The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, a foster home operator, committed violations of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, as alleged by Respondent, sufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to renew Petitioner's license.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1999, Petitioner applied for renewal of her license to operate a foster care home. The license was due to expire on February 15, 2000. Respondent's investigation of the application was eventually concluded on June 15, 2000. By letter dated August 10, 2000, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's decision that, as a consequence of the Florida abuse report finding that Petitioner had failed to provide adequate food and medical care to children in her care, her home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. At final hearing, Petitioner's testimony established that she did not intend to again operate a foster home. Her desire in requesting a hearing was simply "to clear her good name" from the allegations contained in Florida abuse report number 1999-124723. She further admitted that her personal physician opposed renewal of her license due to Petitioner's heart condition. Petitioner offered copies of medical reports from a medical practitioner as proof that allegations of the abuse report were incorrect. Specifically, it is found that the medical records proffered at best show only that the children were taken to a doctor on specific occasions and does little to rebut the abuse report’s allegations of inadequate food and medical care. Further, testimony of Respondent’s employees at final hearing established that Petitioner’s son, a convicted felon without exemption status, had been residing in the home. Pursuant to applicable statutes, such a resident in the home also prevents re-licensure.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is recommended that a final order be entered confirming the denial of Petitioner’s license to operate a foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Stephanie Reeves 1707 Birchwood Circle Apartment 1 Leesburg, Florida 34748 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) may revoke Respondent's family foster care license due to her continued contact with her husband after he was convicted of sexual molestation of their teen-aged daughter.
Findings Of Fact Lila and Charles Dean were licensed foster parents from 1986 through 1991, when they adopted their daughter who was then six years old. The couple subsequently had two natural daughters. In January 2001, the 16-year-old adopted daughter reported that Charles Dean had been sexually abusing her for approximately two years. Lila Dean immediately had Charles Dean move out of the family home. She has been consistently supportive of their daughter and went with her through the whole abuse and rehabilitation system. Charles Dean was convicted in 2001 of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and is a registered sex offender. Lila Dean has been separated from Charles Dean since January 2001, but she has not filed for divorce. On March 13, 2002, Lila Dean was relicensed by DCF as a family foster parent. George Payne, DCF Family Counselor III, testified that during the family foster home re-licensing process prior to March 13, 2002, Lila Dean admitted to him that she was seeing her husband away from the home once every two or three months to discuss child support, insurance, etc., and that he had no contact with the children. She also admitted that with the permission of his probation officer, Charles Dean had come to the home, while the children were at school, to make needed repairs. At Mr. Payne's urging, she promised to get someone else to make any future repairs. The licensing process took eleven months because of DCF's concerns about Mrs. Dean's contacts with her husband, but DCF licensed her individually on March 13, 2002, because of her previous excellent record as a foster parent in another district supervised by Mr. Payne from 1985 to 1989. On May 13, 2002, upon receiving an abuse report that Mrs. Dean had been having regular contacts with her husband; that Mrs. Dean had made comments in the community that Mr. Dean's sexual abuse was not that serious because the girl was his adopted, not his biological child; and that Mrs. Dean had spoken on Mr. Dean's behalf requesting that he be spared a prison sentence, DCF removed the two non-verbal, toddler, foster children who were then in Mrs. Dean's foster care and instituted a further abuse investigation. After the abuse report had been received regarding Mrs. Dean's 2002 contacts with her husband, she told Mr. Payne that she was not looking for a relationship with any other men because they might want a sexual relationship with her, but that sex was not an issue with her husband, so she felt comfortable with him. The abuse report, which related the couple's more frequent contacts, suggests the family is "working toward reconciliation," something Mrs. Dean has denied to Mr. Payne. The abuse report verifies the old abuse information as to the adopted daughter. It does not verify the tipster's allegation that Mrs. Dean does not view Mr. Dean's molestation of their adopted daughter as less serious than it would have been with a natural daughter. There is no direct testimony or otherwise reliable evidence on this issue, on the issue of whether or not she has spoken publicly on his behalf, or on the issue of whether or not a reconciliation is anticipated. There is no evidence that Charles Dean has been in the home since Lila Dean was relicensed. DCF sent a license revocation letter to Mrs. Dean after becoming aware of the increasing frequency of her contacts with her husband. The basis for revocation was given as: . . . pursuant to Section 409.175(8)(b)3. [now Section 409.175(9)(b)3] Florida Statutes, because your continued and repeated contacts with Charles Dean are inconsistent and incompatible with your role as a foster parent. It is not in the best interests of vulnerable foster children to be placed with a foster parent who considers it appropriate to have a relationship with a registered sex offender. [Clarification of statutory citation agreed-to and supplied]. Mr. Payne was unaware of any DCF rules Mrs. Dean broke by having contact with her husband. Mr. Payne has no indication that any children, natural or foster, were at greater risk post-licensing than pre- licensing due to Mr. And Mrs. Dean's increased contact. DCF cannot constantly monitor a foster parent to ensure that the children in her care are not placed at risk by her personal associations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating the family foster home license of Lila Dean and specifically limiting any appearance on the foster home premises by Charles Dean. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucy Goddard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert Vest, Esquire 613 St. Johns Avenue Suite 212 Post Office Box 2525 Palatka, Florida 32177 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondents' application for renewal of their family foster home license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the agency's August 16, 1995, letter to Respondents?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. At all times material to the instant case, Respondents Jose and Emma Perez were licensed to operate a family foster home at their residence in Hialeah, Florida (hereinafter after referred to as the "licensed home"). Before obtaining their license, Respondents were required by the Department to sign an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement"). Respondents signed the Agreement on or about July 1, 1994. In so doing, they agreed that they would, as licensed foster parents, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the [D]epartment." 1/ On or about January 13, 1995, Respondent Jose Perez was involved in a physical altercation with his brother-in-law. The altercation took place in the licensed home. 2/ The brother-in-law was living with Respondents in the licensed home (on a temporary basis) at the time of the incident. 3/ During the altercation, Jose threw a glass object in the direction of his brother-in-law. The object hit a wall and shattered upon impact. A piece of flying, shattered glass accidentally struck Respondents' daughter, Jessica, 4/ who was sleeping in her bedroom. Jessica sustained a cut on her forehead. Jose was subsequently arrested for aggravated battery by the Hialeah Police Department. 5/ Some time after the incident, the Department placed two foster children, A.A. and H.A., in Respondents' care. In the summer of 1995, Respondents filed with the Department an application to renew their family foster home license. The application was ultimately assigned (for review and investigation) to John Gallagher, a senior (foster) licensing counselor with the Department. On July 19, 1995, Gallagher went to the licensed home. Outside the home, on the northwest portion of Respondents' property, Gallagher observed a considerable number of, what appeared to be, discarded items. Inside the home, the floors were dirty and littered with a large amount of trash. On the floor in one of the rooms was dog feces, which Gallagher instructed Respondents to "pick . . . up immediately." During his visit to the licensed home on July 19, 1995, Gallagher had Respondents sign a "Bilateral Service Agreement," which was similar, but not identical, to the Agreement that Respondents had signed the year before. All of the necessary paperwork, however, was not completed during the visit. Upon leaving the home, Gallagher told Respondents that he would stop by again at the end of the day or on the following day to finish the paperwork. At 9:00 a.m. the next day, July 20, 1995, Gallagher returned to the licensed home. He was accompanied on this visit by Maria Siervo, another (foster care) licensing counselor with the Department. The conditions both outside and inside the home were not materially better than they had been the day before when Gallagher had paid his first visit to the home. In the clutter outside the home on the northwest portion of the property was a bucket (with no top or covering) that contained broken glass and a discarded baby diaper. On a table outside the home was a baby bottle containing congealed milk. Both the bucket and the bottle were readily accessible to A.A., the older of the two foster children in the licensed home. (A.A. was approximately two years of age.) Inside the home, the floors were still covered with a considerable amount of dirt and trash. They obviously had not been swept or mopped. A.A. was walking around on these floors without any shoes or socks on in her bare feet. There was a freestanding fan in the bedroom that A.A. and H.A. shared that did not have a protective covering. When Gallagher was in the bedroom, he saw the fan operating and A.A.'s fingers come within a few inches of the fan's exposed, moving blades. Gallagher instructed Respondents to either obtain a protective covering for the fan or remove it from the home. There were no screens on the windows of the home to keep insects out of the living area. 6/ In addition, two doors to the home were "wide open" throughout Gallagher's and Siervo's visit. H.A. was in a playpen that was old and dirty. In Gallagher's presence, a cat with sharp claws (which was not Respondents') started climbing up the side of the playpen. The cat was removed from the premises, however, before it was able to join H.A. in the playpen. The cat was not the only animal in the home on July 20, 1995. Gallagher also discovered newborn puppies underneath a bed in the home. Gallagher and Siervo spoke with Respondents during their July 20, 1995, visit about the unclean, unhealthy and hazardous conditions that existed in the licensed home. They asked both Respondents why the home was not clean. Jose responded by stating that he worked all day and that it was his wife's responsibility to clean the home. Emma stated that she was planning on cleaning the home, but that she was "lazy" and had not yet gotten around to it. Later that same day, after he and Siervo had left the licensed home, Gallagher reported what he had observed on his two visits to the home to the Department's abuse hotline. Two additional reports, both alleging that there was violence in the home, were subsequently made to the abuse hotline. All three reports were assigned to Darlise Baron, a protective investigator with the Department, for investigation. As part of her investigation, which began on March 20, 1995, Baron visited the licensed home. Conditions had improved since Gallagher's and Siervo's visit to the home on July 20, 1995. As Baron stated in her investigative report: Upon PI['s] arrival at address . . ., PI did not see any immediate danger for the children. The family had clean[ed] up the house. The floor was swept, kitchen was clean, no dirty dishes in the sink or around kitchen, the bathrooms were clean, the children's room was clean, the beds [were] made w/clean sheets. Mom['s] room had clean clothes on the bed being folded to be put away. There was dog feces seen on the floors. The large bags of garbage w[ere] placed on the curb, which was fil[l]ed w/clothes and grass. The fan w/out cover was placed in mom's room w/door close[d] to be thrown away. The dirty baby's bottle was not seen. . . . Nonetheless, in view of the information that she had concerning the conditions that had previously existed in the home and the incident that had occurred in the home involving Jose and his brother-in-law, 7/ Baron determined that the reports that were the subject of her investigation should be classified as proposed confirmed and she so indicated in her investigative report. 8/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Respondents' application for the renewal of their family foster home license, without prejudice to Respondents applying for a new license after July 31, 1996. 12/ DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of March, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's foster home license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact From August 24, 2004, and throughout the period material to this proceeding, Petitioner Jannifer Thompson ("Thompson") and her husband, Dalkeith, held a license that authorized them to operate a family foster home under the supervision——and within the regulatory jurisdiction——of Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"). Like all licensed foster parents, Thompson and her husband had entered into a written contract with DCF known as the "Bilateral Service Agreement" ("Agreement"), most recently as of April 30, 2006. This Agreement, by its terms, "reflect[ed] standards of care that are current requirements in Florida [law]." On September 14, 2006, a counselor named Elboney Ojobor, who was employed by a private agency to whom DCF had delegated various responsibilities pursuant to contract, made a routine quarterly visit to Thompson's home. Ms. Ojobor was covering for a colleague (Rondalyn Woulard) who was on maternity leave; she had not met Thompson previously. While interviewing Thompson, Ms. Ojobor learned that Thompson was the only adult living in the home at the time, and that Thompson was getting divorced from Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor understood this to mean that Mr. Thompson had moved out of the home permanently. In fact, Mr. Thompson was away from the home then not because he had moved to another residence ahead of a divorce, but because his job with a shipping company had required him to be out of town for an extended period. Nevertheless, the couple was estranged; Mr. Thompson would leave the marital home for good in the middle of October 2006. Ms. Ojobor's visit was not the first occasion on which Thompson had notified DCF (through its private-sector agent) that her marriage to Dalkeith was in trouble. During an earlier home visit (probably around June 2006, during the quarter immediately preceding Ms. Ojobor's visit in September), Thompson had told her regular counselor, Ms. Woulard, that she might divorce Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor was not aware of this previous communication, however, and thus she reported the apparent change in circumstances (Mr. Thompson's absence) to her supervisor. The upshot was that on September 15, 2006, Ms. Ojobor called Thompson to inform her that, if she were to continue operating the foster home as a single parent, she would need to obtain a new license. As it happened, whatever steps Thompson took thereafter to become re-licensed came quickly to naught because, in early October 2006, DCF received an allegation that children in Ms. Thompson's home were being physically abused. Having brought up the abuse report, the undersigned believes it necessary here to interrupt the narrative flow of the findings, to call attention to some important points. The most serious charge against Thompson in this case is that she used "excessive" corporal punishment on foster children in her care. The accusation is not that Thompson was found by some other agency or investigator to have abused a foster child or children. The distinction is critical. Because DCF has alleged that Thompson used corporal punishment excessively, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) for DCF to prove that someone else, after investigating allegations of abuse, concluded that Thompson had inflicted some sort of physical injury on a foster child. Rather, DCF must prove that Thompson, in fact, actually used corporal punishment, which is a different fact. Indeed, that someone else found Thompson guilty of physical abuse is not especially probative, in this de novo proceeding, of the salient factual dispute, namely whether Thompson used corporal punishment on foster children.2 Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that, on October 9, 2006, DCF referred a report of abuse concerning Thompson to the local Child Protective Team ("CPT"). DCF requested that the CPT examine the allegedly abused foster child and make an assessment of the situation. One member of the CPT who took part in this particular assessment was Karl Dorelien. Though not a medical provider, Mr. Dorelien was present for the medical examination of the child in question, whose name is T. P. The examination was performed by an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP"). Mr. Dorelien testified at hearing. The ARNP did not. At the time of the examination, Mr. Dorelien saw some bruising on T. P.'s forearm. T. P. told Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP that she had been struck by a belt. The CPT did not independently investigate T. P.'s statement. Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP accepted at face value T. P.'s statement about the cause of her injury. The ARNP found that T. P.'s wound was "not accidental." (Mr. Dorelien specifically denied having the expertise to ascertain whether a bruise was caused accidentally or intentionally. There is, it should be added, no persuasive evidence that the ARNP possesses such expertise, either.) Based on the medical examination, the CPT concluded that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (It is not clear how the CPT determined that Thompson——as opposed to someone else——caused T. P.'s injury.3) The evidence shows, in short, that the CPT found Thompson had caused bodily injury to T. P., a foster child then in her care, whom (the CPT determined) Thompson had hit with a belt. There is, however, no persuasive evidence upon which the undersigned independently can find that Thompson actually hit T. P. with a belt (or otherwise). How can this be? First, no one claiming to have personal knowledge of the matter testified at hearing that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (T. P. was not called as a witness.) Thompson denied having perpetrated the alleged misdeed. Second, although there is competent and credible evidence (Mr. Dorelien's testimony) that T. P.'s forearm was bruised, the only evidence as to the cause of this injury was hearsay: (1) T. P.'s statements to the CPT revealing that she had been struck with a belt and (2) the ARNP's opinion (which Mr. Dorelien repeated at hearing) that the wound was not accidental. This uncorroborated hearsay is not a legally sufficient basis for any finding of fact, and even if it were, the undersigned, as the trier of fact, would give it too little weight to support a finding.4 Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that T. P. had been struck with a belt (and there isn't), there yet would be nothing but Mr. Dorelien's ambiguous testimony concerning the substance of T. P.'s out-of-court statement, coupled with inference or speculation (based on uncorroborated hearsay), tending to establish that Thompson did the striking. Again, such "proof" is neither legally sufficient nor, in any event, logically persuasive enough to support a finding that Thompson was at fault for the child's injury. DCF alleges that, in addition to striking T. P. with a belt (which allegation was not proved, as just found), Thompson also spanked J. D. F. and his brother, O. F. Both of these boys, respectively aged 8 and 7 years at the time of hearing, testified against their former foster mother. Each claimed that Thompson had spanked him with a belt. As witnesses, however, the boys did not inspire confidence in the truth of their accounts. Each gave testimony that was confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and lacking in precision. Neither one seemed distinctly to remember the important events at issue, much less any of the details surrounding them, causing the undersigned to wonder, at times, whether the boys were independently recalling the underlying events or, rather, testifying from the memory of what someone might have told them was alleged to have occurred. Doubtless many of these boys' shortcomings as witnesses stemmed from their youth and immaturity. Even so, all witnesses, regardless of age and experience, must be measured according to the same standards of credibility; the bar can be neither lowered nor raised to conform to a particular witness's capacity for giving testimony, for doing so would put a thumb on the scales of justice. At bottom, the accounts of J. D. F. and O. F., though not inherently incredible, nevertheless lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to produce in the undersigned's mind a firm belief or conviction that Thompson had spanked them with a belt. The undersigned hesitates to say more than that such is a possibility. Against the shaky testimonies of the boys was offered the decidedly stronger testimony of their sister, Sancia Jeantil, who swore that while she was living in Thompson's home (which admittedly was not at all times her brothers were there), she never saw Thompson spank either J. D. F. or O. F. She further testified that neither of her siblings had ever complained to her about being beaten. The undersigned has accorded considerable weight to Ms. Jeantil's testimony, because it seems unlikely that she would prevaricate to protect Thompson at her brothers' expense. Although Ms. Jeantil was not always present in the home, her testimony, which the undersigned accepts, is persuasive proof of the pertinent negative proposition, i.e. that Thompson did not use corporal punishment on the boys. Thompson herself testified at hearing and denied having used corporal punishment on J. D. F., O. F., or any other foster child. Mr. Thompson, too, testified that corporal punishment had not been used on any of the foster children in their home. Thompson's own child, J. T., said the same. None of these witnesses conclusively proved the negative of DCF's allegation regarding corporal punishment, but then again it was not Thompson's burden to disprove the charge. What these witnesses did do, effectively, was establish a credible, if simple, theory of innocence: Thompson never beat the foster children in her care. The undersigned has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence as a whole fails to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Thompson used corporal punishment on any of the foster children under her care. Aside from the allegations regarding corporal punishment, DCF has charged Thompson with the lesser offense of failing immediately to notify DCF that her husband had moved out of the home. The evidence shows, however, that Thompson satisfied her duty to notify DCF concerning changes that might affect the life and circumstances of the foster children residing in her home. To recap, briefly, the material facts, Thompson informed DCF's agent, Ms. Woulard, of the possibility that she and Dalkeith might divorce; thus, DCF was on actual notice of a potential change in Thompson's marital status. Thompson likely gave DCF this advance warning in June 2006; in any case, she spoke up long before Dalkeith established a new residence and before the divorce proceeding commenced. There is no clear proof that the couple's situation had changed materially as of September 14, 2006, when Mr. Ojobor visited the home. Without question, Mr. Thompson was away at that time——but he worked for a shipping company and thus extended absences were part of his routine. Having all the evidence of record in view, the undersigned is not convinced that Mr. Thompson had "moved out" of the home as of mid-September 2006 in the sense of having permanently relocated from that residence, which is what DCF maintains. While there is some evidence that such was the case, there is also persuasive evidence that Mr. Thompson did not leave the home for good until October 2006——evidence sufficient to preclude the undersigned from finding, without hesitancy, that DCF's allegation is accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order approving the renewal of Thompson's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner Antoinette Scanziani's license as a family foster home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating family foster homes. Children's Home Society (CHS) is the contract agency in the Central Licensing Zone that directly supervises licenses in that area. Petitioner filed an application to renew her family foster home license on May 26, 2006, which was originally issued for one year in August 2005. Prior to the issuance of her family foster care license on August 19, 2005, Petitioner had completed, inter allia, 30 hours of Models Approach Partnership and Parenting (MAPP) training and signed a Foster Parent Agreement, prepared by CHS, which spells out the duties and obligations of a foster parent. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically states that a foster parent will notify CHS immediately of any change of address. Under Respondent's rules, a family foster care license is not transferable, and a new sanitation inspection and recommendation must be completed before Respondent can issue a new license for the new address. The family foster care license was issued to Petitioner for 5831 Bent Pine Drive, Apartment 300, Orlando, Florida 32822. The first foster child was placed in Petitioner's care on September 1, 2005. In August 2005, Petitioner began a dispute with the rental management company who managed the apartment complex where she lived. This resulted in Petitioner giving the company 60 days' notice that she would not renew her lease after October 31, 2005. The rental company, mean while, would not accept her tender of rental payments for August and September 2005, and initiated eviction proceedings in County Court. Prior to the final hearing, a stipulation was signed by the parties and approved by the County Court. Petitioner moved out of her apartment on October 31, 2005. On November 1, 2005, Petitioner, along with one foster child, moved into a house located at 7741 Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, Florida 32822. CHS was not notified of this change of address until November 11, 2005. The CHS Dependency Specialist worked diligently with Petitioner to obtain a license for her new residence. DCF issued a new family foster care license for 7741 Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, Florida 32822 on December 20, 2005. Petitioner maintained an unlicensed foster home from the period of November 1, 2005, through December 20, 2005. Although the foster child residing with Petitioner was not removed from the home, Petitioner was reminded of the need to notify CHS prior to any moves in the future. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner notified CHS that she had moved from her Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, residence to a residence in Poinciana, Florida (Osceola County) at the end of March 2006. It was subsequently determined that a Writ of Possession for the Orlando residence was issued by the Orange County Court on March 2, 2006. Petitioner testified at the hearing that she moved at the end of March 2006, because of poor maintenance and discriminatory and retaliatory conduct by the landlord. The foster child was not removed from the home and the CHS Dependency Specialist again worked diligently and patiently with Petitioner to obtain a license for her family foster care residence at 127 Conch Drive, Kissimmee, Florida 34759 (Poinciana). Due primarily to Petitioner's lack of cooperation, a completed health inspection of the home was not completed until August 4, 2006. During this time, Petitioner submitted her application for relicensure on May 26, 2006. On July 13, 2006, the CHS Dependency Specialist hand delivered a letter, dated July 11, 2006, to Petitioner reminding her that a face-to-face visit and a walk through of the home was required before recommendation could be given. Petitioner was given a check-list of 16 items which were due to be completed prior to July 16, 2006, or CHS could not recommend renewal of her foster care license. On July 18, 2006, CHS sent Petitioner a follow-up letter. Although another home inspection had taken place on July 17, 2006, it was not a satisfactory home health inspection. In addition, proof of completion of 12 hours of training had not been demonstrated and six other items on the check-list were, also, not completed. The deadline for compliance was extended to August 3, 2006, with a reminder that the existing license expired on August 19, 2006. CHS followed with reminder telephone calls on July 19 and 20, followed by another letter on July 25, 2006, that all remaining items must be completed by August 3, 2006. Petitioner demonstrated compliance with four of the items, but did not provide Radon Test results or proof that her 2A10BC fire extinguisher was tagged and inspected. On August 18, 2006, the foster child, living in Petitioner's home, was removed. On August 19, 2006, Petitioner's family foster care license expired by operation of law, without Petitioner having submitted a completed application package to CHS. On August 28, 2006, Respondent sent Petitioner a notice of intent to deny her application for relicensure. The reasons for the denial were outlined on the four-page letter. Petitioner objected to the notice and requested a formal hearing, and this proceeding followed. From the evidence, it is apparent that CHS worked diligently in helping Petitioner transfer her existing license two times, when Petitioner moved without notifying CHS before the move; and encouraged and worked with Petitioner to complete the application for renewal a month before the expiration of her license. However, due to Petitioner's procrastination and/or resistance, the completed documentation was not sent in to Respondent prior to the expiration of her prior license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner, Antoinette Scanziani's, application for a renewal of her family foster home license be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007.
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing is whether Respondent's foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact On July 1, 1995, Mildred Sands (Respondent) was issued a provisional foster home license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Petitioner), with an effective period of July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1996. Her license number is 0795-06-3. A provisional license is issued when all requirements for a license are not met and the licensee is given a specific time period to comply with the remaining requirements. Due to a court action involving a minor child, J. F., who was born on May 7, 1983, the court placed J. F. with Respondent. In order for the minor child to live with Respondent, Petitioner issued Respondent a provisional license. Prior to the placement, Respondent knew J. F.'s mother for several years on a personal basis. The mother and her children were at one time living with Respondent. Respondent is J. F.'s godmother and has interacted with her since J. F.'s birth. Prior to licensing, on June 12, 1995, Respondent signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Petitioner, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs for the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * 16. We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * 18. We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. Respondent signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement) on July 19, 1993, when she was initially licensed as a foster care provider and on June 12, 1995, during her re-licensure process. The Discipline Agreement signed on July 19, 1993, provides in pertinent part: The following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN in caring for your foster child. Failure to comply may result in an investigation and possible closure of your home. * * * Hitting a child with an object. Slapping or spanking a child, or ANY OTHER physical discipline. The Discipline Agreement signed on June 12, 1995, provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S)... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. On February 14, 1995, Petitioner waived placement requirements in order for J. F.'s siblings to be placed with Respondent to keep the family unit together. J. F.'s siblings had been living with her grandmother who had become ill and was unable to care for the children. On September 1, 1995, Petitioner received a report of alleged child abuse allegedly committed by Respondent against J. F., who was 12 years old, at Respondent's foster home. Respondent was allegedly disciplining J. F. Within a short span of time that same day, Petitioner began an investigation. The minor child, J. F., had raised bruises, swelling, abrasions, and redness on the lower part of her legs. Also, J. F. had a small scratch on one of her legs and a scratch on her left arm. The injuries were purportedly inflicted by a ruler. No expert opinion was presented to confirm that the injuries were consistent with such an instrument, and no attempt was made to obtain the instrument used to commit the alleged abuse. Petitioner removed all the children from Respondent's home. Petitioner notified Respondent that it was revoking her foster home license due to the alleged excessive corporal punishment. The minor child, J. F., did not testify at the hearing. 1/ Respondent did not inflict the injuries to the minor child, J. F. 2/ Respondent did not use corporal punishment of any kind on the minor child, J. F. Respondent did not violate the Discipline Agreement. Respondent was responsible for the supervision and care of the minor child, J. F. Respondent was not aware of J. F.'s injuries and was, therefore, unable to notify Petitioner of the injuries or to obtain medical attention for J. F.'s injuries. Respondent had allowed the children's adult sibling, who was 19 years old, to live with her and the children. Respondent failed to notify Petitioner that the adult sister would be and was living in her home. In failing to notify Petitioner, Respondent violated the Bilateral Agreement, paragraph numbered 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the foster home license of Mildred Sands not be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster parents in the state. Respondent first licensed Petitioners as foster parents on June 29, 2003, and renewed the license on June 29, 2004. The last license expired on June 28, 2005. Petitioners allowed their license to expire on June 28, 2005. They wanted to make improvements to a new home they had moved into before bringing foster children into the home. Petitioners submitted a completed application for a new license on March 20, 2006. By letter dated April 27, 2006, Respondent denied the application for licensure. Petitioners did not receive the notice of denial until May 3, 2006, because Respondent sent the notice to the address of record in the old license application files instead of the correct address in the application for a new license that is at issue in this proceeding. The letter denying the application for licensure incorrectly stated that Respondent intended to revoke Petitioners' license. The misstated literal terms of the letter nevertheless provided Petitioners with adequate notice of the actual proposed agency action to deny the license application. Contrary to the literal terms of the letter, Petitioners understood that the letter constituted notice of Respondent's proposed denial of their license application. Petitioners timely requested an administrative hearing by letter dated May 7, 2006. The request for hearing stated, in relevant part: [W]e received notice advising us that [Respondent] has initiated proceedings to revoke our foster home license. . . . Please note that we are not a licensed foster home at this time. Our license expired in June, 2005. So, we are somewhat confused about proceedings to revoke something that does not exist. Please be advised that we did [sic] however, complete an application for a 'new' foster care license. . . . We were also told that, [sic] our application would be denied and that we would have the right to request an administrative hearing to contest the 'denial'. If the letter that we received is in regard to our application for licensure, and if that application has been denied, then we are requesting an administrative hearing to contest that decision. Respondent's Exhibit 1C. Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk to forward to DOAH to conduct the hearing. However, the agency clerk was confused by the literal terms of the denial letter. When the agency clerk could not ascertain an existing foster home license to revoke, the agency clerk merely "sat" on the request for hearing and did not forward it to DOAH. By letter dated November 13, 2006, Respondent corrected the literal terms of the previous letter. The letter dated November 13, 2006, correctly notified Petitioners of Respondent's proposed denial of the license application. By letter dated November 23, 2006, Petitioners again requested an administrative hearing to contest the proposed denial of the license application. In addition, the request for hearing notified Respondent of Petitioners' intent to rely on the so-called default license provisions in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk. This time, the agency clerk referred the matter to DOAH. However, the agency clerk did not refer the request for hearing to DOAH within the 15 days mandated in Subsection 120.569(2)(a). Rather, DOAH received the referral from the agency clerk on March 6, 2007; approximately 103 days after the date of the second request for hearing and approximately 303 days after the date of the first request for hearing. The delays in referring the requests for hearing to DOAH did not impair either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action. It is undisputed that when Petitioners were previously licensed as foster parents they repeatedly administered corporal punishment to a foster child who was approximately four years old at the time. It is also undisputed that Petitioners punished the child by requiring the child to stand for one hour to one hour and a-half almost daily. Both types of discipline violate applicable standards for foster care and evidence Petitioners disqualification to be foster parents. The parties spent most of the evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the four-year-old female suffered from a condition identified in the record as reactive attachment disorder (RAD). However, the trier of fact finds evidence concerning RAD to be irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether Petitioners are qualified to be foster parents. The evidence that Petitioners administered unauthorized discipline to a four-year-old foster child in their care clearly evidences their lack of qualification. No medical evidence established a nexus between the alleged disorder and illicit discipline of a young child.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order denying Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s request for a foster home license should be denied due to her alleged failure to comply with foster care licensing requirements.
Findings Of Fact Since 2006, Petitioner has held a foster care license, issued by the Department through Citrus, which is a child placing agency ("CPA"). Since becoming a foster parent, there have never been any concerns raised as to the care Petitioner provided to the foster children. Every year, Petitioner entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement with Citrus. The Agreement identifies the responsibilities of both the foster parents and Citrus on behalf of the children served in the foster care program. Under the heading “Foster Parent Responsibilities to the CPA” the Bilateral Service Agreement provides that the foster parent is required: To notify the CPA immediately of a potential change in address, living arrangements, marital status, family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child’s well-being. To notify the CPA promptly of all contacts the family or any member of the home has with police or any law enforcement agencies. In the summer of 2010, Citrus sent a letter to all foster parents reminding them that all family members or visitors who frequent the home on a daily basis, or sleep overnight, or have constant contact with the foster children, must have background checks completed. In the fall of 2010, for the annual review for the upcoming year of 2011, Citrus conducted a home study, which included an announced visit and inspection of the home. The Citrus consultant who conducted the home study recorded that Warren Clark (Clark), Petitioner’s son, was living in the home. Petitioner’s daughter was listed as a family member that did not live in the home and was not a frequent visitor. She conducted a background screening on Clark, and discovered that Clark had been arrested twice for battery/aggravated assault charges in May, 2010. If Petitioner’s daughter had been listed as a household member or frequent visitor, the consultant would have conducted background screening on the daughter as well. During her announced visit, the consultant saw Clark’s room, and only noticed male belongings. She did not see any kind of female items, such as jewelry, makeup, or female clothing. Petitioner never reported Clark’s arrests to Citrus. At the hearing, she testified that she was unaware of her son’s arrests, and was only made aware of the arrests when the Citrus consultant told her about them. Her son testified that he had never told his mother about the arrests because he was embarrassed. The undersigned does not find this testimony credible, as it is self-serving in nature and is not plausible, given that Petitioner’s son lived with Petitioner and was arrested twice in one month. It was ultimately Petitioner’s duty to be informed of any involvement between a household member and law enforcement, and to promptly notify the Department. On January 27, 2011, a foster care licensing staffing was held. Petitioner agreed to have her son move out of her home, due to the nature of the arrests. To memorialize the agreement reached during the meeting, Petitioner signed a statement indicating that she would have her son move out of the foster home, and that she understood that if her daughter was going to be a frequent visitor, her daughter needed to be fingerprinted. The statement also indicated that any violation of this agreement might result in revocation of her foster home license. This statement was dated February 22, 2011. During the exit interviews of two of Petitioner’s foster care children, the children reported that Petitioner’s daughter lived at the foster home. Citrus and the Department conducted an unannounced home visit on March 10, 2011. Dulce Pupo, a Citrus Foster Care Licensing Supervisor, and Ada Gonzalez, a Department Licensing Specialist, conducted the visit. Present at the home were two foster children, Petitioner, Petitioner’s daughter, and a tutor for one of the foster children. One foster child, who was approximately 12 years old, told Ms. Gonzalez that Petitioner’s daughter lived in the home, and pointed out her bedroom. When Ms. Gonzalez approached the room that had been indicated, Petitioner asked her not to enter that room, because it was messy. Ms. Gonzalez entered the bedroom, and found items that belonged to a woman; she photographed women’s jewelry, skin products, perfumes, women’s clothing, women’s shoes, and a curling iron that she saw in the room. Petitioner told Ms. Gonzalez that the items were her daughter’s items, but that her daughter did not live at the foster home. On March 11, 2011, a staffing was held. Petitioner attended and admitted that her daughter was living at her home. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that during this staffing, she was very upset, and misspoke when she stated that her daughter lived in her foster home. She, did, however, admit that her daughter was a frequent visitor, and that she should have reported that fact to Citrus. On May 9, 2011, the renewal of Petitioner’s foster care license was denied by the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding that Petitioner violated section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes, and deny Petitioner’s request to renew her foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2011.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated July 14, 1995, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for a foster care license. According to the letter, the denial was based on noncompliance with Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M- 6.025, Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, it was noted that Petitioner had (1) submitted false information to Respondent regarding persons living in her home; (2) insufficient income in relation to monthly expenses; and (3) improperly insured motor vehicles in which to transport children. Petitioner timely requested a hearing, after which Respondent referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The undersigned noticed the matter for hearing upon the issue of whether Petitioner's application for a foster care license should be denied. Petitioner failed to appear at the formal hearing, and no evidence was presented on her behalf. 4 The Notice of Hearing, mailed to both parties in this case, provided that failure to appear at this hearing shall be grounds for entry of a recommended order of dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition of Mary Luz DeJesus, and denying her application for a foster care license. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CARLOYN S. HOLIFIELD, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank H. Nagatani, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 11351 Ulmerton Road Largo, Florida 34648 Mary Luz DeJesus, Pro Se 7600 71st Avenue, North Pinellas Park, Florida 34665 Richard Doran, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sandy Coulter Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
