The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be placed on the convicted vendor list.
Findings Of Fact On May 31, 1990, Borden pled guilty to commission of a public entity crime, as defined by Section 287.133(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996), for: a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within Peninsular Florida, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within the Florida Panhandle, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; and a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply dairy products for use at federal military installations within Peninsular Florida and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and at the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988. As a corporate entity, Borden was culpable of the crimes committed by its employees or agents. However, as set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, when the crimes came to the attention of Borden's corporate management, Borden cooperated with state and federal investigations and prosecutions of the crimes, promptly terminated the employees and disassociated itself from individuals implicated in the crimes, and promptly paid the damages and penalties resulting from Borden's conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden notified the Department of Management Services within 30 days of its conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, in addition to terminating the employees implicated in the crimes, Borden has instituted self- policing to prevent public entity crimes. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, after a period of suspension by the Defense Logistics Agency of the federal government in relation to Borden's public entity crime, the suspension was terminated, and Borden's Dairy Division has been reinstated as a qualified government contractor. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden has demonstrated its good citizenship with the exception of the public entity crime of which it was convicted. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, other than the public entity crime conviction itself, there was no evidence that it is in the best interest of the public to place Borden on the convicted vendor list.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
Findings Of Fact The facts stated in the Joint Stipulation of the parties to the extent set forth below are hereby adopted as findings of fact: On December 21, 1990, Petitioners, each of which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dean Foods Company ("Dean"), were each convicted of a one-count felony charge brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. On January 7, 1992, Respondent filed and Petitioners received notices of intent to each Petitioner pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)1, F.S. On January 28, 1992, Petitioners, pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)2, F.S., filed a petition, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S., requesting an order determining that it is not in the public interest for Petitioners to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Petitioners' convictions arose out of an investigation initiated by the Florida Attorney General into possible bid-rigging of school milk requirements contracts in Florida by dairies and distributors. In 1988, the Attorney General filed a civil action against these dairies and distributors, including Petitioners. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.c, F.S., establishes "[t]he degree of culpability of the person or affiliate proposed to be placed on the convicted vendor list" as a factor to be considered in the decision whether to place such person or affiliate on such list. The State of Florida's complaint alleged that the bid-rigging and contract allocation scheme began at least as early as 1978. According to the State's attorneys, the illegal activities actually started as early as the 1960's in southeastern Florida (McArthur Dairy's principal market area) and the 1970's in central and southwestern Florida (T.G. Lee Foods' principal market area). Dean purchased Petitioners in 1980. According to the State's attorneys, Jack Wells and James Clark, former sales managers at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods, respectively, participated in such conspiracies during the 1960's and 1970's and fraudulently concealed their efforts from the former owners of T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy, from Dean and from the school boards. Thus, Dean unknowingly bought into these on-going conspiracies. While the fact that Dean bought into these preexisting schemes was not a legal defense, it is relevant to the issue of culpability. This fact and Dean's early settlement offer were given favorable consideration by the State of Florida during settlement discussions. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.d, F.S., establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the convicted vendor list. Dean promptly paid on behalf of Petitioners all civil damages owed the State arising out of such activities. In a press release dated August 1, 1988, the Attorney General confirmed Dean's payment in full settlement of the charges brought by the State of Florida against Petitioners. A federal grand jury sitting in Tampa, Florida also investigated this matter. Dean and Petitioners cooperated fully with that investigation. Pursuant to plea and settlement agreements dated September 12, 1990, entered into by each of Petitioners with the United States Department of Justice, Dean and Petitioners agreed to a comprehensive settlement. Said settlement required that Petitioner plead guilty to a one-count criminal information and pay $1 million each in criminal penalties and $175,000 each in civil damages to the federal government. Such civil liabilities and criminal penalties were paid to the federal government, as reflected in a letter from the federal prosecutor to officials of the United States Defense Logistics Agency dated February 21, 1991, which letter appears as Exhibit A to the Memorandum submitted by Dean to the Defense Logistics Agency. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e, F.S., establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners agreed to and did cooperate fully with the State of Florida in connection with its investigation. Petitioners also cooperated fully with the federal grand jury investigation. This cooperation was confirmed in the letter from the federal prosecutor referred to above, which states: We have found McArthur & T.G. Lee and their attorneys to have been most cooperative in this matter. We believe both the companies and their attorneys have shown a high degree of responsibility by agreeing to settle this matter in an expeditious manner. The negotiated settlement with these defendants resolves all matters relating to their operations in Florida. As a final point, we believe the early agreement by these companies and their counsel to settle this matter for a substantial sum gave the incentive for other corporate defendants to come forward and also offer substantial criminal and civil settlements. Several of those cases have now been favorably concluded. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.f., F.S., establishes "[d]isassociation from any other person or affiliate convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Jack Wells and James Clark, the only individuals at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods implicated in the wrongdoing that give rise to the convictions in question, were terminated. The investigations conducted by the State of Florida and the Department of Justice disclosed no involvement or knowledge on the part of any other employee of Petitioners, Dean or any of Dean's other subsidiaries, as reflected in a letter form attorneys representing the State of Florida to Dean's attorney dated June 29, 1988. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.g, F.S., establishes "[p]rior or future self- policing by the person or affiliate to prevent public entity crimes' as a mitigating factor. All of Dean's subsidiaries, including Petitioners, have an active antitrust compliance program. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.k, F.S., establishes "demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners have been involved in civic and philanthropic affairs throughout the years. For example, T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have spearheaded fundraising events for Edgewood Children's Ranch, a non-sectarian foundation for the support of under-privileged and abused children. T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have also donated milk to the Ranch for a number of years. McArthur Dairy has made substantial contributions to organizations such as the University of Miami, and Miami Dade Junior College.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are true, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility for certification of correctional officers within the State of Florida. Respondent holds Correctional Certificate No. 200857, issued to her by Petitioner. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., on January 8, 2005, Corporal Andrew Markham of the City of Sebring Police Department was dispatched to the scene of a reported traffic crash at the intersection of Center Street and Northeast Lakeview Drive in Sebring, Florida. Corporal Markham found no vehicles in the intersection or any evidence of a crash there. Adjacent to the intersection, in the parking lot of the Sebring Public Library, Corporal Markham saw a car with its brake lights illuminated. He approached the car to determine whether the occupants could provide any information about the reported traffic accident. Corporal Markham observed that the front of the car was damaged from its collision with a low barrier wall that bordered the parking lot. The windshield was also damaged from what Corporal Markham concluded was the impact of the occupants' heads with the windshield when the car hit the barrier. When Corporal Markham approached the car, he saw Respondent exit the driver's seat and begin to walk away. Corporal Markham stopped Respondent to speak with her. Respondent had blood on her face, as did the other occupant of the car. At the time of the incident, Respondent denied being the driver of the car. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she was the driver. During his conversation with Respondent at the scene, Corporal Markham smelled the odor of alcohol on Respondent, noted that she was unsteady, and that her eyes were red. When Corporal Markham asked Respondent to take field sobriety tests, she continued to insist that she was not the driver of the car and would not take the tests. Based on his observations at the scene, his training, and his 13 years of experience as a police officer, Corporal Markham believed Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. Therefore, he arrested Respondent for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Corporal Markham first transported Respondent to the Highlands County Medical Center to receive treatment for her injury. At the Medical Center, Respondent refused medical treatment, and Corporal Markham transported her to the Highlands County Jail. At the jail, Respondent was taken to the area where breath tests are conducted. Corporal Markham read Respondent the "Implied Consent" that informed her that if she refused to take the test, she could lose her driving privilege for up to one year. Respondent refused to take a breath test at the jail. Deputy Loran Danielson of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office was the officer on duty to conduct the breath tests at the jail. When Deputy Danielson met Respondent, he noted that her breath smelled strongly of alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot, her speech was slurred, and she was unsteady on her feet. Based on his observations of Respondent, his training, and his 10 years of experience as a Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Danielson was of the opinion that Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. During the time that Deputy Danielson talked to Respondent, she told him that she had consumed "many" drinks, and if she took the breath test, it would show "I'm drunk." On September 27, 2004, less than four months before the incident at issue in this case, Petitioner issued Respondent a Letter of Acknowledgement for an earlier driving under the influence (DUI) violation by Respondent. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she had "a few drinks" with friends at a bar just prior to her arrest, but she denied that she was intoxicated. Respondent said the crash occurred because she had taken her eyes off the road to speak to passengers in the back seat. Respondent said she refused to take the field sobriety tests or the breath test at the jail because she was scared. Respondent explained that one term of her probation for the prior DUI conviction was that she was not to drink alcohol. Respondent expressed remorse for her behavior on January 8, 2005, and claimed she has stopped drinking alcohol. Respondent stated that her career as a correctional officer is very important to her, and she requested another opportunity to prove she is a responsible person and capable correctional officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent Tena D. Grant failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and ordering that her certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2006.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a) and (b), by unlawfully possessing a controlled substance, cocaine, and by driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when effected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired or with a blood or breath alcohol level of .08 or above, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, is the state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying correctional officers and taking disciplinary action against them for failing to maintain good moral character as required by section 943.13(7). § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. At all times relevant, Respondent was a certified Florida Correctional Officer, having been issued certificate number 279704. On October 14, 2010, Respondent was operating or in actual physical control of his motor vehicle in South Miami, Florida. South Miami Police Officer Junior Vijil observed Respondent's vehicle stopped in the middle of the intersection of 58th Court and Southwest 73rd Street. After observing Respondent's driving pattern, Officer Vijil initiated a traffic stop. Officer Vijil approached Respondent's vehicle and made initial contact with Respondent. Officer Vijil observed certain indicators of potential impairment and requested Respondent to step out of the vehicle. Respondent complied with Officer Vijil's request. At the time of the traffic stop, Respondent had a passenger in the front seat of his vehicle. When Respondent exited the vehicle, at Officer Vijil's request, the passenger remained seated in the vehicle. Officer Vijil called for backup officers and awaited their arrival prior to performing field sobriety exercises with Respondent. The passenger remained seated, unsupervised, in Respondent's vehicle for several minutes until additional law enforcement personnel arrived. When South Miami Police Officer Louis Fata arrived on the scene, Officer Vijil initiated field sobriety exercises. At the conclusion of the field sobriety exercises, Officer Vijil did not immediately arrest Respondent, but rather, requested Respondent provide consent to search the vehicle. Respondent consented to the search. Officer Vijil began the search of the vehicle by first looking in the front interior compartment. He observed, in plain sight, a small, dark, plastic baggie in the center console. The center console's lid was absent. Although the baggie was dark in color, Officer Vijil could observe a white powdery substance that he believed was cocaine. After locating the suspicious substance, Officer Vijil removed the same from Respondent's vehicle and secured it in his patrol vehicle. A field test of the white substance was performed by Officer Vijil and Officer Fata, which resulted in a presumptive positive result for cocaine. Officer Vigil interviewed Respondent and the passenger concerning their knowledge of the suspected cocaine. After both individuals denied any knowledge of the substance, Officer Vijil arrested Respondent for possession of a controlled substance. Karen Wiggins, a criminalist at the Miami-Dade Police Department Forensic Service Bureau, performed a series of tests on the substance at issue, and credibly testified that the suspected substance was cocaine. Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation, the parties stipulate that, on October 14, 2010, Respondent did unlawfully drive or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when effected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired; or with a blood or breath alcohol level of .08 or above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), by his violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of six months, with the requirement that Commission-approved substance abuse counseling be completed prior to the end of the probationary period. It is further recommended that the Commission enter an final order dismissing the allegation that Respondent unlawfully constructively possessed a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2013.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was certified as a correctional officer, having been issued Correctional Certificate Number 276769. On or about July 3, 2008, Respondent was driving his vehicle on State Road 20 in Calhoun County. Trooper Philip Spaziante of the Florida Highway Patrol observed Respondent speeding and conducted a traffic stop of Respondent’s vehicle. After Respondent pulled to the side of the road and stopped, Trooper Spaziante explained to Respondent why he had stopped him. As he spoke to Respondent, he noticed that Respondent appeared to be exceptionally nervous. Respondent told Trooper Spaziante that he was on his way to Port St. Joe to spend the weekend at the beach. Trooper Spaziante then asked Respondent if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Respondent consented to the search. Trooper Spaziante found a purple cloth “Crown Royal” bag in the driver’s side door of Respondent’s vehicle. Trooper Spaziante found a small quantity, less than 20 grams, of cannabis (marijuana) inside a Skoal (chewing tobacco) container which was inside the Crown Royal bag. Trooper Spaziante is trained in the recognition of the smell of burnt cannabis. During his nine years as a State Trooper, he has encountered cannabis many times, during traffic stops in particular. Based upon his experience, Trooper Spaziante was able to identify the substance in the Skoal can as cannabis. Trooper Spaziante then placed Respondent under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. After finding the marijuana, Trooper Spaziante contacted Deputy William Dalton of the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office and requested that he come to the scene and assist. After Deputy Dalton arrived, the two officers continued the search of Respondent’s vehicle. Deputy Dalton is a police canine handler. Deputy Dalton is also trained in recognition of cannabis and cannabis paraphernalia. He is the handler for Gina, a K-9 dog certified in narcotics investigation by the American Canine Police Association. Deputy Dalton deployed Gina to conduct an exterior “sniff” of Respondent’s vehicle. Gina "alerted" as a result of her sniff of Respondent’s vehicle, indicating that narcotics were in the vehicle. Deputy Dalton then continued to search Respondent’s vehicle. The officers found a marijuana “blunt,” which is a cigar with some of the tobacco removed and replaced with marijuana. Trooper Spaziante observed some loose tobacco that appeared to have been removed from the cigar. The officers found a duffle bag in the back seat of the vehicle. The Respondent told the officers that the bag was his and that it contained clothing and personal items for his trip to Port St. Joe. Deputy Dalton took the duffle bag out of the vehicle where Gina “alerted” as a result of her sniff of Respondent’s duffle bag. Deputy Dalton then searched the duffle bag. Inside the duffle bag was a small smoking pipe commonly used to smoke marijuana. Deputy Dalton also observed marijuana residue in the bowl of the pipe. Respondent stated that he had forgotten that the pipe was in the duffle, and that it had been in there a long time. Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards Commission enter a final order revoking the corrections certificate of Respondent, Ben C. Cramer. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ben C. Cramer Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a),2 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-20.0012(2)(f),3 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Taylor was certified by the Commission on March 21, 1990 and was issued Correctional Certificate No. 75624. On May 12, 1999, Mr. Taylor was issued Instructor Certificate No. 212961. On August 7, 2005, Mr. Taylor went to the house where his sister, Michelle Taylor (Ms. Taylor), and her boyfriend, Dean Radney (Mr. Radney), were living. Mr. Taylor owned the house and was allowing his sister to live in the house. Mr. Taylor had been drinking heavily and was intoxicated when he went to his sister’s home. An argument ensued between Mr. Taylor and Ms. Taylor. Ms. Taylor called 911 and requested the Holmes County Sheriff’s Department to intervene. Ms. Taylor felt that if she called the sheriff that Mr. Taylor would leave. Mr. Taylor did leave the house. Deputy Michael Raley came to the residence in response to Ms. Taylor’s call. When Deputy Raley arrived, James Taylor, the brother of Mr. and Ms. Taylor, was at the home. James Taylor told his sister not to press charges against Mr. Taylor. Deputy Raley asked James Taylor to leave, and James Taylor complied with the request. When Deputy Raley arrived at the home of Ms. Taylor, she was upset and told him that there had been a family dispute. Deputy Raley asked Ms. Taylor to walk him through the house, and she did. At the back door, Deputy Raley observed that the back door facing had been damaged. He saw a nine millimeter shell casing lying on the floor of a rear room. There was a bullet hole in the bathroom door and a fragmented bullet in the laundry hamper. Ms. Taylor told Deputy Raley that there was a bullet hole in the living room/kitchen area. He went to that part of the house and saw a nine millimeter shell casing lying on the kitchen floor and a hole in the window. Deputy Raley took a sworn statement from Ms. Taylor, but the statement was not submitted for introduction into evidence. Although Ms. Taylor called 911 to summon assistance, the tape of the 911 call was not submitted for introduction into evidence. At the final hearing, Ms. Taylor stated that she had just come home from a drug rehabilitation facility when Mr. Taylor came to her home, that she was under a lot of stress, and that she did not remember what happened except that she and her brother argued, and she called 911 for assistance. At the final hearing, Mr. Taylor testified that on the day of incident in question, he was too drunk to remember what happened. Other than hearsay testimony, there is no evidence to support the allegations that Mr. Taylor committed assault and battery against his sister or Mr. Radney or that he fired a gun in his sister’s home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Taylor did not violate Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2008.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission was the state agency responsible for the training and certification or law enforcement and corrections officers in Florida. Respondent was certified as a Corrections Officer under certificate No. 48891 on August 8, 1991. On June 29, 1994, Respondent was employed as a Corrections Officer I at the Hillsborough Corrections Institute in Tampa and had been so employed for approximately three and a half years. On that day, officer Ricardo Sementilli, a policeman with the Tampa Police Department's narcotics bureau, with approximately six and a half years experience in law enforcement, was targeting a house in Carver City, a Tampa housing area, for suspected unlawful narcotics activity. In the course of his investigation, Officer Sementilli was using the services of a confidential informant, Penny DuFour. Ms. DuFour, herself a former drug user, had been working as an informant for the police in general and for Officer Sementilli in particular for almost two years. On this evening, he proposed to have Ms. DuFour make a controlled purchase of illegal drugs at this particular residence. As preparation for the controlled buy, Ms. DuFour was searched by Officer Keene, also of the Tampa Police Department, to insure that she did not have any narcotics or other contraband in her possession. None was found during this search which is a normal procedure of the Tampa Police Department as a part of a controlled purchase by a confidential informant. Officer Keene was assigned to the Police Department's Tactical Division in narcotics enforcement and had worked in that division for approximately five years. She was working with Sementilli on this operation because he was well known and she was unknown in the geographic area in which the buy was to be made. Pursuant to the officers' plan, Officer Sementilli drove Ms. DuFour and Officer Keene to the intersection of Laurel and Manhattan Streets in Carver City. At this point, Keene, who had binoculars with her, hid out of sight behind a wall at Jefferson High School in a position where she could see Ms. DuFour. When Keene was in place, DuFour was sent out from the police vehicle to approach the residence in question. Keene was able to keep DuFour in sight the entire time using the binoculars. As DuFour approached the residence in question, a red compact car, occupied by Mr. Sampson and the Respondent, drove up. Both DuFour and Keene indicated Mr. Sampson was in the passenger seat and Respondent, who was dressed in a law enforcement uniform, was driving. DuFour went up to the vehicle and leaned in the passenger window. She asked Mr. Sampson if he was "straight." By this she meant to ask if he had any narcotics on his possession. In response, Sampson said he did, reached under the passenger seat of the car, and pulled out a plastic baggie in which were several pieces of what appeared to be cocaine. He placed the baggie in his lap and from it extracted a small piece of the substance which he gave to DuFour in exchange for $20.00 in U.S. currency which DuFour had been given by Officer Sementilli. All during this time, the baggie was in plain view on Sampson's lap and Respondent could see what was happening. She was either looking at Sampson or looking out the window, and Ms. DuFour was of the opinion that Respondent was fully aware of what was going on though she did not say anything. It is so found. After she received the substance from Sampson and paid him for it, DuFour left the vehicle and returned to where Officer Keene was located without either stopping or speaking with anyone on the way. When she got to Keene, she handed over the substance she had received from Sampson and was searched to insure she had not hidden any additional contraband on her person. She had not. Sementilli performed a field test of the substance at the scene. The test indicated the substance DuFour had received from Sampson in the presence of the Respondent was cocaine. This tentative identification was subsequently confirmed by a laboratory analysis conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. No issue was raised as to chain of custody of the sample in question or as to its identification as cocaine. At the time the sale took place from Sampson to DuFour, the officers obtained the license tag number on the vehicle being driven by Respondent and from which Sampson made the sale. A subsequent check with the Department of Motor Vehicles revealed that the vehicle was owned by Louis Sales, Respondent's father. Approximately one month after the sale described above, the car was discovered at the home belonging to Mr. Sampson's mother. As the officers were attempting to impound the vehicle, Respondent approached them. Keene at that time identified Respondent as the driver of the vehicle at the time of the sale in issue here and placed her under arrest. However, criminal charges were not preferred against her. At hearing, Respondent indicated that on the day of the alleged sale, she had been driven to work in her father's car by her boyfriend, Mr. Sampson, who was without his own vehicle at the time. While at work, she was interrogated by facility investigators relative to an allegation that she was introducing contraband into the corrections facility. Because this upset her, she asked for and was give permission to leave work early, approximately 5:30 PM. She then contacted Mr. Sampson who picked her up in her vehicle at approximately 7:00 PM that evening. When Sampson and Respondent left the corrections facility, they drove to Carver City because Sampson said he had to run an errand in the area. At that time Carver City, located some 45 minutes from Plant City, where Respondent lived, was known as an area of high drug activity. It was not uncommon for many drug dealers to be operating on the streets of the community. Respondent knew that Mr. Sampson was a drug dealer. He would sometime sell drugs openly in front of her. She had been present on several other occasions when DuFour had purchased cocaine from Mr. Sampson. At the time she met Mr. Sampson, in December, 1993, notwithstanding she denied it, Respondent knew he had just recently been released from prison because he told her so. He had been convicted of escape and grand theft. Nonetheless, they developed a relationship during the course of which she admittedly began to suspect he was dealing drugs. She did not ask him if this was so, however, even though she knew that her knowing association with a drug dealer could place her certification in jeopardy. When she became convinced that Sampson was dealing drugs, Respondent still did not terminate the relationship, however, claiming she was afraid to do so. When she was arrested as a result of the instant sale, however, she finally broke off the relationship. As a result of the controlled buy in issue, Mr. Sampson was convicted of sale of cocaine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Sydell T. Sales, be found guilty of demonstrating less than good moral character, and that her certification as a corrections officer be placed on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Miriam L. Sumpter, Esquire 2700 North MacDill Avenue Suite 208 Tampa, Florida 33607 A. Leon Lowry, II Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent may be disciplined for failure to maintain the qualifications established by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002), which requires that a correctional officer have good moral character.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent, Jacqueline L. Scriven, is a state-certified correctional officer holding certificate No. 45230. She was certified by Petitioner on August 28, 1985. On March 18, 2002, Respondent and her 21-year-old daughter, Marissa Jefferson, were involved in a physical altercation. The daughter reported to the arresting officer that Respondent struck her with her fists and a claw hammer. The arresting officer reported physical evidence on Marissa Jefferson's back and shoulders consistent with an attack with a claw hammer. Marissa Jefferson also reported to the arresting officer that Respondent threatened to shoot her with a revolver that Respondent was holding, although Respondent did not point the weapon at her. Marissa Jefferson was not available to testify; she is presently incarcerated for writing bad checks in Orange County jail. She has charges pending in four other Florida counties. She has a history of police involvement for various criminal and drug-related offenses. She stole from her mother while living with her. Interestingly, while Marisa Jefferson is in jail, Respondent is the primary caretaker for Marissa Jefferson's son. Respondent was arrested and charged with aggravated battery (Section 784.045, Florida Statutes (2002)) and aggravated assault with a firearm (Section 784.021, Florida Statutes (2002)). On December 17, 2002, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2002), felony battery. Adjudication was withheld, and she was placed on probation for a period of one year. In addition, she paid $183.50 in costs and was directed to undergo anger management evaluation and training. Respondent, who is 43 years old, had been employed by Department of Corrections since 1985 and had risen to the rank of captain. She was terminated on January 9, 2003. Respondent acknowledges hitting her daughter with a hammer, but denies having ever had the pistol in her possession during the altercation. Respondent contends that she used the hammer in self-defense. The position of the blunt trauma visible on Marissa Jefferson's back and shoulders indicates that she had her back to Respondent when she was struck. Based on the hearsay nature of the evidence supporting the allegations of assault with a firearm and Respondent's candid admission of hitting her daughter with a hammer, but denying having ever had possession of the firearm during the altercation, her testimony is credible regarding both allegations. It does not appear that Respondent's striking her daughter with the claw hammer was in self-defense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Jacqueline L. Scriven, violated Subsection 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, and, as a result, failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that her certification be suspended for two years from January 10, 2003, and that she be given such other associated penalties as Petitioner deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2003.
