The Issue Whether petitioner taxpayer is liable for delinquent sales tax, penalties, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Stat utes, as alleged by respondent Department in its notice of proposed assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Taxpayer Taxpayer is a family-operated Florida corporation which has engaged in retail sales at the Tampa Port Authority since 1975 or 1976; it is a licensed dealer registered with the Department. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) Taxpayer's Sales During Audit Period From June 1, 1977, through July 31, 1980 (the audit period covered by the Department's proposed assessment), Taxpayer had gross sales in the approximate amount of $691,013.46. (Testimony of Roberts; Exhibit 2.) During that period, Taxpayer filed the required DR-15 monthly sales tax reports and paid taxes on all retail sales transactions which took place on the premises of its store located at 804 Robinson Street, (Tampa Port Authority) Tampa, Florida. (Testimony of Roberts.) During the same audit period -- in addition to sales on its store premises -- Taxpayer sold goods to merchant seamen on board foreign vessels temporarily docked at the Port of Tampa. These vessels operated in foreign commerce, entering the port from and returning to international waters outside the territorial limits of the United States. Taxpayer did not report these sales on its monthly sales tax reports; neither did it charge or collect sales tax from the on-board purchasers. (Testimony of Marylis.) Taxpayer failed to charge or collect sales tax in connection with its on-board sales because it relied on what it had been told by Department representatives. Prior to forming Taxpayer's corporation Thomas Marylis went to the local Department office to obtain a dealer's certificate. While there, he asked Manuel Alvarez, Jr., then the Department's regional audit supervisor, whether he was required to collect sales tax on ship-board sales. Alvarez replied that he didn't have to collect sales taxes on sales made to seamen when he delivered the goods to the ship. 1/ (Testimony of Marylis.) The on-board sales transactions took place in the following manner: Taxpayer (through its owner, Thomas Marylis) would board the foreign vessel and accept orders from the captain, chief mate, or chief steward. (Earlier, one of these persons would have taken orders from the rest of the crew.) If individual crewmen tried to place orders, Marylis would refer them to the captain, chief mate, or chief steward. After receiving orders from one of these three persons, Marylis would return to Taxpayer's store, fill the order, and transport the goods back to the vessel. Whoever placed the order would then examine the goods and give Marylis the money /2 collected from the crew. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) The goods sold in this manner were ordinarily for the personal use of individual crew members; typical items were: shoes, underwear, working clothes, small radios, watches, suitcases, soap, paper towels, and other personal care products. (Testimony of Marylis.) Department Audit of Taxpayer In 1980, the Department audited Taxpayer's corporate books to determine if sales tax had been properly collected and paid. Taxpayer could produce no dock or warehouse receipts, bills of lading, resale certificates from other licensed dealers, or affidavits verifying that its on-board sales were made to out-of-state purchasers for transportation outside of Florida. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) Due to Taxpayer's failure to supply documentation demonstrating that its ship-board sales from June 1, 1977, to July 31, 1980, were exempt from sales tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the Department issued a proposed assessment on September 23, 1980. Through that assessment, the Department seeks to collect $21,201.01 in delinquent sales tax, $5,131.39 in penalties, and $3,892.18 in interest (in addition to interest at 12 percent per annum, or $6.97 per day, accruing until date of payment). (Exhibit 5.) Informal Conference with Department; Alvarez's Representations to Taxpayer In October 1980 -- after the audit -- Taxpayer (through Marylis) informally met with Manuel Alvarez, the Department's regional audit supervisor, to discuss the tax status of the shipboard sales. Specifically, they discussed the Department auditor's inability to confirm that Taxpayer delivered the items to the ships, as opposed to the buyers picking up the goods at the store. Alvarez told him: [I]f the buyers would come and just pick them up and take them. And I [Alvarez] think I told him that, if that was the case, it was taxable. But, if they just placed their orders there -- like we have had other ship supplies -- and they them- selves, or one of their employees, would take the items aboard ships, that would be an exempt sale. I did make that state ment. If we had any type of confirmation to that effect, when it comes to that. (Tr. 61.) 3/ (Testimony of Alvarez.) Alvarez then told Marylis to obtain documentation or verification that the sales were made on foreign vessels, i.e., proof that Taxpayer delivered the goods to the vessels. He assured Marylis that if he could bring such verification back, such sales "would come off the audit." (Tr. 62.)(Testimony of Alvarez.) Alvarez was an experienced Department employee: he retired in 1980, after 30 years of service. It was Alvarez's standard practice -- when dealing with sales tax exemption questions -- to reiterate the importance of documentation. He would always give the taxpayer an opportunity -- 30 days or more -- to obtain documentation that a sale was exempt from taxation. (Testimony of Alvarez.) Taxpayer's Verification In response to the opportunity provided by Alvarez, Taxpayer (through Marylis) obtained affidavits from numerous captains of foreign vessels and shipping agents. Those affidavits read, in pertinent part: I, [name inserted] , am the Captain aboard the vessel [name inserted] from [place of origin]. I am personally aware that Speros International Ship Supply Co., Inc. sells various commodities, supplies, clothing, and various sundry items to for eign ship personnel by delivering the said items to the ships docked at various termi- nals inside the Tampa Port Authority and other locations in Tampa, Florida from [date] to the present. (Testimony of Marylis; Exhibit 8.) Moreover, in an attempt to comply with the tax law and avoid similar problems in the future, Taxpayer printed receipt books to be used in all future on-board sales. The receipts reflect the type of goods sold, the date of delivery to the vessel, the foreign vessel's destination, and the total purchase price. Also included is a signature line for the individual who delivers and receives the goods. (Testimony of Marylis; Exhibit 7.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Department's proposed assessment of Taxpayer for delinquent sales tax, penalties, and interest, be issued as final agency action. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Schooley Cadillac, Inc. is a dealer in Cadillac automobiles in West Palm Beach, Florida. The firm requires its salesmen to purchase a new Cadillac automobile each year. When a salesman decides to acquire the new automobile, an order is placed with the Cadillac Motor Car Division and delivery is made some eight to ten weeks thereafter. During the interim period, the salesman's used automobile is placed in petitioner's used car department and sold to a customer. State sales tax is collected by petitioner and remitted to respondent based on sales of the used cars. Title to the used car is transferred from the salesman to petitioner at the time it is resold. Although there is no contract or purchase agreement executed between the salesman and petitioner for the purchase of the new automobile, he is credited with the sale price of the used car on the books of the petitioner at the time the used car is sold. When the salesman's new car arrives, an invoice is prepared that reflects the amount credited to the salesman for the used car on the purchase price of the new car as a "previous trade." State sales tax is collected by petitioner and paid to the state on the price of the new automobile, less the amount credited for the used automobile. Petitioner handles a lesser number of transactions for General Motors retirees and a few winter residents using basically the same procedures involving purchases of new automobiles and prior sale of the individual's used car. In such cases, however, title to the used car is normally transferred to petitioner prior to its sale. (Testimony of Eichhorn) Respondent's tax examiner examined the books of petitioner in 1977 and determined that credit should not have been allowed for the price of the used automobiles in determining the amount of sales tax payable to the state because he viewed the amounts credited for the used automobiles as "down payments" rather than "trade-ins." Based upon 33 such transactions which took place between May 1, 1974 through April 30, 1977, a Notice of Proposed Assessment was prepared and sent to petitioner on August 2, 1977, in which delinquent sales tax in the amount of $9,814.44 was claimed, together with a penalty in the amount of $2,367.19, and interest through June 23, 1977, in the amount of $1,703.79, for a total assessment of $13,885.39. A prior Notice of Proposed Assessment in a somewhat larger amount had been scaled down after certain credits had been allowed to the petitioner. The 33 transactions in question involved 24 sales to petitioner's salesmen and the remainder to General Motors retirees or regular customers. As a result of the proposed assessment, petitioner filed its petition for an Administrative Hearing in the matter. At the hearing, petitioner conceded that tax was payable on three of the transactions in which used vehicles were not sold by the petitioner. These three transactions involved the purchase of new automobiles for the price of $7,500 and $5,200 respectively, and the purchase of a motorcycle for $375, thus making a total of $13,075 upon which petitioner acknowledges sales tax in the amount of 4 percent is due. Such tax amounts to $523, plus applicable interest and penalties thereon. (Testimony of Eichhorn, Elliot, Exhibits 1-2)
Recommendation That petitioner Schooley Cadillac, Inc. be held liable for sales tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $523, plus an appropriate amount for penalty and interest thereon. Done and Entered this 7th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Jensen and James Adams, Esquires 186 Southeast 13th Street Miami, Florida 33130 Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent violated certain provisions within chapter 520, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ as alleged in Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Sam’s Car is a motor vehicle retail installment seller based in Pensacola, Florida, and is governed by chapter 520. Mirza Ahmad is the president and 50-percent owner of Sam’s Car. Between January 7, 2009, and December 31, 2010, Sam’s Car held license number MV0902721 enabling it to conduct business as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. In other words, Sam’s Car could offer financing so that its customers could purchase vehicles through installment payments. At some point in 2010, Mr. Ahmad decided to convert the sole proprietorship named Mirza Aftab Ahmad, d/b/a Sam’s Car, into a corporation named Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. If a sole proprietorship licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller wishes to convert to a corporation, the new corporation must file a new application to be licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. Accordingly, Mr. Ahmad filed an application in December of 2010 for a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license on behalf of Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. Mr. Ahmad did not renew license number MV0902721, and the license went into inactive status on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car could not enter into retail installment contracts with an inactive license. OFR ultimately issued license number MV9905731 to Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car, and that license became effective on March 16, 2011. Sam’s Car never moved to re-activate license number MV0902721, and OFR deemed that license to have retroactively expired on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car was not licensed to enter retail installment sales contracts between January 1, 2011, and March 15, 2011. OFR licenses motor vehicle retail installment sellers such as Sam’s Car and is responsible for ensuring that licensees comply with chapter 520. OFR may conduct examinations and investigations to determine whether any provision of chapter 520 has been violated. In March of 2014, OFR contacted Mr. Ahmad and notified him that OFR would soon be conducting an on-site examination of Sam’s Car. During an on-site examination, OFR examiners visit a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s office, identify themselves, and examine various records in order to verify that the licensee complied with chapter 520 during the time period in question. OFR examiners arrived at Sam’s Car on March 19, 2014, and spent approximately six hours examining and scanning particular records of Sam’s Car. The examiners began by requesting that the office manager of Sam’s Car provide them with all the motor vehicle installment contracts that Sam’s Car had entered into in 2011 and 2012 (“the examination period”). Some of the requested records were at Mr. Ahmad’s home rather than at Sam’s Car. Accordingly, one of the examiners returned to Sam’s Car on April 9, 2014, to scan those documents after they had been retrieved from Mr. Ahmad’s home. The examiners reviewed 20 to 25 records from Sam’s Car and determined that several of the sales contracts utilized by Sam’s Car were not the form contract that had been approved as an industry standard by the Florida Independent Auto Dealer Association. There was a period of time during the examination period when Sam’s Car was utilizing a sales contract that it had essentially created from scratch. The examiners determined that the sales contracts in question did not have several of the items required by chapter 520. On September 5, 2015, OFR issued an Administrative Complaint alleging that Sam’s Car violated four provisions within chapter 520. In Count I, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07, Florida Statutes, by failing to ensure that all motor vehicle retail installment contracts executed by Sam’s Car during the examination period satisfied all of the requirements of section 520.07. The contracts reviewed by OFR allegedly failed to contain the “Notice to Buyer,” the “total amount of payments,” and a specific statement that liability coverage is not included. OFR further alleged in Count I that several of the contracts failed to ensure that the contract had been signed by the buyer and the seller. Finally, OFR also alleged in Count I that there were two instances in which Sam’s Car failed to ensure that the contract was completed before it was signed. OFR alleged in Count II that several of the reviewed contracts violated section 520.07(6) by enabling Sam’s Car to collect delinquency/collection charges or late fees in excess of five percent of the installment payment due. In Count III, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(3), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69V- 50.001 and 69V-50.002 because there were instances in which Sam’s Car had failed to document that it refunded or credited title charges collected from the buyer that exceeded the actual charges. Finally, OFR alleged in Count IV that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1) by selling motor vehicles on installment payments between January 1, 2011, and March 16, 2011, without an active license. The following findings are based on the documentary evidence and testimony received at the final hearing conducted on March 11, 2016. OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the notice to buyer required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the specific statement about liability insurance coverage required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not set forth the “total of payments” as required by section 520.07(2)(c). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 6 through 8, 11, and 14 through 18 were not signed by the seller as required by section 520.07(1)(a). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 18 and 20 were not complete prior to being signed as required by section 520.07(1)(a). In sum, OFR proved all of the allegations in Count I of its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. With regard to Count II, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 6, 7, and 21 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(6) by collecting a delinquency/collection charge in excess of five percent of each installment. As for Count III, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 1 and 14 that there were two occasions during the examination period when Sam’s Car did not refund the overcharges on the estimated title, tag, and registration fees. Accordingly, OFR proved that Sam’s Car violated rule 69V-50. With regard to Count IV, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 22, through 25 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1), by entering into retail installment contracts with four separate buyers during the period when Sam’s Car did not have a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license (i.e., January 1, 2011, through March 15, 2011). Even though OFR proved the allegations in its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence, there was no indication that those responsible for Sam’s Car’s operations intentionally committed the aforementioned violations. Instead, the testimony presented at the final hearing demonstrated that the violations resulted from inadvertence and/or an incomplete understanding of chapter 520’s requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order imposing a $1,000 administrative fine on Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2016.
The Issue Petitioner's liability for tax, interest, and penalty, pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Notice of Assessment, dated December 9, 1975. At the hearing, it was stipulated that the sale by Petitioner to one Norady as set forth in Paragraph B of the Petition was no longer in issue, and accordingly this count was withdrawn by Petitioner. The amount of sales by Petitioner to Triumpho Electric as shown in Paragraph C of the Petition was stipulated to be in the amount of $243,724.34 instead of $248,255.26. In view of the above Stipulations, the Hearing Officer requested that a revised assessment be prepared and submitted after the hearing to reflect the amount now sought by Respondent and to indicate thereon the taxes, penalty aid interest attributable to sales to Ivan Alexander, Triumpho Electric, Grand Bahama Development Company, and Agregados de Cal, purchasers from Petitioner. The revised schedule in the total amount of $12,358.37 was submitted on April 30, 1976, received by the Hearing Officer on May 4, 1976, and is marked as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The parties stipulated at the hearing that the method of computation was correct and Petitioner has filed no objections to the counts of the revised assessment. Accordingly, it is deemed to reflect the amount due and owing if imposition of tax is valid.
Findings Of Fact During the period November 1, 1973 to February 28, 1975, Petitioner made sales of merchandise to the following: Ivan Alexander, Triumpho Electric, Grand Bahama Development Company and Agregados de Cal. the circumstances of each of these transactions are set forth below. Ivan Alexander Construction Co., Ltd. a. Petitioner made sales of electrical equipment in amount of $1,646.50 to Ivan Alexander Construction Co., Ltd. Freeport, Grand Bahamas1 on September 24, 1974. Petitioner delivered e merchandise to Lindsley-RBC, Miami, Florida. Lindsley-RBC was not licensed exporter, but acted in an agency capacity for the purchaser. Subsequent to Petitioner's delivery, Lindsley-RBC consolidated the merchandise with other purchases made by Ivan Alexander, for shipping purposes. After consolidating the merchandise, Lindsley-RBC delivered the merchandise to the shipping vessel, the Tropic Day. It was received by the purchaser in Freeport on October 11, 1974. (Stipulation, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 7). Triumpho Electric, Inc. Petitioner made sales of electrical construction equipment n the amount of $237,634.57 to Triumpho Electric, Inc., Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, during the period under consideration. The procedures used in purchasing, delivering and shipping the merchandise are s follows: Ivan M. Bauknight, an employee of Triumpho, placed the order or the merchandise "on behalf of Triumpho" personally at Petitioner's - place of business, by telephonic communication with a salesman employed by Petitioner, or by contacting its sales representative who took the order in person from Bauknight. In August of 1972, Triumpho had formed Caribbean Supply Company, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary, for purposes of purchasing merchandise, consolidating said merchandise in its own warehouse, and shipping. To further effectuate their purposes, warehouse pace was secured at Miami International Airport. Although Bauknight as in charge of Caribbean Supply Company, Inc., he was not an employee of that company. In fact, Caribbean Supply Company, Inc., had no employees during the period in question, excepting casual labor at intervals who were supervised by Mr. Bauknight. Although it was not a "licensed exporter", Caribbean possessed an export sales tax number issued by Respondent. Subsequent to the placing of orders in the above-described manner, Petitioner delivered the merchandise to Caribbean Supply Company, Inc.'s warehouse located at Miami International Airport where the merchandise was consolidated with other purchases. After delivery, and after packaging and consolidating the merchandise in Caribbean Supply Company, Inc.'s warehouse, Bauknight contacted a shipping company and requested that a "piggyback" trailer be provided on which to load the merchandise. The shipping company then placed the trailer upon Caribbean Supply Company, Inc.`s loading lock where Bauknight and laborers would load the merchandise onto the trailer, seal it, and then inform the shipping company which would take it to Dodge Island Seaport, Miami, Florida, and load it upon a ship. During the assessment period in question, all trailers were loaded at Caribbean Supply Company, Inc. Another method of transportation was shipment by air from Miami International Airport. In such cases, the merchandise was delivered by Petitioners to Caribbean's warehouse where it was packaged and taken to commercial airlines for shipment. (Testimony of Bauknight, Petitioner's Composite Exhibits 1-4). Grand Bahama Development Company, Ltd. Petitioner made sales of merchandise in the amount of $21,407.55 to Grand Bahama Development Company, Ltd., during the period in question. Procedures used in purchasing, delivering and shipping were as follow: America Devco, Inc., Miami, Florida, a wholly-owned company of Grand Bahama Development Company, Ltd., was created by the latter to represent its interests in the United States. At all times pertinent to the instant transactions, America Devco, Inc., was not a licensed exporter but was acting as Grand Bahama Development Company, Ltd's agent. It did, however, possess an export sales tax number issued by Respondent. America Devco, Inc., contacted Petitioner's sales representative by telephone and placed orders subsequently issuing a confirming purchase order to Petitioner. In about 60 percent of the transactions, Petitioner delivered the merchandise to America Devco, Inc.'s warehouse. In about 40 percent of the transactions, America Devco, Inc., went to Petitioner's business site, picked up the merchandise and took it to its warehouse. By both methods, the merchandise usually remained at America Devco, Doc's warehouse from one to three days in order to create shipping documents or to take advantage of the hundred pounds air shipping minimum. America Devco, Inc., utilized its trucks to deliver the merchandise to the airline cargo loading platform. All supplies were kept in the original containers supplied by Petitioner and America Devco, Inc., only affixed shipping label. Shipping documents were prepared by the shipping company. In one transaction, Petitioner delivered purchased merchandise to Alco Shipping Company at the dock in Port Laudania, Florida. (Testimony of Gomez, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 5). Agregados de Cal. Petitioner made sales of merchandise in the amount of 905.90 to Agregados de Cal during the period in question. The merchandise was delivered by Petitioner to Mr. Robert de la-Puirtilla, in employee or representative of Agregados de Cal, at Petitioner's lace of business, at which time he took possession of the merchandise nd delivered it to the airport. (Stipulation, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 6).
Recommendation That the tax assessment of $12,358.37 against Petitioner under the provisions of Section 212.05, F.S., including interest and penalties be imposed by the Department of Revenue and enforcement thereof be effected in accordance with the provisions of law. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia S. Turner Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 George A. Buchmann Penthouse B2 7000 S.W. 62 Avenue South Miami, Florida 33143 Attorney for Petitioner
The Issue Whether FMG Enterprises, Inc. must obtain and post security in the amount of $21,250 as a condition of retaining its sales and use tax dealer‘s certificate of registration as alleged in the Department‘s July 14, 2011 Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the state of Florida charged with the duty to enforce the collection of taxes imposed pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes, to issue warrants for the collection of taxes, interest, and penalties and, where necessary, to require a cash deposit, bond, or other security, as a condition to a person obtaining or retaining a dealer‘s certificate of registration under chapter 212. Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal and mailing address at 9726 Touchton Road, Suite 301, Jacksonville, Florida 32246. At all times material to this case, Petitioner operated a restaurant and club known as Mojitos Bar and Grill at its principal address. Petitioner is a ?dealer? as defined in section 212.06(2), Florida Statutes. Chapter 212 requires specified persons conducting business within the state to register with the Department and to obtain a certificate of registration for purposes of tax collection. Petitioner made application for and received a dealer‘s certificate of registration, No. 26-8015498892-8, for the operation of Mojitos Bar and Grill. The application indicated that the business was to open in March 2011. Mojitos Bar and Grill did not open for business until April 7, 2011. As a dealer, the Petitioner was required to collect sales and use taxes from patrons and customers of Mojitos Bar and Grill, and to submit monthly tax returns and collected taxes to the Department. Sales and use taxes for any given month are due on the first day of the succeeding month, and must be paid to the Department on or before the 20th day of that succeeding month. Petitioner did not file a Sales and Use Tax Return for March 2011. Based on the March 2011 opening date referenced in the application, the Department issued its May 18, 2011 Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration and a Warrant demanding payment in the amount of $5,046.85, which represented the estimated tax liability for March 2011, in the amount of $5,000.00, plus interest and fees. The $5,000.00 monthly tax liability estimate was calculated using an algorithm developed by SAP, a German software company. The algorithm produced the estimate based on the location and type of the business and surrounding businesses. Based on that figure, the Department determined that it was necessary to require Petitioner to post security in the amount of $60,000.00, which represented the projected monthly tax estimate for one year. An informal hearing was held on June 21, 2011. The Department was provided with information that the business was not open in March 2011. As a result, the Department filed a satisfaction of the warrant and release of lien in the official records of Duval County. The Department was also presented with records of tax collections for April and May of 2011. Petitioner filed its Sales and Use Tax Return for April 2011, listing taxes collected for that month in the amount of $2,107.57. The check for the April 2011 taxes was returned for insufficient funds. The April 2011 tax liability has since been paid. Petitioner filed Sales and Use Tax Returns for May 2011, and paid said tax in the amount of $1,437.91. The check was dated June 20, 2011, but the return was filed late. Petitioner was assessed a late penalty of $125.38, although the record contains no evidence that Petitioner had notice of the late penalty before August 15, 2011. Petitioner has not paid the late penalty assessed against it for the May, 2011 taxes. Based on the April and May, 2011 sales and use tax collections, the Department amended the amount of security being required as a condition of Petitioner maintaining its sales and use tax dealer‘s registration certificate from $60,000.00 to $21,250.00. The amended Notice of Intent was issued on July 14, 2011. Pursuant to notice provided in the amended Notice of Intent, an informal conference was convened on August 15, 2011. No representative of Petitioner appeared at the informal conference. Although the Petitioner did not enter into a compliance agreement with the Department as a result of the August 15, 2011 informal conference, all taxes due and owing for the April 2011 and May 2011 collection periods have been paid. Thus, Petitioner has materially resolved its tax liability for those months, with the exception of non-payment of the relatively small late penalty of $125.38. Standing alone, the facts of those two monthly payments are not sufficient grounds to support a revocation of Petitioner‘s sales and use tax dealer‘s registration certificate. The Department has required security in the amount of $21,250.00. That equates to a monthly estimated sales tax collection of approximately $1,770.00. The sales tax collections in April 2011 and May 2011 were for $2,107.57 and 1,437.90, respectively. Therefore, the figure calculated by the Department is reasonable. The Department generally requires that, when security is determined to be necessary, one year of estimated tax collections be posted. That length of time can be shorter based on the circumstances. Given that the first two months of Petitioner‘s operation as a dealer resulted in returned and late payments, and since the May 2011 late penalty remains in arrears, the Department‘s decision to require one year of estimated collections as security is reasonable. The Department raised issues relating to allegations of late or returned payments for taxes collected in June, July, and August, 2011. However, since those issues do not form the basis for the July 14, 2011, amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration, and have not otherwise been pled, the undersigned has not made any findings, or formulated any conclusions regarding those issues. An informal drive-by inspection of Mojitos Bar and Grill conducted on September 19, 2011 by Mr. Hartland indicated that it was no longer open for business. That status was confirmed by counsel for Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order requiring Petitioner to post security in the amount of $21,250.00 within 30 days of the entry of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael R. Yokan, Esquire Post Office Box 40755 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0755 Timothy E. Dennis, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 400 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Lisa Vickers, Executive Director The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice Of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby Filed November 5, 2012 12:49 PM Division of Administrative Hearings a an ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED this a day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Jule Baker, Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this_Q day of November, 2012. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jde Copies furnished: R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32303 cspickard@kfb-law.com Cindy Bresnee Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC 1 Mercedes Drive Montvale, New Jersey 07645 J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley And Scarborough, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 andy.bertron@nelsonmullins.com William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Saket Pan
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a corporation headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, is in the business of operating movie theatres both within and without the State of Florida. At these theatres Petitioner Operates concession stands which sell both candy items and drinks in various sizes at different prices to persons who frequent the theatres. For the period of time from September, 1985 through May, 1985, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue sales tax on the total taxable value of all taxable items sold at its concession stands in all of its Florida theatres, in accordance with the presumptive effective rate of tax of 5.63 percent contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code. As a result of an audit for a previous period dated October 1, 1982, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue the amount of $10,637.00 for sales tax on taxable items sold at its concession stands during this audit period in accordance with the presumptive effective tax rate of 4.5 percent as contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code during the audit period. On August 15, 1985, Petitioner filed with the Department of Revenue, as agent for Respondent, two (2) applications for sales tax refund in the amount of $16,876.52 and $10,637.00. The applications were dated August 13, 1985, and were timely filed. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner: (a) posted and charged flat prices for the various items offered for sale, which prices included sales tax (b) kept records of daily and weekly sales of taxable items at each of its Florida theatres (c) kept records of daily attendance at each movie shown by each Florida theatre and (d) kept records of weekly calculations, through inventory analysis, of sales of drinks and candy items, including the number, size and price of each item sold at each of its Florida theatre. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner did not maintain cash registers at its concession stands in its Florida theatres and did not maintain records made contemporaneously with the sale of taxable items from the concession stands which separately itemized the amounts of sales tax collected on each sale transaction occurring at the theatres' concession stands. Rather, Petitioner chose, for its own convenience, to operate a "cash box" operation at each of its concession stands in its Florida theatres and willingly remitted sales tax to the Department of Revenue pursuant to the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code for the relevant periods. In April, 1985, Petitioner placed computerized cash registers in each of its Florida theatre concession stands. These cash registers provided tapes of each individual transaction each day, specifically recording each taxable and nontaxable sale and the amount of sales tax due on each taxable sale with a daily summation on each tape at each theatre. Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code, requires concessionaires such as Petitioner to remit sales tax at a rate of 5.63 percent of taxable sales under the present 5 percent statutory sales tax schedule and at 4.5 percent of taxable sales under the previous statutory sales tax schedule unless a concessionaire, through its records, shows another effective rate by "proof to the contrary". Petitioner produced an effective tax rate of 5.13 percent for the month of April 1985, for all its Florida theatres by dividing the total sales tax collected during April, 1985 by the total taxable sales during April, 1985, as evidenced by the cash register tapes from all of Petitioner's concession stands in Florida. Petitioner then used that tax rate as a base to retroactively reconstruct an effective tax rate for the refund periods by assuming that the product sales mix (product mix of products sold) and the transactional sales mix (the number of items purchased together in a single transaction by a customer) experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the month of April, 1985. There was no competent evidence that the product sales mix or the transactional sales mix experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the nonth of April, 1985. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support Petitioner's reconstructed effective tax rates that were used to calculate the refunds. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show "proof to the contrary" that its reconstructed effective tax rates are correct or that the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code were incorrect for the refund periods at issue in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Comptroller enter his final order DENYING Petitioner's refund applications. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1986.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's final assessment of sales and use tax plus interest against Petitioner Karsten Enterprises FL, Inc., is correct.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation headquartered in Dothan, Alabama, doing business in Florida. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During the audit period in controversy, from October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2007, Petitioner was a dealer in manufactured or modular homes and did business at one or more Florida locations. During the pertinent period, Petitioner entered into various contracts to provide manufactured or modular homes to its customers for delivery at locations in Florida. At a Karsten Sales Center, models of residential factory-built buildings are displayed. These residential factory-built buildings are produced by manufacturers that Karsten uses for that purpose. In most of the transactions during the audit period, Petitioner's customers would contract with Petitioner for the sale and installation of a factory built building on property owned by the customer. In the remainder of the contracts during the audit period, Petitioner would either purchase the property or enter into a contract for the sale of the property to the customer, and Petitioner would install a home that Petitioner had purchased from a manufacturer and then sell the home and land package to the customer. The contract prices were a lump sum, which included not only the manufactured or modular home, but also installation of the home at a Florida location. Petitioner’s contracts with its customers did not itemize individual components of the modular or manufactured homes, such as individual nuts, bolts, and shingles, but instead agreed to deliver the entire modular or manufactured home on an installed basis. The contracts between Petitioner and its customers specify the type of home that the customer wanted to have erected or installed on the property. Upon selection of a floor plan, options, and other customization, the customer would agree to order a specific home from a manufacturer. Petitioner purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. The manufacturer would produce the home upon receiving an order from Petitioner. The manufacturer shipped the completed home to Petitioner, delivering the home to the property where the home would ultimately be erected and installed. Once shipped to the site, the factory-built buildings were placed on a foundation constructed for that purpose. Petitioner would either directly, through the manufacturer, or through subcontractors, construct the foundations, place the homes on the foundations, and connect the homes to required utilities. All of these activities were done as part of Petitioner's contracts with its customers for real property improvement. In many instances, the manufacturer both delivered the homes to the sites and provided post-delivery services to the homes. Additional services provided by the manufacturer after it installed the homes on the foundations included trim work, repair work, and fit and finish work. Petitioner paid the manufactures directly for these post-delivery services. During the audit period at issue, Petitioner sold, erected and installed approximately 30 residential modular or factory-built buildings in the state of Florida. If the home was built by a Florida factory, the factory would include sales tax in its invoice to Petitioner, based upon the cost of materials, but not including labor, that the manufacturer used in the construction of the home prior to its delivery to the site. If an out-of-state manufacturer built the home, the manufacturer would not include a sales tax amount in its invoices to Petitioner. Rather, the out-of-state manufacturers indicated that the cost of materials for construction of the homes at the factory was approximately 60% of the purchase price Petitioner paid for the homes. When Petitioner closed its contracts with its customers, if the manufacturer was an out-of-state manufacturer that had not previously included a sales or use tax in its invoice to Petitioner, Petitioner would remit a use tax directly to the Department, based upon 60% of Petitioner’s purchase price of the manufactured or modular homes. In either case, whether paying sales tax directly to a Florida manufacturer based only on the Florida manufacturer's cost of materials, or remitting use tax on 60% of its purchase price of manufactured or modular homes from out-of-state manufacturers, rather than paying tax on 100% of the price it paid for the homes, Petitioner did not pay sales or use tax on the manufacturer’s labor or fabrication costs. In remitting use tax, or paying sales tax to the Florida manufacturers, Petitioner was seeking to pay tax only on the manufacturer’s cost of materials used in the manufacturing process. There is no dispute concerning the Department’s math calculations. Rather, Petitioner disputes that the labor costs were taxable. Petitioner has no proof that the Department has ever received payment of tax from any person on the manufacturer’s labor costs at issue in this proceeding. Drenea York, who testified for the Department, is an accountant and auditor with twenty years of experience, all in sales and use taxation. Tammy Miller, who testified for the Department, is an attorney who has worked with the Department for eight years within the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution section (Department's Dispute Resolution Section). The Department's Dispute Resolution Section employs “Tax Conferees,” such as Ms. Miller, who hear informal taxpayer protests, issue the Department's notices of decisions regarding final assessments, and provide guidance to the public upon request. Her practice has focused principally upon sales and use taxation, and she has handled several cases involving taxation of modular home contractors. Tammy Miller signed the notice of decision regarding the Final Assessment at issue. She also wrote the article for the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which Petitioner introduced into evidence as P1. She testified as the Department’s corporate representative. Douglas Uhler testified as a former employee of Petitioner and also as an expert witness for the Petitioner. He is a CPA with some tax experience, who was not shown to be a specialist in taxation or in Florida sales and use taxation. He practices in Birmingham, Alabama, where he is licensed. He has knowledge and expertise in valuation and other areas, but was not qualified as an expert to testify as to the tax determinations at issue in this controversy. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Uhler applied for a TAA. Mr. Uhler was permitted to testify, over the Department’s hearsay and relevancy objections, that he relied on an oral statement from an alleged Department employee, concerning how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During his testimony, however, Mr. Uhler did not know the name of the person to whom he allegedly spoke and he was not sure that the person he spoke to was an employee of the Department of Revenue. Therefore, no weight was given to his testimony regarding his recollection of a conversation with an alleged Department employee on the issue of how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During the audit period at issue, the Department made four revisions to its original audit report in response to additional information provided by the Petitioner. During this period, the Petitioner paid the uncontested portion of the Department's assessment, leaving only one issue in dispute: whether additional tax and interest is due on Petitioner’s purchase of the modular homes. The Department’s audit and resulting tax assessment considered Petitioner, and not the manufacturer, to be the “real property contractor” responsible for the payment of the tax, within the meaning of the aforementioned rule provisions. The Department’s determination that Petitioner was the responsible “real property contractor” is consistent with the fact that the real property improvement contracts at issue were entered directly between Petitioner and its customers, and not between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. In its contracts with its customers, Petitioner directly arranged installation work, either providing the installation itself or through the manufacturer or a subcontractor on behalf of Petitioner's customers. The issue of whether Petitioner or the manufacturer performed the installation work, however, was not considered by the Department to be a determinative factor, in and of itself, in making the Final Assessment. According to the Department, it would not consider a manufacturer to be the responsible “real property contractor” unless the contracts for real property improvement were directly between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's customers had direct contracts for real property improvements with the manufacturers of the homes. The Department also considered Petitioner to be the “end user” under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3) and (4), which, according to the Department, imposes tax on the “end user.” The Department considered Petitioner, as opposed to Petitioner's customers, to be the end user based upon the reasoning that Petitioner was the last party to purchase the modular units as “tangible personal property,” before the modular homes became affixed to real property. Ms. York and Ms. Miller explained that the Department did not consider Petitioner’s customers to be the “end users” because Petitioner's customers did not purchase resold items of “tangible personal property,” itemized in detail under Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3)(d). Rather, they explained that Petitioner’s customers, who purchased under lump- sum contracts, were considered to have purchased an improvement to real property, and improvements to real property fall outside the scope of the Florida sales and use tax chapter. In its audit, the Department examined Petitioner’s contracts with its customers solely to determine that the Petitioner was the end user or the “real property contractor.” The Department’s assessment did not seek to impose tax or interest liability on Petitioner’s transactions with its customers. Instead, the Department taxed Petitioner on Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing modular homes, giving Petitioner full credit for any partial tax that Petitioner had paid. As noted above, during the audit period, when it was dealing with a Florida manufacturer, Petitioner generally remitted sales or use tax directly to the manufacturer, at the time of purchase. More often, however, Petitioner paid sales or use tax on a monthly basis, by direct accrual or remittance to the Department on approximately 60% of the amount Petitioner paid for homes manufactured by out-of-state manufacturers. The invoices to Petitioner frequently included other itemized charges, which the Department did not consider part of Petitioner’s “cost price” of the purchased modular units. For example, if an invoice included sales or use tax, the Department excluded charges for tax when calculating Petitioner’s “cost price,” so as to avoid imposing tax on the itemized tax. Likewise, no charges for installation of the modular units onto real property were included in the Department’s calculation of “cost price.” The Department instead determined “cost price” by adding up the “Base Price” for purchasing the modular homes, together with itemized home “Options,” as they appeared on the manufacturer's invoices to Petitioner for the modular homes. Examples of several “Options” would be such things as better carpeting, a sliding glass door, or a plywood floor. The combined total of “Base Price” and “Options” were used by the Department in determining Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing the units as items of tangible personal property from the manufacturer’s factory. Petitioner's "cost price" as determined by the Department reflected the seller’s (in this case the manufacturer’s) material and labor costs. The Department's Final Assessment, however, did not include costs related to the installation of the modular homes onto real property, as those were considered by the Department as costs arising subsequent to the sale of the product as tangible personal property. The Final Assessment only sought tax on Petitioner’s purchase cost of the modular homes as tangible personal property leaving the factory. Because Petitioner had already paid tax on approximately 60% of its cost price, the Department’s assessment sought to capture the 40% of sales and use tax that Petitioner never paid. The Department's assessment determined that Petitioner owed tax on its own “cost price” as invoiced by the manufacturer. The Department determined that the Petitioner’s “cost price” was a different “cost price” than the manufacturer’s “cost price.” According to the Department, the manufacturer’s cost price excluded labor on its factory floor but Petitioner’s “cost price” included all materials and labor costs that were necessarily a component of Petitioner's actual purchase price. The Department’s auditor gave Petitioner full credit for all taxes paid, whether Petitioner had paid the tax by direct remittance or at the time that it paid an invoice, with one exception: credit was generally not given for payments made by Petitioner to a company named Cavalier because during the audit period at issue, Petitioner remitted certain amounts of sales tax to a manufacturer named Cavalier, but Cavalier refunded these amounts to Petitioner.3/ The Department’s audit and assessment did not treat Petitioner as a “manufacturer” nor give Petitioner the benefit of the special exemption, under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which is available to manufacturers of a “factory- built building.” This is because the Department did not consider Petitioner to be a manufacturer. Although Petitioner argued that it qualified for the special exemption under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, under the theory that it was a "manufacturer," Petitioner failed to show that it is a “manufacturer” entitled to such exemption. In accordance with Petitioner's Application for Registration with the Department, Petitioner was registered as a “Manufactured (Mobile) Home Dealer” rather than as a manufacturer. In response to audit interview questions, Petitioner advised the auditor that it was in the business of “Retail Sale” of “Mobile and Modular Homes.” Petitioner made this same representation again in its response to a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. The first time that Petitioner ever asserted that it was a "manufacturer" was after Petitioner received the Department’s Notice of Intent to make Audit Changes, and became aware that, as a “real property contractor,” it would be assessed tax on 100% of its “cost price.” Petitioner then changed its self-description of its business model, asserting that it was a “manufacturer.” When Petitioner protested the Department’s assessment, however, it abandoned, at least at the informal protest stage, the argument that it was a manufacturer. Petitioner instead argued that it should be treated like a real property contractor engaged in the business of stick built homes. According to Tammy Miller, Petitioner's president, Mr. Copeland, told Ms. Miller during the informal protest process, that Petitioner was not a manufacturer. The Final Assessment corroborates Tammy Miller’s recollection because it addressed Petitioner’s various legal arguments but did not address Petitioner’s argument that it is a manufacturer, because that argument apparently was not made during the informal protest. The Amended Petition does not allege that Petitioner was a manufacturer or that it should be treated like one. Petitioner instead asserts that it is a modular home dealer who purchases from “the factory” and that it should be treated like a stick-built contractor. Petitioner stipulated that it is a modular home “dealer” and that it purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. No evidence was introduced that Petitioner owns or operates factories or an assembly line. Rather, the evidence showed that Petitioner operated out of an office building in Alabama. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has been licensed or certified as a “manufacturer” by the Department of Community Affairs, which is the agency that regulates manufacturers of factory-built buildings. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-1.002(15) and 1.007(1). Petitioner’s representative repeatedly referred to Petitioner, throughout opening statement, argument and testimony, as a dealer purchasing from the factory. The Department’s witnesses testified that the sales and use tax applies to “real property contractors” in a way that taxes all real property contractors (stick-built or modular) on their full “cost price” of purchased materials, regardless of whether the purchased materials are lumber, shingles, nails, finished kitchen cabinetry, or assembled modular home modules. The Department's witnesses explained that the cost price of each item purchased will vary because the item purchased in each instance is different and some items will include greater material and labor costs than others. The Final Assessment reflects the unpaid balance assessed, after all revisions and payments made, and provides a per diem amount so that accrued interest may be readily calculated. The Final Assessment determined that the unpaid balance of tax and interest for the audit period (after crediting Petitioner with all payments made) was as follows: $41,446.31 combined tax and interest through 1/26/09, with $7.57 per day for each day thereafter until the postmark date of payment. The Final Assessment waived all penalties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Final Assessment and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due as of January 26, 2009, in the amount of $41,446.39, with interest thereafter accruing at $7.57 per day, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2010.
