The Issue Whether respondent's alcoholic beverage license should be revoked for violating a stipulation stated on the record in a prior license revocation proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds alcoholic beverage license no. 16-2337, Series 2-APS and owns and operates Hammer's Package Store, the licensed premises, at 3231-A West Broward Boulevard, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In 1981, DABT filed two administrative actions to revoke respondent's alcoholic beverage license pursuant to Section 561.29, Florida Statutes. The charges were, apparently, disputed and a hearing officer requested, since the cases were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer. Thereafter, on April 18, 1981, Hearing Officer Robert T. Benton, II, conducted a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the charges. At hearing, both parties were represented by counsel: DABT by James N. Watson, Jr., a staff attorney for the Department of Business Regulation; respondent by Ray Russell, whose address was 200 S. E. 6th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301. At the outset, counsel for both parties advised Hearing Officer Benton that they had reached "an agreement" (P-1, p. 3), thus obviating the need for a hearing on the charges. Counsel then recited, on the record, the terms of their settlement agreement: respondent was given 90-days in which its corporate entity could be sold, with the period beginning to run from March 19, 1981--the next day--and ending on June 16, 1981; when the corporate entity was sold or the 90-day period expired, whichever occurred first, respondent was to surrender its alcoholic beverage license to DABT for cancellation; respondent waived its right to an evidentiary hearing on the charges and to appeal any matters covered by the agreement; and, from the time the corporate entity was sold or the 90-day period for sale expired, no corporate officers, directors, or shareholders of respondent would again engage in the alcoholic beverage business, make any application for a beverage license, apply for transfer of a beverage license, or hold an interest in any business involved in the sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages. (DABT Ex. 1, p. 5-8). Without objection from respondent's counsel, DABT's counsel described the consent order (or settlement agreement) as "in the nature of a final administrative action and [respondent] acknowledges that its failure to abide by such would subject him to the provisions of Florida Statutes 120.69 (P-1, p. 6). Although this settlement agreement was effective and began to operate immediately (the 90-day period for sale commenced the next day) DABT's counsel contemplated that a written and signed consent order embracing the terms of the settlement agreement would be subsequently issued. Although such follow-up action was intended, it never occurred. DABT never issued a written order, consent or otherwise, embracing the terms of the settlement agreement. Hearing Officer Benton and, at least one party, thereafter relied on the settlement agreement. The hearing officer closed both Division of Administrative Hearings files, and DABT no longer prosecuted respondent under the pending charges. Since June 16, 1981, the expiration of the 90-day period provided in the agreement, respondent has continued to operate its licensed alcoholic beverage premises, has failed to sell its corporate entity, and has failed to surrender its alcoholic beverage license. Respondent has presented no evidence justifying or excusing its failure to surrender its alcoholic beverage license to DABT for cancellation on or before June 16, 1981. Neither does it seek to withdraw from or set aside the settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's alcoholic beverage license be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1983.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, alcoholic beverage license No. 26-01841, Series No. 2-APS, was issued to Respondents, Frank D. and Estella S. Ryers, for their establishment known as the Big B Restaurant, located at 5570 Avenue B, Jacksonville, Florida. A 2-APS license permits the package sale only of beer and wine. It does not permit the consumption on the premises of beer, wine, or liquor. On March 27, 1983, Investigator Wendell M. Reeves conducted an undercover operation directed against the Big B Restaurant predicated upon reports received by Petitioner that Respondents were conducting sales of alcoholic beverages not permitted by the license at the licensed premises. In furtherance of that operation, Reeves utilized another beverage agent, Van Young, in an undercover capacity to make a controlled buy of an improperly sold substance from the licensees. Prior to sending Young into the licensed premises, Reeves searched Young to ensure that he, Young, had no alcoholic beverage or money in his possession. Satisfying himself that that was the case, he gave Young $15 in U.S. currency and sent him into the licensed premises to make the buy. Young entered the Big B Restaurant at 1:00 p.m. and came out 17 minutes later. When he came out of the licensed premises, Young came over to where Reeves was waiting and turned over to him a sealed 200 ml bottle of Fleishman's Gin. Young told Reeves that he had purchased the gin in the licensed premises from a black male whose description matched that of Respondent Frank D. Byers which is contained on Respondent's application for license. Respondent Frank Byers denies making the sale. On balance, however, there is little doubt it was Respondent who made the sale, especially in light of the fact that this same licensee was issued a letter of warning by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco in October 1981 for possession on the premises of an alcoholic beverage not permitted to be sold under the license. Young also stated that he purchased a second bottle which he consumed on the premises with another black male. However, this evidence was in the form of Reeves' report of what was told him by Young. As such, it is clearly hearsay and can be used only to corroborate or explain other admissible evidence. Therefore, as to the allegation regarding the consumption of the gin on the premises, since it is the only evidence of that offense, it cannot be used to support a finding of fact on that allegation. It may, however, be used to explain how Young got the bottle with which he was seen by Reeves to come out of the licensed premises. Several days later, on March 30, 1983, Reeves again entered the licensed premises, where he told Respondent Estella Byers he was there to inspect the site. She opened the cooler for him and he inspected the beer inside and the cigarettes. While he was doing that, however, he noticed her take a cloth towel and drape it over something behind the bar. He went over to it, removed the towel, and found that it covered a bottle of Schenley's gin. Mrs. Byers immediately said she thought it was her husband's, Respondent Frank Byers, but another individual present at the time, Sharon Thomas, said she had taken it from her brother, who was drunk, and had put it there. Again, as to Ms. Thomas' comments, they, too, are hearsay and can only serve here to explain or corroborate other admissible evidence. In any case, after Ms. Thomas made her comment, she was immediately contradicted by Respondent Estella Byers, who again indicated she thought the bottle was her husband's. In any case, at the hearing, Respondent Estella Byers contended she did not know it was there. On balance, Mr. Reeves' testimony that she covered it with a towel while he was inspecting and the evidence of the prior warning for an identical offense tend to indicate she did know it was there and that it was unlawful for it to be there. There is, however, no evidence to establish sufficiently the reason for its being there.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent, Club Manhattan Bar and Grill, LLC, d/b/a Club Manhattan Bar and Grill (Respondent), committed the acts alleged in the administrative complaints dated September 13, 2010, and December 1, 2010, and, if so, what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating persons holding alcoholic beverage licenses. § 561.02, Fla. Stat. Respondent is licensed under the Florida beverage law by the Department. Respondent holds a 4COP/SRX special restaurant license issued by the Department with Alcoholic Beverage License No. 68-04347. Ms. Stokes is the licensee of record for Respondent. Consequently, Respondent is subject to the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Respondent's series 4COP/SRX is a special restaurant license that permits it to sell beer, wine, and liquor for consumption on the licensed premises. Additionally, the licensee must satisfy seating and record-keeping requirements and must comply with 51 percent of its gross sales being food and non- alcoholic beverages. See § 561.20(2)(a)4., Fla. Stat. Respondent's restaurant is located in Sarasota County, Florida, and, pursuant to the 4COP/SRX license, must have seating and capability to serve 150 customers at any one time. On August 5, 2010, Special Agent Flynn conducted an inspection of Respondent's business premises. He conducted the inspection based on complaints made to the Department that Respondent was operating as an after-hours bar, rather than a restaurant. At this initial inspection, which occurred at 2:30 p.m. on August 5, 2010, Special Agent Flynn found the restaurant did not have any customers or menus. Further, he noticed that the premises had seating for only 92 people and a large dance floor. Further, he observed that the walls had signs advertising drink specials and late-night parties. Special Agent Flynn met Ms. Stokes, Respondent's manager and holder of the license, and informed her that the beverage license required that Respondent be able to serve 150 customers at one time. Also, Special Agent Flynn requested the required business records concerning the purchase of alcoholic beverage invoices from the distributors for a 60-day proceeding period. Ms. Stokes did not have the requested records on the premises. On August 19, 2010, Special Agent Flynn sent Ms. Stokes a written request, requesting alcoholic purchase invoices for a 60-day period before August 19, 2010. The request allowed Ms. Stokes 14 days to compile the records and to provide the records to the Department. The record here showed by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not produce records for the audit period. On September 8, 2010, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Special Agent Flynn returned to Respondent's premises. Again, he found that Respondent did not have the required seating number and ability to serve 150 customers at one time. Special Agent Flynn offered credible testimony that, during the September 8, 2010, inspection, he found Respondent had only 106 available seats. Further, consistent with his inspection on August 5, 2010, Special Agent Flynn observed facts showing that Respondent was a late-night bar, as opposed to a restaurant. The evidence showed that on September 8, 2010, Special Agent Flynn observed that Respondent did not have any customers, menus, and very little food in its small kitchen. Special Agent Flynn, however, did observe that Respondent continued to have its large dance floor, disc jockey booth, advertised drink specials, and posters advertising late-night parties. Clearly, Respondent was being operated as a bar, rather than a restaurant as required by its license. At the September 8, 2010, inspection, Special Agent Flynn again requested Respondent's business records that he had previously requested for the 60-day time period before August 19, 2010. Ms. Stokes provided a few invoices for purchases of food and non-alcoholic beverages. These invoices were dated after the August 19, 2010, date that Special Agent Flynn had requested and did not cover the requested 60 days prior to the August 19, 2010, request. These records included food and beverage purchases by Respondent from retailers, but did not contain any records concerning the points of sale at the restaurant. Ms. Nadeau, an auditor for the Department, offered credible testimony concerning the Department's request for business records from Respondent for the audit period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010. On August 27, 2010, Ms. Nadeau set up an audit request for the period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010, based on information provided by Special Agent Flynn. The Department provided Ms. Stokes with an audit engagement letter that requested business records. Ms. Nadeau testified that on September 10, 2010, she was contacted by Ms. Stokes. Ms. Stokes informed Ms. Nadeau that Ms. Stokes had become the owner of the restaurant in June 2010 and that she did not have the required records. Ms. Nadeau informed Ms. Stokes to provide all the records requested in the audit engagement letter that Ms. Stokes had and to try to obtain the prior records from the previous managing member of Respondent. On September 22, 2010, Ms. Stokes mailed to the Department records she claimed met the audit period. The records consisted of guest checks for July and August 2010, which only showed food purchases and no alcoholic beverage purchases. Further, Ms. Nadeau found that the records were not reliable, because the records contained numerous personal items not related to the restaurant, such as baby wipes, cotton swabs, and boxer shorts. Consequently, the record clearly and convincingly shows that Respondent failed to provide the required business records for the audit period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010. Next, based on Respondent's failure to provide any reliable records, the Department was unable to conduct an audit of the business. Records provided by Respondent indicated that the only sales that occurred on the premises were for food. However, the testimony showed that Respondent's business included the sale of alcohol and marketed the sale of alcoholic beverages for late-night parties. Mr. Torres, the senior auditor for the Department, credibly testified that he conducted an independent review of Ms. Nadeau's initial audit findings. Mr. Torres, who has been employed with the Department for 27 years, reviewed the records provided by Respondent. He credibly testified that Respondent's guest checks were very questionable because they showed all food sales, but no alcohol, which was not consistent with Special Agent Flynn's observations. The evidence further showed that Ms. Stokes became the managing member of Respondent in June 2010. Ms. Stokes provided the Department with a change of corporate officers and named herself as registered agent, rather than apply for a new license. This distinction would later become important because, as explained by Ms. Nadeau, in the Department's eyes, there is a continuation of ownership. Under a continuation of ownership, Ms. Stokes was required to have business records for the time period before she became the managing member of Respondent. Ms. Stokes credibly testified that she did not have any records before June 20, 2010; thus, Respondent was unable to provide records for the audit period. Ms. Stokes candidly admitted that her restaurant had been struggling financially, which is why she had worked to catering special events to draw foot traffic.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order revoking Respondent's alcoholic beverage license and finding that Respondent violated: 1. Section 561.20(2)(a)4., within section 561.29(1)(a), on September 8, 2010, by failing to provide the required service area, seating, and equipment to serve 150 persons full-course meals at tables at one time as required by its license; 2. Rule 61A-3.0141(3)(a)1., within section 561.29(1)(a), the audit period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010, by not providing the requested business records; and 3. Rule 61A-3.0141(3)(a)1., within section 561.29(1)(a), on September 8, 2010, by not providing the requested business records. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order find that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated section 561.20(2)(a)4., within section 561.29(1)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2011.
The Issue Whether or not on or about the 14th day of May, 1976, Mary Lener Arnold, a licensed vendor, did have in her possession, permit or allow someone else to have unlawfully in their possession on Mary Lener Arnold's licensed premises, alcoholic beverages, to wit: 9 half-pints of Smirnoff Vodka, not authorized by law to be sold under her license, contrary to 562.02, F.S.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mary Lener Arnold, t/a Buggs' Drive Inn, held on May 14, 1976 and now holds beverage license no. 50-2 series 1-COP with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. This licensed premises is located on Main Street, Greenville, Florida. On May 14, 1976, a confidential informant with the Division of Beverage went to the licensed premise of the Respondent in Greenville, Florida and purchased a bottle of alcoholic beverage not permitted under a 1-COP license. This confidential informant was working for officer B.C. Maxwell of the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. Officer Maxwell along with other officers with the Division of Beverage and officers of the Madison County, Sheriff's office returned to the licensed premises on May 14, 1976 and in looking through the licensed premises found a black bag containing 9 half-pints of Smirnoff Vodka on the licensed premises. This Smirnoff Vodka was not permissible on the licensed premises under a 1-COP license. On the licensed premises at the time of the inspection was one Patsy Jackson Williams who indicated that she was in charge of the premises. The confidential informant who had purchased the bottle of alcoholic beverage indicated that his purchase had been made from the same Patsy Jackson Williams. The black bag with its contents of 9 half-pints of Smirnoff Vodka is Petitioner's Exhibit #2 admitted into evidence. The alcoholic beverage purchased by the confidential informant is Petitioner's Exhibit #4 admitted into evidence.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Mary Lener Arnold have her beverage license suspended for a period of 30 days based upon the charge proven in the hearing. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Winson, Esquire Staff Attorney Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mary Lener Arnold t/a Buggs' Drive Inn Main Street Greenville, Florida
Findings Of Fact By Stipulation filed September 11, 1986, the parties agreed to findings of fact 1-11. Donna Sawyer filed a preliminary application to participate in the state lottery for liquor license on January 20, 1984, on Department of Business Regulation form No. 747L. On September 18, 1984, Donna Sawyer was notified by Respondent that she had been selected in the lottery held on September 12, 1984, to be eligible to apply for a state quota liquor license. That on or about November 2, 1984, Donna Sawyer, acting through her wholly owned corporation, Sarasota County Liquors, Inc., filed a sworn "application for Alcoholic Beverage License" (Department of Business Regulation Form No. 700L), with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. That application included a description of a location which was to be the licensed premises. A Personal Questionaire, Department of Business Regulation Form 710L, was also included by Petitioner with said application. The license application was denied by Respondent on March 8, 1985. The grounds for the denial as stated in the denial letter were Petitioner's failure to provide: (1) proof of right of occupancy to the premises Petitioner was seeking to license; (2) verification of financial investment; (3) business name, and (4) sketch of the premises affixed to the application. On April 10, 1985, Sandra Allen, Esquire, acting on behalf of Petitioner, requested an administrative hearing in order to contest the March 8, 1985, denial of the subject license. Joseph Forbes, Esquire, of Gainesville, Florida, was then retained by Petitioner to resolve the denial of the requested license, which was then pending before the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, as an informal administrative proceeding, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. In this capacity, Forbes, among other things filed a Motion for Continuance and Stipulation in this case attached to a June 6, 1985 cover letter. Forbes thereafter reached an agreement in the informal proceeding with Thomas Klein, Esquire, then counsel of record for Respondent, evidenced by letter dated October 1, 1985, which in its relevant portions indicated: This is to continue our telephone conversation of October 1, 1985, in which the following was discussed and agreed upon: Sarasota Liquors - your client will have 45 days from the date of this letter to cure the defects set forth in the March 8, 1985 letter of denial. Please direct your client to respond to the Tallahassee office. In order to rectify the original deficiencies causing the license denial, Petitioner re-filed an Application for Alcoholic Beverage License, Department of Business Regulation Form 700L, including exhibits, with Respondent, on or about November 13, 1985. Petitioner's re-filed license application was denied by Respondent on February 19, 1986, for two reasons: (1) "Application incomplete as applicant does not have right of occupancy to the premises for which she is seeking to license," and (2) "Division is unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation." On or about November 4, 1985, while searching for a location to submit as the licensed premises, in the re-filed application of November 13, 1985, Donna Sawyer and Ocie Allen met with Alton Allen at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida, who was an agent for Walter Spector, owner of several retail store spaces at that address. Ocie Allen, acting on behalf of his corporation, Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, entered into a lease for a store at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida. On or about November 4, 1985, Ocie Allen, acting on behalf of his corporation Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, purportedly subleased the premises at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida to Petitioner. That Petitioner had submitted a letter dated November 4, 1984, signed by Jim Irey, as President of Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., which is attached to the November 13, 1985 application, which stated that certain financial support would be available to the subject alcoholic beverage sales contemplated by Petitioner. That as a result of the investigation following the November 13, 1985 application, Respondent was "unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation," since Respondent's agents were unable to locate Jim Irey or his company at the address indicated on the November 4, 1984 letter. Based upon the evidence presented, the following additional findings of fact are made: Donna Sawyer's preliminary application to participate in the state lottery for a quota liquor license included instructions to the applicant that it was the first part of a two part application and that the second part would require proof of occupancy for the premises to be licensed. The second part of the application was that license application filed with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco on November 2, 1984, and again on November 13, 1985. As part of the notification that she was eligible to apply for a state quota liquor license, Donna Sawyer was advised that she had 45 days to file a full and complete application and that if she failed to do so, this failure would be deemed as a waiver of her right to file for a new quota liquor license. The letter also advised her that the Division had 180 days from the date of the drawing to act upon her application. The Petitioner's first quota liquor license application was denied on March 8, 1985. March 8, 1985, was within 180 days of the applicable lottery drawing held on September 12, 1984. The agreement of the parties to resolve the March 8, 1985, denial of the subject license evidences an tacit agreement by the parties to waive any applicable time limits existing at that time in order to allow the Petitioner to resubmit a corrected application within 45 days as allowed by the Thomas Klein letter of October 1, 1985. The Division investigated the Petitioner's second application and determined that the applicant did not have a right of occupancy to the premises sought to be licensed, 258 Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida, because Petitioner only had a purported sublease for the subject premises from Ft. Myers A & T Corporation. Ft. Myers A & T Corporation had obtained a lease for the property on November 4, 1985, from Walter Spector, deceased at the time of the administrative hearing. Said lease between Walter Spector, lessor, and Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, lessee, provided that subleases must be approved by the lessor and be in writing. The Petitioner did not produce evidence of written authorization by Walter Spector to allow Ocie Allen or Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, Inc., to sublease the subject premises to the Petitioner or to any other person. The only evidence of such authorization was the hearsay statement by Ocie Allen that Walter Spector had orally given such authorization. Furthermore, Mr. Alton Allen, then agent for Mr. Spector for leasing this property testified he had no knowledge that Mr. Spector was ever informed of a sublease. Therefore it is found that the sublease violated a material provision of the underlying lease from Walter Spector to Ft. Myers A & T Corporation. Mr. Ocie Allen, agent for the Petitioner and Donna Sawyer, testified and it is found that there was no intention for the Petitioner to operate an alcoholic beverage license at the 258 Tamiami Trail location. Petitioner's November 13, 1985, license application was also denied on February 19, 1986, for: Application incomplete as . . . the Division is unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation. This denial was due to the Division's agents being unable to verify the availability of financial funding from Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc. The Petitioner had submitted a November 9, 1984 letter from that corporation in its November 13, 1985 license application offering certain funding. Upon checking phone directories and making attempted telephone calls to the source named in that letter, the Division was not able to find the named business as source of funding. The Division further investigated Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc. as an alleged source of funding by sending an agent, Robert B. Baggett, to the address supplied by the applicant in a November 9, 1984 letter from Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., only to find that no such business was located there and no neighbors knew of a new location. Sandra Allen, Esquire, testified that the source of the funding at the time of the second application was a new company run by the same person who was behind Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., which was named as the source in the November 9, 1984 letter. However, this new company's name and address and verification of continued financial support to the Petitioner could not reasonably be determined by the Division and no evidence was presented that the Division had ever been provided with said new company's name or location prior to the denial of the second license application. Contradictory testimony was presented by Lt. Ewing and Sgt. Mills as to the existence of a policy requiring a "14 day" deficiency notice letter to applicants. It is clear that that policy was not recognized in the office supervised by Sgt. Mills. It was also not established that Lt. Ewing had the authority to set or enunciate policy for the Division.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of its license under the beverage law. Specifically, Respondent purportedly violated the actions set forth in two counts, as follows: Count I--Respondent failed to "provide the required service area, seating and equipment to serve 200 persons full course meals at tables at one time as required by its license. [S]ections 561.20(2)(A)(4), within Section 561.29(1)(A), Florida Statutes"; and Count II--Respondent failed to "provide at least 4,000 square feet of area dedicated to the operation of the restaurant as required by its license. [S]ections 561.20(2)(A)(4), within Section 561.29(1)(A), Florida Statutes." Respondent has also raised the issue of whether Petitioner should be estopped from enforcement actions concerning the alleged violations.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, issuing and monitoring licenses to businesses within the state relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages. Respondent is the holder of an alcoholic beverage license, No. BEV46-261 Series 4-COP/SR (the "License"). An SR, or Special Restaurant, license is a unique kind of license which was issued by the Division prior to the establishment of quota licenses. Holders of SR licenses are allowed to sell beer, wine and liquor, package sales and sales by the drink on the premises. Quota licenses are issued based on a population ratio, i.e., no more than one license per 7,500 people in a given geographic area may exist. When Respondent obtained its SR license in 1979 (by way of transfer from the original owner of that license), the existing statutes mandated that the License be housed in a building of not less than 4,000 square feet with room in the building to seat at least 200 people at any one time. The statutes also required that food be served at all times the establishment was open. In 1979, when Respondent filed an application seeking to obtain the transfer of the SR license that had been issued in 1957, the application included an Affidavit from Marianne Gunn agreeing to a specific location (2704 Anderson Avenue, Fort Myers, Florida)1 for the business, which was to be known as the Stardust Lounge. The Affidavit affirmed Marianne Gunn's agreement to maintain the premises with the necessary equipment and supplies to seat 200 people at any one time. The Affidavit affirmed that the building housing Stardust Lounge would be at least 4,000 square feet in size. The License was then transferred to Respondent by the Division. Approximately one year after receiving the License and commencing operations, the Stardust Lounge burned down. Some undisclosed portion of the building remained, but no business could be operated on the site. It would have been difficult to rebuild the building under the then-current building codes. Further, the City of Fort Myers expressed its opposition to the existence of an alcoholic beverage establishment at that site. Some time after the fire, Respondent asked the Division to place the License in an inactive status (also known as placing a license in escrow). The request from Respondent asked that the License be placed in escrow for up to eight months. Respondent represented that it was in negotiation with the City of Fort Myers concerning a land swap to settle certain claims Respondent had against the city. Respondent estimated the negotiations would go on for approximately two months. Respondent advised the Division that if negotiations were successful, it would allow the License to be cancelled upon transfer of the premises to the city. If the negotiations were not successful, Respondent estimated it would need at least six months to sell the property at a private sale. It was Respondent's intent that the License be "taken care of" along with the land deal. "That's what that was all about," Fox testified at final hearing. Based upon Respondent's request, the Division apparently placed the License in escrow. There was no documentation presented at final hearing to substantiate this fact. However, the Division sent Respondent a bill each year to renew the License despite there being no physical site for operating a business by the licensee. Respondent dutifully paid the renewal fee each year. Eighteen years after the License was placed in escrow, the State of Florida commenced condemnation proceedings relating to a portion of the premises where the Stardust Lounge had formerly existed.2 During this nearly two-decade hiatus, Respondent continued to renew the License each year upon notice from the Division. Respondent's counsel sent a letter to the Division dated June 27, 2000, which said in pertinent part: We send you this letter at the request of our client, Mrs. Fox. . . . She has a liquor license in escrow with the Department. Due to the condemnation taking, she will not be able to utilize the license at this location and she has agreed that if this license can be moved to another location, it would not be an issue in the condemnation case. The letter did not address the issue of Respondent's prior representation that the License would be cancelled within eight months of its May 21, 1982, letter, some 18 years earlier. The Division responded to Respondent's counsel in a letter dated the very next day which stated in pertinent part: I am responding to the request of you and the licensee wanting to know if the liquor license that is held in the name of Marianne Gunn, DBA Stardust Lounge is movable. In the case of the property being taken by the state, the license may be moved one time and only one time. Providing that we have copies of all paperwork involved with the property condemnation taking. This license is not a moveable license unless in a case like this. The only thing that the licensee needs to understand is that it is changing location only one time. The Division's letter did not mention the escrow status of the License, either. The inartfully worded request and nebulous response added to the confusion concerning the status of the License. There is no evidence indicating whether any information concerning the condemnation was ever provided to the Division. Respondent could not say at final hearing when the condemnation actually occurred, how much land was taken, or how much was paid for the land. The License apparently remained in escrow at that time pending a move to some other location. Marianne Gunn Fox testified that the reason for her negotiations with the City of Fort Myers in 1982 was partly because the city did not want the bar located at the site where it had burned down. She testified that she had received insurance proceeds from the fire and intended to rebuild the lounge, but the city objected. That was the only testimony given as to why the lounge was not rebuilt during the 18 years it remained in escrow. Glen Fox testified that the original site of the Stardust Lounge would not be acceptable for rebuilding the structure after the fire due to certain building code issues. Both Mr. and Mrs. Fox testified that there was insufficient land available to build on site after the property condemnation taking. Fox testified that she owned three lots at the corner of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Cranford Avenue. Those lots were 50-feet-wide by 150-feet-deep (for a presumed total lot size of 150-feet-wide by 150-feet-deep). Fox does not know the size of the lots after the condemnation proceeding. It has long been the policy of the Division, pursuant to its interpretations of the Beverage Law set forth in statute, that SR licenses could not be moved from their original location. In 2005 or 2006, a licensee who was operating a business in American Beach filed a lawsuit against the Division seeking to move his SR license to a different location. As a result of the lawsuit, the Division changed its existing policy to allow for such a change. The new policy was posted on the Division's website for review by SR license holders. There is no evidence that SR license holders were notified about the change in policy by any other means. Respondent does not remember receiving any notice whatsoever regarding the change in policy. Within four to six months, and as a result of further legal research by Division attorneys, the Division once again altered its policy concerning the transfer of SR licenses. The newly-revised policy established the current Division position, i.e., that no SR license could be moved for any reason. Further, the policy states that all licensed premises must be in continuous operation or else the license would be forfeited. Again, the Division posted the new policy on its website and notified all SR license holders by way of letters to their establishments (or, in the case of Respondent, to the last known address). It is unclear from the record whether the letter was ever sent to or received by Respondent, although the Division obviously had Respondent's address because it sent renewal notices there each year. Some time after the change in policy, the Division determined that Respondent's license must be terminated or revoked. At that time, there were no premises associated with the License. The last time the License was in operation was 1979 or 1980, some 28 years prior to the Administrative Action being filed. The official address of the premises on the License during each of the renewal periods since 1980 had been "Escrow." That is, there was no site address associated with the License. There was obviously some address associated with the License, however, since Fox received annual billing statements from the Division. In November 2007, the Division issued an Administrative Action against Respondent concerning the License. The Administrative Action alleged that Respondent had not complied with the requirements of the License, i.e., size of premises and on-going operations. The Division indicated that it would sanction the License, including, but not limited to, revocation. Respondent does not dispute the fact that it is not complying with the requirements for an active license, but maintains that its escrowed license is exempt from those requirements. The License, despite being inactive for 28 years, is still apparently valid at this point in time (based on the Division's acceptance of Respondent's renewal payments each year). The License may have some monetary value, but there was no competent, substantial evidence presented at final hearing as to what the value might actually be. Marianne Gunn Fox testified that she did not know how much the License was worth, only that "nothing is worth as much as it used to be." Fox cannot remember how much she paid for the License when it was transferred to her. She cannot remember how much she asked for the License when she offered it for sale. She cannot remember how much was offered for the License as part of the condemnation sale. Fox does know that she paid an annual fee each year for renewal of the License. She does not know what the fee was each year, but "I paid whatever the state told me was due." (The Division testified that the annual fee was $1,820.00. Presuming 28 years of payments, the total paid to-date would be approximately $50,960.) When suggested to Fox by her counsel that the License was worth $300,000, she agreed with that amount, but could not substantiate why that amount was valid. Fox testified that she would like a "reasonable time" to market the License for sale. She did not express what a reasonable time might be, but has not been able (or willing) to sell the License for over 28 years. Respondent put the License "out for feelers" three or four years ago, but did not include an asking price for the License. About seven months ago, someone told Fox that the License was worth approximately $326,000, but there is no support for that estimate. Patrick Roberts, former law enforcement major with the Division, opined that he would have handled Respondent's case differently had it come across his desk. He opined that the requirement for 4,000 square feet and seating for 200 people should only apply to an existing business, not one in escrow. Roberts agreed that only quota licenses are allowed escrow status by statute. Roberts did not express any opinion as to the requirement that a business be on-going at all times. Roberts agreed that an SR license should not be placed in escrow, but said he'd try to negotiate a settlement, rather than file an Administrative Action. He did concur that an Administrative Action might be necessary if all else failed. Roberts did not opine that an Administrative Action was improper, only that it wasn't his first choice of action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, revoking Respondent, Fox Marianne Gunn, d/b/a Stardust Lounge's, License No. BEV46-261 Series 4-COP/SR. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2010.
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Respondent violated Section 562.02, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by unlawfully possessing certain alcoholic beverages on its licensed premises which were not authorized to be sold under its license; (2) whether Respondent violated Subsection 561.14(3), Florida Statutes, by purchasing or acquiring alcoholic beverages for the purpose of resale from persons not licensed as distributors; and (3) if so, what penalty or administrative fine should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and was at all times relevant hereto, the holder of alcoholic beverage License No. 62-10299, Series 2-COP, which permits the sale of beer and wine, but no other alcoholic beverages, for consumption on the premises. Petitioner seeks to impose sanctions on the license of Respondent. Mr. Pagini owned and operated Latin American Café, a restaurant located at 3780 Tampa Road, Oldsmar, Florida. The restaurant serves Latin American and South American foods and desserts, some of which contain alcoholic beverages in preparation of said food. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the menu for Latin American Café stated that only one type of liquor was used for cooking. Respondent was placed on the Division's "No Sale" list on August 21, 2007, for failure to renew its license. As a result of being on the "No Sale" list, distributors were prohibited from selling alcoholic beverages to Respondent. Nevertheless, as discussed below, a receipt dated August 23, 2007, shows that a distributor sold alcoholic beverages to Respondent. Due to Respondent's being placed on the "No Sale" list, Casey Simon, a special agent with the Division, conducted an inspection of Latin American Café on November 21, 2007. During the inspection, Agent Casey discovered beer and liquor on the premises. The beer was located in a cooler behind the bar at the front of the premises, and the liquor was located in the manager's office and in the kitchen cupboards. The liquor discovered on Respondent's premises on November 21, 2007, consisted of the following: (a) one, one-quart bottle of Mr. Boston Crème De Cassis; (b) one, 750-millimeter bottle of Cinzano Rosso Vermouth; (c) one, 750-millimeter bottle of Chevas Regal Whiskey; (d) one, 750-millimeter bottle of Sambuca Di Amare; (e) one, 1.75-liter bottle of Heritage Triple Sec; (f) one, 250-millimeter bottle of Chasqui Licor De Café; (g) one, 750-millimeter bottle of Truffles Liquor; (h) one, one-liter bottle of Sambroso Licor De Café; and (i) one, .75-liter bottle of Heritage Rum. Respondent contends that seven of the nine kinds of suspect liquor found on the premises were used for cooking, mostly desserts, at the business. The remaining two liquors found on the premises, Chevas Regal Whiskey and Sambuca, were for Mr. Pagani's personal use. The Chevas Regal Whiskey was a present that had been given to Mr. Pagini, and at the time of the inspection, the whiskey was in a box in his office. The Sambuca Di Amare is a "digestive" liquor made in Italy and was for Mr. Pagini's personal use. Although most of the liquor was found on Respondent's premises during the inspection, Respondent's menu does not list any of the suspect liquors as an ingredient in any of the menu items. The beer discovered on Respondent's premises on November 21, 2007, consisted of the following: (a) 41, 12-ounce bottles of Bud Light, with a born date of September 2007; (b) six, 12-ounce bottles of Budweiser; (c) 27, 12-ounce bottles of Miller Lite; (d) 12, 12-ounce bottles of Heineken; and (e) 19, 12-ounce bottles of Corona. The Bud Light's "born date" of September 2007, is the date in which the beer was manufactured. Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that beer with a "born date" of September 2007, cannot be purchased prior to that month. During the November 21, 2007, investigation, the Division's agent requested invoices for the beer found on the premises. Respondent produced a receipt from Sam's Club dated November 16, 2007, which reflected the sale of various items to a "member," identified, presumably, by a membership number. Among the items purchased were other documents provided to Agent Simon which showed that Latin American Café was the member on the November receipt. Next to the name of each kind of beer was the number "24" which, presumably, indicated the number of bottles of beer that were purchased. Mr. Pagini testified that many of the items purchased from Sam's Club on November 16, 2007, including the Bud Light and the Heineken, were for personal use. At this proceeding, Respondent introduced into evidence copies of two receipts which reflect that it purchased alcoholic beverages from two authorized distributors, J.J. Taylor Distributors Florida, Inc. ("J.J. Taylor Distributors") and Great Bay Distributors, Inc. ("Great Bay Distributors"). The receipts were dated August 9, 2007, and August 23, 2007, respectively. The receipt from J.J. Taylor Distributors dated August 9, 2007, reflects that Respondent purchased the following alcoholic beverages: (a) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Becks beer; (b) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Braham beer; (c) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Heineken beer; (d) 24, 12-ounce bottles of "Lite" beer; and (e) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Presidente. The receipt from Great Bay Distributors dated August 23, 2007, reflected the purchase of the following alcoholic beverages: (a) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Budweiser beer; (b) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Corona beer; (c) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Modesto Especial; and (d) 24, 12-ounce bottles of Negro Modesto. Despite Respondent's providing receipts from distributors, no plausible explanation was provided to establish when and from whom the Bud Light, discovered on Respondent's premises on November 21, 2007, was purchased. The receipts from the distributor were dated about one month prior to the Bud Light's born date of September 2007. The suspect Bud Light has a born date of September 2007, which is after the dates of the distributor receipts and after Respondent was placed on the "No Sale" list. No evidence was offered to establish where the suspect beer, Bud Light, was purchased or acquired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order: (1) finding that Respondent, Latin American Café and Market, Inc., d/b/a Latin American Café, violated Section 562.02, Florida Statutes; (2) finding that Respondent did not violate Subsection 562.14(3), Florida Statutes; (3) imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 for the violation of Section 562.02, Florida Statutes; and requiring the fine to be paid within 30 days of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2009.
The Issue The issues for disposition are whether Respondent sold alcoholic beverages to an underage person in violation of section 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Petitioner’s Administrative Action dated February 20, 1996, and if so, what penalty or discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the holder of alcoholic beverage license no. 69-01472, Series 2APS, for a licensed premises doing business as Superette #3, located at 199 North Country Club Road, Lake Mary, Seminole County, Florida. On February 8, 1996 and at all relevant times, Salim Dhanani was the sole corporate officer and sole shareholder of Superette #3, Inc., the holder of the above-referenced alcoholic beverage license. The “City/County Investigative Bureau” (CCIB) is a task force of officers from the Seminole County Sheriff’s Department and surrounding cities assigned to investigate crimes relating to drugs, alcohol and vice, including the sale of alcohol to minors. CCIB acts on complaints and works with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (DABT). Darrell Brewer, born March 18, 1976, was a police explorer who was asked to help the CCIB investigate sales of alcohol to underage persons. On February 8, 1996, he was 19 years old and was working with Officers Johnson and Hartner. On February 8, 1996, in the evening around 8:00 p.m., Brewer and a CCIB agent entered the licensed premises, Superette #3. Brewer wore jeans and a tee-shirt and carried cash and a valid ID, which he was instructed to present if requested. Brewer picked out a 6-pack of Miller Genuine Draft beer and took it to the counter, where he purchased it without being asked for identification or any question regarding his age. Brewer turned over the beer to Officer Johnson, who returned to the store and arrested the clerk who had made the sale, Salim Dhanani. In May 1996, Dhanani went to court and pled no contest to the criminal charge of sale of alcohol to an underage person. He paid a fine. In his eleven years in the United States, this is the only violation by Dhanani. He worked in several places before taking over Superette #3 in November 1993, and he never had problems with DABT. After the Brewer incident, Dhanani hired a private consultant to train his wife and him and their one employee. They learned to “ID” everyone, including regular customers; they posted signs and notices informing customers of their “responsible vendor policy” and their intent to prosecute minors attempting to purchase alcohol. Dhanani admits that he sold beer to Brewer without asking for identification and without questioning his age. Brewer is a large, mature youth who, at the time of hearing, looked to be in his mid-20’s. To Dhanani, at the time of sale, Brewer appeared to be “28 or so”. Under the responsible vendor program any customer who appears to be under the age of 30 must be required to present proper identification. Through Capt. Ewing, DABT presented unrebutted evidence that the premises in Lake Mary has been vacated by the licensee, Superette #3, Inc., and a new license was issued to the landlord of the premises. Cancellation of the Superette #3 license is in abeyance pending this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Alcohol Beverages and Tobacco enter its final order finding that Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Action, assessing a fine of $1000.00, and suspending the license for 7 days, or until Respondent has found an approved new location. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of April 1997 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas D. Winokur, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Steven G. Horneffer, Esquire Suite 109 101 Sunnytown Road Casselberry, Florida 32707 Richard Boyd, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue This case concerns the application of William E. Morey, who does business as Morey's Restaurant, to acquire a new series 2-COP beverage license from the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, in which the Respondent has denied the license application on the grounds that the granting of such a license would be contrary to provisions of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code deal with the prohibition of a financial interest directly or indirectly between distributors of alcoholic beverages and vendors of alcoholic beverages.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Willian E. Morey, applied to the State of Florida, Departent of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, for the issuance of series 2-COP alcoholic beverage license. By letter dated, January 23, 1979, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco denied the application based upon the belief that such issuance wood violate the provisions of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code. The pertinent provision of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, states: 561.42 Tied house evil; financial aid and assistance to vendor by manufacturer or distributor prohibited; procedure for en- forcement; exception.-- (1) No licensed manufacturer or distributor of any of the beverages herein referred to shall have any financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or business of any vendor licensed under the Beverage Law, nor shall such licensed manu- facturer or distributor assist any vendor by any gifts or loans of money or property of any description or by the giving of rebates of any kind whatsoever. * * * In keeping with the general principle announced in Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has enacted Rule 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code, which states: 7A-4.18 Rental between vendor and distri- butor prohibited. It shall be considered a violation of Section 561.42, Florida Sta- tutes, for any distributor to rent any property to a licensed vendor or from a licensed vendor if said property is used, in whole or part as part of the licensed premises of said vendor or if said property is used in any manner in connection with said vendor's place of business. The facts in this case reveal that William E. Morey leases the premises, for which he has applied for a license, from Anthony Distributors, Inc., of 1710 West Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. Anthony Distributors, Inc., is the holder of a J-DBW license to distribute alcoholic beverages in the State of Florida. This license is held with the permission of the State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Consequently, the issuance of a series 2-COP license to William E. Morey at a time when he is leasing the licensed premises from a distributor of alcoholic beverages, namely, Anthony Distributors, Inc., would be in violation of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, and Role 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, William E. Morey's application for a series 2-COP beverage license be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Willian E. Morey d/b/a Morey's Restaurant 4101 North 66th Street St. Petersburg, Florida 33709 Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for an alcoholic beverage license should be denied because of the direct or indirect interest of John Lee Johnson, a person allegedly lacking good moral character.
Findings Of Fact In May, 1982, petitioner Betty Jean Johnson applied for a 2 APS (beer and wine) alcoholic beverage license to be used in connection with a business known as Johnson's Corner Grocery, 1400 North J. Street, Pensacola, Florida. On her application, petitioner indicated that she owned the business and that no other person had a direct or indirect interest in the business. (R-1) Prior to the petitioner filing her application, John Lee Johnson, her husband, had applied for a beverage license for the same location under his own name. When he failed to disclose his criminal history on the application, his application was denied and he was charged with the crime of filing a false official written statement. On May 12, 1982, he was convicted by the County Court of Escambia County. (Testimony of Baxley; R-3) John Johnson's filing of a false official statement supports an inference that he lacks good moral character. Petitioner did not present evidence sufficient to rebut or negate this inference. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, John Johnson has a direct or indirect interest in Johnson's Corner Grocery. He owns the underlying real property. He signs, and is authorized to sign, checks on the business account of Johnson's Corner Grocery. The business's utilities, light, water, and gas accounts are all in his name. (Testimony of Baxley, Johnson, Kelly; R-4) Petitioner, however, manage's the day-to-day operations of Johnson's Corner Grocery. On her application, she indicated that she had purchased the business for $80,000, with $25,000 down, and $55,000 financed by the Barnett Bank. She now admits that the $25,000 down payment was provided by John Johnson, her husband, and that he also co-signed the $55,000 note and mortgage. Her application, however, does not disclose Mr. Johnson's participation in the purchase and financing of, the business. (Testimony of Johnson; R-1, R-4) On November 9, 1982, three days before hearing, Mr. Johnson leased the Johnson's Corner Grocery property to petitioner for $675.00 per month for three years. The handwritten lease, which was not signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, states that Mr. Johnson will not be "responsible for . . . the operations of . . . [the] business." This assertion is rejected as unworthy of belief in light of his extensive involvement in purchasing and setting up the business, and his continuing access to its funds. (P-1)
