The Issue The issue presented here concerns the jurisdiction of the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to pass on the issue of whether the Petitioner, John Jackson, meets the definition of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes; it having been determined that the Department has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner. Secondarily, this Recommended Order considers the question of whether the Petitioner can, through the process of this administrative hearing, controvert the clinical summary dated October 13, 1980, by challenging the findings of that report, even if it has been determined that the Department has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner and the Department is without jurisdiction to enter a final order on the question of whether the Petitioner meets the definition of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Of particular interest on the secondary issue is that part of the report which indicates that the Petitioner still meets the definition of sex offender.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the Petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 5, 1981. Specifically, the Petition asked that a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing be conducted to consider the question of whether the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner John Jackson, who was enrolled in one of the Respondent's sex offender programs at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. The prayer for relief offered by the Petitioner was in keeping with the language of Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977), which states: . . . if the department returns an offender to the court because the department has determined that it has exhausted all treatment of the offender, the court shall remove the offender from the custody of the department. A continuance of the formal hearing scheduled for January 30, 1981, was granted and the final hearing was eventually held on March 3, 1981. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the Petitioner promoted a substantial change to the Petitioner's claim for relief. That change was one which conceded the dispute fashioned in the details of the "Petition for Administrative Hearing," in that the Petitioner and Respondent agree that the Respondent had exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the programs for sex offenders offered in the State of Florida. The Petitioner then attempted to amend his Petition to request that a final order be entered by the Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which decided if the Petitioner continued to meet the definition of sex offender found in Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the Petitioner, in the person of his counsel, attempted to amend the Petition to attack the details of the staff report of October 13, 1980, dealing with the status of the Petitioner's condition with particular emphasis on the finding that Jackson continued to he a sex offender. The Respondent was opposed to the amendment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Respondent to consider these claims, it having been determined that the Respondent had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner and moreover, the Respondent objected to the change in the Petition which did not grant the Respondent sufficient notice to prepare to defend against the accusations. The Respondent's position was found to be meritorious and the reasons for that decision will be discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order.
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, William Thomas Massey, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division or Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 9, 1980. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until February 4, 1981, so that Petitioner might secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called as witness Michael Pomeroy, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital. The Respondent called Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital as its witness. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning March 1, 1979, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period, in fact, no significant change has been observed in the petitioner's sexually deviant condition which dates from 1960. That condition has been diagnosed as homosexuality with a secondary diagnosis of personality disorder, inadequate type. This latter condition is manifested by maladapted behavior in the sense of lack of impulse control, in the sense that the Petitioner has a short temper when matters do not transpire in a fashion that he would approve. Referring again to the Petitioner's participation in the group therapy sessions, he lacks personal involvement. In this connection, the Petitioner has a problem becoming open and honest with the other members of the group, notwithstanding his ability to deal with their problems in the group session. He presents himself superficially to the members of the group, getting along with those members but not letting the group participants get close to him nor he to them. In summary, the Petitioner has cooperated superficially but has not progressed. If the Petitioner remains in the program, he is not expected to progress in group therapy. The Petitioner was placed in the program having been found guilty by jury on a charge of sexual battery on a seventeen year old male. The Petitioner does not acknowledge that he has committed a crime and he has not progressed in dealing with his propensity to commit homosexual acts with younger men. In other words, there has been no basic personality change in the Petitioner. Petitioner, having a past history of alcohol abuse, has participated in and completed the alcohol abuse program for the forensic service at the Hospital. He still participates in the Alcoholics Anonymous program on the ward, is a member of the Jaycees and is a ward representative for grievance matters. The Petitioner has been involved in the ancillary therapies; leather and music in the past, and was involved in wood occupational therapy at the time of the hearing, but his attendance was below average. He lacked interest in that therapy program. The Petitioner also writes articles for the Hospital newspaper. The Petitioner has the freedom of movement on the grounds of the facility that includes walks and attendance at dances. At the November, 1980, staffing conference concerning the Petitioner's case, Petitioner expressed an interest in vocational rehabilitation. The ancillary programs as discussed herein in the absence of progress in the primary treatment modality, i.e., group therapy, will not promote satisfactory progress and change the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment on the patient. On December 11, 1980, the Petitioner's case was presented to the screening committee of Unit Directors of all mentally disordered sex offender units within the State of Florida, and it was the unanimous opinion of those members that the Respondent had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner as a mentally disordered sex offender. This determination comports with the conclusion reached at the staffing conference held at the Florida State Hospital and reported as Respondent's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence, which determined that the facility where the Petitioner was assigned had exhausted treatment. The Petitioner feels like he continues to be helped by the & program and is making progress and has greater self esteem, in addition to being able to relate to others better. Specifically, the Petitioner feels that he is able to control his temper better and has gained an insight into his problem with alcoholism. Nevertheless, the Petitioner would not benefit sufficiently from further hospitalization in the sex offender program, to cause a change in the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for William Thomas Massey, and that said William Thomas Massey be returned to the committing court for further proceedings. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude Arrington, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Second Judicial Circuit 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue Did Respondent, Jennifer Abadie, R.R.T., violate sections 468.365(1)(q), 468.365(1)(x), 456.072(1)(v), or 456.063(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by committing sexual misconduct?
Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 468, Florida Statutes, charge the Board with regulating the practice of respiratory care in Florida. Ms. Abadie is a licensed registered respiratory therapist in Florida. Ms. Abadie worked for Comprehensive Healthcare of Clearwater (Comprehensive) from October 24, 2017, through February 4, 2018, at its Pinellas County, Florida, location. Comprehensive is a residential rehabilitation and nursing facility. Ms. Abadies’s 89-year-old father was a patient at Comprehensive from before she started working there until his death. He suffered from dementia. Ms. Abadie visited her father frequently, before and after her shifts and when she was not working. G.B. was a severely ill patient at Comprehensive trying to recover from multiple strokes. G.B. was only 56 years old. However, he had extensive medical conditions. They included hypertension, congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, diabetes, blindness and end-stage renal (kidney) disease. G.B. received dialysis three times a week for his kidney disorder. He took dozens of medications daily. G.B. also had a tracheostomy. A tracheostomy is a tube that goes into the trachea to help people with impaired breathing breathe. The heavy treatment load weighed on G.B. psychologically and caused him anxiety and depression. Ms. Abadie provided respiratory therapy services to G.B. G.B. recognized Ms. Abadie from an earlier time when she worked at Florida Hospital where he had been a patient. He reminded her of that time and established a friendship with her. Over time, the friendship grew closer. As a result of their friendship and Ms. Abadie's compassion for G.B., Ms. Abadie and G.B. spoke regularly. When Ms. Abadie visited her father, she usually checked on G.B. He and Ms. Abadie talked about the range of subjects that acquaintances talk about including families, children, marital status, holiday plans, and day-to-day lives. They spoke regularly by telephone as well as in person. Although they spoke regularly, Ms. Abadie and G.B. did not always speak at length. Sometimes she just waved and poked her head in to say hello. At G.B.'s request, Ms. Abadie brought him items from outside the facility, such as toiletries and a blanket. G.B. grew very fond of Ms. Abadie and wanted her as his girlfriend and eventually his wife. Ms. Abadie did not encourage or reciprocate these feelings or intentions. Lisa Isabelle was G.B.'s only other visitor. G.B. was a friend of her husband. She had known G.B. for most of their lives. Ms. Isabelle rented G.B. a residence on her property. Ms. Isabelle described her relationship with G.B. as "love-hate." Ms. Isabelle held a durable power of attorney for G.B. His family lived out of town and decided it would be good for somebody local to hold the power of attorney. On Sunday, February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie came to Comprehensive to visit her father. She wanted to watch the Eagles play in the Super Bowl with him. Their family is from Philadelphia. Ms. Abadie stopped at G.B.'s room first. Charity Forest, L.P.N., was on-duty that day. G.B. was one of her patients. Towards the end of the first of her two shifts, Ms. Forest noticed that the curtain by G.B.’s bed was pulled halfway around his bed, which was unusual. The door was open. Ms. Forest entered G.B.’s room and looked around the curtain. She saw G.B. and Ms. Abadie sitting on the bed, on top of the covers. The head of the bed was raised about 45 degrees to provide a backrest. G.B. was wearing long pajama pants but not wearing a shirt. Ms. Abadie was wearing jean shorts, a T-shirt, and Keds®. Ms. Abadie was resting her feet on her iPad® so she would not dirty the covers. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were not touching each other. They were talking, watching television, and looking at pictures on Ms. Abadie's telephone. The room was a two-bed room. There was a patient in the other bed. Ms. Forest thought that the two sitting on the bed was inappropriate and left in search of her supervisor. Ms. Forest could not locate her supervisor. But she met another L.P.N., Ruth Schneck. Ms. Forest told Ms. Schneck what she had observed. Ms. Schneck went to G.B.'s room. The door was open. Ms. Schneck briefly entered the room. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Ms. Schneck left immediately, closing the door behind her. She joined the search for the supervisor. Neither Ms. Schneck nor Ms. Forest could locate the supervisor. While looking for the supervisor, Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck encountered Sean Flynn, L.P.N. They told him what they had seen. Mr. Flynn was a licensed practical nurse and a case manager at Comprehensive. He had come to the facility briefly that day in order to take care of some paperwork. After talking to Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck, Mr. Flynn went to G.B.’s room and opened the door. Ms. Abadie and G.B. were sitting on the edge of the bed facing the door. Mr. Flynn asked them if anything was going on. They said no. Mr. Flynn left the room and called Nicole Lawlor, Comprehensive's Chief Executive Officer. Ms. Lawlor told Mr. Flynn to return to G.B.'s room, instruct Ms. Abadie to leave, and tell her that she would be suspended pending an investigation. He returned to G.B.'s room with Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Mr. Flynn asked Ms. Abadie to step outside. She did. G.B. soon followed in his wheelchair. Mr. Flynn told Ms. Abadie that she was suspended and had to leave. G.B. overheard this and became very upset and aggressive. He insisted that Ms. Abadie was his girlfriend and that he wanted her to stay. Ms. Abadie asked to visit her father before she left. Mr. Flynn agreed. Ms. Abadie visited her father for a couple of hours. Ms. Abadie also called Ms. Isabelle to tell her that Mr. Flynn asked her to leave and that G.B. was very upset. After Ms. Abadie's departure, G.B. became increasingly upset and loud. His behavior escalated to slamming doors and throwing objects. Comprehensive employees decided G.B. was a danger to himself and others and had him involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act at Mease Dunedin Hospital. On her way home, Ms. Abadie received a telephone call offering her full-time employment at Lakeland Regional Hospital. February 4, 2018, at 6:08 p.m., Ms. Abadie submitted her resignation from Comprehensive in an e-mail to Ms. Lawlor. Ms. Abadie's only patient/caregiver relationship with G.B. was through her employment with Comprehensive. As of 6:08 p.m. on February 4, 2018, G.B. was not a patient of Ms. Abadie. She no longer had a professional relationship with him. Ms. Lawlor suspended Ms. Abadie on February 4, 2018. She based her decision on the information that Ms. Forest, Ms. Schneck, and Mr. Flynn told her, not all of which is persuasively established or found as fact in this proceeding. Still, Ms. Lawlor's memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie reveals that the nature of G.B.'s relationship with Ms. Abadie and the events of February 4, 2018, were not sexual. Ms. Lawlor's Employee Memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie does not identify a state or institution rule violated in the part of the form calling for one. She wrote "Flagrant violation of code of conduct." The description in the "Nature of Infraction" section of the form reads, "Employee was found cuddling in bed with a resident during her time off." There is no mention of sex, breasts, genitalia, or sexual language. None of the varying and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the day mention touching or exposure of breasts, buttocks, or genitalia. None of the accounts describes or even alludes to sex acts or statements about sex. The only kiss reported is a kiss on the cheek that G.B. reportedly forced upon Ms. Abadie as she was leaving. The deposition testimony of the Board's "expert," offers many statements showing that what the Board complains of might be called "inappropriate" or a "boundary violation" but does not amount to sexual misconduct. He testified about the strain a patient expressing romantic feelings toward a therapist puts on the professional relationship. He says the professional should tell the patient that the statements are inappropriate. The witness says that if the patient starts expressing the romantic feelings by touching the therapist, the therapist must tell the patient that his behavior is inappropriate and begin recording the events for the therapist's protection so that "no inappropriate allegations are made later." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 3). Asked his opinion about allegations that Ms. Abadie was laying on G.B.'s bed, the witness says the behavior "crossed a professional boundary" and that he was not aware of the "behavior being appropriate in any situation." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 16). The witness acknowledged that a hug is not inherently sexual. (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 24 & 30). In addition, the training and experience of the witness do not qualify him as someone whose opinion should be entitled to significant weight. Among other things, he has never written about, lectured about, or testified to an opinion about sexual misconduct. Had the deposition not been offered without objection, whether the testimony would have been admissible is a fair question. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. After February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie attempted to continue her friendship with G.B. by telephone calls and visits. However, Comprehensive refused for several weeks, against G.B.'s wishes, to allow Ms. Abadie to visit G.B. and would only permit Ms. Abadie brief, supervised visits with her father. G.B. was very upset by Comprehensive's prohibition of visits from Ms. Abadie. He began refusing food and treatment, including medications and dialysis. G.B.'s condition deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to hospice care. At that point, on February 24, 2018, Comprehensive contacted Ms. Abadie and gave her permission to visit G.B and lifted restrictions on visiting her father. A February 27, 2018, e-mail from Shelly Wise, Director of Nursing, confirmed this and admitted that the Agency for Health Care Administration had advised that G.B.'s right as a resident to visitors trumped Comprehensive's concerns. Ms. Abadie resumed visiting her friend, G.B. On May 21, 2018, G.B. passed away. G.B. was a lonely, mortally ill man. He initiated a friendship with Ms. Abadie that she reciprocated. Ultimately, he developed unfounded feelings about her being his girlfriend and them having a future together. The clear and convincing evidence does not prove that the relationship was more than a friendship or that it was sexual in any way.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Mary A. Iglehart, Esquire Christina Arzillo Shideler, Esquire Florida Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Kennan George Dandar, Esquire Dandar & Dandar, P.A. Post Office Box 24597 Tampa, Florida 33623
Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Respiratory Care, dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2019.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, an osteopathic physician who had a year-long consensual affair with one of his patients, committed sexual misconduct in the practice of osteopathic medicine; and if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent David Simon, D.O. ("Simon"), is a family practitioner who was, at all times relevant to this case, licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida. His office was located in Palm Beach County, where he practiced medicine from 1985 through the events at issue and beyond, until at least the date of the final hearing. Petitioner Department of Health (the "Department") has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Simon. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. In May 2005, a 30-something year-old woman named C.K. became a regular patient of Simon's. As C.K.'s primary care physician from 2005 until the end of 2011, Simon treated C.K. for a variety of physical and psychological disorders. The nature and quality of Simon's medical care of C.K. are not in dispute, the Department having neither alleged nor proved that Simon's treatment of C.K. ever fell below the applicable standard of care, or that Simon's medical records failed to justify any course of treatment he undertook for her benefit. In or around November 2010, while their otherwise unremarkable physician-patient relationship remained intact, Simon and C.K. entered into a mutually consensual sexual relationship. This affair had its genesis in a discussion between Simon and C.K. that occurred on October 12, 2010, during an office visit. While being seen that day, C.K. expressed concern about having been exposed recently to sexually transmitted diseases as a result of experiences which she not only related in some detail to Simon, but also corroborated with photographic evidence stored in her cell phone. In view of these disclosures, Simon lost his professional detachment and entered into a flirtatious conversation of a personal, even intimate, nature with C.K. that was outside the scope of his examination or treatment of C.K. as a patient. C.K. was a willing participant in the non-clinical sexual banter which ensued. Some days or weeks later (the precise date is unavailable), C.K. stopped by Simon's office on a Friday afternoon after business hours, when Simon was there alone. The two resumed their previous, personal conversation, and C.K. proposed that they have sexual relations with one another, a suggestion to which Simon responded positively. Within weeks afterwards, Simon called C.K., and they made arrangements to meet privately after hours at his office, which they later did, as mentioned above, sometime in November 2010. Beginning with that visit, and continuing for about one year, Simon and C.K. met once or twice a month in Simon's office, alone, to engage in sexual activity.2/ Simon used his cell phone to call or text C.K. to schedule these trysts. C.K. consented to the sexual activity with Simon. She was, however, incapable of giving free, full, and informed consent to such activity with her physician.3/ Because C.K. was, at all relevant times, a competent adult, the undersigned infers that her incapacity to freely give fully informed consent stemmed from Simon's powerful influence over her as a patient of his. C.K. and Simon did not have sexual relations during, or as part of, any visit that C.K. made to Simon's office for the purpose of seeking medical advice or care. In other words, doctor's appointments did not provide occasions, or serve as cover, for intimate rendezvous. There is no persuasive evidence that Simon ever tried to convince C.K. that their sexual encounters would be therapeutic or were somehow part of a course of purported medical treatment or examination. Rather, Simon testified credibly (and it is found) that he and C.K. kept their personal and professional relationships separate and distinct.4/ The Department has made much of the type of sexual acts that Simon and C.K. engaged in. Simon described their behavior, somewhat euphemistically, as "sexually adventurous." The Department, in contrast, has implied that Simon is a paraphiliac or pervert, a contention which the undersigned rejects as not just unsupported, but disproved by the evidence. Although at least some of the sexual conduct in question might fairly be dubbed unconventional, more important is that every interaction between these adults took place in private, within the context of mutual consent. There is, moreover, no clear and convincing proof in this record of sexual violence or aggression, nor any evidence of actual injury, damage, or harm. For reasons that will be discussed, the undersigned has concluded that the details of Simon and C.K.'s sexual encounters are irrelevant to the charges at hand; thus, no additional findings about the specific sexual activities are necessary. Simon's liaison with C.K. lasted until late December 2011, at which time C.K. abruptly terminated the relationship. The evidence fails to establish C.K.'s reasons for doing so. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the end of the affair, of which scant evidence was presented in any event, are irrelevant. In the wake of the break up, Simon's affair with C.K. became a matter of public knowledge, gaining him the sort of notoriety few physicians would covet. Facing personal disaster and professional ruin, Simon sought counseling from Helen Virginia Bush, a specialist in sex therapy who is licensed both as a clinical social worker and as a marriage and family therapist. Ms. Bush counseled Simon on subjects such as professional boundaries and erotic transference. At her urging, Simon attended and successfully completed the PBI Professional Boundaries Course, a nationally recognized program for doctors and others at risk of developing inappropriate personal relationships with patients or clients. Ms. Bush testified credibly that in her opinion, which the undersigned accepts, Simon is unlikely to enter into another sexual relationship with a patient or attempt to do so. Simon shares office space and staff with Mary Scanlon, D.O., a physician who, like Simon, specializes in family medicine. Although she has an independent practice, Dr. Scanlon works in close proximity to Simon, whom she met in 2000 during her residency when Simon was the attending physician. Dr. Scanlon believes Simon to be an excellent physician from whom she has learned much about practicing medicine, and her credible testimony that Simon's patients hold him in high regard and have largely stood by him throughout this scandal is accepted. Dr. Scanlon was an effective character witness for Simon who favorably impressed the undersigned with her earnest and forthright demeanor. That she has elected to continue practicing in the office she shares with Simon despite the public disclosure of Simon's disgraceful dalliance with C.K. (which she in no way condoned or tried to excuse), even though she is not contractually bound to stay there, manifests genuine support of and respect for Simon, and tells the undersigned—— more persuasively than any testimony——that his career is worth saving. This is the first time that any disciplinary action has been taken against Simon's medical license. Ultimate Factual Determinations The evidence establishes, clearly and convincingly, that Simon exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship, albeit probably unwittingly, for purposes of engaging C.K. in sexual activity. This ultimate finding is based in part on an inference which follows from the presumed fact of C.K.'s incapacity to consent to sexual activity with Simon, but also on other circumstances, the most salient of which are that the initial steps toward the affair were taken during a medical examination, and that all of the sexual activity at issue occurred in the doctor's office. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Simon is guilty of engaging in sexual misconduct with a patient, as more fully defined in section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, which is a disciplinable offense punishable under section 459.015(1)(l).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order finding Simon guilty of committing sexual misconduct with a patient, which is punishable under section 459.015(1)(l), Florida Statutes. Because this is Simon's first such offense, it is further RECOMMENDED that Simon be placed on probation for two years subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the board deems appropriate, and that an administrative fine of $10,000 be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Stephen H. Rosenthal, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued on or about December 22, 1999, by Petitioner, Tom Gallagher, as Commissioner of Education and, if so, what penalty should be imposed upon Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Stephen Rosenthal, holds a valid Florida Educator's Certificate, Number 644646. Respondent's Certificate covers the areas of Elementary Education and Mathematics and is valid through June 30, 2001. At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent was employed as a fifth-grade teacher at Manatee Elementary School, an elementary school in the St. Lucie County School District. During the fall of 1997 Paul E. Griffeth, a detective with the Port St. Lucie Police Department, was informed that Respondent had been in contact through the internet with a detective of the Keene, New Hampshire Police Department, that Respondent believed that he was communicating with a minor, and that Respondent had sent the Keene detective pornographic pictures via the Internet. Based upon the information Officer Griffeth received, a search warrant was obtained. The search warrant authorized a search of an address where Respondent was believed to reside. Officer Griffeth, Todd Schrader, then a detective with the Port St. Lucie Police Department, and a Detective Calabrese attempted to execute the search warrant. When they served the search warrant on Respondent they learned that Respondent no longer lived at the address identified in the search warrant. Respondent informed Detectives Schrader and Griffeth of his new residence address and agreed to allow them to search his residence without obtaining a new warrant. Respondent inquired into the reason for the search warrant and was told that it was believed that he was suspected of having sent child pornography on the internet and of having files on his computer and computer disks in his residence that contained child pornography. Respondent initially denied these allegations. Detective Schrader asked Respondent if he knew who "Luke 14" was. Respondent admitted that he believed that "Luke 14" was a 14-year-old male. Detective Schrader told Respondent that "Luke 14" was a police detective. Respondent shook his head and said, "No, no." Respondent later admitted that he had sent pornographic pictures, including pictures of Respondent naked, to "Luke 14," believing he was a 14-year-old boy. Respondent then admitted to Detective Schrader that he had a number of pictures that he had downloaded from the internet and acknowledged that some of the pictures could be construed as child pornography. Respondent also admitted that he had numerous diskettes with pictures of minors that he had downloaded from the internet. When the detectives entered Respondent's residence, they found two pictures of two individual nude males, with their genitalia exposed, which the detectives believed to be between the ages of 12 to 16. Respondent admitted that he believed that that was the age of the boys. Respondent also admitted that he had downloaded the pictures off the internet and that he had printed them. A number of diskettes were found at Respondent's residence which contained pictures of males with their genitalia exposed. Although some of the males pictured appeared to be minors, the evidence failed to prove that they were in fact pictures of minors. 1/ On November 3, 1997, Respondent was arrested. He was charged in an Indictment filed before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "U.S. District Court") with eight counts of Knowingly Receiving a Visual Depiction of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct that had been transported and shipped in Interstate Commerce by Computer and one count of Having Possession of Three or More Visual Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct that had been transported and shipped in Interstate Commerce by Computer. In March 1998 Respondent entered into a Plea Agreement in the U.S. District Court, agreeing, in part, to the following: The [Respondent] agrees to plead guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment, which charges the defendant with the knowing receipt of child pornography in interstate commerce by computer, that is, visual depictions of minors engaged in sexual conduct . . . . The [Respondent] admits that he is, in fact, guilty of this offense. On March 12, 1998, Respondent appeared before the Honorable James C. Paine, United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of Florida. Respondent was questioned extensively concerning the Plea Agreement and Respondent's understanding of the charges to which he had admitted. During this proceeding, the essential facts relating to Counts 1 and 3 were summarized and Respondent was asked whether he agreed with those facts. Respondent agreed with all the summarized facts; except the allegation that he thought that Luke 14 was a minor. 2/ Among the summarized facts which Respondent admitted to are the following: That Respondent knowingly received a visual depiction; the visual depiction was shipped or transported by interstate commerce by any means, including computer; that the visual depiction was of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and that Respondent knew that the visual depiction was of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; That Respondent sent several sexually explicit pictures to Luke 14. The pictures were of the Respondent, naked; and That Respondent had photographs of two nude minors in his residence. Respondent entered a plea of guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment, was adjudicated guilty of the two counts, and was sentenced to 70 months in prison on each Count to run concurrently. The other seven counts were dismissed. The evidence failed to prove that Respondent's plea of guilty was made as the result of any threat, coercion, or fraud. By entering a plea of guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment, Respondent admitted to the following: On or about February 5, 1997, in St. Lucie County, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant, STEPHEN H. ROSENTHAL, did knowingly receive a visual depiction that had been transported and shipped in interstate commerce by computer . . . depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . to wit: a depiction of a minor male engaging anal-genital sexual intercourse with an adult male, the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. By entering a plea of guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment, Respondent admitted to the following: On or about April 15, 1997, in St. Lucie County, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant, STEPHEN H. ROSENTHAL, did knowingly receive a visual depiction that had been transported and shipped in interstate commerce by computer . . . depicting minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . to wit: a depiction of two minor males engaging oral-genital sexual intercourse, the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. By pleading guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment and admitting to Judge Paine that he had committed those offenses, Respondent admitted that he had been in possession of child pornography and that he had downloaded the child pornography from the Internet. Respondent subsequently attempted to withdraw his plea. This effort was rejected. Respondent is currently incarcerated at FCC Coleman serving his 70-month sentence. The arrest and subsequent conviction of Respondent resulted in adverse and widespread publicity in St. Lucie County. Respondent's arrest and conviction and the resulting adverse publicity were sufficiently notorious to disgrace the teaching profession and seriously reduce Respondent's effectiveness as a teacher. Respondent's employment with the St. Lucie County School Board was terminated due to the foregoing incidents. Petitioner issued an Administrative Complaint on or about December 22, 1999, in which Petitioner recommended that the Education Practices Commission impose appropriate disciplinary sanctions on Respondent's educator's certificate pursuant to Sections 231.262 and 231.28, Florida Statutes, and Rule 6B-1.006, Florida Administrative Code, due to the following alleged facts: 3. During the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school year, Respondent was in possession of child pornography and down loaded the child pornography from the Internet onto his home computer. On or about November 3, 1997, Respondent was arrested and charged with 8 counts of Knowingly Receiving a Visual Depiction of Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct that had been transported and shipped in Interstate Commerce by Computer, and one count of Having Possession of Three or More Visual Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct that had been transported and shipped in Interstate Commerce by Computer. On or about June 2, 1998, Respondent pled Guilty to two of the counts of receiving the photographs. The court dismissed all other charges and adjudicated Respondent Guilty on the remaining two. Respondent was sentenced to 70 months on each count to run concurrently, to receive health/psychiatric counseling during incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, not possess a firearm and pay $3200 in fines and fees. On or about November 25, 1997, Respondent was terminated from his position with the St. Lucie County School Board. Respondent filed an unexecuted Election of Rights form and a letter in response to the Administrative Complaint. Although Respondent did not specifically request an administrative hearing, he did dispute the material facts of the Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint and Respondent's letter were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 19, 2000, with a request that the matter be assigned to an administrative law judge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent, Stephen H. Rosenthal, violated Sections 231.28(1)(c) and (f), Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the charge that Respondent violated Section 231.28(1)(i), Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Florida Educator's Certificate, Number 644646, be permanently revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 2001.
The Issue The issue to be presented is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, having been issued certificate number 281123. Respondent was employed by the City of Madison Police Department from December 2008 through July 2009. At the beginning of 2009, Respondent was 23 years old. Sometime in late December 2008 or early in 2009, Respondent received the telephone number for E.B.H. from Paige Bell, a friend of E.B.H.'s. At the time Ms. Bell gave Respondent E.B.H.'s number, E.B.H. was 16 years old. Respondent knew that E.B.H. was under the age of 18. Although the exact time-frame of the communications is unclear, in approximately January or February of 2009, Respondent and E.B.H. texted and called each for a one to two-week period. They never met in person. During their short period of communication, the two sent each other pictures of themselves so that each knew what the other looked like. E.B.H. testified that the first pictures sent were normal photos where she was clothed. After receiving those, she testified that Respondent asked her for "sexy" photos of herself wearing no underclothing. In response, E.B.H. sent him two pictures of herself, either nude or partially nude. The communication between Respondent and E.B.H. was brief, lasting no more than a few weeks. Once E.B.H. learned that Respondent was a law enforcement officer, she stopped texting him because she did not want either of them to get in trouble. Sometime after the texting stopped, the police chief for City of Madison Police Department received an anonymous complaint alleging that Respondent had possession of nude pictures of a minor female. On July 7, 2009, Sergeant Benton Ebberson was assigned to conduct an internal investigation in response to the complaint. As part of his investigation, Sergeant Ebberson spoke to several individuals who did not testify at hearing. What those individuals told him during the investigation is clearly hearsay. However, from these interviews, Sergeant Ebberson was able to gather enough information to get descriptions of the photos and identify E.B.H. as the subject of the photos. As a consequence, Sergeant Ebberson located and, with the permission of her parents, interviewed E.B.H. She admitted sending the photos to Respondent, but no longer had possession of the phone from which the texts were sent or copies of the pictures. Her father had discovered her actions and the pictures earlier in the year, and had deleted the photos and confiscated her telephone. Respondent also was interviewed as a consequence of the internal investigation. Consistent with the information he gave during his interview, he denies asking for the photos and claims E.B.H. sent them to him on her own volition. Whether he asked for the pictures is not particularly relevant. There is no dispute that E.B.H. sent and Respondent received at least two pictures of E.B.H. in which E.B.H. was wearing little or no clothing. Respondent claims that, while he received the pictures and looked at them, he did not know they were pictures of E.B.H., and therefore a minor, because the pictures did not include her face. However, he knew that the pictures were received from E.B.H.'s telephone number. Respondent did not report receiving the pictures to either his supervisors or to E.B.H.'s parents. Respondent also claims that upon receiving the pictures, he simply deleted them. His testimony to this effect is not credible. E.B.H. testified credibly that while she had sent inappropriate photographs to a former boyfriend on a separate occasion, she had sent these photographs to Respondent only. Regardless of the possible motives involved for complaining, it makes no sense that anyone would be able to complain to the police department and that the photos could be described in sufficient detail for Sergeant Ebberson to be able to locate E.B.H. unless Respondent either talked about receiving the photos or showed the photos to someone else. The photos, however, are not in evidence. E.B.H. knew she was either completely nude or only partially dressed, but could provide very little other information about the photos. No evidence was presented to indicate that the photos included a depiction of sexual conduct.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kerra A. Smith, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ernest M. Page, IV, Esquire Post Office Box 167 Perry, Florida 32348 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Paul Rancourt (Mr. Rancourt), established through clear and convincing evidence his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Before discussing the findings from the administrative hearing, it is appropriate to set out the procedural history of the criminal proceedings. On December 18, 1996, the State charged Mr. Rancourt and Daniel McLean (Mr. McLean) with the kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery of A.S., which occurred on October 31, 1996. On July 27 through July 30, 1998, the State tried Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean together. The jury convicted both men, and the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to life imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On April 5, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal issued an opinion overturning Mr. McLean's conviction based on trial errors. McLean v. State, 754 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The appellate court reversed Mr. McLean's conviction for kidnapping because it found that the State "failed to prove [McLean] intended the kidnapping to occur, or that he performed any action that assisted in the kidnapping." Id. at 180. Further, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in two key evidentiary rulings. First, the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony from the medical provider who examined A.S. following the assault. The disputed question was: "[d]id she act in any way inconsistent with the way a rape victim would act?" Id. at 181. The appellate court found that the prejudicial effect of the expert testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. Second, the trial court erred in excluding testimony under the Rape Shield Statute.3/ Id. Specifically, the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. McLean's attorney to cross-examine the medical provider about whether or not the A.S.'s soreness in her vulva area was due to the fact that she had not had sexual intercourse in the past year, as opposed to a sexual battery. Id. The appellate court found that this question went to a key issue of whether the sexual contact was consensual. The appellate court found the exclusion of this testimony was not harmless error; and thus, reversed Mr. McLean's convictions and sentences, and ordered a retrial. On January 5, 2001, Mr. McLean, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled nolo contendere to one count of sexual battery, section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1996). Based on the plea agreement, Mr. McLean was sentenced to 64 and one-half months’ incarceration, which reflected his time served, and two years’ probation. On June 14, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Rancourt's convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, and his life sentences. Rancourt v. State, 766 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In affirming Mr. Rancourt's conviction, the appellate court found that trial counsel had failed to preserve the issues concerning the medical expert's opinion vouching for the victim's credibility and the exclusion of the medical testimony under the Rape Shield Statute. On September 13, 2000, the appellate court issued its mandate. On September 10, 2002, Mr. Rancourt filed a post- conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction motion alleged, in part, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the evidentiary issues that had formed the basis of Mr. McLean's reversal. On November 3, 2003, the circuit court entered an order vacating Mr. Rancourt's convictions and sentences "after considering the Motion and applicable law, and upon agreement of both parties[.]" The order directed that a new trial be held. On September 27, 2005, the State re-tried Mr. Rancourt for sexual battery and kidnapping. The jury convicted Mr. Rancourt of the lesser-included offense of battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1996), a first-degree misdemeanor. Consequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt to one year in the Polk County jail with credit for time served. On June 25, 2010, Mr. Rancourt filed the Amended Petition for Determination of Wrongfully Incarcerated Person, which is the subject of this hearing. Mr. Rancourt has not been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. At the time of these events, Mr. Rancourt was a 32-year- old man, and A.S. was a 19-year-old freshman at Florida Southern College. Mr. Rancourt, in offering proof of actual innocence, testified on his own behalf that the sexual encounter that occurred between him and A.S. was consensual. Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, was consistent with the testimony that he had provided in his two criminal trials. Transcripts of Mr. Rancourt's prior testimony at the criminal proceedings were admitted into evidence. Mr. Rancourt's testimony at the hearing concerning his meeting A.S. and the subsequent sexual encounter was not believable. Specifically, the undersigned did not find Mr. Rancourt's description of how a young woman, whom he had never spoken too, would at the closing of the bar grab him at the door as patrons attempted to leave the bar, and give him a "deep french kiss." Further, it was incredulous that after asking him for a ride back to her dorm room that A.S., while in the back seat of the car, would engage in a series of intimate gestures towards himself and his best friend, Mr. McLean. Finally, it was not credible that A.S. and Mr. Rancourt engaged in a consensual sexual encounter as described by Mr. Rancourt on the lawn of a home off a dark street. The conclusion that Mr. Rancourt's description of the events is not credible is further bolstered by the testimony showing A.S.'s actions immediately after the sexual encounter, and Mr. Rancourt's untruthful responses to the police investigation following the events. Mr. Rancourt also offered Mr. McLean, who testified that he witnessed A.S. acting as a "willing participant" in the sexual encounter with Mr. Rancourt. Further, Mr. McLean offered testimony that he did not engage in any sexual relations with A.S., and that he only pled to the sexual battery charge in order to avoid the risk of receiving another lengthy sentence. Next, Mr. Rancourt brought forward the testimony of Brandon Perron (Mr. Perron), a private investigator, and introduced into evidence copies of Mr. Perron's investigative reports. The record shows that Mr. Perron prepared these reports as part of Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction efforts. The reports and Mr. Perron's testimony show that he identified many factual issues regarding Mr. Rancourt's convictions. Specifically, Mr. Perron raised issues concerning discrepancies in A.S.'s statements, testimony, and her motivations to lie concerning the events of October 31, 1996; discrepancies in witnesses' statements to the police investigator and testimony; poor and prejudicial police investigative techniques that overlooked potentially exonerating evidence showing that the sexual encounter was consensual; and defense counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potential witnesses. Although Mr. Perron was a persuasive witness for showing potential problems with the State's criminal case against Mr. Rancourt, Mr. Perron's testimony did not establish Mr. Rancourt's actual innocence. Mr. Rancourt's final witness was his aunt, Barbara Hoffman (Ms. Hoffman). In October 1996, Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean were living with Ms. Hoffman while they sought employment. Ms. Hoffman's testimony concerned Mr. Rancourt's character and her opinion that he was not capable of committing a crime. Further, she testified about the day that law enforcement officers went to her home to ask Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to come in for questioning. She testified that the detective investigating the events had prejudged Mr. Rancourt to be guilty of rape. The purpose of this testimony appeared to show that statements given by Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to the police may not have been voluntary. It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Rancourt nor Mr. McLean was arrested; thus, the questioning was non-custodial. Moreover, Ms. Hoffman's testimony was marginally relevant in that it did not bring forward any fact showing that Mr. Rancourt was actually innocent of the sexual battery and kidnapping charges. The State introduced evidence showing that the sexual encounter was not consensual. A.S.'s trial testimony shows that she consistently testified that the sexual encounter was not consensual. In addition to A.S.'s trial testimony, the State introduced trial testimony of Angie Wren (Ms. Wren) and Issac McKeithan (Mr. McKeithan). The criminal trial transcript shows that Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove upon A.S. shortly after the event and saw a car quickly drive away from the area where A.S. was standing. Ms. Wren testified that A.S. was hysterical and crying, and "she just didn't look like she had been through anything good, that's for sure." A.S. reported to Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan that she had been raped. Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove A.S. to the Lakeland Police Department immediately, and the attack was reported. This testimony shows that A.S. contended that she had been raped moments after the sexual encounter. Further, a review of the criminal proceedings shows that the State brought forward medical testimony showing bruises on A.S.'s arms. A.S. had testified that, before the attack, she did not have the bruises. Finally, the criminal trial transcripts and testimony given at the December 8 through 9, 2011, hearing showed that Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean had provided false statements, and changed the story given to the officer conducting the investigation. Specifically, the trial transcripts, and Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, showed that he told the investigator at first that he did not engage in sexual relations with A.S., then changed his story to claim that he and A.S. had sex in the vehicle, and then changed his story, yet again, to state that he and A.S. had consensual sex on the front yard of a home off a dark street. During his testimony on December 8, 2011, Mr. Rancourt acknowledged that the statements he gave about not having sex with A.S. and then having sex in the vehicle were false. Similarly, Mr. McLean, when asked if he and Mr. Rancourt had sex, informed the officer "no." Mr. McLean testified that he answered that way because he contended that he had not had sex with A.S. This parsing of words was not credible. The undersigned found these acknowledged false statements, made at the time of the investigation, persuasive evidence that Mr. Rancourt's explanation of the night was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Mr. Rancourt has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Mr. Rancourt's claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Dr. Richard M. Dunham is licensed to practice psychology in the State of Florida by the State Board of Examiners of Psychology. Dr. Dunham is primarily employed as a tenured professor on the faculty of Florida State University. Dr. Dunham is not trying to build a private practice, and over a two or three month period may see three to four people professionally. In connection with this limited private practice he maintains an office in his home in Wakulla County and did so at all times pertinent to this cause. It was Dr. Dunham's usual practice to see patients for counseling in his home, rather than in his office on the University campus or some other place. In 1973, Dr. Dunham was acquainted, through his service in the United States Naval Reserve, with Dan Holsenbeck, then the husband of Judy Holsenbeck. He was likewise acquainted with Judy Holsenbeck. Dr. Glenn King, a clinical psychologist with the Auburn University Clinic, counseled Mrs. Holsenbeck on October 23, 1973, in Auburn, Alabama. Over the next five or six weeks, he saw her a total of five times for counseling, the last session being November 5, 1973. She related to Dr. King that she was concerned because she was sexually attracted to other men and she was unable, to achieve orgasm during intercourse with her husband. Further, she was depressed because she felt she could not be faithful to her husband. Dr. King counseled her and found her to have a passive aggressive personality disorder with depressive features. In early December, 1973, Mrs. Holsenbeck moved to Tallahassee, Florida. Through her husband's contact with Dr. Dunham, she met with him in his office on the FSU campus sometime around December 20, 1973, to discuss her psychological problems and to seek counseling. Dr. Dunham suggested several other psychologists whom she could consult, and, in the alternative, offered to take Mrs. Holsenbeck as a patient himself. Mrs. Holsenbeck requested Dr. Dunham to take her as patient, to which request he acceded. The psychological problems Mrs. Holsenbeck related to Dr. Dunham for which she sought counseling, involved her sexual activity and were similar in nature to those related to Dr. King at Auburn. After the initial meeting on or about December 20, 1973, Dr. Dunham saw Mrs. Holsenbeck as a patient on five separate occasions. These were as follows: December 27, 1973; January 1, 1974; January 17, 1974; February 6, 1974; and February 28, 1974, which meeting Mrs. Holsenbeck recalls occurring on March 6, 1974. Each of these meetings was a counseling session and took place at the home of Dr. Dunham in Wakulla County. It was alleged that in the course of the counseling sessions on January 17, 1974, and February 6, 1974, Dr. Dunham engaged in sexual intercourse and other sexual activities with Mrs. Holsenbeck. It was further alleged, that at the last counseling session, which occurred on February 28, 1974, Dr. Dunham made sexual advances toward Mrs. Holsenbeck, which were rebuffed. No one other than Dr. Dunham and Mrs. Holsenbeck were present in the home of Dr. Dunham at the time of the counseling sessions on January 17, 1974, and February 6, 1974. Similarly, no one other than Dr. Dunham and Mrs. Holsenbeck were present at the inception of the last counseling session. However, Mrs. Dunham, Dr. Dunham's wife of 7 or 8 years, came home during that counselling session. Mrs. Dunham was aware of Mrs. Holsenbeck's presence in the house and was not aware of any sexual activity or problem between Dr. Dunham and Mrs. Holsenbeck at that time. The counseling sessions on January 17, 1974, and February 6, 1974, took place at approximately 9:00 a.m. and lasted from one hour to one and one-half hours. The last counseling session occurred in the early evening. In December of 1973, and continuing through the date of the last counseling session, Mrs. Holsenbeck worked in a race relations program headed by Dr. Dunham at F.S.U. Mrs. Holsenbeck was very dissatisfied and eventually withdrew from it in the spring of 1974. On April 18, 1974, Dr. King contacted Mrs. Holsenbeck, at the request of her husband, whereupon Mrs. Holsenbeck alleged that Dr. Dunham had made certain sexual advances toward her during the course of his treatment of her. After a further meeting with Mrs. Holsenbeck, Dr. King told her that Dr. Dunham's alleged conduct was a serious breach of ethics and asked her if she would lodge a complaint against Dr. Dunham. Thereafter, Dr. King put Mrs. Holsenbeck in touch with Dr. Wallace Kennedy, also of the FSU faculty, and under whom Dr. King had studied. Dr. King had Mrs. Holsenbeck contact Dr. Kennedy so that her allegations might be conducted to the Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology for action by them. There was evidence presented of a serious professional and, perhaps, personal disagreement between Dr. Dunham and Dr. Kennedy, who are both in the same psychology department at FSU. This disagreement arose long before December, 1973. Both the Petitioner, Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology and the Respondent, Dr. Richard Dunham, agree that acts of the nature alleged constitute a serious ethical breach warranting suspension or revocation of a license to practice psychology. It was not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Richard Dunham made sexual advances toward, nor engaged in sexual activities with Mrs. Holsenbeck at any time. It is a very unwise practice on the part of Dr. Dunham to counsel patients in the privacy of his own home with no one else present, particularly when such a patient is a female manifesting sexual problems. Had Dr. Dunham been more circumspect concerning this practice, there would probably have been no opportunity for charges such as those presented herein.
Recommendation There having been no finding of fact that the Respondent, Dr. Richard Dunham, engaged in the alleged activities of misconduct, it is hereby recommended that the Florida State Board or Examiners of Psychology take no action against the Respondent and dismiss the charges herein. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1975. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire W. Dexter Douglass, Esquire P. O. Box 1752 Douglass & Powell Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Post Office Box 1674 Attorney for Petitioner Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Attorney for Respondent
