacock, currently Assistant County Administrator who was directly involved in the CETA program during its entire existence, testified that none of the participants who worked for the County occupied regularly established positions, or were in budgeted positions and none were paid from county budgeted salary funds. Mr. Little's employment file stated that he was hired in January, 1975, as a Title VI CETA participant and that no record showed payment of any retirement contributions on his behalf. Mr. Little testified that retirement contributions were deducted from his first four (4) paychecks, but thereafter stopped. Ruth Sansom, the Division representative, testified that the Division records as provided by the County reflected that the County began payment of retirement contributions on Mr. Little in January, 1977, and that there was no evidence or record that contributions had been paid from January, 1975, to January, 1977. Mr, Little submitted the Minutes of Escambia County for (inter alia) February 11, 1975, which showed numerous individuals hired as "manpower: laborers and four (4) men hired as "manpower planning aides". Included in that latter group was Mr. Little. Ms. Sansom testified that she checked the retirement records of several persons in the first group and all four (4) persons in the latter group. None of the persons had received creditable service for the employment, and the Division had no record of contributions having been paid. The evidence shows that Mr. Little was employed as a CETA participant and was not a county employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a resident of Florida and resides at 306 Sweetwater Cove Boulevard, North, Longwood, Florida 32779. Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, is an agency of the State of Florida located at Cedars Executive Center, Building C, 2639 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32303. Intervenor is a resident of 5448 San Luis Drive, Orlando, Florida 32807. The agency action challenged by the Petition is the determination that the continuing monthly retirement benefit available under Option 4 of the Florida Highway Patrol Pension Plan, which provides for a continuing monthly benefit to the "spouse" of the retiree shall be paid to the person who was the spouse at the time of the retiree's retirement, not the individual who was the spouse of the retiree at the time of the retiree's death. Petitioner was not married to Florida Highway Patrol retiree Jack E. Walden on the date of his retirement, which was November 1, 1972, but was the legal spouse of Jack E. Walden at the time of his death on January 9, 1985. Florida Highway Patrol retiree Jack E. Walden was married to Barbara C. Walden on the date of his retirement; however, subsequently on January 22, 1976, Barbara Walden and Jack Walden were divorced. Thereafter, on February 6, 1976, Jack Walden married Marilyn S. Walden and she remained his spouse during the following nine years until his death. Petitioner has sought to be paid a "surviving spouse" or other benefit available from the Florida Highway Patrol pension plan, however, the Agency has determined that any benefit must be paid to the former spouse of Jack E. Walden, not Petitioner. Intervenor, Barbara C Yeater, was married to Jack E. Walden on January 19, 1949. She was his spouse during the entire time of his service with the Florida Highway Patrol, at the time of his retirement in 1972, and until dissolution of their marriage in 1976. In September, 1972, prior to his retirement, Jack E. Walden designated Barbara Walden as his beneficiary under the Highway Patrol Retirement System. (Exhibit 1)2 On June 27, 1975, Respondent received Exhibit 2,3 but did not respond to it. At the time Exhibit 2 was received by Respondent, it was the Division of Retirement policy that a retiree who had selected Option 4 under Chapter 321, F.S., could not change the previously selected recipient of survivor benefits subsequent to retirement and cashing of the first warrant. A copy of Exhibit 2 was not sent to Barbara Yeater. There was no further communication from Jack E. Walden to Respondent concerning changes in beneficiary or option selection after June 27, 1975. There was an exchange of correspondence between Respondent and Barbara Yeater (Exhibits 3, 4 and 5),4 but copies of that correspondence were not sent to Jack E. Walden. The Petition and final judgment of dissolution between Jack Walden and Barbara Yeater are Exhibits 7 and 8 in evidence. The subject retirement benefits were not disposed of in the final judgment of dissolution. The monthly benefit payable to Jack E. Walden's surviving spouse is $622.00 plus cost-of-living adjustments. Decedent retired with 21.60 years service, which produced an initial benefit of $475.91. Jack E. Walden believed, at the time of his death, that he had accomplished the change in beneficiary which he sought to carry out by filing Exhibit 2 with Respondent. This fact is based on the absence of any reply by Respondent rejecting the proposed change, by Decedent's failure to make other arrangements for Marilyn Walden, by not seeking to modify the alimony payments awarded to Intervenor, and by his statements to Petitioner and to his friend, George Watson, indicating his belief that the change had been effected, and, finally, by the fact that Respondent accepted and thereafter utilized the change of address contained in the change of beneficiary notice. Respondent relied on the Arnow case5 in its decision to award the continuing benefits to Intervenor on the death of Jack E. Walden (discussed below).
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order awarding continuing retirement benefits to Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1985.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive Florida Retirement System (FRS) benefits from her deceased spouse’s retirement account, pursuant to FRS Option 3 (lifetime monthly benefit to joint annuitant).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lettie Jones, is the wife of FRS member, James Jones, and a designated beneficiary of his FRS account. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency with the responsibility to administer the FRS. Background Findings Mr. Jones applied to the State of Florida for disability retirement on July 13, 1994. On his application, Mr. Jones noted that the “[m]uscles in [his] feet and legs [were] deteriorating.” In response to a question regarding any other physical impairments, Mr. Jones answered, “Losing strength in right hand.” The record does not reflect the effective date of Mr. Jones’ retirement. Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in April 1996. On January 27, 1997, Mr. Jones obtained from the state an “Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits” listing the approximate monthly benefit payment amounts for all four FRS payment options. On that date, Mr. Jones also obtained Form 11o, the FRS retirement benefit election option form, and Form FST 12, the FRS beneficiary designation form. On March 18, 1997, Mr. Jones executed Form 11o, choosing Option 2 for payment of his monthly retirement benefits, and Form FST 12, designating Petitioner as primary beneficiary, and his daughter as contingent beneficiary, of his retirement account. Form 11o provides the following explanation of Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 payments. No further benefits are then payable. Form 11o requires the spouse’s signature acknowledging the member’s election of Option 2. The spousal acknowledgment section appears in a box on Form 11o following the description of Options 1 and 2. The first line inside the box reads, in all capital letters, “THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2.” On March 18, 1997, Petitioner signed the box on Form 11o acknowledging her husband’s election of Option 2. Mr. Jones received more than 120 monthly retirement benefit payments prior to his death in 2013. Petitioner’s Challenge Petitioner alleges that Mr. Jones lacked the capacity to make an informed election of benefit payments on March 18, 1997, because he had reduced cognitive function. Both Petitioner and her daughter testified that they accompanied Mr. Jones to the FRS office on March 18, 1997, but were not allowed to “go back” with him when he met with an FRS employee to select his retirement option and execute Form 11o.2/ Petitioner admitted that she did sign the box on Form 11o, which acknowledges spousal election of Option 2, but testified that the form was blank at the time her husband presented it to her for signature. Petitioner signed the spousal acknowledgment on Form 11o the same day her husband executed the form. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than the testimony of her daughter, that Mr. Jones suffered from reduced cognitive function on March 18, 1997. The fact that Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in 1996 is insufficient evidence to prove that he lacked the mental capacity to make an informed retirement option selection on the date in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the relief requested in the Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The central issues in this case are (1) whether Petitioner is eligible for membership in and retirement benefits from the Teachers' Retirement System; and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to receive as a refund contributions paid by his employing agency and, if so, how much and at what interest rate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, currently sixty-six years old, was employed as a professor of economics and finance at the University of South Florida (USF), Tampa, Florida, from September 1965 through August 31, 1981, when he terminated employment. As a member of the teaching faculty, Petitioner automatically became a compulsory member of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) and remained a member throughout his tenure at USE. When Petitioner originally enrolled in the TRS in September 1965, he signed an enrollment form entitled "Teachers' Retirement System of Florida, Enrollment Blank New Teachers." The form provided general information concerning the TRS, and included information about contributions, service credit, and service retirement benefits under the TRS. The enrollment form provided in part the following: I understand that the full amount of deductions from my compensation for annuity purposes with compound interest will be returned to me if I leave the service without a retirement benefit or will be paid to my beneficiary if I die in active service. At all times relevant hereto, the TRS required that members make contributions of six-quarter percent of their total salaries to their retirement accounts. Of this amount, six percent went into the TRS member's retirement account and the quarter percent was allocated to the Survivors' Benefits Fund. In addition to the contributions made by TRS members, employers were required to contribute matching funds to the TRS Retirement Fund. While employed at USF, the prescribed six quarter percent of Petitioner's salary was deducted, with six percent appropriately posted to his TRS retirement account. During the time Petitioner was employed at USF, the employer contribution paid by USF to match Petitioner's contribution was $23,846.06. Had Petitioner remained a member of TRS, he would have been eligible to begin receiving benefits in February 1993. While employed at USF, Petitioner was given the option to transfer from the TRS to the newly created Florida Retirement System on five different occasions: December 1970; June 1971; July 1972; January 1975; and January 1979. Through information disseminated by Respondent, TRS members were notified that by transferring to the "new" Florida Retirement System, they would become mandatory members of the federal Social Security System. Petitioner chose to remain in TRS rather than transfer to the Florida Retirement System, thereby foregoing membership in the federal Social Security System. In August 1981, prior to his normal age of retirement, Petitioner terminated his employment with USF and requested that Respondent refund Petitioner's retirement contributions. In making the request, Petitioner completed and signed a form entitled, "Request for Refund," FRS M81. Completion of this form is a requisite for receiving retirement refunds and applies to members of any of the Florida retirement systems. The Request for Refund states: I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement Systems. I do waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. On the reverse side of the Request for Refund card, is the following: Under the provision of the Florida Statutes, a member MUST terminate employment before he can obtain a refund. * * * The refund process may be started upon receipt of this application. It may be necessary to issue a second refund after all payrolls on which a member's name appears are received and audited by the Retirement System Office. A member who has ten or more years of creditable service has a vested interest in retirement and may leave his contributions on deposit indefinitely and qualify for deferred retirement. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the Division refunded $22,153.10 to Petitioner in October 1981. The refund, which was provided in three warrants, included all employee contributions and earned interest posted to Petitioner's retirement account as of the date of the refund. Petitioner's refund was provided in three separate warrants because the system in place, in 1981, was incapable of generating a single check for an amount in excess of $9,999.99. In late 1995 or early 1996, Petitioner called the Division of Retirement to inquire about his benefits under the TRS. Petitioner made after this call after he reviewed his Social Security wage earning history and learned that no contributions had been posted to his Social Security account during the sixteen years he had been employed at USF. Upon reviewing the Petitioner's request, Respondent discovered that $1,692.96 remained in Petitioner's TRS account. Of the amount remaining in Petitioner's account, $292.63 represented Petitioner's employee contributions, and $1,400.33 was earned interest. Respondent's failure to refund Petitioner's $292.63 and the interest earned thereon as soon as these moneys were posted to Petitioner's account was the result of an unintentional accounting error. Under the procedures used by the Division at that time, Petitioner's most recent employee contributions were not posted to his account until November or December 1981. The interest earned on Petitioner's employee contributions were not posted to Petitioner's account until the end of the 1981/1982 fiscal year. This matter is addressed in the Request for Refund which notified members that "it may be necessary to issue a second refund" after all payrolls on which the member's name appears have been posted. After discovering this inadvertent accounting error, Respondent initially agreed to refund Petitioner the outstanding $1,692.96. Subsequently, the Division of Retirement agreed to pay Petitioner $1,692.96 plus six a-half percent interest from October 1981, for a total amount of $4,088.31. The six and a- half percent interest rate is the current rate established by Respondent. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, Respondent has not yet refunded Petitioner's outstanding employee contributions and interest, pending the culmination of this proceeding. At the time Petitioner completed and signed the Request for Refund, it was his intention to obtain all of his contributions and interest. It was not until Petitioner's inquiry in 1995 or 1996 that he became aware that a small amount of his employee contributions and interest thereon had not been refunded. Petitioner believes that because Respondent did not refund all moneys due him, some $1,692.96, he retained membership in the TRS and is now able to retire from that system with a partial benefit. Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to receive as a refund, all contributions paid into his retirement fund, including the contributions paid by USF. According to Petitioner, his understanding and belief in this regard is based on an explanation provided to him by Dr. John Milliken, the Dean of the College of Business at USF. Petitioner's understanding in this regard was not correct. At some point prior to Petitioner's terminating his employment at USF, he reviewed a Summary Plan Description (SPD) which was issued by the Division of Retirement in 1980. One section of the SPD, Refund of Contributions, provides in relevant part: If a member terminates employment he may elect to receive a refund of all the contributions he has made to the retirement system, except those made to the Survivors' Benefit Trust Fund. Furthermore, the first paragraph of the Summary Plan Description states: This brochure contains basic information on the Teachers' Retirement System, established by Ch. 238, Florida Statutes. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the Teachers' Retirement System and should not be used in place of the law on questions of interpretation and appli-cation. Any question which are not answered by this brochure may be addressed to the Div. of Retirement, . . . . Based on Petitioner's reading of the provision of the SPD quoted in paragraph 20 above, it was his "judgment" and "impression" that any refund prior to retirement, would include both employee and employer contributions and the interest on these contributions. At no time did Petitioner verify his interpretation with the Division of Retirement or the USE Personnel Office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Petitioner, John C. Deiter, is (1) ineligible for retirement benefits under the Teachers' Retirement System and (2) is not entitled to receive employer contributions and interest thereon. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELDK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Murray B. Silverstein, Esquire POWELL, CARNEY, HAYES and SILVERSTEIN, P.A. Barnett Tower One Progress Plaza, Suite 1210 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Stanley M. Danek, Senior Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Petitioner's retirement benefits should be suspended pursuant to Section 121.091(9)(c) , Florida Statutes. Petitioner appeared at the hearing unaccompanied by counsel or other representative. His rights in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chanter 120, F.S., were explained to him and he elected to represent himself in the matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Theron J. Owen was employed by the Department of Transportation, State of Florida, for a period of 13 years, and made contributions under the applicable retirement system during that period. On March 1, 1977, at the age of 56, he retired under the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with a monthly benefit of $88.79. (Testimony of Petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Petitioner was reemployed by the Department of General Services as a security guard at the State Office Building in Winter Park, Florida, on Nay 19, 1978. In December, 1978, Respondent received from Petitioner an executed Form FR23 "Application of Retiree for Suspension of Retirement Benefit and Return to Service" wherein he advised the Director of Retirement of his employment with the Department of General Services and that he had reached 500 hours of reemployment on August 15, 1978. Petitioner previously had provided verbal notice of his reemployment to Respondent in November, 1978. (Respondent's Exhibits 1-2) Petitioner's retirement benefits were suspended by Respondent in November, 1978, pursuant to Section 121.091(9) Statutes. However, December, benefit was inadvertently paid to Petitioner. During the period August- December, 1978, Respondent received $314.70 in retirement benefits. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Parties) Petitioner elected to take "early" retirement, but obtained reemployment with the state for financial reasons. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the state, but has been unable to obtain a loan to repay the overnayments. He has not received retirement benefits during 1979. He is of the opinion that the statutory provision which limits a retired state employee to state benefits only during the first 500 hours of reemployment with the state shows a punitive intent on the part of the legislature to prevent retired personnel from returning to gainful state employment. During his one-year tenure with the Department of General Services, he has been promoted and received an "above-satisfactory" performance rating. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent suspend payment of retirement benefits to Petitioner until restitution has been made of excess benefits paid in the amount of $314.70, plus accrued interest at 10 percent compounded annually from date of receipt of such excess benefits until date of repayment. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Theron J. Owen 818 San Juan Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent Francis Thompson's interests in the pension plan are forfeited under the law, whether he should be required to repay all monies received less accumulated contributions, and whether Respondent Patricia R. Thompson's interest in the plan is forfeited upon the forfeiture of the rights of her former husband.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The City of Daytona Beach (City) is a municipal corporation created as a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Petitioner, Board of Trustees of the City of Daytona Beach Police and Fire Department Pension Fund (Board), was established by Special Act of the Legislature in 1959, as amended in 1965. The Board is responsible for administering the City's police and fire department retirement plan (plan) and paying benefits to eligible participants subject, however, to the requirements of Chapter 112, Part VII, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Francis Thompson, is a plan participant, having retired as a police officer with the City of Daytona Beach Police Department on September 24, 1994. His dates of service are from July 31, 1972, to July 30, 1977, and from June 19, 1983, to September 24, 1994. Under the terms of the plan, upon retirement, Francis Thompson was entitled to $1439.84 per month in retirement benefits. Sometime prior to his retirement, however, his marriage to Patricia R. Thompson was dissolved. As a part of the settlement between the parties, Francis Thompson agreed to transfer a portion of his benefits (48.75% had he retired on January 31, 1992), but not to exceed a total liability of $31,000.000, plus twelve percent simple interest on the unpaid balance computed from January 31, 1992. This agreement is embodied in a Domestic Relations Order entered on March 30, 1993, by the Circuit Court, in and for Volusia County, Florida. Although the City was never given notice of this proceeding nor an opportunity to participate, the order reflects that a copy of the same was served upon the plan administrator. Notwithstanding the above action, Section 10 of Sub-Part D of the City Code provides that "the right of a person to a pension . . . shall be unassignable." In other words, Francis Thompson was prohibited from assigning his plan benefits to another person. Faced with a court order which directed the City to pay a portion of the benefits to a third party, the plan administrator consulted with the City's legal counsel, who advised the adminstrator to "follow the intent" of the court's order and begin paying a portion of the benefits to the former wife. It is noted, however, that Patricia R. Thompson did not receive an interest in the plan by the court's order; rather, she obtained entitlement to a portion of the benefits of a plan member. Between September 1995 and the end of November 1997, Patricia R. Thompson has received $24,199.32 in benefits. As of the same date, Francis Thompson received a total of $55,333.18 in benefits. Based upon a belief that Francis Thompson had been convicted of a specified offense related to conduct prior to his retirement, on August 5, 1997, the Board initiated this proceeding for the purpose of terminating all of his rights and benefits under the plan and requiring him to return $42,655.20, plus all distributions, if any, made subsequent to June 1997. Because Patricia R. Thompson is now receiving a portion of her former husband's benefits, she was also named as a party. Between 1987 and 1994, Francis Thompson was evidence custodian and in charge of the evidence and property room for the City of Daytona Beach Police Department. In that position of special trust, he was responsible for keeping all weapons, drugs, moneys, and other property seized or held by the Police Department. The position of evidence custodian was a position that required the City to trust that the custodian would properly perform his responsibilities and duties. It is undisputed that during his tenure as evidence custodian, Francis Thompson removed multiple firearms from the evidence and property room and shipped them to another person in the State of Pennsylvania for personal use. The Police Department could not find any evidence that the firearms had been properly logged or recorded for removal in accordance with proper protocol. By engaging in this conduct, Respondent violated the City's trust. On June 27, 1996, Francis Thompson was convicted of multiple felony violations of the United States Code in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Case No. 2:95CR00232-1. One of these offenses was "shipping stolen firearms in interstate commerce." Because the offense involved the commission of a theft by a public employee from his employer, it constituted a "specified offense" as defined by Sections 112.3173(2)(e)2. and 6., Florida Statutes (1997). The conviction for a specified offense calls for forfeiture of all retirement benefits under Section 112.3173(2)(e)2., Florida Statutes (1997). Finally, it is noted that the illicit activity occurred while Respondent was employed as evidence custodian with the City's Police Department. Throughout his term of employment with the City, Francis Thompson made accumulated contributions to the plan totaling $29,173.21. As of November 30, 1997, the plan administrator had distributed plan benefits in the amount of $79,532.50, or $50,359.29 more than contributions. At hearing, Respondent's present wife, Patricia B. Thompson, testified on his behalf. Her testimony was limited to a request that, due to financial and health problems incurred by her incarcerated husband, the undersigned appoint counsel on his behalf. That request was denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the City of Daytona Beach Police and Fire Department Pension Fund enter a final order determining that Francis Thompson's interest in the plan, including past payments made and future benefits payable by the plan, less accumulated contributions shall be forfeited by the Board pursuant to law; that all persons deriving an interest through his interest in the plan, including his present and former wife shall forfeit all future payments from the plan upon the issuance of a final order; and that Francis Thompson shall pay back to the Board all payments in excess of his accumulated contributions in such manner as the Board may determine. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret T. Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 832 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32170-0832 David D. Fuller, Esquire 220 South Ridgewood Avenue Suite 210 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Francis Thompson Registry Number 17952-018 Eglin Air Force Base Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 32542 James C. Maniak Plan Administrator City of Daytona Beach Post Office Box 2451 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2451
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has forfeited her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the record in this proceeding, including the evidence presented at the formal hearing and the stipulation of the parties in the Joint Response to Pre-hearing Order, the following Findings of Fact are made: The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Florida Division of Retirement is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Florida Department of Management Services. For over 21 years, Ms. Painter was the head softball coach for Gulf Coast, an FRS-participating employer. By virtue of her employment, Ms. Painter was enrolled in the FRS. On May 5, 2014, the Bay County Sheriff’s Office commenced an investigation into allegations that Ms. Painter had misappropriated cash that had been provided to her to pay for players’ meals during a softball tournament in Las Vegas and that Ms. Painter was collecting and keeping rent money from softball players who were on full room-and-board scholarships and had their rent paid by the college. In the summer of 2014, Ms. Painter was charged by information with one count of grand theft, a third-degree felony. Gulf Coast did not terminate Ms. Painter’s employment. Gulf Coast allowed Ms. Painter’s employment contract to expire on June 20, 2014. On January 9, 2015, the information was amended to include seven counts of grand theft, each constituting a third degree felony under section 812.014(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014). Though some counts dealt with other allegations, for the purposes of this proceeding, the essential charges involved the meal money and the rental payments. Ms. Painter ultimately entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of grand theft. During the hearing before the court, the state attorney specified that Ms. Painter was pleading to Count IV, which alleged theft of the meal money. The contemporaneous notes taken by the court clerk state that Ms. Painter was pleading to “Count 4.” The order of probation states that she pled to “Count 4.” However, the actual written “Plea, Waiver and Consent” signed by Ms. Painter and the attorneys shows the numeral “1” under the heading, “Count.” It is unclear from the document whether Ms. Painter was pleading nolo contendere to one count of grand theft, or to Count I of the information. Count I involved the allegation that Ms. Painter had improperly collected rent from one of the scholarship players, Megan Griffith. At the circuit court hearing, no mention was made of the specific factual allegations in the count to which Ms. Painter was pleading. The court made no findings of fact. Ms. Painter was not required to allocute to any facts.2/ Upon entry of the nolo contendere plea, the court withheld adjudication. Ms. Painter was given two years’ probation and ordered to make restitution of $4,400, perform 100 hours of community service, and was directed to have no contact with Gulf Coast or her former players. The undersigned finds that the understanding of all parties, including the court, was that Ms. Painter was pleading nolo contendere to Count IV of the information. The amount of restitution ordered is roughly consistent with the amount of meal money that was at issue in Count IV. The numeral “1” on the plea document is either a misprint or was intended to convey that Ms. Painter was pleading to a single count of grand theft. At the final hearing, Ms. Painter testified that she was given $4,752 in cash to pay for meals during the Las Vegas trip, which began on January 31, 2014, and ended on February 4, 2014. Ms. Painter testified that if the girls were splitting up to eat at different restaurants, she would dole out cash to each group. If everyone was eating at the same restaurant, all the girls would place their orders, and Ms. Painter would pay the entire tab. Ms. Painter testified that this had been her practice on team trips for some time. She stated that she used to give each girl her portion of the total meal money at the start of a trip. However, some girls would inevitably spend all of their money before the end of the trip and Ms. Painter would have to pay for their meals out of her own pocket. By doling out the money one meal at a time, Ms. Painter ensured that it would last the entire five days. Ms. Painter denied keeping any of the meal money for herself. She admitted that she did not keep receipts from each meal she purchased, but testified that meal receipts were not required on multiple day trips, such as the Las Vegas tournament. Nothing she did on this trip was different than her usual practice. At the end of the trip, she returned $132 in unspent meal money to the athletic department. Ms. Painter testified that her nolo contendere plea was made for financial and emotional reasons. The case had dragged on for 17 months. The ordeal was humiliating and exhausting. She stated that accepting the plea deal was the hardest decision she had ever made, but that she did not in fact take any of the meal money from her softball players. The Department offered no admissible direct evidence to contradict Ms. Painter’s version of events. The undersigned did not admit the deposition of Gulf Coast Athletic Director Gregg Wolfe because it was a discovery deposition taken in Ms. Painter’s criminal case. The undersigned did admit the Bay County Sheriff’s Office case file on Ms. Painter’s criminal case, which included witness interviews and Ms. Painter’s bank statements. However, the case file was admitted on the understanding that it was a hearsay document that could only be used to supplement or explain other evidence. In the absence of competent non-hearsay evidence, or any showing by the Department that elements of the case file would be admissible over objection in a civil trial, the case file was of no utility. The Department’s only witness aside from Ms. Painter was its employee Allison Olson, the benefits administrator in the Bureau of Retirement Calculations. Ms. Olson’s knowledge of the case was gleaned purely through her review of the paper record, including the case file and the transcripts of depositions taken in the criminal proceeding. She had no first- hand knowledge of any of the events in question. Ms. Painter offered the deposition testimony of Joanne Booker, a member of Ms. Painter’s softball team at the time of the Las Vegas trip and currently an assistant basketball coach for Gulf Coast. In most essentials, Ms. Booker corroborated Ms. Painter’s testimony. Ms. Booker did not recall many particulars as to how the meals were purchased, but testified that at each meal the players were either given cash by Ms. Painter or had their meals paid for by Ms. Painter. Ms. Booker recalled no problems as to meals and recalled no one complaining about food on the Las Vegas trip. Even if it were found that Ms. Painter’s plea was actually entered as to Count I, the findings would be much the same. Ms. Painter testified that the “rent” she was accused of collecting and pocketing from the scholarship players was actually a voluntary contribution toward the rent of the non- scholarship players, to enable the entire team to live together in the same apartment complex. Ms. Painter testified that any money she collected was turned over to the lessor of the apartments. Again, the Department offered no admissible direct evidence to contradict Ms. Painter’s version of events. Ms. Painter’s testimony was at least credible enough to be accepted in the absence of any competent non-hearsay evidence to the contrary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order restoring to Susan Painter her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System and providing for payment to her of any past due benefits, together with interest at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2018.
The Issue On April 11, 1996, the undersigned Hearing Officer entered a Final Order in City of St. Petersburg v. Division of Retirement, Case No. 95-5089RU, finding that certain non-rule policies of the DIVISION OF RETIREMENT violated the provisions of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. In light of legislation being considered by the 1996 Legislature, certain issues asserted by the Petitioner under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, were not resolved at the time of the entry of the Final Order in Case No. 95-5089RU. The CITY OF PALATKA, the TOWN OF LANTANA, and the CITY OF LARGO (CITIES), Petitioners in the above-referenced consolidated cases now seek a determination that the Respondent, the DIVISION OF RETIREMENT (DIVISION), may not subsequently enforce the non-rule policies which in case No. 95-5089RU were found to be in violation of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. Petitioners further seek a determination that such non-rule polices, having been determined to be rules within the meaning of Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, are invalid under the provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The ultimate issues in these cases are: 1) whether certain agency statements made by the Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, regarding the application of the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, to pension plans for municipal firefighters and police officers are "rules" as defined by Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes; and, 2) if so, whether the agency statements impermissibly enlarge, modify, or contravene the statutory provisions of Chapter 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and therefore constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the issues in these cases relate to the criteria required of local law pension plans by the Legislature to qualify for the distribution of premium tax monies. Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, provide for pension plans for firefighters and police officers, and authorize two types of pension plans. "Chapter plans" are created by state law, and "local law plans" are created either by special act of the Legislature or by municipal ordinance. The gist of the petitions filed by the CITIES in these cases is that the DIVISION is attempting to impose, without express statutory authority, the same requirements relating to terms, conditions, and benefits on local law plans that the DIVISION requires of chapter plans. Specifically, the alleged non-rule policies of the DIVISION of which the CITIES complain are: 1) the definition of "credited service"; 2) the definition of "average final compensation"; 3) the disallowance of a Social Security offset and worker's compensation benefit offset; 4) the interpretation of "disability retirement"; and 5) the prohibition on prospectively reducing pension benefits to coincide with future available funding. As set forth below, the requirements specified by the Legislature for local law plans to receive premium tax monies have been the subject of extensive litigation. In rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of these statutes, the Court in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, 528 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) stated: Chapters 175 and 185 create a purely voluntary program whereby municipalities may receive state-collected taxes, imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums, with which to fund retirement programs for local police and firefighters. In exchange for receipt of these funds, the legislature has established certain criteria under which the funds must be operated and managed. Id. at 469. The dispute in these cases once again focuses on ascertaining what specific criteria the Legislature has established for the operation and management of such local pension plans in order to determine whether a local law plan complies with the applicable statute for purposes of receiving state-collected tax funds. Petitioners, CITY OF PALATKA, TOWN OF LANTANA, and CITY OF LARGO, take the position that Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, has made non-rule policy statements, and required compliance therewith, which go beyond the specific and express criteria established by the Legislature for participation in the program. Petitioners contend that such statements are "rules" which unlawfully enlarge, modify, or contravene the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and therefore violate the provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners further contend that even though the DIVISION pursuant to Section 120.535(5), Florida Statutes, has, subsequent to the filing of these cases, promulgated proposed rules embodying these non-rule polices, the polices nonetheless may not be retroactively applied to deny the Petitioners their premium tax monies for calendar year 1995 to which they are otherwise entitled. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, takes the position that the DIVISION has complied with the provisions of Section 120.535(5), Florida Statutes, and may apply the non-rule policy statements which are now proposed rules to require compliance from the Petitioners. The DIVISION further contends that the non- rule policy statements, which have now been promulgated as proposed rules, merely construe and apply the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, in the manner intended by the Florida Legislature, and therefore are not invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The validity of the proposed rules which were promulgated by the DIVISION on July 12, 1996, is the subject of two separate pending administrative challenges brought pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and filed on July 30, 1996, by the Florida League of Cities and the City of St. Petersburg in cases Nos. 96-3560RP and 96-3561.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, the CITY OF PALATKA, is a municipality of the State of Florida which has established a local law plan and participates in the voluntary program to receive state-collected taxes levied on property and casualty insurance with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal firefighters and police officers under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, respectively. Petitioner, TOWN OF LANTANA is a municipality of the State of Florida which has established a local law plan and participates in the voluntary program to receive state-collected taxes levied on property and casualty insurance with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal firefighters and police officers under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, CITY OF LARGO, is a municipality of the State of Florida which has established a local law plan and participates in the voluntary program to receive state-collected taxes levied on property and casualty insurance with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal firefighters and police officers under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT (DIVISION), is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority to administer the voluntary program under which municipalities receive state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund local plans pursuant to Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1993, the Florida Department of Insurance was the state agency responsible for the administration of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. History Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, relating to pension plans for firefighters and police, authorize two types of retirement or pension plans. One type is called "chapter plans" and the other is known as "local law plans." Chapter plans are created under state law, and the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, control the plans' terms, conditions and benefits. Local law plans are purely voluntary and are created either by special act of the Legislature, or by municipal ordinance. The special act or municipal ordinance contain the provisions relating to the terms, conditions, and benefits of the local law retirement plan. Both chapter plans and local law plans receive funds from the state-collected premium tax on property and casualty insurance. The Petitioner CITIES have voluntarily participated on a continuing basis in the program created under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, whereby the CITIES have received state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums with which to fund its local plans for firefighters and police. The CITIES have received such premium tax monies until calendar year 1995. In 1986 the Legislature significantly amended Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. See Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida. Chapter 86-41 pertained to municipal firefighters; Chapter 86-42 pertained to municipal police officers. As indicated above, the constitutionality of these statutes was upheld in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, supra. In Section 1 of each act, the Legislature added substantially the same legislative intent language: Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of firefighters as hereinafter defined, and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal firefighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retirement systems or plans to be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the firefighters' pension trust funds. This chapter hereby establishes minimum standards for the operation and funding of municipal firefighters' pension trust fund systems and plans. After the enactment of Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida, the Department of Insurance undertook rulemaking to implement the provisions of the acts. The City of St. Petersburg and the Florida League of Cities challenged the proposed rules under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Department's proposed rules were upheld by the DOAH Hearing Officer. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the order of the Hearing Officer, and held that the majority of the department's proposed rules were invalid because statutory provisions governing chapter pension plans, which were not made specifically and expressly applicable by the Legislature to local firefighter and police plans, did not preempt municipal power with respect to local law plans. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 540 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) review denied 545 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 1989), [hereinafter referred to as the "Rules Case"]. From 1988 to 1991, the Department of Insurance engaged in litigation with numerous municipalities regarding compliance of local law plans with the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. The Department settled these cases and continued to distribute premium tax funds to these local law plans with the understanding that the disputed issues of statutory compliance would be better resolved through rulemaking. The Department of Insurance conducted staff workshops to discuss rulemaking; however, the Department did not thereafter initiate formal rulemaking under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, with regard to any compliance requirements for local law plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. In 1993 the Legislature transferred statutory responsibility for the administration of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, from the Department of Insurance to the DIVISION. The legislative transfer effected a transfer of all programs as well as personnel. Since the legislative transfer in 1993, the DIVISION has made a continuous and good faith effort to present these issues to the Legislature for clarification and resolution. Indeed, during the 1996 Session, HB 1951 and SB 2484 were introduced which specifically addressed and clarified the issues presented in these cases. On October 19, 1995, the City of St. Petersburg in case No. 95-5089RU filed a Petition challenging certain non-rule policies of the DIVISION under Sections 120.535 and 120.56, Florida Statutes. On April 11, 1996, the Final Order was entered in case No. 95-5089RU, holding that the DIVISION's non-rule policies violated the provisions of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. The Final Order did not resolve the Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, issues. On May 10, 1996, the City of St. Petersburg filed a Notice of Appeal in case No. 95-5089RU as to the Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, issues, and that matter is now pending before the First District Court of Appeal, in case No. 96-1817. As indicated above, HB 1951 and SB 2484, specifically addressing the issues raised in these cases, were introduced during the 1996 Session Florida Legislature. On April 30, 1996, HB 1951 was passed by the Florida House of Representatives, but died along with SB 2484 in the Florida Senate on May 4, 1996. The 1996 Legislature failed to enact any legislation addressing or otherwise clarifying the issues raised in these proceedings. On May 31, 1996, the DIVISION noticed a rules workshop addressing these issues in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On June 12, 1996, the DIVISION disseminated proposed rules. On June 21, 1996, the DIVISION conducted the rules workshop. On July 12, 1996, the DIVISION published proposed rules and amendments, 60Z-1.004, 60Z-1.006, 60Z-1.026, 60Z-1.027, 60Z-1.028, 60Z-2.017, 60Z-2.018, and 60Z-2.019, which address the issues raised in these cases. On July 30, 1996, the City of St. Petersburg, and the Florida League of Cities, pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, filed Petitions challenging the DIVISIONS's proposed rules. The Section 120.54 Petitions are now pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings in cases Nos. 96-3560RP and 96-3561RP. Stipulated Facts The following facts are undisputed by the parties: The DIVISION takes the position that Sections 175.032 and 185.02, Florida Statutes, (Definitions), apply to local law plans, including the definitions of "aggregate years of service" and "salary." It is the position of the DIVISION that firefighters disabled from duties of a fireman as defined in Section 175.032, Florida Statutes, are eligible for disability benefits. It is the position of the DIVISION that local law plan benefits may not be offset by social security or workers compensation benefits. It is the position of the DIVISION that a municipality with a local law pension plan is prohibited from prospectively reducing pension benefits so as to coincide with available funding. The premium tax monies for calendar year 1995 are withheld from each of the Petitioner CITIES by the DIVISION. Prior to 1994 the DIVISION, or its predecessor agency, the Department of Insurance, have never withheld Chapter 175 or 185 insurance tax premium moneys from the CITIES. It is the position of the DIVISION that all municipal pension plans submitted for review must comply with the non-rule policies at issue in the present case in order to receive Chapter monies pursuant to Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the Petitioner CITIES do not fulfill the requirements of Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the Petitioner CITIES do not fulfill the requirements of Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the term "credited years of service" as used in Section 175.351(4) and 185.35(1)(d), Florida Statutes, is to be defined in accordance with the term "aggregate number of years of service" and "aggregate number of years of service with the municipality" under Sections 175.032(1)(a) and 185(1)(b), Florida Statutes, respectively. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 60Z, Florida Administrative Code, to withhold Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax money to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority to release payment of Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax moneys to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes, provided the municipality is making good faith efforts to bring the violations into compliance.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has forfeited her rights and benefits under the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2010).
Findings Of Fact On or about February 11, 1986, Respondent commenced her employment as a police community service officer with the City of Tampa Police Department. As a city employee, Respondent was eligible for, and participated in, the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund, which is a public retirement system. Respondent was continuously employed by the City of Tampa through September 1, 2011. Sometime around May 1994, Respondent was promoted to the position of investigative assistant where she worked closely with a team of detectives. Respondent’s job duties as an investigative assistant included interviewing crime victims, witnesses, and individuals who were suspected of having engaged in criminal activity. As an investigative assistant, Respondent often had access to confidential information, and she understood that confidential information was not to be disclosed to unauthorized individuals. An “officer safety alert” is one such piece of confidential information that Respondent had access to in her position as an investigative assistant, and like other confidential information, Respondent understood that an officer safety alert should only be disclosed to authorized personnel. Officer safety alerts are internal police department missives that are often issued for the purpose of advising officers to proceed with caution when encountering individuals who may be under investigation, but who have not yet been charged with a crime. Around 7:50 a.m. on the morning of January 19, 2011, Respondent’s co-worker, Priscilla Phillips, reviewed an officer safety alert that identified Reginald Dennard Preston as a subject of an ongoing investigation. The officer safety alert contained a picture of Respondent’s nephew, and other individuals, along with the following narrative: The above listed subjects are part of an ongoing investigation. S.I.B./Enforcement Group 2 has purchased firearms from these subject(s) that were taken in a residential burglary. The subjects are still in possession of additional firearms. The subjects are not wanted at this time due to the ongoing nature of the investigation. Use caution when coming into contact with the listed subjects and vehicle. Also use caution if responding to calls at the listed addresses. Due to ongoing investigations, only distribute to TPD Personnel. LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE The information contained within this bulletin is the property of the Tampa Police Department and constitutes active criminal intelligence information, and is exempt from public record. The information has been collected in accordance with 28 CFR Part 23 and Florida State Statute Chapter 119. It is undisputed that Ms. Phillips knew that Mr. Preston was Respondent’s nephew and that within minutes of reviewing the officer safety alert, she sent Respondent a text message regarding the same. Respondent admits that she sent a reply text message to Ms. Phillips within a minute or so of receiving the initial message. During the morning hours of January 19, 2011, Respondent was home from work on sick leave when, according to Respondent, she received a message from Ms. Phillips informing her that Reginald Preston was “wanted for questioning regarding a burglary.” According to Respondent, Ms. Phillips then took a snapshot of Reginald Preston’s photograph and sent it to Respondent without including any other information from the officer safety alert. In other words, Respondent claims that she had no knowledge that Ms. Phillips had gleaned the information regarding Respondent’s nephew from an officer safety alert, and that as far as she knew, the only issue, as conveyed by Ms. Phillips, was that her nephew was “wanted for questioning regarding a burglary.” Respondent’s credible testimony regarding this issue is as follows: Q: Now, when Ms. Phillips contacted you on January 19th of 2011, she informed you that Preston was part of this officer safety alert; right? A: She did not inform me that he was part of an officer safety alert. She advised me that they want[ed] to speak to my nephew in reference to a burglary. She did not mention an officer safety alert to me, sir. Q: But she did inform you that there was an investigation ongoing that had to do with your nephew, Mr. Preston; right? A: She did not mention an ongoing investigation to me, sir. She indicated that they want[ed] to speak to my nephew in reference to a burglary. Q: You knew that there was an ongoing investigation when you spoke to her regarding your nephew; correct? A: I was not at work, sir. I did not see this bulletin. Q: But my question is: Did you know there was an ongoing investigation at that point regarding your nephew? A: If they want[ed] to speak to him in reference to a burglary, it’s an investigation; correct. Q: Is that a yes, you knew there was an ongoing investigation regarding your nephew; correct? A: It was an ongoing investigation. She told me they wanted to speak to him in reference to a burglary. Tr. pp. 84-85. Armed with the information from Ms. Phillips, Respondent, over the course of about two hours, had multiple conversations with her brother (Reginald Preston’s father), her sister-in-law (Reginald Preston’s mom), and her nephew, Reginald Preston. Respondent disclosed to her relatives that Reginald Preston was “wanted for questioning regarding a burglary” and she told them that Mr. Preston (the nephew) needed to go to the police station to address the situation. As part of the investigation of this matter, the police department secured phone records for both Ms. Phillips and Respondent, and according to the testimony of Brent Holder, neither Respondent’s nor Ms. Phillips’ phone records revealed the substance of the text messages sent or received by either individual. Ms. Phillips did not testify at the final hearing. Also as part of the investigation, Brent Holder conducted a recorded interview of Respondent. Neither the recorded statement nor a transcript thereof was offered into evidence. Brent Holder was employed by the Tampa Police Department from 1987 until his retirement in 2013. Mr. Holder was a detective with the police department for many years. Mr. Holder testified that when he interviewed Respondent on August 24, 2011, she admitted to the following: Q: What did you do next? A: I then conducted an interview with Ms. Harvin and showed her the same memo. And during our interview I asked her questions about it, had she had--had she disclosed the information, had she had conversation with Mr. Preston. I will go back on her cell phone records. That morning after she received the text message from Ms. Phillips, there were numerous calls to Ms. Harvin’s brother, who is the father of Reginald Preston, her sister, and there actually were five phone calls to Reginald Preston himself. Q: From Ms. Harvin’s cell phone? A: From Ms. Harvin’s cell phone, yes. Q: And did she admit to all this during her interview? THE COURT: Did she admit to what? A: She admitted to making the phone calls to her brother, and during the conversation with her brother she explained that this was regarding a burglary and some stolen firearms and that Reginald Preston was the subject of this investigation. And then she also in her conversations with Reginald Preston admitted to telling him that it was regarding firearms taken in a burglary, and she said Mr. Preston’s response was, “I didn’t do nothing.” Q: Did she admit to anything else? A: She admitted to having conversation with her sister. Q: Let me ask you this question: Did Ms. Harvin ever deny learning of the officer safety alert? A: She did not. Q: Did she ever deny contacting Mr. Preston? A: She did not. Q: Did she ever deny informing Mr. Preston of the officer safety alert? A: She did not. * * * Q: Did Ms. Harvin admit to knowing that there was an ongoing investigation? A: She did. She admitted knowing it was an ongoing investigation, that this was confidential information, and that it was not to be disclosed outside of the Tampa Police Department. * * * Q: Did Ms. Harvin admit that the reason or the way she found out [about] the officer safety alert was through Ms. Phillips? A: Yes. Tr. pp. 29-31 As noted previously, Mr. Holder interviewed Respondent on August 24, 2011. There is no indication in the record that Mr. Holder’s recollection as to the specifics of his interview with Respondent from nearly five and a half years ago was refreshed, and the undersigned is not persuaded that Mr. Holder independently recalls, with the specificity testified to, the details of his interview with Respondent. Petitioner suggests that Respondent admitted during her deposition that she received a copy of the officer safety alert from Ms. Phillips and disclosed the contents of the alert to her nephew. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, Respondent’s deposition testimony contains no such admission, but does contain an acknowledgement by Respondent that she was confirming “what they wrote up” on the notice of disciplinary action issued to her by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund enter a final order: Finding that forfeiture of Respondent’s benefits under the retirement plan is not authorized pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2010); and Dismissing the petition for forfeiture, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Beverly Harvin 423 Benson Street Valrico, Florida 33594 Luis A. Santos, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Natasha Wiederholt, CPA GE Pension Plan Supervisor General Employee Retirement Fund City of Tampa 306 East Jackson Street, 7th Floor Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.
