The Issue The issue in this case is whether to grant the petition challenging the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-302.111(2).
Findings Of Fact At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was on probation and under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner obtained a form pro se motion for early termination of probation from the Leon County circuit court clerk's office. The form contained fields for Petitioner's probation officer and the assistant state attorney to object or not object to early termination and to comment. Petitioner presented the form to his probation officer, who had her supervisor fill in the probation officer's field. The supervisor indicated neither an objection nor lack of objection. She commented that she was leaving it to the court to determine if Petitioner had met the vehicle impoundment condition of his probation, but that Petitioner had met all other requirements to be considered for early termination of probation. A hearing was scheduled on Petitioner's motion in June 2013. The judge notified the assistant state attorney assigned to the case and asked her to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the assistant state attorney objected to early termination of Petitioner's probation. At some point in time, the assistant state attorney also checked the field on the form motion indicating her objection to early termination. The judge denied the motion. Petitioner blames the denial of his motion on subsection (2) of rule 33-302.111, which states: Before a correctional probation officer considers recommending an offender for early termination of supervision, the following criteria shall be met: Completion of one-half of the supervision period; Payment in full of restitution, fines, and court costs; Cost of supervision is current; All special conditions of supervision are fulfilled; A Florida Crime Information Center/National Crime Information Center (FCIC/NCIC) records check reveals no new arrest during the course of supervision of which the sentencing or releasing authority has not been previously notified; and No violations of supervision are pending. In order for an officer to request an early termination of supervision from the sentencing or releasing authority, approval must be obtained from the officer's supervisor, the State Attorney's Office, and the victim, if the offense involved a victim. If the State Attorney's office denies the request, or the victim opposes the early termination, the department will not proceed with the early termination recommendation. The officer shall not disclose a victim's objection to the offender. The officer shall notify the offender of the judge's decision upon receipt of the judge's response. If the offender was adjudicated guilty, the officer shall review the restoration of civil rights process with the offender. He contends that subsection (2) of the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the statutory grant of rulemaking authority and enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. See § 120.52(8)(b) & (c), Fla. Stat. (2013). Specifically, Petitioner contrasts the rule with section 948.04(3), Florida Statutes, which states: If the probationer has performed satisfactorily, has not been found in violation of any terms or conditions of supervision, and has met all financial sanctions imposed by the court, including, but not limited to, fines, court costs, and restitution, the Department of Corrections may recommend early termination of probation to the court at any time before the scheduled termination date. Although on the precise subject as the rule, section 948.03(4) is not cited in the rule as either the rulemaking authority or the law implemented. Instead, the rule cites section 944.09, Florida Statutes, for both.
Findings Of Fact Danny Michael Shipp is a black male who was employed at the Jacksonville, Florida, aluminum can plant of Respondent Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. This period of employment was from October 29, 1978 until November 19, 1978. Mr. Shipp was hired as an equipment tender. In that position his duties included loading pallets, maintaining six paint spray guns and generally checking on equipment to ensure that is was functioning properly in the assembly of aluminum cans. His job required no special skills or qualifications. At the tame Mr. Shipp was hired, Kaiser was adding 70 to 80 people to its working force because it was starting up a new production shift. There were approximately 500 applicants and around 300 people were interviewed by plant management. A background check was made by Pinkerton's of Florida, Inc. on the newly-hired personnel including Mr. Shipp and another employee K.M. 1/. Of the 70 to 80 people hired, only K.M., who is white, and Mr. Shipp were reported to have a criminal record. Mr. Shipp's Pinkerton's report indicated: 7-2-77 Case number 77-2789 Possession of Contra. Substance (more than 5 grams) WHASJ Guilty 19 Month Probation. Released on $751.00 Bond. 3-26-70 Case number 701455 Assault and battery, case discharged 4-7-70 Case number 70 1454 Malicious Mischief, sugar in gas tank of Gail Shipp. K.M.'s report stated: 4-30-76 Case number 21013 possession Narcotics implements Nol. Press. Possession controlled substance Marijuana, over 5 gr. $250.00 Fine 7-31-78 Case number 3105 Sale of controlled substance, 80 days Duval County jail, 1 year Probation. There were other charges which were later shown as misdemeanor's. (sic.) On the job application form filled in by Mr. Shipp, Kaiser asked if he had been convicted of a felony within the last seven years. Mr. Shipp answered by checking a box "no." After several weeks of employment, Mr. Shipp on November 19, 1978, was invited to a conference with Mr. Rice, the Kaiser administrative manager; the plant manager; and the plant superintendent. This was still during his thirty- day probation period when he could be fired without cause and without the right to grieve a discharge. He was told by Mr. Rice that he was being terminated due to the Pinkerton's report. When Mr. Shipp asked for a specific reason for his discharge, Mr. Rice responded: (From Hearing Transcript p. 142) "He said, Well what are you talking about specifically?' And I said, 'Well, based on the evidence, the background check, that we no longer want to keep you as an employee. He said, 'Well, what specifically are you talking about?' And I said, 'Well,' I said, 'You currently are on probation?' He said, 'Yes, sir.' And I said, 'Well, let's just let it go at that, and I'm not going to talk about it anymore.' And that's basically what we did. And then Mr. Carlson walked back to the lockerroom with Mr. Shipp and we all walked out to the front, shook hands, and that was it. On October 21, 1977, Mr. Shipp was placed on probation, adjudication withheld for the felony possession of more than 5 grams of marijuana. His probation successfully expired on April 21, 1979, subsequent to his discharge at Kaiser. On his application with Kaiser, gave "layoff" as the reason for leaving a former employer, Jacksonville Shipyard. In fact, as was brought out during his cross examination, he was terminated there due to being absent from work. Kaiser's primary reason for discharging Mr. Shipp was because of his arrest record. At the time of his termination, Mr. Rice believed after consulting with Kaiser counsel, that Mr. Shipp had not been convicted of any felonies. He further believed that for the purpose of terminating an employee, K. M.'s report was the equivalent of Mr. Shipp's. K.M. who was also in his probationary period as an equipment tender was dismissed by Kaiser because of his arrest record. Kaiser has and had no custom, policy (written or otherwise) or practice of terminating an employee for his arrest record, conviction or criminal probation status. The decision to fire Mr. Shipp and K. M. was made spontaneously by Mr. Rice, Mr. Gene Miller, the plant manager, and Mr. Curtis Thompson, who collectively are the top management at the Jacksonville plant. There is no proof that anyone has ever been fired either before or after the termination of Mr. Shipp and K.M. because of their arrest record, convictions or criminal probation status. After his discharge, Mr. Shipp spoke with his probation counselor, Mrs. Susan Karl, about his discharge. She wrote a letter to Mr. Kaiser on November 28, 1978, in which she explained Mr. Shipp's legal status and gave her opinion about his currently being a law-abiding citizen. She asked that Mr. Shipp be considered for reemployment. He was not rehired. A copy of the Notice of Failure of Conciliation in Mr. Shipp's case was sent to him on March 10, 1980. He filed his Petition for Relief with the Commission on April 8, 1980. For reasons not appearing in the record, a Second Notice of Failure of Conciliation was sent to Mr. Shipp on March 28, 1980. During his employment at Kaiser, Mr. Shipp received three weekly evaluations as a probationary employee. For the first week his evaluator rated him as "fair" and commented that he "overreacted and needs to study more for the test." During the second week he received a "good" with the note that he "Works good on line, picks up on job fast." Finally, on November 17, 1980, he was given a "good" rating with the comment that "Danny's performance has been consistently good overall (He was late once)." With respect to Mr. Shipp's complaint charging Kaiser with race discrimination the Commission by its Executive Director has made a determination of reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition for relief filed by Danny Michael Shipp and supported by the Commission. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of January, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Freddie A. Horton, is a 46 year old male who presently resides at 58 Tortuga Road, Palm Springs, Florida. On or about December 9, 1980, Petitioner filed an application for a Class G license with Respondent, Department of State. Said license authorizes the holder to carry a firearm while employed in a security guard capacity. Question 13 on the application required that the applicant state whether he had ever been arrested. Petitioner answered he had not (Respondent's Exhibit 1). A subsequent investigation of Petitioner's record by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that Petitioner was arrested by the United States Army for desertion in June, 1955, for which he was confined to the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Camp Gordon, Georgia, for almost two years. Horton was also given a dishonorable discharge from the service. Petitioner has had no other arrests or convictions since that time. Question 12 on the application asks the type of discharge received from the Armed Forces. Petitioner answered he had been given an honorable discharge, which was obviously not true. Petitioner initiated inquiries with the U.S. Army in late 1980 to upgrade his dishonorable discharge to an honorable discharge (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The request is still being considered at this time. Petitioner readily acknowledged his troubles with the Army but stated that he answered questions 12 and 13 in the manner that he did because (1) he thought the upgrading of the discharge would be resolved by the time the application was acted upon, and (2) he did not know that a military arrest was part of the law enforcement record contemplated by question 13. Petitioner is currently employed by Armour Industrial Security, Inc. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In May, 1981, he was issued a temporary permit by the Department to carry a firearm and has most recently held the position of sergeant of the guard with supervising authority over eight employees at the Port of Palm Beach, Florida. A Class G license is necessary in order for him to retain this position on a permanent basis. Petitioner's record since 1955 has been exemplary. This was corroborated by letters of recommendation prepared by no less than six past employers who each gave him high marks for good character, honesty and trustworthiness. His present employer rates him equally high and would entrust him with supervisory responsibilities if the license is granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Petitioner, Freddie A. Horton, for a Class G license to carry a firearm be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1981.
Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Jeffrey D. Ahl, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0155081. The last license issued was as a broker-salesperson, c/o Data Pak Systems & Services, Inc., 1050 South Federal Highway, Delray Beach, Florida 33483. On September 12, 1991, respondent was found guilty of eleven counts of lewd assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes. The Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, adjudicated the respondent guilty on each count and committed the respondent to the Palm Beach County Jail for a term of 364 days, followed by a term of probation of 10 years. Notwithstanding his conviction on September 12, 1991, it was not until March 13, 1992, that respondent, through his attorney, informed petitioner of his conviction of the aforesaid felony. According to respondent, whose testimony is credited, the myriad of personal problems that befell him during this time period, including the remorse he was suffering, his divorce, a foreclosure, and his conviction, preoccupied his mind such that he overlooked his obligation to notify petitioner upon his conviction. Notably, respondent did not practice such profession following his conviction, and upon receipt of the renewal notice for his broker's license immediately recognized his oversight and had his attorney promptly inform petitioner of his conviction. Respondent served eight months and one week of his 364-day sentence in the Palm Beach County Jail, and was released from custody in May 1992. Currently, pursuant to the court's commitment order, respondent is on probation for a term of 10 years, the first year of which he is under community control. So controlled, respondent is required to report to his probation officer every Monday and secure approval of his weekly schedule of activities. Except for work, church and two hours of shopping each week, respondent is confined to his residence. Following successful completion of community control, respondent will be on a more relaxed form of probation, with monthly reporting to his probation officer. The court's commitment order further required that respondent continue psychological/psychiatric treatment, pay any medical expenses for his daughter's psychological/psychiatric treatment, and remain current on his child support payments. Respondent has duly abided by such obligations. The offense for which respondent stood convicted involved the touching and fondling of his daughter during times when he believed her to be asleep. Such activity occurred during the period of time she was 9 to 13 years of age, and ceased in approximately 1986, when respondent realized his daughter knew what was occurring. Disclosure of his activities apparently occurred in September 1990, during the course of his divorce proceedings. Upon disclosure of what had occurred, respondent was referred by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to Helen Bush, a marriage, family and sex therapist, for counseling. Since such initial referral in September 1990, respondent has been regularly and responsibly counseled through Ms. Bush, except for that period of time in which he was incarcerated. In the opinion of Ms. Bush, which is credited, respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, regressed pedophilia, which, precipitated by stress, was the cause for his misconduct towards his daughter. Such disorders are treatable and where, as here, the offender is genuinely remorseful about what occurred, has the motivation to rehabilitate himself, and the support of his family, the likelihood of respondent being successfully treated is great. Currently, respondent has remarried, and continues to fulfill his responsibilities to continue treatment and to remain current in his support obligations. It is respondent's desire to once again practice as a real estate broker so that he might reasonably support his new family, as well as remain current with his obligations, and he would like to associate himself with William W. Harris, another licensed real estate broker. Mr. Harris testified at hearing, is aware of respondent's conviction, and is most amenable to respondent being associated with his office. Considering the quality of proof offered in this case, it is found that, notwithstanding respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, respondent possesses the requisite honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, good character and good reputation for fair dealing required for licensure as a real estate broker. In reaching such conclusion the seriousness of the offense with which respondent stands convicted has not been overlooked; however, neither has the fact that the conduct which precipitated such offense had its genesis in a psychiatric disorder that is treatable and that respondent is currently experiencing success in such treatment. Under such circumstances, respondent's conviction does not detract from the conclusion that he possesses those worthy attributes of honesty, trustworthiness and fair dealing the public is entitled to expect when dealing with a real estate broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered finding respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes, not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(n), Florida Statutes, and imposing the penalty set forth in paragraph 18, supra. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of September 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September 1992.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the Final Hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On March 3, 1994 Petitioner submitted to the Department an application for licensure as a Limited Surety Agent (Bail Bondsman). In a Denial Letter dated July 20, 1994, the Department notified Petitioner that his application for licensure was denied. The basis for the Department's denial of Petitioner's application was Petitioner's past felony convictions. The evidence established that on or about December 4, 1980, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Case Number 80-105 (the "First State Case"), with trafficking in illegal drugs and the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of Sections 893.135 and 790.07, Florida Statutes. On June 5, 1981, Petitioner pled no contest in the First State Case to trafficking in excess of two thousand (2,000) pounds, but less than ten thousand (10,000) pounds of cannabis. Petitioner was fined and placed on probation for ten (10) years. On or about June 14, 1981, Petitioner was charged in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case Numbers 83-6033-CR-EPS and 83-6038-CR-NCR (the "Federal Cases"), with five felony counts of possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs and conspiracy to import illegal drugs into the United States of America, in violation of Title 21, Sections 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), 960(a), 963, and 843(b), United States Code. On or about November 5, 1981, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Case Number 81-1191 CFG (the "Second State Case") with violation of the Florida Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), Section 943.462, Florida Statutes. Although the exact timing is not clear, at some point after his arrest, Petitioner began cooperating with authorities which led to plea bargains and a sentence which did not include any jail time. On April 4, 1984, Petitioner pled guilty to one count in each of the Federal Cases to attempt and conspiracy to import marijuana and methaqualaudes into the United States of America. As a result of his plea in the Federal Cases, Petitioner was fined and placed on 5 years probation. On April 6, 1984, Petitioner pled guilty in the Second State Case, was fined $7,500.00 and placed on probation for fifteen (15) years. This plea was negotiated as part of the plea in the Federal Cases. Petitioner's probation from the First State Case was terminated May 20, 1988. Petitioner's probation from the Federal Cases was terminated on April 21, 1989 and September 11, 1989. Petitioner's civil rights were restored pursuant to Executive Orders of the Office of Executive Clemency dated May 19, 1989 and May 23, 1990. It is not clear from the record if the Executive Orders constitute a "full pardon" as suggested by counsel for Petitioner at the hearing in this matter. Petitioner down plays his role in the elaborate criminal scheme that led to his arrests and convictions. He suggests that all of the charges were related to the same scheme. Insufficient evidence was presented to reach any conclusions regarding the underlying criminal activity and/or Petitioner's exact involvement. Petitioner has been very active in community affairs since his convictions. He has apparently been a good family man and claims to have rehabilitated himself. Subsequent to his conviction, Petitioner and three other investors started a bail bond business. Petitioner claims he did not play an active role in the business. However, when the Department learned of his involvement, it required Petitioner to terminate any affiliation with the company. Petitioner's wife currently owns a bail bond company. Petitioner operates a "court services" business out of the same building where his wife's bail bond business operates. No evidence was presented of any improper involvement by Petitioner in his wife's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a Limited Surety Agent. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4893 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Subordinate to findings of fact 4 through 10. Subordinate to findings of fact 13. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Subordinate to findings of fact 14 and 15. Subordinate to findings of fact 14 and 15. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2 through 10. Subordinate to findings of fact 14. Rejected as argumentative and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399 Julio Gutierrez, Esq. 2225 Coral Way Miami, FL 33145 Allen R. Moayad, Esq. Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed May 28, 1986, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) charged that Respondent, Theodore Riley (Riley), while employed as an adjuster by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Group, (USF&G), did wrongfully obtain the sum of $400 from a workmens compensation claimant to assure that USF&G would not contest the claim (Count I). The complaint further alleged that on September 16, 1985, Riley entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging a violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes, a felony of the second degree and a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the court withheld adjudication and placed Riley on 18 months probation (Count II). The Department concluded that such conduct demonstrated, inter alia, a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance; fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit; and, a plea of nolo contendere to a felony involving moral turpitude. Section 626.611(7),(9) and (14), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Riley entered a plea of no contest to Count II of the Administrative Complaint in exchange for the Department's dismissal of Count I of the Administrative Complaint and the Department's agreement that the penalty imposed would be limited to a suspension of his eligibility for licensure for a period of two (2) years. While not conditioning his agreement to a two year suspension, Riley did request that the Department consider crediting the time he has been on probation against the two year suspension. The evidence shows that Riley was arrested and charged with the subject offense in March 1985, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere, that adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that he was placed on probation for 18 months commencing September 16, 1985. As a special condition of probation, Riley was ordered not to apply for an adjuster's license during the term of his probationary period. Consistent with the terms of his probation, Riley has not renewed his adjusters' license. The Department's records reflect that Riley's license was last due for renewal, but not renewed, on April 1, 1985.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a) and (b), by unlawfully possessing a controlled substance, cocaine, and by driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when effected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired or with a blood or breath alcohol level of .08 or above, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, is the state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying correctional officers and taking disciplinary action against them for failing to maintain good moral character as required by section 943.13(7). § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. At all times relevant, Respondent was a certified Florida Correctional Officer, having been issued certificate number 279704. On October 14, 2010, Respondent was operating or in actual physical control of his motor vehicle in South Miami, Florida. South Miami Police Officer Junior Vijil observed Respondent's vehicle stopped in the middle of the intersection of 58th Court and Southwest 73rd Street. After observing Respondent's driving pattern, Officer Vijil initiated a traffic stop. Officer Vijil approached Respondent's vehicle and made initial contact with Respondent. Officer Vijil observed certain indicators of potential impairment and requested Respondent to step out of the vehicle. Respondent complied with Officer Vijil's request. At the time of the traffic stop, Respondent had a passenger in the front seat of his vehicle. When Respondent exited the vehicle, at Officer Vijil's request, the passenger remained seated in the vehicle. Officer Vijil called for backup officers and awaited their arrival prior to performing field sobriety exercises with Respondent. The passenger remained seated, unsupervised, in Respondent's vehicle for several minutes until additional law enforcement personnel arrived. When South Miami Police Officer Louis Fata arrived on the scene, Officer Vijil initiated field sobriety exercises. At the conclusion of the field sobriety exercises, Officer Vijil did not immediately arrest Respondent, but rather, requested Respondent provide consent to search the vehicle. Respondent consented to the search. Officer Vijil began the search of the vehicle by first looking in the front interior compartment. He observed, in plain sight, a small, dark, plastic baggie in the center console. The center console's lid was absent. Although the baggie was dark in color, Officer Vijil could observe a white powdery substance that he believed was cocaine. After locating the suspicious substance, Officer Vijil removed the same from Respondent's vehicle and secured it in his patrol vehicle. A field test of the white substance was performed by Officer Vijil and Officer Fata, which resulted in a presumptive positive result for cocaine. Officer Vigil interviewed Respondent and the passenger concerning their knowledge of the suspected cocaine. After both individuals denied any knowledge of the substance, Officer Vijil arrested Respondent for possession of a controlled substance. Karen Wiggins, a criminalist at the Miami-Dade Police Department Forensic Service Bureau, performed a series of tests on the substance at issue, and credibly testified that the suspected substance was cocaine. Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation, the parties stipulate that, on October 14, 2010, Respondent did unlawfully drive or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when effected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired; or with a blood or breath alcohol level of .08 or above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), by his violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of six months, with the requirement that Commission-approved substance abuse counseling be completed prior to the end of the probationary period. It is further recommended that the Commission enter an final order dismissing the allegation that Respondent unlawfully constructively possessed a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2013.
Findings Of Fact In July 1975, in Hillsborough County, Florida, Petitioner was arrested on the charge of buying, receiving and concealing stolen property. He was placed in the Pretrial Intervention Program, which he successfully completed. As a result, formal charges were either never filed or were dismissed by the State Attorney. On January 18, 1982, Petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea to one charge of trafficking in excess of ten thousand pounds of cannabis in Hernando County, Florida. Adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence was withheld by the court. Petitioner was placed on probation for twelve years. On August 1, 1983, in Pinellas County, Florida, Petitioner entered pleas of nolo contendere to the offenses of aggravated assault with the use of a firearm and carrying a concealed weapon on or about his person. The court accepted Petitioner's pleas. Adjudications of guilt were withheld on August 1, 1983. Petitioner was placed on probation for a period of five years, to run concurrent with his probation in Hernando County, Florida. Petitioner's probation in the trafficking case was terminated early in Hernando County, Florida, on March 14, 1985. Petitioner's probation for the aggravated assault and the concealed weapon was terminated early in Pinellas County, Florida, on December 11, 1985. Petitioner was never adjudicated guilty of the charges the Division used as the basis for the denial of his application. As a result, he has not been convicted of any of these crimes as the term "conviction" is defined in Subsection 493.6101(8), Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted eleven letters of good moral character from people in the community who have known him throughout the years and are aware of the prior criminal charges.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner's application for a Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern License should be granted. ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Hearing Officer finding #7. The Department's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Rejected. Contrary to prehearing stipulation. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Hearing Officer finding #1. Reject. Contrary to fact only one charge of trafficking in the Information and only one nolo contendere plea on a charge of trafficking. As the basis given for licensure denial was alleged trafficking charges, the importation of cannabis charge and nolo contendere plea were not considered by the Hearing Officer pursuant to Subsection 493.6118(3), Florida Statutes. See Hearing Officer finding #2. Accepted. See Hearing Officer findings #3 and #5. Accepted. See Hearing Officer finding #7. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph H. Ficarrotta, Esquire 600 Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire Honorable Jim Smith General Counsel Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Tallahassee Florida 32399
The Issue The issue presented in this case was whether the Petitioner had falsified his application for a licensure as an employee guard by failing to report his arrest and conviction of a felony and by not having had his civil rights restored.
Findings Of Fact James McClure applied for licensure as an employee guard to the Division of Licensing. In his application he stated that he had been arrested and indicated that the arrest was for driving with no driver's license. McClure stated that he had earlier been arrested for robbery in 1959 and subsequently convicted of that offense. He was sentenced to prison and served five years and six months for this offense. McClure failed to state that he had been arrested and convicted for this offense. McClure stated that he did not report this arrest and conviction because he did not think it was important. McClure stated that his record in now clean and that he has not been arrested since 1969 or '70 for driving without a license. McClure did not know whether his civil rights had been restored; however, he had taken no action to have them restored.
