Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ida L. Salz, began her employment as a classroom teacher in 1942 with the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri. The Central Institute for the Deaf is a private, non-profit agency and has been such ever since its beginning in 1914. Mrs. Salz worked for the institute as a classroom teacher for eight (8) years. She moved to Florida in 1954 and began employment with the public schools in January, 1955, at which time she also became a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. When she started her employment with the Dade County School System, she completed an enrollment application form which is required of all teachers in the public school systems of Florida. The purpose of the enrollment form was to identify the member, to provide beneficiary designation, to establish the beginning date of employment and the beginning date of membership in the Teachers' Retirement System. In 1966, she inquired of the (then) Teachers' Retirement System regarding her right to purchase credit for the eight (8) years of out-of-state teaching service from Missouri. She was informed shortly thereafter by the Teachers' Retirement System (Mr. B. M. Kelley) that she would be allowed to purchase eight (8) years of credit for hem Missouri teaching time. The Petitioner received a letter from Mr. B. M. Kelley employed by the Respondent, in September 2, 1966, stating that she could make periodic personal remittances to the Teachers' Retirement System in any amount she desired. She made periodic payments to the Teachers' Retirement System and on November 28, 1977, made the final payment of the amount due to the Teachers' Retirement System representing the eight (8) years prior service credit which she was purchasing. The Petitioner retired on June 15, 1981. She thereupon made application to the Respondent for retirement benefits. The Petitioner is sixty- four (64) years of age and has been a classroom teacher since 1942. The Petitioner's husband had previously retired on April 1, 1979,and is now sixty- seven (67) years old. The Petitioner's and her husband's retirement plans were based upon their belief that her retirement benefits would be computed based upon credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state Missouri service. The Petitioner would not have retired in July of 1981 had she not been in the belief, since 1966, that she would receive credit for her eight (8) years of out-of-state service. She relied on the Division of Retirement's representation in 1966 that she would have credit for those eight (8) years out-of-state service and had computed her expected retirement benefits and personal budget based on this information. Had the Petitioner known that after her retirement benefits resulting from the eight (8) years out-of-state service would be denied, she would not have retired, since the income so generated is insufficient to adequately support her and her husband. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's retirement application by the Division, the Bureau of Retirement Calculation reviewed the Petitioner's file for compliance with the statute and appropriate rules and regulations. It determined that the eight (8) years out-of-state service was not creditable because it was in a private school. The Respondent took the position that the so-called approval given the Petitioner in 1966 to purchase the service time related to her private school teaching was a "clerical error or a oversight" by the division. In a letter of August 3, 1981, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, Director of the division, advised the Petitioner that the out-of-state service had been erroneously allowed to her, that the contribution she had paid for it would be returned, and that she would not get retirement credit for those eight (8) years. The personnel of the Teachers' Retirement System (later the Division of Retirement) are unilaterally responsible for the investigation in 1966, which led to their determination at that time that the Petitioner was entitled to the eight (8) years out- of-state service. The Petitioner had no influence in making this determination, but has relied on it in making her retirement plans during the years from 1966 through 1981. Sometime after the Petitioner started employment in the Dade County School System, the Division of Retirements' sent a form. to the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis and, either personnel of that institute or of `a state agency of Missouri, completed the form and returned it to the Division of Retirement. The form certifies that the Petitioner was employed in the school, Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, from September 1, 1940 to June, 1948. The word in the form, "public", which appears before "schools" on the form was crossed out by either the Central Institute personnel or an employee of the Missouri State Government who completed the form. Thus, the Respondent's official who read the form and made the decision that the Petitioner was entitled to eight (8) years of out-of-state service was on notice that the out-of-state service was performed at a private institution rather than a public school. The parties stipulated that the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, is a private, non-profit school and not a public school and that their interpretation of the statute quoted below is that out-of-state service in private schools is not creditable. The Petitioner contends, however, that inasmuch as the Petitioner relied, from 1966 through 1981, upon the representation made to her in 1966 that she would be allowed credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state service and planned her retirement and budgeted her retirement income accordingly, that the State Division of Retirement is now estopped to deny her benefits based upon those eight (8) years out-of-state service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, the Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order finding that the Petitioner be allowed credit for her out-of-state teaching service, and recompute her retirement benefits from the date of her retirement, allowing her such credit. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William DuFresne, Esquire Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration The Carl ton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT IDA L. SALZ, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2487 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Verna M. Johnson, terminated all employment with a Florida Retirement System employer, or employers, as defined in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes, when she concluded or terminated her "DROP" participation and therefore whether she actually, finally retired.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School Board in 1998 and 1999 and prior to that time. She was a regular class member of the FRS who begin participating in the DROP program on August 1, 1998. Thereafter, on July 9, 1999, the Petitioner terminated her employment with Alachua County Schools to begin receiving her DROP accumulation and her monthly FRS retirement benefits. The Petitioner and her husband had founded the Caring and Sharing Learning School (Charter School) back on January 28, 1998, while the Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School District and had not yet retired or entered the DROP program. She was a full-time FRS employee with the Alachua County School system. The Charter School was not then an FRS employer, nor were retirement contributions made on the Petitioner's behalf by the Charter School. She worked most of the ensuing year after entering the DROP program, and on June 9, 1999, ended her employment relationship by exercising her resignation from the Alachua County School District employment, at which point she began receiving FRS benefits and her DROP accumulation. Thereafter, on July 16, 1999, the Director of State Retirement for the FRS, and the Charter School, entered into an agreement for admission of the Charter School to the FRS as an FRS employer. It had not been an FRS-enrolled employer before July 16, 1999, slightly over a month after the Petitioner had terminated her employment with the school district and began receiving her DROP accumulation and retirement benefits. That agreement provided that the effective date of admission of the Charter School into the status of an FRS employer (with attendant compulsory FRS membership by all employees) was related back with an effective date of August 24, 1998. The record does not reflect the reason for this earlier effective date. The Petitioner continued to work as an administrator with the Charter School even through the date of hearing in 2005. The Division performed an external audit of the Charter School during the week of March 15, 2004. In the process of that audit the Division received some sort of verification from the school's accountant to the effect that the Petitioner was employed as an administrator and had been so employed since August 24, 1998. Because of this information, the Division requested that the Charter School and the Petitioner complete "employment relationship questionnaires." The Petitioner completed and submitted these forms to the Division. On both questionnaires she indicated that the income she receives from the school was reported by an IRS form W-2 and thus that the employer and employee-required contributions for employees had been made. She further indicated that she was covered by the school's workers' compensation policy. On both forms the Petitioner stated that her pay was "more of a stipend than salary." On the second form she added, however, "when it started, at this time it is salary." She testified that she was paid a regular percentage of her total income from the Charter School before her DROP termination and the stipend after. She added that she just wrote what she "thought they wanted to hear" (meaning on the forms). The check registers provided to the Division by the Petitioner also indicate "salary" payments for "administrators" in September 1999. It is also true that the Petitioner from the inception of the Charter School in January 1998, and was on the board of directors of the Charter School corporation. According to the Division, the Petitioner was provided at least "three written alerts" by the Division that she was required to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers for at least one calendar month after resignation, or her retirement would be deemed null and not to have occurred, requiring refund of any retirement benefits received, including DROP accumulations. The Division maintains that based on the material provided it by the Petitioner, that the Petitioner was an employee of the Charter School from August 24, 1998 (the date the "related-back agreement" entered into on July 16, 1999, purportedly took effect) through at least May 12, 2005. It is necessary that a member of the FRS earning retirement service credits, or after retirement or resignation, receiving retirement benefits have been an "employee," as that is defined in the authority cited below, in order for the various provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and related rules to apply to that person's status. This status is determinative of such things as retirement service credit contributions and benefits, including DROP benefits, entitlement, and accumulations and the disposition made of them. In any event, the Division determined that the Petitioner had been an employee of the Charter School, as referenced above, and took its agency action determining that the Petitioner failed to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers (that is she kept working for the Charter School) before and during the month after resignation from the Alachua County School Board and continuing through May 12, 2005, as an employee in the Division's view of things. Therefore, because she was still employed by an FRS employer during the calendar month of July 1999 (only because of the agreement entered into between the Charter School and the division director on July 16, 1999,) her retirement (which had ended her employment with the Alachua County School System) was deemed null and void. The Division thus has demanded that she refund all retirement benefits and DROP accumulations earned or accrued between the date of entry into DROP which was August 1, 1998, through approximately May 12, 2005. This apparently totals approximately $169,000.00.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, determining that the Petitioner's retirement was effective and lawful, that she was entitled to the retirement benefits accrued and paid from June 9, 1999, forward, including the DROP accumulations that accrued up from August 1, 1998, until that date. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Verna M. Johnson 3432 Northwest 52nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32605 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Erin R. McGuire, is entitled to purchase retirement service credit for the 1980-1981 school year based upon the determination of whether she was on a properly authorized leave of absence for that school year or, conversely, had actually resigned for that year before returning as a full- time employee of the Bay County School System the following year.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a regular class member of the FRS, with some 28 years of service credit. Her entire FRS career has been with the Bay County School District. On October 8, 1980, the Petitioner resigned her employment with the Bay County School System to re-locate her residence to Alabama. She wanted to be closer to her family in Alabama and at the time did not intend to return to Bay County. She changed her mind, however, and on September 9, 1981, was re-hired by the Bay County School System. She has continued her employment with Bay County schools from that time until the present. The Petitioner maintains that she spoke to her school principal after tendering her resignation in 1980, and he persuaded her to rescind her resignation and instead take a leave of absence. No school board record of such a decision or denomination of her absence from employment as a leave of absence, was produced at hearing. The Petitioner did admit that when she left her employment with Bay County in 1980, she had no intention of ever returning at that point. She did, however, return for the following school year and has been employed by Bay County Schools ever since. When a member, such as the Petitioner, seeks to purchase a leave of absence from the FRS, they, and their employer, must verify the leave of absence on the FRS form FR That form is provided by the Division and must be executed by both the employer and the employee. The leave of absence must have been approved by the employer, the school board, either prior to or during the time period of the leave of absence, according to the rule cited herein. When Ms. McGuire submitted her form FR 28 to the school board, the board completed the form indicating that she had resigned on October 8, 1980 (not a leave of absence), and was re-hired as a "new hire" on September 9, 1981. It is also the case that the school board approved amending her record to show the time period in question as a leave of absence. That amendment of her record was approved by the school board on January 14, 2004, however, long after the time period of the purported leave of absence itself.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denying the Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit for the period October 1980 through September 1981. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Erin McGuire 1507 Rhode Island Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444
The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether St. Lucie County School Board (School Board) Rules 6.16 and 6.50*+ are invalid exercises in delegated legislative authority as defined by sections 120.52(8)(c), (d), and (e).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Jones is currently an employee of the St. Lucie County School Board, and has a professional service contract pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. Her status with the School Board is “suspended without pay,” for reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding. As a classroom teacher, Ms. Jones is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board of St. Lucie County and the Classroom Teachers Association. On June 13, 2017, the School Board suspended Ms. Jones without pay and on July 27, 2017, a Petition for Termination in Termination I was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing. At that point, while Ms. Jones remained an employee of the School Board, she received no pay and no benefits from the School District. She began to look for other employment to support herself and her family. Ms. Jones applied to and was offered a job to work as a music teacher by the Somerset Academy St. Lucie (Somerset). Somerset is a charter school in St. Lucie County sponsored by and located within the geographical bounds of the School District and the jurisdictional bounds of the School Board. Ms. Jones did not submit an application for leave and the School Board did not approve a request for leave of absence in order for Ms. Jones to work at Somerset. By letter dated August 28, 2017, Superintendent Gent notified Ms. Jones of his intent to recommended to the School Board that she be terminated for grounds in addition to the already-existing suspension, i.e., for violating the School Board’s Rules 6.16(1); 6.301(2), (3)(b)(i), (3)(b)(xix), and (3)(b)(xxix); and 6.50*+. That letter became the basis for the Termination II proceeding. The factual basis for pursuing the second termination proceeding was that Ms. Jones was working at Somerset without having applied for and received approval for a leave of absence from the School Board. The merits of the School Board’s allegations in this second proceeding are no longer relevant in terms of Ms. Jones’ employment with the School Board, as the School Board, through counsel, has represented that the School Board no longer intends to pursue the allegations in Termination II. The allegations are relevant and informative, however, in establishing the School Board’s interpretation of its rules and establishing Ms. Jones’ standing to challenge the validity of those rules. The evidence presented at hearing established that Ms. Jones has standing to bring this rule challenge. School Board rule 6.16 is entitled “Dual employment,” and provides as follows: No person may be employed to work in more than one position in the school system except upon the recommendation of the Superintendent and approval of the School Board. No employee shall accept other employment that might impair the independence of his or her judgment in the performance of his or her duties. Rule 6.16 lists as its statutory authority sections 1001.41, 1012.22, and 1012.33, Florida Statutes, and lists sections 1001.43 and 1012.22 as the laws implemented. No reference to authority granted by the Florida Constitution is identified. School Board Policy 6.50*+ is entitled “Leave of Absence,” and provides in pertinent part: Leave of absence. A leave of absence is permission granted by the School Board or allowed under its adopted policies for an employee to be absent from duty for a specified period of time with the right to return to employment upon the expiration of leave. Any absence of a member of the staff from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. Length of Leave and Pay. Generally, no leave or combination of leaves, except military leave or Workers’ Compensation Leave, will be granted for a period in excess of one year. Illness-in-line-of- duty leave may not be extended beyond the maximum medical improvement date or a maximum of two (2) years from the date of injury, whichever is the earliest date. Leave may be with or without pay as provided by law, regulations of the State Board, and these rules. For any absence that is without pay, the deduction for each day of absence shall be determined by dividing the annual salary by the number of days/hours for the employment period. Employment leave. A leave shall not be granted to any employee to accept other employment unless the leave is to accept employment at a charter school as provided in paragraph (5) below. Accepting employment while on a leave of absence cancels the leave automatically. The person on leave will be notified that he or she must return to work with the School Board immediately, resign or be terminated. The Superintendent shall develop procedures to implement leave provisions. Charter School Leave. An employee may be granted leave to accept employment at a charter school in St. Lucie County in accordance with the following provisions: Teachers. Teachers may apply for leave to work at a charter school. The School Board will not require resignation of teachers desiring to work at a charter school. Teachers granted such leave by the School Board are not required to be on a continuing or professional services contract and shall not be subject to the seven (7) continuous years’ service requirement. Should a teacher on leave elect to return to work at the District, the teacher shall return to the teacher’s former position or a comparable position for which the teacher is qualified. * * * Method to Request Leave. An application to request leave to accept employment in a charter school shall be submitted using the procedures specified in Policy 6.501(1). For ten month instructional personnel, an application to request leave to accept employment at a charter school shall be submitted to the principal at least forty-five (45) days prior to the first day of work for the school year . . . . Insurance and Retirement Benefits. It shall be the sole responsibility of the charter school site to provide insurance and retirement benefits to charter school employees . . . . * * * Notice of Intent to Return. Employees on charter school leave shall give the School Board written notice of their intent to return at least sixty (60) days prior to the beginning of the semester they wish to return. Requirement for Annual Renewal. Charter school leave must be renewed annually. It is the sole responsibility of the employee on leave to submit an annual written letter notice of leave to the Superintendent or designee, and a copy of the annual written letter notice of leave to the employee’s school principal or immediate supervisor, as applicable, on or before April 1 of each year if they wish to renew their charter school leave for the following school year. Employees who do not submit the required annual leave form on or before April 1st will be considered to have voluntarily terminated their employment, and will no longer be eligible for any benefits or other consideration under this leave policy. (Emphasis supplied.) 11. Rule 6.50*+ lists sections 1001.41, 1012.22, and 1012.33 as its statutory authority, and lists sections 1001.43, 1002.33(12)(e), 1012.22, 1012.61, 1012.63, and 1012.66 as the laws it implements. No reference to authority granted by the Florida Constitution is identified. Rule 6.50*+ provides that if a teacher working for the School Board wishes to work at a charter school within St. Lucie County, that teacher must apply for permission to do so. However, the definition of a leave of absence in the first paragraph of rule 6.50*+ specifically provides that a leave of absence allowed under the rule is for a specified period of time “with the right to return to employment upon the expiration of leave.” By its terms, the rule does not appear to encompass those employees whose status is “suspended without pay,” given that those employees who are suspended without pay do not necessarily have the right to return to employment upon expiration of leave. Rule 6.50*+ also provides that an application for charter school leave shall be provided to the teacher’s principal at least 45 days before the beginning of the school year. For teachers on suspension without pay or who are not assigned to a particular school, there is no principal to whom the application can be given. The rule does not specify an alternative. Instead, Mr. Clements stated that it would be up to Ms. Jones (and presumably, anyone in her circumstance) to ask where to submit an application for charter school leave. The School Board interprets rule 6.50*+ as applying to all employees, regardless of their status. Rule 6.50*+ does not indicate what criteria would be used for determining if an employee’s application for leave should be granted. Mr. Clements testified that the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. He also testified that had Ms. Jones applied for charter school leave, he would not have recommended that her request be approved, because as a teacher on unpaid suspension, she is not in good standing with the School District. Nothing in rule 6.50*+ alerts Ms. Jones, or any other teacher in her circumstances, that her suspension without pay would be a basis for disapproval of an application for charter school leave. Nothing in the rule alerts any applicant of the criteria to be considered for the grant or denial of a requested leave of absence. The consideration of a staff member’s current disciplinary status is not an unreasonable consideration for the Superintendent or for the School District. It is not, however, included in the rule as a basis for deciding whether a request for charter school leave should be approved or denied.
