Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
BOOKER CREEK PRESERVATION, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 81-001435RP (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001435RP Latest Update: Jul. 23, 1981

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation which has as its purpose the preservation of air quality in Pinellas County and in the State of Florida. Petitioner has approximately twenty members. The Department of Environmental Regulation has published notice that it is proposing to repeal its Rule 17-2.05(8), Florida Administrative Code. This rule is known as the "Complex Source Rule". It requires that permits be obtained from the Department before a facility which can reasonably be expected to cause an increase in concentrations of air pollutants is constructed. Petitioner is a party in a proceeding in which another party has submitted an application for a complex source permit. Administrative appeals of final agency action adverse to the Petitioner are being pursued. If the "Complex Source Rule" is repealed, the proceeding would be subject to dismissal. The primary focus of the "Complex Source Rule" is to regulate concentrations of pollutants that are generated by automobiles that would use a facility for which a permit is sought. There are other methods for controlling this sort of pollution. These include the Federal Motor Vehicle Control Program, which is designed to decrease the pollutants in automobile emissions; non-attainment plans designed to bring an area where pollutants exist at levels in excess of Respondent's rules into compliance; various federal monitoring programs; and mechanical alteration of motor vehicles, including installation of catalytic converters and greater fuel efficiency. Arguably, the "Complex Source Rule" would augment the desirable impacts of these other means of dealing with automobile related pollution. Petitioner has failed to establish, however, that these other methods and programs are not adequate to deal with the problems.

Florida Laws (1) 120.54
# 1
CHARLIE CRIST, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs DONNA FRIED, 03-000383PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 03, 2003 Number: 03-000383PL Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2024
# 2
PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs LOUIS DEPRIEST, 17-005373PL (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 26, 2017 Number: 17-005373PL Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2024
# 3
ALEX K. SHINDLE vs CITY OF TAMPA, 92-003781 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 07, 1994 Number: 92-003781 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 1994

The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position at the City because of his physical handicap, diabetes, in violation of Section 760.10(1(a), Florida Statutes. Whether Petitioner could be reasonably accommodated to perform the essential functions of his duties as an Engineer I position with the City Sewer Department.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 40 year old male. Petitioner was diagnosed with Diabetes Mellitus in 1979. This is a Type I Classification of diabetes which required that Petitioner must take insulin from its onset. Petitioner is further classified as a "brittle" diabetic, which is a type that is difficult to control. Additionally, Petitioner has hypothyroidism (underactive thyroid) and an adrenal insufficiency. This combination is rare. Petitioner is a handicapped person. Petitioner worked steadily at a variety of jobs in the engineering construction field from 1979 to the time he was hired by the City of Tampa on December 12, 1990. Petitioner's diabetic condition did not place any restrictions on his ability to fulfill his job responsibilities at any of his places of employment between 1979 and December 12, 1990. Petitioner was hired by the City of Tampa, an employer, as an Engineer Tech 2 on December 12, 1990. As an Engineer Tech 2, Petitioner was responsible for monitoring the electrical and instrumentation construction at a sanitary sewage treatment plant, and for sewage pumping stations throughout the city. He was essentially an inspector. Prior to accepting employment with the City, Petitioner talked with his prospective supervisors, Jack Kulik and Jeff Taylor, about his diabetic condition. During the period Petitioner was employed as an Engineer Tech 2, he had some insulin reactions on the job in the office. Those reactions were caused by a lowering of Petitioner's blood sugar level. When these reactions occurred, office personnel would assist Petitioner by encouraging him to eat a food product containing sugar. The episodes would take 15-30 minutes to subside. During the period Petitioner was employed as an Engineer Tech 2, he drove a City car alone while at work, and drove his personal car to and from work. When at a construction site, Petitioner went near high voltage panels, into manholes, and also into open pits with open wells on a regular basis. The supervisor, Jack Kulik, did not have any concerns about Petitioner's ability to drive a car. Petitioner received a good performance evaluation for his work as an Engineer Tech 2 on June 12, 1990. He was rated as either "Excellent" or "Fully meets Expectations" in all 13 rating categories. Petitioner's diabetes did not prevent him from performing the essential functions of his job. Petitioner was promoted to an Engineer I position in August 1990. From August 1990 through early February 1991, Petitioner worked half- days at the Hookers Point facility, and then commuted to downtown Tampa to work a half-day. The Engineer I position was primarily an office job, with 80% of the responsibilities in-office and 20% at various job sites. During the period between August 1990 and February 1991, Petitioner had several insulin reactions in the office of the Engineer I position. His new supervisor Korchak did not recognize the symptoms of Petitioner's reaction. He characterized Petitioner as being "asleep" on the job on three occasions, and was impaired on numerous other occasions. Due to his physical handicap, Korchak lost confidence in Petitioner's ability as an engineer. Petitioner ate food to counteract the reactions, which took 20 to 30 minutes to subside. In August 1990, shortly after Petitioner was promoted to an Engineer I position, he was involved in an automobile accident, while driving his personal car. The accident resulted from a diabetic reaction. When he was able, Petitioner called his supervisor, Mr. Korchak, and reported the accident. Mr. Korchak relayed the information about the accident to Andy Cronberg, a deputy director, second in command of the department, who was in an office adjacent to Mr. Korchak when he received the call from Petitioner. Mr. Cronberg made a decision, at that moment, in August 1990, based solely on his conversation with Mr. Korchak, to revoke petitioner's privilege to drive a City car. The decision to revoke Petitioner's driving privileges was made in accordance with a general policy of the City, and not on individualized analysis of Petitioner's condition. The decision to restrict Petitioner's driving privileges was not communicated to Petitioner until a performance review on February 8, 1991. In addition, during this same period, Korchek began tailoring and limiting Petitioner's position to in-office functions only, based on what Korchek believed Petitioner could accomplish safely, and downgraded his evaluation when he rated him on his performance review. Prior to the implementation of the decision to restrict Petitioner's driving privileges on February 8, 1991, the City's representatives did not speak to Petitioner about his driving abilities; they did not speak or consult in any way with Petitioner's doctors; nor did they speak with Petitioner's previous supervisor with the City, Jack Kulik. The first contact the City had with Petitioner's doctor was a response to a questionnaire sent to Dr. Sumesh Chandra and, received by the City on February 27, 1991, wherein Dr. Chandra indicated that Petitioner could safely and effectively operate an automobile. The City's representative Mr. Rice indicated that Dr. Chandra's response raised more questions than it answered, and the City did not restore Petitioner's driving privileges. Neither Mr. Rice, nor any other City employee ever consulted with Dr. Chandra to clear up the confusion they had over Dr. Chandra's statement that Petitioner could safely and effectively drive a car. Petitioner is licensed to drive by the State of Florida. His license has never been revoked, either in Florida or any other state. Dr. Chandra stated that, in his opinion, Petitioner could safely and effectively operate an automobile because, "He's capable, dexterous, and coordinated. He's like any normal individual except that he is unfortunately diabetic. So for routine capacity his skills are like any other normal individual." Twenty percent of the Engineer I position required travel to various job sites. Because Petitioner was not allowed to drive an automobile on city time, and was restricted in in-office functions while performing his Engineer I position, he was not able to fulfill the essential functions of the Engineer I position. Following a request by Phil Rice of the Sewer Department, the City received a letter from Dr. Jai H. Cho, a physician on May 15, 1991, that Petitioner had seen for a short period of time. Dr. Cho's letter indicated, among other things, ". . . it is inevitable, that he will develop hypoglycemia with loss of consciousness in the future because of his concurrent illness with diabetes and adrenal insufficiency." Dr. Cho never specifically addressed the issue of whether Petitioner could safely drive an automobile or work alone at job sites, either in writing or in phone conversations with Mr. Rice. No City representatives ever discussed Petitioner's ability to drive a car or work alone on a job site with Petitioner, Dr. Chandra, Dr. Cho, Petitioner's previous supervisors with the City, or Petitioner's previous supervisors with other employers. On May 20, 1991, the City terminated Petitioner's employment. Petitioner was informed of his termination by Mr. Korchak, Mr. Hoel, and Mr. Rice. Mr. Rice told Petitioner that the reason for the termination was the City's concern about its potential liability. Following his termination, Petitioner was unemployed for nine months. Petitioner was then hired in September, 1992, by Omega Tech in Hardee County, Florida, to work at the Hardee Power Station, performing the same duties as he performed as an Engineer Tech 2 for the City of Tampa. Petitioner commutes the 68 miles each way from Tampa to Hardee County every day in his own car. At the Hardee Power Plant, Petitioner is exposed to the same conditions to which he was exposed while working for the City of Tampa. During the 13 years since Petitioner was diagnosed with diabetes, he has never injured any other person as a result of his diabetes, nor received any serious injury to himself. At the present time, the position of Engineer I with the City of Tampa has been eliminated, and has been replaced by a person holding a contractors license. If Petitioner had remained employed with the City of Tampa, he would have earned $36,294.44 from the period June 20, 1991, through September 18, 1992, exclusive of health benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered that Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of his handicap when his employment was terminated; The Petitioner receive back pay and health benefits in accordance with applicable law; and The Petitioner be awarded the attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of this action. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39(in part), 40, 41, 42, 43 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 15, 39 (Petitioners was hired by Omega Tech) Rejected as hearsay: paragraph 33 Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,10,11(in part), 12,13,14(in part),15,17,18,19,20(in part),22(in part),23,25,26,30,31 Rejected as irrelevant or immaterial or argument: paragraphs 8,9,11(in part),14(in part), 20(Petitioner's written comment),21,24(in part),27,28,29 Rejected as hearsay: paragraphs 16,22(in part),24(in part) COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herdman, Esquire KELLY, McKEE, HERDMAN & RAMUS, P.A. 1724 E. Seventh Avenue Tampa, Florida 323605 Margaret A. Jones, Clerk Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Rd. Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113 Mr. Kenneth C. Perry City of Tampa 306 East Jackson Street 7N Tampa, Florida 33602 Dana Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 794 Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.01760.1090.702
# 5
SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC. (CITRUS COUNTY) vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 81-000258 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000258 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts relevant to the issue presented for determination are found: Customers who testified at the hearing and those who adopted the testimony of others had three major complaints as to the quality of water and sewer service received from the petitioner. These included the inconsistency of the quality of the water, billing procedures and practices, and plant and system management. The quality of the water which petitioner provides to its customers has not been consistent. While quality has greatly improved since November of 1980, the water does, on occasion, appear rusty, muddy or yellowish and does, on occasion, discolor laundry and ice cubes. No evidence was offered as to the frequency of such occasions. Some customers have received a bill for a vacant lot upon which there was no sewer connection or water meter. Another customer was billed at the wrong address after notifying the petitioner of a change in address. A customer who spent some eighteen months in Michigan continued to receive bills in full service amounts after he had requested that his water be disconnected. His correspondence on this problem was not responded to by Petitioner. Petitioner's main office is located in Orlando, approximately one hour away from Inverness. When major breakdowns in the water and sewer system occur, a crew can be dispatched from the Orlando area. Petitioner purchased the subject water and sewer operation in June of 1978. At that time the condition of the mechanical and electrical aspects of the operation was poor and the water was high in iron content, thus causing the water to have an almost constant rusty appearance. Petitioner installed a chemical called "aquamag" to hold the iron in suspension. Aquamag does not, however, remove the iron from the water, and petitioner is presently engaged in research concerning the possibility of a new water supply. It is possible that petitioner could have a new well in operation by June of 1981. Neither the water system nor the sewer system of petitioner are currently under any citations from local or state officials or agencies. Prior to November of 1980, petitioner employed three or four operators who were not able to provide the customers with the best quality of water possible. A new operator was employed in November of 1980 and service and the quality of water has greatly improved since that time. This operator is capable of handling routine operations. If major breakdowns occur, petitioner's mechanics and electricians in Orlando can be radio dispatched to the system for any type of repairs. Petitioner's Orlando office has had a toll-free 800 number for the convenience of customers for the past eight months to one year. The number is displayed at some of petitioner's plants, but is not presently printed on the bills which the customers receive. At the time of the hearing, the customer bills were being restructured to include the petitioner's toll-free number. Prior to the acquisition of the water and sewer system by the petitioner, the former owners had approval in their tariffs filed with the Public Service Commission to charge fees for vacant lots. Such charges were dropped in May of 1979, and the bills which the customers are presently receiving containing such a charge are actually past due bills from a time prior to May of 1979. During the 1979 test year, the annual average of customers served by petitioner was 166 for water service and 130 for sewer service. At the time of the hearing, petitioner estimates approximately 235 lots for water service and 159 or 160 active sewer service customers.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the quality of service provided by petitioner to its customers in Citrus County be found to be satisfactory and that no adverse consequences be imposed upon the petitioner as a result of the quality of its service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April. COPIES FURNISHED: R.M.C. Rose Myers, Kaplan, Levinson, Kenin and Richards Suite 103, 1020 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 M. Robert Christ Legal Department Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack Shreve Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe Cresse, Chairman Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 367.081367.111
# 6
LAKE VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, 81-000227 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000227 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: During the development stage of a condominium project, known as Lake Villas Condominium, in Altamonte Springs, Florida, First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando foreclosed on some forty (40) units of the project. At that time, approximately in November of 1975, thirty-one (31) units already had fee- simple owners or were under a lease/purchase option and they were not involved in the foreclosure proceedings. Mr. David McComb, a vice-president and mortgage loan officer with First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, was given the responsibility of assuring the completion of the remaining units, selling the units and setting up a homeowners' association for the Lake Villas Condominium. The petitioner Lake Villas Condominium Association's five-position board of directors was originally comprised of three members who were personnel of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, so that First Federal would have majority control at a time when it held the ownership to the majority of the units. In June of 1976, thirty-seven of the seventy-one units had been sold to individuals. Thereafter, the composition of the petitioner's board of directors changed and the individual-unit owners held the majority of the five positions. Mr. McComb, as a representative of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, remained on the board of directors and continued First Federal's attempts to sell the remaining unsold units. First Federal retained a sales representative who lived in one of the condominium units, operated her sales office from one of the vacant units owned by First Federal and was paid a real estate commission when she sold a unit. The sales contract on the last of the units owned by First Federal was closed on December 12, 1977. Prior to mid-1976, the Florida Power Corporation account for seven or eight common element meters was in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, doing business as Lake Villas Condominium Association, and the billing statements were mailed to the Orlando office of First Federal Savings and Loan. In June or July of 1976, after the majority of units had been purchased by individual owners and majority control of the board of directors was obtained by the individual owners, Mr. McComb of First Federal placed a telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office. The purpose of this call was to inform respondent that First Federal wanted the account name and address for the seven or eight meters changed and to inform respondent that the Lake Villas Condominium Association had taken over responsibility for the accounts. Mr. McComb spoke on the telephone to a female who handled commercial accounts for the respondent's Winter Park office and informed her that he wanted the name of First Federal Savings and Loan taken off the account and the bills to be mailed to the Lake Villas Condominium Association at a post office box in Altamonte Springs. The female to whom Mr. McComb spoke took down the information regarding the account numbers and change of billing names and addresses, and told him she would take care of it. Mr. McComb did not inquire about a rate adjustment, and no discussion was had concerning rates for the seven or eight meters. Following the June or July, 1976, discussion between Mr. McComb and a female at the respondent's Winter Park office concerning a change in billing name and address, the billing statements were sent and received at the post office address of the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. in Altamonte Springs. Approximately one year later, in mid-1977, Mr. McComb was forwarded some delinquent notices on the seven or eight meters. They had originally been sent to the petitioner's post office box in Altamonte Springs, but were thereafter forwarded to Mr. McComb's attention at First Federal. Mr. McComb noticed that, although the post office address had been changed, the accounts were still in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando. He then placed another telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office, spoke with a female in the commercial department and requested that the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando be removed from the account and that the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be inserted as the new-named customer. The female informed Mr. McComb that this request would be taken care of and that nothing further need be done. No inquiry by Mr. McComb or discussion was had concerning a rate adjustment for these seven or eight meters. Electricity for the individual living units of the Lake Villas Condominiums are separately metered. In addition, there are seven or eight separately billed meters which service the common areas of the condominium, such as the two swimming pools, the internal street and sidewalk lighting, the clubhouse and small post lamps for an open green area. From at least April of 1979 through October of 1980, no commercial activity occurred in any of the condominium units. In April of 1979, Mr. O. K. Armstrong became the manager of the Lake Villas Condominiums and was responsible for the association's financial transactions. He noticed in May of 1979 that the bills for the seven or eight subject meters contained the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, though they did list the condominium's post office box number for the address. After speaking with Mr. McComb about the matter, Mr. Armstrong telephoned a Mr. Harbour at the respondent's Winter Park office. It was during this discussion that petitioner, through Mr. Armstrong, learned that the seven or eight common element meters might qualify for a residential, as opposed to the higher commercial, rate. Thereafter, the rates for the seven or eight meters were changed by Florida Power Corporation from commercial to residential. The request of Mr. Armstrong for a retroactive application of those residential rates to January 1, 1976, which would amount to a refund of all amounts paid in excess of the residential rates from that date, was denied by Mr. Harbour, respondent's office manager in Winter Park. During the hearing, the petitioner verbally amended the request for retroactive application of the residential rate from January 1, 1976, to July of 1976.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Mapp Hunter, Pattillo, Marchman, Mapp and Davis Post Office Box 340 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Blair W. Clack Assistant Counsel Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Arthur Shell Public Service Commission Legal Department 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

# 7
EMERALD COAST UTILITIES AUTHORITY vs MICHAEL A. EMMONS, 12-002915 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 07, 2012 Number: 12-002915 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 2012

Findings Of Fact 1. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor who had a predetermination/liberty interest (name clearing) hearing held on August 24, 2012. After that hearing, he was terminated effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012 and notified of that fact via correspondence dated August 27, 2012. (See, e.g., Exhibit 4). 2. On September 4, 2012, Emmons submitted a written request to ECUA’s Director of Human Resources and Administrative Services (hereinafter “HR Director”) appealing disciplinary action taken against him in his employment with ECUA. 3. That same date, ECUA requested the services of an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a Recommended Order to ECUA’s Executive Director pursuant to the Administrative Law Judge Services Contract previously entered into between ECUA and DOAH. 4. DOAH assigned an ALJ to preside over the matter, who in turn issued a Notice of Hearing scheduling an evidentiary hearing to take place beginning at 10:00 a.m. on October 15, 2012 in ECUA’s Board Room. 5. ECUA was present and ready to proceed with the evidentiary hearing at the appointed time and place, yet neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf appeared. Furthermore, no one had heard from Emmons. 6. After waiting fifteen (15) minutes after the designated start-time for the hearing, neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf had been heard from. 7. Thereafter, the ALJ called the hearing to order, and ECUA proffered witness testimony and admitted exhibits into the record. The record established the following: a. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor in ECUA’s Sanitation Department. b. On March 28, 2012 Emmons was notified by a Sanitation Equipment Operator under his supervision that his truck (Truck #43B), had broken down. After Emmons arrived on the scene in ECUA Truck #11C, he went to sleep while on duty. c. Emmons slept for approximately twenty to thirty minutes, and his vehicle, Vehicle #11C, was idling with the air conditioner on throughout this time. d. While Emmons slept, an ECUA employee photographed him. e. This was not the first time Emmons had slept while on duty; instead, in the Summer of 2011 Emmons was observed sleeping in his ECUA-assigned vehicle by another ECUA employee. f. Furthermore, within the past twelve months Emmons was observed by ECUA employees reclined with his eyes closed for an extended period of time on two other occasions during the past twelve months. g. Additionally, in 2010 a photograph of Emmons apparently sleeping on duty was brought to one of his superiors’ attention. In this instance, Emmons was cautioned that it was completely unacceptable for a supervisor to be sleeping anywhere 3 at any time while on duty and that if this were to happen again disciplinary action would be imposed. h. ECUA issued a written notice of predetermination hearing to Emmons on August 21, 2012 regarding contemplated disciplinary action for violations of Section B-13A(4), [Conduct Unbecoming an ECUA Employee], Section B-13A(18) [Loafing], Section B-13A(21) [Neglect of Duty], Section B-13A(25) [Sleeping on Duty], and Section B-13A(33) [Violation of ECUA rules or policies] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. i. Section B-37(A) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual additionally provides that ECUA employees shall avoid unnecessary vehicle idling and prohibits allowing a vehicle to idle solely to operate the air conditioner for the comfort of the vehicle’s occupants. j.._ Emmons knew of the above-referenced provisions of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual by virtue of the fact that he had received it, as well as the fact that the substantive provisions of it applicable to his sleeping on duty had been previously discussed with at least one of his superiors. k. Upon proper notice a predetermination hearing was held on August 24, 2012, and thereafter a written notice of disciplinary action was issued to Emmons on August 27, 2012 notifying him that his conduct violated Sections B-13A(4), (18), (21), (25), and (33) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. 8. The hearing was closed at approximately 10:27 a.m. 9. Based upon a review of the record, the evidence shows that Emmons’ conduct was violative of Sections B-13A(4) [conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee], 4 Section B-13A(8) [loafing], Section B-13A(21) [neglect of duty], Section B-13A(25) (sleeping while on duty], Section B-13A(33) [violation of ECUA rules or policies], and Section B-37 [vehicle and equipment idle reduction] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 5, 6). The evidence further shows that you were aware of these provisions within the Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 7). 10. Two days later, on September 17, 2012, R. John Westberry, Esq., entered an appearance on behalf of Emmons and filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on his behalf. In neither of these filings was any justification proffered for Emmons’ having failed to appear at the scheduled evidentiary hearing. Additionally, good cause was not shown for Emmons’ attorney having failed to appear at the hearing (although it is unclear whether the attorney had been retained at that time). 1. Nevertheless, on October 18, 2012 the ALJ rendered an Order Closing File ostensibly dismissing the matter.

Conclusions Petitioner, Emerald Coast Utilities Authority (hereinafter either "ECUA" or “Petitioner”), terminated Respondent, Michael A. Emmons (hereinafter either "Emmons" or “Respondent”), from his employment with ECUA effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012. Emmons timely requested a hearing in order to appeal his termination, and his case was forwarded to Florida Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing and issue findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. After being properly noticed, a formal hearing was held in this cause on October 15, 2012 in Pensacola, Florida, before Diane Cleavinger, Administrative Law Judge with the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, which Emmons elected not to attend. . Three days later, on October 18, 2012, Judge Diane Cleavinger submitted an Order Closing File, which for reasons set forth below is deemed a Recommended Order. Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(10, Florida Statutes, the Parties had 15 days within which to submit written exceptions to the Recommended Order. That time-frame has expired, with only Petitioner’s having filed a submission. Emmons also filed no response to Petitioner’s exceptions. See Rule 28-106.217(3), Florida Administrative Code (affording a party 10 days from the filing of the other party’s exceptions to respond to those exceptions).

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.65 Florida Administrative Code (2) 28-106.21028-106.217
# 9
CHARLIE CRIST, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs PHILLIP M. FOX, 03-000917PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 17, 2003 Number: 03-000917PL Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2024
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer