Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ralph Todd Schlosser, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health insurance agent, health insurance agent and general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a life and health insurance agent for American Sun Life Insurance Company (ASLIC) and Pioneer Life Insurance Company of Illinois (PLICI). On March 2, 1987, respondent met with one Mildred H. Camp, then a resident of Clearwater, Florida, for the purpose of selling her an ASLIC long term care health insurance policy. After discussing the matter with respondent, Camp agreed to purchase a policy. She completed an application and gave respondent a check in the amount of $511.88. The check was deposited into respondent's business account at First Florida Bank in Clearwater the same day. Camp did not testify at hearing. Therefore, the only first hand version of what was discussed by Schlosser and Camp and the nature of any further communications between the two was offered by respondent. That version was not contradicted, and it is accepted as being credible. Within a week after executing the application, Camp contacted respondent by telephone concerning the policy. Pursuant to that telephone conversation, respondent did not process the application or remit the check to the company, but attempted instead to arrange another meeting with Camp to answer further questions about the policy. Although he telephoned Camp "every single Monday", respondent was unable to arrange an appointment with her until April 30, 1987. On April 30 Camp and respondent met for the purpose of him explaining in greater detail the benefits and coverage under the policy. Because two months had gone by since the application was first executed, it was necessary for respondent to update Camp's health information. Accordingly, Camp executed a new application the same date and Schlosser forwarded the check and application to ASLIC shortly thereafter. On May 5, 1987 ASLIC received the April 30 application and premium check, less respondent's commission. The application was eventually denied by ASLIC on the ground of "excessive insurance" and a refund check was forwarded by ASLIC to Camp on June 11, 1987. There is no record of any complaint made by Camp against Schlosser in ASLIC's files nor did ASLIC contact respondent regarding this matter. When Schlosser began representing ASLIC, he executed a general agent contract which contained the terms and conditions pertaining to his appointment as a general agent for the company. As is pertinent here, the contract provided that Schlosser had a responsibility "to promptly remit such funds" received by him to the company. According to a former second vice-president of ASLIC, Joyce Lynch, who worked for ASLIC when the Camp transaction occurred, the company expected in the regular course of business to have checks and applications remitted by agents to the home office within fifteen days after the application was written, and that the above provision in the general agent contract was interpreted in this manner. Lynch added that she knew of no reason why an agent would hold an application and check for sixty days before submitting it to the company, particularly since once an application is completed and signed, it is the "property" of the company and not the agent. She concluded that if a customer desired more information about a policy after an application had been signed, which is not unusual, the agent still had a responsibility to promptly forward the application and check to the company within fifteen days. At that point, the company, and not the agent, would cancel a policy and refund the premium if so requested by a customer. Therefore, Schlosser breached the general agent contract by failing to promptly remit such funds. On July 28, 1987 Schlosser visited one Maxine Brucker, an elderly resident of Sarasota, for the purpose of selling her a PLICI health insurance policy. He had telephoned Brucker the same date to set up an appointment with her. After discussing the matter with respondent, Brucker agreed to purchase a policy, executed an application and gave respondent a check for $680.00. The check was deposited into respondent's bank account the following day. After Schlosser departed, Brucker noted that Scholosser did not leave a business card and she immediately became "worried" about her money and the possibility of not getting the insurance she had paid for. She telephoned the Department the same day to check on his "reputation" and to verify that Schlosser was an insurance agent. On August 4, 1987 she wrote a letter to the PLICI home office in Rockford, Illinois to ascertain if her check and application had been received but she did not receive a reply. She wrote a second letter to PLICI on August 14, 1987 but again received no reply to her inquiry. After telephoning the home office a few days later, Brucker contacted the Department a second time in late August and requested that it assist her in obtaining a refund of her money. At no time, however, did Brucker attempt to contact respondent. In early September, Brucker received by mail a money order from respondent which represented a full refund of moneys previously paid. Brucker acknowledged that she was happy with her policy when it was initially purchased. She also acknowledged that she had never contacted respondent personally to request a refund of her money. It was only after she received no reply from the home office that she made a request for a refund. According to the agency agreement executed by Schlosser when he became a general agent for PLICI, respondent had the responsibility to "immediately remit to (PLICI) all premiums (collected)". Testimony by Ronald F. Bonner, a vice- president of PLICI, established that in the regular course of business an agent was required to forward the check and application to PLICI no more than twenty-five days after receiving them from the customer. Any application held more than twenty-five days was considered "stale", was presumably invalid and had to be returned to the customer. Even so, Bonner did not contradict respondent's assertion noted in finding of fact 11 that his failure to remit the application and check was based on instructions from the home office, and under those circumstances, was not improper. Respondent readily admitted he did not remit the Brucker application and check because of instructions from the home office received after Brucker had telephoned the home office. After unsucessfully attempting to speak with Brucker by telephone daily for about two weeks, Schlosser voluntarily sent Brucker a money order via mail in early September. A review of respondent's business bank account for the months of March and August 1987 revealed that after the checks from Camp and Brucker had been deposited, the balances in the account thereafter dropped below $511.88 and $680 during those respective months. This raises an inference that those moneys were used for other undisclosed purposes during that time. According to respondent, he submitted applications and premiums checks to the home office approximately two or three times per month. It was also his practice to wait ten days or so after receiving a check from a customer to allow it sufficient time to clear. Schlosser denied having converted insurance moneys to his own personal use. There was no evidence that Schlosser lacked reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in insurance transactions authorized by his licenses, a matter requiring conventional factual proof. Similarly, there was no evidence to establish that Schlosser intended to willfully violate the law or that his conduct demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the insurance business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint filed against respondent be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1990.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
The Issue Whether the Respondent's insurance licenses should be disciplined on the basis of the alleged multiple violations of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing insurance agents of all types, regulating licensure status, and enforcing the practice standards of licensed agents within the powers granted by the Legislature in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Wolfe was licensed as an insurance agent in the following areas: Ordinary Life, Ordinary Life including Disability Insurance, General Lines, and Disability. Respondent was also registered with the Department as an Automobile Inspection and Warranty Salesperson. Respondent Wolfe conducted his insurance business through Edison Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter Edison), which is located in Fort Myers, Florida. The Respondent is the President, the Director, and sole shareholder of the insurance agency. All of Edison's personnel who collected funds in a fiduciary capacity, on behalf of the insured named in the Administrative Complaint, acted through the supervision and control of Respondent Wolfe, the licensed general lines agent of record at Edison. One of the services provided to customers who sought insurance through Edison was the agency's processing of premium financing applications. If an insurance customer decided to finance premium payments, the Respondent or agency personnel, would arrange premium financing for the customer through Regency Premium Finance Company (hereinafter Regency). Once the insurance customer's application to Regency was processed, Regency would issue a check for the financed portion of the premium. The check would name Edison as the payee, and would be sent to the agency's offices. The Respondent or agency personnel acting through his licenses, were then required to remit the money to the insurance company to obtain the insurance coverage selected by the proposed insured. Count I On October 7, 1986, Regency issued a check in the amount of eleven thousand eighty four dollars and twenty five cents to Edison. Upon receipt of the check, Edison paid the outstanding balance of the premiums owed to Canal Insurance Company by Shirley Turlington, who became insured with the company through Edison on July 16, 1986, under policies numbered P02 31 71, and 14 43 39. On November 7, 1986, a Notice of Cancellation was sent by Regency to the insurer as the insured did not pay an installment payment, as agreed, by October 16, 1986. The insurance policies were cancelled by the insurer, and an unearned premium of ten thousand one hundred and twenty four dollars was credited to Edison's account with Dana Roehrig & Associates, an authorized representative of Canal Insurance Company. Pursuant to the Premium Finance Agreement signed by the insured Shirley Turlington, Regency was assigned all unearned premiums returned by the insurance company on these specific policies. Shirley Turlington was not entitled to the unearned premiums credited to Edison's account by Canal Insurance Company through Dana Roehrig & Associates. A determination of Regency's entitlement to the unearned premium refund is currently pending in a civil action. Count II On March 16, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of nine thousand four hundred and forty one dollars to Edison. The purpose of the check was to have Edison pay the outstanding balance of the premium owed to Canal Insurance Company by Guillermo Rodriguez for a commercial automobile liability policy numbered 152 656. In reality, the amount of money necessary for payment to Canal Insurance Company had already been earmarked in the account maintained by Dana Roehrig & Associates which shows the credits and debits placed on Edison's business transactions with Dana Roehrig & Associates. The premium was paid, and the policy was issued by Canal Insurance Company with an effective date of February 2, 1987. In the premium finance agreement completed on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez in Edison's Offices, the inception date of the policy was projected for March 29, 1987. Respondent Wolfe and Edison personnel were unable to bind Canal Insurance Company so that an actual policy number and policy inception date were unknown by Edison at the time the finance agreement with Regency was completed at the agency. As the commercial automobile liability market was very active at Dana Roehrig & Associates during this time period, it is unknown what basis was used for the projected inception date of the policy. On May 27, 1987, a Notice of Cancellation was sent by Regency to the insurer as the insured did not pay an installment payment, as agreed, on April 29, 1987. The policy was cancelled September 25, 1987. No evidence was presented at hearing to demonstrate what happened to the unearned premium refund. Count III On March 24, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of twenty one thousand four hundred thirty five dollars to Edison. The purpose of the check was to pay the outstanding balance of the premium on a commercial automobile liability policy from Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company which had been applied for by Thomas Gleason through Edison. Edison did not purchase an insurance policy for Mr. Gleason with the funds sent to Edison by Regency for that purpose. The check from Regency was cashed, and the funds were commingled with other funds in the agency's account number 632717. Count IV On April 21, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of twenty five thousand one hundred and fifty eight dollar and seventy five cents to Edison. The agency was to apply these funds against the outstanding balances on premiums for Clayton Olding, Inc., a trucking firm. The proposed insured had applied for insurance coverage from Canal Insurance Company and Cadillac Insurance Company. Edison paid for policy number 155941 with Canal Insurance Company with check number 7120. The premium amount and the inception date listed on the Regency premium finance agreement were correct. A notice of cancellation was sent to Canal Insurance Company on July 1, 1987, as Clayton Olding had failed to pay the installment due Regency on June 13, 1987. However, the policy had already been cancelled by the insured on June 1, 1987. A credit of nineteen thousand one hundred seventeen dollars and eighty cents was placed against Edison's account with Dana Roehrig & Associates, the authorized representative for Canal Insurance Company. Paperwork given to Clayton Olding, Inc. represented that the company was insured by Cadillac Insurance Company through Edison. Edison was the authorized agent of Cadillac Insurance Company and was able to temporarily bind the company. However, the money which was to be given to Cadillac Insurance Company as the down payment on the insurance premium was never sent to the insurer. Instead, Rose Delaney, an employee of Edison, created interagency documents which reflected that the money had been sent, and took the money for her own personal use. When Clayton Olding, Inc. notified Ms. Delaney to cancel the policy on June 1, 1987, this customer believed that Edison had acquired the insurance policy requested with Cadillac Insurance Company. Clayton Olding, Inc. received a refund from Edison after the cancellation of the two policies in the amount of approximately one thousand dollars. It was not revealed at hearing whether the refund related to the Canal Insurance Company policy or the Cadillac Insurance Company policy, or both transactions. Count V On April 28, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of four thousand five hundred and sixteen dollars to Edison for payment of the outstanding balance of the premium purportedly owed by Arthur Farquharson to Canal Insurance Company through Edison. Edison did not purchase an insurance policy for Mr. Farquharson with the funds sent to Edison by Regency for that purpose. The check from Regency was cashed, and the funds were commingled with the funds in the agency's checking account numbered 632717. The policy requested by Mr. Farquharson was never obtained by Edison on his behalf. Counts VI through VIII Count VI through Count VIII of the Administrative Complaint involve requests from proposed insured to purchase insurance through Edison. The proposed insured were Clinton Roole, Bertel Alexander Prince, and A & E Young Trucking, Inc, respectively. In each application for insurance, the proposed insured requested premium financing through Regency. Regency issued checks on behalf of these proposed insured to Edison. The agency was to pay the outstanding balances on insurance premiums in the policies purportedly obtained by Edison on behalf of these customers. Edison did not properly apply the funds sent to the agency by Regency because the requested policies were never purchased by Edison on behalf of these customers. The checks from Regency were cashed by the agency, and commingled with other funds in the agency's checking account numbered 632717. The customers did not receive the benefits requested from Edison, their insurance agency. Count IX On May 7, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of thirty two thousand one hundred and nine dollars to Edison. The agency was to apply the funds against the outstanding balances on three policies which were purportedly applied for from the following companies through Edison: Canal Insurance Company, Cadillac Insurance Company, and South Atlantic Council. The proposed insured was Charles Bernardo d/b/a ABX, Inc. A binder of insurance was issued by Canal Insurance Company to Mr. Bernardo for a fifteen day period which expired on April 28, 1987. A full policy was never purchased by Edison on behalf of Mr. Bernardo with the funds sent to Edison by Regency for that purpose. No information was provided at hearing regarding the purported application for insurance from South Atlantic Council on behalf of Mr. Bernardo through Edison. The check from Regency to Edison was cashed, and the funds were commingled with other funds in the agency's checking account numbered 632717. Mitigation All of the insurance transactions involved in the Administrative Complaint were conducted by Rose Delaney, an employee of Edison. During the months of March 1987 through May 1987, this employee was involved in a complex embezzlement and document falsification scheme in which she embezzled funds from the insurance agency and created phoney insurance policies and premium financing agreements, as well as false agency control documents, to cover her misdeeds. Respondent Wolfe was unable to discover this embezzlement scheme until May 23, 1987. His inability to detect the scheme was based upon a number of extraordinary factors, in spite of his reasonable attempts to supervise his insurance business and the employees with the high degree of care commensurate with his responsibilities as an insurance agent. These extraordinary factors were: the rapid and intense growth of Respondent's business during this time period; the redesign of the computerized accounting program by the agency's accountant, who failed to recognize that he had disabled an account reconciliation function within the program; the sophistication of Ms. Delaney's embezzlement scheme, and her ability to generate false documents within the agency setting which hid her crimes from the supervisory reviews conducted by Respondent Wolfe over a two and one half month period. Rose Delaney, the perpetrator of the embezzlement and documentation falsification scheme, is currently being treated in a mental health institution for mental illness. She has been diagnosed as having major depression with psychotic features as well as suffering from latent schizophrenia, paranoid type. Based upon the professional opinions of the two psychiatrists who examined Ms. Delaney, she was insane during the time she handled the insurance transactions set forth in the Administrative Complaint. The McNaughton standard was applied by both of the experts, and no evidence to the contrary was presented during the administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Gary Stephen Wolfe, be found not guilty of all nine counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of September, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4927 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO# 2. Accepted. See HO# 2. Accepted. See HO# 3. Accepted. See HO# 3. Petitioner's findings do not contain a number 5. Accepted. See HO# 3. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 4. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 5. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 5. Accepted, but for further exposition of the facts, see HO# 7. Accepted. See HO# 5. Accepted. See HO# 6 and # 7. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 8. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO# 8. Rejected. See HO# 10. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 11. Accepted. See HO# 12. Accepted. See HO# 12. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HOC 27. Accepted. See HO# 13. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO# 13. Rejected. Irrelevant to pleadings. See HO# 13. Rejected. Irrelevant to pleadings. See HO# 13. Accepted. See HO# 14. Accepted. See HO# 14. Accepted. See HO# 14. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 17. Accepted. See HO# 18. Accepted. See 1O# 18. 43.-48. Not provided to the Hearing Officer. Accepted. See HO# 18. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 19. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 19. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 19. Accepted. See HO# 20. Rejected. Cumulative. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Cumulative. Rejected. See HO# 25 and #27. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO# 25. Rejected. See HO# 27. Rejected. Irrelevant. Improper shifting of burdens of proof. Not an ultimate issue in these proceedings. Rejected. Immaterial. Outside the scope of the pleadings. Rejected. Contrary to fact. A co-signer was required on any checks signed by Ms. Delaney. Rejected. Outside the scope of the pleadings. Accepted that Respondent Wolfe was not personally involved in the wrongdoings committed by Ms. Delaney. See HO# 25. The rest of paragraph 84 is rejected as argumentative. Rejected. Irrelevant - Argumentative. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Argument as opposed to proposed finding of fact. Improper summary. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO# 2. Accepted. See HO# 3. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted the first statement in paragraph 4. See HO# 9. The rest is rejected a- irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 26. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Not established by competent evidence. Accepted. Rejected. Improper summary with many factual conclusions that are immaterial to the allegationS in the Administrative Complaint. Rejected. Irrelevant to these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Not established by competent evidence. Rejected. Irrelevant to these proceedings. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 27. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 25. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Improper summary. For rulings on each transaction, refer to Findings of Fact in the Recommended Order. Accepted. See HO# 25. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Joseph D. Stewart, Esquire Hardt & Stewart 801 Laurel Oak Drive Suite 705, Sun Bank Building Naples, Florida 33963 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Florida Real Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (FRPCJUA) failed to comply with applicable requirements and standards of Part I of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, when it utilized a request for proposals (RFP) in autumn 1995 to arrive at its decision in early 1996 to contract with Intervenors, Audubon Insurance Company (Audubon), AIB Holdings, Inc. (AIB), and American International Insurance Company (AIIC), but not with the Petitioner, Bankers Insurance Company (Bankers), for insurance policy servicing work through the year 1999. Specifically, Bankers asserts: (1) that FRPCJUA improperly gave policy servicing work to AIB, which is not a licensed insurance company; that FRPCJUA violated Chapter 287, Florida Statutes, regarding competitive bidding requirements for state agencies; that, regardless whether Chapter 287 is applicable, whether FRPCJUA acted arbitrarily and in bad faith instead of using procedures equivalent to the procedures found in Chapter 287, Florida Statutes; and (4) that FRPCJUA violated the Government in the Sunshine Law, Chapter 286, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, the Department of Insurance (the Department), and the Intervenors oppose Bankers' assertions. After initially seeking maintenance of the status quo or a contract on the same terms as the others, Bankers now seeks money damages from FRPCJUA, including attorney fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact In response to Hurricane Andrew, which struck in September 1992, insurers either stopped or significantly curtailed writing residential property and casualty insurance in Florida, or in parts of Florida. In response to this crisis, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 627.351, Florida Statutes, which created the Intervenor, the Florida Real Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (FRPCJUA). FRPCJUA is an unincorporated association of insurers licensed to write residential property and casualty insurance in Florida. In addition to the licenses held by its members, FRPCJUA itself also is required by law to be licensed by the Respondent, the Department of Insurance (Department), as an insurer in Florida. FRPCJUA is governed by a Board of Governors chosen in accordance with the statute; some members are appointed by the Insurance Commissioner. The Petitioner, Bankers Insurance Company (Bankers), was represented on the initial FRPCJUA Board of Governors. The FRPCJUA Board hires an executive director and other staff to conduct the day-to-day operations of FRPCJUA. The evidence indicates that Florida Representative John Cosgrove and his staff were the primary drafters of the FRPCJUA legislation and that the House Insurance Committee he chaired was its primary sponsor. Rep. Cosgrove believed that the legislation did not intend to authorize FRPCJUA to contract with non-insurers for policy and claims servicing. Rep. Cosgrove's primary reasons for wanting to limit policy and claims servicing to insurers were to ensure the financial backing of those doing the work and to maintain regulatory control over them. However, policy and claims servicing providers bear no policy risk, and the Department maintains regulatory control over FRPCJUA both under the Section 627.351 and under the statutes regulating licensed insurers. Insurance Commissioner, Tom Gallagher, and his staff also were involved in the enactment of the FRPCJUA legislation. Commissioner Gallagher believed that the legislation authorized FRPCJUA to contract with non-insurers for policy and claims servicing. He believed that the legislation was not designed to enable insurers, who had "created" the insurance crisis by refusing to write or curtailing the writing of, insurance, to keep the lucrative policy and claims servicing to themselves. Section 627.351 requires FRPCJUA to operate pursuant to a plan of operations approved by the Department. FRPCJUA's first plan of operations and its articles of association were approved by the Department in 1993. The First Amended Articles of Association were approved by the Department on December 29, 1993. Before approving them, the Department reviewed both of these documents and required FRPCJUA to make corrections or revisions. Both of these documents provided for the use of insurers (called service carriers) and non-insurers (called servicing providers) to provide policy and claims services for FRPCJUA. In addition, they provided that FRPCJUA itself could provide those services. Bankers' President, David Meehan, was on the FRPCJUA Board when it produced the first two versions of FRPCJUA's plan of operations. Bankers never objected to the provisions for the use of non-insurers to provide policy and claims services. In accordance with the plans of operation, FRPCJUA formed the Shared Market Insurance Services, Inc. (SMISI) to provide policy and claims services for FRPCJUA. SMISI in turn contracted with other entities, including Intervenor, Policy Management Services Corporation (PMSC), which did policy servicing using a computer system it developed called the Point System. In addition to the SMISI contract, FRPCJUA also had policy and claims servicing contracts with five servicing carriers: Bankers; Diamond State Insurance Company; Fortune Insurance Company; Intervenors, Audubon Insurance Company (Audubon); and American International Insurance Company (AIIC). In late 1994, Bankers objected to the growth of SMISI. When Bankers' President tried to persuade Commissioner Gallagher to abolish or down-size SMISI, he was informed that Gallagher himself supported SMISI. In response, Meehan said he was going to resign in protest. Gallagher told Meehan that he intended to ask all representatives of FRPCJUA's members to resign and asked Meehan to wait until all resigned for the sake of appearance. Meehan agreed. Approximately coinciding with Meehan's conversation with Commissioner Gallagher, the Department initiated a market conduct examination of Bankers. For various reasons, Bankers believed and alleged in this proceeding that Bankers was targeted for the market conduct examination and other punitive measures in reprisal for opposing SMISI and for arguing the issue with Commissioner Gallagher. Bankers' allegations were not proven by the evidence in this case, but Bankers' beliefs colored its perception of the Department's dealings with it from then on. They also caused Bankers to suspect that the Department also was trying to influence FRPCJUA to take punitive action against Bankers. But it was not proven that the Department's relations with Bankers had any effect on FRPCJUA's dealings with Bankers. In late 1994, Florida elected Bill Nelson to succeed Tom Gallagher as Insurance Commissioner in January 1995. Commissioner Nelson appointed William Wilson as new chair of the FRPCJUA Board and recommended that Wilson consider James W. (Jay) Newman, Jr., for appointment as new Executive Director of FRPCJUA. Wilson interviewed and hired Newman, who had impressive credentials (including service as Insurance Commissioner for the State of Virginia) and extensive and directly relevant experience. The Department approved FRPCJUA's Second Amended Plan of Operation on July 21, 1995. As with the earlier versions of the plan of operations, the Department reviewed the document and required FRPCJUA to make corrections or revisions before approving it. As with the earlier versions of the plan of operations, the Second Amended Plan of Operation provided for the use of insurers (called service carriers) and non-insurers (called servicing providers) to provide policy and claims services for FRPCJUA. It also provided that FRPCJUA itself could provide those services. Although Bankers no longer was represented on the FRPCJUA Board, it knew of these provisions and voiced no objection to them. By September 1995, FRPCJUA had decided to reduce its business (so-called "depopulation") and thought that it soon would not need so many contracts for policy and claims servicing. It also thought it could save money by reducing the number of servicing contracts. Meanwhile, the contracts of the five servicing carriers were due to expire in February 1996, and the deadline for notice of non-renewal was approaching. (Bankers' contract would have expired in approximately June 1995, but it was extended.) Although all of the contractors were performing satisfactorily, Executive Director Newman thought FRPCJUA should give notice to the five servicing carriers that their contracts would not be renewed and should initiate a request for proposals (RFP) for new contracts. His desire was to reduce the number of contracts from five to either two or three. (The SMISI contracts and subcontracts were not due to expire, and no consideration was given to terminating those contracts at the time.) At the FRPCJUA Board meeting on September 19, 1995, which was noticed and conducted as an open meeting, Newman presented this idea, and the FRPCJUA Board agreed with him. It directed Newman to give notice of non-renewal to the five servicing carriers and to proceed with the RFP process. On October 18, 1995, FRPCJUA published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly that it would be accepting proposals from insurance companies interested in servicing FRPCJUA policies and that the deadline for proposals would be December 4, 1995. The notice referred those interested to FRPCJUA staff from whom the RFP would be available at a later date. No specifics of the RFP were included in the notice. Prior to the Board's next meeting on October 25, 1995, Newman prepared Proposed Servicing Carrier Selection Criteria. At the Board's meeting on October 25, 1995, which was noticed and conducted as an open meeting, the Board decided to add a provision that FRPCJUA should reserve the right to reject all proposals and instead negotiate contracts apart from the RFP and that the criteria should allow all existing servicing carriers to be eligible for selection. The Board directed Newman to proceed with the RFP so that the Board would be in a position to make its selection decision at its December 1995 meeting. (It does not appear from the evidence that there was a November 1995 meeting of the Board.) Immediately after the meeting on October 25, 1995, Newman began the task of drafting an RFP with the help of FRPCJUA General Counsel Michael Colodny and FRPCJUA staff attorney Fred Karlinsky. At some point in the drafting process, Colodny noticed that, by its terms, the draft RFP only solicited proposals from servicing carriers (insurers) and could be construed to prohibit servicing providers (non-insurers) from responding. To include servicing providers, other modifications to the RFP also would have to made. Newman, Colodny, and Karlinsky re-drafted the RFP to accommodate proposals by servicing providers and issued the re-drafted RFP on November 7, 1995. Bankers did not object to the eligibility of non- insurers to respond to the re-drafted RFP. Instead, it proceeded to prepare its response. On November 17, 1995, FRPCJUA published an amended notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly that it would be accepting proposals from both insurance companies and non- insurers interested in servicing FRPCJUA policies and that the deadline for proposals would be December 6, 1995. The RFP provided for a pre-bid conference to answer any questions on the services to be rendered under the RFP; it also provided an opportunity for written inquiries after the pre-bid conference. The pre-bid conference was held on November 28, 1995. Bankers attended and asked questions about the applicability of Chapter 287, Florida Statutes, and Newman answered that it did not apply. Bankers also asked questions on how to present compensation proposals and how different proposals would be scored. Newman explained that the intent was to encourage creative responses. Questions also were asked at the pre-bid conference about the requirements for a non-insurer to act as a servicing provider. Newman explained the terms of the RFP and confirmed that proposals from non-insurers were welcomed. Bankers did not object then or at any time prior to submission of its proposal. The RFP provided that proposals would be evaluated by FRPCJUA's executive director and staff. Newman asked FRPCJUA Chief Operating Officer, Robert Sklenar, Colodny, and Karlinsky to assist him in evaluating the proposals. Sklenar had extensive (35 years) experience in the insurance industry, mostly as vice-president of personal lines for Travelers Insurance Company. His experience included the design and preparation of competitive scoring processes for vendor selection by Travelers. Newman asked him to prepare the documents to be used for scoring RFP responses (the score sheets). Proposals were received on December 6, 1995. Proposals were received from Bankers, AIIC, Audubon, PMSC, Fortune, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Mobile America Insurance Group, Inc., National Con-Serv, Inc. (NCSI), American Southern Insurance Company, and Intervenor, AIB Holdings, Inc. (AIB), which had a subcontract for policy and claims servicing with Diamond State. The RFP provided that submission of a response signified acceptance of the terms and conditions of the RFP. Newman, Sklenar, Colodny, and Karlinsky met in Tallahassee to evaluate the responses on December 6, 1995. First, the four jointly evaluated the proposals to determine whether they met seven mandatory criteria. They determined that all ten proposals met the mandatory criteria. Then each evaluator independently scored the ten proposals on each of seven technical criteria, using a numerical point scale of 1 to 5 for each criterion. Then they compared their scores, discussed any differences, and attempted to reach consensus scores for each technical criterion. Then they added the consensus scores given on all technical criteria for each of the ten proposals. At this point in the process, the evaluation team observed that 15 points seemed to be a natural break point and reasoned that American Southern Fortune, Mobile America, and NCSI should be eliminated from further consideration because they got less than 15 points on the technical criteria. Of the proposals still under consideration, Hartford scored 23 on the technical criteria, PMSC scored 22, Audubon scored 21, AIIC scored 20, Bankers scored 18, and AIB scored 17. The evaluators then discussed the top two scorers, Hartford and PMSC. The team did not think FRPCJUA should enter into a contract under the RFP with either Hartford or PMSC. By this time, the evaluation team was aware that the SMISI contract would terminate as of December 27, 1995, for "breaches and defaults of the agreements and obligations owing to the FRPCJUA by SMISI," in accordance with correspondence from FRPCJUA Board Chairman Wilson, dated November 14, 1995; however, it was anticipated that PMSC would continue to handle the SMISI business--fully half of FRPCJUA's total book of business--under a direct contract with FRPCJUA. Due to capacity concerns, the team did not think additional business should be directed to PMSC until those concerns were allayed. Meanwhile, Hartford's proposal disclosed that it would not be in a position to handle a large number of policies for some time, and it proposed either delaying initiation of services or subcontracting with PMSC in the interim. The evaluation team did not think either alternative was acceptable. Evaluation of the mandatory and technical criteria took approximately six hours and was not completed until 1 or 2 a.m. on December 7, 1995. The evaluators decided not to review or evaluate the compensation proposals; however, the other three evaluators persuaded Newman to at least look at the compensation proposals and generally advise the group as to the general nature and parameters of the compensation proposals without identifying the proposers. Colodny was unable to meet again on December 7, 1995. Newman, Sklenar, and Karlinsky met briefly to review the proposals, but it was decided that Newman would conduct a more thorough review and report his findings and recommendations to the others by telephone. Although Newman knew the team would not recommend either Hartford or PMSC, he evaluated their compensation proposals for information and comparison. Hartford offered a flat 18.42% fee. PMSC offered two alternatives. One was a very favorable flat fee of 14.9%; the other proposed flat dollar amounts. Bankers proposed an 18% fee for six-month policies, and an 18.45% fee if FRPCJUA returned to annual policies. The other compensation proposals were tiered by volume (either net written policies or policies in force). AIB structured its compensation proposal as follows: 18% fee for $25 million net written policies (NWP); 17.75% for $25-$30 million NWP; 17.50% for $30- $35 million NWP; 17.25% for $30-$40 million NWP; and 17.00% for more than $40 million NWP. Audubon proposed a 17.9% fee for up to 50,000 policies in force (PIF), 17.5% for up to 100,000 PIF, and 16.9% for over 100,000 PIF. AIIC structured its proposal: 20.0% for up to 50,000 PIF; 19.5% for up to 100,000 PIF; 19.0% for up to 150,000 PIF; 18.5% for up to 200,000 PIF; 18.0% for up to 250,000 PIF; and 17.5% for over 250,000 PIF. In order to evaluate the tiered proposals, Newman had to exercise professional judgment as to future volume in light of FRPCJUA's "depopulation" efforts and intention to replace five contracts with just two or three. Newman did not score the Hartford and PMSC compensation proposals since he knew the team would not be recommending that FRPCJUA should enter into contracts with either under the RFP. In Newman's judgment, based on a 15 point scale, the Audubon and AIB compensation proposals deserved scores of 14, Bankers' proposal deserved a score of 10, and AIIC deserved a score of 9. Adding these scores to the technical scores, Audubon's proposal would be scored the best, with 35 points, AIB would score 31 points, AIIC would score 29 points, and Bankers would score 28 points. As agreed, Newman telephoned the other evaluators to discuss the compensation proposals and Newman's scoring of them. All agreed with Newman's assessments. They decided to recommend that FRPCJUA contract with Audubon and attempt to negotiate with the others to accept Audubon's compensation proposal. Sklenar wanted to recommend that FRPCJUA contract with Audubon and one other; Newman thought it would be more prudent to contract with three. It was agreed to recommend that FRPCJUA first attempt to negotiate with AIB and AIIC to accept Audubon's compensation proposal and to negotiate with Bankers (and, if necessary, those previously eliminated from consideration) only if either AIB or AIIC refused to accept Audubon's compensation proposal. The recommendation of the evaluation team was put in writing on December 11 and was presented to the FRPCJUA Board at its meeting on December 14, 1995, which was noticed and conducted as an open meeting. The evidence was that the Board had a full and open discussion of the recommendation. Ultimately, the Board voted unanimously to accept the evaluation team's recommendation, and it instructed Newman and his staff to proceed with contract negotiations. Section 24 of the Second Amended Plan of Operation provided a means for resolving disputes with respect to any decision of the FRPCJUA Board. Section 24 provided: Except as to any dispute, cause of action, claim or controversy arising under, or out of, any contract or Agreement pertaining to bonding or borrowing by the Association, any person or entity aggrieved with respect to any action or decision of the Board of the Association, or any Committee thereof, (other than matters regarding Assessments which appeals are governed by Sections 15, 16 and 17 hereof) may make written request of the Board for specific relief. All written requests for relief or redress shall be deemed Appeals and shall be delivered to the Executive Director. The Executive Director shall schedule any Appeal for hearing at the next regularly scheduled Board meeting occurring, not less than ten (10) days nor more than forty (40) days from the Executive Director's receipt of the Appeal. Any person or entity whose Appeal for relief is denied by the Board may appeal to the Insurance Commissioner in the manner provided by § 627.371, Florida Statutes. A transcript of any Appeal items shall be made at the time of hearing. In accordance with Section 24 of the Second Amended Plan of Operation, Bankers and Fortune appealed from the FRPCJUA Board's action taken at its meeting on December 14, 1995. Before the next scheduled meeting of the FRPCJUA Board on February 7, 1996, Newman was able to successfully negotiate contracts with Audubon, AIIC, and AIB. However, the contracts were not finalized and executed by the time of the meeting. Bankers also indicated its willingness to accept the terms being offered to the other three if FRPCJUA would agree to contract with Bankers as well. At the Board's meeting on February 7, 1996, which was noticed and conducted as an open meeting, the Board fully and openly discussed several subjects relevant to the RFP contracts, including capacity concerns and whether to contract with Bankers, Fortune and Hartford. Ultimately, a motion was made to reject the RFP process and negotiate contracts with the five existing servicing carriers--i.e., Audubon, AIIC, Bankers, Fortune, and Diamond State--with new contract provisions and a blended compensation rate. The Board voted to approve the motion with only member Diaz voting "no." Bankers and Fortune indicated that the Board's action was acceptable to them, and Chairman Wilson announced that the Board's action mooted the appeals of Bankers and Fortune. Audubon, AIIC, and AIB did not indicate whether the Board's action was acceptable to them. Before the next regular meeting of the Board, all three appealed from the Board's action under Section 24 of the Second Amended Plan of Operation. The next regular meeting of the FRPCJUA Board was held on February 29, 1996, which was noticed and open to the public. The Board considered a motion by member Ricciardelli to rescind its action on February 7, 1996. After a full and open discussion, the Board voted to approve the motion; members McGriff and Burgess voted "no." As part of its attempt to prove improper influence by the Department and arbitrary and capricious action by the FRPCJUA Board, Bankers introduced as evidence that Insurance Commissioner Nelson contacted Board member McGriff once by telephone prior to the meeting on February 29, 1996, to ask him to support the FRPCJUA staff's recommendation made on December 14, 1995. But there also was evidence that Bankers' representatives contacted McGriff several times to ask him to vote to uphold the Board's action on February 6, 1996, and it is self-evident that Commissioner Nelson's telephone contact did not influence McGriff at all. In accordance with Section 24 of the Second Amended Plan of Operation, on February 29, 1996, Bankers filed an appeal of the Board's actions of that date, and Bankers presented its appeal to the Board at a meeting on April 7, 1996, which was noticed and open to the public. After hearing and discussion, the Board denied the appeal. On April 24, 1996, Bankers appealed the Board's decision to the Department of Insurance. It is found from the evidence presented that the FRPCJUA's actions in connection with the RFP were neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board and its staff set about to reduce the number of servicing contracts it had (other than the SMISI contract) from five to either two or three in order to save money. FRPCJUA thoughtfully adopted a reasonable RFP process for achieving its objective and implemented the RFP in a thoughtful and reasonable manner. The result achieved the objective. FRPCJUA replaced the five existing servicing contracts with three new contracts and has saved FRPCJUA millions of dollars a year in servicing fees. Bankers presented the testimony of an expert in business valuation, RFP processes, and gaming theory in an attempt to prove that the RFP process and the scoring of the proposals was so flawed as to be arbitrary and capricious. But Bankers' evidence itself was flawed. First, Bankers' expert questioned RFP specifications that Bankers accepted. Second, the expert questioned the points given by the evaluators on the scoring scale they used without ever reviewing or considering any proposals other than those submitted by Bankers, Audubon, AIIC, and AIB. Third, while the expert conceded that it was important to understand the thought processes of the evaluators in assessing the validity of their judgments, he had absolutely no evidence and no knowledge about the judgments of Colodny or Karlinsky. Fourth, while the expert criticized the scoring system as not being sophisticated enough to indicate "fractional differences" between proposals, and criticized the team's failure to use a "tie-breaking" mechanism, he conceded that the consensus scoring used by the team was a valid and acceptable way to assess relatively small differences between proposals and to break scoring ties. Fifth, much of the expert's criticism amounted to disagreements as to how to evaluate aspects of the proposals; meanwhile, as the expert admitted, in most cases the evaluation required the exercise of professional judgment, and the evaluation team had more and better expertise. The expert's testimony did not prove that the RFP process and the scoring of the proposals was arbitrary or capricious.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order denying Bankers' appeal and claim for money damages and attorney fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Mang, Esquire Wendy Russell Wiener, Esquire Mang Law Firm, P.A. Post Office Box 11127 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3127 Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Perry Ian Cone, General Counsel AIB Insurance Group, Inc. 2500 Northwest 79th Avenue Miami, Florida 33122 Michael Colodny, Esquire Stuart B. Yanofsky, Esquire Colodny, Fass & Talenfeld, P. A. 2000 West Commercial Boulevard Suite 232 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Fred E. Karlinsky Associate General Counsel Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association 101 North Monroe Street Suite 1000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Zollie M. Maynard, Esquire William C. Owen, Esquire Panza, Maurer, Maynard & Neel, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 320 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mitchell B. Haigler, Esquire Paul R. Ezatoff, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent, HOWARD P. HAUSER, was eligible for licensure and licensed in this state by the Florida Department of Insurance as a Life and Health Insurance Agent; General Lines Insurance Agent - Property, Casualty, Surety, and Miscellaneous Lines; and Legal Expense Insurance Agent. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was the registered agent and an officer or director of Hauser and Associates Insurance Agency, Incorporated of 7770 Davie Road Extension, Hollywood, Florida. Beginning on or about January 1, 1986, and continuing through August 31, 1987, Respondent represented to one of his clients that he had obtained insurance coverage for that client's three restaurants. This representation of coverage was false. Respondent received from the client insurance premium payments of $56,550.00, more or less, for the insurance of the client's three restaurants. These funds were obtained by Respondent under false pretenses. Respondent provided the mortgagee of one of the restaurants owned by his client with a document purporting to be a certificate of insurance on that restaurant from Scotsdale Insurance Company insuring the restaurant for the period December 11, 1985, to December 11, 1986. Respondent further provided the mortgagee with a declaration sheet stating that Protective Insurance Company would insure the restaurant from January 1, 1987, to January 1, 1990. Respondent falsified these declaration sheets. Respondent's client suffered no loss, other than the loss of his premium dollars, because of Respondent's misrepresentations as to coverage. Respondent was charged with one count of Grand Theft of the Second Degree, a second degree felony, based on the dealings with his client. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Grand Theft of the Second Degree. The Circuit Court, in and for Broward County, Florida, placed Respondent on probation for a period of three years and withheld adjudication of guilt. As a condition of the Order of Probation, the court required that Respondent make restitution to his client in the amount of $56,550.00 and further required that $15,000.00 be paid toward restitution on October 24, 1988, the date Respondent entered his plea of nolo contendere and the date the court entered the Order of Probation. Respondent made a restitution payment of $15,000.00 on October 24, 1988. Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner since April 1972. Although Petitioner has received other complaints about Respondent, no formal action has been previously taken against him. Respondent has been a good citizen, except for this misconduct, and a good family man. Respondent regrets his misconduct. Respondent timely requested a formal hearing after the Administrative Complaint was served upon him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order which revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance to Respondent, Howard Paul Hauser. DONE and ENTERED this 21st of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings addressed as follows: of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2. Addressed in paragraph 2. 3. Addressed in paragraph 6. 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5. Addressed in paragraph 4. 6. Addressed in paragraphs 3-4. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 9. Addressed in paragraph 6. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in part in paragraph 7. Rejected in part as being speculative. Rejected as being a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert G. Gough, Esquire, (at the hearing) and Charles Christopher Anderson, Esquire, (on the proposed recommended order) Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Gary D. Weiner, Esquire, Glendale Federal Building Suite 209 901 Southeast 17th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
