Findings Of Fact Petitioner completed an application for issuance of a Class "C" Private Investigator License. That license request was denied on October 30, 1991. On November 20, 1991, Petitioner challenged the denial leading to the formal hearing held pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The statement of denial was amended on December 23, 1991. The reasons in the amendment are associated with Petitioner's criminal law history. The amended statement of denial frames the dispute. Petitioner was charged in the case of United States of America v. Hugh Mattingly Padgett, Jr., No. 63-230-CR-J, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, with having in his possession and custody, and under his control, a still and distilling apparatus set up, which had not been registered as required by law, in violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Section 5601(a)(1). He was convicted in that case upon a plea of guilty and fined $500. He was given a nineteen month sentence with was suspended upon service of probation for three years under supervision. The judgement and order of probation was entered on January 31, 1964. The probation was terminated after two years of service. That action by the Court shortening the probationary period was by order drawn on January 17, 1966. On May 8, 1981, in Hunterton County, New Jersey, Petitioner was convicted of distributing a controlled substance, methaqualone; possession of that controlled substance; possession of that controlled substance with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute that controlled substance. For this conviction he received a prison term totalling ten years and a $45,000 fine. Petitioner served the prison sentence in New Jersey. There was a Florida criminal law case which was basically the factual counterpart to the New Jersey prosecution. That case was State of Florida v. Hugh M. Padgett, Jr., No. CF880-2813A2-XX, in the Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida. On June 27, 1989, Petitioner plead guilty to the Florida case. That plea pertained to a violation of the Florida Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act, Section 943.462(3), Florida Statutes, and trafficking in methaqualone more than five kilograms but less than 25 kilograms, a lesser included offense, Section 893.135(1)(e)3, Florida Statutes. Part of the sentence which Petitioner was given in the Florida case involving the controlled substance methaqualone was a five year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes. For entering his plea the court sentenced the Petitioner to a period of eight years concurrent time with 192 days credit for jail time served. Later by order of February 14, 1990, in connection with the case, Petitioner was given credit for 894 days of jail time served, reflecting credit for time spent in New Jersey awaiting return to Florida. The two cases involving controlled substances stem from activities by the Petitioner in 1980 in both Florida and New Jersey. Concerning the 1964 Federal conviction, Petitioner acknowledges that he knew of the operations of what he referred to as a "moonshine still" but denies that he received any money from that operation beyond rent money from the person to whom he had rented a house and upon which property the still had been found.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which denies the application for a Class "C" Private Investigator License. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. Copies furnished: Ronald L. Jones, Esquire Jones and Koch 1200 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary, Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent was convicted or found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of chiropractic medicine; and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's chiropractic license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact The Parties At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Mia Ann Higginbotham, D.C., was licensed to practice chiropractic medicine in the state of Florida. The Department has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed chiropractors such as Dr. Higginbotham. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a chiropractic physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Chiropractic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the licensee has committed a disciplinable offense. The Material Historical Facts In April 2006, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed an Amended Information in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, which charged Dr. Higginbotham with six counts of insurance fraud as defined in section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004); four counts of grand theft in the third degree, as defined in section 812.014; 24 counts of communications fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(b)1.; and one count of organized fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(a)1. Dr. Higginbotham had been arrested earlier on some or all of these (or similar) criminal charges, on October 21, 2004. The record does not contain the original information. The 38-count Amended Information also charged five other defendants, namely Francisco Javier Espinosa, Evelyn Cajuste, Romer Ferguson, Deborah Eugene, and Christopher Wesley Nelson.3 Two of these individuals——Mr. Ferguson and Ms. Eugene—— testified at the final hearing in this case. Each admitted having participated in a staged (i.e. fake) automobile accident on March 18, 2004, and, afterwards, having seen Dr. Higginbotham for treatment of "injuries" purportedly sustained in the "accident." Each claimed to have received real treatment from Dr. Higginbotham and other providers in her office. (Ms. Eugene testified that her back truly hurt at the time, not as a result of the fake accident of course, but due to a previous injury.) Each disclaimed any personal knowledge that Dr. Higginbotham had been aware that the March 18, 2004, "accident" was staged to defraud insurance companies.4 To the extent and as described in this paragraph, the undersigned credits the testimony of Mr. Ferguson and the testimony of Ms. Eugene and finds these facts, as stated, to be true. By the time the criminal case finally came to trial in February 2009, Dr. Higginbotham was the last defendant remaining, the others having previously made deals with the state pursuant to which they, or some of them, had agreed to testify against Dr. Higginbotham. During the nearly four and one-half years that elapsed between Dr. Higginbotham's arrest and the trial, the state had offered her numerous deals. Dr. Higginbotham had rejected all of the proposed deals because they would have required her to plead guilty, which she refused to do. Dr. Higginbotham consistently maintained her innocence throughout the criminal proceeding and has done the same in this proceeding as well. At the outset of the criminal trial on February 3, 2009, the state offered Dr. Higginbotham a no-prison deal under which, if she agreed to plead nolo contendere to eight of the 35 charges pending against her, the state would recommend that adjudication of guilt be withheld and that she be sentenced to a term of probation. Significantly, the state did not demand that Dr. Higginbotham relinquish her chiropractic license as consideration for the deal. Dr. Higginbotham had very little time to think about whether to accept the state's offer. Her defense attorney was adamant that she accept the deal because juries are unpredictable and the proposed plea bargain would eliminate the risk of incarceration. As Dr. Higginbotham recalled the scene, in testimony the undersigned accepts as credible and persuasive, "[My attorney] was screaming at me at the top of his lungs that he felt I needed to take this deal and all he was concerned about was that . . . I wouldn't be going to jail and he said you never know what could happen." The adverse consequences of a guilty verdict would have been devastating for Dr. Higginbotham. She faced the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence if convicted——in the worst case scenario, about 160 years, the prosecutor had stated. Were she to be incarcerated for even a fraction of that period, Dr. Higginbotham's professional life would be finished and her personal life shattered. In regard to the latter, Dr. Higginbotham wanted to start a family but felt she could not do so while the criminal case was pending. She likely would lose that opportunity if she spent her childbearing years behind bars. Ultimately, Dr. Higginbotham accepted the state's offer because, as she put it, "at the time I was scared, I was nervous, I was under a lot of stress. My attorney was putting an enormous amount of pressure on me and I felt I really had no other choice." The undersigned accepts this testimony as truthful and finds that Dr. Higginbotham agreed to plead nolo contendere, not because she had a guilty conscience, but to avoid the catastrophic downside of a guilty verdict, which she needed to reckon a possibility, despite being conscious of her own innocence. Consequently, Dr. Higginbotham pleaded no contest to four counts of insurance fraud as defined in section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and four counts of communications fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(b)1. (the "Uncontested Charges"). The court accepted the plea and entered an order disposing of the case, which is captioned "Finding of Guilt and Order Withholding Adjudication/Special Conditions" (the "Order"). In the Order, after reciting that it appeared Dr. Higginbotham "ha[d] been found guilty" of the Uncontested Charges "upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea," and that it appeared Dr. Higginbotham should not "presently [be required] to suffer the penalty imposed by law," the court ordered that "adjudication of guilt be . . . stayed and withheld." The court placed Dr. Higginbotham on probation for a period of four years, subject to early termination after the successful completion of two years. The court further ordered Dr. Higginbotham to pay about $2,300 in costs but reserved ruling on whether to require her to make restitution. Due to the insufficiency of the evidence, the undersigned is unable to make any findings of fact regarding the conduct of Dr. Higginbotham which gave rise to the Uncontested Charges. Simply put, given the minimal persuasive evidence regarding Dr. Higginbotham's conduct, the undersigned cannot determine what she actually did as a result of, or in connection with, the fake accident described above, besides (a) provide some chiropractic treatment to persons who falsely told her they had been hurt, as found above, and (b) plead no contest to the Uncontested Charges. In short, other than the undisputed fact of the plea, there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that Dr. Higginbotham committed any crime. Ultimate Factual Determinations Dr. Higginbotham did not impliedly admit guilt when she pleaded nolo contendere to the Uncontested Charges. Her explanation of the reasons for accepting the state's offer provides objectively reasonable grounds——consistent with innocence——for having entered the plea, refuting the implication that she acted on a guilty conscience or the substantial likelihood of a conviction. In this connection, it is further determined that Dr. Higginbotham, while being conscious of her innocence and never admitting guilt, entered the plea to avoid the possibility of being found guilty and sent to prison, potentially for many years; to be able to get on with her personal life; and to retain the ability to resume her professional career as a chiropractic physician. In addition, given that the state was willing to give up more than three-quarters of the criminal charges against Dr. Higginbotham; and that the sentence imposed (four years' probation subject to early termination) was lenient as compared to the range of potential sentences, including many years of imprisonment, which could have been imposed were she tried and convicted; the undersigned infers that the prosecutor's offer was a generous one, reflecting the strength of Dr. Higginbotham's position relative to the state's. In sum, under the circumstances, the no-prison plea bargain offered to Dr. Higginbotham was too good to refuse, given that an acquittal would have been only marginally more beneficial than a sentence of probation with a withhold of adjudication, whereas a guilty verdict would have been ruinous. Accordingly, it is determined as a matter of fact, based on the totality of the evidence including the plea of nolo contendere and the presumption of a conviction which arises therefrom, that Dr. Higginbotham was not "convicted or found guilty" of crimes relating to the practice of chiropractic medicine. Dr. Higginbotham is not guilty, as a matter of fact, of committing an offense punishable under section 460.413(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Chiropractic Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Higginbotham not guilty of the charge set forth in the Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 11th day of May, 2011.
The Issue The Administrative complaint dated September 19, 1994, alleges that Respondent, a licensed class "D" security officer, violated section 493.6118(1)(j), F.S. by committing a battery on or about January 28, 1994. The issue is whether that violation occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this action, Respondent, Ivan Machiz, was licensed as a class "D" security officer, license number D91-19035, by the Department of State, Division of Licensing, pursuant to chapter 493, F.S. The proceeding at issue is the only disciplinary action in evidence against Mr. Machiz' license. On January 28, 1994, Mr. Machiz visited Jameryl Curley at her apartment in Tampa, Florida. Mr. Machiz and Ms. Curley had been roommates. Mr. Machiz sought to recover his claimed possessions, including some chairs and a French racing bicycle. Ms. Curley told Mr. Machiz she had sold the items as payment for some delinquent bills and that he was not entitled to take them. He moved to take the bicycle and she hung on to it. The couple argued and struggled over the bicycle. In the struggle Mr. Machiz grabbed Ms. Curley and pinned her left arm behind her back, twisting it and causing her to cry for help. Benjamin Dobrin, who lived with his brother in the next door apartment and shared a back porch with Ms. Curley, answered the call and found Mr. Machiz on top of Ms. Curley, forcing her face-first into a couch or futon, and twisting her arm behind her back. Mr. Dobrin immediately returned to his apartment and called "911" for help. He then went back to Ms. Curley's apartment. By then, she was up and was holding on to the bicycle and Mr. Machiz was dragging it with her. She was crying and yelling, "Help, you're hurting me. Stop!" Mr. Dobrin and his brother stopped the bicycle and Mr. Machiz left. Deputy Chris Williams arrived shortly thereafter and found Ms. Curley upset and hyperventilating. After interviewing the Dobrins, Ms. Curley, and then Mr. Machiz (at his apartment in the next building), Deputy Williams arrested Mr. Machiz. He admitted that he put Ms. Curley in a wristlock because she was struggling against his attempts to recover what he claimed was his. He was not protecting himself or another from physical harm. At the criminal trial on one count of a battery charge, on March 24, 2994, County Judge Cynthia A. Holloway heard the testimony of the Deputy, Mr. Dobrin, Ms. Curley, and Mr. Machiz, and admonished that Mr. Machiz had no right to "self-help" recovery of his property, to go to someone's apartment to remove property over objection, and to "pulverize anybody to get that property back". (Respondent's exhibit #1, p. 20) The court withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Mr. Machiz on six months probation, with the provision for termination after four months on the condition that he perform 25 hours of community service, pay court costs and write a letter of apology to Ms. Curley.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order finding that Ivan Drew Machiz violated section 493.6118(1)(j), F.S., and imposing a penalty of $500 fine. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 13th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Dept. of State/Division of Licensing The Capitol MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ivan Drew Machiz 481 Hardendorf Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30307
The Issue Should the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the Commission) impose discipline on Respondent in association with his Correctional Officer Certificate?
Findings Of Fact Having considered Respondent's comment in requesting a formal hearing, it is inferred that Respondent holds a correctional officer's certificate issued by the Commission. On October 28, 2004, Respondent and Misty Quarles were living together in Gainesville, Florida, as a couple. Ms. Quarles describes their relationship as boyfriend and girlfriend. Respondent determined to end the relationship, to include removing Ms. Quarles' name from the lease for the apartment. An argument ensued. Ms. Quarles left the bedroom and went to the bathroom and closed the door. Respondent opened it and started yelling at Ms. Quarles. Respondent was angry. Respondent pushed Ms. Quarles forcefully. She fell to the ground. When Respondent pushed her down, Ms. Quarles hit her head on the and door the impact left a knot on her head. She got up and pushed Respondent back. The argument continued. Respondent pushed Ms. Quarles again and she landed on the bed in the bedroom. Ms. Quarles then began to pack her belongings to leave. Respondent started gathering some of her clothing and other effects to throw in the dumpster outside the apartment. Ms. Quarles knocked those items out of Respondent's hands. Respondent began yelling again and punched Ms. Quarles on her leg while holding her down on the bed. In trying to stop Respondent from punching her, Ms. Quarles used her right hand to resist the Respondent. He pushed against a joint in her hand, causing a right thumb fracture at the base of the first metacarpal. After that, Ms. Quarles asked Respondent to take her for medical treatment. Respondent took Ms. Quarles to North Florida Regional Medical Center where she was observed to have the fracture, together with abrasions on her nose, under her left eye, and a contusion on her right forehead. Her right hand was also swollen. Ms. Quarles received a splint and was told to use ice and employ elevation and rest to deal with her fracture. She was provided pain medication and referred to an orthopedic physician. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered one is a composite exhibit containing a series of photographs depicting Ms. Quarles physical state after her encounter with the Respondent leading to her injuries. Respondent's actions against Ms. Quarles were against her will and intentionally caused bodily harm. Deputy Robert Wesley of the Alachua County Sheriff's Office came to the hospital to investigate. Based upon his investigation, he arrested Respondent for felony domestic battery involving the incident with Ms. Quarles. The disposition of that arrest was not explained at hearing. There is no indication that Respondent has had prior discipline imposed on his correctional officer's certificate.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding violations of the statutes and rules referred to and revoking Respondent's correctional officer's certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2007 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Curtis Coleman, Jr. Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Rampage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, including the parties' Joint Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 19, 1998, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. He holds Correctional Certificate Number 178896. On February 19, 1982, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida and issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 34142, which has since expired. Respondent is now, and has been since shortly after receiving his bachelor of science degree in education from Slippery Rock University, certified as a teacher in the State of Florida. From the early 1980's until 1993, Respondent worked as a police officer for various law enforcement agencies in Florida. In 1985, Respondent was physically arrested and charged with battery in Pinellas County. He was acquitted of the charge following a jury trial. After the acquittal, at Respondent's request, records relating to the matter were ordered sealed. In the mid 1990's, Respondent worked for Wackenhut Corporation as a teacher at correctional facilities in Moore Haven and South Bay, Florida. While working for Wackenhut in South Bay, Respondent was asked to assist in the "start up" of a "work release center" in Broward County, Florida, that Wackenhut was going to operate for the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Pursuant to Wackenhut policy, Respondent had to "go through a correctional academy" before assuming his new duties. After graduating from the "correctional academy," Respondent relocated to Broward County and began his new assignment for Wackenhut. Respondent's primary tasks were to "draw[] up all the rules and regulations for the [soon to be opened] facility" and "interview[] people for jobs." Respondent was housed in a "temporary [Wackenhut] office" in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, Florida, along with others involved in the effort to open the facility, including Richard Fortenberry, who was going to be the facility administrator. On September 26, 1997, Respondent was accused of stealing a "couple of packs of playing cards" from a retail establishment in Palm Beach County, Florida. The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office deputy on the scene issued Respondent a notice to appear2 in lieu of physically arresting Respondent. As directed, Respondent subsequently appeared in the Criminal Division of Palm Beach County Court to respond (in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04) to the retail theft accusation made against him. On November 17, 1997, Respondent signed a Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97- 024167 MM A04,3 which provided that, if Respondent complied with the[] "conditions [set forth in the agreement] during the [three-month] period of Deferred Prosecution, no criminal prosecution concerning this charge [of retail theft] [would] be instituted " On December 22, 1997, the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office issued a Nolle Prosse in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04. The Broward County "work release center" was scheduled to open in February of 1998. Respondent was to occupy a "lead supervisor" position at the facility when it opened. Before he was able to assume this position, however, Respondent needed to fill out an "extensive" application (even though he was already employed by Wackenhut) and pass a pre- employment review conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Respondent filled out the application, "to the best of [his] ability," in October of 1997. On the application, he mentioned the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge of which he was acquitted, but not the notice to appear that he had received the previous month.4 Deputy James Diefenbacher was the Broward County Sheriff's Office "contract manager" for the Broward County "work release center" project. In November of 1997, after Respondent had entered into his Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04, Mr. Fortenberry told Respondent that Deputy Diefenbacher needed from Respondent certain documents concerning the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge in order for Deputy Diefenbacher to complete his pre-employment review of Respondent's background. Respondent promptly furnished Deputy Diefenbacher the requested documents. On December 31, 1997, Deputy Diefenbacher "showed up" at Respondent's office in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea and told Respondent that he "needed to talk to [Respondent] real quick." It was New Year's Eve. The "handful of people," including Respondent, who were there, were finishing up there work for the day so the office could close early. After he and Respondent "looked over [Respondent's] application" together, Deputy Diefenbacher turned on a tape recorder, "swore [Respondent] in," presented Respondent with a document, and told Respondent, "I need you to sign this document here. It means that you don't have any other arrest history."5 The document, which was typed on Broward County Sheriff's Office letterhead, read as follows: I swear under oath that all information regarding my criminal history has been presented to the Broward Sheriff's Office. My criminal history consists of a charge of simple battery, of which I was found not guilty of all charges by the court. Not [sic] other criminal history exists. SWORN AND ATTESTED TO BY TIMOTHY J. MILLER ON THIS 31ST DAY OF DECEMBER NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN. Signed By: DEPUTY JAMES DIEFENBACHER OF THE BROWARD SHERIFF'S OFFICE Signed CCN# Respondent signed the document without reading it. Respondent took Deputy Diefenbacher at his word that, by signing the document, Respondent was attesting that he had no other arrests other than his 1985 arrest in Pinellas County for battery. Respondent did not intend to deceive anyone in signing the document. He believed that the information contained in the document (as explained to him by Deputy Diefenbacher) was true.6 He did not consider his having been given a notice to appear (on September 26, 1997, in Palm Beach County) to have constituted an arrest.7 Nonetheless, "a couple [of] years later," Petitioner was charged with and tried for perjury in connection with his signing the document; however, he was acquitted of the charge.8
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2004.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On December 13, 1991, Ms. Sanders was certified as a correctional officer in the state of Florida. Her correctional officer certificate is numbered 122576. On January 30, 2004, Ms. Sanders was employed as a sergeant by the Florida Department of Corrections at the Brevard Correctional Institution (Brevard), where Joseph Sonntag was an inmate. Mr. Sonntag is a diabetic, who must have insulin injections two times each day. On the morning of Friday, January 30, 2004, Bertie Gladys Florich, a correctional officer at Brevard, went to Mr. Sonntag's cell to awake him to take him to the medical unit for his insulin injection. Mr. Sonntag pulled the cover over his head and did not get up. Ms. Florich told Ms. Sanders that Mr. Sonntag would not get up and asked her to tell him to get up for his injection. Ms. Sanders went into Mr. Sonntag's cell, pulled the cover from Mr. Sonntag, and told his cell mate to leave the cell. Ms. Sanders snatched Mr. Sonntag by the collar of his shirt and flung him across the cell. As he landed, his leg hit the sink. Ms. Florich, who was on the next cell level, heard a thump. She looked at Mr. Sonntag's cell and saw Ms. Sanders helping Mr. Sonntag up. Mr. Sonntag had landed too far from his bunk to have fallen from his bunk. After Ms. Sanders left the cell, Mr. Sonntag told Ms. Florich that Ms. Sanders had pulled him forcibly off his bunk and that he had hurt his leg. Ms. Florich called Sergeant Carter, who was a superior officer. Sergeant Carter went into Mr. Sonntag's cell and came out later, stating that Mr. Sonntag needed to be taken to the medical unit. Mr. Sonntag told a male sergeant that Ms. Sanders had thrown him off the bunk. The male sergeant told Mr. Sonntag that if he made such an allegation that an investigation would be conducted and he would be placed in confinement while the investigation was being conducted. Because he feared being placed in confinement, Mr. Sonntag filled out an incident report, stating that he sustained his injuries by falling off his bunk. Mr. Sonntag was taken to the medical unit for treatment, and he also told medical personnel that he had fallen from his bunk. In an effort to cover up her injury to Mr. Sonntag, on January 30, 2004, Ms. Sanders completed and signed a Report of Injury or Illness, which was submitted to Brevard, indicating that Mr. Sonntag fell off his bunk. The report was false. On Sunday, February 1, 2004, Mr. Sonntag's mother came to visit him at Brevard. He told her that Ms. Sanders had thrown him off his bunk, causing the injury to his leg. Apparently, Mr. Sonntag's mother informed officials at Brevard of her son's allegations, because on Monday, February 2, 2004, Mr. Sonntag was asked by officials at Brevard to give another statement detailing the events that led to his injury. Senior Prison Inspector Barry Glover was assigned to investigate Mr. Sonntag's allegations. As part of the investigation, Mr. Glover interviewed Ms. Florich, who did not actually see how Mr. Sonntag sustained his injuries. While the investigation was being conducted, Ms. Sanders approached Ms. Florich in an attempt to get their stories straight. Ms. Sanders tried to get Ms. Florich to tell the investigator that Mr. Sonntag had either fallen off the bed or jumped off the bed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lucinda Sanders did not violate Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-20.0012(1)(f); finding that Lucinda Sanders did violate Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes; suspending her Correctional Officer Certificate for two years; placing her on probation for two years following the suspension of her certificate; and requiring her to complete such training courses as deemed appropriate by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2006.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, because of a prior regulatory and criminal history, the Petitioner is entitled to licensure in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuity agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eugene P. Kent, at times pertinent hereto was a licensed insurance agent in South Dakota. He was apparently an agent or broker for the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and engaged in the insurance business with regard to the various group benefits coverage for that association. Apparently in 1995, he become involved in a dispute between the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. This dispute, the exact nature of which is not of record in this case, resulted in the Petitioner being charged with mail fraud by the United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota. He was prosecuted for mail fraud and ultimately was convicted by jury verdict on or shortly after October 26, 1996. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The Petitioner believed that evidence existed in the home office of United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, which would exonerate him, and that his counsel during the criminal prosecution had, for unknown reasons, failed to subpoena and obtain such evidence for use in his criminal trial. He obtained new counsel who was successful in obtaining the evidence in question, which indeed proved to be exculpatory. It resulted in the presiding judge in the criminal case vacating the order of conviction, resulting in the Petitioner's release from incarceration. Because of his conviction, the insurance departments of South Dakota, as well as North Dakota and Nebraska, had revoked his insurance licenses, based upon the criminal conviction. On October 26, 1996, during the progress of the criminal trial referenced above, the Petitioner and his wife became concerned that she would not have funds to pay for his counsel, to operate her home and the business and to pay for her son's alcohol rehabilitation expenses if the jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in his incarceration. Consequently, on that day, the Petitioner made a withdrawal from his business account, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., account in the amount of $9,900, by writing a check on that account. On the same day, the Petitioner went to a different branch of the same bank and negotiated a second check on this same account also made payable to him, again, in the amount of $9,900, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., business account. The bank officer upon the occasion of the second withdrawal that same day told him that a currency transaction report would have to be filed. The Petitioner readily agreed to file the report and assisted the bank officer in completing and executing the transaction report. Thereafter, the United States Attorney secured an indictment of the Petitioner, during his incarceration for the earlier criminal conviction, before it was vacated by the trial judge. He prosecuted the Petitioner for "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report." During the pendency of this second criminal proceeding, the Petitioner remained incarcerated from the earlier proceeding, which was later vacated. Because of this, his counsel in the second criminal proceeding advised him to plead guilty to the second charge in return for a light penalty, because his counsel believed that if he attempted to litigate the second criminal matter to trial, he would have difficulty convincing a jury of his innocence because he was already incarcerated on the earlier mail fraud charge. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment as a result of that plea, which ran concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1997, regarding the mail fraud charge. After release, he was sentenced to supervised release for a period of approximately two years. The preponderant evidence in this proceeding shows that the Petitioner did not attempt to defraud the federal government or to prevent the bank involved from filing the report. Upon being informed of the requirement of filing the report, he freely consented and helped execute the report form involved at his bank. The funds he withdrew with the two checks were his funds from an account over which he had ownership and signatory authority. There is no evidence that the funds in the account withdrawn by the Petitioner had been obtained through an criminal alleged enterprise or that the Petitioner contemplated using them for such a purpose. The post-conviction evidence that was obtained by the Petitioner and his counsel resulted in the judge vacating the first conviction for mail fraud. This new evidence was also the basis for the South Dakota Insurance Regulatory Agency reinstating his licensure. Ultimately, the other states which had revoked his licensure reinstated his licenses. The Petitioner is now similarly licensed in 17 or 18 states. He applied for licensure as a non-resident life, health, and variable annuity agent in Florida and that application was denied by the Department due to his criminal history and the prior administrative actions against his licensure in the other states. That denial resulted in this proceeding. The other states which have since either reinstated his licensure or licensed him did so with knowledge, as reported by the Petitioner, of his prior criminal and administrative proceedings. The Department has a rule listing various crimes (in Classes A, B, and C) such that, if a petitioner has been so convicted, then that petitioner cannot be licensed for periods of times stated in that rule. Class A crimes listed in that rule carry the longest period of time during which licensure is prohibited with a waiting period extending as much as 15 years. The Division of Licensing of the Department decided that the crime involved herein was a "Class A crime." The rule allows the Department to analogize the crime of which a petitioner or applicant has been convicted with one of the crimes listed in this rule if the crime, of which an applicant was convicted, is not itself listed in the rule. The Division of Licensing thus decided to classify the crime of "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report" as analogous to "defrauding the government" or "obstruction of justice." The Petitioner was not charged with either defrauding the government or obstruction of justice and was not convicted of those crimes. Although the stipulation of facts between the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, attendant to the Petitioner's plea in the second federal criminal case (Petitioner's Exhibit G), shows that the Petitioner knowingly attempted to avoid the reporting requirement imposed by Title 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) on the bank for currency transactions of more than $10,000 in one day, there is no persuasive evidence that he did so for any illegal purpose or fraudulent intent, or intent to in any way "obstruct justice," or engage in dishonest conduct. There was no demonstrative harm to the public nor was there any "victim" of his purported crime. If the Petitioner had truly wanted to conceal the transaction or induce the bank to fail to report it, he could simply have presented the second $9,900 check on another day for cashing, or had his wife negotiate such a check on a different business day. Instead, when told by the bank employee, on presenting the second check, that a currency transaction report would have to be filed, he freely assented and assisted in the preparation of the report form; even the above-referenced stipulation of facts attendant to his criminal plea shows this. There was no requirement that a report be made until the second check was negotiated on the same day. The Petitioner's testimony in evidence, including the fact that 18 states have licensed him or re-instated his licensure since the criminal and administrative proceedings at issue herein, with knowledge of those proceedings, shows preponderantly that his crime did not "involve moral turpitude" and that he is fit and trustworthy for engagement in the practice of insurance. The crime to which he pled did not involve any significant, rational relationship or nexus to the two "analogized crimes" involving "obstruction of justice" or "defrauding the government" for purposes of the Department's rule cited below. Two affidavits, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits J and K, as corroborative hearsay, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, bear out this finding and are worthy of quotation. The first affidavit is that of attorney James L. Volling, the Petitioner's counsel for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to his first conviction, and his counsel for purposes of the second criminal case. Mr. Volling practices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is admitted to practice by the Minnesota Supreme Court, as well as by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and for the District of North Dakota. He is also admitted to practice in the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, as well as the United States Supreme Court. He testified in pertinent part as follows: Following Mr. Kent's conviction on two counts of mail fraud, I was retained to represent him for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to the conviction as well as in connection with a second case brought against him. Upon reviewing the facts and the law in Mr. Kent's case, I became convinced that his conviction was defective and inappropriate. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and his petition for post-conviction relief was granted and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The government chose not to appeal that decision which I believe clearly would have been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During the pendency of post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Kent's case, the government brought a second case against Mr. Kent involving allegations of an attempt to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. In my view, these allegations were petty at best, especially considering that the bank involved did file a currency transaction report and Mr. Kent expressly permitted them to do so. Mr. Kent was simply withdrawing his own money and there was no claim that those funds were the product of any illegal activity [or for any illegal purpose]. The government's second case was only technical in nature and, in my view, would not have been charged in any other jurisdiction with which I am familiar. Indeed, the assistant United States attorney representing the government told me that the only reason the government brought the second case was their concern that Mr. Kent's conviction in the first case would ultimately be overturned, which of course it was. With regard to the currency transaction reporting matter, Mr. Kent elected to enter a plea bargain to avoid further expense and burden, and which did not augment the punishment that had been given to him in the first case. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Kent, had not been convicted in the first case so that he would not have had that stigma at the time of the second case, he would have elected to try the currency transaction reporting case rather than to enter into a plea agreement. It was after that plea agreement, that the conviction and sentence in Mr. Kent's first case were vacated. I have known and dealt with Eugene Kent for approximately five years now. During that entire time, he has always been a man of his word. He has done exactly what he said he would do and has told me the truth in every respect. I have great respect and admiration for Mr. Kent as person and as a client. I believe he has suffered unfairly throughout this entire ordeal, but he has remained steadfast and persevered through some truly difficult times. I have been proud to serve as his legal counsel, and I would recommend him unhesitatingly to anyone in terms of employment or any business relationship. The second affidavit is by Mark F. Marshall. Mr. Marshall is now a lawyer and at times pertinent hereto has been admitted to the practice of law by the South Dakota Supreme Court. He has been in the active practice of law since 1981. At times pertinent hereto from January 1, 1996, until August 1, 2000, Mr. Marshall served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. Mr. Marshall testified pertinently as follows: From January 1, 1996 until August 1, 2000, I served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted the initial appearance and detention hearings in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 96-40002-01. Over the objection of the United States, I ordered Mr. Kent released on conditions. A copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release, as well as Mr. Kent's Appearance Bond in the Amount of $100,000.00 is attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. [released on a non-surety bond requiring no security.] In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 97-40111. [the currency transaction prosecution.] I denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as I believed that an issue of fact existed as to the Defendant's intent. While I believed that it would be improper to dismiss the case because of that issue, I also know that if I had been the finder of fact I would have found the Defendant not guilty of all of charges in the indictment. Perhaps more so than any defendant who appeared before me, Mr. Kent comported himself with grace, dignity, and the utmost of integrity with regard to both criminal cases. Since being exonerated from all underlying criminal counts regarding this matter, Mr. Kent has asked me to submit an affidavit on his behalf. Initially, I was reluctant to do so not because Mr. Kent was unworthy of support, but because I was concerned about whether doing so would reflect adversely on my former judicial office. I have concluded that the interests of justice compel me to provide this affidavit on behalf of Mr. Kent. I am firmly of the belief that Mr. Kent committed no criminal acts in either of the cases venued in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and as such he should not bear the stigma of any criminal record. I have been a member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles since July of 2002. During my tenure as a member of the Parole Board, I have reviewed hundreds of applications for pardons. I have reviewed all public filings in Mr. Kent's civil actions arising from his conviction as well as all filings in the criminal action itself. Based on my experiences as a Parole Board member, my knowledge of Mr. Kent individually and professionally, and as well as my knowledge of the role that pardons serve in the state and federal judicial system, I believe that Mr. Kent is an unusually worthy applicant for such extraordinary relief. It is my personal belief that Mr. Kent poses no threat to society whatsoever. Society's interests, as well as those of Mr. Kent, would be well served by granting him the relief he seeks . . . . Dated this 11th day of November, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be granted licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Eugene P. Kent 1209 West 37th Street Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57105
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a firefighter should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James F. Mathis, is a certified firefighter. On April 7, 1997, Respondent pled guilty to the charge of unlawful sexual battery upon a child under the age of 16, contrary to Section 800.04(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent was sentenced to 180 days in jail, ten years' probation, no contact with the victim, no allowance for early termination of probation, admission to sex offender treatment, and payment of court costs. However, adjudication was withheld. Respondent presented evidence to show: the factual basis for the charge; his rehabilitation; the unlikelihood of a repeat offense; how his plea of guilty came to Petitioner's attention; Respondent's dedication and commitment to quality service as a firefighter; the quality of Respondent's service as a firefighter; and the desire of the Bayshore Fire Protection and Rescue Service District and the local community to have the benefit of Respondent's services as an employed firefighter. Petitioner did not contest Respondent's evidence but took the position that the evidence was irrelevant. As reflected in the Conclusions of Law, it is agreed that the evidence was irrelevant, and no additional findings are necessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification as a firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrence F. Lenick, Esquire Post Office Box 430 Bonita Springs, Florida 34133 James F. Mathis 11260 Shirley Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on April 28, 1988, and issued him certificate number 86967. At all material times, the Miami-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation employed Petitioner as a correctional officer. At the time of this incident, Respondent worked at the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center (TGK). For December 20-21, 1999, Respondent reported to TGK for a shift that began at 10:30 p.m. on December 20 and ended at 6:30 a.m. on the next morning. Respondent's position was a unit manager of Unit K4-2. As the unit manager, Respondent was responsible for the care, custody, and control of all inmates in this unit. This responsibility included the duty of ensuring that all inmates were present and accounted for in the unit, and Respondent was required to conduct an inmate headcount and in- cell checks of all inmates. Correctional officers conducting in-cell checks document the time of their checks on a Visual Checks log. The purpose of the Visual Checks log is to inform the correctional officer's superior and other correctional officers that the officer entering the information in the log walked the entire unit at the time noted and visually checked all inmates housed in the unit. If, as is customary, the correctional officer found nothing amiss, he would enter "QRU" in the log, which informs his superior and other correctional officers that all was well in the unit at the time indicated for the check. During his shift of December 20-21, 1999, Respondent made seven entries in the Visual Checks log for his unit. The indicated times were hourly, on the hour, from 11:00 p.m. on December 20 through 6:00 a.m. on December 21. For each entry, Respondent recorded a headcount and wrote in the Visual Checks log, "VISUAL CK UNIT/INMATES ALL QRU." At 9:15 a.m. on December 21, 1999, another correctional officer discovered that inmate Carlos Nevis in room 552, which is in the unit for which Respondent was responsible, had hanged himself to death. The question in this case is whether Mr. Nevis hanged himself on Respondent's watch. If so, given the close proximity of the hanging body to the door window through which an officer makes a visual inspection of the cell, the inference readily follows that Respondent did not conduct a visual check of Mr. Nevis's cell, as Respondent indicated he had done on the Visual Checks log. When the body of Mr. Nevis was found, it was already displaying the effects of rigor mortis. The one witness who had indicated otherwise retreated from his earlier statement and, visibly uncomfortable, testified only that he could not recall if the body felt stiff or hard. Four other witnesses testified that the body was stiff to the touch when it was discovered. The time of death is contested by two expert witnesses. Petitioner relies on the Chief Medical Examiner for Miami-Dade County. He conducted an autopsy and found substantially digested food in Mr. Nevis's stomach. The food appeared to be a green vegetable and red beans, as well as a tan fluid of less than one cup in volume. The food was from dinner on the evening of December 20, not the 1:00 a.m. breakfast on December 21, which had no vegetables. Considering the witness reports of body stiffness, Petitioner's expert concluded that Mr. Nevis died not much after 4:00 a.m.--and well prior to 6:00 a.m.--on December 21. The expert also noted that the fire rescue squad declared Mr. Nevis dead at 9:22 a.m.--two minutes after they arrived at the scene-- and the absence of any indication of chest compressions, bagging, or ventilation is consistent with the finding that Mr. Nevis had been dead several hours by the time his body was discovered at 9:15 a.m. Respondent's expert has served as the regional medical examiner, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, and Medical Examiner for Dade County since 1972 and is now a forensic pathologist consultant. However, Respondent's expert could not adequately account for the partially digested food found in Mr. Nevis's stomach. Respondent's expert tried to explain that emotional stress would slow digestion, but Petitioner's expert countered convincingly that many persons who have decided to end their lives find peace in their final hours--a premise that would be consistent with the fact that Mr. Nevis had the presence of mind to prepare a final note to his girlfriend and tuck a Bible into his waistband prior to hanging himself. Even Respondent's expert had trouble establishing a time of death considerably past 6:00 a.m. Called as a witness in his own case, Respondent testified that he started the 6:00 a.m. check at 5:45 a.m., and a visual check of the entire 48-room unit takes ten to fifteen minutes to complete. Respondent thus testified that he saw Mr. Nevis alive a few minutes before 6:00 a.m. Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent falsely noted in the Visual Checks log that he had checked Mr. Nevis's room at 6:00 a.m., or even 5:45 a.m. Despite his testimony to the contrary at the hearing, Respondent never checked the room at the round that he claimed to have performed at, or shortly before, 6:00 a.m. on December 21.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James C. Casey Slesnick & Casey 10680 Northwest 25th Street, Suite 202 Miami, Florida 33172-2108
