Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is seeking attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code. This matter relates to the administrative proceeding in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 94-2941. Respondent, a state agency, initiated the underlying cases, ACHA Case Nos. 90-08689 and 90-08804. Respondent was more than a nominal party in these cases. The attorney's fees that Petitioner seeks are reasonable in amount. The statutory cap of $15,000.00 applies. Petitioner did not employ more than 25 full-time employees. His net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time Respondent initiated the underlying action. Respondent initiated state action against Leonard E. Masters, M.D. in his individual capacity. Respondent did not initiate state action against Petitioner's professional corporation, L. E. Masters, M.D., P.A. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and cost only if he was employed as a sole proprietor of a professional practice in 1993 when Respondent initiated the underlying action. Petitioner is a licensed physician who has practiced as a sole proprietor of a unincorporated professional association since 1961. For tax year 1993, Petitioner filed a Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Business, with his federal joint income tax return. As reflected in that return, Petitioner earned a substantial portion of his 1993 income as a sole proprietor of a professional practice. L. E. Masters, M.D., P.A., is an active professional corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida on December 17, 1992. However, there is no evidence that Petitioner earned any income or business profit as an employee of his professional corporation in 1993. The mere existence of this corporation does not preclude Petitioner from practicing medicine as a sole proprietor of an unincorporated professional association. During discovery, Respondent requested that Petitioner furnish the name and address of his alleged sole proprietorship of an unincorporated business from 1990 through the present. Petitioner answered this inquiry as follows: L. E. Masters, M.D., P.A. since 1961 North Beaches Family Practice 100 Royal Palm Drive Atlantic Beach, Florida Petitioner's professional corporation was not created until 1992. This answer is not persuasive evidence that Petitioner worked solely as an employee of his professional corporation in 1993. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that, at all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was a "small business party" as defined in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Prior to the Probable Cause Panel meeting of December 7, 1993, Respondent forwarded to the panel members the entire investigative file, including all applicable medical records, and the written opinions of experts Neville Marks, M.D., and Reynold Stein, M.D. Each Panel member received and reviewed the materials prior to the Probable Cause Panel meeting. Present at the December 7, 1993 Probable Cause Panel meeting were panel members Robert Katims, M.D., Chairman of the Panel, and Martin Fenwick, M.D. Also present were Allen Grossman, Assistant Attorney General and counsel for the Board of Medicine's Probable Cause Panel and Fred Whitson, Senior Attorney for the agency. Prior to the consideration of any cases, Mr. Grossman advised the panel members that any questions concerning the interpretation of the law or rules, or what the panel's duties were, should be directed to him. Mr. Grossman also advised the panel that questions about the facts of the case, or the agency's recommendation should be directed to Mr. Whitson. Mr. Whitson proceeded to discuss the specific facts of the case. He reviewed the medical history of the four alleged victims described in the proposed Administrative Complaint. The panel voted unanimously to find that probable cause existed to charge Petitioner with violating Section 458.331(l)(t), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the proposed Administrative Complaint. The panel documented its finding of probable cause in a memorandum signed by the Chairman of the Panel. During the probable cause proceeding, the panel considered the reports of two medical experts which support the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. One of those experts, like Petitioner, was a board certified family practice physician. The other was a psychiatrist. Both had experience in treating chemical dependency in adults. Both of Respondent's medical experts opined that Petitioner's treatment of four patients for chronic pain fell below the applicable standard of care. These opinions concluded that each patient had complicated medical, psychological, and/or chemical dependancy problems. The experts were especially critical of Petitioner's attempt to diagnose, treat, and manage the chronic pain of the patients with narcotic drugs but without the benefit of consultations with a psychiatrist or a chemical dependency specialist (addictionologist). Respondent was substantially justified in relying on the opinions of these experts, the patient's medical records and investigative reports to support the allegations in the Administrative Complaint even though they did not prove to be persuasive at hearing. After the formal hearing in the underlying case, the greater weight of the evidence indicated that Petitioner did not violate the applicable standard of care in his treatment of the four patients. This conclusion was reached after consideration of all the testimony and evidence presented at hearing. It did not mean that Respondent lacked a reasonable basis in law and fact for alleging that Petitioner violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes.
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department), is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility of regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Chapters 20, 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed in Florida as a Certified General Contractor, having been issued license number CG C018621, and authorized to engage in the practice of general contracting as an individual. At the time of the hearing, Respondent's license had been suspended. At no time material was Respondent licensed to practice contracting in Florida through Florida East Coast Properties, Inc. On or about November 13, 1995, Respondent, doing business as Florida East Coast Properties, entered into a contract with Kazimierz and Maria Charchut (the Charchuts) for construction of a single family residence to be located at 8 Farmsworth Drive, Palm Coast, Flagler County, Florida. The original contract price was $124,000. At the time of the signing of the contract, the Charchuts lived in Brooklyn, New York, and continue to reside there. The Respondent's license number does not appear on the contract. The Respondent's notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund does not appear on the contract. Between September 13 and November 28, 1995, the Charchuts paid Respondent a total of $44,000 of the contract price towards construction of the residence. This amount constituted more than 10% of the contract amount (10% of the contract amount would have been $12,400). A closing on the construction loan was scheduled for October of 1995. Respondent called Mr. Charchut a couple of days before the first scheduled closing telling him they could stop the closing so that they could get better interest rates. Between October 1995 and June of 1997, Respondent failed to appear at a total of three scheduled closings on the construction loan. The Charchuts wrote several letters and made several phone calls to Respondent expressing concern that the closing had not yet occurred although they had already paid him a substantial amount of money. The closing finally took place in October of 1997. Because of some change orders that were to be made to the house, including wooden floors and a longer driveway, the Charchuts paid an additional $14,813.75 at the closing bringing the total cost of the construction of the home to $138,813.75. Included on the Change Order form was an amount of $2,001.75 for water and sewer assessments, which comprised part of the $14,813.75 total additional moneys paid by the Charchuts. The closing agent testified that this closing was atypical, because the bank was concerned that Respondent held too much money in the construction project. She testified that the bank requires that builders have no more than ten percent deposit. Consequently, Respondent was required to reimburse the bank $16,786.25 of the Charchut's $44,000 deposit at the closing. This was accomplished by Respondent bringing a check to the closing in the amount of $25,000 and receiving a refund overage check from Flagler County Abstract Co., (written to Florida East Coast) in the amount of $8,213.75, resulting in Respondent paying a net amount of $16,786.25 at the closing. At the closing, the bank received a check from Flagler County Abstract Co. for $31,600 to put in the construction loan account. This amount was composed of the Charchut's payment of $14,813.75 plus Respondent's payment of $16,786.25. Mr. Charchut wrote to Respondent in March of 1998 expressing concern that the closing had taken place in October of 1997 but the construction of his home had not yet begun. Respondent replied to Mr. Charchut in a letter dated April 8, 1998, stating that he was sorry for the delay in beginning construction of the home and that he intended to begin construction the week of April 20, 1998. Respondent applied for the building permit on May 7, 1998. Respondent applied for water and sewer service on May 5, 1998. He began construction of the house in June or July of 1998. By the end of July 1998, Respondent finished the slab foundation and rough plumbing of the Charchut's home. Consequently, the mortgage company paid $14,769.40 out of the first draw payment on the construction loan to Respondent's company. Of that amount, $3,485.86 was for reimbursement for payment to subcontractors. In addition to the amounts paid to Respondent, the mortgage company paid Mastercraft Plumbing $1,894 and $5,656.60 to CRS Rinker Materials Corp. The total first draw was $22,320. After payment of the first draw in August of 1998, little if any work was done on the construction of the Charchut's home. After the initial work on the slab, Respondent stopped construction and told the Charchuts that he did not want to continue to build their home and was looking for another contractor to finish the house for them. After being told that Respondent did not want to work on the home, the Charchuts wrote to Respondent on October 5, 1998, notifying Respondent to stop doing further work on the property and asking him to notify the Building Department so a transfer of the construction permit to another builder could take place. The Charchuts subsequently engaged another contractor, Mr. V. M. Zarbo. Mr. Charchut testified that he paid approximately $160,000 for the house to be built, including the money paid to Respondent. Mr. Charchut testified that when Mr. Zarbo began his work, Palm Coast Utility asked him to pay the impact fee for water and sewer. Despite the Charchut's having paid Respondent $2,001.75 toward water and sewer assessments, Respondent's check for that amount made out to Palm Coast Utility Company was returned for insufficient funds. Consequently, the Charchuts had to pay $2,116.75 for this fee again through their subsequent general contractor, notwithstanding Respondent claiming that he had incurred this expense. When added together, the Charchuts paid Respondent a total of $51,650.50 for the work Respondent did on the house. The total is composed of the sum of $27,213.75 (the net Respondent retained on the original down payment), $14,769.40 paid to Respondent from the first draw, and $1,894 and $5,656.60 paid to Respondent's suppliers/subcontractors from the first draw. Additionally, the Charchuts paid $2,116.75 for payment of the utility impact fee that the Charchuts had to pay twice. The Charchuts asked their subsequent contractor to prepare an estimate of the cost of the work that Respondent performed on the home. His written estimate was for a total of $21,536.68. The Charchuts included that written estimate in a letter to Respondent dated November 16, 1998, asking for a refund of amounts they paid in excess of his costs. Roy Brand testified as an expert witness for Petitioner. Mr. Brand has been a certified commercial contractor for about 20 years. He reviewed the estimate of Respondent's expenses that was provided by the Charchut's subsequent contractor. It was Mr. Brand's opinion that the cost estimate was appropriate and, if anything, Respondent's expenses might have been less. Respondent testified that he spent more on some items that were listed in the estimate. Respondent, during the investigation leading up to this case, was given an opportunity to provide receipts to Petitioner's investigator of expenditures made to the house. The receipts supplied to Petitioner's investigator do not total an amount in excess of the estimate made by the Charchut's subsequent builder. Based upon Respondent's failure to provide receipts to prove that the estimate total was too low, Mr. Zarbo's good faith estimate of building expenses made after his inspection of the property, and testimony of Petitioner's expert witness as to the reasonableness of the estimate, the estimate of expenses for Respondent's work in the amount of $21,536.68 is accepted as appropriate. Thus, Respondent has failed to account for or return to the Charchuts $30,113.82, the difference between the amount paid by the Charchuts and the estimate of expenses.1 As of September 20, 2000, the Department's costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding legal costs, totaled $1,498.66. Previous disciplinary action At hearing, the Department offered proof that, on two prior occasions, Respondent had been subjected to disciplinary action by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the Board). The first occasion is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, (Final Order No. BPR-2000-01399) dated April 4, 2000, which found Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by making misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent representations to a client; Section 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes,2 by acting in the capacity of a contractor in a name other than as set forth on the issued certificate or registration; Section 489.129(1)(h)1, Florida Statutes, by committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer; Section 489.129(1)(l), Florida Statutes, by signing a statement with respect to a project or contract with false information; Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting; and Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes, by committing incompetency or misconduct in the practice of contracting and imposing the penalties of placing Respondent on probation for two (2) years and payment of an administrative fine, costs and restitution to a customer. The second occasion that Respondent was subjected to disciplinary action is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, (Final Order No. BPR-2000-01443) also dated April 4, 2000, which found that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, by acting in the capacity of a contractor under a certificate or registration other than in the name of the certificateholder; Section 489.129(1)(h)1 and 3, Florida Statutes, by committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer; Section 489.129(1)(l), Florida Statutes, by signing a statement with respect to a project or contract falsely indicating that payment had been made for all subcontracted work; Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting; and Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes, by committing incompetency or misconduct in the practice of contracting; and imposing the penalties of probation, payment of fines, costs and restitution. Respondent apparently did not satisfy the fines and costs imposed by the foregoing orders as Respondent's license was suspended on May 17, 2000, for non-payment of fines, costs or restitution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order adopting the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and which, as penalty for the violations found, imposes an administrative fine in the total sum of $11,250, revokes Respondent's license, orders that Respondent pay restitution to the Charchuts in the amount of $30,113.82, and assesses costs of investigation and prosecution (through September 20, 2000) in the total sum of $1,498.66 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Terry G. Jewell is the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, wherein Jewell engages in business as a real estate broker-salesman. His net worth is less than $2,000,000. In DOAH Case No. 87-2192, the Division filed an Administrative Complaint dated April 20, 1987, wherein the Division essentially alleged that Jewell was co-owner and agent for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of constructing homes; that Jewell, as vice- president and agent for Sun Country Homes, entered into a contract with the Koblinskis to build their house; that Sun Country Homes received approximately $74,900.00 to build the home; that Sun Country Homes did not pay certain materialmen and contractors; and that Jewell did not pay the outstanding liens. The Division sought revocation and other penalties against Jewell's license as a real estate broker-salesman, alleging that Jewell was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction. After hearing, a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on September 25, 1987, recommending dismissal of the Administrative Complaint. The recommendation was based on findings that Jewell's contacts with the Koblinskis were solely as an officer, co-owner and agent for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc.; that all sums paid by the Koblinskis were to Sun Country Homes and were deposited to its corporate account; that the president of Sun Country Homes mismanaged the corporate funds and did not pay some of the subcontractors on Koblinskis' home, that Jewell quit the corporation then he found out about this; that Jewell did all he could to assist the Koblinskis once he had resigned from the corporation; that the president of the corporation disappeared with the Koblinskis' money; and that Jewell did not benefit from the funds paid by the Koblinskis to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc. The recommendation was based on conclusions of law that the contract was between the Koblinskis and Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc.; that Jewell had no intent to deceive the Koblinskis; that it is well settled law that disciplinary action cannot be taken against a real estate broker's license for conduct not connected with the licensee's business as a broker; and that Jewell did not violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. The Final Order of the Division, through the Florida Real Estate Commission, adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation in the Recommended Order and dismissed the Administrative Complaint. The affidavit which initiated this action was filed on February 5, 1988, and was later supplemented by the Petition for Small Business Party's Attorney's Fees and Costs. The affidavit, which was an application for an award of fees and costs, was timely, having been filed within 60 days after the date on which Jewell became a prevailing small business party. In this case, the 60 days is calculated from the date on the Certificate of Service showing mailing of the Final Order to the parties. See Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes. According to the affidavit of William C. Andrews, and the statements of account attached thereto, Jewell incurred legal fees of $3,252.50 and costs of $957.21. These fees and costs are found to be reasonable since the Division has not filed a counter affidavit or response questioning their reasonableness. According to the Petition, the disciplinary action in DOAH Case No. 87- 2192 was substantially unjustified at the time it was initiated: because the Administrative Complaint was an attempted disciplinary action taken against Petitioner's real estate broker-salesman's license for conduct not connected with the licensee's business as a broker-salesman, and there was a complete absence of evidence to show any wrong doing on the part of the Petitioner.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate (Division), for the Florida Real Estate Commission, was the state agency responsible for the licensing of real estate professionals and the regulation of the real estate profession in Florida. Respondent was licensed as a real estate salesperson or broker in Florida. During pertinent portions of 1990, Respondent was licensed both as a real estate broker by the Division, and as a contractor by the Construction Industry Licensing Board of the State of Florida. During that period he handled numerous sales of real property for the United States Veterans Administration and received deposits of funds on those sales which he placed in his brokerage trust account with First Commercial Bank of Manatee County. At that time, the bank had a policy on availability of funds of seven business days for out-of- town checks and three business days for local checks. In January 1990, Respondent wrote five checks from his trust account, each in excess of $1,000.00. Three of these were to the VA for sales deposits, and two were to others. All five checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. Thereafter, on August 24, 1990, the Division filed an Administrative Complaint against the Respondent alleging the utterance of dishonored checks as misconduct. Respondent, at an informal hearing, admitted the utterance of the dishonored checks, and as a result, the Florida Real Estate Commission revoked his broker's license on October 16, 1990. Respondent's subsequent appeal of that action to the Second District Court of Appeal resulted in a per curiam denial of his petition for review. Sometime later, in 1991, Respondent appealed to the Commission for reinstatement. At a subsequent hearing before the Commission, an exculpatory letter of explanation from Respondent's accountant resulted in the Commission allowing Respondent to sit for the salesman's examination, as a result of which he was subsequently licensed as a salesman. Respondent was thereafter again licensed as a broker on December 6, 1993. In the interim, however, on June 4, 1992, Respondent's contractor's license was disciplined by the Construction Industry Licensing Board for misconduct involving his failure to properly supervise a construction project and allowing an unlicensed individual to do the work on a project for which he had pulled the permit. An informal hearing was held by the Board as a result of which it imposed an administrative fine of $2,000.00, and to assure the payment thereof, provided for suspension of Respondent's license if the fine was not paid within thirty days. Respondent admits he did not pay the fine. He contends he called the Board office to inquire what would happen were he not to pay the fine and was advised his license would be suspended. Since Respondent intended to cease working as a contractor anyway, he elected not to pay the fine and sent his license in to the Board. Respondent's contractor's license was suspended on July 22, 1992, though he claims he did not receive a copy of either the Board's Final Order or the notice of the suspension going into effect. Respondent had an obligation to pay the fine imposed as punishment for past misconduct. Voluntary relinquishment of his license, which he thought he could do without effect on him since he was getting out of the construction business, did not excuse his non-payment of the fine. On October 21, 1993, after Respondent's salesman's license had been reinstated, he applied for licensure as a broker, In his answer to the first part of question 13 on the application form, Respondent indicated he had had a license suspended. He noted thereon the prior case against his license by the Commission which dealt with the dishonored checks. He did not, however, list the action taken against his contractor's license. He listed the prior real estate case, he contends, upon the advice of someone in the Division office. He did not, at the time of his call to the Division indicate or inquire about the action taken by the Board on his contractor's license. He claims he did not list that action on the application form because the action taken by the Board was not based on fraud or dishonesty but merely a failure to supervise, and because he did not know his license had been suspended. He thought that voluntarily relinquishing his license ended the situation. Respondent claims he did not intend to conceal any misconduct or adverse action as he could not do so. It was a matter of public record, and he believed the information available to one regulatory board was available to all others that were under the Department. At some point thereafter, not further established, a complaint was filed with the Commission which resulted in the matter being referred to Mr. Pence for investigation. Mr. Pence assembled the documents relating to the allegation of concealment and sent a written notice of his inquiry to the Respondent. Upon receipt of that notice, Respondent telephoned Mr. Pence to discuss the matter. During the ensuing conversation, Pence asked Respondent if he was aware of his suspension by the Construction Board and claims Respondent indicated he was. Respondent allegedly indicated he was under the impression he had been fined by the Board and that the suspension was only to insure the fine was paid. Respondent further indicated that because of the depressed economy and because he was not much interested in keeping his contractor's license he had let it go. In evaluating the evidence presented, it must be noted that the interview between Pence and the Respondent took place about a year ago. Pence's investigative notes are no longer available and he testified from memory. It was evident that much of Mr. Pence's testimony was a reconstruction of how Mr. Pence, in retrospect, felt he would have handled the interview and what he feels sure he would have asked. Taken together, the evidence of record establishes that Respondent was disciplined by the Real Estate Commission for dishonored checks and his license revoked. Though, on the basis of his accountant's exculpatory letter, Respondent was allowed to be re-examined for a salesman's license, that evidence did not completely exonerate the Respondent. This is shown by the fact that the revocation of his broker's license was not reversed. He was merely allowed to reapply for licensure as a salesman. In addition, the accountant's letter does not explain or justify all the bad checks. In regard to the Construction Board's discipline, the evidence shows that Respondent pulled a permit and then allowed a non-licensed individual to do most of the work without proper supervision. Respondent contends that complaint was filed by his friend, the owner of the property, after the project in question was determined to be far more extensive than had been anticipated. The complaint, Respondent asserts, was not made because of any dissatisfaction arising out of his performance, but merely to preserve the owner's interest as to a possible insurance claim. That argument is not persuasive. The fact is that Respondent was disciplined because he had committed an act which authorized the imposition of discipline. His approach to the situation was cavalier, and that approach or attitude continues to raise a substantial question as to his fitness to have entrusted to him the money, property, transactions and rights of others.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED THAT the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Warren Up. Box, guilty of Misrepresentation and concealment in his application for a license as a real estate broker in Florida, and of having been twice guilty of misconduct which warrants suspension, and revoking his license as a real estate broker in this state. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional regulation Division of real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Terrence Matthews, Esquire 5190 26th Street West Bradenton, Florida 34207 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact On February 19, 1993, Respondent, AHCA, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 19, No. 7 at Page 859, a request for proposal "to provide identification and recoupment of medicaid overpayments to hospital vendors for the period prior to January 19, 1991." The RFP noted that all determinations or identification must be made and provided to the Department within sixty (60) days of the date of contract signing. The RFP provided that all proposals were to be provided no later than 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1993. In the RFP, the Department "reserved the right to reject any and all proposals." The RFP generated four (4) bids (proposals) of which Petitioner submitted one. Petitioner's proposal was discussed by AHCA who in turn consulted with the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida for an opinion. Petitioner's proposal was reviewed with Gary Clark, the Assistant Secretary for Medicaid, and Terry Flynn, an Assistant United States Attorney in Florida. Petitioner's proposal to AHCA proposed to the Department of Health Rehabilitative Services' medicaid unit that, for a forty percent (40 percent) finders' fee, they would identify and recover medicaid overpayments made to certain unnamed hospitals which had been stockpiling funds in the event that the overpayments were discovered by medicaid. Approximately 55 percent of Florida's medicaid funds comes from the federal government. Assistant Secretary Clark requested a written opinion from the United States Attorney from the Northern District (of Florida). By letter dated April 12, 1993, the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District formalized its opposition to such a contract for the following reasons: Title 31, U.S. States Code, Section 3730 allows for qui tam actions to be initiated by individuals. Should the federal government elect to pursue the qui tam action, the individuals who provide evidence to initiate the action can be awarded up to ten percent (10 percent) of proceeds recovered. (In recovery actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, damages can be assessed in the amount of triple the face amount of false claims). If the federal government does not elect to pursue the qui tam action, the individual may pursue the case on its own and can be awarded up to twenty percent (20 percent) of the proceeds. The U.S. Attorney's Office inquired of Petitioner the source of their knowledge of overpayments. They refused to disclose. The U.S. Attorney's Office officials questioned whether the proposers had any civil or criminal liability and whether they were knowing participants in obtaining medicaid overpayments for any such hospital. The U.S. Attorney opined that it would be inappropriate for AHCA to enter into such a proposal. The conclusion was buttressed by the fact that the State of Florida was without authority to bind the federal government with such agreement as it would not preclude a federal grand jury from subpoenaing necessary evidence and testimony nor would it preclude the U.S. Attorney's Office from prosecuting civil and criminal violations which might surface from information gleaned from the proposal. Based on the U.S. Attorney's Office opposition, as related to AHCA, and Respondent's inability to determine whether or not the proposers had any civil or criminal liability, either state or federal, AHCA made the decision to reject any and all bids submitted in response to the RFP. The notice of rejection of all bids by AHCA was served on all parties on April 19, 1993. That notice was also posted at the site of the bid letting. In addition to rejecting all proposals, the RFP was withdrawn and negotiations with all proposers were suspended. Throughout the RFP, which was prepared by Karen Kutrer, a planner for AHCA, AHCA reserved the right to reject any and all proposals. Some of these reservations are set forth on pages 10, 11 and 23 of the RFP. Subsequent to the rejection of all bids by AHCA, the U.S. Attorney's Office advised AHCA that it was no longer opposing such a contract although it was still uncertain whether the proposers had "clean hands." AHCA further discussed the matter with its staff but decided that it would no longer initiate proposals pursuant to the subject RFP and declined to negotiate further with the proposers based on its determination that it was not in the agency's best interest to enter into such an agreement with proposers like Petitioner. This was done since it could not grant any immunity from prosecution in the event that the proposals provided the source for civil or criminal prosecution. AHCA also determined that the Petitioner had other alternatives, i.e., they could initiate qui tam actions on their own.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent (AHCA) enter a Final Order rejecting Petitioner's bid protest filed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger Maas, Esquire Senior Attorney 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 271 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard K. Slavin Project Director 1400 Miami Gardens Drive, #210 North Miami Beach, Florida 33179 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rodney G. Green and Charter Realty, Inc. (petitioners) are both small business parties within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984). This is not disputed by respondent. They are licensed real estate brokers actively engaged in the real estate business in Oveido, Florida. On February 1, 1985 respondent, Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate (Division), filed an administrative complaint against petitioners alleging that they had violated certain provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in connection with a real estate transaction that occurred in 1984. After hearing a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on July 3, 1985 dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The Recommended Order was adopted as a Final Order by the Division on August 20, 1985. There is no judicial review of that order. By adopting the Recommended Order, respondent's Final Order sustains petitioners' position that no impropriety or unlawful conduct occurred. The petition for attorney's fees and costs was filed on October 7, 1985 and is therefore timely. With leave of the undersigned an amended petition was later filed on October 25, 1985. Respondent filed its response on November 15, 1985. To defend against the Division's action, petitioners engaged the services of an attorney. According to an affidavit attached to the amended petition; petitioners have incurred $399.50 in costs and $2,287.50 in legal fees. These costs are found to be reasonable since respondent has not filed a counter-affidavit questioning their reasonableness. According to petitioners' affidavit, the disciplinary action in Case NO. 85-0735 was substantially unjustified because of the following reasons: The actions of the state agency in bringing this proceeding and prosecuting it through formal hearing were not substantially justi- fied and under the circumstances it would be just to award attorney's fees and costs to Respondents pursuant to Subsection 57.111, Florida Statutes. Respondent's affidavit responds in the following manner: The Petitioner acted within the scope of its judicatory responsibilities as prescribed in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, when it initiated and advocated that administrative disciplinary action be taken against the licensees of Respondent's Rodney G. Green and Charter Realty, Inc. In accordance with the pre-existing statutory and regulatory re- quirements, petitioner's actions in this matter conformed to and were consistent with the aforementioned delegated authority. At all times relevant, the Petitioner's acts were "substantially justified" in that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact that the Respondents had violated Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The administrative complaint in Case NO. 85-0735 generally alleged that petitioners had solicited and obtained a sales contract from certain prospective purchasers of property, that the purchasers had given respondents a $20,000.00 cash deposit to be held in escrow, and that when the transaction did not close petitioners failed to return the deposit to the purchasers until they complained to the Division. The complaint also charges petitioners with having failed to properly place the deposit in their escrow account, and with having failed to notify the Division when conflicting demands for the deposit were made. In an attempt to substantiate the charges, the agency presented the testimony of the principal purchaser and offered into evidence certain documentation concerning the transaction. The charges were ultimately determined to be without merit, and the complaint was dismissed.
