The Issue Whether Respondent's employment by the Petitioner should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this case, Hodgson was employed by the School Board as a custodian. She has been so employed since 1981. In 1999, Hodgson became deficient in the most basic element of a custodian's job--the duty to show up for work at her assigned school, in this case Miami Park Elementary (Miami Park). By July 1, 1999, Hodgson had accumulated ten unauthorized absences, enough to draw the attention of Principal Henry N. Crawford, Jr. (Crawford), and enough, standing alone, to justify termination under Petitioner's contract with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) the bargaining unit to which Hodgson belongs. At this time Crawford did not seek to terminate Hodgson's employment, although he could have. Instead, he counseled her regarding the School Board's reasonable and lawful requirement that she, like all employees, had the responsibility to inform the school's administration in advance of an absence, or as soon as practicable in an emergency. Nevertheless, on July 30, 1999, Hodgson left work at 6:46 p.m. instead of at the end of her shift at 11:30 p.m. Her area of the building was not cleaned properly and she was docked one half day's pay. For a considerable time after that incident, Hodgson's attendance improved. But in March 2000, her attendance again became a problem. Hodgson was absent 13 times between March 3 and March 20. Crawford again attempted to work with Hodgson, authorizing six of those absences. At the same time, he informed her of the obvious: that this level of absenteeism impeded the effective operation of the worksite. Crawford encouraged Hodgson to consider taking advantage of the School Board's generous leave-of-absence policy in order to preserve her good standing at work while taking the time necessary to deal with the issues which were causing her to miss work. Respondent neither replied to Crawford's proposal that she consider a leave of absence nor improved upon her by now sporadic attendance. Thereafter, Crawford requested assistance from OPS. On April 11, 2000, OPS wrote to advise Hodgson that she was absent without authority and that her absences were deemed abandonment of position. She was directed to provide written notification to OPS to review her situation or her employment would be terminated by the School Board. For a short time, Hodgson took this threat seriously enough to improve her attendance, but by now Crawford had a much shorter fuse with respect to Hodgson's disregard for workplace policies regarding attendance. When, on May 11, 2000, Respondent was an hour and a half late to work, Crawford sent her a memorandum the next day, again reminding her that she must report to work on time and that she was to report any absences or tardiness to school administration in a timely manner. Crawford wrote two additional warning memos to Hodgson in June 2000, but was unsuccessful in persuading her to improve her attendance or to discuss her situation, including the advisability of a leave of absence, in a forthright manner. Finally, Crawford directed Respondent to attend a disciplinary conference known as a Conference for the Record (CFR) on July 3, 2000, to discuss her absenteeism. At the CFR, Crawford again gave Respondent face-to-face directives to be present at work and when absences were unavoidable, to call the school in a timely manner. Two additional formal disciplinary conferences were held between the July 3 CFR and Respondent's termination. Crawford, having been unsuccessful in his efforts to generate honest communication with Hodgson about why a 20-year employee had stopped fulfilling her most basic job requirement, attempted to refer her to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). EAP offers employees assistance in resolving personal problems in a manner which allows the employee to also fulfill work obligations. If such accommodations cannot be made, EAP counselors assist in helping the employee separate from his employment in a manner which does not blemish his resume. Supervisors such as Crawford may make referrals to the EAP whenever they feel an employee can and should be helped, and EAP services are also available for the asking to any School Board employee who wishes to take advantage of those services. No one is required to use EAP services, and Hodgson declined to do so. Hodgson's by now chronic absenteeism persisted. Her colleagues on the custodial staff tried, some more graciously than others, to cover her assigned duties, but Crawford was fielding an increasing number of complaints from teachers regarding their classrooms not being serviced. Morale among custodians declined in the face of the administration's seeming inability to control Hodgson. During the last two years of Hodgson's employment, she had 175 unauthorized absences. Eighty-one of those occurred in the last 12 months prior to her termination. By way of defense, Hodgson said that she developed diabetes in the past three years and that most of her absences were medically necessary. She offered voluminous stacks of paper which she claims document legitimate medical problems which made it impossible for her to work. Additional exhibits relate to a young relative she felt obligated to drive to medical appointments during her work hours. These exhibits prove little, if anything. Individually and collectively they are neither self-authenticating nor self-explanatory, and many had not been previously provided to Crawford in connection with her failure to appear for work, nor disclosed to the School Board in compliance with the pre-hearing order in this case. But even if these documents had been properly authenticated and would have in fact justified an extended medical and/or family hardship leave of absence, the evidence fails to establish that they were tendered to Crawford at the time Hodgson was absent. Hodgson did not seek medical or disability leave, either individually or through her collective bargaining unit. Hodgson offered no testimony to contradict the School Board's evidence regarding the dozens of occasions on which she failed to show up for work. Neither did she offer any evidence that her repeated failure to comply with attendance policies was justified due to any misconduct on the part of any of Petitioner's employees. At all times material to this case, the School Board was in compliance with applicable statutory and contractual provisions concerning employee discipline and termination with respect to Hodgson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered, sustaining Respondent's suspension without pay and terminating her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice E. Hodgson 14020 Northeast 3rd Court, No. 5 North Miami, Florida 33161 Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Merrett R. Stierheim, Interim Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 912 Miami, Florida 33132 Honorable Charlie Crist, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact in the recommended order are supported by competent, substantial evidence. They are adopted with modification together with the following supplemental findings of fact and as such both constitute the complete set of findings of fact for purposes of this final order. Albury also engages in the private practice of law as a member of a law firm. He devotes a majority of his working hours in that practice and is prohibited from representing other school boards because of his work relationship with the Monroe County School Board (the School Board). Until 1980 or 1981, Albury utilized his private law office and his private secretary to perform his duties as school board attorney. There is no evidence that this was for the convenience of the School Board, and it was a known fact that he performed his work from his private law office. The new school board office was renovated in 1980 or 1981, but no office was set up for Albury until late 1983. At that time, one room was made available to both the school board members and to Albury as school board attorney who jointly shared the one room. Prior to late 1983, that room was used by a school board employee who retired in mid-1983. Albury spends very little time in this office since a majority of his duties are performed elsewhere. Until relatively recently, Albury's private secretary did most of his secretarial work in connection with his school board representation. She was a long time employee and very familiar with his working habits, etc. When he left his employment, his new secretary who was less familiar with his habits and school board matters did less work in this area. Consequently, Albury used any one of three school board secretaries for assistance. He does not supervise any of the three secretaries and must request permission from their supervisors before having them perform work for him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order declaring Hilary U. Albury eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984.
Findings Of Fact In September, 1989, Shirley B. Walker (Walker), was a clerk-typist in the Bartow office of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), District 6, Subdistrict B, Children, Youth and Families, Child Protection Services. Walker was absent on Tuesday, September 5, 1989, and had a friend call her supervisor to say that Walker would not be at work until Friday, September 8, 1989, due to a medical condition. Walker reportedly had been in an altercation with her husband over the Labor Day weekend and had been injured to the extent that her neck was in a brace. The supervisor, Patricia Lawler, asked that the friend give Walker the message that she would need to bring a doctor's excuse with her on her return to work. Walker did not return to work on Friday, September 8, 1989. Walker did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work that day. Since Walker had no home telephone, and the telephone number of a relative that had been given to her supervisor as a means of contacting her at home was obsolete by September 8, Lawler asked office friends of Walker to go to Walker's home during the lunch hour to check on her well-being and find out why she was not at work. When they did, they found no one at home. Walker also did not go to work on Monday through Friday, September 11 through 15, 1989. Again, she did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work. No one at the office knew anything further about Walker or why she was not at work from Friday, September 8 through Friday, September 15, 1989. When Walker began her work at HRS, she was given an employee handbook, part of which clearly states: "If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned." At approximately 4:45 p.m. on Friday, September 15, 1989, Lawler hand- delivered to Walker at Walker's home a letter notifying Walker that she was being terminated from her employment with HRS for the consecutive unexcused and unauthorized absences, which were viewed as an abandonment of her employment and a resignation from the State Career Service. Although Walker asked for a formal administrative hearing on the question whether she had abandoned her position, neither she nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Shirley B. Walker, abandoned her position and resigned from the State Career Service. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley B. Walker 1050 Golfview Avenue Apartment 803 Bartow, FL 33830 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, a former employee of the Respondent, was overpaid in the amount of $1,165.76, and should be required to repay that amount to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a career service employee of the Respondent and was initially employed on November 17, 1997. The Petitioner’s employment with the Respondent was terminated on June 30, 2003, due to layoffs created by the outsourcing of the Family Services Unit of the Respondent. The Petitioner’s annual rate of pay at the time of her termination was $19,797.44, paid bi-weekly. By letters dated August 26, 2003, October 14, 2003, and February 16, 2004, the Petitioner was informed that six separate salary overpayments had occurred. The Petitioner actually worked 56 hours during the pay period of June 20, 2003 through July 3, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The Petitioner was inadvertently paid for working the days of July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, although her employment had been terminated effective June 30, 2003. The overpayment was for 24 hours, amounting to $183.79, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. The Petitioner was no longer employed by the Respondent during the pay period of July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The overpayment amounted to $601.70, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. Following termination of employment, the Respondent’s Human Resources Department conducted an audit of the terminated employee’s leave. An audit was performed by the Respondent concerning the Petitioner’s leave. In the course and scope of the Respondent performing the audit of the Petitioner’s leave, the Respondent discovered that the Petitioner had been overpaid for four pay periods in 2003. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages in sick leave. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has either sick leave or annual leave remaining, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time becomes “leave without pay.” The Petitioner was overpaid in four separate pay periods when she had insufficient sick or annual leave as follows: 1/31/03-2/13/03: 16.50 hours 4/11/03-4/24/03: 22.75 hours 4/25/03-5/08/03: 4.25 hours 5/23/03-6/05/03: 4.75 hours The sum of the hours of overpayment is 48.25, which translates to the amount of $380.27 in overpayment to the Petitioner for the referenced pay periods. The total amount of the Respondent’s overpayment to the Petitioner, based upon the salary payments for July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, July 4 through 17, 2003, and the four pay periods in which the Petitioner was overpaid when her sick and annual leave had run out is $183.79 plus $601.70 plus $380.27, which totals $1,165.76. The Petitioner was not at fault for the overpayment. She did not falsify her leave reports or timesheets, nor was she accused by the Respondent of having done so. The Petitioner believed that the pay she received for July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, was severance pay since she had been terminated when her position had been eliminated. The Respondent does not issue severance pay to terminated employees. The Petitioner believes that some of the leave she had taken during the four pay periods when her sick and annual leave had run out should have been considered administrative leave which, according to the Respondent, was offered to employees in the Family Services Unit who were facing termination as an aid to finding new jobs. Administrative leave was available to employees whose positions were being eliminated to allow them to use the Internet while at the office to search for jobs, and to leave the office for interviews or any testing required for re- employment. The Petitioner failed to document leave time, if any, during the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, that she took for purposes of job testing or interviews. The Petitioner failed to properly designate administrative leave on the automated leave system, Time Direct, for the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, even though, as a secretary specialist for the Respondent for seven years, her duties included keeping track of leave for the people in her work unit. The Respondent offered several of the Petitioner’s timesheets that reflect the Petitioner’s having taken administrative leave on more than 30 occasions from October 2002 through May 2003. These time entries for administrative leave include time during each of the four pay periods at issue in this proceeding, January 31, 2003 through February 13, 2003, April 11, 2003 through April 24, 2003, April 25, 2003 through May 8, 2003, and May 23, 2003 through June 5, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order requiring the Petitioner to repay the Respondent $1,165.76. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosanna Boyd Apartment 162 3400 Townsend Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32277 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to training and education at Respondent’s expense in order to return him to suitable gainful employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Respondent or Department), is the agency of the state of Florida charged with administration of medical care coordination and reemployment services that are necessary to assist employees injured in the workplace to return to suitable gainful employment. Petitioner, Nathan Lavon Florence, is a 37-year-old man residing in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner received his Graduation Equivalent Diploma in 2001, and held a number of different jobs between 2001 and 2007, including line cook, sales associate, construction laborer, and warehouse worker. Petitioner began an electrician apprenticeship program in 2007, which he completed in May 2012. Petitioner began working for Barnes Electrical Company, Inc. (Barnes), as an electrician’s helper in August 2013. Barnes paid Petitioner biweekly at the rate of $13 per hour for regular work and $19.50 per hour for overtime. On July 16, 2014, Petitioner suffered an on-the-job injury in which his right hand was crushed by a light pole. A workers’ compensation claim (the underlying claim) was filed with Amerisure Insurance Companies, Barnes’ workers’ compensation carrier. Petitioner’s authorized treating physician was Dr. Steven Kronlage. On October 22, 2015, following three surgeries and a period of treatment, Dr. Kronlage determined Petitioner had attained maximum medical improvement and referred Petitioner for pain management. Dr. Kronlage assigned Petitioner a permanent impairment rating of 15 percent and assigned the following work restrictions: medium-level work, no use of power tools with right hand, and no lifting more than 20 pounds with right hand. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, medium-level work limits lifting to a maximum of 50 pounds. Barnes was unable to offer Petitioner employment that met his work restrictions. The parties to the underlying claim entered into a joint stipulation on January 14, 2016. The joint stipulation “resolv[ed] all issues” and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The parties agree that the Claimant’s average weekly wage shall be amended upward by $7.59 resulting in a new average weekly wage of $386.09. The Employer/Carrier shall recalculate Claimant’s past indemnity benefits utilizing the average weekly wage of $386.09 and shall pay past due benefits utilizing this average weekly wage plus penalties and interest. Petitioner was represented by counsel in the underlying claim. On November 8, 2015, Petitioner applied to the Department for a vocational assessment to determine the best way to return Petitioner to suitable gainful employment. On November 19, 2015, the Department issued Petitioner a decision letter determining that the best way to return Petitioner to suitable gainful employment was through job placement assistance. Cynthia Baker was the vocational rehabilitation consultant assigned to Petitioner’s case. Ms. Baker based her recommendation for job placement assistance on Petitioner’s educational background, his pre-injury average weekly wage (AWW), his work restrictions, and the “transferable skills” Petitioner could bring to the job market (e.g., knowledge of the English language; knowledge of materials, methods, and tools used in construction and repair of housing; and knowledge of machines and tools). Ms. Baker conducted a labor market survey to identify job openings appropriate for Petitioner’s skill level and work restrictions. Her goal was to identify jobs which could return Petitioner to employment at, or close to, his pre-injury AWW. The labor market survey identified a variety of jobs available in the Pensacola area which Ms. Baker deemed suitable to Petitioner’s skill level and work restrictions. Potential jobs included customer service representative for Florida Pest Control, retail sales associate for T-Mobile, asset protection/loss prevention specialist for Home Depot, and vehicle transporter for Hertz. Ms. Baker prepared a résumé for Petitioner to utilize in applying for jobs identified in the labor market survey, and she connected Petitioner with Michelle Godson at CareerSource, the customer service specialist who would further assist Petitioner with employment opportunities in the area. Petitioner did not apply for any of the jobs identified by Respondent through the labor market survey. Rather, Petitioner found employment on his own and sought no further assistance from Respondent. Petitioner began work in December 2015 with WIS International (WIS) as an inventory associate. The job entails traveling to, and conducting inventory for, a variety of retail stores in the region. Petitioner utilizes a hand-held scanner to complete retail inventories. Petitioner’s rate of pay is $8.50 per hour and he is paid on a weekly basis. Petitioner works part-time for WIS, thus his earnings are below his pre-injury AWW. Petitioner has no plans to apply for a full-time position with WIS, although full-time work has become available with WIS during his employment. Petitioner invested significant time and effort toward his electrician apprenticeship, and desires a career in a field he enjoyed as much as electrician’s helper. Petitioner has requested the Department provide him with a training and education program to become a radiology (x-ray) technician. Specifically, he would like to attend Pensacola State College’s Radiography Program. Mary Cilek is a senior management analyst supervisor with the Department and reviewed Petitioner’s request for training and education. Ms. Cilek researched information on the internet regarding the personal qualities of, and physical demands on, radiology technicians, as well as the educational requirements to become a radiology technician. No competent evidence was introduced on which the undersigned could make a finding as to the particular educational requirements to become a radiology technician, or whether Petitioner would be able to perform the duties of a radiology technician within his work restrictions.1/ Petitioner’s argument in this case is twofold: First, the Department should assist him to obtain a career, rather than “any old job” that would allow him to earn at or near his pre- injury AWW. Second, Petitioner objects to the Department’s reliance on his pre-injury AWW as the basis for a labor market survey. Petitioner maintains that his pre-injury AWW was artificially low because he was out of work, or working part- time, during some of the weeks prior to the injury due to an illness. Section 440.491(1)(g), Florida Statutes, defines “suitable gainful employment” as employment . . . that is reasonably attainable in light of the employee’s age, education, work history, transferable skills, previous occupation, and injury, and which offers an opportunity to restore the individual as soon as practicable and nearly as possible to his or her average weekly earnings at the time of injury. While Petitioner maintains that none of the jobs identified was reasonably obtainable, given Petitioner’s work history, education, and work restrictions, Petitioner introduced insufficient evidence on which the undersigned could make that finding.2/ In this case, Petitioner’s AWW was established by the stipulation. Petitioner introduced no evidence that he had moved to set aside the stipulation or otherwise challenge the determination of his AWW. Petitioner did not claim that the stipulation was obtained by either fraud or duress, or based on mistake of fact.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Nathan Lavon Florence, is not eligible for training and education services at Respondent’s expense. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Respectively on September 20 and September 9, 1988, the Petitioner and the Respondent submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix To Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommending rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbers 1 and 5 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent substantial, evidence. The petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 2 is hereby rejected in that the petitioner did not terminate her position on August 17, 1987, and she was not reemployed on September 29, 1987, for the reasons stated above in paragraphs numbers 1 through 12. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 3 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reasons stated in paragraphs No. 7 and 8 above. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is rejected as phrased, for the reasons and upon the grounds set forth in paragraph No. 4 above. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact numbers (1) through (7) are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner became a member of the Florida Retirement System in September 1987 and allowing Petitioner to transfer her previously-earned Teachers' Retirement System credits to the Florida Retirement System. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0673 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 6 and 7 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Ann Ash, Esquire Harold N. Braxton, Esquire One Datran Center, Suite 406 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Department of Administration 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department"), was overpaid in the amount of $826.82 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On June 5, 1995, Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with Respondent to resolve certain disciplinary matters not directly relevant to this case. For purposes of this proceeding, the key element of the settlement agreement was that Petitioner would accept a voluntary demotion. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Petitioner would retain his current salary status for a period not to exceed five years, though it would exceed the maximum for his new pay grade. On June 7, 1995, the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") entered a final order approving the settlement agreement in disposition of Petitioner's complaint. Petitioner did not appeal the final order. Rule 60K-2.004(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a demoted state employee's base rate of pay may exceed the maximum of the salary range to which the employee has been demoted for a maximum of five years. Petitioner's base rate of pay was allowed to exceed the maximum of his new pay grade for the full five years. During this period, Petitioner benefited from pay grade increases, received a reclassification of his position, and was not promoted. The five-year period ended in June 2000. Respondent's main office in Tallahassee twice per year issues a computer-generated list of employees receiving pay over the maximum of their pay grades. Human resources employees in Respondent's branch offices then examine the list to determine whether these employees' base rate of pay should continue to exceed the maximum. Respondent issued an "Employees Over Maximum" list in September 2000. Rex Duley of the District 8 human resources office examined the approximately 15 listed names of persons working in District 8. Mr. Duley determined that the applicable five-year period for Petitioner's receipt of pay above his grade had expired in June 2000. Mr. Duley prepared a letter, dated September 11, 2000, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,316.11 in gross overpayments since June 2000. Respondent subsequently completed the full computation through the Bureau of State Payroll's automated system, and determined that the net overpayment to Petitioner was $826.82. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the net overpayment. Petitioner testified that he would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. Instead, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence calling into question the validity of the 1995 settlement agreement. This evidence was deemed irrelevant and was not admitted. The evidence established that Petitioner voluntarily entered the settlement agreement, did not appeal from the PERC final order adopting the settlement agreement, and accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement for a period of five years. The time for contesting that agreement has long passed. Petitioner also questioned Respondent's diligence in discovering the overpayments. Petitioner was well aware of the five-year limitation on the salary arrangement established by the settlement agreement, and was in at least as good a position as Respondent to know that he was being overpaid between June and September 2000. Petitioner accepted the overpayments without questioning them or calling Respondent's attention to them. Petitioner's contention that he is being penalized for Respondent's lax bookkeeping is thus without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Robert J. Richmond 5411 Loyloa Lane Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Since 1968 the Petitioner, Donald W. Hulmes has been attorney for the Broward Community College. Previously he was attorney for the Broward County Board of Public Instruction (School Board), having held this position since 1955. During the Petitioner's employment with the School Board he was a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). In 1968 the college was separated from the School Board by the legislature, and became autonomous under its own Board of Trustees, which appointed the Petitioner as its college attorney. For four more years in this capacity, until 1972, the Petitioner continued to be enrolled as a member of SCOERS. The college's finances were examined on an annual basis by legislative auditors. As a result of these audits performed for fiscal years 1969-1970 and 1971-1972, the auditor commented adversely on the college's practice of processing the Petitioner's annual retainer as salary payments with applicable payroll deductions taken. When the Petitioner was employed by the college there was no change in his contract status relative to duties and responsibilities, and the college had continued to make retirement deductions for him the same as was done during his School Board employment. As a result of the adverse comments from the legislative auditor the college fiscal personnel considered whether the Petitioner's position was as an employee, or was contracted services. If the position of college attorney was to be on an employee basis, time reports would have to be maintained and other policies affecting employees would have to be adhered to. If the position was contracted services, compensation would have to be in a form other than salary payments. Based on these considerations, the college provided the Petitioner with a contract for one year with a stipulated retainer, and in 1972 the Petitioner was disenrolled from SCOERS. Alternatively, the college could have determined that the Petitioner's position was as an employee. Although the Petitioner was not formally notified of the action taken by the college, he and the college comptroller discussed the matter, and the Petitioner assumed he was going to have some problems. Subsequently, he noticed that his checks were a different color, and had different slots and blocks, but his secretary handled the deposit of the checks into his account, so little attention was paid to these changes, including the absence of a deduction for retirement. Sometime thereafter the Petitioner began to make inquiries of the college fiscal personnel relative to reentering the retirement system. However, no formal or written inquiry was made until 1978 when the Petitioner had been out of SCOERS for six years. During these years, and until 1979, the Petitioner's compensation arrangement with the college was by annual retainer for specified services, plus an hourly rate for special services. He has been and remains the senior partner of a law firm consisting of himself and four other attorneys. He is free to provide legal advice to and represent members of the public. This law firm maintains two offices, one in Hollywood and one in Fort Lauderdale, and the Petitioner has a private listing in the telephone directory. He has a $1,000 per month draw with his law firm, although he does not pay into the firm or contribute to its income substantially. When the Petitioner applied to get back into the retirement system, the college was given an Employment Relationship Questionnaire to complete, for the purpose of determining the facts relative to his eligibility. Among other information submitted by the college, it indicated that the Petitioner was engaged by the college on a part-time basis. In addition, in June of 1978, the president of the college analyzed the nature of the services rendered by the Petitioner as college attorney, and estimated that on a monthly basis he spent approximately 30 hours on routine and special issue work. Further, the Petitioner provides his own office space, library, secretarial assistance, and in his absence his law partner was available to advise the college, if necessary. Faculty members at the college have a 30 hour work week, and administrative staff personnel and other classified employees are required to work 37 1/2 hours per week. The Petitioner's relationship with the college does not require him to maintain any special working hours as other college employees are required to do. He is not subject to a pre-employment physical examination. He does not receive annual leave or sick leave. No written performance evaluations are prepared for the Petitioner, as is done for other college employees except the president. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not been a full-time employee of Broward Community College. In 1979 the college began making deductions from the Petitioner's payments as contributions to the Florida Retirement System, and these contributions were reported. As a result the Division of Retirement advised the Petitioner that he is not eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System, and denied him reinstatement in SCOERS. Previously, in 1970, the Petitioner had rejected an opportunity to become a member of the Florida Retirement System. He has left his contributions of SCOERS on deposit. His contributions to the Florida Retirement System since 1979 are in the process of being refunded. Essentially, the Petitioner contends that he was disenrolled from membership in SCOERS by the college wrongfully, as a result of administrative error; the Respondent claims that there was no error because the Petitioner was not eligible for membership in the SCOERS retirement system, and does not meet the criteria for membership in the Florida Retirement System.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED, that the Petitioner, Donald W. Hulmes, be denied reinstatement in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, and that he be denied membership in the Florida Retirement System. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 24th day of June, 1981. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Terry McNab, Esquire Post Office Box 12 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North ionroo Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
