The Issue Whether Sandra Ann Lindstrom (“Ms. Lindstrom” or “Respondent”), a licensed physician assistant, prescribed Lorcet, a medication containing a controlled substance (hydrocodone), in violation of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed at the Department of Health in DOH Case No. 2006-36542 on October 27, 2014. If so, what is the appropriate discipline?
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department of Health is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of physician assistants in the State of Florida. The regulation is pursuant to both chapter 456 (“Health Professions and Occupations, General Provisions”) and chapter 458 (“Medical Practice”), Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed as a physician assistant by the Board of Medicine. Her license number is PA 9103823. The license was effective on August 3, 2006, with an expiration date of March 31, 2008. Her license has been continuously renewed since its effective date. See Pet’r’s Ex. A. Ms. Lindstrom is not licensed to practice medicine as a physician. Id. Physician Assistants Physician assistants are governed by section 458.347, a section within the chapter of the Florida Statutes that governs Medical Practice. Physician assistant licensure is provided for in section 458.347(7), and the Board of Medicine is authorized to “impose any of the penalties authorized under ss. 456.072 and 458.331(2) upon a physician assistant if the physician assistant or the supervising physician has been found guilty of or is being investigated for any act that constitutes a violation of this chapter [Ch. 458] or chapter 456.” § 456.347(7)(g), Fla. Stat. A physician assistant’s supervisory physician may delegate authority to conduct aspects of medical practice to a physician assistant under circumstances expressed in the statutes. The limited medical practice that may be delegated to a physician assistant includes certain practices at county health departments. Whether conducting the delegated practice of medicine at a county health department, or not, physician assistants may be delegated authority to prescribe medications provided they are not listed on a formulary created pursuant to section 458.347(7)(f). See § 458.347(7)(d) and (e), Fla. Stat. The formulary must include “controlled substances as defined in chapter 893.” § 458.347(7)(f)1., Fla. Stat. In sum, physicians may not delegate to physician assistants the prescription of medications which are controlled substances as defined in chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The Department’s Investigative Office The Department has an investigative office charged with looking into regulatory complaints. In a typical regulatory investigation, the investigator discloses his identity to any party interviewed, whether the party is the source of the complaint, a witness, or, if amenable to an interview, the licensee who is the subject of the complaint. Aside from interviews, the investigations include record reviews, the obtaining of evidence, and the preparation of an investigative report. In addition to investigating complaints of regulatory violations by licensed health care practitioners, the investigative office looks into cases of unauthorized practice by unlicensed individuals. Investigations of unlicensed activity are conducted by what is known as the “ULA” section of the office. Commonly, ULA investigations are done by investigators who are “undercover,” that is, the investigators hide their identity as investigators and use pseudonyms rather than their actual names. Typically, undercover ULA investigators present at the offices of the subjects of investigation. If the unlicensed subject of the investigation offers to perform services that require a license or engages in practice that requires a license, the Department pursues remedies, including an order that the subject cease and desist from the unlawful, unlicensed activity. Investigations of a licensee for practicing outside the scope of the licensed activity may be viewed as something of a hybrid of a typical regulatory investigation and a ULA investigation. It is regulatory since the subject is a licensee, but it is usually done undercover in the same manner in which a ULA investigation is conducted. One such investigation was conducted by Ryan Heal, an employee of the Department between August and December of 2006. Mr. Heal conducted the investigation undercover using a pseudonym referred to in Department documents as “RJ.” RJ and the 2006 Investigation of JHS Mr. Heal has been a medical malpractice investigator for the Department since November 2000. During the course of his more than 15 years as a Department investigator, Mr. Heal has investigated both regulatory violations and unauthorized practice violations. In 2006, allegations reached the Department that prescriptions were being written at Jacksonville Health Systems (“JHS”), a clinic located on Baymeadows Road in Jacksonville, Florida, by a physician assistant without the supervision of a physician. In response, the Department launched an investigation. The investigation was conducted undercover by Mr. Heal using his pseudonym RJ. Commenced in August of 2006, the investigation lasted until the following December. August 10, 2006 On August 10, 2006, Mr. Heal, using his fictitious name, presented at JHS. A woman behind the counter in the reception area accepted a cash payment for the visit. She took RJ’s blood pressure and requested the name of the pharmacy for any medicine prescribed. To the best of Mr. Heal’s recollection, the receptionist recorded some of the information. After the interaction with staff in the reception room, Mr. Heal took a seat and waited to be called back to the examination room. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Lindstrom emerged and asked for RJ. Mr. Heal “stood up and went over to her.” Hr’g Tr. 19. Ms. Lindstrom identified herself by her first name and said, “I’m the provider here.” Id. Ms. Lindstrom accompanied Mr. Heal to the examination room where only she and Mr. Heal were present. After Mr. Heal complained of back pain, Ms. Lindstrom asked where in his back the pain was located and what caused it, but she did not conduct a physical examination. As Mr. Heal testified at hearing, “[t]here was no examination. She never touched my back. Never took vitals or anything.” Hr’g Tr. 20. Ms. Lindstrom suggested that Mr. Heal use a chair with lumbar support, try stretching, lose weight, and have an MRI. Ms. Lindstrom then stated that she would prescribe medication to treat the pain: Lorcet, Flexeril, and Motrin. With the visit in the examination room concluded, Ms. Lindstrom took Mr. Heal back to the receptionist. The meeting in the examination room and his first visit to the JHS offices being over, Mr. Heal departed the JHS facility. He did not return until the following October. October 31, 2006 Mr. Heal returned to the JHS facility on October 31, 2006. The process during the second visit was similar to the one followed during the visit the previous August. He presented as “RJ.” A staff member took his blood pressure in the reception area and he paid her $90 in cash. Mr. Heal sat down and waited to be called. Again, Ms. Lindstrom appeared in the reception area and took him to the examination room in the back. The visit was shorter than it had been in August. Ms. Lindstrom asked if his pain had improved and if an MRI had been done. With the intention of calling in his prescriptions, Ms. Lindstrom showed Mr. Heal a list of five pharmacies from which to choose. Mr. Heal, however, took a tack that was different from Ms. Lindstrom’s intention and from his first visit: I explained to her that I did not have reliable transportation and asked [for] . . . handwritten prescriptions . . . so that I could take them to whatever pharmacy was convenient . . . . She agreed that she could write them that time, but that on the next visit, I would have to arrange for proper transportation to get to the pharmacy or wherever they needed to be called into. Hr’g Tr. 23. Ms. Lindstrom wrote out three prescriptions: Two of them were for “Flexeril 10mg (ten) #30 (thirty)” and “Ibprofen (sic) [Ibuprofen] 800mg #120 (one twenty).” Pet’r’s Ex. B. The third prescription was for “Lorcet 10/650 #90 (Ninety).” Id. Ms. Lindstrom explained to Mr. Heal that he should use one of the five pharmacies on her list because “several [of the Clinic’s patients] had been kicked out of pharmacies . . . [that] were refusing to fill the prescriptions.” Hr’g Tr. 25. Ms. Lindstrom also “mentioned that a couple of her patients had been arrested for forging prescriptions.” Hr’g Tr. 25-6. At no time during his visit to JHS on October 31, 2006, did Mr. Heal see a physician. No one entered the examination room where Ms. Lindstrom met with Mr. Heal that day. Nor did Ms. Lindstrom leave the examination room while Mr. Heal was present in the room. Like the first visit the previous August, Ms. Lindstrom recommended that Mr. Heal have an MRI. She explained that results from an MRI were needed “in case the DEA wanted to look at the file, to show that [she and JHS] were actually treating [Mr. Heal] for something.” Hr’g Tr. 28. December 1, 2006 Little more than a month later on December 1, Mr. Heal made a third visit to JHS. The reception process was the same. The receptionist took his blood pressure, he paid $90 in cash, and waited in the reception area for Ms. Lindstrom to call him back. While waiting, he was informed that the number of pharmacies that would accept JHS prescriptions had been drastically reduced. Only one pharmacy would now accept JHS prescriptions: a pharmacy called New Horizon. Subsequent to the third visit, Mr. Heal presented to the pharmacy identified as New Horizon. In the company of law enforcement and with its supervision, Mr. Heal had the prescriptions filled for three medications: Flexeril, Ibuprofen at a prescription-strength dosage, and Lorcet. Supervising Physician and Other Claims At hearing under oath, Ms. Lindstrom admitted that she treated Mr. Heal once at the JHS facility and admitted that she prescribed Flexeril and Ibuprofen for him. She claimed under oath that the supervising physician for the 2006 visit in which she prescribed the two medications was James Hendrick, M.D. The Department produced documentation in the Department’s official business records that shows that Dr. Hendrick cancelled his Professional Liability Insurance Policy effective October 1, 2005, the year before Ms. Lindstrom claims to have seen Mr. Heal at the JHS facility under Dr. Hendrick’s supervision. The reason for the cancellation of the policy is listed on the letter from the insurer to the Department as “Retired.” Pet’r’s Ex. F, letter dated October 17, 2005, from FPIC, First Professionals Insurance Company. Department records also include an “Address Change” form that contains a section entitled “Financial Responsibility” dated November 21, 2005, the year before the incidents in this case. No boxes are checked in the section that shows “Financial Responsibility Coverage.” Under a section on the form entitled, “Category II: Financial Responsibility Exemptions,” Dr. Hendrick checked a box that indicated he was “retired or maintain[ed] part-time practice,” id., at least as of late November 2005, 11 months or more before the October 31, 2006, visit by Mr. Heal. Ms. Lindstrom made other claims with regard to RJ’s visit that she asserted occurred on October 3, 2006, rather than October 31, 2006, as charged. Among them was that she left the examination room after completing the prescriptions for Flexeril and Ibuprofen and partially completing a third prescription by inserting all the information, including her signature, except for the medicine to be prescribed and how often it should be taken. Ms. Lindstrom claimed that she intended to write a prescription for Lodine, but failed to write down “Lodine” on the third prescription form because she was distracted by a discussion with Mr. Heal about the need for RJ to have an MRI. She says she left the room to make arrangements for an MRI and when she returned, RJ was gone, together with the two filled out prescriptions, the third incomplete prescription, and her prescription pad. Ms. Lindstrom’s testimony about the theft of the pad and other details about the event, including when it occurred, is not credible. In contrast, Mr. Heal’s testimony about the visits he made to the JHS facility, seeing Ms. Lindstrom, and her prescription of Lorcet, is credited as truthful. Lorcet Lorcet contains hydrocodone, which is a controlled substance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent Sandra A. Lindstrom, P.A., violated section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2006), by violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-30.008 (2006), as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; Imposing a $2,500 fine; and Revoking Respondent’s license as a physician assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra Ann Lindstrom 6726 Pomeroy Circle Orlando, Florida 32810 Yolonda Y. Green, Esquire Maciej Lewandowski, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Andre Ourso, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 (eServed) Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Diane Potts Kyle is a registered nurse, licensed to practice in the state and is the holder of license number 62079-2. On November 5, 1975, following a formal hearing held pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 120.57(1), Respondent's license to practice nursing as a registered nurse in the State of Florida was suspended for a period of two years, based upon a finding that the Respondent had engaged in unprofessional conduct due to her failure to properly chart or account for controlled narcotics signed out by her for patients in her care. Thereafter, on April 22, 1978, while working as a staff relief nurse at Coral Gables Hospital, Coral Gables, Florida, the Respondent, on several occasions, converted to her own use a controlled drug, to wit: Demerol, by signing out for said narcotic which was intended for patients in her care and failed to administer said drugs to the patients. She thereafter failed to account for said drug withdrawals on the patients' medical charts. On or about May 1, 1978, Respondent voluntarily executed a notarized statement admitting to converting to her own use Demerol ordered for patients in her care by signing out for said drug but not administering same to the patient and not charting it on the patient's medical chart. Thereafter, Respondent subsequently voluntarily surrendered her license to the Petitioner. (See Board's Exhibits A, B, and C.) As stated, there is little dispute respecting the facts in this case, however, the Petitioner appeared on her own behalf and offered testimony in mitigation of the allegations of the complaint which were stipulated to by her. (Board Exhibit A.) Some time during May, 1978, the Respondent enrolled in the Spectrum Drug Abuse Program and has been under the care and guidance of drug counsellor Robert Healy. The Respondent attends weekly sessions and the course uses as a primary approach of therapy, Transactional Analysis. Counsellor Healy, who holds a Master's degree in Psychology and is a drug counsellor at the Spectrum program, appeared and testified that he has been working with the Respondent for approximately six months. He testified that Respondent has undergone serious changes on her own and that he determined that the Respondent's problems stem from stress situations in which she was involved both at work and at home. According to Healy's prognosis, the Respondent will successfully graduate from the Spectrum program within the next six months. Healy opined that the Respondent's life style is one in which she feels that all around her must be "all-perfect" and that based on such a life-style, she is constantly in a state of stress. He testified that since her enrollment in the Spectrum program, she has isolated this problem and is now able to return to work with little danger of abusing drugs. Healy testified that the likelihood of the Respondent receeding to a drug abuser is minimal inasmuch as she is a very confident person and she has a family, her husband and children. The undersigned has considered all of the mitigating factors offered on behalf of the Respondent in this case. However, as noted in the prior case, 1/ a failure to enter medication on a patient's medical chart is a very serious omission on the part of a registered nurse, since it could lead to either the administering of double dosages of medicine or a failure to properly administer medication to nurses as the case may be, which could result in fatal accidents. Such a practice amounts to unprofessional conduct within the meaning of Chapter 464.21, as alleged, and it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. While the period of probation is in effect, it is further recommended that the Respondent be placed in roles of employment wherein her contact with narcotics and other controlled substances is minimal. Additionally, it is recommended that the Respondent be required to submit to periodic medical examinations as requested by the Board to verify the fact that the Respondent is not abusing drugs. ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Petitioner's Medicaid provider number should be cancelled for the reason stated in Respondent's October 1, 1995, letter to Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a provider of community mental health services. It provides these services to residents of Palm Beach County and the surrounding areas. Some of the services it provides are unique to the area it serves. Petitioner provides services to Medicaid recipients pursuant to a Medicaid provider agreement dated September 6, 1994, paragraphs 8 and 9 of which provide as follows: The provider and the Department agree to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. The agreement may be terminated upon thirty days written notice by either party. The Depart- ment may terminate this agreement in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has attempted to enter into a contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health office (hereinafter referred to as "ADM"), but to date has been unable to do so because ADM has not had the money to fund such a contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered terminating Petitioner's provider agreement and cancelling its provider number on the grounds that it "does not have a contract with the [Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services] ADM [Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health] office." DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene Silvernail, Esquire Forest Hill Counseling Center 2624 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Gordon B. Scott, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Fort Knox Number 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Fort Knox Number 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Fort Knox Number 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issue presented is whether the respondent committed the violations alleged in the Final Agency Audit Report, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency for Health Care Administration is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's Medicaid Program. Section 409.902, Fla. Stat. (1995). At all times material to this proceeding, Community was a Medicaid provider, having been assigned provider number 0277738-00. In a letter dated February 17, 1994, the Agency notified Douglas Nalls, M.D., that staff from its Medicaid Program Integrity office would arrive at his office on February 23, 1994, to collect and copy documents supporting certain Medicaid clams submitted by Community. The letter informed Dr. Nalls that the Agency would use the documents to conduct a prepayment review of Community's pending unpaid Medicaid claims. A second letter, dated April 21, 1994, was sent to Dr. Nalls, in which the Agency notified him that its staff was ready to make arrangements to retrieve copies of the records supporting Community's pending unpaid Medicaid claims. Both the February 17 and April 21 letters were sent by certified mail, and receipts were received by the Agency showing that the letters had been accepted at the address to which they were sent. Because Community failed to provide the records requested by the Agency, the Agency was unable to complete its prepayment review of the pending unpaid Medicaid claims. In the Final Agency Audit Report, the Agency indicated that, based on the violations alleged, Community should be terminated from the Medicaid program for a period of 10 years. Although the Agency had considered imposing a lesser penalty, the Agency's determination that a 10-year termination was warranted was based on a review of its authority under section 409.913, Florida Statutes (1993), the Agency's files, the seriousness of Community's offense, and Community's regulatory history.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the pending unpaid Medicaid claims submitted for payment by A Community Home Health, Inc.; finding A Community Home Health, Inc., guilty of failing to furnish Medicaid-related records necessary to determine which Medicaid payments were due and the amount thereof; and terminating Community Home Health, Inc., from the Medicaid program for a period of 10 years. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1996.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent properly maintained and supplied required records to support and document prescription claims, which it billed to Medicaid and for which it received payment from the Medicaid program during the audit period of April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. If that is not the case, it must be determined whether the Agency is entitled to recoup from the Respondent the sum it seeks of $108,478.77, as the purported amount overpaid to the Respondent by the Agency. It must also be determined whether the applicable laws and regulations referenced herein were complied with by the Respondent, in terms of its accepting and filling prescriptions, dispensing relevant drugs, and recording and documenting such activities in its pharmacy records. Finally, it must be determined whether the statistical methodologies employed by the Agency, through its audit and investigation of the Respondent, were sufficiently representative and accurate so as to support the calculation of estimated overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an Agency of the State of Florida charged by the statutes and rules referenced herein with ensuring that proper reimbursement is effected to providers, including pharmacies, by the Medicaid system. Because of its duty to enforce and regulate the Medicaid system, the Petitioner Agency has an audit and oversight function, as well as an enforcement function, to ensure that Medicaid payments and the general operations of the Medicaid system are carried out correctly. It is through this duty imposed by the cited Florida Statutes and rules, as well as the federal regulations it is charged with enforcing, that the Petitioner carried out an audit of the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy, concerning the audit period of April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. The Petitioner conducts audits of providers such as Brown in order to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and Medicaid provider agreements. These are called "integrity audits" and are routinely performed by auditors contracted from private firms such as Heritage. Brown Pharmacy (Brown) is licensed in the State of Florida as a pharmacy (license Number PH562). Brown maintained a business location at 312 West 8th Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32206, at times pertinent to this case. During the audit period Brown was an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Agency. The terms of the provider agreement governed the contractual relationship between Brown and the Agency. Pursuant to that provider agreement, Brown was to maintain the Medicaid-related records and documentation for at least five years. Any Medicaid provider, such as Brown, not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. During the audit period, Brown dispensed prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid claims were filed and paid electronically as "point of sale" transactions during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this case was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the provider agreement and pertinent regulations. As a condition of participating in the Medicaid program, a Medicaid provider must comply with all provisions of a provider agreement, which is a voluntarily agreement between the Agency and the provider. Those provisions include the provider's agreement to comply with all relevant local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, bulletins, manuals, and handbooks, etc. The provider must agree to keep and maintain, in a systematic and orderly manner, all Medicaid- related records as may be required by the Agency and make them available for state and federal agencies and review. It must maintain complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that will justify and disclose the extent of goods and services rendered to customers or patients and rendered as billings to the Medicaid system. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.250 promulgates, as part of the rule, the above-referenced handbook (handbook) which sets out Medicaid polices and rules. The polices and rules govern the rights and responsibilities of drug providers, such as Brown, including coverage and payment methodologies for services and goods rendered to Medicaid recipients and billed to the Medicaid program. The types of records that must be maintained are as follows: Medicaid claim forms, professional records such as patient treatment plans, prior and post authorization information, prescription records, business records, including accounting ledgers, financial statements, purchase and acquisition records etc., tax records, patient counseling information and provider enrollment documentation. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in the handbook are subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Chapter five of the handbook, in defining overpayment provides that any amount not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claims, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake, constitutes overpayment. Incomplete records are records that lack documentation that all requirements or conditions for the providing of services have been met. Medicaid may recoup payments for services or goods when the provider has incomplete records or cannot locate the records. The Agency contracted with Heritage to conduct an on- site audit at Brown. The audit was conducted March 18th through March 20, 2002. Heritage isolated a sample of 205 prescription claims, known as the "judgmental sample" out of a total universe of paid pharmacy claims from Brown totaling 16,727 for the audit period. Heritage also selected 250 random prescription claims out of the remaining total universe of paid pharmacy claims of 16,522, which remained after the 205 judgmental sample claims had been removed or isolated from the remainder of the total claims. With the acquiescence of the Agency, Heritage chose the 205 claims by weighing it in favor of the "high dollar" or more expensive drug prescriptions. Those prescriptions are primarily for HIV and Aids therapy drugs and psychotherapeutic drugs for various mental conditions, including schizophrenia. Weighing of the judgmental sample strongly in favor of the high dollar prescription claims would seem to render the judgmental sample fundamentally unfair against Brown if the judgmental sample had then been extrapolated to the entire universe of claims ($16,727). This was not done, however. The judgmental sample was audited and compiled by doing an actual count and totaling of claim amounts in dollars represented by all the discrepant prescriptions, including all those the Agency and Heritage maintained resulted in "overpayments" to Brown. Therefore, the judgmental sample is an actual number rather than an extrapolated calculation so that weighing the sample in favor of the high dollar prescriptions does not result in an unfair or biased sample, as to the judgmental sample. Because the judgmental sample was drawn from the total pool of audited claims and removed from that claim pool prior to the identification and drawing of the random sample, the two are mutually exclusive and the amounts calculated do not represent a duplication or overlap. Thus the findings from the judgmental sample and then the random sample may be properly added together. The randomly selected claims (random sample) were taken of the remaining 16,522 claims in the audit claim pool after the judgmental sample of 205 claims had been removed. According to the report rendered by Heritage, the 250 randomly selected claims totaled $10,632.59 in paid Medicaid dollars. The Heritage auditors determined that there were 56 discrepant claims out of these which totaled, according to their calculation, $2,450.13 in apparent overpayments. This resulted in an average overcharge per claim of $9.80 (determined by dividing the documented "sanction amount" by the total number of claims in the random sample (250), multiplied by the universe of claims from which the random sample was taken (16,522) which yielded an extrapolated overcharge of $161,924.19. Applying the statistically appropriate 95 percent "one-sided" lower confidence limit of this extrapolation resulted in a purported overpayment extrapolated from the randomly selected claims of $102,700.85. This means that the overpayment amount calculated by Heritage represents an amount statistically 95 percent certain to be the lowest amount overpayment based on the extrapolation of the overpayment represented in the 250 randomly selected claims. The non-extrapolated judgmental findings showed, according to Heritage, that there were 72 discrepant claims. Heritage then determined that, of these, there were $29,381.09 in apparent actual overcharges. The discrepancies determined by Heritage involved the failure to produce documentation of refill authorizations for 80 prescription claims; 31 prescription claims containing an incorrect Medicaid provider number; the failure to produce 12 "hard copy" prescriptions representing 25 claims; four claims that did not have the prescriber's DEA number on the prescription for controlled substances; three claims for prescriptions that did not contain the original date of service; two claims that were billed for quantities greater than that authorized by the physician; one claim that was billed for an incorrect day's supply; one claim that was billed in excess of the maximum allowable quantity of prescription of the drug, set by Medicaid policy; and one prescription claim that was billed for an incorrect prescriber's Medicaid provider number (although this should not be a discrepancy because the correct prescriber was documented in the pharmacy's computer, which the regulations allowed). Additionally, there was one claim billed for a drug different than that prescribed by the physician, according to Heritage in its report. Heritage also conducted an invoice review using utilization reports provided by the Respondent. This was apparently a review of 25 different drugs that purportedly showed that the prorated purchases of those drugs were insufficient to cover the number of units billed to Medicaid for all 25 drugs reviewed, and thus yielded a purported shortage of $87,942.13, representing the amount billed to Medicaid above the amount the records of purchases from suppliers proved that Brown had purchased of those drugs. Based upon the Heritage audit as well as documentation findings and overpayments calculations (see Exhibit 8), the Agency issued a PAAR dated September 27, 2002, determining that Brown had been overpaid $150,036.71 for Medicaid claims during the audit period. That report advised Brown that it was a provisional report only and encouraged Brown to submit any additional information or documentation which might serve to change the overpayment. The report listed examples of documentation that the Agency would consider for a possible reduction in the overpayment amount initially claimed. Thereafter, the Agency agreed to an extension of time for Brown to submit additional documentation and sent a letter to Brown dated October 31, 2003, advising that the audit had been placed in abeyance pending the outcome in a related case, but that the Agency expected to resume the audit and that therefore all Medicaid-related records and documentation regarding paid claims should be maintained and preserved until the audit was finalized. The FAAR was addressed in the testimony of Ms. Stewart for the Agency. Through her testimony it was revealed that certain corrections should be made to the FAAR updating it from the findings in the Heritage initial audit report. The Agency corrected the information in the FAAR for this reason and for the reason that it secured some additional information from the Respondent. Thus, for the audit period it was established that there were 16,727 total claims for prescriptions dispensed by Brown, for which it was paid $795,564.59 during the 21-month audit period, of those claims, 205 were pulled out from the total universe of claims as the judgmental sample. There were some 72 allegedly "discrepant claims" totaling $36,393.51 in dollars paid to Brown. The Agency's position is that $29,381.09 of those are so called "documented overcharges." The random sample of 250 claims was extrapolated to the remaining universe of 16,522 prescription claims. The Agency now takes the position that it found 49 "discrepant claims" in the random sample which totaled $2,154.40 in dollars paid to Brown's pharmacy and of that it maintains that $1,927.55 are "documented overcharges" for the 250 randomly selected claims (for which Brown had been paid $10,632.59). Thus the Agency found an average overcharge for the 250 randomly sampled claims of $7.71 per claim. The $7.71 average per claim overcharge was then multiplied by the remaining universe of 16,522 claims, yielding an extrapolated purported overcharge of $127,387.92. The Agency then applied the 95 percent "one-sided lower confidence limit" to this extrapolation, that is, that it or its statistician, Dr. Johnson, felt that there was a 95 percent chance that the lower confidence limit number it calculated was accurate. That number is $79,097.68. When that number is combined with the Agency's position as to overcharges from the judgmental sample results in a total postulated overcharge of $108,478.77. This is the final amount the Agency claims as an overpayment that must be recouped for Medicaid. The FAAR summarized the discrepant claims for the judgmental sample as follows: 61 claims involve refills which exceeded the authorized number of refills without documentation of reauthorization; 10 claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number but the correct prescriber license number was documented in the pharmacy's computer; and For two claims the hard copy description did not have an original date of service depicted on it and did not reference a DEA number. The discrepant claims shown in the FAAR as to the random sample were as follows: There were 19 claims for refills without documentation of refill authorization (refills had been previously authorized, but for the 19 claims at least one refill had been issued beyond the authorization limit); Fifteen claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number on the claim and the license number was not documented in the Respondent's computer; Seven claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number, but the correct license number was documented in the pharmacy's computer; There were seven claims for which the original hard copy prescriptions could not be found on file during the audit period; For one claim the hard copy prescription did not have an original date of service or DEA number; For one claim the quantity paid exceeded the quantity authorized by the prescriber or dispensed to the recipient; and For one claim the number of days supply submitted by the pharmacy was not consistent with the quantity and directions of the prescriber and the quantity exceeded the limit set by the plan. The most common discrepancies with regard to the judgmental sample and the random sample occurred when the Respondent billed refills in excess of the number authorized by the prescriber, without any written authorization for such being provided in the audit process or later. Concerning the random sample, the second most common discrepancy occurred when the claim depicted an incorrect precriber number on the claim and the license number of the prescriber was not documented in the computer. In the judgmental sample the second most common discrepancy occurred when the claim showed an incorrect prescriber number, but the correct prescriber number was documented in the pharmacy's computer. The discrepancies in the FAAR with the indication "UR", references "unauthorized refills." The records of the pharmacy showed that Brown issued refills of prescriptions to Medicaid recipients in excess of the presriber's limit depicted on the prescriptions but showed no written record of a telephonic or written authorization by the prescriber allowing the additional refill or refills. It is also true that as to some or even many of these the Respondent may have obtained verbal authorization, but failed to document that re- authorization. Medicaid policy, the statutory authority cited herein, and the PDSCLR Handbook provide that all verbal orders authorized by the prescriber of a prescription must be recorded either as a "hard copy" or noted in the pharmacy's computer in order to comply with the relevant law cited herein, for record- keeping and auditing purposes under Medicaid policy. The Agency's Statistical Methodology Mark E. Johnson, Ph.D., testified on behalf of the Petitioner. He was qualified as an expert witness in the area of statistical formulas, statistical methodology, and random sampling, including the random sample statistical methodology employed by the Agency in determining the overpayment amount. He is a professor of statistics at the University of Central Florida. Dr. Johnson reviewed the statistical methodology, numbers and calculations arrived at by the Agency and its extrapolation method of arriving at the overpayment amount. He also used his own independent analysis based upon a software package he commonly uses in the practice of his discipline in testing the methodology employed by the Agency and the random sample employed by the Agency and Heritage. The statistical formula employed by Dr. Johnson and the Agency is a standard one routinely used in Dr. Johnson's profession and statistical sampling. He established through his own testing of the methodology that the random sample was appropriate for Medicaid program integrity audits and determinations as employed in this case. The random sampling, according to Dr. Johnson, was employed because it would be time and cost prohibitive to examine individually each of 16,522 claims regarding overpayment issues. The random sampling methodology using 250 randomly chosen samples is a time and cost saving device and yet still presents a "plausible estimate" as established by Dr. Johnson. He established that for the universe of 16,522 claims which were subjected to the random sample and extrapolation statistical analysis and calculation, that such is a reasonable sample for purposes of this audit and that the 250 random samples employed by the Agency are indeed statistically appropriate random samples. His calculation of overpayment was at variance with the Agency's by 55 cents. He established that is not a significant difference since the 95 percent certainty limit of $79,097.68 for the random sample extrapolation analysis is so much lower than the estimate established at $108,478.22. Dr. Johnson established that the Agency had employed appropriate and valid statistical methods in its determination of the above-referenced overpayment amount based upon the random sample of paid claims. The expert testimony of Dr. Johnson, together with his written report in evidence, is credible and persuasive as to the validity of the random sampling of the claims during the audit period and as to the random sample portion of the analysis employed in arriving at the final overpayment calculation and numbers depicted in the FAAR. Dr. Johnson established the appropriateness of the statistical formula, including extrapolation, used to calculate the overpayment amount, the appropriateness of the sample size relative to the universe of claims, and the improbability that the overpayment amount is attributable to chance causes alone. Thus Dr. Johnson's testimony is accepted as credible and persuasive in establishing the validity of the Agency's method of overpayment calculation, and the overpayment calculation in conjunction with the statistical evidence in this record, except as modified by the findings below.1/ The Respondent's Position Gary Steinberg testified on behalf of the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy. He was accepted as an expert witness in the areas of Medicaid policy, audits and pharmacy practice, including Florida pharmacy practice. Mr. Steinberg acknowledged that Brown had not properly documented all claims that had been paid by the Medicaid program nor maintained all required records. He emphasized in his testimony, however, that Brown had not fraudulently billed the Medicaid program with claims for prescription medications that it had not actually dispensed to the patients or recipients. Rather, all medications involved in the subject prescription claims had actually been dispensed. There is no evidence or claim on the part of the Agency that Brown charged and collected more than the appropriate approved price for the prescriptions at issue. Through the explanation given in his testimony, Mr. Steinberg opined that although Brown was guilty of technical errors in record keeping and documentation as to the prescriptions involved in the subject claims, Brown had made substantial compliance with the Medicaid program requirements of the Medicaid provider agreement and the statutes and rules at issue and policies embodied in the subject handbook. He explained in his testimony that in the pharmacy practice setting in which Brown has operated, whereby it serves a large indigent population in an inner city environment, it is difficult to contact a prescriber at the time when a patient needs a critical prescription refilled in order to get a refill authorization. The prescriptions at issue mostly involve critical medications for HIV/Aids and psychotropic medications for severe mental conditions such as schizophrenia. The patients who need these critical medications (and there are very few patients, since most of the procedures involve filling and refilling for a small number of such recipients) are patients of clinics operated at the nearby university hospital (Shands). In these circumstances, where the patient literally needs the HIV/Aids medication refilled on an immediate basis, possibly even to prevent death, and the mental health patient critically needs a refill in order to prevent harm to the patient or harm to the members of the public if the patient goes without medication and "decompensates," the ethical thing for a pharmacist to do is to refill the prescription and seek authorization later. Mr. Steinberg established that it is often difficult to obtain authorization from the original prescriber since the medication were prescribed by residents practicing in the various clinics at the Shands Hospital and that the residents can not always be identified or contacted easily since they do not maintain a fixed medical practice in the area. Consequently, some of the prescriptions were not documented as to authorization, although in some cases the pharmacy actually obtained authorization and entered it in its computer. In some cases, being unable to obtain re-authorization from the resident who originally prescribed the medication the pharmacy used the DEA license or prescribing number of the hospital itself. He explained that although under the law a pharmacy can refill a prescription on an emergency basis for up to a 72-hour supply, that this is generally impracticable and unsafe for patients in this plight because such indigent, mental health and HIV/Aids patients tend to be non-compliant with their medication regimes quite often anyway, and it is often unreasonable to expect them to return to the pharmacy for another refill within two or three days. He thus opined that the ethical and safe thing for the pharmacist to do was to refill and re-dispense the medical approved medication for up to a 30 or 34-day supply (the normal refill supply duration). He further explained that the Shands Hospital license number was used in some of these circumstances because the resident doctor who originally issued the prescription could not be identified on the Shands Hospital prescription forms and because the resident doctors at the Shands clinics only have and can use Shands Hospital prescription forms in any event. Mr. Steinberg thus established that 35 percent of those prescription claims classified as "WMP," that is the prescription claims contained an incorrect prscriber license number were for these reasons and the pharmacist could only use the Shands Hospital license number because the resident could not be identified from the Shands Hospital prescription forms. He thus opined that 35 percent of the random sample extrapolation amount, the 95 percent statistical confidence limit amount of $79,097.00, should be deleted from that amount in determining the correct amount of overpayment predicated on the random sample. Likewise, with regard to the judgmental sample concerning the HIV/Aids and mental health patient prescriptions and related claims, he opined that, in effect, $19,500.00 of the total $29,381.09 overpayment amount claimed by the Agency pursuant to the judgmental sample portion of the claims, should be deleted from that portion of the overpayment claim by the Agency; this is a result of his explanation regarding "substantial compliance" in the critical refill situation he described concerning the HIV/Aids and mental health patients and their prescription drugs. The preponderant, persuasive evidence does establish (and indeed the Agency acknowledged in its Proposed Recommended Order) with regard to the judgmental sample, that 10 of the claims at issue listed an incorrect prescriber license number, but that the correct prescriber license number was actually documented in the pharmacy's computer record with the name of the prescriber. This circumstances comports with the law referenced below and in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. This results in a reduction in the overpayment claim with regard to the judgmental sample of 13.88 percent of the judgmental sample claims or a reduction of $4,078.09. Likewise, with regard to the random sample extrapolation calculation of overpaid claims, the preponderant, persuasive evidence, also as acknowledged by the Agency in its Proposed Recommended Order, disclosed that seven claims listed an incorrect prescriber license number on the claims, but had been correctly documented in the pharmacy's computer system and therefore were in compliance with the relevant statutes, rules, and the subject handbook. Thus the discrepant claims and the overpayment amount related to the random sample portion of the audit claims should be reduced by 14.28 percent of the total amount of $79,097.00 for a $11,295.05 reduction of that $79,097.00 random sample overpayment amount. Mr. Steinberg demonstrated that Brown was not overcharging on the drugs prescribed and dispensed and was charging the Medicaid-authorized amount for the drugs involved in the prescription claims at issue. The Agency is not claiming that there was any fraudulent practice or illegal overcharging for the prescriptions involved. In fact, Brown was earning only a very small profit on the drugs dispensed that are the subject of the prescription claims at issue. Mr. Steinberg thus opined that since Brown did indeed dispense all the drugs at issue and was only paid the legal authorized amounts for the drugs and prescriptions at issue that recoupment of the amounts sought by the Agency or, in effect, established in these findings of fact, would be fundamentally unfair. He and the Respondent contend, rather, that since Brown performed substantial compliance, but was guilty of technical non-compliance with the relevant rules, agreement, and Medicaid policy, that the Agency should impose a lesser fine instead of seeking recoupment. In summary, in view of the preponderant persuasive evidence establishing the above facts, it has been shown that the documentation and record-keeping, dispensing errors, and omissions in the manner found above, with regard to the prescription claims and types of claims addressed in the above findings of fact, occurred. If those deficiencies amount to violations of the authority cited and discussed below which justify recoupment, then the amount of overpayment established by the above findings of fact is $93,104.95.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration providing for recoupment of $93,104.95, and that the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy, must re-pay that amount to the Petitioner Agency, through a reasonable re- payment plan established between the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2006.
The Issue These two consolidated cases are both license discipline cases in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against an individual pharmacist and a community pharmacy for various statutory violations which are alleged in separate Administrative Complaints. At the hearing the Respondents admitted some of the allegations of the Administrative Complaints. Thereafter both the Petitioner and the Respondents presented testimony and exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties decided not to order a transcript of the hearing. The parties were allowed until November 25, 1987, within which to file their proposed recommended orders. Both parties filed timely proposed recommended orders containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorpor- ated into this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Findings based on stipulations and admissions Respondent Gus Goldstein is, and has been at all times material hereto, a pharmacist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PS 0005354. Respondent's last known address is 110 East Adams Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. Respondent Gus Goldstein is and has been at all times material hereto, designated as the prescription department manager of Center Pharmacy, a community pharmacy in the State of Florida, having been issued permit number PH 0002430 and located at 110 East Adams Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. On or about December 23, 1986, a pharmacy medication audit was conducted at Center Pharmacy for the period between approximately June 1, 1986, and December 23, 1986. That audit revealed that the Respondents' records for the period of June 1, 1986, through December 23, 1986, failed to account for the following: Description Bought Dispensed Unaccounted For Tylenol #3 w/codeine 4200 2102 2098 Tylenol #4 w/codeine 5000 2600 2400 Fiorinal #3 1900 1810 90 Valium 5mg. 900 380 520 (Diazepam 5mg.) Valium 10mg. 2200 1600 600 (Diazepam 10mg.) Tylenol #3 with Codeine and APAP with Codeine 30mg are "medicinal drugs" as defined in Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, which contain codeine, a controlled substance, in such quantity that they are included in Schedule III of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Tylenol #4 with Codeine and APAP with Codeine 60mg are "medicinal drugs" as defined in Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, which contain codeine, a controlled substance, in such quantity that they are included in Schedule III of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Fiorinal #3 with Codeine is a "medicinal drug" as defined in Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, which contains codeine, a controlled substance, in such quantity as to be included in Schedule III of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Valium is a brand name of a "medicinal drug" as defined in Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, which contains diazepam, a controlled substance, which is listed in Schedule IV of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Tylenol #3 with Codeine is a brand name of a "medicinal drug" as defined in Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, which contains a sufficient quantity of codeine, a controlled substance, to be listed in Schedule III of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Respondent Center Pharmacy is, and has been at all times material hereto, the permittee of Center Pharmacy, a community pharmacy, located in the State of Florida at 110 East Adams Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202, having been issued permit number PH 0002430. Respondent Center Pharmacy has, and had at all times material hereto, Gus Goldstein, a pharmacist in the State of Florida having been issued license number PS 0005354, designated as its prescription department manager. Respondent Center Pharmacy is, and has been at all times material hereto, registered with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. Respondent has been issued certificate of Registration Number AC 5050719. Findings based on the evidence adduced at the hearing On or about October 27, 1986, Respondent Gus Goldstein created a record which purported to be a telephone prescription (#116-450) for F.W. for Tylenol #3 with Codeine, purportedly prescribed by Dr. Samuel J. Alford, M.D. The prescription (#116-450) for F.W. for Tylenol #3 with Codeine was not authorized by Dr. Samuel J. Alford, M.D. Respondent Gus Goldstein dispensed Tylenol #3 with Codeine to F.W. without first being furnished with a prescription. Respondent Gus Goldstein knew that the purported telephone prescription (#116-450) for F.W. was a false record. During the process of dispensing drugs, normally there will be small errors in the counting of the drugs. These small errors will result in shortages in the drug inventory which cannot be accounted for. If proper record-keeping and dispensing practices are followed, the shortages resulting from these small errors normally will be in the range of from 1 percent to 2 percent of drugs dispensed; certainly no more than 3 percent of drugs dispensed. Shortages greater than 3 percent of drugs dispensed are indicative of a failure to follow proper record- keeping and dispensing practices.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Board of Pharmacy enter a final order in these consolidated cases to the following effect: Finding the Respondent Gus Goldstein guilty of the violations charged in Counts One, Two, and Three of the Administrative Complaint in Case Number 87-3151; Dismissing the violation charged against Gus Goldstein in Count Four of the Administrative Complaint in Case Number 87- 3151; Imposing an administrative fine against Gus Goldstein in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each of the violations of which he is found guilty; i.e., administrative fines totaling fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00); Revoking Gus Goldstein's license to practice pharmacy; Finding the Respondent Center Pharmacy guilty of the violation charged in the Administrative Complaint in Case Number 87-3913; Imposing an administrative fine against Respondent Center Pharmacy in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00); and Revoking the permit of Center Pharmacy. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-3151 AND 87-3913 The following are my specific rulings on all of the findings of fact proposed by the parties. In the rulings which follow I have rejected much of what both parties offered as proposed findings of fact due to the form of the proposals. The most frequent defect in the form is the commencement of a statement with the words "So-and-so testified," followed by a summary of the testimony. Testimony is, of course, one of the raw materials from which findings of fact are made, but (with the exception of perjury trials) summarization or quotation of testimony is hardly ever an appropriate finding of fact. Rather than summarize or quote the testimony, the parties should refine from the testimony the essential material and relevant facts and submit that refined product as their proposed findings. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Rejected for the following reasons: First, it is a summary of testimony, rather than proposed findings of fact; second, parts of it are inconsistent with the greater weight of the evidence; and, third, most of it consists of subordinate, irrelevant, or unnecessary details. First unnumbered paragraph following Par. 2: Rejected for the first and third reasons noted immediately above. Second unnumbered paragraph following Par. 2: Rejected as a commentary on the evidence rather than a proposed finding of fact. Further, the portion following the comma is inconsistent with the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 3: Rejected for the same reasons as rejection of Paragraph 2. Unnumbered paragraph following Par. 3: Rejected for the following reasons: First it is a summary of the testimony, rather than proposed findings of fact, and, second, most of it consists of subordinate, irrelevant, or unnecessary details. Paragraph 4: Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than proposed findings of fact. Last unnumbered paragraph: Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. Findings proposed by Respondents: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Covered in part by stipulated facts. Most of the remainder rejected as subordinate or unnecessary details or as not supported by competent substantial evidence. First unnumbered paragraph following Par. 2: First three sentences rejected as summary of testimony rather than proposed findings of fact. Second and third sentences also rejected as not being supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as consisting of subordinate, irrelevant, or unnecessary details. Second unnumbered paragraph following Par 2: Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than proposed findings of fact and because it constitutes subordinate, irrelevant, or unnecessary details. Paragraph 3: Rejected as irrelevant and as not supported by competent substantial evidence. First unnumbered paragraph following Par. 3: Rejected as constituting argument or legal conclusions rather than proposed findings of fact. Second unnumbered paragraph following Par. 3: Rejected as constituting argument or legal conclusions rather than proposed findings of fact. Further, portions of the arguments and conclusions are based on inferences which are not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 4: Rejected as summary of testimony rather than proposed findings of fact and as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. First unnumbered paragraph following Par. 4: Rejected for the same reasons as rejection of Paragraph 4. Second unnumbered paragraph following Par. 4: First sentence rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Second sentence accepted in substance. Last sentence accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Rod Presnell Executive Director Board of Pharmacy 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Michael A. Atter, Esquire 333-1 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202
