Findings Of Fact Petitioner was initially employed as a non-degree teacher in Putnam County, Florida, beginning with the 1951-52 school year. During the 1952-53 school year, Petitioner attended the University of Florida where she obtained her degree. She then returned to the Putnam County school system for the school year beginning in 1953. Petitioner was a member of TRS from 1945 until her retirement in 1970, and seeks to purchase retirement credit for the 1952-53 school year in order to qualify for a 25-year pension. The issue to be determined is whether or not she was on an approved leave of absence in 1952-53, or whether she was merely reemployed in the Putnam County school system after completing her degree program. Petitioner was encouraged to obtain her degree by W.M. Thomas, who was then Superintendent of Putnam County Schools, and was advised by him that her absence would be considered an approved professional leave. Mr. Thomas subsequently corroborated this by letter. Additionally, a former school board member, Mr. Clyde Middleton, stated that Mrs. Carter was granted professional leave for this period. See Exhibit One. Mrs. Carter made no written request for the leave of absence nor do school board records reflect any consideration of this matter. However, the current superintendent has accepted Mrs. Carter's statement and those of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Middleton, and has certified approval of this leave to TRS. See Exhibit One. Respondent rejects this after-the-fact documentation and maintains that the only acceptable evidence of prior approval would be the school board minutes or other records reflecting official action by the board.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order authorizing Petitioner to purchase credit in the Florida Teachers' Retirement System for the 1952-53 school year. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Melcene L. Carter 401 Kersey Street Hazlehurst, Georgia 31539 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Department of Administration Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C--Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. McMullian, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT MELCENE L. CARTER, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 82-234 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner had a contractual obligation, which it breached, to employ Respondent during the 2009-2010 school year, and, if so, what damages should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact The following is a verbatim recital of the Joint Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties on June 8, 2012: Lurana Hillard (Respondent) was employed by the St. Lucie County School District (Petitioner) as a Program Specialist for School Psychology and School Psychologists beginning in the 2005/2006 school year. Respondent was a participant in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") and its Deferred Retirement Option Program (hereinafter "DROP"). Respondent's initial 60-month period of DROP was from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2007. In January 2007, Respondent signed a document requesting to extend her participation in DROP beyond the initial 60- month period. A true and correct copy of the Form is attached as Exhibit B.[1/] Barbara Casteen is the Director of Student Services and Respondent's supervisor. On January 12, 2007, Barbara Casteen sent Steve Valencia, Director of FTE/Position Control, an email with a copy to Respondent regarding DROP extension. A true and correct copy of that email is attached as Exhibit A.[2/] On January 16, 2007, DROP Extension forms [sic] prescribed by the Florida Retirement System were executed by Respondent and Steve Valencia. A true and correct copy of the Form is attached as Exhibit B. Mr. Valencia had the authority, as the Superintendent's designee, to execute the form advising that that the School Board stipulates that the Respondent was eligible to participate in DROP beyond the initial 60- months. On January 23, 2007, at a regularly scheduled School Board meeting, the Board approved the Personnel Agenda which included DROP extension for Respondent.[3/] Attached is a true and correct copy of the Personnel Agenda for the January 23, 2007 meeting and minutes from the same.[4/] The Board has taken no subsequent formal action regarding Respondent's DROP status. On May 26, 2009, Barbara Casteen sent Respondent a letter advising that she would not recommend her for reappointment for the 2009-2010 school year. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit C. On June 30, 2009, Respondent signed a Notification of Separation from Employment Form. A true and correct copy of that Form is attached as Exhibit D. On July 29, 2009, the School Board approved Respondent's retirement. A true and correct copy of a letter from Shelby Baker, Personnel Records Specialist and Employer Notification of Employment Termination are attached as Exhibit E. Respondent initially submitted a letter of resignation pursuant to the DROP statute dated June 30, 2007. Based on request to extend DROP, Respondent submitted another letter of resignation dated June 30, 2010 pursuant to the DROP statute. Respondent received from FRS a Revised Notification of DROP Extension Benefits which is attached as Exhibit F. Attached is a true and correct copy of the FRS DROP Termination Notification as Exhibit G. Apart from the documents referred to herein, Respondent was issued no documents by the St. Lucie County School Board reflecting her employment status during the period of her DROP extension. The body of the January 12, 2007, email from Ms. Casteen to Mr. Valencia attached to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts as Exhibit A (1/12/07 Email) read as follows: I am approving the DROP extension for Lurana Hillard for 3 years from 7/1/07 to 6/30/10. If you need any further information, please feel free to contact me. The "Form" attached to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts as Exhibit B is a completed Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Division) form--Form DP-EXT (05/05) (DROP Extension Form)--signed in January 2007, by Ms. Hillard and by Mr. Valencia, as the Superintendent's "designee".5/ On this completed and signed DROP Extension Form (Executed Extension Form or Form), Ms. Hillard indicated that her "DROP begin date" was July 1, 2002; that her "DROP termination and resignation date" was June 30, 2007; and that she was "requesting to extend [her] DROP participation through 6/30/10 with the approval of [her] employer." The "Employer Certification" section of the Form contained the following statement made to the Division by Mr. Valencia, as the Superintendent's designee: This is to certify that the St. Lucie County School Board (agency name) has rescinded the resignation of the above named member whose position meets the definition of an instructional position. The agency has approved a new termination date of 6/30/10. This agency stipulates that this member is eligible to participate in the DROP beyond 60 months and the member will continue working in a regularly established position as a School Psychologist.[6/]
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of St. Lucie County issue a Final Order declining to award Ms. Hillard the relief requested in her Petition. S DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2012.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ida L. Salz, began her employment as a classroom teacher in 1942 with the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri. The Central Institute for the Deaf is a private, non-profit agency and has been such ever since its beginning in 1914. Mrs. Salz worked for the institute as a classroom teacher for eight (8) years. She moved to Florida in 1954 and began employment with the public schools in January, 1955, at which time she also became a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. When she started her employment with the Dade County School System, she completed an enrollment application form which is required of all teachers in the public school systems of Florida. The purpose of the enrollment form was to identify the member, to provide beneficiary designation, to establish the beginning date of employment and the beginning date of membership in the Teachers' Retirement System. In 1966, she inquired of the (then) Teachers' Retirement System regarding her right to purchase credit for the eight (8) years of out-of-state teaching service from Missouri. She was informed shortly thereafter by the Teachers' Retirement System (Mr. B. M. Kelley) that she would be allowed to purchase eight (8) years of credit for hem Missouri teaching time. The Petitioner received a letter from Mr. B. M. Kelley employed by the Respondent, in September 2, 1966, stating that she could make periodic personal remittances to the Teachers' Retirement System in any amount she desired. She made periodic payments to the Teachers' Retirement System and on November 28, 1977, made the final payment of the amount due to the Teachers' Retirement System representing the eight (8) years prior service credit which she was purchasing. The Petitioner retired on June 15, 1981. She thereupon made application to the Respondent for retirement benefits. The Petitioner is sixty- four (64) years of age and has been a classroom teacher since 1942. The Petitioner's husband had previously retired on April 1, 1979,and is now sixty- seven (67) years old. The Petitioner's and her husband's retirement plans were based upon their belief that her retirement benefits would be computed based upon credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state Missouri service. The Petitioner would not have retired in July of 1981 had she not been in the belief, since 1966, that she would receive credit for her eight (8) years of out-of-state service. She relied on the Division of Retirement's representation in 1966 that she would have credit for those eight (8) years out-of-state service and had computed her expected retirement benefits and personal budget based on this information. Had the Petitioner known that after her retirement benefits resulting from the eight (8) years out-of-state service would be denied, she would not have retired, since the income so generated is insufficient to adequately support her and her husband. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's retirement application by the Division, the Bureau of Retirement Calculation reviewed the Petitioner's file for compliance with the statute and appropriate rules and regulations. It determined that the eight (8) years out-of-state service was not creditable because it was in a private school. The Respondent took the position that the so-called approval given the Petitioner in 1966 to purchase the service time related to her private school teaching was a "clerical error or a oversight" by the division. In a letter of August 3, 1981, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, Director of the division, advised the Petitioner that the out-of-state service had been erroneously allowed to her, that the contribution she had paid for it would be returned, and that she would not get retirement credit for those eight (8) years. The personnel of the Teachers' Retirement System (later the Division of Retirement) are unilaterally responsible for the investigation in 1966, which led to their determination at that time that the Petitioner was entitled to the eight (8) years out- of-state service. The Petitioner had no influence in making this determination, but has relied on it in making her retirement plans during the years from 1966 through 1981. Sometime after the Petitioner started employment in the Dade County School System, the Division of Retirements' sent a form. to the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis and, either personnel of that institute or of `a state agency of Missouri, completed the form and returned it to the Division of Retirement. The form certifies that the Petitioner was employed in the school, Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, from September 1, 1940 to June, 1948. The word in the form, "public", which appears before "schools" on the form was crossed out by either the Central Institute personnel or an employee of the Missouri State Government who completed the form. Thus, the Respondent's official who read the form and made the decision that the Petitioner was entitled to eight (8) years of out-of-state service was on notice that the out-of-state service was performed at a private institution rather than a public school. The parties stipulated that the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, is a private, non-profit school and not a public school and that their interpretation of the statute quoted below is that out-of-state service in private schools is not creditable. The Petitioner contends, however, that inasmuch as the Petitioner relied, from 1966 through 1981, upon the representation made to her in 1966 that she would be allowed credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state service and planned her retirement and budgeted her retirement income accordingly, that the State Division of Retirement is now estopped to deny her benefits based upon those eight (8) years out-of-state service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, the Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order finding that the Petitioner be allowed credit for her out-of-state teaching service, and recompute her retirement benefits from the date of her retirement, allowing her such credit. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William DuFresne, Esquire Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration The Carl ton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT IDA L. SALZ, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2487 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Petitioner retired under the provisions of the Florida Teacher Retirement System (TRS) on October 1, 1988. Prior to her retirement, Petitioner had been employed as an accounting instructor by Broward Community College (BCC). BCC is a tax-supported institution of higher learning in the State of Florida which participates in the Florida Retirement System. All instructional personnel at BCC are classified as "instructors". There is no job classification of "teacher" used by BCC. On December 14, 1988, Petitioner worked three hours as a substitute instructor at BCC and was paid $61.35. On March 17, 1989, Petitioner worked five hours as a substitute instructor at BCC and was paid $102.25. petitioner worked -as a substitute instructor at the request of personnel at BCC. Prior to agreeing to substitute on these two occasions, Petitioner had read and had relied on certain information provided by Respondent to retirees from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and from the Florida TRS. That information was contained in a pamphlet published October 1987 entitled "Florida Retirement System - After You Retire" and the 1988 Supplement to that publication. Petitioner was aware that retirees from the TRS could not receive both a salary from a participant in the FRS and retirement benefits from TRS. Petitioner was aware that the pamphlet published October 1987 discussed two exceptions that did not apply to her situation. Petitioner construed a third exception, discussed in the 1988 Supplement, as authorizing her to be1 reemployed as a substitute instructor at BCC without that reemployment interfering with her retirement benefits. The 1988 Supplement discussed the third exception as follows: A third exception to the reemployment law was provided by 1988 legislation. After being retired and "off the payroll" for one calendar month, FRS and TRS retirees may work for 780 hours of the first 12 months as an hourly teacher on a noncontractual basis. The language from the 1988 Supplement which discusses the third exception to the reemployment law provided by 1988 legislation and upon which Petitioner relied fails to advise the retiree that the exception is limited to teachers employed by district school systems. This failure lead to Petitioner's misunderstanding as to the scope of the exception. Following an audit, Respondent advised Petitioner by letter dated September 21, 1989, that she was not entitled to payments of retirement benefits for the months of December 1988, January 1989, and March 1989, because she had been reemployed by BCC during those months. Respondent demanded that Petitioner repay the sum of $3,270.41 that she had received for those three months. On November 15, 1989, Respondent advised Petitioner by letter that it had revised its determination and that only the months of December 1988 and March 1989 were in dispute. Respondent demanded reimbursement of the sum of $2,173.54, the amount of the retirement benefits paid to Petitioner for the months of December 1988 and March 1989. Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing to challenge Respondent's determinations in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which finds that Petitioner received overpayment of retirement benefits for December 14, 1988, and for March 17, 1989, due to her reemployment by Broward Community College and which requires her to repay the retirement benefits she received for December 14, 1988, and for March 17, 1989. DONE AND ENTERED this 12 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE 89-6853 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. end The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 5-7 are rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Nellie E. Dry, pro se 1501 South Ocean Drive, M804 Hollywood, Florida 33019 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Administration 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Shirley Hoefer Broward Community College 225 East Las Olas Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ben L. Bryan, Jr., has been a member of the Florida Bar since 1962 and has continually engaged in the private practice of law in Fort Pierce since 1965. His offices are located at 101 1/2 South Second Street, Fort Pierce, Florida. In January, 1971, Petitioner was retained by the St. Lucie County School Hoard to represent it in the capacity of school board attorney. He remained in that position until October, 1974. During that period of time he was a member in good standing of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and made the required contributions into the program. Bryan was credited with 3.83 years of service credit for that period. Since January 1, 1980, Petitioner has been retained by the St. Lucie County School Board as its attorney under a succession of written agreements which are substantially similar in form. He also re-enrolled as a participant in the FRS and began making the necessary contributions to the plan. On October 4, 1982, Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, advised Petitioner by letter that because he failed to comply with current FRS membership requirements, he was being removed from FRS membership effective January 1, 1980. The letter prompted the instant proceeding. Under the written agreements of employment, Petitioner is generally responsible for the handling of all legal matters of the school board. He devotes approximately thirty to forty hours per month to school board work while the remainder of his time is spent in his private law practice. A part of the school board work is performed at its administrative offices; however, the majority is done at Petitioner's law office. He is paid from a regular salaries and wage account. Either the superintendent or the board controls Petitioner's hours by assignment of the work to be done, including requests for advice, research and opinions. The board determines which cases will be settled, defended or appealed. Bryan is required to accept any case or matter assigned, and does not reject assignments. He is furnished the Education Law Reporter and other materials, including stationery and envelopes, by the school board. Additionally, dues are paid to various professional associations on his behalf. Bryan receives no pay for vacations, holidays or illnesses. He is, however, reimbursed for traveling expenses, and is covered by the school's health and life insurance and workers' compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Ben L. Bryan, Jr., be DENIED. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben L. Bryan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 3230 Fort Pierce, Florida 33454 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Fred D. Greene, began service with the Hamilton County School Board as a teacher in August, 1965. He was employed on annual contract for three school years until he was granted a continuing contract by the school board on July 23, 1968, as a teacher pursuant to Section 231.36, Florida Statutes. After the execution of the continuing contract, Petitioner was assigned as coordinator of vocational education during the 1969-1970 school term but in addition to those duties, continued to teach five classes. As Petitioner was assigned additional duties by the Superintendent, his teaching duties were reduced. Starting in 1970 and continuing through 1973, though the continuing contract as a teacher had not been rescinded, Petitioner and the school board entered into annual contracts of employment in which Petitioner was assigned as Director of Vocational Education. On June 5, 1973, the parties entered into a second continuing contract which described Petitioner's duties as "Director of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education." At no time did Petitioner ever hold a contract as "principal" nor was he ever paid as such. His current Florida Teacher's Certificate shows him certified in, among other things, secondary administration and supervision. Both this contract and the 1968 continuing contract contained a provision that the school board was authorized, upon recommendation of the superintendent of schools, to transfer and assign the Petitioner to a "similar position in any other school" in the district, provided that "the duties shall be similar to the duties originally assigned and the salary shall be as heretofore set forth." From the time he was appointed director of VTAE until January, 1981, Petitioner served in that capacity. As director of VTAE, he considered his position as similar to that of a principal in that he reported directly to the Superintendent of Schools, he supervised the teachers who taught within his program (although he did not rate them) he was paid on the non- instructional salary schedule as is a principal he was responsible for the procurement of and administration of students including their promotion and graduation. Nonetheless, he was not classified as a principal, he served schools throughout the county, the teachers in the program were recruited from regular day teachers and additional personnel who taught only in the night program, and these teachers were rated by their day principal when appropriate. Consequently, his position as Director, VTAE, was not similar to that of a principal. At the time he left the job as Director, VTAE, to assume the office of Superintendent of Schools, he was paid a salary of $21,000.00 per year for a 12 month term and was on step 6 of the non-instructional salary schedule. He has never released the school board from the terms of the continuing contract. In January, 1981, Petitioner took office as Superintendent of Schools. At that time the function of Director, VTAE, was assigned to Ms. Scaff who subsequently also occupied several other positions within the school board system including instructional coordinator, secondary curriculum coordinator, community education director, law education director, and management information systems director. Ms. Scaff did not assume all those functions at one time. The job was built up over a period of years and while the duties changed, the title of Director, VTAE, did not. Ms. Scaff was paid as an instructional director on the non-instructional salary schedule. As Director, VTAE, Ms. Scaff, and Mr. Greene before her, occupied one of the director positions reflected in the directory of the School Board. The School Board uses the same contract form for directors and principals and the director is evaluated by the Superintendent of Schools as is a principal, but there are few other similarities between the function of principal and Director. Petitioner served as Superintendent of Schools from 1981 until November, 1984, when he was replaced as superintendent by Mr. Hinton. Several months before his term expired, in June, 1984, Petitioner recommended to the School Board that it appoint Ms. Scaff, who was at that time serving as, inter alia, Director, VTAE, to a two year contract in that position. This contract was approved by the School Board. Shortly after his defeat in the election, Petitioner allegedly told Mr. Hinton that he did not wish to displace anyone employed by the school system in order to enforce his return rights under the continuing contract he held. It was his position that he would accept a teaching position but at a salary level equivalent to that of an administrator until such time as an administrator's position within the system became open. At a special meeting of the School Board called by Petitioner on the last day of his term as superintendent, Mr. Greene nominated himself for the position as principal at NHE. This nomination, however, was tabled by the School Board upon advice of counsel so that an advisory opinion on it could be requested from the Florida Commission on Ethics. At this point it should be noted that though the position as Principal at NHE became vacant prior to Petitioner leaving his position as superintendent, he did not apply during the period that the·advertisement was open. The only person to do so was Harry Pennington who was subsequently placed in that position. When Mr. Hinton assumed the position of Superintendent of Schools, replacing Mr. Greene, he immediately assigned Petitioner to the position as teacher of business education. Mr. Greene accepted the assignment but requested that he be paid a salary equivalent to the 20th step on the salary schedule for the position of instructional director at a figure of $32,550.00 per year. The figure demanded by Petitioner was not paid, however. After conferring with the State Department of Education regarding the proposed salary for Petitioner, the School Board determined that since he held a continuing contract as a teacher, he would be employed at a salary based on the teacher position. He was given credit for four years of teaching service while serving as Superintendent of Schools which placed him at the 20 year service point. In addition, he was given credit for a master's degree and for teaching in his field of certification. His total salary, therefore, was set at $23,460.00 over a ten month term. Petitioner was not satisfied, especially since Mr. Pennington, who was serving as principal of NHE was receiving $28,100.00 per year based on a 12 month employment contract. On May 27, 1985 the school board rejected Mr. Greene's nomination of himself as principal at NHE. The board's rejection of Mr. Greene was based on the recommendation of Mr. Hinton who felt that Petitioner was not qualified for the position in that he did not hold certification in administration and supervision at the elementary level his contract was not for the position of principal he had no experience as principal or assistant principal he did not apply for the position when it was advertised and because counsel advised that filling the position based on self nomination might violate Florida law. Mr. Pennington on the other hand, was fully certified in administration and supervision for all grade levels involved at NHE. Other positions for which Respondent felt himself qualified came open during the 1984-1985 school year but he was not selected to fill any of them. Included in these were that of principal of Hamilton County High School and administrative assistant positions at both North Hamilton Elementary and South Hamilton Elementary. When Mr. Hinton took over as Superintendent of Schools, as a part of his management program and in an effort to correct what appeared to be a problem regarding the late payment of School Board obligations which existed when he took over, he recommended certain personnel changes including the creation of an office manager position. Mattie Fouraker, formerly the business education instructor at Hamilton High School, was appointed office manager to the School Board at a salary approximately equivalent to that she received as a teacher. It is to her vacant job as teacher of business education that Mr. Greene was assigned. Petitioner contends Ms. Fouraker was appointed to the position before it was ever officially created and approved by the School Board. Be that as it may, however, it becomes clear that the Superintendent of Schools intended that a problem be solved and to do so, created a position designed to correct it. He appointed Ms. Fouraker to the job on a temporary basis and as soon as the School Board met at the next scheduled meeting in December, 1984, it approved the position and confirmed Ms. Fouraker's assignment to it. This formal board action, however, served to increase her pay from that of a teacher at $23,460.00 per year to that of an administrative position at $29,700.00 per year and her position was changed from that of a 10 month to a 12 month employment, along with the benefits accruing thereto. Petitioner's salary as business education instructor was developed through a tailored formula developed with an intent to,-in the opinion of Mr. Hinton, put Mr. Greene in approximately the same position for the four years he was Superintendent of Schools. As was stated previously, Mr. Greene was given credit for his 16 years in the classroom plus his years of superintendent for a total of 20 years experience credit. Added to that was credit for a Master's degree and credit for teaching in his field of certification. When the $23,460.00 salary that was arrived at for this was compared to what it was anticipated he would have earned had he stayed as Director of VTAE, it was seen that had he remained in his position on the same salary schedule, he would have presumably earned $2,362.50 per month ($23,625.00 per 10 month school year) as an instructional director, Step 6. This is approximately $155.00 more over the school year. Had Petitioner been paid at the salary of an instructional support position, Step 6, the monthly salary would be slightly lower. It should be noted, however, that due to schedule changes during the period, this might not be a valid comparison. Positions within the school system are assigned by the Superintendent of schools on the nature of the position. Non- instructional personnel are assigned categories on the salary schedule based on an assessment of their qualifications and value to the system. Teachers, on the other hand, who are generally serving under contracts, are placed on the salary schedule consistent with the number of years experience they have plus certain other additions. It was Mr. Hinton's position that Mr. Greene should be paid as a teacher since he was serving as a teacher and once that decision was made, Mr. Greene was paid the highest amount that a person with his certificate and his experience and qualification could earn in that position. When the Florida Commission on Ethics issued its opinion on the question certified to it regarding Petitioner's recommending himself for the position of Principal of NHE, the opinion indicated the Commission could not conceive of how the Petitioner's actions in recommending himself for a position could not have constituted a misuse of public position. In other words, while not saying that it was, the Commission concluded that it probably was a violation. Thereafter, the School Board requested an Attorney General's opinion on whether a school superintendent may nominate himself for appointment of a principal. The opinion was not received as of the date of the hearing. Turning again to the issue of the function of Director of VTAE, the School Board contends that the function of Director has steadily expanded in scope. For example, Mr. Hinton urges that the work that Mr. Greene was doing as Director, VTAE prior to being elected superintendent now constitutes only 10 to 20% of the currently described duties of the position. The additional functions that Ms. Scaff performs, as described above, he contends, constitute more by far than that which Petitioner did when he held the job. In support of that position, Mr. Hinton refers to the organization and management study conducted in 1983 at the request of Petitioner when he was Superintendent of Schools. Among the pertinent recommendations of that study was the restructuring of the organization within the school district level. The position of Director, VTAE was not one of the three Director and five coordinator positions recommended by the study. Ms. Scaff indicates that when Petitioner was defeated in his bid for re-election as superintendent of schools, she indicated her willingness to step down from the position of Director, VTAE and return to classroom teaching. She does not consider the return to a position of teaching as a demotion nor does Ms. Fouraker. It should be noted, however, that both individuals received substantial increases in salary by virtue of their position changes under the Hinton administration. For example, Ms. Fouraker's promotion to the position of office manager carried a pay increase from $23,460.00 to $29,700.00 per year. Ms. Scaff now earns the same. Mr. Greene was at Step 6 on the non-instructional scale when he left the job of Director, VTAE. These scales were modified in the intervening years, and Ms. Fouraker traced Mr. Greene's position as Director, VTAE, to the new scale as if he had stayed in place. She placed him at Step 6 on the new scale at a salary of $28,350.00. Petitioner contends that he should be treated the same as Mr. Coe, Director of Personnel, who realized a large salary and step increase when the pay scales were changed. If this were done, and he was given an instructional director's position at step 20 on the non- instructional salary schedule, his salary would be $32,500.00. Subtracting that $28,350.00 from the $32,550.00 he says he should be earning, Mr. Greene indicates that he lost approximately $4,958.87 for the period starting November 20, 1984, when he began teaching, to the end of the school year. He further contends that his salary loss is continuing at the rate of $757.50 per month and in addition, he is also being deprived of other benefits of employment such as paid annual leave, sick leave, enhanced retirement benefits, and other like perquisites attached to a 12 month contract. Mr. Greene further contends that since he was involved in litigation with the school board concerning Mr. Coe's contract prior to his leaving the position of Superintendent of Schools, the School Board should have known of his entitlements under the continuing contract since it was shown that it had been established for assignments and transfers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Fred D. Greene, be assigned a non-principal supervisor/director position within the Hamilton County Schools as available that he be paid accordingly when performing in such a position but that he be denied adjustment for back pay and attorney's fees and costs. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Carlson, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Girtman 1030 East Lafayette, Suite 112 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Paul Hendrick, Esquire 111 South Central Avenue Suite 1 Jasper, FL 32052 Owen Hinton, Jr. Superintendent Hamilton County School Board P. O. Box 1059 Jasper, FL 32052 Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 APPENDIX Ruling by the Hearing Officer as to the Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact: Paragraphs Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted* Accepted* Accepted* Accepted Accepted except as to the veracity of the reported comment of the School Board member Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted except as to comments of Ms. Scaff as to her being a principal and signing forms as such Accepted except for Petitioner's comment that he would receive temporary certificate for Elementary Ed principal and would obtain certification in grades K-6 without much problem Accepted Accepted Rejected as irrelevant Irrelevant as a finding of fact should be conclusion of law Accepted Accepted except as to last sentence which is irrelevant unnumbered between and 23 Rejected Rejected Rulings by the Hearing Officer as to Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact (Respondent failed to number paragraphs.) The unnumbered paragraphs are therefore treated in sequence and numbered herein for purposes of identification only. Paragraphs Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted as to substance Accepted Accepted Accepted except that acceptance of the position was not meant to be acquiesed in permanent assignment Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted as it relates to teacher salaries only Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted as to the request made. As of the hearing, the opinion had not been received. It was not offered into evidence and though attached to Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order, was not considered Accepted Accepted Accepted except for the conclusion drawn in the last sentence which was not supported by evidence admitted. Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected. Position was held by Ms. Scaff who performed the same duties performed by Petitioner when he was the encumbent, in addition to additional duties which he did not *Petitioner's terms describing the personnel changes are not necessarily dispositive of the issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bill A. Corbin, has been a member of the Florida Bar since October, 1972 and has continually engaged in the private practice of law in Blountstown since that time. His present office is located at 305 Fannin Street, Blountstown, Florida. On January 1, 1973, petitioner was retained by the Calhoun County Board of Commissioners to represent the county in the capacity of county attorney. He remained in that position until March 1, 1983, or a period of ten years. During that period of time he was a member in good standing of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and made the required contributions into the program. From April 1, 1980 until August 26, 1983, Corbin also served as county attorney for Liberty County. When he left the employ of Calhoun County on March 1, 1983, he reenrolled in the FRS effective the same date using his employment with Liberty County as a basis for the continued enrollment. After conducting an audit of petitioner's employment in early 1983, respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, advised petitioner by letter dated April 22, 1983 that because he failed to comply with current FRS membership requirements, he was being removed from FRS membership effective July 1, 1979. The effect of this action was to leave Corbin with approximately 6 1/2 years of creditable service with the FRS rather than almost 10 1/2 years. The proposed agency action triggered the instant proceeding. The position of county attorney in Calhoun County was a regularly established position and has been for some 25 years. The same is true for the county attorney slot in Liberty County. In Calhoun County, Corbin was paid on a monthly basis and had the normal deductions made from his salary. He received the same annual percentage increase in salary as did other county employees. He was also covered under the County's errors and omissions policy, and was eligible for workers' compensation coverage. According to a Calhoun County Commissioner, Corbin received annual and sick leave of one day per month while serving as county attorney. However, unlike other county employees, he was not compensated for unused leave when he terminated employment, and did not have to fill out leave slips as do other employees when taking leave. He also was given stationery, use of a reproduction machine, and clerical help from the county clerk's office when necessary. Corbin's initial employment with Calhoun County was based upon an oral agreement between he and the commissioners. This agreement was later reduced to writing in 1979 in order to comply with concerns expressed by the county's outside auditors. The standard employment contract specified a set fee per month for Corbin to attend regular Board meetings, advise them on legal matters concerning County business, and to prepare resolutions, correspondence and ordinances. Additional services concerning litigation were rendered on either a contingent fee basis or an hourly rate basis. These sums were paid from monies set aside each year by the County for legal services not covered by Corbin's monthly salary. No deductions were taken from payments made to Corbin for these additional services. The contract also provided that either party could terminate the same upon giving thirty days' notice. A similar agreement was executed by Corbin for his employment with Liberty County except that the agreement called for compensation at a rate of $40 per hour. Corbin's normal duties generally included attending two regular board meetings each month which lasted from two to twelve hours each, attending special meetings, handling correspondence, keeping minutes of each meeting, and being on call for requests for advice from Board members. In all, petitioner estimated he spent approximately 30 hours per month on Calhoun County business. Although some of the county work was performed in the courthouse where the boards met, most of it was done in Corbin's law office since he was not provided an office by either county. The members of the Board control petitioner's hours by assignment of the work to be done, including requests for advice, research and opinions, and litigation. The Board determines which cases will be settled, defended or appealed. Corbin is required to accept any case or matter assigned, and does not reject assignments. However, the Boards do not control the day to day methods by which petitioner litigates cases and performs legal judgments. Petitioner does not supervise any employees employed by the County nor does he supervise or direct the activities of any full time or part time assistant county attorneys or legal secretaries. The rule which makes petitioner ineligible for membership in the FRS is Rule 22B-1.04, Florida Administrative Code, which became effective on July 1, 1979. After the rule was adopted, respondent sent a memorandum to all local agencies, including Calhoun and Liberty Counties, requesting that they review those employees that might fall within the "professional" status in order to determine their eligibility under the newly adopted rule. A copy of the rule was also sent to each local agency. The agencies were then required to transmit information on each such employee to the respondent. Thereafter, it began the lengthy process of auditing all reporting units, including the two counties in question. Because respondent is now reviewing over 700 reporting units, the audit process is time-consuming, and has resulted in lengthy delays in removing ineligible employees from FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Bill A. Corbin to remain in the Florida Retirement System from July 1, 1979 through August 26, 1983 be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1984.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Verna M. Johnson, terminated all employment with a Florida Retirement System employer, or employers, as defined in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes, when she concluded or terminated her "DROP" participation and therefore whether she actually, finally retired.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School Board in 1998 and 1999 and prior to that time. She was a regular class member of the FRS who begin participating in the DROP program on August 1, 1998. Thereafter, on July 9, 1999, the Petitioner terminated her employment with Alachua County Schools to begin receiving her DROP accumulation and her monthly FRS retirement benefits. The Petitioner and her husband had founded the Caring and Sharing Learning School (Charter School) back on January 28, 1998, while the Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School District and had not yet retired or entered the DROP program. She was a full-time FRS employee with the Alachua County School system. The Charter School was not then an FRS employer, nor were retirement contributions made on the Petitioner's behalf by the Charter School. She worked most of the ensuing year after entering the DROP program, and on June 9, 1999, ended her employment relationship by exercising her resignation from the Alachua County School District employment, at which point she began receiving FRS benefits and her DROP accumulation. Thereafter, on July 16, 1999, the Director of State Retirement for the FRS, and the Charter School, entered into an agreement for admission of the Charter School to the FRS as an FRS employer. It had not been an FRS-enrolled employer before July 16, 1999, slightly over a month after the Petitioner had terminated her employment with the school district and began receiving her DROP accumulation and retirement benefits. That agreement provided that the effective date of admission of the Charter School into the status of an FRS employer (with attendant compulsory FRS membership by all employees) was related back with an effective date of August 24, 1998. The record does not reflect the reason for this earlier effective date. The Petitioner continued to work as an administrator with the Charter School even through the date of hearing in 2005. The Division performed an external audit of the Charter School during the week of March 15, 2004. In the process of that audit the Division received some sort of verification from the school's accountant to the effect that the Petitioner was employed as an administrator and had been so employed since August 24, 1998. Because of this information, the Division requested that the Charter School and the Petitioner complete "employment relationship questionnaires." The Petitioner completed and submitted these forms to the Division. On both questionnaires she indicated that the income she receives from the school was reported by an IRS form W-2 and thus that the employer and employee-required contributions for employees had been made. She further indicated that she was covered by the school's workers' compensation policy. On both forms the Petitioner stated that her pay was "more of a stipend than salary." On the second form she added, however, "when it started, at this time it is salary." She testified that she was paid a regular percentage of her total income from the Charter School before her DROP termination and the stipend after. She added that she just wrote what she "thought they wanted to hear" (meaning on the forms). The check registers provided to the Division by the Petitioner also indicate "salary" payments for "administrators" in September 1999. It is also true that the Petitioner from the inception of the Charter School in January 1998, and was on the board of directors of the Charter School corporation. According to the Division, the Petitioner was provided at least "three written alerts" by the Division that she was required to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers for at least one calendar month after resignation, or her retirement would be deemed null and not to have occurred, requiring refund of any retirement benefits received, including DROP accumulations. The Division maintains that based on the material provided it by the Petitioner, that the Petitioner was an employee of the Charter School from August 24, 1998 (the date the "related-back agreement" entered into on July 16, 1999, purportedly took effect) through at least May 12, 2005. It is necessary that a member of the FRS earning retirement service credits, or after retirement or resignation, receiving retirement benefits have been an "employee," as that is defined in the authority cited below, in order for the various provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and related rules to apply to that person's status. This status is determinative of such things as retirement service credit contributions and benefits, including DROP benefits, entitlement, and accumulations and the disposition made of them. In any event, the Division determined that the Petitioner had been an employee of the Charter School, as referenced above, and took its agency action determining that the Petitioner failed to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers (that is she kept working for the Charter School) before and during the month after resignation from the Alachua County School Board and continuing through May 12, 2005, as an employee in the Division's view of things. Therefore, because she was still employed by an FRS employer during the calendar month of July 1999 (only because of the agreement entered into between the Charter School and the division director on July 16, 1999,) her retirement (which had ended her employment with the Alachua County School System) was deemed null and void. The Division thus has demanded that she refund all retirement benefits and DROP accumulations earned or accrued between the date of entry into DROP which was August 1, 1998, through approximately May 12, 2005. This apparently totals approximately $169,000.00.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, determining that the Petitioner's retirement was effective and lawful, that she was entitled to the retirement benefits accrued and paid from June 9, 1999, forward, including the DROP accumulations that accrued up from August 1, 1998, until that date. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Verna M. Johnson 3432 Northwest 52nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32605 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact The ultimate issue to be decided is whether the Petitioner is eligible to transfer from Florida Teacher Retirement Plan A to Florida Teacher Retirement Plan E and if so, whether he should be allowed to do so at this time. Robert L. Wonsick, the Petitioner, served as a classroom teacher in the Pinellas County School System for approximately 19 years. He resigned from his employment as a school teacher on approximately June 14, 1972 which resignation was accepted by his employer. At that time, Petitioner advised duly the employer through its agent, Jerry J. Switts, Director of Elementary Placement and Retirement, that he was unable to return too work the 72-73 school year due to illness; therefore he opted to, void his Florida Retirement System Transfer Ballot which would have been effective July 1, 1972, and requested disability retirement under the Teacher's Retirement System Plan. Petitioner was advised by Switt's to submit a written request for final decision on his application filed for disability retirement. As indicated by his petition filed on or about March 5, 1976, Petitioner takes the position that he should be entitled to transfer from Teachers Retirement System (hereinafter referred to as TRS) Plan A to TRS Plan E. Petitioner attempted to elect to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter sometimes referred to as FRS) in 1972, the effective date to be July 1, 1972. This was denied inasmuch as Petitioner had already resigned his employment and never worked under or contributed to FRS, since by his own testimony he resigned in August, 1972, on or about the second day of pre-school. Respondent therefore denied the application for transfer based on Section 121.051(2)(a) 3(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted his transfer ballot which was received by Respondent along with numerous other employees in 1972. By letter dated September 8, 1972, Petitioner requested that his transfer ballot be cancelled. Upon learning that Petitioner had in fact not worked after July 1, 1972, the transfer ballot was forwarded for reasons previously stated by way of "Application for Retirement Acknowledgement Form" dated September 11, 1972. Petitioner was requested to supply certain information to Respondent and by that same form was advised that he might wish to transfer from TRS Plan A to TRS Plan B. By letter dated December 12, 1972, Petitioner was supplied with estimates of retirement benefits showing that his monthly benefits under Plan A would be approximately $129.00 per month and the benefits under Plan E would be approximately $260.00 per month with the caveat that in order to effectuate the transfer to Plan E (an option open to him at that time) it would be necessary for him to pay in approximately $2,550 in contributions. Said contributions were necessary to meet the statutory contribution rates for Plan E if Petitioner desired to become a member of said plan. Section 238.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was also notified that he would have to remit $228.47 if he wished to receive retirement credit for a leave of absence utilized by him during school year 1970-1971. Within the next few days i.e., December 15, 1972, Petitioner indicated without question that he intended to remain a member of Plan A and remitted the requested $228.47 in required contributions to receive retirement credit for the above mentioned leave of absence. During a hiatus of a considerable period, adequate medical evidence was provided to Respondent to demonstrate Petitioner's disability and he began receiving monthly benefits under his monthly benefit i.e., Plan A. Thereafter on September 12, 1973, Petitioner inquired of Respondent concerning difference in benefits available under Plan A and Plan E, and possibility of changing from one plan to the other. Respondent answered Petitioner's inquiry by letter dated January 4, 1974, informing him of his previous choice to remain in Plan A. In addition, Respondent informed him that inasmuch as he had chosen not to remit the additional $2,550 necessary to transfer to Plan E in 1972, there were no provisions under the law allowing a change in retirement plans to be made after an employee had elected to retire under another plan. It should be noted that Petitioner had been advised in December of 1972 of all options available to him prior to the time of his retirement and his subsequent choice of Retirement Plan was unequivocally made by him. Again, on May 9, 1974, Petitioner requested that his claim be reevaluated whereupon Respondent replied by letter dated May 20, 1974, advising that Respondent had followed his (Petitioner's) written instructions and had taken the action permitting him to retire under plan A per his request. He was again reminded of the status of the law which did not permit a change in retirement plans. He was reminded that assuming for the sake of argument that his account could be reopened and benefits be computed under the Florida Retirement System, it would be necessary for him too contribute more than $2,200.00 to his account which he had previously elected not to do when given the option. Accordingly, his request for reevaluation was denied by Respondent. Again, by letter dated June 5, 1974, Petitioner requested that he be credited with approximately $2,250.00 that he would have been eligible to receive had he retired under Plan E and requested that said amount be credited to his account in order to facilitate his transfer into Plan E. These requests were denied by Respondent by letter dated June 13, 1974. Thereafter, Petitioner wrote a series of letters to various state officials and agencies including federal agencies requesting reconsideration of Respondent's decision to decline his request to reevaluate his claim that he had not been afforded ample information to assist him in making an informed choice concerning his retirement benefits. Petitioner appeared and testified at the hearing and recalled the series of transactions entered into by him in transferring from the various plans. He testified that he was aware of the difference in benefits or that he became aware of the difference in benefits after he had made the decision to transfer from Plan E to Plan A. He voiced the opinion that he probably could not raise the additional $2,500.00 that would be required assuming that he was given the option of now transferring to Plan E. He indicated that he had received no public assistance and that his large family and the mental problems prevented him from making an intelligent choice at the time he made the election to retire under Plan A. During the hearing, he admitted that he had received full cooperation and assistance from Respondent but that it was his mental condition and other financial problems which hampered his ability to make an intelligent choice based on psychological problems, etc. Based on all the evidence presented in this case, it is clear that the Respondent afforded Petitioner all of the information requested and explained all the options available to him including the differences in the benefits of the various plans and his contributions for retirement in such plans. It is further clear that at each juncture, he was permitted to change his mind about enrolling in various plans when the change could be effectuated within the permissible guidelines under the law. With these facts in mind and inasmuch as there is no provisions in the law which permits a retiree from changing plans after his effective date of retirement, Petitioner's claim that he was wrongfully denied the opportunity to retire or to change his retirement plan to Plan E must fall as being unsubstantiated by the record evidence. I shall therefore recommend that his petition requesting permission to allow him to change from Plan A to Plan E be denied.
Recommendation Based on the above facts and conclusions of law, I recommend than the Petition filed herein requesting permission to retire from Plan A to Plan E be disallowed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Lawrence L. Black, Esquire 152 8th Avenue, Southwest Largo, Florida 33540 Robert L. Wonsick 6260 Second Avenue, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707
