KISTLER, J. Defendants seek reconsideration of our opinion in ZRZ Realty v. Beneficial Fire and Casualty Ins., 349 Or. 117 , 241 P.3d 710 (2010). We allow their petition for reconsideration, modify our earlier opinion, and adhere to that opinion, as modified. Defendants seek reconsideration on three grounds. We reject without discussion the first two grounds that defendants raise and write to address the third ground regarding the scope of the remand. In ZRZ Realty, we determined that,...
DURHAM, J. Plaintiff Alan Cler suffered severe injury to his arm and hand after receiving intravenous chemotherapy treatment from defendant Oregon Hematology Oncology Associates, PC. Cler and his wife (plaintiffs) brought this action against defendant, alleging that one of defendant's nurses had caused Cler's injury by negligently administering the chemotherapy treatment. During defendant's closing argument, defense counsel made several factual statements regarding a nurse expert who did not...
WALTERS, J. The matter before the court is plaintiff's petition for reconsideration of our decision in Estate of Michelle Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., 348 Or. 442 , 235 P.3d 668 (2010). On reconsideration, we clarify that the issue on remand is not whether defendant is liable for punitive damages, but rather what is the correct amount of those damages. We also address defendant's statement of costs and disbursements and allow it in part and disallow it in part. In all other respects, we...
GILLETTE, J. These two cases, which we have consolidated for purposes of opinion, present two issues, both of which concern the proper interpretation and applicability of statutes and administrative rules that have long since been amended, but which continue to govern the treatment of prisoners who committed their crimes while those statutes and rules were in effect. 1 The first issue is whether the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the board) has the authority effectively to...
GILLETTE, J. These two parole eligibility cases have been consolidated in this court for purposes of opinion. They concern the scope of authority of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board) to consider for parole persons who had been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life in prison with a minimum of 30 years imprisonment, but who, 20 years later, are found by the board to be capable of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time. In Janowski/Fleming v. Board...
KISTLER, J. Once a tax assessor has determined the value of property and listed it on the assessment roll, the assessor may not correct the value listed on the assessment roll merely because he or she "would [now] arrive at a different opinion of value." ORS 311.205(1)(b). 1 An assessor, however, may add property to the assessment roll that "has from any cause been omitted, in whole or in part," from the assessment roll. ORS 311.216. The question that this case poses is whether the Clackamas...
GILLETTE, J. This case concerns a criminal defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a consent search of her purse. Defendant argued to the trial court that suppression was required because her consent to the search was a product of prior conduct on the part of the police that violated her rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution—specifically, an unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful, seizure of her person. The trial court rejected that argument but, on defendant'...
DURHAM, J. This matter is before the court on the petition for attorney fees and cost bill filed by respondent on review (wife). Petitioner on review (husband) objects, asserting that this court lacks authority to award attorney fees and costs to wife and that, even if such authority exists, the court should decline to award attorney fees and costs. For the reasons set out below, we allow costs to wife and deny the petition for attorney fees. This is a marriage dissolution proceeding. Wife...
GILLETTE, J. This case is before the court on a certified question of Oregon law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.2009) (certifying question); ORS 28.200-28.255 (granting authority to answer certified questions and describing procedure). Plaintiff Patton sued his employer, defendant Target, in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon for wrongful discharge, alleging that Target demoted and...
KISTLER, J. This case arises out of a dispute over insurance coverage for plaintiffs' ship dismantling business. Before this court, the parties have raised primarily two issues. The first is whether plaintiffs or defendants had the burden to prove that environmental damages resulting from the operation of plaintiffs' business were neither expected nor intended. On that issue, the Court of Appeals held that, when the insurance policies that defendants issued expressly granted coverage only for...
WALTERS, J. In this case, we answer three questions certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit). The questions arise from an action that West Linn Corporate Park (plaintiff) originally filed in state court against the City of West Linn (the city) alleging that the city effected a taking of plaintiff's property when the city required, as a condition of development of that property, that plaintiff construct off-site public improvements. In that...
KISTLER, J. The primary question in this case is what is a "roof" within the meaning of plaintiffs' homeowners' insurance policy. Plaintiffs Beth and Tim Dewsnup sustained losses due to water damage while their roof was undergoing repair. Although their insurance policy generally excludes coverage for water damage, they contended that an exception to that exclusion applies. The trial court ruled otherwise on defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Dewsnup v....
KISTLER, J. The question in these two cases is what constitutes "withhold[ing] necessary and adequate * * * physical care" within the meaning of ORS 163.205 and ORS 163.200, two statutes that prohibit first- and second-degree criminal mistreatment. In both cases, defendants had children under their care who were well fed and healthy but who lived in homes with potential safety hazards. Following its precedent, the Court of Appeals held that creating or failing to correct potential safety...
BALMER, J. This mandamus action requires us to determine the effect of a final judgment, containing a "money award," that was entered "pursuant to" Measure 37, a land use statute that applies here but that has now been substantially superseded by later legislation. Dorothy English, an owner of land in Multnomah County, filed a cause of action under Measure 37 against the county, ultimately obtaining a judgment "against [the county] for just compensation pursuant to the provisions of [Measure...
