The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners' foster home license should be denied on the basis that the abuse registry examined during the re-licensure process disclosed a verified finding of abandonment of a child, recorded against the Petitioners as perpetrators, under authority of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners were licensed as a foster home and sometime in the latter part of 1999, their licensure came due for renewal. They were advised by a denial letter dated October 8, 1999, from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), that their home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. The initial agency decision to this effect was because the Petitioners, or at least Mr. Barnes, had an entry on the Department's abuse registry indicating a verified finding of abandonment against the Petitioners. The finding of abandonment involved the Petitioners' adopted son, D.B., being left at the office of the Department's foster care staff. Apparently the Barnes had had a great deal of trouble with D.B.'s behavior and had been unable to constructively discipline him and improve his behavior. This apparently made them very frustrated such that on March 26, 1999, Mr. Barnes called the Department regarding D.B., to inform the Department that they were simply unable to handle the child. Mr. Barnes talked to James Grant, supervisor of the foster care unit in the Department's Ocala office, and a witness for the Department in this case. Mr. Grant offered to provide assistance to the family to help resolve the issues between the Petitioners and their child. That offer of assistance was refused, however. Later that day, Mr. Barnes took D.B. to the Ocala offices of the Department's foster care unit and apparently left him sitting in the lobby of the building which houses the foster care staff. Mr. Barnes did not speak to Mr. Grant or anyone else in a responsible position before leaving the building and permanently abandoning the child. He only informed the receptionist that he was leaving the child. Because of the Petitioners' actions in leaving the child sitting in the lobby, a call was placed to the abuse hotline that same day. Joanne Hunter was assigned as the investigator of the abuse report. According to the final report of the investigation that was admitted into evidence, the case was closed with a verified indication of abandonment and neglect, the result of D.B. being abandoned in the Department's lobby. On March 27, 1999, a shelter hearing was held before a circuit judge and D.B. was placed in the custody of the Department due to the Petitioner's act of abandonment at the Department's office. Subsequently, the child was adjudicated dependent and placed in a long-term foster care placement. The child remained in that foster care placement at the time of the instant hearing. Certified copies of the judge's shelter order and the order of adjudication and disposition have been entered into evidence in this case. Prior to their adoption by the Petitioners, D.B. and his two siblings had been abused and neglected by their natural parents. They had, therefore, been placed in foster care by the Department. D.B.'s natural parents' parental rights had been terminated because of the uncorrected and continuing abuse and neglect of D.B. and his two siblings. The Petitioners had adopted D.B. and his two siblings. Children who have been abused and neglected or abandoned by their parents are especially vulnerable and require the greatest degree of stability in their home life that is possible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the re-licensure of the Petitioners as a licensed family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Billie and Willie Mae Barnes 15606 Southwest 27th Avenue Road Ocala, Florida 34473 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 43785 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondents’ renewal foster home license application should be denied based upon allegations that Respondents violated a foster child’s safety plan, refused to sign a corrective action plan, and refused to work in partnership with Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Parties DCF is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes. DCF administers foster care programs by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 19, which is the geographic area encompassing Port St. Lucie, DCF has contracted with Devereux Community Based Care (“Devereux”) to be the “lead agency” to provide the majority of child services. Devereux, in turn, has subcontracted with Camelot Community Care (“Camelot”), which is licensed as a child placement agency. Respondents, who are husband and wife, are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed by DCF. At all times material hereto, Mr. and Mrs. Arias have fostered children at their home in Port St. Lucie. Respondent, Kathleen Arias (“Mrs. Arias”), does not work outside the foster home. She is a “stay-at-home” foster mom. Over the past 16 years, Mrs. Arias has fostered many children. Mrs. Arias is very loving to the foster children in her care, and she has provided a great benefit to the foster children in her care.2/ Kenneth Strout’s Prior History of Sexually Inappropriate Behaviors Kenneth Strout (“Kenneth”), who recently turned 18 years old, was placed into Respondents’ foster home in 2013. Prior to his placement in Respondents’ home, Kenneth engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors. As a therapeutic foster child in Respondents’ home, Kenneth received therapeutic services, including therapy, psychiatric services, support, and therapeutic parenting by a trained therapeutic foster parent, Mrs. Arias. Despite receiving therapeutic services, Kenneth continued to engage in inappropriate sexual behaviors while living in Respondents’ home. During the time in which Kenneth lived in the home, he had a history of sexually touching others, exposing himself, and masturbating in close proximity to others. On one particular occasion on September 17, 2014, Kenneth was sitting on the couch watching television, and Mrs. Arias’ sister walked in the room. While she had her back to Kenneth, he dropped his pants, exposed himself to her, and pressed his penis against her buttocks. The Applicable Safety Plan Requirements As a result of this incident, an updated safety plan was developed.3/ The safety plan was signed by Mrs. Arias on October 8, 2014. Mrs. Arias reviewed the safety plan and is aware of the requirements of the safety plan. Specifically, the safety plan requires, in pertinent part: “Client needs to be within eyesight and earshot of a responsible adult, who is aware of and will enforce the safety plan at all times.” The May 28, 2015, Incident at LA Fitness and its Aftermath Against this backdrop, on May 28, 2015, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Mrs. Arias took Kenneth, who was 17 years old at the time, to LA Fitness, a gym facility in Port St. Lucie. Mrs. Arias had a membership at LA Fitness and frequented the facility on a regular basis. Despite Ms. Arias’ knowledge of Kenneth’s inappropriate sexual propensities, Kenneth often accompanied Mrs. Arias to the facility, where he would play basketball on an indoor basketball court, while Mrs. Arias exercised in another area at the facility. During the evening of May 28, 2015, Kenneth had been playing basketball on the indoor basketball court. He left the basketball court and approached Mrs. Arias and told her that he needed to use the bathroom. Mrs. Arias gave Kenneth permission to go to the bathroom. The men’s restroom is located inside the men’s locker room. At this point, Kenneth walked toward the men’s locker room, and entered the men’s locker room through the door leading from a hallway into the men’s locker room. Mrs. Arias did not go into the men’s locker room with Kenneth, nor was Kenneth accompanied by an adult when he entered the men’s locker room. Once Kenneth entered the men’s locker room, he walked to the other end of the locker room to another door, which led to the Jacuzzi area. Kenneth then opened the door from the men’s locker room leading to the Jacuzzi area. At this point, Kenneth observed a female, Concepcion Alvarado, sitting alone in the Jacuzzi. Ms. Alvarado was in her swimsuit. At this point, Ms. Alvarado was relaxing in the Jacuzzi with her eyes closed. After observing Ms. Alvarado for a moment, Kenneth stripped down to his boxer shorts, entered the Jacuzzi, and inappropriately touched Ms. Alvarado on her leg. Upon realizing that somebody touched her leg, Ms. Alvarado opened her eyes, saw Kenneth in front of her, and said to him: “What are you doing, little boy?” “Just get out of my way, or do your own stuff.” Kenneth then touched Ms. Alvarado on her shoulder. At this point, Ms. Alvarado became very angry and said to Kenneth: “Why are you touching me? You’re not supposed to do that.” “Just get out.” Kenneth smiled at Ms. Alvarado as Ms. Alvarado exited the Jacuzzi. Ms. Alvarado then entered the nearby pool. Kenneth followed Ms. Alvarado and jumped in the pool as well. Ms. Alvarado recognized Kenneth because he had engaged in similar inappropriate sexual behavior a week earlier. On the prior occasion, Kenneth and Ms. Alvarado were in the Jacuzzi when Kenneth tried to kiss her and touched her leg. Ms. Alvarado did not report the prior incident. However, Ms. Alvarado reported the May 28, 2015, incident to an LA Fitness employee. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officers arrived at the facility and arrested Kenneth. Kenneth was taken to a juvenile detention facility where he spent the night. Kenneth was not within eyeshot or earshot of Mrs. Arias or another responsible adult once he entered the men’s locker room on May 28, 2015. Kenneth was not within eyeshot or earshot of Mrs. Arias or another responsible adult when the inappropriate physical contact perpetrated by Kenneth against Ms. Alvarado in the Jacuzzi on May 28, 2015, occurred. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents violated the October 2014 safety plan by failing to ensure that Kenneth was within earshot and eyeshot of a responsible adult at all times when he was at LA Fitness. Had Kenneth been within eyeshot and earshot of a responsible adult at all times on May 28, 2015, while he was at LA Fitness, the incident in the Jacuzzi with Ms. Alvarado would not have occurred.4/ Notably, given Kenneth’s history of sexually inappropriate behaviors, Mrs. Arias knew that she was taking a risk to the public in bringing Kenneth to LA fitness because it was an environment that could be problematic for him. At hearing, Ms. Linda Green, a licensed clinical social worker formerly employed by Camelot, persuasively and credibly explained the difficulties she and Mrs. Arias faced in their efforts to deal with Kenneth’s sexually inappropriate behaviors. According to Ms. Green, a true bond developed between Mrs. Arias and Kenneth. Kenneth referred to Mrs. Arias as “mom,” and he felt like she was his mother. In an attempt to keep the family unit intact, Ms. Green wanted significant “client-directed therapy” and “advocation because the client should have the right to control their life.” On the other hand, Ms. Green was concerned about keeping society safe from Kenneth. In hindsight, Ms. Green candidly admitted at hearing that Kenneth “probably needed institutionalization sooner.” Mrs. Arias recognized her inability to control Kenneth’s sexually inappropriate behaviors and the danger he posed to society prior to the May 28, 2015, incident. Prior to the May 28, 2015, incident, Mrs. Arias requested that Kenneth be placed on a “30-Day Notice.” Kenneth was on a “30-Day Notice” when the incident at the gym on May 28, 2015, occurred. Nevertheless, Kenneth remained in the Respondents’ home as of the May 28, 2015, incident at the gym because Devereux was having difficulty finding a new placement, and Mrs. Arias agreed to keep Kenneth in the home until after the end of the school year. The school year ended the first week of June. Kenneth never returned to Respondents’ home after the May 28, 2015, incident at LA Fitness. Instead, Kenneth was discharged from the foster care program, and placed in a group facility where he has resided ever since. It is anticipated that Kenneth will remain in the group facility until he is 23 years old. Following the incident at the LA Fitness gym on May 28, 2015, DCF undertook an investigation. As a result of its investigation, DCF concluded that the safety plan was violated because Kenneth was not within earshot or eyeshot of a responsible adult when the incident at the gym on May 28, 2015, occurred. DCF’s investigation resulted in a verified finding of abuse against Respondents based on inadequate supervision. Based on DCF’s verified finding of abuse based on inadequate supervision, a corrective action plan was required by administrative rule and prepared for Respondents to execute. A corrective action plan is a document which identifies issues of concern to DCF and how DCF, as an agency, can work together with the foster parent to improve the foster parent’s performance. A corrective action plan serves as a supportive intervention and is not punitive in nature. Respondents refused to execute the corrective action plan because they were concerned that, in doing so, they would admit DCF’s investigative finding of abuse based on inadequate supervision. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents refused to execute the corrective action plan. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing fails to establish that Respondents failed to work in partnership with DCF.5/ Respondents’ foster care license was due to expire on October 18, 2015. After the May 28, 2015, incident occurred, DCF placed another child under Respondents’ care. Regardless of the incident at LA Fitness on May 28, 2015, DCF intended to re-license Respondents. DCF intended to renew Respondents’ foster care license after the May 28, 2015, incident despite the verified finding of inadequate supervision. DCF was unable to re-license Respondents because they failed to execute the corrective action plan required by rule. Had Respondents executed the corrective action plan required by DCF, Respondents’ foster care license would have been renewed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Department of Children and Families placing Respondents’ foster care license in provisional status for six months, during which time Respondents shall execute the corrective action plan. If Respondents decline to execute the corrective action plan within six months, the provisional license will not be replaced with a regular license or renewed.7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Margaret Speer (Speer), received her initial foster care license from Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), on March 18, 1991. Speer resided at 1501 Windorah Way, West Palm Beach, Florida 33411, on that date. On March 18, 1992, HRS renewed Speer's foster care license. At that time Speer was living at 992 Whipporwill Way, West Palm Beach, Florida. On April 14, 1992, after moving to 12212-3 Sagharbor Court, Wellington, Florida, Speer received a foster home license for the new address. In October 1992, Speer received a foster home license for her residence at 129 Gregory Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. In June or July of 1992, Speer moved to 5380 Gene Circle, West Palm Beach, Florida. HRS never issued a foster home license to Speer at this address and the residence was not inspected by the local health department. In September 1993, Speer moved to 738 Carissa Drive, Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411. On October 18, 1993, the Health Department inspected Speer's home at 783 Carissa Drive, Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411, and found it to be unsatisfactory for use as a foster home for children. Speer moved to 4852-C Orleans Circle, West Palm Beach, Florida. She received a foster home license for that residence on October 31, 1993. At the date of the final hearing, Speer was living at 515 North 10th Street, Lake Worth, Florida. It is important that foster children have stability in their lives, including the location of their residence. Speer's frequent changes of residence could have a detrimental effect on the foster children in her care as noted by an HRS children and families counselor who visited Speer's homes over 17 times from June 1992 to October 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Margaret Speer's application for renewal of her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1769 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Rejected as not necessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's letter did not delineate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Paragraphs 1-2: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 3: Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine M. Linton Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 South Sapodilla West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Margaret Speer 515 North 10th Street Lake Worth, Florida 33460 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for re-licensure as a family foster home should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lorraine Arnold, has operated a foster home since 1995 at her current place of residence. Petitioner applied for and was granted a family foster home license in January 1995. Petitioner was approved for placement of up to two children between the ages of 5 and 10 years. Foster home licenses are valid for one year and must be renewed annually. Petitioner's license was renewed annually thereafter. On December 15, 2000, Petitioner applied to renew her foster home license. Respondent denied Petitioner's application for renewal on March 9, 2001. During the relevant time-period in 2000, Petitioner was entrusted with responsibility for several children, including two teenage foster children, L. C. and J. B. In late August 2000, Respondent's case worker approached Petitioner with the request to accept into her home L. C., a 17-year-old female. Petitioner was told that L. C. was severely emotionally disturbed (SED), had violent behavior problems and was taking psychotropic medication. Because of L. C.'s history of behavioral problems, including incidents of violence, Respondent offered to contract with a private company to provide Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) services to supplement the care given to L. C. Contract CNAs were to be present with L. C. around the clock, in order to provide Petitioner and her family some semblance of protection in the event of a violent outburst by L. C. This case worker assured her that under the watchful eye of the CNAs, L. C. would do fine. Petitioner was provided with additional monetary inducements by Respondent in order to persuade Petitioner to take in L. C. Upon placement, L. C.'s "Blue Book" was not provided to Petitioner. The "Blue Book" contained critical medical and social information about L. C. In addition, L. C. was not under the care of any local healthcare professional at the time of placement. Although Petitioner is a licensed pharmacist in Florida, she has received no special training in dealing with SED children. No specialized training of any kind was provided by Respondent during the two months that L. C. lived in Petitioner's home. Respondent was aware that L. C.'s needs required that she be placed in a living situation where she could receive proper therapy for her special needs, but none was provided. Respondent's conduct in the placement of L. C. in Petitioner's home violated its own guidelines and demonstrated very poor judgment on its part. The presence of contract CNAs was not intended to, nor did it in fact, relieve Petitioner of her responsibility to supervise foster children in her care. However, Petitioner was not instructed by Respondent that the teenage children in her care were not permitted to be alone or leave with the CNA, if the CNA offered to take them out for a supervised activity. In August of 2000, Petitioner gave L. C. and J. B., both minor girls, permission to go with the CNA, then on duty, to the home of L. C.'s aunt. While at the home of L. C.'s aunt, J. B., then fourteen years old, slipped out of the house and smoked marijuana. When J. B.'s case worker learned of the incident, she had J. B. tested for drug usage; J. B. tested positive for marijuana. Petitioner had L. C. tested and her test results were negative. Carla Washington, case worker for both L. C. and J. B., had previously informed Petitioner that L. C. was not to have contact with family members that was not supervised by Respondent. Petitioner misunderstood the instructions, and believed that L. C. was only restricted from having contact with her mother. Petitioner was not negligent in this incident, and J. B.'s misconduct could not have reasonably been foreseen. Less than a month before the incident in which J. B. smoked marijuana at L. C.'s aunt's house, there were two other incidents involving J. B. and L. C., with results detrimental to the foster children. On one occasion, Petitioner gave permission for the CNA on duty to take L. C. and another foster child out to the movies. Because of a family emergency, Petitioner left Orlando and drove to Tallahassee, leaving her adult daughter in charge of the household. The CNA took the two foster children to her residence, changed into "hoochie" clothes, went to a bar during which L. C. visited with her mother and witnessed a shooting. After the incident, the case worker spoke to Petitioner and reminded her that L. C. was not to have unsupervised contact with her mother. Petitioner complied with these instructions. No evidence was presented concerning the disposition of the CNA that perpetrated this outrageous conduct. Petitioner was not negligent in giving permission for the girls to go to the movies, and the CNA's conduct could not have been foreseen. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner was placed in a position of duress in regard to L. C. She had not received L. C.'s Blue Book, which contained all of her medical records and her Medicaid number, and L. C. was out of all of her psychotropic medications. Petitioner tried several times to find a psychiatrist who would treat L. C. She spent 2 days looking through the telephone book and calling every psychiatrist until she found one who would accept Medicaid. She also went to the Nemours Children's Clinic and spent most of the day waiting at the Sanford Health Department, where Petitioner finally discovered that L. C. could only be seen by a doctor in the Oviedo area. When the doctor in Oviedo was contacted an appointment was made for the following day at 2:00 p.m. Petitioner contacted the caseworker for assistance in getting L. C. to the doctor's appointment because Petitioner was unable to remain out of work for a third day. The case worker informed Petitioner that she was unable to assist, and if Petitioner did not see that the child got to the doctor any repercussions would be Petitioner's responsibility. Petitioner was given no choice but to rely on a family member to assist in making sure that L. C. received the required medical attention. Petitioner asked a family member to take L. C. and J. B. to the doctor's appointment. He left them in the reception area for 20 minutes to run an errand while L. C. waited to see the doctor. Before he returned, L. C. and J. B. misbehaved at the doctor's office. The adult family member did not have reason to believe that these two teenagers could not be left alone at a doctor's office for 20 minutes. He expected that the teenagers would behave themselves for such a short period of time. During the course of her testimony in this matter, J. B. testified that she had sexual relations in the house while living with Petitioner. This testimony is neither credible nor relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner has not committed an intentional or negligent act which materially affected the health or safety of L. C. or J. B. while in her care. Several years in the past, Petitioner used corporal punishment on a much younger, uncontrollable foster child on more than one occasion. Upon receiving counseling from her case worker, Petitioner agreed to corrective action to address her improper use of corporal punishment of foster children entrusted to her care. Over time, Petitioner has displayed extreme care and concern for the children placed in her care. She has taken the issues of supervision seriously. Petitioner has demonstrated that as a foster mother she has given the children placed in her care an abundance of love. She has taught them how to care for and love themselves. She has been there to listen to their needs and their desires, and she cares about them. She has taught them that self- control, self-discipline and hard work will lead to success in life.
Recommendation Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary grant Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Lorraine Arnold 3997 Biscayne Drive Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's license to operate a foster care home.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Respondent issued this license to Petitioner through the Devereux Foundation, which operates and maintains a network of foster homes to serve dependent children in Respondent's custody. Respondent places children in therapeutic foster when they have been exposed to a severe degree of physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse, as well as extreme neglect and/or abandonment. Such children require special care and cannot be disciplined like children in a stable nuclear family. Therapeutic foster parents should never spank or use other physical methods of punishment or behavior management on these children. Many therapeutic foster children have acute and unresolved issues with control and authority. In such cases, attempts by authority figures to assert rigid control over the children will likely provoke emotionally charged oppositional reactions by the children. This is especially true when the children have not developed a relationship with the authority figures. The likelihood that such oppositional reactions will occur is much greater when authority figures attempt to impose their will on the children with the use of physical force. Children in foster care experience great difficulty in learning to trust others. The inability to trust others is reinforced when a near-stranger makes demands on therapeutic foster children, then uses physical force to compel submission. Children from dysfunctional families often experience violence in the homes of their natural parents. The children learn at an early age to respond with violence to stressful situations. The use of physical force on foster children thus generates a real and severe risk of physical injury to the foster children, the foster parents, and innocent bystanders. One purpose of therapeutic foster care is to help children learn that violent behavior is not acceptable. When foster parents use physical force to compel obedience, they reinforce the lessons learned in the homes of their natural parents at the expense of the lessons the foster care program attempts to teach. Therapeutic foster parents undergo special training before they become licensed. The Model Approach to Parenting and Partnership (MAPP) training that all foster parents receive places special emphasis on the emotional fragility of children in foster care and the consequent need to avoid confrontation with foster children. In other words, MAPP training teaches foster parents not to engage in power struggles with their charges. MAPP training emphasizes the use of positive discipline for the inevitable situations in which foster children test the boundaries set by the foster parents. These methods include reinforcing acceptable behavior, verbal disapproval, loss of privileges, and redirection. Any form of verbal abuse or physical force is strictly prohibited. Petitioner received all of the training described above. In March 2001, a sibling group of two sisters (S.M.1 and S.M.2) and a brother (D.M.) were living in a therapeutic foster home operated by Brad and Sharon Carraway through the Devereux Foundation. Mr. and Mrs. Carraway were licensed therapeutic foster parents. Respondent and the Devereux Foundation have a policy that allows for substitute foster care when therapeutic foster parents need some time away from their foster children. In that case, Devereux arranges for another licensed therapeutic foster home in its network to care for the foster children for a period of time, usually a weekend. This arrangement is known as respite foster care. During March 2001, the Carraways needed a weekend away from their foster children to take care of some family business. At that time, Loretta Kelly was the foster care program manager for Devereux in the North Florida area. Ms. Kelly made arrangements for Petitioner and his wife to take the children during the weekend of March 23-25, 2001. The children arrived in Petitioner's home late in the afternoon of Friday, March 23, 2001. As S.M.1 and S.M.2 settled into their room, Petitioner advised them that supper would be served in five minutes. S.M.1 then announced that she was not hungry and would not be going to supper. Petitioner replied that S.M.1 could either go to the table for supper or he would be back in five minutes and make her go to the table. Five minutes later, Petitioner returned to the bedroom. He told S.M.1, who was sitting on the bed, to come in to supper. When S.M.1 refused again, Petitioner grabbed S.M.1 by the wrists and tried to drag her into the dining room. A struggle ensued with S.M.1 yelling for Petitioner to let go. During the struggle, S.M.1's wrist watch broke, leaving scratches on her arm. S.M.2 was in the hall. Hearing her sister call for help, S.M.2 ran in to help S.M.1. S.M.2 pushed Petitioner away from her sister. Petitioner then grabbed S.M.2 by the wrists and struggled with her for over a minute. During the struggle, S.M.2 slid down to a sitting position with her back against the wall. S.M.2 then used her feet in an attempt to break free from Petitioner. The struggle left S.M.2 with a scar from a scratch she received on her arm. Petitioner finally gave up and called the girls' therapist, Lori Farkas, to complain about the situation. S.M.2 heard Petitioner state that he wanted the girls out of his home. The incident was reported to Respondent. Subsequently, Respondent commenced a child protective investigation into the allegations; the investigation was still open on April 20, 2001. Petitioner became angry when he learned what the children told Respondent's investigators. He telephoned Ms. Kelly on the afternoon of April 20, 2001. He accused the children of lying and asserted that they should be punished. He threatened to file battery charges against the children and have them arrested if they did not change their story and "tell the truth." Next, Petitioner telephoned Ms. Carraway. He told Ms. Carraway that she ought to be teaching the girls morals and honesty. He accused the girls of lying. Petitioner informed Ms. Carraway that he was going to consult an attorney and have the girls arrested at school for assault and battery. Petitioner told Ms. Carraway that he would be more believable in light of the children's background. S.M.1 was with Ms. Carraway during Petitioner's telephone call. Ms. Carraway and S.M.1 wrote notes to each other regarding Petitioner's comments during the telephone call. Both girls were apprehensive for some time after this telephone call about the possibility of being arrested. Ms. Carraway called Ms. Kelly immediately after talking to Petitioner. Ms. Kelly then called Petitioner to instruct him not to make any further calls to the Carraway home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioner's therapeutic foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Motes 2023 Duneagle Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32311 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondents have cared for foster children for some twenty years. In November or December of 1975, they began with Christian Youth Care, Inc. (CYC), a foster home in Zephyrhills founded under the auspices of the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills. Since then small groups of adolescent girls have lived with respondents and their teenage daughter, Dawn. In all, some 80 children have lived at CYC since respondents have had charge of the home. In July of 1977, petitioner placed June Holmes, who is deaf and dumb, with respondents. After June had been with the Houghs for two weeks or so, Lillian Parsons, a social worker in petitioner's employ, told Mrs. Hough that June should be wearing a hearing aid. June did not want to wear a hearing aid. She was also disappointed that Mrs. Hough would not take her to Daytona Beach; she became very upset, wielded a straightened safety pen and started knocking things off bureaus. When Mr. Hough served as a medical technician in the armed forces, unruly patients were sometimes wrapped in blankets. Perhaps remembering this experience, he enlisted Mrs. Hough in wrestling June to the floor, wrapping her in a blanket and securing the blanket with three belts. In the process, Mr. Hough said to June, "See how mad you can get." These events caused concern among the other children living in the home, who gathered to watch and, at respondents' suggestion, to say prayers. Mrs. Hough told June that she loved her. After June had lain bound in this fashion for 45 minutes, respondents released her. The following day Mrs. Hough called Mrs. Parsons to report the incident and to ask that June be placed in another home. Mrs. Parsons expressed no disapproval of respondents' method of restraining June nor did she tell them not to do it again. June remained with respondents until she left for boarding school in St. Augustine. When June returned to the Houghs from school on Easter vacation 1978, she wanted a new pair of shoes that cost $24.95. Respondents bought her a different pair instead. Easter morning June wanted to wear her old shoes, not her new shoes. This caused an argument. Mrs. Hough stayed home with June while Mr. Hough took the others to church. When Mrs. Hough began packing June's clothes into a suitcase, June was "worried that [respondents] would move [her] out." Deposition of June Holmes, p. 5. She walked outside and sat under a tree near the road. Mrs. Hough telephoned her husband and summoned him home from church. With the help of a deputy sheriff brandishing handcuffs, respondents coaxed June into their van and drove her up the driveway to their home. At first she refused to leave the van, so respondents went inside without her. When June eventually went inside, there was another confrontation. Mr. Hough wrestled June to the floor and sent Mrs. Hough for a blanket. After respondents wrapped June in the blanket and secured it with belts, Mr. Hough set off to retrieve the children he had left at church. After Mr. Hough returned with the other children, respondents unwrapped June and there was an Easter egg hunt. The next day Mrs. Hough called petitioner's offices in New Port Richey, then drove June to New Port Richey and left her there, because she wanted no more to do with her. When Mrs. Parsons learned that respondents had wrapped June in a blanket a second time, she asked to be relieved of responsibility for June. Eventually David J. Schultz, at the time a child welfare social worker in petitioner's employ, assumed responsibility for June; and June was again placed with respondents. Mr. and Mrs. Hough frequently communicated with guidance counselors and teachers at the schools children in their care attended. They made six visits to talk about Evelyn Ciacelli's progress with Ricky Rowell, guidance counselor at Woodland Elementary School in Zephryhills, and spoke to him on the telephone about Evelyn on several other occasions. Disappointed in Evelyn's progress with her homework one night, Mr. Hough picked her up and shook her. On another occasion, Evelyn and her roommate were wrestling in their room after they had been sent to bed. Mr. Hough heard them from the kitchen, walked into their bedroom with a spatula in his hand, and gave Evelyn, who was wearing a bathrobe over her nightgown, a swat on the rear with the spatula. On November 20, 1978, David J. Schultz left Petitioner's employ. He subsequently went to work for a corporation controlled by respondents and began living in their home. He lived there on December 13, 1978. On December 13, 1978, Bonnie Blair McKenzie, then employed by petitioner as a community youth leader, picked up Cindy Spickelmier at a shelter home in Dade City and drove her to respondents' home. Cindy, a 14 year old, was at the shelter home after having run away from another foster home, the Newmans'. She had lived with respondents previously and David Schultz also knew her. Shortly after Cindy's arrival, David Schultz was talking to her in the Houghs' living room, where she was sitting on a couch, crying. Also present were Mr. Hough, Ms. McKenzie, Nancy Newman, the foster mother who had previously had custody of Cindy, and Ed Springer, then the social worker in petitioner's employ responsible for Cindy's placement. Angry because Cindy was ignoring him, David Schultz grabbed the hair of her head, jerked her up into a standing position, had her bend over and lean against a desk for support, and struck her buttocks with a wooden paddle an inch thick. He administered the first blow with such force that Ms. Newman was frightened and Ms. McKenzie was "horrified and devastated." (T.52). Cindy fell to her knees, hysterical. Less forcefully, David Schultz struck her buttocks a second time. At the hearing Mr. Hough testified that: after Dave gave her the swats she sat back down and she was a new child. We were able to communicate with her and we thought we were really making good progress and being able to work with the child. That was the purpose of the new program and of course we were trying to set up parameters that would be beneficial to the child. (T.233). Notwithstanding this perceived improvement in Cindy's deportment, Ed Springer gave Cindy another spanking 30 or 45 minutes after David Schultz had finished. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Hough, and Mr. Schultz, Ed Springer struck Cindy five times on the buttocks with the same wooden paddle David Schultz had used, as punishment for running away from the Newmans' house. Later, on the evening of December 13, 1978, Cindy ran away from the Houghs'. She ended up at her mother's house where she spent the night. The next day her mother took her to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. There Fay Wilbur an investigator for the Sheriff's Department, took photographs of Cindy's badly bruised buttocks. Petitioner's exhibits 3, 4 and 5. On the following day, December 15, 1978, Dr. Lena Ayala, a pediatrician, examined Cindy. She found large "[v]ery tender, painful" (T.55) hematomas covering the whole area of Cindy's buttocks. If she had seen a child in the custody of its natural parents in that condition, Dr. Ayala testified, she would have reported the matter to the child abuse registry. Petitioner discharged Ed Springer because of the beating he had administered to Cindy Spickelmier. Petitioner publishes a manual with a chapter entitled "Foster Family Group Homes for Dependent youth," Petitioner's exhibit No. 8. In part, the manual provides: 8.4.4 Unacceptable disciplinary approaches include: a. Corporal punishment--slapping, kicking, hitting, etc. * * * Humiliation, ridicule, sarcasm, shaming in front of the group or alone. Deprivation of essential needs such as food, sleep, or parental visits. Petitioner's exhibit No. 8, p.9. Although petitioner sometimes furnished foster group home licensees copies of its manuals, petitioner's files do not indicate that either Mr. or Mrs. Hough ever received a copy. Respondents wore unaware of the manual's contents on December 13, 1978; and David Schultz was also unaware of any policy against corporal punishment of foster group home children. Lorraine Cash, a foster mother in Pasco County, never spanked any foster child in her care over the age of eleven years. On the other hand, Henry Arnett, another foster parent in Pasco County, used corporal punishment in disciplining teen aged foster boys. He and his wife, Doris, were named foster parents of the year in 1978. On December 14, 1978, Joanne Wall telephoned respondents on behalf of petitioner and told Mr. Hough that David Schultz should be barred from their premises. When Mr. Hough protested that David Schultz lived on the premises, Ms. Wall asked Mr. Hough to keep David Schultz from working with the girls, which Mr. Hough agreed to do. On December 18, 1978, respondents submitted an application to petitioner for a child care center license, an application on which they had begun work considerably before December 13, 1978. Discouraged by the pace at which this application was being considered and by what respondents perceived as unfairness on the part of some of petitioner's personnel, Mr. Hough on February 15, 1979, told William Laing, a manager for petitioner, that he wanted all the foster children but two removed by five o'clock the following day, a Friday. Even though the agreement between petitioner and respondents called for two weeks' notice by the foster parents, petitioner's exhibit No. 6, Mr. Hough was unwilling to wait so long. Petitioner arranged to pick up all the foster children in respondents' care on the following day. Some of the children had not been told they would be leaving the Houghs' home. Respondents own improved real estate from which they derive rental income. In addition, CYC, funded by the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills, paid respondents a salary. Occasionally, Mr. Hough worked outside the home. Pasco County contributed to the costs of caring for foster children. Respondents did not need moneys petitioner paid them on behalf of the children for their own personal purposes.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That, on the next anniversary of the date of respondents' original foster group home license, petitioner discontinue respondents' license for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara McPherson, Esquire Post Office Box 5046 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Robert L. Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 443 Dade City, Florida 33525
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to operate a foster home for dependent children should be suspended or revoked for lack of cooperation, and violation of the Petitioner's discipline policy, and licensing standards as outlined in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an elderly woman who has operated a foster home since October 1989, at 7018 Ironwood Drive, Orlando, Orange County, Florida. Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license in October, 1989. Foster home licenses are valid for one year and must be renewed annually. Respondent has annually renewed her license and presently holds license number 1093-11, issued October 18, 1993. In a licensing visit on April 6, 1990 Respondent admitted that she had been using some physical discipline with the children. She stated that she had been tapping the children's hands and had threatened one of the kids with a comb. Respondent was counselled by the Petitioner's licensing representative in regard to the agency's disciplinary guidelines. As a follow-up to the counseling session, a letter was sent to Respondent, dated April 6, 1990, by Licensing Representative Barbara Wavell, which advised Respondent that physically disciplining a foster child in her home was a violation of HRS policy. Respondent received the letter, and although she now believes that it contains misstatements of facts, she did not dispute its contents at the time. Respondent was made aware of the discipline policy of HRS on various occasions and during the required foster parent training, and agreed to abide by it. On April 10, 1992, Respondent expressed to Ms. Wavell that she believed "schools should be allowed to spank" and that "children need discipline and there is nothing wrong with appropriate spanking". In late 1993, Respondent hit at least one foster child who was placed in her home, because the child wet the bed. During 1993 and early 1994, Respondent allowed older foster children to discipline younger foster children with corporal punishment. On occasion, Respondent has restricted children from having access to their family members. Respondent has made derogatory remarks about some of the foster children's biological family members while in the presence of the foster children. Respondent had problems working with some of the children's caseworkers, most notably Jodi Peterson, on various occasions. Respondent expressed her concern that the caseworker visited her home too much, and she preferred that Ms. Peterson not have much contact with her foster children. Respondent felt that she should be included in the conversations between the children and their foster care counselors and would get upset that she was not included in these discussions. Respondent did not recognize the need for the children to have privacy and that it impinged on their right to have a proper relationship with their counselors. Respondent had on-going communications problems with the caseworkers. Respondent was specifically instructed concerning monetary allowances for the children, and the fact that the money given to Respondent was to be used for the children for clothing and incidentals. Respondent had difficulty accepting the fact that the children were entitled to monetary allowances to be used for clothing and incidentals. Respondent refused to allow the foster children placed in her home to participate in school activities, she refused to give them their allowance money to pay for school field trips. Respondent did not allow the foster children to have friends visit or to go places for fun. She encouraged them to stay home and watch television in their free time. Respondent on occasion made derogatory marks to some of the foster children placed in her home. Respondent did not show appropriate concern for the safety of a four- year-old foster child who was sharing a bedroom with two twelve-year-old foster children. Respondent was aware that they were hitting her, however, Respondent did not remove the child from that bedroom, although she had three empty bedrooms in the home. Although many visits have been made to the Respondent's home in an attempt to work with her to assist her in bringing the quality of care in her home up to an acceptable level, Respondent has failed to comply. On April 5, 1994, Petitioner's representative visited the Respondent to discuss the reasons that the Petitioner would be seeking a revocation of her license to operate a foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's license to operate a foster home. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1 (in part), 2, 4 (in part), 7 (in part), 8 (in part), 10 (in part), 11 (in part), 13 (in part), 14, 15, 16 (in part), 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), 31, 33, 34. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence: 1 (in part), 10 (in part), 19, 24. Rejected as subsumed, irrelevant or immaterial: paragraphs 3, 6 (in part), 7 (in part), 8 (in part), 9, 11 (in part), 12, 13 (in part), 16 (in part), 17, 23, 27, 28 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), 32. Rejected as a conclusion of law: paragraph 5 Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 7 Legal Office 400 W. Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jane Carey, Esquire 905 W. Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Bouelvard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Bouelvard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 5, 1977, the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Vincent A. Morris, filed an application for licensure to operate a foster home in District V of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Carol Parks, a Social Worker employed by the Petitioner and who is in charge of licensing in the Foster Care Section of District V, testified as to the procedures utilized in considering applications for foster home licensure. Ms. Parks testified that once an applicant files, she visits the applicant and goes through the orientation session, familiarizing the applicant with the forms, procedures and in a general manner outlining the standards necessary to obtain a foster home license. Ms. Parks ascertained that the Morrises were married and she additionally checked with the Sheriff's Department and other local law enforcement agencies to determine whether or not the Respondents had been convicted of a felony as an adult. 1/ Based on this search with the various local law enforcement agencies, Ms. Parks found no evidence of a conviction of the Respondents. As stated, the Respondents filed the application on or about December 5, 1977, and a license was granted them during April, 1978. On cross-examination, Ms. Parks failed to recall whether or not she asked the Respondents whether or not there were any outstanding felony convictions against them. She testified that she was satisfied with the manner in which the Respondents operated their facility and confirmed the fact that the Respondents were permitted to adopt a sixth foster child during January of 1979. Esther Morris testified that during the orientation session, Ms. Parks never inquired of her if she had been convicted of a crime. Mrs. Morris inquired of Ms. Parks and other agency personnel of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services whether or not she could begin to remodel her home when she initially filed her application. She was advised by Ms. Parks and others that she should defer any remodeling until they advised her to proceed. The Morrises later obtained approval from that Department to commence the remodeling of her home, which she did, and expended funds totaling approximately $22,000.00 for preparation of this facility as a foster home facility. Presently, she has six foster children, the last of which was adopted during January, 1979. She testified that Ms. Parks asked her whether or not she or her husband had been to jail and she replied that she had not. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 is a certified copy of a judgment and sentence indicating that on or about August 11, 1975, Respondent, Esther V. Morris, was convicted of welfare fraud, for which she was fined $500.00. Chapter 10C-10.29(7), Florida Administrative Cede, provides in pertinent part that: "No applicant can be considered who, as an adult, has been convicted of a crime." It is based on this rule that the Petitioner is here seeking to revoke the foster hose license of the Respondents. Inasmuch as the above-mentioned rule makes no mention of or provides any procedure for revocation of a license which has been granted, the undersigned is of the considered opinion that such rule provides no basis upon which the Petitioner can revoke the Respondents' license. Particular note was made of the fact that the Respondents credibly testified that they, at no time, misrepresented to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that they were convicted of a crime as an adult. While it is true that the cited rule indicates that no person can be considered who, as an adult, has been convicted of a crime, a different issue is here posed inasmuch as the Respondents are now possessed with a license, a right to which certain due process procedures must be complied with prior to revocation. With these facts in mind, the undersigned is not prepared to read into the above- quoted rule authority which is not contained in said rule. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the Administrative Complaint filed herein be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
