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DIANE ANDREW vs SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 15-007041 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Dec. 14, 2015 Number: 15-007041 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2016

The Issue Whether Petitioner, who is employed as an occupational therapist by a local school board, is considered a “teacher” eligible for the 2015 State of Florida Best and Brightest Scholarship Program.

Findings Of Fact The 2015 Florida Legislature Appropriations Act created the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program, chapter 2015- 232, p. 27, Item 99A. The eligibility pre-requisites for applying to and being awarded the Scholarship (up to $10,000) were established in the Scholarship. The Scholarship provides as follows: Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are provided to implement Florida's Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The funds shall be used to award a maximum of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a teacher must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment and have been evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the teacher is a first-year teacher who has not been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. In order to demonstrate eligibility for an award, an eligible teacher must submit to the school district, no later than October 1, 2015, an official record of his or her SAT or ACT score demonstrating that the teacher scored at or above the 80th percentile based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. By December 1, 2015, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the department the number of eligible teachers who qualify for the scholarship. By February 1, 2016, the department shall disburse scholarship funds to each school district for each eligible teacher to receive a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall provide payment of the scholarship to each eligible teacher. If the number of eligible teachers exceeds the total the department shall prorate the per teacher scholarship amount. The Scholarship does not define the word “teacher.” Petitioner, who timely filed an application for the Scholarship, contends that she is a “teacher” and is therefore eligible for the award. Respondent and Intervenor contend that Petitioner is an occupational therapist, and, as such, she is not considered a “classroom teacher,” which is the target group that the Legislature intended for the teacher scholarship program to cover. Petitioner contends that even if the Scholarship is limited to “classroom teachers,” she meets the statutory definition of a “classroom teacher” and is therefore eligible to receive the Scholarship. It is undisputed that the 2015 Scholarship language is vague as to whether the Scholarship is limited to classroom teachers. In 2016, the Legislature made it clear that the award is intended to only cover “classroom teachers.” Legislation enacted in subsequent legislative sessions may be examined to ascertain legislative intent. See Crews v. Fla. Pub. Emp’rs Council 79, AFSCME, 113 So. 3d 1063, 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)(citing Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1230 (Fla. 2006)). Recently, the Governor signed chapter 2016-62, Laws of Florida. Section 25 of chapter 2016-62 enacts section 1012.731, Florida Statutes, the Florida Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program.1/ Section 1012.731(2) provides that the “scholarship program shall provide categorical funding for scholarships to be awarded to classroom teachers, as defined in s. 1012.01(2)(a), who have demonstrated a high level of academic success.” The Legislature's amendment of the language, just a year after the first appropriation, confirms that the Legislature intended the award to go to "classroom teachers," as defined in chapter 1012. Petitioner was hired by Respondent as an occupational therapist. She has worked as an occupational therapist for Respondent for approximately 17 years. Petitioner does not hold a Florida teaching certificate and her position as an occupational therapist does not require a Florida teaching certificate. Instead, Petitioner is licensed by the Florida Department of Health, which has jurisdiction over ethical violations committed by occupational therapists licensed in Florida. In her position as an occupational therapist, Petitioner reports to Respondent’s director of Pupil Support Services, who supervises all therapists within Sarasota County Public Schools. Petitioner’s stated job goal is “[t]o facilitate the handicapped student’s independent functioning in the school setting.” Petitioner’s performance responsibilities, as set forth in her job description, are to: Conduct appropriate evaluation of students referred for possible exceptional student education needs and prepare reports of the evaluation and findings. Plan intervention and service delivery programs to meet student’s individual needs. Implement and direct interventions essential to meeting targeted students’ needs. Provide information and consultative services to appropriate personnel in support of students with disabilities. * * * Establish schedules for meeting with students, conferencing with parents and assisting in rehabilitation techniques. Provide resources to all stakeholders involved in the evaluation, identification of student needs and rehabilitation of students. Petitioner delivers therapeutic services individually or in a small group setting, in a room assigned to her, or in a classroom, usually at the same time a teacher is delivering instruction to the entire class. Petitioner completes “lesson plans,” which are referred to in the therapy setting as “plans of care.” Plans of care differ in substance from lesson plans prepared by teachers because lesson plans set out a teaching plan for the entire class, whereas plans of care set out therapeutic goals and activities directed to one student that complies with the goals set forth in a student's Individualized Education Plan (IEP). As an occupational therapist, Petitioner is responsible for maintaining a “class roster,” which is referred to in the therapy setting as a “caseload.” Occupational therapists maintain a caseload for student accountability purposes and for Medicaid billing purposes. Petitioner’s therapy sessions are assigned a “700” course code, which correlates in the Florida Department of Education's course directory to “related services.” Joint Exhibit O is an example of courses offered to students by Respondent. The course list includes math, language arts, physical education, science, social studies, art, Chinese, music, and occupational therapy. Petitioner is listed as the “teacher” for the occupational therapy course. Unlike the other listed “teachers,” Petitioner is not instructing students in a subject area; she is delivering a service. See § 468.203(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). Succinctly stated, the difference, in this context, between “occupational therapy” and the other listed “courses,” is that occupational therapy is not a subject area that a student learns about; it is a service that a student receives to help them to achieve independent functioning. Although listed as “course” by Respondent, occupational therapy, as compared to the other listed “courses,” is not a “course” within the meaning of section 1012.01(2)(a).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County enter a final order finding Petitioner ineligible for the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2016.

Florida Laws (12) 1002.661003.011012.011012.341012.57120.569120.57468.1125468.203486.021627.6686641.31098
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs DOLLIE M. TUNSIL, 98-005286 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Dec. 02, 1998 Number: 98-005286 Latest Update: Jun. 04, 1999

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt owed to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Respondent applied for a student loan in the amount of $2,500 under the Florida Guaranteed Student Loan Program in an application dated August 8, 1986. Respondent needed the loan to pay the cost of her attendance at Roffler Hair Design College (school) for the period of September 1986 through January 1987. Petitioner guaranteed Respondent's loan. The loan number is 0000522112. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association (Glendale) issued the loan proceeds in two equal disbursements. The first disbursement took place on or about September 26, 1986. The second disbursement took place on or about November 7, 1986. Glendale subsequently sold the loan to Student Loan Marketing Association/Student Loan Services (SLS). The loan accrues interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per year unless Respondent is in deferment status, i.e. attending school on a minimum part-time basis. In this case, Respondent dropped out of school for a period of time in 1987. On or about June 25, 1987, the school returned $632.52 of the Respondent's loan to the lender. This sum represented the unused portion of Respondent's loan. Respondent's account was credited accordingly. The last day that Respondent attended the school was May 27, 1988. By letter dated September 1, 1988, SLS notified Respondent of the repayment schedule for her loan. Her first payment was due on December 27, 1988. Respondent made no payments on the loan to Glendale or SLS. Accordingly, SLS declared Respondent's loan in default and filed a claim dated August 14, 1989, with Petitioner. On February 20, 1992, Petitioner, as guarantor of the loan, paid SLS for Respondent's defaulted student loan. On that date, the claim principal was $1,864.48 ($2,500 less the $635.52 credit) and the outstanding interest due was $469.95. After Petitioner acquired the loan, the outstanding interest was capitalized resulting in a balance of $2,334.43. This sum accrues interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per year. Respondent made no payment on her loan after Petitioner acquired it until a portion of her lottery winnings was applied to her account. By letter dated August 31, 1998, Petitioner notified the Department of Lottery about Respondent's outstanding defaulted loan in the amount of $3,561.89, including principal and interest. Petitioner requested the Department of the Lottery to transmit a portion of Respondent's prize money to be credited toward Respondent's debt. Thereafter, the Department of the Lottery transmitted $3,561.89 of Respondent's prize money to Petitioner. By letter dated September 14, 1998, Petitioner notified Respondent that it was in receipt of $3,561.89 of her $5,000 lottery prize. Petitioner applied Petitioner's winnings to her outstanding balance. Respondent has applied for and received at least one other loan which is held by the United States Department of Education (USDE) in the Federal Direct Consolidation Loan Program. The loan which is the subject of this proceeding is not the same loan which is held by USDE.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner was authorized to apply $3,561.89 of Respondent's lottery prize toward her outstanding debt for a student loan. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald E. Stowers, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dollie M. Tunsil 5813 Pompano Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.5724.115
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MADISON OAKS EAST, LLC, AND ARC 2019, LLC vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 20-001780BID (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 09, 2020 Number: 20-001780BID Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s ("Florida Housing") intended action to award housing tax credit funding to Intervenors Westside Phase, I, LLLP ("Westside"), HTG Edgewood, Ltd. ("HTG Edgewood"), Diplomat South, LLC ("Diplomat"), and Tranquility at Milton, LLC ("Tranquility"), under Request for Applications 2019-113 Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Medium and Small Counties (the "RFA"), is contrary to governing statutes, rules, the RFA specifications, and clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code, and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. The low income housing tax credit program (commonly referred to as "tax credits" or "housing credits") was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These housing tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects that qualify. These credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. The effect is that the credits reduce the amount that the developer would otherwise have to borrow. Because the total debt is lower, a housing tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the housing credits. The demand for housing tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. The Competitive Application Process Florida Housing is authorized to allocate housing tax credits and other funding by means of a request for applications or other competitive solicitation in section 420.507(48) and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60, which govern the competitive solicitation process for several different programs, including the program for housing tax credits. Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing allocate its competitive funding through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. 1 In their applications, applicants request a specific dollar amount of housing tax credits to be given to the applicant each year for a period of ten years. Applicants normally sell the rights to that future stream of income housing tax credits (through the sale of almost all of the ownership interest in the applicant entity) to an investor to generate the amount of capital needed to build the development. The amount which can be received depends 1 A request for application is equivalent to a "request for proposal" as indicated in rule 67- 60.009(3). upon the accomplishment of several factors, such as a certain percentage of the projected total development cost; a maximum funding amount per development based on the county in which the development will be located; and whether the development is located within certain designated areas of some counties. This, however, is not an exhaustive list of the factors considered. The RFA was issued on August 20, 2019, and responses were initially due October 29, 2019. The RFA was modified on September 10, 2019, and the application deadline was extended to November 5, 2019. No challenges were made to the terms of the RFA. Through the RFA, Florida Housing expects to award up to an estimated $14,805,028 of housing tax credits to proposed developments in medium counties and up to an estimated $1,413,414 of housing credits to proposed developments in small counties. Florida Housing received 184 applications in response to the RFA. A review committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing's Board of Directors (the "Board"). The review committee found 169 applications eligible and 15 applications ineligible. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, 11 applications were preliminarily recommended for funding. The review committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On March 6, 2020, the Board met and considered the recommendations of the review committee. Also, on March 6, 2020, at approximately 9:35 a.m., Petitioners and all other applicants received notice that the Board determined whether applications were eligible or ineligible for consideration for funding, and that certain eligible applicants were selected for award of housing credits, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets on the Florida Housing website, www.floridahousing.org, one listing the Board approved scoring results and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund. In the March 6, 2020, posting, Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to 11 applicants, including Westside, HTG Edgewood, Diplomat, and Tranquility. Petitioners timely filed notices of protest and petitions for formal administrative proceedings, and Intervenors timely intervened. The RFA Ranking and Selection Process The RFA contemplates a structure in which the applicant is scored on eligibility items and obtains points for other items. A summary of the eligibility items is available in section 5.A.1., beginning on page 64 of the RFA. Only applications that meet all the eligibility items will be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection. There were two total point items scored in this RFA. Applicants could receive five points for Submission of Principals Disclosure Form, stamped by the Corporation as "Pre-Approved," and five points for Development Experience Withdrawal Disincentive, for a total application score of up to ten points. The RFA has three funding goals: The Corporation has a goal to fund four Medium County Developments that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal outlined in Section Four A.11.a. of the RFA. The Corporation has a goal to fund two Developments with a Demographic commitment of Family that select and qualify for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal outlined in Section Four A.11.b. of the RFA. The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) Development that qualifies for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal outlined in Section Four A.11.c. of the RFA. *Note: During the Funding Selection Process outlined below, Developments selected for these goals will only count toward one goal. As part of the funding selection process, the RFA starts with the application sorting order on page 68. The highest scoring applications are determined by first sorting together all eligible applications from the highest score to lowest score, with any scores that are tied separated as follows: First, by the Application's eligibility for the Proximity Funding Preference (which is outlined in Section Four A.5.e. of the RFA) with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.10.e. of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Development Category Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.4.b.(4) of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application's Leveraging Classification, applying the multipliers outlined in item 3 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications having the Classification of A listed above Applications having the Classification of B); Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Funding Preference which is outlined in Item 4 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); And finally, by lottery number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. The RFA includes a Funding Test where small county applications will be selected for funding only if there is enough small county funding available to fully fund the eligible housing credit request amount, and medium county applications will be selected for funding only if there is enough medium county funding available to fully fund the eligible housing credit request amount. The RFA outlines a specific County’s Award Tally: As each application is selected for tentative funding, the county where the proposed Development is located will have one Application credited towards the County’s Award Tally. The Corporation will prioritize eligible unfunded Applications that meet the Funding Test and are located within counties that have the lowest County Award Tally above other eligible unfunded Applications with a higher County Award Tally that also meet the Funding Test, even if the Applications with a higher County Award Tally are higher ranked. According to the RFA, the funding selection process is as follows: The first Application selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible Applications that qualifies for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal. The next four Applications selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible Medium County Applications that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. The next two Applications selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible Family Applications that qualify for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/HUD-designated SADDA Goal, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. The next Applications selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Small County Applications that (i) can meet the Small County Funding Test and (ii) have a County Award Tally that is less than or equal to any other eligible unfunded Small County Applications. If Small County funding remains and no unfunded eligible Small County Application can meet the Small County Funding Test, no further Small County Applications will be selected and the remaining Small County funding will be added to the Medium County funding amount. The next Application(s) selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Medium County Applications that (i) can meet the Medium County Funding Test and (ii) have a County Award Tally that is less than or equal to any other eligible unfunded Medium County Applications. If Medium County funding remains and no unfunded eligible Medium County Application can meet the Medium County Funding Test, no further Applications will be selected and the remaining funding will be distributed as approved by the Board. According to the terms of the RFA: Funding that becomes available after the Board takes action on the [Review] Committee’s recommendation(s), due to an Applicant withdrawing its Application, an Applicant declining its invitation to enter credit underwriting, or an Applicant’s inability to satisfy a requirement outlined in this RFA, will be distributed as approved by the Board. All 184 applications for the RFA were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. HTG Edgewood’s Application (DOAH Case No. 20-1778BID) During scoring, Florida Housing determined that the HTG Edgewood application was eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, selected HTG Edgewood for funding. HTG Edgewood, Florida Housing, and Rochester now agree that HTG Edgewood’s application is ineligible for consideration for funding and the application of Rochester is eligible for funding. Accordingly, HTG Edgewood, Florida Housing, and Rochester agree that Florida Housing should deem the HTG Edgewood application ineligible for funding and Rochester’s application eligible for funding. Diplomat’s Application (DOAH Case No. 20-1779BID) During scoring, Florida Housing deemed the Diplomat application eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, preliminarily selected Diplomat for funding. Diplomat and Madison Square now agree that Diplomat is ineligible for funding. Florida Housing does not contest Diplomat’s admission of ineligibility. Madison Square, Diplomat, and Florida Housing agree that Madison Square is eligible for funding. Tranquility’s Application (DOAH Case No. 20-1780BID) Florida Housing deemed the Tranquility application eligible for funding, and pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Tranquility was selected for preliminary funding. Tranquility’s Principals Disclosure Form Madison Oaks contests Florida Housing’s preliminary selection of Tranquility for an award of housing tax credits. In its challenge, Madison Oaks argues that Tranquility failed to correctly complete its Principals Disclosure Form by not identifying the multiple roles of its disclosed principal. Specifically, Madison Oaks argues that Tranquility failed to list Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, which is disclosed as a manager, as a non- investor member as well. Accordingly, Madison Oaks contends Tranquility is not eligible or should lose five points. The purpose of the Principals Disclosure Form is to allow Florida Housing to track an entity’s past and future dealings with Florida Housing so that Florida Housing is aware of the entity with which it is dealing. In regard to principal disclosure, the RFA states, in relevant part: c. Principals Disclosure for the Applicant and for each Developer (5 points) Eligibility Requirements To meet the submission requirements, the Applicant must upload the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Form Rev. 05-2019)("Principals Disclosure Form") with the Application and Development Cost Pro Forma, as outlined in Section Three above. Prior versions of the Principal Disclosure Form will not be accepted. The Principals Disclosure Form must identify, pursuant to subsections 67-48.002(94), 67- 48.0075(8) and 67-48.0075(9), the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) as of the Application Deadline. The investor limited partner of an Applicant limited partnership or the investor member of an Applicant limited liability company investor must be identified. A Principals Disclosure Form should not include, for any organizational structure, any type of entity that is not specifically included in the Rule definition of Principals. Point Item Applicants will receive 5 points if the uploaded Principal Disclosure Form was stamped "Approved" during the Advance Review Process. The Advance Review Process for Disclosure of Applicant and Developer Principals is available on the RFA Website and also includes samples which may assist the Applicant in completing the required Principals Disclosure Form. Note: It is the sole responsibility of the Applicant to review the Advance Review Process procedures and to submit any Principals Disclosure Form for review in a timely manner in order to meet the Application Deadline. The RFA website provides guidance and instructions to assist applicants in completing the principal disclosure. The instructions state: "List the name of each Member of the Applicant Limited Liability Company and label each as either non-investor Member or investor Member (i.e., equity provider and/or placeholder), as applicable." The RFA website guidance and instructions further provides Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQ’s") concerning principal disclosures. FAQ number 4 states: Q: If the Applicant entity is a member managed limited liability company, how should it be reflected on the form since there is no "member-manager" choice at the First Principal Disclosure Level? A: Each member-manager entity/person should be listed twice—once as a non-investor member and once as a manger. If Housing Credits are being requested, the investor-member(s) must also be listed in order for the form to be approved for a Housing Credit Application. On its Principals Disclosure Form, Tranquility listed two entities at the first principal disclosure level: Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, identified as a manager of the applicant and Timshel Partners, LLC, identified as an investor member of the applicant. However, Tranquility failed to identify the dual role of Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, as a non- investor member in addition to its disclosed role as a manger. Nevertheless, Tranquility’s equity proposal letter submitted as part of its application identified Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, as a member of the LLC because according to the equity proposal, Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, would retain a .01% ownership interest in the company. Thus, the role of Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, as a member is available within Tranquility’s application. Tranquility participated in Florida Housing’s Advance Review Process, and on October 17, 2019, Florida Housing approved the Principals Disclosure Form submitted by Tranquility during the Advance Review Process for an award of housing credits. During scoring, Tranquility received five points for having its Principals Disclosure Form stamped "Approved" by Florida Housing. Tranquility’s Principals Disclosure Form met the eligibility requirements of the RFA and Tranquility is entitled to the five points. In addition, Ms. Button persuasively and credibly testified that even if Tranquility’s failure to list the dual role of its disclosed principal on the Principals Disclosure Form is an error, it is so minor as to constitute a waivable, minor irregularity. As detailed above, Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC, was specifically designated as a manager on the form and information identifying Tranquility Milton Manager, LLC’s, additional role as a member is included in the equity proposal letter submitted with the application. Madison Oak’s Application (DOAH Case No. 20-1779BID) Madison Oaks’ application was deemed eligible for funding, but pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Madison Oaks was not selected for preliminary funding. Madison Oaks Site Control Certification Florida Housing and Tranquility now argue that Madison Oaks failed to demonstrate site control. As an eligibility item, the RFA requires applicants to demonstrate site control by providing a properly completed and executed Florida Housing Finance Corporation Site Control Certification form ("Site Control Form"). For the Site Control Form to be considered complete, the applicant must attach documentation demonstrating that it is a party to an eligible contract or lease or is the owner of the subject property. Applicants can demonstrate site control by providing documentation that meets the requirements in the RFA for an eligible contract, deed or certificate of title, or a lease. An eligible contract must meet all of the following conditions: It must have a term that does not expire before April 30, 2020 or that contains extension options exercisable by the purchaser and conditioned solely upon payment of additional monies which, if exercised, would extend the term to a date that is not earlier than April 30, 2020; It must specifically state that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance; The Applicant must be the buyer unless there is an assignment of the eligible contract, signed by the assignor and the assignee, which assigns all of the buyer’s rights, title and interests in the eligible contract to the Applicant; and The owner of the subject property must be the seller, or is a party to one or more intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, or conveyances between or among the owner, the Applicant, or other parties, that have the effect of assigning the owner’s right to sell the property to the seller. Any intermediate contract must meet the criteria for an eligible contract in (a) and (b) above. In demonstrating site control, the RFA states: Note: The Corporation will not review the site control documentation that is submitted with the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process unless there is a reason to believe that the form has been improperly executed, nor will it in any case evaluate the validity or enforceability of any such documentation. During scoring, the Corporation will rely on the properly executed Site Control Certification form to determine whether an Applicant has met the requirements of this RFA to demonstrate site control. The Corporation has no authority to, and will not, evaluate the validity or enforceability of any eligible site control documentation that is attached to the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process. During credit underwriting, if is determined that the site control documents do not meet the above requirements, the Corporation may rescind the award. Additionally, the RFA requires that the site control "documentation include all relevant intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, conveyances, intermediate leases, and subleases." In the instant case, Madison Oaks attached a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Madison Oaks Agreement") to its Site Control Form. The Madison Oaks Agreement lists West Oak Developers, LLC, as the "Seller" and Madison Oaks East, LLC, as the "Purchaser." However, the City of Ocala owns the property in question. The Madison Oaks Agreement in section 12 states that: "Seller has a valid and binding agreement with the City of Ocala, Florida pursuant to which Seller has the right to acquire fee simple title to the Property …." Tranquility and Florida Housing contend that Madison Oaks failed to demonstrate site control because Madison Oaks failed to include the City of Ocala Redevelopment Agreement for Pine Oaks ("Redevelopment Agreement") in its site control documentation. Madison Oaks maintains that the City of Ocala is a seller, pursuant to the Joinder and Section 28 of the Madison Oaks Agreement, and therefore, the Redevelopment Agreement did not need to be included. However, the Madison Oaks Agreement clearly identifies West Oak as the "Seller" and the City of Ocala as the "City." At hearing, Ms. Button persuasively and credibly testified that the Madison Oaks application is ineligible because it did not include the Redevelopment Agreement, which is a relevant agreement for purposes of demonstrating site control. The Redevelopment Agreement was a relevant intermediate contract, which was required to be included in Madison Oak’s application. Madison Oak’s failure to include the Redevelopment Agreement renders its application ineligible. Madison Oaks contends that including the Redevelopment Agreement in its application was unnecessary because of a joinder provision within the Madison Oaks Agreement. The Madison Oaks Agreement contains a Joinder and Consent of the City of Ocala approved by the City Council ("the Joinder"), whereby the City of Ocala joined and consented to the Madison Oaks Agreement "solely for the purposes set forth in, and subject to, Section 28 herein." The Madison Oaks Agreement in Section 28 states that: "Seller hereby acknowledges and agrees that in the event of Seller’s default hereunder, that is not timely cured, or Seller's refusal to close hereunder, Purchaser shall be entitled to close on the property subject to this Agreement … directly with the City on the terms and conditions set forth in this Section 28." However, Section 28 only applies in the event of a default by West Oaks that is not timely cured or West Oak’s refusal to close. There is no information within the Madison Oaks application to determine whether a default or termination of the Redevelopment Agreement occurred as of the application deadline. Westside’s Application (DOAH Case No. 20-1770BID) Florida Housing deemed Westside’s application eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Westside was preliminary selected for funding to meet the goal to fund one development that qualifies for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal. Westside’s Election to Compete for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal In order to qualify for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal, the RFA states: Applicants for proposed Developments that are part of a local revitalization plan may elect to compete for this goal. To qualify for this goal, the Applicant must submit the properly completed Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government/Community Redevelopment Agency Verification That Development Is Part Of A Local Community Revitalization Plan form (Form Rev. 08-2019) as Attachment 18. The form is available on the RFA Website. Included with the form must be either (1) a link to the local community revitalization plan or (2) a copy of the local community revitalization plan. The plan must have been adopted on or before January 1, 2019. Florida Housing, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, also has a goal to fund four medium county developments that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal. Westside included an executed Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government/Community Redevelopment Agency Verification that Development is Part of a Local Community Revitalization Plan form (the "Local Community Revitalization Plan Form") and a link to the local government revitalization plan at Attachment 18 of its application. At question 11.c. in the application, applicants are asked to select "Yes" or "No" from a drop-down menu in response to the question: "Is the proposed Development eligible for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal?" Westside selected "No" from the Yes/No drop-down menu in answering question 11.c. regarding the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal. At question 11.a. in the application, applicants are asked to select "Yes" or "No" from a drop-down menu in response to the question: "Is the proposed Development eligible for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal?" Westside selected "Yes" from the Yes/No drop-down menu in answering questions 11.a. regarding the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal. During scoring, Westside was deemed to have qualified for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal and the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal. During the funding selection process, Westside was selected for funding to meet the Local Government Community Revitalization Initiative Goal. HTG Addison selected "Yes" from the Yes/No drop-down menu in answering question 11.c. regarding the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal. HTG Addison included an executed Local Community Revitalization Plan Form at Attachment 18 of its application. HTG Addison selected "No" from the Yes/No drop-down menu in answering question 11.a. regarding the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal. HTG Addison is the next highest ranked eligible applicant qualified for the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal after Westside. If Westside is deemed not to have qualified for the revitalization goal, then HTG Addison, as the next highest ranked eligible applicant, would qualify for that goal. HTG Addison alleges that Westside should not be selected to meet the Local Community Revitalization Initiative Goal because Westside selected "No" from the drop-down menu in response Question 11.c. Ms. Button persuasively and credibly testified that Florida Housing does not rely on the drop-down responses to questions 11a., b., or c. in determining whether an applicant "elects to be eligible for a certain goal" because answering "Yes" or "No" to these requirements is not a requirement of the RFA. Rather, Ms. Button persuasively and credibly testified that in determining whether an applicant qualifies for a funding goal, Florida Housing relies on the documentation submitted with the application that is required for the funding goal. In the instant case, Westside included the executed Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Revitalization Plan form and a link to the local community revitalization plan at Attachment 18 of its application.2 In addition, Ms. Button persuasively and credibly testified that even if Westside erred in selecting "Yes" in response to question 11.c., it is so minor as to constitute a waivable, minor irregularity because Florida Housing has the required information within the application (the executed form and a link to the local community revitalization plan at Attachment 18). 2 Notably, another applicant responding to the RFA, Tranquility at Ferry Pass, selected "Yes" in response to question 11.c., but failed to include at Attachment 18 either a copy of or a link to the local community revitalization plan. During scoring, Florida Housing determined that Tranquility at Ferry Pass did not qualify for the revitalization goal. Florida Housing’s scoring of the Westside application is consistent with its scoring of the Tranquility at Ferry Pass application because in both cases, Florida Housing scored the application based on the requirements of the RFA for the revitalization goal and the documentation submitted in response to those requirements. Florida Housing did not rely on the applicant’s response to question 11.c. regarding the applicant’s expressions of its own eligibility.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order: dismissing the protests of HTG Addison and Madison Oaks; (2) finding the HTG Edgewood, Diplomat, and Madison Oaks applications ineligible for funding; and (3) finding the Rochester, Madison Square, Tranquility, and Westside applications eligible for funding. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2020. Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC 1400 Village Square Boulevard, Suite 3-231 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A. 109 North Brush Street, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Sarah Pape, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 3000 (32802) Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) J. Timothy Schulte, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 3000 (32802) Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A. 106 East College Avenue, Suite 820 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68420.504420.507420.5099 Florida Administrative Code (4) 67-48.00267-48.007567-60.00867-60.009 DOAH Case (11) 17-3273BID18-2156BID19-1261BID20-0140BID20-1775BID20-1776BID20-1777BID20-1778BID20-1779BID20-1780BID2020-0
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DANIEL B. GOPMAN vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 05-003583 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 30, 2005 Number: 05-003583 Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2008

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible for a Bright Futures scholarship even though he did not take foreign language classes in high school.

Findings Of Fact At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner Daniel B. Gopman ("Gopman") was a fulltime college student enrolled in the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University ("FAU"). Respondent Department of Education ("Department") administers the Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program ("Bright Futures"), among other responsibilities. Before graduating from Dr. Michael M. Krop Senior High School ("Krop") in June 2003, Gopman had applied for a Bright Futures scholarship. Specifically, Gopman had sought a Florida Academic Scholars Award, which is the most generous——and selective——of the several types of scholarship available under Bright Futures. The Department had found him ineligible for a Bright Futures scholarship because Gopman had not earned two high-school credits in a foreign language.1 To his credit, Gopman had taken many academically challenging courses in high school, including honors and advanced placement courses, and had done quite well, despite having a learning disability that had resulted in his being provided special education services pursuant to an individual education plan ("IEP"). He had not, however, taken any foreign language courses in high school. Instead, after graduating from high school (and before beginning his studies at FAU), Gopman successfully completed two courses of Russian at Miami-Dade Community College ("M-DCC"). In the present case, Gopman has suggested that his failure to study a foreign language in high school was due, wholly or in part, to (a) taking the courses prescribed in his IEP, which, coupled with other subjects required for graduation, completely filled his scholastic schedule every semester; and (b) never receiving from school district personnel complete or accurate information concerning the need to take foreign language courses as a condition of qualifying for a Bright Futures scholarship. Lending some support to the first of these purported impediments is a "To Whom It May Concern" letter dated May 30, 2003, which George Nunez, then the principal of Krop, sent to the Department around that time. In this letter, Mr. Nunez urged the Department to grant Gopman an "academic waiver" of the foreign language requirement, arguing that Gopman's failure to take "a second year of a foreign language"——actually, he had not taken even a first year——"was not due to a conscious oversight on [Gopman's] part" but happened because "the mandates of his IEP" had required him to take an "additional elective" instead "of what would have been other academic electives including the second year of his foreign language." Even if scheduling conflicts had made it impossible for Gopman to take foreign language courses in high school, however, and even if he had been given poor advice regarding the requirements for a Bright Futures award (which Mr. Nunez pointedly did not suggest had occurred), Gopman's eligibility to receive a scholarship would be unchanged, for legal reasons that will be discussed below. In any event, though, the evidence in its entirety does not support Gopman's claims in this regard; rather, it disproves them. Based on the greater weight of the persuasive evidence, it is found that Gopman could have taken two foreign language classes in high school, special education services notwithstanding, had he wanted to do that.2 It is found, as well, that Gopman was not misinformed or misled regarding the requirements to qualify for a Bright Futures award. To the contrary, his guidance counselor advised Gopman, in the tenth grade, to start taking foreign language classes soon, while there was still time to complete two years of study before graduating from high school. Gopman told the guidance counselor that, because he planned to attend an out-of-state college, he would not need foreign language credits for admission (as is generally required for admission to a Florida state university) and was not concerned with Bright Futures eligibility.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED Daniel B. Gopman's application for a Bright Futures scholarship be denied because he failed to meet the foreign language requirement, and that the Department enter a final order consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2008.

Florida Laws (10) 1002.411003.011003.451007.2711009.401009.5311009.534120.56120.569120.57
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NOVA LISHON-SAVARINO vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 08-001075 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Feb. 29, 2008 Number: 08-001075 Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2024
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QUINCY L. MOORE vs NORTH FLORIDA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 03-001612 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 02, 2003 Number: 03-001612 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on February 5, 2001.

Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1999, Respondent, North Florida Community College (NFCC), advertised for candidates for the position of Vice President for Academic and Student Affairs. Respondent advertised to fill this position by placing an advertisement in local newspapers, as well as in Gainesville, Florida. Additionally, an advertisement for this position was placed in the Affirmative Action Register, which is a publication for minorities, as well as in the Chronicle of Higher Education. The advertisement did not specify a salary and specified an application deadline of November 9, 1999. The position vacancy advertisement included the following: Qualifications include: an earned doctorate from an accredited institution of higher education; at least five years of successful progressively responsible administrative experience in academic programs, preferably at a community college; some previous experience in teaching at the postsecondary level; and/or experience as a counselor or administrator for student services functions, this latter qualification being preferable. Experience in the Florida Community College System is a plus. William Hunter is the Human Resources Director for NFCC. Mr. Hunter was responsible for placing the advertisements for the Vice President's position in the various publications. He is also responsible for ensuring that search committees are appointed, communicating with applicants, determining salaries to be offered to individual candidates based upon an established procedure, and offering positions by telephone to those persons selected. A search committee was appointed by the President of NFCC, Dr. Grissom. There were five members of the selection committee, including Clyde Alexander, NFCC's Athletic Director and Equity Coordinator. Mr. Alexander is African-American. Initially, 51 persons applied for the position. The selection committee narrowed the list of applicants from 51 to eight semi-finalists. Mr. Hunter was instructed to notify each semi-finalist that he/she was selected. He notified each of the semi- finalists by telephone and coordinated interview dates. Mr. Hunter sent a letter to each semi-finalist. The letters informed the candidates of their selection as a semi-finalist, confirmed their interview date and time, and advised them that NFCC would be paying for the travel expenses to Madison, Florida, for the interviews. The letters to the semi-finalists also stated that the salary range was $45,000 to $75,000 per year, "depending on experience." The salary range was established by the college's Board of Trustees. Petitioner is an African-American male. Petitioner was selected as a semi-finalist. Also among the semi-finalists were Dr. Barry Weinberg and Dr. Thomas Eaves, both white males. Interviews were conducted between December 1 and December 9, 1999. Each of the semi-finalists was given a tour of the campus and had an opportunity to meet with various college officials, as well as the President and members of the search committee. After the interviews of the semi-finalists were completed, the selection committee provided a list of finalists to the President.1/ The first choice of the selection committee was Dr. Barry Weinberg, who at that time was employed as Vice President for College Advancement at Rockingham Community College in Wentworth, North Carolina. Dr. Weinberg holds a Bachelor of Science in Education from State University of New York at New Paltz; a Master of Science in Student Personnel Services (Higher Education Administration) from State University of New York at Albany; a Certificate of Continuing Studies in Applied Behavioral Sciences from Johns Hopkins University; and a Doctor of Education in Higher Education Administration from Vanderbilt University. Mr. Hunter offered the position to Dr. Weinberg pursuant to instructions from President Grissom. Despite the letter which informed the semi-finalists that the top of the salary range was $75,000, Mr. Hunter was informed by the President that no applicant could be offered more than $70,000 per year because of a budget shortfall. The salary to be offered to an applicant was based on the application of an established formula to the applicant's experience as follows: subtracting the minimum salary from the maximum salary in the published salary range for the position; dividing that number by (30) to arrive at a multiplier; multiplying the applicant's years of relevant experience (after subtracting the years of experience required to qualify for the position) by the multiplier; and adding the result to the minimum salary in the range. The multiplier for the Vice President's position was $1,000. In applying the salary formula to Dr. Weinberg, Mr. Hunter determined that he had 29 years of relevant experience. He then subtracted the five years required experience, resulting in Dr. Weinberg having credit for 24 years of relevant experience, for purposes of the salary formula. The 24 years of experience was multiplied by $1,000 and added to the published base salary of $45,000. This resulted in the initial starting salary to be offered to Dr. Weinberg to be $69,000. Mr. Hunter had authority from President Grissom to add an additional amount of $2,500 per year in order to attract a candidate, provided that no candidate was offered more than $70,000 per year. Dr. Weinberg did not accept the initial offer of $69,000. Mr. Hunter then offered $70,000, which was ultimately rejected by Dr. Weinberg. Pursuant to direction from President Grissom, Mr. Hunter then offered the job to Petitioner. Petitioner holds a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from Culver- Stockton College; a Master of Science in Guidance Counseling from University of Nevada; a Doctorate in Counselor Education from the University of Iowa; and holds a certificate from Harvard University in the Management Development Program. Mr. Hunter applied the salary formula by determining that Petitioner had 21 years of relevant experience. He subtracted the five required years of experience resulting in 16 years of relevant experience. After multiplying 16 by $1,000 and adding that to the minimum salary of $45,000, Mr. Hunter offered $61,000.00 to Petitioner. When Petitioner did not accept the offer, he increased the offer to $62,500. Although he was authorized to offer him $63,500, it was Mr. Hunter's understanding, after a telephone conversation with Petitioner, that Petitioner would not accept the job for less than $82,000. Therefore, Mr. Hunter did not bother offering the additional $1,000 to Petitioner. In any event, whether or not Mr. Hunter offered $63,500 to Petitioner, he was not authorized to offer $70,000 to Petitioner, as had been offered to Dr. Weinberg, because of the application of the salary formula to Petitioner. Pursuant to instruction from Dr. Grissom, Mr. Hunter next offered the position to Dr. Thomas Eaves. Dr. Eaves holds a doctorate and lesser degrees from North Carolina State University, and has teaching and related research experience at numerous universities. Mr. Hunter applied the salary formula and determined that Dr. Eaves should be offered $67,000. Mr. Hunter was authorized by the President to an additional $500.00 on top of the $2,5000 salary "sweetener" because the college had been turned down twice. Mr. Hunter called Dr. Eaves and initially offered him $67,000. Ultimately, Mr. Hunter increased the offer to $70,000, which was accepted by Dr. Eaves. Petitioner left Virginia Commonwealth University in July 2001 to work at West Chester University where he is Dean of Undergraduate Studies and Student Support Services. His starting salary at West Chester University was $84,500. His current salary, which was effective July 1, 2002, is $88,500. If Petitioner had accepted the position at NFCC for $63,500, he would have received a five percent pay increase in 2000 to $66,675 per year. However, because of a college-wide salary freeze which has been in place since 2000, Petitioner would not have received any further salary increases.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 2003.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs SILVA OF SOUTH FLORIDA, INC., D/B/A NEW HORIZONS (7502), AND YUDIT SILVA, 17-003898SP (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jul. 12, 2017 Number: 17-003898SP Latest Update: Mar. 14, 2018

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents, as the owner and operator of a charter school or a private school, or both, engaged in fraudulent activity or otherwise ran the school(s) in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of students or the public; and, if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' participation in several scholarship programs that provide financial assistance to eligible students who choose to attend private schools.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Silva of South Florida, Inc. ("SSF"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation that, at all times relevant to this case, operated a private school known as New Horizons (the "School"). An employee of SSF, Yudit Silva ("Silva"), served as the School's principal or administrator at all times relevant. The Department of Education ("Department") administers the Gardiner Scholarship Program and the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program. See §§ 1002.385 & 1002.39, Fla. Stat. The Department has some administrative responsibilities in connection with the operation of the Florida Tax Credit ("FTC") Scholarship Program as well. See § 1002.395, Fla. Stat. Gardiner, McKay, and FTC scholarships defray tuition and other qualified educational expenses for eligible students who attend private schools in the state of Florida. It is not necessary to make detailed findings about these scholarship programs. There is no dispute that, during the relevant time, the School participated in the three programs mentioned, and was therefore eligible to accept, and did receive, scholarship funds paid on behalf of its students on scholarships. As will be discussed more thoroughly below, the Commissioner of Education possesses the authority to immediately suspend payment of McKay and FTC scholarship funds to a private school if he or she finds probable cause for believing that, inter alia, the school has engaged in "fraudulent activity." In addition, or alternatively, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's continued participation in the McKay and FTC programs for wrongful conduct, including the operation of an "educational institution" by the private school's owner or operator "in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of the public." Finally, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's participation in the Gardiner Scholarship Program "for a violation of . . . section" 1002.385, Florida Statutes. On March 30, 2017, Petitioner Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner"), issued an Administrative Complaint against Silva and SSF stating that she had determined there was probable cause for believing that Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity during the years 2013 through 2016 while operating a charter school known as Pathways Academy K-8 Center ("Pathways"). On May 2, 2017, the Commissioner issued an Amended Administrative Complaint wherein she expanded the original charges with new allegations that, in 2017, Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity while operating the School. Based on the alleged wrongdoing of Silva and SSF, the Commissioner immediately suspended payment of all scholarship funds to the School and gave notice of her intent to revoke the School's participation in the Gardiner, McKay, and FTC programs. The Commissioner's immediate and intended actions rested substantially on allegations of misconduct that the Broward County School Board ("BCSB") had asserted previously as grounds for terminating the charter school agreement between BCSB and SSF under which SSF operated Pathways. BCSB had given notice to SSF of its intent to terminate this agreement in April 2016, prompting SSF to request a formal administrative hearing. SSF's request had led, in turn, to the initiation of Broward County School Board v. Silva of South Florida, Inc., DOAH Case No. 16-2576 ("Pathways"). Over the course of several days in July and August 2016, Judge Robert E. Meale had conducted the Pathways hearing. In his Recommended Order dated January 9, 2017, Judge Meale had recommended that BCSB terminate SSF's charter. SSF had submitted exceptions to the Recommended Order, but on February 27, 2017, before BCSB had taken final agency action, SSF filed a Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal of Petition for Hearing, stating that SSF planned not to renew its charter and would, instead, close Pathways. BCSB evidently accepted this notice as sufficient to conclude the Pathways litigation, for it failed to issue a final order. The upshot is that Judge Meale's findings of fact never achieved administrative finality.1/ The relevant BCSB allegations, as the Commissioner summarized them in the administrative complaints, were quoted above in the Preliminary Statement. To prove them, the Commissioner relied primarily on two witnesses: Andrew Ramjit and Patrick Reilly. Neither provided evidence persuasive enough to support findings confirming the BCSB allegations. Mr. Ramjit is a former employee of SSF. He worked at Pathways as an assistant principal for a few months in the summer of 2015, between school years. His brief tenure at the charter school was apparently an unhappy one for all concerned, and when Mr. Ramjit left this job, he took with him (i.e., stole) original files belonging to SSF, to use as evidence of the wrongdoing he would accuse SSF of committing. He later filed several complaints against SSF with the Department, which in August 2015 referred the matter to BCSB to investigate, since BCSB was Pathways' sponsor. BCSB assigned the task of conducting the investigation to Mr. Reilly, a CPA who conducts audits for the school district. Mr. Reilly's months-long investigation resulted in findings that were detailed in an Internal Audit Report presented to the school board in March 2016. Mr. Reilly concluded that Mr. Ramjit's allegations were "substantiated" and that BCSB had good cause to terminate Pathways' charter school agreement. BCSB agreed and, as already noted, took steps to do just that. As a witness at hearing, Mr. Ramjit at times came across as a disgruntled ex-employee anxious to settle some scores. Despite the evident bias, however, the undersigned finds Mr. Ramjit's testimony to be more or less believable, as far as it goes. The problem is, Mr. Ramjit's testimony is superficial or conclusory, or both. For example, he asserts that he observed SSF employees "forging" teacher and parent signatures on various documents, but none of these supposedly falsified documents was produced, no forgery "victim" testified, and no expert testimony about disputed signatures was adduced. Mr. Ramjit claims that Silva and another administrator directed him to "artificially lower" teacher evaluation scores——but, really, what does this mean? Mr. Ramjit, who worked at Pathways during the summer months only, could not himself have evaluated any teacher (for he had not been there to observe anyone teach at the charter school), and therefore, he cannot truly have known whether a particular score was "artificial" or not. Mr. Ramjit accuses SSF personnel of spending public funds on goods purchased for private use, but the items in question, insect repellant and plants, are not inherently personal in nature and could reasonably have been purchased for the school, as Silva testified.2/ This testimony, at bottom, does not amount to much. Mr. Reilly's testimony (which was presented in the form of a transcript from the Pathways hearing) has more substance but is deficient in a different way. Mr. Reilly related the granular findings of his investigation, but he, himself, possesses no personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts he had found. In other words, what he knows, he did not witness or experience; rather, he searched for proof, as an investigator does, and reached conclusions based on the evidence obtained. To be sure, if Mr. Reilly's testimony had consisted in relevant part of expert opinions based on hearsay, such opinions might have been competent substantial evidence. His testimony, however, concerned matters of historical fact that did not require expertise to understand (or, at least, not expertise in accounting). Mr. Reilly's testimony, in short, establishes persuasively that he believes the BCSB allegations to be true, but, consisting largely of hearsay, is insufficient to prove to the undersigned the truth of the allegations. The Commissioner alleged that, while working at the School in March 2017, Silva sent a handful of suspicious faxes to the Broward County School District's Office of Exceptional Student Education. These faxes transmitted eight letters, each of which purported to be from the parent of a student receiving a McKay scholarship. The letters were identical (a form, obviously) and unsigned. In them, the parent (or "parent") complained that the district had "illegal[ly]" changed his or her child's "IEP Matrix Level" from "level 4" to "level 1" "without notifying [the parent] and without an IEP meeting." The letter urged the district to "[p]lease change the IEP Matrix Level back to its correct level within 5 business days" and requested that all future communications be in writing "only through email." Without getting into unnecessary detail, the "IEP Matrix Level" reflects the intensity of services provided to a student with disabilities. The higher the level, the greater the number of services required. There is a correlation between the matrix level and the level of funding available under the McKay scholarship program, so that a reduction in the matrix level might affect a student's McKay scholarship. The requests to increase the matrix level from 1 to 4, therefore, might have been prompted by a concern that, without such action, the students in question would see their scholarships diminished. There was nothing wrongful per se about the form letters at issue; sure, the contentions therein that the district had acted illegally and was preventing students from receiving necessary services might have been overblown or mistaken, but ultimately the decision whether to change the matrix level back to 4, as rather politely, if firmly, requested, was the district's alone to make. If there were a wrongful act, it would have been that Silva sent the letters on the parents' behalf without their approval. On this charge, the only nonhearsay evidence of record is the deposition of E.M., a parent who supposedly sent one of the form letters. E.M. disclaimed knowledge of the letter and denied having authorized the School to write and send it for him. At the same time, though, he professed to know nothing about the scholarship programs and freely acknowledged that he relied entirely upon the School to take care of all the paperwork required "to get that money." E.M.'s testimony persuades the undersigned that regardless of whether E.M. had any involvement in the form letter, he certainly would have expected the School to prepare and submit such "paperwork" if the School believed it necessary to "get that money." Based on this evidence, the undersigned cannot find that the School committed fraud. The remaining allegations against SSF and Silva concern several dozen FTC scholarship applications submitted to Step Up for Students ("SUFS"), a nonprofit scholarship funding organization that helps administer the FTC and Gardiner Scholarship Programs. FTC scholarships are intended to benefit students who, without financial assistance, would be unable to attend private school due to low household income. Because household income is an important factor in determining an FTC scholarship award, any knowingly false, misleading, or incomplete representations made in an application that bear on this material fact would constitute an act of fraud——a point that is stressed in the application forms. The Commissioner argues that, in at least 39 applications, Silva falsely represented facts regarding the household income of students of the School. The disputed applications were submitted, online, in several tranches. Six were submitted between 8:28 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. on February 22, 2017. Five were sent on February 24, 2017, between 11:15 a.m. and 3:48 p.m. On the night of March 12, 2017, from 7:20 p.m. through 11:59 p.m., 12 of these applications were submitted, followed by 13 more on March 13, 2017, sent between 9:22 a.m. and 2:53 p.m. A final group of three was submitted on the morning of March 14, 2017, between 11:29 a.m. and 11:52 a.m. Because it is unlikely that 39 parents acting independently would happen to file their applications in bunches like this, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that the School's staff coordinated these submissions. SSF and Silva admit, at any rate, that the School's staff assisted the parents with these scholarship applications, providing them with email addresses and computer access. Other details about these applications, however, suggest that the assistance provided by the School's staff was more hands-on than SSF and Silva have admitted. The application asks the parent completing the online form to identify his or her "birth city" as the answer to a security question. Every parent gave the same answer, "miami." While it is doubtful that every parent was, in fact, born in Miami, the truth of this assertion is immaterial. Still, that every applicant typed in "miami" raises an eyebrow; that all of them failed, idiosyncratically, to capitalize the proper name strongly implies a common agency, the most likely being the School——an inference further reinforced by the probability that the School's staff did not know the actual birthplace of every parent, and thus would have found it convenient simply to make Miami the ubiquitous choice by default. Another common denominator of the applications is that every parent reported his or her marital status as, "Single. I have never been married." This emphatic statement of lifelong singlehood seems peculiar, suggesting a common hand, but the response might have been a selection from a dropdown menu, a possibility which undermines the inference. Nevertheless, it would be unusual if, in this group of 39 single parents of young children, not one had ever been married——so unusual, in fact, that the undersigned deems that situation highly unlikely; some of these responses, it is inferred, were untrue. That being said, the materiality of the representation that the parent had never been married is unknown, for the record is silent on this point. Like the ubiquitous answer to the "birthplace" security question, however, the shared response to the martial status inquiry implies a common agency——the most obvious candidate being, again, the School. The evidence reviewed so far supports the inference, which the undersigned has drawn, that School personnel provided assistance to the parents in completing applications for FTC scholarships, including supplying requested information. In so doing, the School made each parent say he or she had never been married, making a representation of fact that was probably false in at least some instances. Because that fact was not shown to be material, however, it cannot be concluded, without more, that the School committed fraud. Unfortunately, there is more. Each parent claimed in the application to have "zero" household income. This was a material representation. Obviously, to be a single parent without any income is to experience extreme poverty. While it is theoretically possible that all 39 of the subject parents were destitute, this is highly improbable,3/ and, not surprisingly, the number of zero- income applications coming from the same private school caught the attention of SUFS, which in due course launched an investigation.4/ Meantime, however, SUFS sent the parents two forms, on paper, to be competed and returned. One was called Verification of Household Composition ("Verification Form"), and the other was titled Statement of No Household Income ("Explanation Form"). The Verification Form needed to be filled out by someone neither related to nor living with the applicant, e.g., a friend or neighbor, who was capable of listing, as requested, the names of all adults and children residing in the applicant's household, together with their respective ages and relationships to one another. On the Explanation Form, the parent (applicant) was required to "explain in the space provided how you are able to pay for rent, food, and clothing, etc." with "a household income of zero ($0.00)." Alternatively, if "the entry of a household income of zero ($0.00) was a mistake," the applicant was to "provide proof of the most recent 30 days of income for each person receiving income in your household." Silva completed, signed, and submitted to SUFS a Verification Form for each of the 39 parents. Every form she signed was dated March 15 or March 17, 2017, except for one dated March 21, 2017. The only adult listed on any of these completed forms is the parent or guardian (applicant). The only other members of the households at issue whom Silva listed are minor children. In other words, to be clear, every household Silva described in these 39 Verification Forms consisted of one parent or guardian plus that adult's minor child or children—— and no one else. Above Silva's signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate, the persons listed above are personally known to me and the household as shown above is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that providing false representations constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. Each completed Explanation Form that SUSF received bears a signature purporting to be that of the parent or guardian and has the same date as the corresponding Verification Form. On every form, except one, the parent states that he or she is able to survive on zero income because "I live with family members" or similar words to the same effect.5/ Above each signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. The undersigned further understands that providing false representations herein constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. As an explanation for how one is able to get by with zero household income, the statement that "I live with family members" can only be read to mean that the income-less person and his or her dependents are residing in (and thus belong to) the household of generous relatives who have the wherewithal to provide financial support for their impecunious kin; otherwise, it would be nonresponsive to the question posed by the Explanation Form. So understood, however, the statement——if true——logically refutes the applicant's assertion that his or her "household income" is zero because the family members supporting him or her must have had an income, which should have been reported and substantiated per the instructions on the Explanation Form. It seems impossible that not one of the 39 applicants noticed that SUFS was interested in household income as opposed to parental income, and thus likely that some of them (assuming any personally completed these forms) would have been aware that their responses (if true) were contradictory and incomplete to the point of being, arguably, fraudulent. But this inconsistency is of passing interest, as it does not necessarily inculpate the SSF, Silva, or the School. A different discrepancy implicates the School in wrongdoing. The statements of household composition in the Verification Forms that Silva signed, all of which describe a household consisting of one adult (the applicant) and his or her minor dependent(s), belie the statements in the Explanation Forms claiming that the applicant lives with, and relies financially upon, his or her relatives——relatives who, in this context, cannot plausibly be understood as being the applicant's minor children. These statements, clearly, are mutually exclusive and, therefore, cannot both be true. If an applicant lived with family members who supported the applicant's family, as represented in every Explanation Form at issue, then Silva provided false information to SUFS in every Verification Form she executed. While a few instances of inaccurate reporting on Silva's part might be written off as honest mistakes, an error rate of 100 percent would suggest that something else was going on. The other possibility that must be considered, however, is that Silva was truthful, and the applicants (unknown to her) were not. In this scenario, the applicants——operating individually or in concert——falsely claimed to be living with family members (presumably to maintain the "zero income" fiction) without informing Silva of this deception. The undersigned regards this latter possibility as incredible. There is no reasonable likelihood that 39 applicants separately decided to commit the exact same fraud using essentially the very same language; such a coincidence is simply inconceivable. As a practical matter, the applicants would have needed to conspire with one another. But to infer such a conspiracy, one must assume that all 39 applicants (not only the one(s) who came up with the scheme) were sufficiently dishonest to participate and disciplined enough to keep their mouths shut about it. These assumptions defy credulity. This is not to say that the statements in the Explanation Forms were likely truthful. To the contrary, the undersigned infers that they were false or intended to mislead. That is, in all likelihood, the applicants' households were, in fact, composed (for the most part) of the persons listed in the Verification Forms, and the false statements of material fact were that the applicants had no household income and were financially dependent upon family members with whom they lived. It is found, further, that Silva, not any applicant(s), was the driving force behind this deception, because, in view of all the circumstances, no other reasonable inference can account for the fact that 39 applicants happened to make the very same false statements in their applications. Whether the parents, or any of them, knowingly participated in Silva's fraudulent scheme is unclear——but is ultimately immaterial for purposes of this case.6/ Ultimate Factual Determinations The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, to increase the chances that the School's students would receive the maximum amount of FTC scholarship funding, Silva engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: Silva falsely represented to SUFS that 39 FTC scholarship applicants had "zero household income" and were forced, as a result, to live with family members. Silva made these statements of material fact knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the representations, which were in fact false.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order revoking Respondents' participation in the McKay, FTC, and Gardiner scholarship programs. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2017.

CFR (1) 7 CFR 210 Florida Laws (6) 1002.331002.3851002.391002.395120.569120.57
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RUSSELL J. KEIRS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-001171 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001171 Latest Update: Oct. 14, 1980

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Florida State University during the 1979- 1980 academic year as a tenured professor of chemistry at an annual salary of $22,819.00. Petitioner submitted an Application for Service Retirement Benefits dated May 2, 1980, to Respondent, which application reflected Petitioner's intention to terminate his employment at Florida State University effective May 30, 1980. Previously, Petitioner had advised the Chairman of the Chemistry Department of Petitioner's intention to retire effective June 5, 1980. However, in submitting the aforesaid application dated May 2, 1980, Petitioner determined to relinquish four days of employment salary in June in order to become eligible for retirement benefits begin to accrue on the first day of the first month following termination of employment. Petitioner's request to terminate his employment effective May 30, 1980, was approved by both his department chairman and by the Retirement Coordinator at Florida State University. As a result of his notification of intent to terminate his employment effective May 30, 1980, Petitioner was removed from the payroll of Florida State University effective May 30, 1980. However, Petitioner continued to perform his duties as a professor of chemistry at Florida State University until the end of the academic school year on June 16, 1980. Petitioner continued actual classroom and laboratory instruction until the end of classes on June 6, 1980. Petitioner continued actual classroom and laboratory instruction until the end of classes on June 6, 1980, and, following the end of classes, he conducted final exams, graded examinations, issued grades and, on June 16, 1980, briefly attended a faculty meeting. Although Petitioner's contract of employment provides for a faculty appointment from September 7, 1979 through June 5, 1980, these dates relate only to pay periods, since a faculty member's contractual duties and responsibilities, unless specifically altered by mutual agreement between the contracting parties, extend through the end of the academic school year in this case, June 16, 1980. The academic school year at Florida State University is nine months long and is comprised of three academic quarters, during which approximately one-third of a faculty member's annual salary is paid in each of the three academic quarters. Petitioner was paid through May 30, 1980, by Florida State University, and received no payment for services rendered during the month of June, 1980. However, when Florida State University officials were advised by respondent's personnel that Petitioner's request to establish May 30, 1980 as his termination date for retirement purposes would not be honored, Petitioner was advised that the University stood ready to pay him the $468.08 which he would have received for his work in June, 1980, had he not chosen the May 30, 1980 employment termination date. The record reflects that Petitioner made the decision to choose May 30, 1980, as his employment termination date, rather than the later date of June 5, 1980, during counseling sessions with representatives of Respondent, when it became apparent to them that he could receive $1,554.64 in retirement benefits for the month of June, as opposed to the $468.08 he would receive in June in salary had he chosen to continue to receive his salary for services performed at Florida State University. Petitioner was correctly advised by Respondent's personnel that by working through June 5, 1980, and earning salary for that time period, he would be ineligible to begin accruing retirement benefits until the end of June, 1980.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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