Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
MAVIS R. GEORGALIS vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 04-002339F (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 06, 2004 Number: 04-002339F Latest Update: Mar. 31, 2006

The Issue What amount of legal fees and costs should be awarded to Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.569(2)(e) or 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, for Respondent’s erroneous classification of Petitioner’s position and subsequent failure to correct that error and reclassify Petitioner’s position back to career service as requested by her in Georgalis v. F.D.O.T., DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.

Findings Of Fact On April 1, 2002, Petitioner was discharged from her position with the Department without stated cause or hearing. See Petitioner’s Ex. 1-2, Dep’t of Transportation v. FCHR, 842 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). On June 11, 2003, Petitioner was temporarily reinstated by order of the Circuit Court to her position with the Department pursuant to section 112.3187(9)(f). Petitioner’s Ex. 1-3. The administrative case underlying this request for fees and costs was initiated by Petitioner through the filing of a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on August 15, 2002. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4. In that Petition, Petitioner demonstrated, through reference to the position description provided to her by the Department, that she did not fit within any of the categories of employees exempted from career service by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 7. Petitioner also put the Department on notice that she believed the Department’s action in reclassifying her was “frivolous and was done for an improper purpose,” since it was contradicted by the Department’s own documents. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 12. She also requested that she be awarded appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. After nearly four months, the Department forwarded the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative hearing regarding whether its decision to reclassify Petitioner was proper. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-5. By this letter, which was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 10, 2003, the Department requested a formal administrative hearing and manifested its opposition to the relief requested by Petitioner in her Petition. A hearing was held in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED on April 15, 2004. Following the preparation of a transcript, the parties submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order because it improperly raised an argument that Petitioner could properly be exempted from career service because she was an “administrator.” Petitioner’s Ex. 1-6. That Motion was granted. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-7.1/ On July 2, 2004, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order concluding that Petitioner was improperly reclassified into Select Exempt Service. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, p. 12. On September 1, 2005, the Department entered a Final Order adopting the Recommended Order entered in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.2/ Petitioner’s Ex. 1-11. Paragraph 13 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order states that: based on the duties and responsibilities contained in Petitioner’s position description and the actual duties she performed, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioner was subject to exemption from career service as concluded by Respondent in July 2001. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 13. In paragraph 19 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order, the undersigned concluded that: [t]he suggestion of the Respondent’s witness that the exemption should apply if a state employee is assigned to work with anyone retained or commissioned by Respondent to perform services for Respondent, however menial the task, simply misconstrues the statutory exemption: the relevant issue for the purposes of the exemption is whether such persons are department “employees,” not whether a department has contracted or engaged their services as independent technical consultants. Such contract administration is not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner could properly be classified as a selected exempt employee. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 19. Following entry of the Recommended Order, Petitioner filed her two (2) Motions for Attorneys’ Fees. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-12 and 1-13. These motions seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the lack of factual or legal support for the Department’s opposition to Petitioner’s request that the Department correct its error in reclassifying her position to Select Exempt Service. Id. Petitioner submitted an affidavit and itemized statement of the requested hours, a summary of hours by the attorney, and a summary of costs incurred in this matter. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14. Petitioner also submitted the testimony of J. Steven Menton, Esquire, who corroborated the reasonableness of the services and time expended by Petitioner’s counsel and also confirmed the reasonableness of the fees charged and costs incurred by Petitioner’s counsel for those services. The Department did not contest the number of hours sought by Petitioner’s counsel. Respondent did offer the testimony of Michael Mattimore, Esquire, who was also counsel of record for the Department in this case, suggesting that the rates charged by Petitioner’s counsel exceeded those which are normally charged by similar attorneys in the community. Mattimore’s testimony related to fees charged in “employment” law cases in which he has been involved during his career and did not focus on administrative litigation challenging the actions of a governmental agency, such as the present case which involved more than merely examining the factual circumstances surrounding a discharge or other adverse employment action. Confirming the complexity of the underlying case was Mattimore’s testimony regarding the outcome in other reclassification cases. The great majority of reclassification challenges (more than 95 percent of them) have been resolved in favor of the governmental agency or have not been pursued by the impacted employee. Id. The outcome obtained by attorneys for Petitioner in the underlying case is suggestive of fees toward the high end of the range. Petitioner reported the following hours and rates (Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14): LAWYERS: Hours Rate Amount M. Stephen Turner, P.A. 44.40 $400 $17,760.00 David K. Miller, P. A. 1.00 $300 $ 300.00 Martin A. Fitzpatrick 228.50 $250 $57,125.00 Brooke Lewis .90 $200 $ 80.00 TOTAL ATTORNEY HOURS 274.80 $75,365.00 Paralegals: Theresa J. Everhart Hours 1.90 Rate $80 Amount $152.00 Trishia Finkey 1.00 $80 80.00 TOTAL PARALEGAL HOURS 2.90 $ 232.00 TOTAL LEGAL FEES: $75.597.00 The hours and rates requested are found to be reasonable in view of the novelty and complexity of the issues, level of legal skills required, and the result obtained for the Petitioner. The rates sought are in line with fees charged by similarly-situated attorneys for similar work in the community. The amount requested is reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Moreover, the costs and expenses for which reimbursement is sought ($1,523.25) and the expert witness fees of $1400 ($280 /hour for 5 hours) are also reasonable and are of a kind typically billed to clients in addition to the hourly rate charged.

Florida Laws (8) 110.205112.3187120.569120.595120.6820.0457.105768.79
# 1
ROBERT WOOD, P.E. vs THE FLORIDA BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 12-002900RU (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 04, 2012 Number: 12-002900RU Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2014

The Issue The issue for disposition in this case is whether Respondents have implemented agency statements that meet the definition of a rule, but which have not been adopted pursuant to section 120.54.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert Wood, P.E., is a Florida-licensed professional engineer, holding license No. PE 31542. A large part of Petitioner?s work involves the design of aluminum-framed structures. Respondents, DBPR and FBPE, are charged with regulating the practice of professional engineering in the State of Florida, pursuant to chapters 455 and 471, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61G15. The FEMC is a public-private partnership established by the legislature to provide administrative, investigative, and prosecutorial services to the FBPE. By statute, the FEMC operates under a written contract (Contract) with the DBPR, which Contract is approved by the FBPE. Term of the Contract From the creation of FEMC in 1997 until 2000, the legislature provided that the required written contract was to be “renewed annually.” In 2000, the legislature amended section 471.38 to require that the written contract be an “annual contract.” In 2003, the legislature again amended section 471.38 to repeal the requirement that the contract be an annual contract. There is currently no specified term or time for renewal for the required written contract. The DBPR and the FEMC have elected to continue to enter written contracts with a term of one year. Determination of Legal Sufficiency Since its creation in 1997, section 471.038 has provided that “[t]he corporation may not exercise any authority specifically assigned to the board under chapter 455 or this chapter, including determining probable cause to pursue disciplinary action against a licensee, taking final action on license applications or in disciplinary cases, or adopting administrative rules under chapter 120.” The only change to that restriction was made in 2000, when the term “corporation” was changed to “management corporation.” In 2000, the legislature also enacted the Management Privatization Act, section 455.32, Florida Statutes. That Act was intended to establish a model for the creation of non-profit corporations with which the DBPR could contract for “administrative, examination, licensing, investigative and prosecutorial services to any board created within the department.” The similarities between section 471.38 and section 455.32 make it obvious that the latter was largely patterned after the former. Among the duties to be performed by a “corporation” under section 455.32(10) is to: . . . make a determination of legal sufficiency to begin the investigative process as provided in s. 455.225. However, the department or the board may not delegate to the corporation, by contract or otherwise, the authority for determining probable cause to pursue disciplinary action against a licensee, taking final action on license actions or on disciplinary cases, or adopting administrative rules under chapter 120. In previous years, at least through 2001, the written contract between the DBPR and the FEMC provided that “FEMC shall not exercise the police powers inherent in the Department and the FBPE including a determination of legal sufficiency or insufficiency of a disciplinary complaint.” At some time after the passage of the Management Privatization Act, the contractual “police powers” restriction was changed, and now reads, as reflected in the current Contract, as follows: Except when providing those prosecutorial and investigative services set forth in this Agreement, FEMC shall not exercise the police powers inherent in the Department and the FBPE under Chapters 455 or 471, Florida Statutes, including determining probable cause to pursue disciplinary action against a licensee, other than failure to comply with final orders of the Board as set forth in Rule 61015-18.005(2), Florida Administrative Code, taking final action on license applications or in disciplinary cases, or adopting administrative rules under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Prosecutorial servicing shall only be executed in the name of FBPE. That contractual restriction is consistent with the statutory limitation on the powers of the FEMC set forth in section 471.38. In its current form, the Contract establishes the services that are to be provided by FEMC to the DBPR and the FBPE. The list of prosecutorial services to be provided by FEMC include coordinating with investigators, reviewing and taking “appropriate action” on complaints, and preparing cases for presentation to the FBPE probable cause panel. The list of investigative services to be provided by FEMC include receiving complaints, interviewing complainants, witnesses, and subjects of complaints, issuing subpoenas, preparing investigative reports, and taking other actions leading to the prosecution of a case. The Contract does not specifically address the issue of determining legal sufficiency. The typical procedures of the FEMC in performing its investigatory functions are initiated when the FEMC receives a complaint by various means, including telephone, e-mail, or submission of a written complaint. Written complaints are normally directed to the FEMC chief prosecutor, who assigns them to an investigator for initial review. If the complaint is verbal, the investigator fielding the call will ask the complainant to file a written complaint. If a complaint is unaccompanied by information to substantiate the claims, the investigator typically requests supporting documentation, which may be a set of engineering plans, a report, or similar evidence of the facts underlying the complaint. In a procedure implemented by the FEMC in 2012, after receipt of the complaint and supporting documentation, the investigator forwards the complaint to an engineering expert retained by FEMC for a pre-review. The expert prepares a preliminary report which is then considered in the determination of legal sufficiency. Prior to implementation of the 2012 pre- review procedure, the determination of legal sufficiency was made without the benefit of a pre-review report in the manner otherwise described below. After receipt of the complaint, the supporting documentation, and, since 2012, the pre-review report, the investigator presents the complaint to the FEMC chief prosecutor. If the chief prosecutor determines that the complaint is not legally sufficient, the investigator is instructed to draft a memorandum for the chief prosecutor to review, which is in turn submitted to the FBPE Executive Director for signature. If the chief prosecutor determines that the complaint is legally sufficient, he or she verbally authorizes the investigator to place the engineer on notice of the investigation. At that point, the complaint is investigated using the investigative tools available to FEMC as set forth in the Contract. If sufficient evidence that a violation has occurred is found, the investigation culminates in a recommendation to the FBPE probable cause panel for a decision as to whether the panel believes there to be probable cause to proceed with disciplinary action. The decision to proceed with a disciplinary proceeding requiring a point of entry to challenge the action is entirely that of the FBPE probable cause panel. Probationary Project Review On November 4, 2009, FBPE entered a disciplinary final order regarding Petitioner that incorporated a stipulated settlement agreement, and imposed sanctions on Petitioner, including probation. By his entry of the settlement stipulation, Petitioner agreed to a “project review” at six and eighteen-month intervals. The project review consisted of the submission by Petitioner of a list of all completed projects. That list was provided to an engineering expert, who then selected two of the projects for a more comprehensive review. The steps to be performed by Petitioner and the FBPE are generally described in Project Review Process Guidelines that were provided to Petitioner by FBPE as an attachment to the notice of the two projects selected for comprehensive review. As a result of the project review, the two projects were determined to violate engineering standards, which resulted in the FEMC making a recommendation of probable cause to the FBPE probable cause panel. The probable cause panel found probable cause, leading to the issuance of an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner. Petitioner introduced evidence of one other case in which a project review was required as a condition of probation. In that case, an administrative law judge, after having determined that the professional engineer committed violations of section 471.033 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15- 19.001, recommended imposition of “probation for two years with appropriate conditions for this case.” The Final Order, entered on March 12, 2008, imposed the recommended probation “with a plans review at 6 months and 18 months from the date of this Order.” The basis for the imposition of that sanction was not explained. There was no evidence introduced at the final hearing as to any other specific case in which a project review was required, other than the case involving Petitioner. The 2012 FEMC Annual Report, which is a business record of the FEMC, indicated that between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012, the FEMC was involved in the investigation and/or prosecution of 32 cases in which Administrative Complaints were filed against engineers. Disciplinary sanctions imposed against engineers during that one-year period included, among others, twenty-five reprimands, six license suspensions, eight probations, seven license restrictions, two voluntary license relinquishments, and four license revocations. Also included among the sanctions imposed during that period were three project reviews. The sanction of project review is one that is, statistically, used sparingly by the FBPE. There was no evidence introduced to establish the criteria, if any, for the imposition of a project review as a condition of probation, or to demonstrate that it was generally applied in any specific circumstances.

Florida Laws (12) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.68455.225455.227455.2273455.32471.033471.038
# 2
ROBERT REINSHUTTLE vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 04-002011SED (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 07, 2004 Number: 04-002011SED Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
# 3
ATTORNEYS` TITLE INSURANCE FUND, INC., AND FLORIDA LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, INC. vs FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION, AND OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION, 05-002630RP (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 25, 2005 Number: 05-002630RP Latest Update: Mar. 30, 2007

The Issue Whether Proposed Rule 69O-186.003(1)(c) should be invalidated on the grounds that it is an invalid delegation of legislative authority as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2005).1

Findings Of Fact Based on the record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Background The Commission was created by statute effective January 7, 2003. It is composed of the Governor, the Attorney General, the Chief Financial Officer, and the Commissioner of Agriculture. The Commission members "serve as agency head of the Financial Services Commission." § 20.121(3), Fla. Stat. The OIR is an "office" of the Commission and is "responsible for all activities concerning insurers and other risk bearing entities . . . ." The OIR is headed by a director, who is also known as the Commissioner of Insurance Regulation. § 20.121(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. Pertinent to this proceeding, the legislature delineated the powers to be exercised by the Commission and the OIR, respectively, in Section 20.121(3), Florida Statutes, as follows: (c) Powers.--Commission members shall serve as the agency head for purposes of rulemaking under ss. 120.536-120.565 by the commission and all subunits of the commission. Each director is agency head for purposes of final agency action under chapter 120 for all areas within the regulatory authority delegated to the director's office.[3] Stipulated Facts (verbatim) The following stipulated facts are adopted as findings of fact for the purpose of this Final Order: On February 25, 2003, the Commission met, considered, and approved an agenda item involving the rulemaking process to be used by the Commission, the OIR, and the Office of Financial Regulation. The rulemaking procedure that is under consideration in this case involves the Commission's delegation to the OIR of the authority to engage in certain rulemaking activities. A true and correct copy of that agenda item, as approved by the Commission, and the relevant pages of the transcript of that meeting, are attached hereto as "Appendix A." On May 13, 2003, the Commission met and without objection approved the minutes of the Commission's February 25, 2003, meeting. The rulemaking process and delegation set forth in Appendix A permit the OIR to initiate rulemaking and to publish a proposed rule without the prior approval of the Commission, but require the Commission to approve the proposed rule prior to its filing for final adoption pursuant to Section 120.54(3)(e), Florida Statutes. Since its adoption in 2003, the Commission and the OIR have routinely employed the rulemaking process described in Appendix A and used this delegation of rulemaking authority in promulgating rules regulating the insurance industry. The Commission and the OIR employed the rulemaking process described in Appendix A and used this delegation of rulemaking authority in promulgating the proposed JLP rule that is the subject of the pending rule challenge. In May 2005, the OIR issued an order approving the JLP forms that had previously been submitted by First American Title Insurance Company. Shortly thereafter, on June 3, 2005, the OIR published a proposed rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly that would set an industry-wide premium rate for the newly approved JLP forms. Pursuant to the OIR's notice of proposed rulemaking, a public hearing was held on July 13, 2005, at which interested parties had the opportunity to speak and address the provisions of the proposed rule. The OIR's counsel specifically stated on the record during the hearing that the rulemaking process was ongoing and that the "final" hearing for the proposed rule would be subsequently noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly and held before the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Commission. On or about July 25, 2005, the Fund and the Association filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings challenging the validity of the proposed JLP rule. Consistent with the Commission's routine practice, a notice of the "final" hearing before the Commission on the proposed JLP rule will be published in Part VI of the Florida Administrative Weekly ("Notices of Meetings, Workshops and Public Hearings"), and a copy of the notice will be mailed to all persons who notified the OIR of their interest in the proposed JLP rule, including the Fund and the Association. Statutory rulemaking procedures A "rule" is defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, as "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule." Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, sets forth the rulemaking procedures that are to be followed by all Florida agencies, including the Commission, see § 120.52(1)(b)4., Fla. Stat., and these procedures constitute the exclusive process for the promulgation and adoption of rules in Florida. See § 120.54(1)(a) and (3)(c)2., Fla. Stat. The rulemaking procedures mandated in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, are detailed and comprehensive and contain two primary requirements: public notice at each step of the rule-development and rule-adoption process and an opportunity, throughout the rulemaking process, for the public and substantially affected persons to be heard with respect to any rule an agency proposes to adopt. See § 120.54(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. Generally, the first step in the rulemaking process is "rule development," as described in Section 120.54(2), Florida Statutes. The agency is required to give notice of its intent to develop proposed rules in the FAW "before providing notice of a proposed rule as required by paragraph (3)(a)," and the notice must "indicate the subject area to be addressed by rule development, provide a short, plain explanation of the purpose and effect of the proposed rule, cite the specific legal authority for the proposed rule, and include the preliminary text of the proposed rules, if available " § 120.54(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The agency may also hold public workshops during the rule development process, and it must hold a public workshop "if requested in writing by any affected person, unless the agency head explains in writing why a workshop is unnecessary." Id. Once the agency has developed a proposed rule, it must follow the adoption procedures set forth in Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes. Foremost among these procedures is publication of notice of the agency's "intended action" in the FAW. This notice must be published by the agency "[p]rior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule other than an emergency rule" and only "upon approval of the agency head." § 120.54(3)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. The notice "must state the procedure for requesting a public hearing on the proposed rule" and must include a short, plain explanation of the purpose and effect of the proposed action; the full text of the proposed rule or amendment and a summary thereof; a reference to the specific rulemaking authority pursuant to which the rule is adopted; and a reference to the section or subsection of the Florida Statutes or the Laws of Florida being implemented, interpreted, or made specific. § 120.54(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. If requested in writing, a public hearing must be conducted by the agency prior to adoption of a proposed rule in order to "give affected persons an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues under consideration." See § 120.54(3)(c)1., Fla. Stat. Once this public hearing has been held, the agency may modify or withdraw the proposed rule or may adopt the proposed rule by filing it with the Department of State. See § 120.54(3)(d) and (e), Fla. Stat. If the agency decides to modify the substance of a proposed rule after the final public hearing or after the time for requesting a public hearing has passed, any substantive change in the rule "must be supported by the record of public hearings held on the rule, must be in response to written material received on or before the date of the final public hearing, or must be in response to a proposed objection by the [Administrative Procedures] committee." § 120.54(3)(d)1., Fla. Stat. The agency must also, among other things, publish notice of the change and the reasons for the change in the FAW. Id. When the agency has determined that the proposed rule is ready for adoption, it must file with the Department of State "three certified copies of the rule it proposes to adopt, a summary of the rule, a summary of any hearings held on the rule, and a detailed written statement of the facts and circumstances justifying the rule. § 120.54(3)(e)1., Fla. Stat. The proposed rule must be filed for adoption "no less than 28 days nor more than 90 days after the notice required by paragraph (a) [of Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes]," § 120.54(3)(e)2., Fla. Stat.; the proposed rule is adopted upon filing with the Department of State and becomes effective 20 days after it is filed. § 120.54(3)(e)6., Fla. Stat. In addition to the opportunities to be heard at public hearings specified in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, persons who are substantially affected by a proposed rule may file a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting an administrative hearing to determine the validity of the proposed rule, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part: GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF A RULE OR A PROPOSED RULE.-- (a) Any person substantially affected by a rule or a proposed rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. * * * (e) Hearings held under this section shall be de novo in nature. The standard of proof shall be the preponderance of the evidence. Hearings shall be conducted in the same manner as provided by ss. 120.569 and 120.57, except that the administrative law judge's order shall be final agency action. The petitioner and the agency whose rule is challenged shall be adverse parties. . . . CHALLENGING PROPOSED RULES; SPECIAL PROVISIONS.-- Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed rule by filing a petition seeking such a determination with the division [of Administrative Hearings] within 21 days after the date of publication of the notice required by s. 120.54(3)(a), within 10 days after the final public hearing is held on the proposed rule as provided by s. 120.54(3)(c), within 20 days after the preparation of a statement of estimated regulatory costs required pursuant to s. 120.541, if applicable, or within 20 days after the date of publication of the notice required by s. 120.54(3)(d). The petition shall state with particularity the objections to the proposed rule and the reasons that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The petitioner has the burden of going forward. The agency then has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised. Any person who is substantially affected by a change in the proposed rule may seek a determination of the validity of such change. Any person not substantially affected by the proposed rule as initially noticed, but who is substantially affected by the rule as a result of a change, may challenge any provision of the rule and is not limited to challenging the change to the proposed rule. * * * (c) When any substantially affected person seeks determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule pursuant to this section, the proposed rule is not presumed to be valid or invalid.

Florida Laws (14) 120.52120.536120.54120.541120.56120.565120.569120.57120.68186.00320.0520.121627.78290.302
# 4
ROBERT J. CROUCH vs PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 03-003139SED (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 29, 2003 Number: 03-003139SED Latest Update: Mar. 01, 2004

The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner was a supervisory employee as defined by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), and was therefore properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner became employed by the Commission as an Engineering Supervisor in 1984, and held Select Exempt status prior to 1991, when he was reclassified to a Career Service employee. From 1997 until his retirement, he held Position No. 00168, titled “Utility Systems/Communications Engineer Supervisor.” The first paragraph of his October 1, 1997, Position Description states: This is work supervising engineers in the Bureau of Economic Regulation. The primary duty of the employee in this position is to spend the majority of time communicating with, motivating, training and evaluating employees, planning and directing their work; and having the ability to effectively recommend to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline subordinate employees. The October 1, 1997, Position Description was in effect at the time Petitioner was reclassified to Select Exempt following enactment of the Service First Initiative. Following the decision of the District Court of Appeal in Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (1st DCA 2003), Petitioner was notified of his right to seek an administrative hearing for the purpose of challenging his reclassification. Petitioner timely requested a hearing on August 13, 2003. Petitioner does not dispute the supervisory nature of the job outlined in the Position Description. He claims that despite his Position Description, his position was not truly “supervisory” as a practical matter and thus did not fit within the authorized grounds for reclassification under Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001). The Position Description alone is not controlling, because it is possible the actual nature of Petitioner’s job changed and the Position Description had not been amended to reflect that. It is therefore appropriate to look behind the Position Description to see whether the actual duties expected of Petitioner were supervisory in nature. To support his claim that his responsibilities had “eroded” to the point they were no longer supervisory in nature, Petitioner points to the hiring of several individuals to work in the section for which he was responsible. Several individuals (Ed Fuchs, Ted Davis, Gerald Edwards, and Jeanette Sickel) were hired to work under Petitioner by the Commission. Petitioner objected to the hiring of some of those persons on the ground that they lacked qualifications, educational and otherwise, for their positions, but they were hired nevertheless. Another individual, Wetherington, was hired with Petitioner’s assent after interviewing with Petitioner and the Bureau Chief. Once the individuals were hired, they worked under the supervision of Petitioner. He was responsible for approving their time sheets, conducting their annual evaluations, approving travel and leave requests, and training. Petitioner was responsible for assigning the work to employees Sickel, Munroe, Davis, Edwards, and Wetherington, and for monitoring its quality. It was Petitioner who the Commission held responsible for the work product of the section. Petitioner directed the manner in which the employees performed their work on a day-to-day basis. Petitioner answered to Marshall Willis, Bureau Chief of Rate Filings. Willis was responsible for evaluating Petitioner’s performance on the basis of how well Petitioner managed the performance of employees under Petitioner’s supervision, and Petitioner was rated and held accountable to communicate, train, direct, and assign work to subordinate employees assigned to him. Petitioner’s evaluation by Mr. Willis dated December 8, 2000, notes that Petitioner must put forth greater effort in reviewing the work of his engineering section and in improving the analysis reflected in written recommendations. Similar issues had been raised in an earlier evaluation. In response to a November 1998, evaluation of his performance by Mr. Willis, Petitioner acknowledged deficiencies in the performance of his engineering section, and provided assurance that he would “strive to do a better job of supervising my staff” in the future. At all pertinent times, Petitioner’s position was not of a routine, clerical, or ministerial nature, and did require the application of judgment. Petitioner had a significant role in personnel administration, as he served as the officer trusted by the state to verify the hours worked, to direct the amount and quality of work performed during those hours, and to be held accountable for the collective performance of the employees in the engineering section. Petitioner did lack the ultimate authority to hire and fire personnel, but that does not make his role in personnel administration insignificant. While hiring and firing are indeed important decisions, in state government the ultimate authority to hire and fire always resides with the agency head or office head. The bulk of the day-to-day management of personnel does not consist of hiring and firing, but rather of assigning the work and monitoring its successful completion. In addition to the expectations set out in the Position Description, the course of conduct and of communications received from his Bureau Chief establish that supervisory responsibility was in fact a requirement of Petitioner’s position. Petitioner was actually expected to spend a majority of his time communicating with, motivating, and training employees, and planning and directing their work. The clearly established expectations for Petitioner’s position would place upon the incumbent the responsibility for making effective recommendations for hiring, transfer, suspension, layoff, recall, promotion, discharge, assignment, reward, or discipline of subordinate employees. The instances of other Commission officials declining to follow Petitioner’s recommendations regarding hiring reflect the officials’ lack of satisfaction with the way Petitioner was carrying out those supervisory responsibilities, not an acknowledgement that those responsibilities do not exist.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Public Service Commission enter a final order that Petitioner’s position was properly reclassified as Selected Exempt Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S S. SCOTT STEPHENS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Crouch 245 Pond Court Havana, Florida 32333 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1906 Christiana T. Moore, Esquire Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Blanco Bayo Director of Records and Reporting Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 William D. Talbott, Executive Director Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Richard D. Melson, General Counsel Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Florida Laws (4) 110.205120.569120.57447.203
# 5
GEORGE NELSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 80-001925RX (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001925RX Latest Update: Dec. 19, 1980

The Issue This matter concerns the Petitioner's attack on Rules 22A-13.04 and 22A- 7.10(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, on the grounds that they are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, George Nelson, was a permanent status Career Service employee on July 14, 1980, working for the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry. His specific employment was a firefighter. On the subject date, by correspondence directed to an official within the Division of Forestry, namely, Larry Wood, the Petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to run for a School Board Seat, District IV, in Wakulla County, Florida. A copy of that notification may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. As stated in the correspondence, Nelson had made an attempt to determine the necessary steps to gain the approval of his agency before taking the oath of candidacy for the aforementioned position. (This request was made following a conversation with the same Larry Wood held on July 10, 1980, on the subject of Nelson's candidacy. On July 10, a letter was sent addressed only to "Larry" and at Mr. Wood's instigation the subsequent letter of July 14, 1980, was dispatched referring to Wood as "Mr. Larry Wood", for appearance sake.) As set forth in the Nelson correspondence, the last date for qualifying for the School Board position was July 22, 1980, at 12:00 Noon. Prior to that date, the Petitioner's request to run was forwarded through the decision-making channels within the Division of Forestry. At the time Nelson dispatched his letter of July 14, 1980, there was some concern expressed by Wood to the effect that there might be some scheduling conflict between Nelson's primary employment duties as a forest ranger and his duties as a School Board Member; however, Wood indicated that the scheduling matter could probably be accommodated. Wood offered no guarantee to the Petitioner that the request to run for office would be approved by the appropriate agency officials. On July 18, 1980, and again on July 21, 1980, officials with the Division of Forestry orally indicated to the Petitioner that he would not he allowed to run for the School Board. In view of the fact that the last day for qualifying was July 22, 1980, the Petitioner determined to offer his candidacy without the permission of his agency head and on that date he took the loyalty oath for public office for the School Board, District IV, Wakulla County, Florida, as may be seen by Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, which is a copy of the Loyalty Oath and the Oath of Candidacy and Statement of Candidacy. On July 23, 1980, Larry Wood, District Forester and supervisor to the Petitioner, contacted the Petitioner to inquire why the Petitioner had offered his candidacy without permission of the agency. The Petitioner responded that he did so because he did not feel that there was any conflict between school board duties and that of forest ranger. Wood informed him that he would hear from the Division of Forestry on the subject. Following the conversation with Wood, on July 24, 1980, the Petitioner received two items in response to his request. One of those items was dated July 21, 1980, from John M. Bethea, Director, Division of Forestry, addressed to Larry Wood, in which the subject of the Petitioner's candidacy was discussed and the indication given that it would not be approved due to scheduling problems and conflict and controversies "that are generated by any local governmental political body". The memorandum went on to say, "These controversies might affect the Forestry Division's ability to carry out the responsibilities with the very segments of the public." A copy of this memorandum may be found as petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The second item received by the Petitioner on July 24, 1980, was dated on that date, and addressed to George Nelson from Larry Wood, indicating a denial of the petitioner's request to run for public office. This correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, a copy of which has been admitted into evidence. After the Petitioner had received the memoranda discussed herein, there ensued a series of meetings between the Petitioner and various officials within the agency in which the agency tried to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in view of the fact that he had not gained their permission to run for the school Board. Throughout these discussions, the Petitioner continued to assert the conviction that unless some conflict of interest could be shown to him, he did not intend to withdraw as a candidate. In the discussions, the agency further stated that the choices open to the Petitioner were ones of resignation from his position as A Forest Ranger or withdrawal from the School Board race. They also stated that if he were caused to resign, there could be no rights to appeal beyond that point. In the course of the process, the Petitioner met with Director Bethea, who explained the Director's position on the Petitioner's right to run for office and reiterated his opposition, based upon his problems of scheduling to accommodate the needs of the Division of Forestry and the needs of the school Board of Wakulla County and also the concern of possible conflicts and controversies arising out of the necessity for forest rangers to go on the property of the citizens of the several counties in the State of Florida and the fact that this might create a problem in view of the nature of the functions of a school board member. Although the Director generally held the philosophy that employees in positions such as the Petitioner's should not normally be allowed to run for local office, he did not absolutely foreclose the possibility that someone might persuade him to the contrary and thereby cause him to allow them to seek a local office. Each case would be reviewed on its own merits. The matter was also presented before representatives of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, who took the same position as had been taken by the other authorities within the department, and again the Petitioner indicated that he would decline to withdraw as a candidate. Following the meeting with the Department officials, Wood made one other contact to ascertain if the Petitioner had changed his mind about withdrawing his name as a candidate and the Petitioner indicated that the had not. Subsequent to that latter conversation with Wood, the Petitioner was hand-delivered a letter dated August 12, 1980, which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This letter informed the Petitioner that he was deemed to have resigned his position as Forest Ranger effective August 15, 1990, and offered as a statement of authority Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes. After August 15, 1980, the Petitioner was removed as a permanent party Career Service employee with the Respondent. Following his dismissal, the Petitioner through his counsel in the subject case has attacked the Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, by contending that those aforementioned exhibits constitute invalid rules for reason that they were not duly promulgated. The Petitioner continued to work beyond August 15, 1980, and was eventually reinstated as a probationary employee with the Division of Forestry and holds the position of probationary Forest Ranger at this time.

Florida Laws (14) 110.127110.201110.217110.227110.233112.011120.56120.57120.68286.0117.10775.082775.083775.084
# 6
MARK A. SEMONE vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 03-004715SED (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Dec. 15, 2003 Number: 03-004715SED Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2008

The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Petitioner was a supervisory employee as defined by Subsection 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), and was, therefore, properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001.

Findings Of Fact The 2001 Florida Legislature enacted a substantial revision of the Florida Civil Service system referred to as the "Service First" initiative. (See Chapter 2001-43, Laws of Florida). This revision, which became effective on July 1, 2001, substantially expanded the parameters of the Selected Exempt Service classification to include many positions which had previously been identified as Career Service positions. Generally, Selected Exempt Service employees serve at the pleasure of the agency head and are considered at-will employees; whereas, Career Service employees have greater employment rights and job security. Petitioner was employed by Respondent at the Pinellas Maintenance Yard from December 15, 1997, to September 19, 2002. Initially, Petitioner held the position of Office Support III, but was eventually promoted to Office Support V in June 2001, both Career Service classifications. Following the enactment of the Service First initiative, Respondent reclassified Petitioner's Career Service position to Selected Exempt Service status in July 2001. On September 19, 2002, Petitioner was terminated from employment without explanation. His annual salary was $32,500. Following the decision in Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), Respondent notified Petitioner of his rights to seek an administrative hearing and challenge the reclassification. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's action. During his tenure working for Respondent, Petitioner, pursuant to his written position description, was responsible for various administrative functions, including personnel, records, and fiscal matters, as well as supervisory responsibilities, including the supervision of a few administrative staff. Specifically, his position description provides in part: 20% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the daily administrative activities . . . . Ensuring the reception telephone and radio are fully staffed at all times. . . 15% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the personnel activities for Pinellas Maintenance Office. Counsels employees in matters of retirements, benefits, grievances, discipline and other personnel and work related problems. . . 15% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the fiscal activities for the Pinellas Maintenance Office. Supervises the maintenance of ledgers and Journals associated with local Purchase Orders, local Charge Accounts and Purchase Requisitions, Utility Invoice Transmittals, Contract Invoice transmittals, Partial Payments, etc. . . 10% of time: Directs purchasing for the Pinellas Maintenance Office. . . 10% of time: Serves as representative of the Pinellas Maintenance Engineer at meetings. . . 10% of time: Receives incoming mail, reviews and distributes to appropriate personnel. . . 5% of time: Participates in the selection process for entry level Field Operations Unit positions. . . 5% of time: Directs and coordinates the maintenance and use of records storage. . . 5% of time: Trains employees in methods for performing an efficient and effective job. 5% of time: Performs other related duties as required. Petitioner admits that he was responsible for and routinely engaged in many activities that were supervisory in nature. The evidence supports the fact that Petitioner performed these duties, and his performance evaluations reflect his activity. Petitioner's position description allocated specific time frames to the written duties and responsibilities. Upon careful review, the position description provides that the Office Support, Level V position employee shall "supervise and/or participate" in administrative, personnel, and fiscal matters 50 percent of the work-time. The remaining 50 percent of work-time is allocated to other duties, including purchasing, attending meetings, mail distribution and inquiries, assisting with the selection process of certain entry level positions, coordinating records storage, training certain employees, and performing other "related duties as required." While Petitioner admits that he performed supervisory activity, he contends that it consumed a small percentage of his work-time. He further argues that he was authorized and required to spend 50 percent of his time "supervising and/or participating in" certain activities. Petitioner alleges that he spent little time "supervising" and most of his time "participating" and actually performing the activities. The evidence demonstrates that among the 80 to 100 people employed at the yard, Petitioner supervised a personnel technician, a financial clerk, a clerical employee, and a receptionist, all of whom required limited supervision. Petitioner primarily served as the personnel liaison for all of the employees, maintained their files, researched personnel matters, and responded to inquiries. He handled the personnel paperwork related to hiring and firing, leave, pay adjustments, travel reimbursements, and employee benefits. In addition, Petitioner investigated and processed workers' compensation claims and handled the yard's safety and training records. He worked on special projects including ferreting out overtime abuse, installing a security system, and handling certain maintenance issues. In addition to his administrative personnel responsibilities, Petitioner admittedly supervised, trained, directed, and evaluated four subordinates and was responsible for improving their performance via counseling and corrective action. He initiated disciplinary action and issued a written reprimand to one employee with poor attendance. On occasion, Petitioner conducted staff meetings with his subordinates and also met with them individually. He managed attendance and approved leave for his staff of four. He participated in interviewing and selecting candidates for open positions under his supervision and determined the appropriate criteria, created the interview questions, and was a member of the interview panel. Petitioner was evaluated, in part, upon his supervision of subordinates. One evaluation noted that he needed to improve follow-up with assignments made to others and another indicated that he capably initiated change, but occasionally required assistance to effectuate it. Petitioner's evaluations also assessed his leadership and delegation skills, and one noted that he delegated well, but needed to work to regain better control of his areas. Although some of Petitioner's time was spent supervising, the evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of his work-time was spent performing non-supervisory activities. The facts show that Petitioner actually performed the noted activities the majority of the time and supervised those activities on occasion. Furthermore, Mr. Nawab, who periodically served as Petitioner's supervisor, provided credible evidence that Petitioner's primary responsibilities and the majority of his work-time involved non-supervisory activities. While Petitioner, during his testimony, diminished the time he spent engaged in supervisory work, the credible evidence demonstrates that he spent the minority of his work-time communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees and planning and directing employees' work. Although Petitioner may have demonstrated mediocre supervisory skills, which does not make the position any less supervisory, neither Petitioner's supervisor nor his position description required him to spend the majority of his work time engaged in those supervisory activities.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The position of Office Support V for the Pinellas Maintenance Yard for the State of Florida Department of Transportation was not exempt from Career Service classification as defined in Subsection 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001); Respondent improperly reclassified the position as Selected Exempt Service; and Petitioner should be reinstated with the full benefits accrued since his termination on September 19, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 324 South Hyde Park Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33606 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (3) 110.205120.569120.57
# 8
KENNETH BOWE vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 77-002077 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002077 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1978

Findings Of Fact Respondent employs petitioner as a youth counselor II in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Petitioner attained permanent career service status in May of 1972. In addition to "carrying a normal caseload," i.e., supervising 85 to 88 youngsters in the customary fashion, petitioner met four times weekly with children who had been referred by courts or school authorities for intensive counseling. These groups counseling sessions began at six o'clock in the evening and lasted from one to one and a half hours. John B. Romano became petitioner's immediate supervisor on March 18, 1977. With the acquiescence of Mr. Romano's immediate predecessor, Ben Robinson, petitioner ordinarily reported for work between half past nine and half past ten in the morning. The week Mr. Romano started as petitioner's supervisor, he noticed that petitioner arrived for work between half past nine and ten in the morning. When he spoke to petitioner about this, petitioner told him of an accommodation that had been reached with Mr. Robinson, on account of petitioner's staying at work late to conduct group counseling. Mr. Romano told petitioner that he should report for work at half past eight in the morning, until a youth counselor's vacancy that then existed in the office could be filled. Subsequently, on at least one occasion before May 31, 1977, Mr. Romano spoke to petitioner about being late for work. On May 31, 1977, by which time another counselor had been hired, petitioner reported for work at approximately half past ten. On June 7, 1977, after petitioner had been suspended, Mr. Romano issued a written reprimand to petitioner, characterizing petitioner's arrival at half past ten on May 31, 1977, as "an insubordinate offense." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. One Harry Greene told Earl Stout, a service network manager for respondent and Mr. Romano's superior, that a boy whom petitioner had supervised had accused petitioner in open court of selling drugs and smoking marijuana. Messrs. Greene, Stout and Romano visited the facility at which petitioner's accuser was incarcerated and interrogated him. On May 13, 1977, a Friday, Mr. Romano told petitioner to meet him at nine o'clock the following Monday, but did not explain why. Present at the meeting on May 16, 1977, were petitioner, Mr. Romano, Mr. Greene and Mr. Stout. Petitioner was told of the accusations against him, but the accuser's identity was withheld. Mr. Stout gave petitioner the choice of resigning his position or taking annual leave for the duration of a formal investigation. Petitioner refused to resign. Mr. Stout instructed petitioner to tell no one that he had been asked to take leave or that he would be the subject of an investigation. When petitioner left this meeting he promptly told his fellow youth counselors that the had been suspended. For this petitioner received a written reprimand dated June 7, 1977. Respondent's exhibit No. 6. Petitioner subsequently availed himself of grievance procedures to raise the question whether he should have been permitted to take administrative leave instead of annual leave; and it was decided that he was entitled to take administrative leave. On June 8, 1977, Earl Stout wrote petitioner a letter which began "On June 1, you were advised by me that effective June 2, you were being suspended for insubordinate acts . . . ." This letter was sent to petitioner by certified mail. Mr. Stout testified without contradiction that blanket authority had been delegated to him to suspend employees under him.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the suspension be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Wayne Jennings, Esq. 2871 Forth-Fifth Street Gifford, Florida 32960 Mr. K.C. Collette, Esquire Forum 3, Suite 800 1665 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

# 9
WILLIAM H. MATHIAS vs. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 85-001176 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001176 Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1985

Findings Of Fact William H. Mathias was initially employed by SWFWMD as Director of Employee Relations on January 30, 1980, at pay grade At the time of Petitioner's employment William C. Tatum was Executive Director of SWFWMD. Petitioner has over ten years' experience in personnel relations and security and holds two master's degrees. Due partly to Petitioner's aggressiveness and strong personality, he began exerting influence in the personnel division in pushing the Personnel Department in directions not necessarily approved by Tatum. Tatum wanted to reduce the influence the Personnel Department was having on SWFWMD. On July 26, 1982, Petitioner was transferred to the Field Operations Division with no change in grade. Exhibit 5, which announced this transfer, stated Petitioner was transferred as Assistant Director. On July 28, 1982, a subsequent memorandum, Exhibit 6, was issued by Tatum changing Petitioner's title from Assistant Director to Acting Administrative Assistant. Prior to this transfer Tatum spoke with William F. Sietman, Director of Field Operations, who advised Tatum that he had no need for Petitioner in the Field Operations Division however, Tatum insisted that Petitioner, with his two master's degrees, could make a valuable contribution to SWFWMD if placed in the right niche. Shortly thereafter, Tatum was replaced as Executive Director by Gary W. Kuhl, who was promoted to that position from Assistant Executive Director. The first evaluation report submitted by Sietman on Petitioner, at the end of his first six months on the job, was unsatisfactory. Petitioner appealed to Kuhl, who withdrew his evaluation partly because no job description had been prepared for the position occupied by Petitioner. Kuhl directed the preparation of a job description for the work to be done by Petitioner. When the job description_ was prepared, the position was given the title of Program Management Analyst and the duties to be performed are as contained in Exhibit 1. Principally, Petitioner's function was to do some coordinating of the budgets prepared by the various sections in Field Operations, coordinate planning and negotiate and oversee the building maintenance contract. This position was a staff function as opposed to a line function in which the incumbent would exercise direction, or command, over the section heads. As a staff function his duties were coordination as opposed to direction. Subsequent to his initial unsatisfactory evaluation at the end of his six months probationary period, Petitioner's evaluations improved each evaluating period and at the time of his termination his performance can be described as very good. However, on several occasions complaints about Petitioner giving personnel advice to Respondent's employees regarding overtime, job classifications, and pay grades reached Kuhl. This was the subject of a memorandum addressed to Petitioner and Sietman by Kuhl on May 15, 1984 (Exhibit 7). Petitioner was told to leave personnel matters and advice to the Personnel Department or face disciplinary action. Changes in the functions imposed on Respondent in 1984 necessitated the employment of additional technical people and the establishment of additional technical positions at SWFWMD. The Governing Board indicated to the Executive Director that the budget could not be raised by the amount needed to fund all of these positions and that cuts would have to be made. Kuhl met with the various division heads to require more justification for the proposed new positions and to ascertain which existing positions they could eliminate. This resulted in a proposed list of positions including the librarian, Petitioner's position, and other positions currently unoccupied. As a result of these discussions it was concluded the unfilled positions and the position of Program Management Analyst could be eliminated. By memorandum dated August 17, 1984 (Exhibit 4), Kuhl advised the Governing Board of the proposed reduction in work force. By letter dated August 20, 1984 (Exhibit 15), Kuhl advised Petitioner that the position of Program Management Analyst was eliminated effective immediately and that he was eligible to apply for any other position in SWFWMD for which he was qualified. Petitioner appealed the termination to the Governing Board and, when the Board affirmed his termination, he filed the instant petition. Prior to the transfer of Petitioner to the Field Operations Division, the budget was prepared by each section chief for his section, and the division director coordinated the budgets. While Petitioner was assigned to Field Operations, he performed this budget coordination role previously taken by the director. When Petitioner's position was eliminated, the division reverted to the way it operated before Petitioner's arrival, with little, if any, noticeable effect. The role Petitioner had assumed in supervising the maintenance contract also reverted back to where it was before Petitioner's arrival, again with no noticeable effect.

Florida Laws (5) 110.403120.57373.044373.079760.10
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer