The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code as alleged in an Amended Order to Show Cause and, if so, what penalty, if any, is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating viatical settlement providers in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Future First Financial Group, Inc., is licensed by the State of Florida as a viatical settlement provider. Its President and Chief Executive Officer is Mr. Randy Stelk. A viatical settlement contract involves the sale of a life insurance policy's benefits in exchange for an immediate discounted cash settlement to the original policy holder. A Florida resident "viator" (the insured) desiring to enter into a viatical settlement contract, acts through a Florida licensed broker, who provides the policy information to licensed viatical settlement providers like the Respondent, for subsequent re-sale of policy benefits to purchasers. Future First was initially licensed as a viatical settlement provider on December 26, 1997. The initial regulation of viatical settlement providers in the State of Florida by the Petitioner began at approximately the time Future First initially became licensed. Consolidated findings concerning Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 20, 22, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, and 45: Future First was a licensee of and regulated by the Department of Insurance at all times pertinent hereto. The health status representations on the exhibits (referenced in the Department's Proposed Recommended Order) concerning each of these counts, which are the insurance policy applications in question in these counts, are materially inconsistent with the health status representations related to the later viatical settlement agreements contained in the other exhibits so referenced as to each of the above-enumerated counts. These latter exhibits constitute the showing of actual medical condition to the Respondent by the insureds or viators in each transaction referenced in these counts. The overall effect of this showing is to indicate to the Respondent that the viators in question in these counts were HIV positive or had the disease AIDS, along with related diseases and medical conditions, contrary to the representations initially made to the insurance companies issuing the subject policies, in the insurance policy applications referenced in these counts, wherein the viators represented that they suffered from none of the medical diseases or conditions referenced in those application forms, including AIDS. All the exhibits referenced in these counts came from the business files of Future First and were supplied to the Department by Future First upon the Department's request during the investigation process. These material inconsistencies should have caused Future First to be on notice or to know or believe that the viators in question in these counts had made or indeed may have made fraudulent or material misrepresentations on their insurance policy applications. Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, requires Department licensees to report to the Department any knowledge or belief that a fraudulent insurance practice, as defined in Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, had been or was being committed. Subsection 817.234(3), Florida Statutes, specifically prohibits the presentation of false, incomplete or misleading information in support of an insurance application or the concealing of any fact material to the application. Thus Subsection 817.234(3), supra, specifically prohibits the very act strongly suggested by the evidence presented in the exhibits supportive of the above-referenced counts of the Amended Order. Future First made no reports to the Department concerning these matters until it contends it first became aware of these inconsistencies in health status representations upon receipt of the Order to Show Cause and later the Amended Order to Show Cause. Consolidated Findings of Fact Concerning Counts 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, and 42: The facts established as to these counts are much the same as those referenced above. The health status representations on the insurance policy applications in question and in evidence (exhibit numbers cited in the Proposed Findings as to these counts in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order) are materially inconsistent with the health status representation on the other exhibits which consist generally of the various documents of health or medical information provided to the Respondent by the viators in question, when the transactions leading to the viatical settlement agreements at issue were being entered into and finalized. The commonality among all of these counts as well as the counts in the above Findings of Fact (Part A above) consist of the viator's having been diagnosed with HIV or AIDS and/or related medical conditions sometime in the past prior to executing the insurance policy applications at issue and then responding in the negative on relevant questions on those policy applications, the overall effect of which was to deny the HIV positive test result, the HIV infection and the diagnosis of AIDS and related medical conditions. The viators at issue then openly revealed these conditions and the dates of the relevant diagnoses, all of which pre-dated the insurance policy applications, in the medical status representations they made to the Respondent and which were also revealed in the medical records provided to the Respondent at some point prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause and Amended Order. The health status representations made by the viators at these two different, germane points in time are materially inconsistent. Those material inconsistencies reasonably should have caused Future First and its operating officers to be on notice, to know or to believe that the viators made or may have made fraudulent or material misrepresentations on their insurance policy applications. Moreover, the evidence, as to these counts delineated in Part B above, shows that Future First was actually informed specifically that the policies in question had been rescinded by the insurers because the viators had made material misrepresentations on their policy applications. Exhibits such as the Future First policy summary forms show that Future First had been informed of the policy recisions as to the Counts referenced in Part B above. All of the documents constituting the Department's exhibits supportive of these findings, and the policy summary forms included, were found within the business files of Future First and were supplied to the Department by Future First upon its request during the investigative phase of this prosecution. Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, requires Department licensees to report to the Department any knowledge or belief that a fraudulent insurance practice as defined in Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, had been or was being committed. Subsection 817.234(3), Florida Statutes, specifically prohibits the presentation of false, incomplete or misleading information in support of an insurance application or the concealing of any fact material to the application. Thus, Subsection 817.234(3), supra, specifically prohibits the acts suggested by the documentary evidence presented by the Department, which supports the Findings of Fact herein. Future First made no report on these matters concerning the viators and policies to the Department, prior to the investigatory audit. Additional Findings of Fact Concerning Counts 2, 5, 41, 42, 43, and 44: Concerning Count 2, Exhibits 15 through 17 are viatical settlement purchase agreements entered into between Future First and various viatical settlement purchasers. These agreements represent to those purchasers that the policies, which are the subject of the agreements, are beyond the contestability period (typically two years) during which an insurer company may rescind its policy. The settlement purchase agreements specify that the "contestability period" runs for two years from the date of policy issuance. Exhibit 2 shows, however, that the policy in question was issued on January 22, 1998, and Exhibits 15 through 17, the agreements, were entered into in February, March and April of 1998, well before the January 22, 2000, conclusion of the contestability period. Future First thus had within its possession, in its files, the documents and information to show that the policies were not beyond contestability when the interests in those policies were sold to the investors or viatical settlement purchasers. The purchasers, by initialing the relevant portion of their purchase agreements had indicated and contracted for the purchase of non-contestable policies or policies which had survived the two-year contestable period before being purchased by these investors or viatical settlement purchasers. The vice-president in charge of underwriting, Mr. Sweeney, under the business practices of Future First, essentially made all the calculations and decisions involved in negotiating and effecting the settlement purchase agreements with the investors and the viatical settlement agreements with the original viators or insureds. As an experienced insurance executive and underwriter who had all of the relevant documents available to him, he is chargeable with knowledge that the policies he and Future First were conveying to the settlement purchasers were still within the contestability period, despite his being on documentary notice that the investors had contracted to purchase only non-contestable policies. The officers and directors of the Respondent allowed him to have this independence of action, freedom of conduct and bargaining power on behalf of Future First and therefore, Future First, the corporation, is chargeable with the conduct it allowed him to engage in, even assuming, arguendo, that no other officer, director or employee of the company knew of the relevant details of these transactions. Thus Future First misrepresented to its investors that the policies were beyond contestability when in fact they were not. It thus is chargeable with knowingly selling interests in contestable policies to investors, who had specifically contracted for the purchase for non-contestable policies. This misrepresentation was material to the purchases because the insurers' ability to rescind the policies during contestability, thereby destroying the very instrument securing the purchasers' investment, was not made known to those purchasers. The potential destruction of that instrument and the consequent loss of the investment to the purchaser is material to any reasoned decision to invest. CEO Randy Stelk's testimony at hearing to the effect that computer input error had caused contestable policies to be inadvertently sold to purchasers who contractually specified a non-contestable policy is rebutted by Future First's own documents from its records which correctly and explicitly identify the policy as contestable. See Exhibits 11a and 11f, at pages 1 and 4, and Exhibit 24, all of which correctly identify the policy as contestable. Exhibit 24 specifically notes the dates at which the policy was projected to emerge from its contestability period. Thus this documented evidence, together with the evidence of Mr. Sweeney's close and direct involvement with arranging for the transactions and making decisions as to which policies to sell to which investors belies Mr. Stelk's testimony in this regard. Concerning Count 5, Exhibits 50, 54, 55, 56 and 57, are viatical settlement purchase agreements which inter alia represented to the respective viatical settlement purchasers that the policy in question was beyond the contestability period during which an insurer may rescind the policy. The "contestability period" runs for two years from the date of policy issuance. However, Exhibit 39, shows that the policy in question was issued on February 3, 1998, and Exhibits 50, 54, 55, 56 and 57, were respectively entered into in February of 1998, well prior to the February 3, 2000, end of the contestability period. Here again, Future First's own records, which correctly and explicitly identify this policy as contestable also specifically note, at Exhibits 42d and 46, the date at which the policy was projected to emerge from the contestability period. The purchase agreements referenced above clearly show that the investors contemplated and contracted to purchase a non-contestable policy. These documents clearly were available to Mr. Sweeney and to Future First at the time Mr. Sweeney was making the underwriting decisions and entering into the agreements with the investors, and consequently this knowledge is chargeable to him and to Future First. Again Mr. Stelks' testimony that computer input error had caused inadvertent sale of contestable policies to purchasers who had contractually specified non-contestable policies is rebutted by Future First's own records, the evidence concerning Future First business practices and specifically Mr. Sweeney's underwriting methods and conduct. Thus, Mr. Stelk's testimony in this regard is not credited. Thus, it is inferred that Future First, through Mr. Sweeney, knowingly represented to investors that the policies were beyond contestability when they were not and such a representation was material to the purchase because the insurers' ability to rescind a policy during contestability and destroy the very instrument securing the investment was not made known to the purchaser. The potential destruction of that instrument and the consequent loss of investment is material to any reasoned decision to invest. Concerning Count 41, the fifth page of Exhibit 428, contains a paragraph entitled "Incontestability" which establishes that the life insurance policy in question was subject to a two-year contestability period, during which the insurer could rescind the policy. Exhibits 446, 447, 448, 449, 450 and 451, are all viatical settlement purchase agreements through which the viatical settlement investors purchased an interest in the death benefit of the life insurance policy in question. Each of those purchase agreements contains a standard section entitled "Minimum Criteria" which is initialed by the purchaser, thereby indicating the purchaser's decision to purchase an interest only in a policy which was beyond contestability. Future First nonetheless placed all of those investors' monies into the policy in question (See Exhibit 428) while it was still within the two-year contestability period without informing the purchasers of that fact. Future First had the policy in its possession and necessarily had to have a copy of it in possession in order to purchase the policy from the viator, which it did in July of 1998. It thus knew the policy was still within its contestability period when interest in it were sold to the purchasers in question. The same reasons found with regard to Counts 2 and 5 prevail here with regard to Mr. Sweeney's involvement. The documents were in Future First's possession and within its knowledge such that the circumstantial evidence clearly shows that Future First is chargeable with knowledge or belief that it sold contestable policies to investors who had no reason to believe they were purchasing contestable policies. Concerning Count 42, Exhibit 453 is dated March 24, 1998, and is a viatical settlement purchase agreement between Future First and the viatical settlement purchaser named therein. The agreement contains the same initialed provision found with regard to the agreements in Counts 2, 5 and 41, indicating the purchasers' decision to invest only in a policy which was beyond the two-year contestability period. The agreement bears the designation "PRA 58075" in the lower left hand corner of the first page (purchaser number). Exhibit 459 is a letter dated May 21, 1998, authorizing Charles R. Sussman, Trustee for the Fidelity Trust (identified in numerous exhibits, including 454 in this count, as the escrow agent used by Future First for viatical settlement contract transactions), to wire funds from that trust to Compass Bank for the purchase of an interest in the death benefits of the Farmers New World Life Insurance policy on the viator named therein, which purchase was accomplished through the execution of Exhibit 454 on June 6, 1998. Among the PRA numbers identified in Exhibit 459, is 58075, corresponding to Exhibit 453, the above-referenced purchase contract. Exhibit 455 is an internally prepared Future First document that clearly states that the life insurance policy in question was still well within its contestability period on May 21, 1998. The exhibits thus establish that Future First represented to the investor that the policy it would purchase with his funds was beyond contestability when, because of the unequivocal documents in its possession, Future First had to have known, through Mr. Sweeney, that it was not. Indeed all of those exhibits were found within the business files of Future First and Future First stipulated that included in those exhibits are its purchase request agreements that contain the contestability provision in question. Exhibits 462 and 463 establish that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy referenced in those exhibits was issued on March 28, 1998. Exhibit 465, establishes that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy was purchased by Future First on June 22, 1998. Exhibit 468, establishes that on July 1, 1998, purchaser 58075's funds were used to purchase an interest in that Manhattan National Life Insurance policy obviously well within the two-year contestability period since the policy was only issued on March 28, 1998. This was despite an express representation otherwise in the viatical settlement purchase agreement. Exhibits 471 and 472, show that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy was rescinded during the contestability period in September 1998. Exhibit 473 establishes that Future First decided to switch the viatical settlement purchaser's funds out of the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy into a John Hancock Life Insurance Company policy. However, it did not inform the purchaser that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy had been rescinded during its contestability period. Exhibits 485 and 486, establish that the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy referenced therein was issued on January 23, 1998. Exhibit 487 establishes that the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy was purchased by Future First in November of 1998, using the purchaser's funds referenced in Exhibits 488 and 489. Among those purchaser's funds were those of Purchaser 58075. Thus, Purchaser 58075's monies were used to purchase an interest in the death benefit of the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy in question. Despite the "beyond contestability" representation made in the viatical settlement purchase agreement between Purchaser 58075 and Future First, Future First placed that purchaser's money into the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy while it was still in its contestability period. Future First's own records refute Mr. Stelk's testimony that computer input error caused inadvertent sales of contestable policies to purchasers who had specified, contractually, their desire for non-contestable policies. The documents from Future First's own records in evidence, explicitly identify this policy as contestable and that the purchasers involved had desired non- contestable policies. In light of the foregoing reasons found as fact as to Counts 2, 5 and 41, which are adopted as to Count 42, Future First is chargeable with knowledge that it was selling contestable policies to purchasers who had specified contractually their wish and intent to purchase non-contestable policies. Count 43 involves the sale by Future First of interests in the death benefits of J.C. Penny Life Insurance Company Policy No. 25184/74L40L3762 in January of 1998, to three different viatical settlement purchasers. This is evidenced by Exhibits 498, 499 and 500, the respective settlement purchase agreements. Each of those purchase agreements includes a provision that required the purchase of an interest only in a policy which was beyond contestability. Exhibits 494, 496, 498, 499 and 500, together however, show that the interest in the policy sold to those purchasers were sold while the policy was still contestable, without informing the purchasers. All of these exhibits came from the business files or records of Future First and Future First stipulated that included in those exhibits are the purchase request agreements that contain the provisions restricting purchases to policies which were beyond the two-year contestability period. In light of the findings made as to Counts 2, 5, 41 and 42, next above, it is determined that Future First, the Respondent, is charged with knowledge that it, and specifically its vice-president in charge of underwriting, Mr. Sweeney, sold those policies which were still contestable to the relevant purchasers; that those purchasers had specified in their purchase agreements their intent to purchase only policies which were uncontestable and that it had not so informed those purchasers. Count 44, concerns a viatical settlement purchase agreement entered into by Future First on March 24, 1998, relating to the sale and purchase of an interest in the death benefit of an insurance policy. See Exhibit 510, in evidence. That agreement represented to the purchaser that the interest to be purchased was to be from a policy which was beyond the two- year contestability period. See Exhibits 508 and 510. However, the policy selected for investment for that purchaser by Future First was not beyond contestability. Exhibit 506, obtained from Future First's own files, clearly shows that the issuance date of the policy was May 6, 1998, and Exhibits 504, 508 and 510 considered together, indicate that the policy was sold to that purchaser while it was still contestable. Future First thus subjected the purchaser's investment to the undisclosed risk of rescission of the policy. The existence of such a risk would certainly be material to that investor's decision about whether to so invest. Thus by investing the purchaser's funds in a contestable policy instead of an uncontestable policy, without advising that investor of such a deviation from their contractual agreement, is, in effect, a material misrepresentation in that transaction. For the reasons found as to Counts 2, 5, 41, 42 and 43 above, Future First is chargeable with knowledge that the policy was contestable and that it had invested the purchaser's funds in a contestable policy when it was contractually bound to only invest that purchaser's funds in an uncontestable policy, as established by the terms of the viatical settlement purchase agreement. Future First's business practices. Future First conducts its business in various states through representatives resident in such states known as viatical settlement brokers. Viatical settlement brokers gather all relevant information, including available medical information and usually provide it to various viatical settlement providers in order to solicit multiple bids on a particular policy. Future First does not solicit viators itself. During the time period relevant to the allegation in the Amended Order, when Future First initially received a package from a broker, it was divided into its insurance and medical components. The insurance component was provided to Mr. William Sweeney, Future First's Vice-President of Underwriting. The medical component was provided to a nurse on the staff with Future First for initial medical review and then forwarded to Future First's independent medical consultant, Dr. Michael Duffy. During the time period relevant to the Amended Order, Future First offered a one, two or three-year viatical purchase program. That is, viators must have a certified life expectancy of one, two or three years in order to qualify with Future First. After Dr. Duffy reviewed a particular file and the viator was deemed qualified as to one of the three available programs, Dr. Duffy would certify and assign a life expectancy to the viator and return the file to Mr. Sweeney. Life expectancy estimates are inherently subject to many variables, are unpredictable and constitute a risk to the purchaser. Mr. Sweeney's responsibilities included verification that the insurance information provided with any particular file was correct and complete (including insurance policy applications), that the policy actually existed and was in force, that premiums were paid up to date, that the insurance company had the appropriate rating, as well as conducting other verifications. Before a policy was approved for purchase, it was Mr. Sweeney's ultimate responsibility, pursuant to Future First's existing corporate policy, to compare the date of initial diagnosis of a potential viator's medical condition to the insurance policy application to look for any inconsistencies. Mr. Sweeney next completed a "file summary cover sheet" referencing certain information and verifications and attached it to the file. Mr. Sweeney was essentially a "one-man operation" in exclusive control of Future First's underwriting department and was ultimately responsible for deciding whether or not Future First would offer to bid on a particular policy. Future First's business operations in effect at the time relevant to the Amended Order were so compartmentalized that other officers or employees at Future First might not know any details associated with Mr. Sweeney's activities. After Mr. Sweeney authorized Future First to bid on a particular policy, the file was transferred to the bidding department. The bidding department did not re-visit or otherwise question Mr. Sweeney's decision to bid on a particular policy, but only reviewed the cover sheet to establish a bid price. If documentation was missing from any file, it was Mr. Sweeney's responsibility to contact the broker to request the missing documents. All viatical settlement brokers with whom Future First did business in Florida were required to be licensed by the Petitioner. Future First currently no longer conducts business with the broker "Funds For Life" because that particular broker dealt solely in "contestable" policies and Future First no longer purchases such policies, at least since the Petitioner's audit. Future First no longer has a business relationship with the Texas-based broker "Southwest Viatical," in part because Southwest Viatical routinely failed to provide complete documentation to Future First, including the insurance applications of viators. Southwest Viatical was specifically requested to provide insurance policy applications regarding the relevant policies referred to in the Amended Order but refused to do so. Most of the Southwest Viatical files purchased by Future First did not include insurance applications at the time of purchase. The insurance applications were ultimately obtained by Future First, however, at some point prior to the 1999 audit by the Petitioner. Future First became concerned about the character of individuals associated with Southwest Viatical and when requested by Southwest Viatical to forward commission funds to an offshore account, Future First declined to do so and immediately ceased doing business with Southwest Viatical. Future First cooperated thoroughly with Texas authorities in their investigation of Southwest Viatical, ultimately culminating, as a direct result of Future First's assistance, with the apprehension and subsequent incarceration of two principals of Southwest Viatical. During the period of time alleged in the Amended Order Future First received, on the average, between 400 and 600 policies per month from brokers requesting a bid. Future First rejected and never bid on the majority of policies referred to it by Southwest Viatical. On the average, Future First ultimately purchased approximately 25 percent of the policies submitted to it for a bid. Mr. Sweeney was primarily responsible for communicating with brokers as to all aspects of a potential viatical settlement transaction and to request all required documentation, including insurance policy applications. During the course of Mr. Stelk's affiliation with Future First he personally became familiar with the handwriting of William F. Sweeney. It is Mr. Sweeney's initials which appear on the cover sheets entered into evidence by the Petitioner, exemplified by Petitioner's Exhibit 4a. All the remaining "cover sheet" exhibits of the Petitioner contain the initials "WFS" on the top right hand corner which are Mr. Sweeney's initials. Mr. Sweeney is not currently an officer, director or employee of Future First because he was removed from any position with the Respondent corporation by order of the Petitioner. No other officers, directors or employees of the Respondent have been subject to a similar removal order, nor has Future First itself. The criminal proceedings currently pending against the Respondent are the direct result of Mr. Sweeney's activities while employed by Future First. The Petitioner's lead investigator reviewing Future First's business activities recommended that individual charges only be brought against Mr. Sweeney and against no other individual employed by or affiliated with the Respondent. Future First has a business relationship with licensed life insurance agents and/or securities brokers throughout the United States to solicit funds from individuals for ultimate purchase of viatical settlements. Those licensed individuals present an approved Purchase Request Agreement (PRA) to a potential purchaser to discuss the various Future First programs available and to help the purchaser finalize a PRA. Depending on what state the purchaser resided in, the purchaser would then issue a check either to Future First directly or to the Fidelity Trust (Future First's escrow agent), to be held until such time as Future First could purchase from a viator a policy matching the program desired by that purchaser. Thereafter, a formal "closing" would occur when the purchaser was, where appropriate, made a beneficiary on one or more insurance policies; all verifications and notifications to the insurance company and other entities were completed; an attorney and the trustee, would approve all aspects of the transaction within their purview, and a copy of the closing package would be sent to the purchaser for his or her records. After the closing, Future First would engage Life Watch Services, Inc., an unaffiliated company, to monitor the health status of the viator on a monthly basis in order that all appropriate actions may be taken at the time of the viator's death, so that the policy benefits may be promptly paid to the purchaser. Future First initially engaged in the purchase of contestable policies only after being approached by groups of agents with potential purchasers willing to assume the risk associated with contestable policies. Understanding the risk associated with such policies, Future First reserved 20 percent of its potential profit from such transactions and placed those funds in trust in a "Guaranty Fund" in the event that an insurance company rescinded a policy within the contestable period. In the event an insurer rescinded a contestable policy, Future First purchased a new policy for its customer out of the Guaranty Fund, at no additional cost to the customer. No purchaser ever lost any "investment time" if a policy was rescinded by an insurance company because that purchaser would be provided a new policy involving a viator with the same ultimate remaining life expectancy. Thus, without any prompting by a governmental authority, Future First made the business decision to voluntarily exceed the protections of Florida law by establishing the Guaranty Fund in order to purchase replacement policies for its customers if the initial policy was rescinded by the insurer. The Guaranty Fund was also utilized to make the purchaser whole even when an insurance company cancelled or non- renewed an insurance policy on an entire group, or if a new insurance carrier for a particular group later reduced the benefit level assigned to the purchaser. The Guaranty Fund was also used for the benefit of purchasers if a viator as a member of an employer group, quit his or her job and the viator exercised a statutory right to have the group policy benefits converted to an individual policy. Because benefit levels on such individual policies are typically lower, the Guaranty Fund was used to purchase additional insurance benefits to assign to the purchaser. Additionally, if a policy lapsed for any reason, the Guaranty Fund was used to procure a new policy or policies in order that the purchaser would be fully protected according to the terms of the PRA. No policy purchased by Future First has ever lapsed for failure of Future First to pay the premium. Funds from the Guaranty Fund have been used to purchase new policies when a viator committed suicide and the insurance company later rescinded the policy, as well. The Guaranty Fund maintained by Future First existed to cover other contingencies beyond just the possible recession of insurance policies because of the misrepresentation of the viator discovered by the insurer within the contestable period. Future First, through use of the Guaranty Fund, has replaced approximately 17 million dollars in face value of insurance policies, equating to about 12.4 million dollars in direct cost to Future First and, as a result, no Future First purchaser has ever been harmed. The 12.4 million dollars used to purchase replacement policies would otherwise have been retained by Future First as profit. Today Future First does not purchase contestable policies in the regular course of its business. The only exception to that occurs when an insured group undergoes a carrier change and a new contestable period is automatically instituted by the new carrier. There is no prohibition in Florida either presently or during the times relevant to the Amended Order, against the purchase of contestable policies by a viatical settlement provider. The recission of the contestable policies at issue in fact immediately followed an inquiry from the Department of Insurance to the insurers, which alerted them that the Department suspected fraud in the inception of the policies. That is, it suspected fraud on the part of the viators or insureds on those policies, not Future First. Future First immediately utilized the Guaranty Fund and began replacing the policies. None of the rescinding insurers have accused Future First of any complicity in any alleged fraud with respect to the policies referenced in the Amended Order, nor has the Department of Insurance alleged any such fraud against Future First. All but one or two of the rescinded policies have been replaced and the purchasers made whole, pursuant to the terms of their original PRA. One of the two policies not fully replaced as of the date of the hearing was being contested by Future First as to the legality of the insurance company's rescission, and Future First will replace the policy, if needed, at such time as that legal issue is resolved. Of all the policies at issue in the Amended Order, including, as well, any replacement policy subsequently purchased by Future First with money from the Guaranty Fund, only one or two contestable periods had not expired as of the date of the hearing. Those contestable periods were to expire thirty to sixty days after the date of the final hearing in this matter. Future First regularly monitors and verifies the status of all policies assigned to its purchasers, including the status of all replacement policies. The direct costs to Future First to purchase replacement policies for the rescinded policies referenced in the amended order was approximately $1.5 million dollars paid out of the Guaranty Fund. Since its initial licensure in the State of Florida, Future First has cooperated with the Petitioner concerning pending legislation, rule development and other contacts with the Petitioner agency. It has cooperated fully with the Petitioner when the audit of Future First occurred in February of 1999, provided all requested information and documentation and made all personnel available to confer with examiners in a full and frank manner. In the course of the four-week on-site audit, Mr. Stelk personally met with the Petitioner's examiners once or twice a week to discuss the Petitioner's suggestions for improving compliance. The Petitioner issued a draft "Report of Examination" as a result of its audit on August 5, 1999. It contained suggestions, comments and recommendations which had been discussed during Future First's staff meetings with the examiners. Future First addressed many of the Petitioner's concerns raised in the Report of Examination (report) and implemented certain suggested changes in its business practices. Mr. Stelk directed that a formal response to the report be filed, addressing the specific points raised by the Petitioner and explaining any corrective action taken where applicable. Future First viewed certain of the findings and suggestions made at the earlier meetings and later contained in the draft report as potentially helpful to its business. It therefore implemented those suggestions even before receiving the draft of the report. Certain suggestions in the report of such as a request to formalize a refund policy, were not strictly required by a controlling statute. However, Future First nonetheless voluntarily implemented such a refund policy. Future First has cooperated with all governmental agencies interested in reviewing its files at all times during the course of its licensure as a viatical settlement provider and during the course of the relevant investigations. There has been no allegation or suggestion that it has in any way altered any documents, tampered with its files or that any information was purposely missing. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner had no knowledge as to when any particular documents were received into Future First's files, including insurance applications, medical diagnosis information or other documents and has conceded that some policy applications or medical documentations may not have been received until after the bid process and viatical transactions in some cases were actually closed. Thus, Future First would not have been able to compare documents to detect possible fraud as to those situations. Therefore, Future First could not have been guilty of fraud or misrepresentation to its purchasers as to such transactions and files if it had no documentation at the point of the transaction being closed to indicate to it that possible insurance fraud in the inducement, by a viator, had occurred. In point of fact the Petitioner is not accusing Future First of fraud. However, as of the time of the audit in February 1999, because of the discussions and information it received at meetings with Department agents and employees, and certainly as to formal notification on August 5, 1999 in the Department's report, the Respondent knew that many insurance applications in its files had medical diagnosis information or disclosures by viators which were at odds with the medical information it obtained in the viatical settlement and contracting process. It still failed to report that knowledge (and indeed circumstantial evidence clearly indicates that at least Mr. Sweeney had that knowledge even before the February 1999 audit, as to many of the files). Future First still did not report potential fraud on the part of viators to the Department that it obviously had knowledge of until it began to actually report it in a formal way, after the first Show Cause Order was served (January 2000). It is also clear that the Department knew about this inconsistent medical information and probable insurance fraud by the time of its February 1999 audit. In November of 2000, as part of its efforts to cooperate with the requirements of the Department and the relevant statutes and rules, Future First filed an Anti-Fraud Education and Training Plan (Plan) with the Department, Division of Insurance Fraud. Neither Future First nor any of its representatives received any notice from the Department that the Plan was in any way deficient or otherwise non-compliant with Florida law. It has implemented that Plan and adherence to it has had a positive effect on Future First's business. The Anti-Fraud Plan stresses that Future First will not bid on a policy for purposes of viatical settlement unless the viator's insurance application is present in the file at or before the time of the bid. Future First's corporate policy, even prior to the implementation of the Anti-Fraud Plan has been that the insurance application must be reviewed and compared with available medical documentation for any inconsistencies prior to bidding on a policy. It is also apparent, however, that Mr. Sweeney and those under his direction and control apparently did not do so in many cases. During the course of the investigation, the "free- form" stage of this proceeding and the formal stage of this proceeding, Future First has made numerous form and other filings with the Petitioner seeking approval in connection with a new PRA and various other purchaser disclosures required by recent amendments to Florida Statutes. After comments and questions from the Department, resulting in some revisions to such documents, the new PRA and disclosure documents were approved by the Department, approval of the last document being obtained in April 2001. The Respondent, by its involvement through Mr. Stelk with the Viatical Life Settlement Association of American and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, has made a bonafide effort to gain knowledge of specific, appropriate business practices of other viatical settlement providers doing business in the United States as well as in Florida. Unlike certain other viatical settlement providers operating in Florida and elsewhere, Future First has never made premium payments on insurance policies out of the personal checking accounts of officers, directors or employees, has never instructed viators not to contact insurance companies and has never required viators to sign undated, change-of-ownership forms for filing with the insurer after the contestability period expired for any reason whatever, including as part of an effort to conceal from an insurance company the fact that an insurance policy was subject to viatical settlement. No such activity or effort to conceal has been alleged. (Compare, Accelerated Benefits Corporation documents in evidence pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion for Official Recognition). On March 19, 2000, February 8, 2001, and March 6, 2001, Future First filed with the Department identifying information and documents pursuant to the requirements of Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, to the effect that fraud may have been involved in the procurement of all of the rescinded insurance policies referenced in the Show Cause Order and the Amended Order. The three separate fraud notifications constitute the Respondent's Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 and correspond to the time period shortly after service of the initial Show Cause Order and the Amended Show Cause Order.
Findings Of Fact Parties Respondent, Department of Insurance (DOI) and Intervenor, Department of Banking and Finance (DBF) are state agencies charged with the regulation of insurance and banking activities, respectively. Great Northern Insured Annuity Corporation (GNA) is an insurance company and agency operating in Florida and elsewhere in space leased in financial institution lobbies, customer service areas and atriums. From its approximately eighty-four locations in Florida it markets annuities, securities and whole life insurance products. Approximately one-third of its 1992 sales of $130 million was in annuities. GNA's principal profits in Florida are derived from its sale of annuities, which it directly underwrites and services. First Nationwide Bank (FNB) leases space in its lobbies and other common areas to insurance agencies and companies, including Vista Financial Group, (Vista). In 1992 Vista sold approximately $13.5 million in annuities from the locations it leases from FNB. First Union Mortgage Corporation (FUMC) is a financial institution with "grandfathered" insurance activities pursuant to section 626.988(5), F.S. It has also been granted a certificate of authority by DOI as a Third Party Administrator pursuant to section 626.88, F.S. Florida Bankers Association (FBA) is a trade association of the banking industry in Florida. It represents its financial institution members. The Association of Banks in Insurance Inc. (ABI) is a trade association of financial institutions and insurance companies. The Florida Association of Life Underwriters (FALU) is a professional association of life, health and direct writer multi-line insurance agents with approximately 8,900 members. James Mitchell and Co. and its subsidiary, JMC Insurance Services Corporation (JMC) are California corporations involved in marketing financial products, including annuities in Florida. Florida Central Credit Union, Railroad and Industrial Federal Credit Union and GTE Federal Credit Union are state or federally chartered credit unions authorized to do business in Florida. Credit Union Services, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of GTE Federal Credit Union, sells insurance to credit union members. The Florida Association of Insurance Agents (FAIA) is a trade association representing independent insurance agents in Florida. Barnett Banks Trust Company, N.A. is a trustee for annuities issued by James Mitchell and Company. Barnett Banks Insurance, Inc. is a Florida licensed insurance company providing credit insurance of various types for credit extended by Barnett Banks throughout Florida. BTI Services, Inc. a subsidiary of Barnett, provides records administration services for insurers. Marketing One, Inc., Liberty Securities Corporation and Compulife, Inc. market annuities to existing and prospective customers of financial institutions. Those marketing activities are conducted from lobbies, atriums or other central areas of the premises of the financial institutions. The Financial Institutions Insurance Association is a California non- profit association of financial institutions and insurance companies with members in Florida who lease space to insurance agency tenants. California Federal Bank is a federal savings bank operating branches in the State of Florida and leasing space to a company selling insurance in that space in bank branch offices. The Statute Although other sections of statutes are cited as "law implemented" in proposed Chapter 4-223, its undeniable focus is section 626.988, F.S., as described in the first rule of the proposed chapter: 4-223.001 Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to implement the provisions of Section 626.988, Florida Statutes, and to ensure that customers of financial institutions conduct their business in an atmosphere free from direct or indirect coercion, unfair competition, and unfair or deceptive trade practices, and to implement those statutory provisions which prohibit insurance agents and solicitors who are directly or indirectly associated with, under contract with, or controlled by a financial institution from engaging in insurance agency activities as an employee agent, principal, or agent of a financial institution agency. These rules establish procedures and standards for insurance companies, agencies, agents and solicitors in their relationships and business arrangements with financial institutions. Embodied in Florida's insurance code, a code described as more lengthy than the New Testament, Section 626.988 F.S. enacted in 1974, ". . . generally prohibits banking institutions from engaging in insurance agency activities. . . ." Florida Association of Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 591 F.2d 334 (U.S. 5th Cir. 1979). The prohibition is accomplished indirectly by forbidding licensed insurance agents or solicitors from engaging in insurance agency activities under certain relationships with financial institutions. There are exceptions to the blanket prohibition, including an amendment in 1990 to permit state chartered banks to sell annuities in the event that federal law permits federal banks to sell annuities. After almost twenty years of attempted enforcement, DOI has described section 626.988, F.S. as "a vague statute with imprecise standards". (Notice of proposed rule, Florida Administrative Weekly, June 26, 1992) The Rules DOI's experience with interpretation and enforcement of Section 626.988, F.S. commenced in earnest in the early 1980's, when insurance companies began to market annuities in the lobbies or public access areas of financial institutions. Many of these companies consulted with the department and obtained guidance as to the applicability of the law to their varied circumstances. In 1985, American Pioneer Life Insurance Company, through its counsel, Edward Kutter, Esquire, inquired of Commissioner Gunter concerning the effect of the law on its operations. American Pioneer Life Insurance Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of American Pioneer Savings Bank. Donald Dowdell, General Counsel of the department, responded by letter dated November 18, 1985. He analyzed the relationships among the insurer, the financial institution, and the insurance agents and determined that there was no significant probability of the financial institution exercising control over the agents: . . . In view of the fact that American Pioneer Savings Bank is the ultimate parent of American Pioneer Life Insurance Company, the specific issue which must be resolved in responding to your inquiry is whether an independent agent appointed by American Pioneer Life is directly or indirectly associated with, or retained, controlled, or employed by American Pioneer Savings Bank. Absent such a relationship, Section 626.988 does not prevent American Pioneer Life and its agents from marketing insurance in this state. . . . These corporate relationships in and of themselves do not create a prohibited relationship between American Pioneer Savings Bank and independent insurance agents appointed by American Pioneer Life. . . . It is recognized that as the corporate parent, American Pioneer Savings Bank may influence or control various corporate activities of its subsidiaries which would not entail control of the solicitation, effectuation and servicing of coverage by insurance agents. If, in fact, American Pioneer Savings Bank does not directly or indirectly control the conduct of insurance activities by American Pioneer Life agents but, instead, the agents sell insurance free of influence from the financial institution, the prohibitions of the statute are inapplicable. (GNA Exhibit No. 8) (emphasis added) Thus, in 1985, the department limited the prohibitions of section 626.988, F.S. to the financial institution's control of, and authority over, an agent's insurance activities. By 1986, other aspects of an association became a concern of the department. Letters responding to inquiries outlined requirements that leased space and insurance sales literature be physically or visually separated from the functions of the financial institution. (GNA Exhibits No. 10, 13 and 16) As a result of the body of opinions being circulated in the form of incipient policy, the department proposed rules implementing section 626.988. These proposed rules were later withdrawn before adoption, but the department continued to use them as guidelines. During this period, DOI received a handful of complaints, mostly from agents. Douglas Shropshire, director of Agent and Agency Services during the relevant period, testified that he could not recall a single consumer complaint with respect to financial institutions engaging in the distribution of insurance products. Gail Connell, identified by Mr. Shropshire as "the Department's person most intimately familiar with field investigation of .988 issues" (Tr. at 760), agreed. (FUMC Exhibit No. 35, at 184-85 See also. FUMC Exhibit No. 36 at 347-50, 353) In 1991, in anticipation of the rule-making mandate of section 120.535, the department reviewed its guidelines. As a part of that review, representatives of the agents' associations, FALU, FAIA and others, were consulted as to the desirability of the rules. In January, 1992, DOI published proposed rules that were substantially similar to the guidelines. Donald Dowdell stated that the proposed rules published at that time represented the department's determination of a reasonable interpretation of the statute, adding, "[T]he line was drawn with the realization of what was happening in the real world today. We could have -- I think the statute prohibits an association, and as I indicated yesterday, if we had wanted to be Draconian about it and make life easier on ourselves, we could have attempted to prohibit any kind of association and see how that would have flown." (FUMC Exhibit No. 36 at 260-261) The rules published in January of 1992 were withdrawn in order to permit the department to correct some perceived inadequacies in the economic impact statement. The rules were presented at a workshop and were republished in June, 1992. The rules were virtually the same as those published in January. A public hearing was held July 12, 1992. On October 6, 1992, DOI published a Notice of Change which materially altered Rules 4-223.003, .004, and .005. According to the Notice of Change, the change was in response to comments received at the public hearing held July 12. More specifically, the amendments were the result of the department's adoption of FALU's position in its petition challenging the June version of the rules. The amendments most significantly provided a definition of "associated" or "associate" and forbade insurance agents from occupying space virtually anywhere within the confines of a financial institution. Mr. Shropshire drafted the amendment to Rules 4-223.003-.005. His source for the definition of "associate" was Webster's Dictionary. Mr. Shropshire testified that the modified proposal resulted from "explosive changes" in the number of banks involved in insurance in this state (Tr. at 793) and information which had come to his knowledge which indicated a need for a more restrictive rule. The two sources of information regarding insurance activities in Florida identified by Mr. Shropshire were the report prepared by investigator Ernest Ulrich in support of the economic impact statement and an ongoing investigation and prosecution of JMC for its marketing of annuities. Both sources predate or were contemporaneous to the June publication of the rules. Mr. Shropshire's reason for the October change was the anticipated difficulty DOI faced in enforcing its rules as originally published. He stated, "So it was getting plain to us that we were going to have to very vigorously and closely and labor-intensively enforce the rule, if it was passed as it was promulgated in June of '92." (tr. at 808) As described by Mr. Shropshire and others, the agency was concerned that insurance activities in financial institutions were not being conducted behind partitions, or even behind planters or other visual separations; and that bank agents were making referrals, taking telephone messages, and setting appointments for insurance agents who covered multiple bank branches on a "circuit-rider" system. Banks leasing space to agents also commonly paid bank employees a bonus for making appointments and referrals of customers to the agents. DOI determined that these leasing arrangements established a strong connection between the bank and the agent, in effect wrapping the insurance program in the bank's colors and presenting it as another bank product. This, to DOI, justified the previously characterized "Draconian" measures. The banks' and other witnesses freely described the economic advantage to a financial institution of having insurance services available at the same location for its customers. Additional amendments to the proposed rules were published in December 1992. Those amendments acknowledge or track the statutory exceptions to the section 626.988(2), F.S. prohibitions. The rules therefore do not apply to mortgage insurance business, credit unions, banks located in cities having a population of less than 5,000, and the sale of annuities when national banks have been authorized to sell such annuities. During the course of the formal hearing, the agency proposed a final change to the rules at issue, clarifying that Chapter 4-223 does not apply to credit life and disability insurance and credit unemployment insurance. (American Banking Insurance Co. Exhibit No. 1) The Economic Impact Dr. Tim Lynch, Director for the Center for Economic Policy Analysis for Florida State University, conducted surveys, collected data and analyzed the economic impact of the June 1992 version of the proposed rules. He prepared the economic impact statement for DOI. Dr. Lynch was consulted by the department about the October changes to the proposed rules and did additional analysis on the impact of the proposed changes. The economic impact statement prepared for the June publication was not amended, but Dr. Lynch's observations are found in his notes, or what he terms a "work in progress". He discussed those observations with department staff and considers the economic impact of prohibiting leases to be at least in the $ millions. The agency did not republish an economic impact statement after the October changes, but plainly considered the impact of those changes as articulated by its consultant, Dr. Lynch. Prohibiting the sale of annuities on bank premises would have a devastating effect on companies engaged in that activity. Banks, also, would be affected, as they recognize a substantial benefit of providing their customers the convenience of an in-house service. Although annuities are defined in Florida law as "life insurance" (See Section 364.602(1), F.S.) they are generally considered investments for future security rather than a cushion against loss. On March 20, 1990, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a formal approval letter stating, among other things, that under controlling Federal banking law, annuities are primarily financial investment instruments that national banks are permitted and authorized to sell. (GNA Exhibit No. 41) A follow-up letter to J. Thomas Caldwell as representative of the Florida Bankers Association specifically concluded that federally chartered banks in Florida were authorized to sell annuities. (GNA Exhibit No. 42) The OCC conclusion with regard to the authority of national banks was upheld in the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. Robert Clarke, et. al., (VALIC) on November 22, 1991, by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Civil Action No. H-91-1016, 786 F. Supp. 639. The case is pending on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke, Case No. 92-2010) In the meantime, the OCC continues to issue opinion letters consistent with its earlier opinion. (See 5/10/93 letter filed as supplemental authority on 6/18/93) National banks are presently selling annuities, and the impact of the October 1992 absolute prohibitions is nullified as to annuity products by the December 1992 amendments addressed in paragraph 30, above.
The Issue The issue is whether Interamerican Financial Corporation is guilty of six types of violations of the Florida Retail Installment Sales Act alleged in the Department's Administrative Complaint of June 23, 1992, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Interamerican Financial Corporation (Interamerican) is a Florida corporation with its sole place of business at 2600 S.W. 3rd Avenue, Suite 730, Miami, Florida. Interamerican is registered with the Department as a Retail Installment Seller, under license number HI-0004299/SF-592236293 000. The Department is authorized by the Florida Retail Installment Sales Act (Chapter 520, Florida Statutes) to examine licensees engaged in the retail installment financing business. Interamerican is in the business of financing automobile loans. Most of its loans are ones banks will not make because of the age of the automobile or because of the borrower's lack of a credit history. Borrowers are often first time retail installment purchasers. The purchase price of the vehicles financed ranges from about $2,000.00 to $5,000.00. Interamerican is owned by Raul Lopez and his wife. Mr. Lopez is President of the corporation. Its affairs are conducted on a day to day basis by Ms. Iris Hernandorena, who has been an employee of Interamerican since its inception twelve years ago in December 1980. There are 3 employees other than Ms. Hernandorena, two of whom are full time employees. Interamerican has flexible criteria for reviewing applications when deciding whether to make loans. Interamerican weighs the length of the applicant's employment, the length of residence at the applicant's present address, personal references, and the applicant's salary. Applicants often speak little or no English. They depend on Ms. Hernandorena to explain each element of the transaction to them. They are highly dependent on the good faith of Ms. Hernandorena, and their limited fluency in English leaves most of them ill-equipped to protect their own interests in the financing transaction. The Department conducted an examination of Interamerican on February 10 and February 27, 1992. This examination covered the period from November 1, 1990, through January 31, 1992. The examining officer examined 7.6 percent of Interamerican's 314 financing contracts for the examination period. Ms. Iris Hernandorena is a single mother with three children, is a naturalized American citizen and a native of Argentina. As a practical matter, Ms. Hernandorena runs the affairs of Interamerican for Mr. Lopez with little supervision. Ms. Hernandorena reviews and approves applications for credit using the criteria set out in Finding 4, pays the automobile dealers when an application has been approved, and handles face-to-face dealings with the borrowers. Before the time period covered by the examination, Interamerican was an authorized agent for Bankers Insurance Group to issue credit life insurance certificates to Interamerican borrowers who elected to purchase credit life insurance. It was Interamerican's practice to include credit life insurance on the retail installment contracts at the time they were initially presented for a borrower's consideration. Credit life insurance was always explained to the customer by Ms. Hernandorena. Whenever a borrower requested it, the credit life insurance and the premiums were deleted from the retail installment contract. Fewer than 4% of Interamerican's borrowers declined credit life insurance. When the loan documents were signed, the borrowers signed Franchise Creditor Insurance Certificate applications which disclosed credit life insurance premiums. These premiums were also disclosed on the face of the retail installment contracts. If a borrower elected credit life insurance, a certificate of insurance was issued and Interamerican forwarded one half of the premium disclosed on the financing contract to Bankers Insurance Group. Because the premium was included in the total amount financed by borrowers, this payment to Bankers was an additional cash outlay by Interamerican. Over the life of the loan, the borrower repaid the full amount financed and Interamerican recovered pro rata in each payment its cash outlay to Bankers (the first 1/2 of the insurance premium financed), and its commission (the second 1/2 of the premium financed). During its examination, the Department made its random sampling of 314 Interamerican customer files. It found four which contain the following information concerning charges for credit life insurance: Bankers Credit Life Amount of Credit Insur. Account Buyer's Date of Life Insurance Certif. Number Name Contract Premium Charged Number TA 388 Maria E. Arias 12-24-91 $60.22 FLO 44341 VE 165 Juan A. DelVilla 11-25-91 $74.38 FLO 43482 BEN 603 Julio C. Figueroa 05-06-91 $32.52 FLO 43378 HON 178 Darryl D. Pride 02-27-91 $70.38 FLO 43018 (Administrative Complaint, Paragraph 6) The monies received from these customers for credit life insurance policies were never remitted to Bankers Insurance Group. Bankers Insurance Group had no record of franchise creditor insurance certificates issued on behalf of these borrowers, or of any payments from Interamerican to Bankers for the period January 1, 1991, to February 26, 1992. Franchise credit life insurance certificates on the borrowers were not submitted to Bankers Insurance Group, nor do any of the certificate numbers match any series of numbers issued by Bankers during the past five years. The standard credit life insurance policies which had been issued through Bankers Insurance Group before the credit period had provided that Interamerican was named as beneficiary in the event of the borrower's death. The amount of the insurance coverage automatically reduced during the life of the loan so that the benefits due under the policy in the event of the death of the borrower equaled the amount of the loan balance at all times. Before the period covered by the Department's examination, Interamerican had two occasions when a borrower died and Interamerican had to make application to Bankers Insurance Group for payment of the proceeds due on the credit life insurance the borrower had purchased. In both instances, Interamerican had a difficult time collecting the remaining portion of the loan from Bankers Insurance Group. As a result of these experiences, before the audit period at issue here, Ms. Hernandorena decided on her own that Interamerican should become "self-insured," rather than send Bankers Insurance Group fifty percent of the credit life insurance premium financed by the borrower at the signing of the retail installment contract. After Interamerican ceased sending credit life insurance premiums to Bankers Insurance Group, it was the intention of Ms. Hernandorena to use the funds collected for credit life insurance premiums as a sort of reserve for bad debts out of which to pay the uncollected loan balances of borrowers who died, after having paid for credit life on their retail installment contracts. No specific escrow or reserve account was established with the funds, however. Because so few borrowers decline credit life insurance (see Finding 7), for about 96% of the 314 financing contracts entered into during the credit period, borrowers were charged for credit life insurance which was never put in force. Ms. Hernandorena reasoned that borrowers were not harmed by this arrangement. Borrowers never would have received any payment from Bankers Insurance Group if the credit life insurance became payable--Interamerican was the only beneficiary of the insurance, which would pay only the outstanding loan balance. They received a substitute of equal value in her eyes, the waiver by Interamerican of any claim for the remaining balance due on the loan if the borrower died after having paid for what appeared to be "credit life" insurance issued through Bankers Insurance Group. The Department examined the following four Interamerican customers' files which disclosed that these customers were charged premiums for credit life insurance on their retail installment contracts apparently placed with Bankers Insurance Group after August 31, 1991 in excess of the uniform rate permitted by the Department of Insurance for credit life insurance contracts: Credit Life Uniform Account Buyer's Date of Insurance Rate Amount of Number Name Contract Premm Chrgd Permitted Ovrchrge VE 163 Early H. Wims 11-21-91 $57.66 $48.05 $ 9.61 TA 395 Reyna I. Boyd 01-27-92 $64.60 $53.84 $10.76 HON 236 A. Sarrantos 01-08-92 $58.93 $49.10 $ 9.83 TA 388 Maria E. Arias 12-24-92 $60.22 $50.19 $10.03 & Mario F. Carrion (Administrative Complaint, Paragraph 7) How these overcharges came about were not explained at the hearing. The Department submitted no evidence that these overcharges were part of a scheme to intentionally overcharge customers. There was no evidence that these four instances of overcharge in the sample of contracts audited equate to any specific likely percentage of overcharges in contracts not selected for audit. Contrast Finding 13, above. Interamerican failed to journal payment for and to affix documentary stamps to the following three customer contracts: Interamerican Account Buyer's Number Name Date of Charge Amount of Documentary Stamps Charged on Contract TA 395 Reyna I. Boyd 01-27-92 $6.15 TA 388 Maria E. Arias 12-24-91 $5.70 VE 159 Maria A. Reyes 10-25-91 $8.40 (Administrative Complaint, Paragraph 8) Interamerican did purchase the requisite amount of documentary stamps from the Florida Department of Revenue. The explanation given for the error in not affixing the stamps was that stamps of small denomination were not always on hand. Since the examination was in February 1992, this reason is not persuasive. Two of the contracts involved were ones from October and December of 1991. There had been adequate time to exchange larger stamps for smaller ones or to purchase more small denomination stamps. The amount involved, however, is trivial ($20.25). Interamerican negligently failed to maintain credit insurance acknowledgment forms, since it was not actually placing credit life insurance in force. See Findings 13 through 14, above. Contrary to the allegations of Paragraph 9 of the Administrative Complaint, Interamerican did not charge finance charges in excess of the legal maximum permitted by law. The contracts for the borrowers set forth below contained an "amount charged" on the face of the contract which is slightly in excess of the legal maximum charge. This came about because the machine used to calculate the amount placed on the contact had a limited number of decimal places. Each of these borrowers was later furnished with a payment coupon book by Interamerican which contained an amount charged within the maximum rate. These payment books were prepared with computer programs using more decimal places, and the payment books are what borrowers used in repaying their loans. No additional notification was given to the borrowers calling attention to the small differences, indicating that the payment books, rather than the contracts, stated the correct amount due. The payment books served as a notice of correction to the borrowers. No Interamerican customer has paid any finance charges in excess of the legal maximum (Tr. 23). The customer contracts examined contained the following information: Account Number Buyer's Name Total Amount Charged Per Contract Legal Maximum Differences VE 178 Sonia E. Vanturyl $2,152.86 $2,147.84 $5.02 VE 173 Monique D. Jordan $1,715.13 $1,711.16 $3.97 VE 165 Juan A. Delvilla $1,481.37 $1,477.99 $3.38 VE 152 Edward Mantilla $1,712,56 $1,708.56 $4.40 Jannette S. Williams $1,347.97 $1,344.84 $3.13 The Department conducts an examination of Interamerican and other retail installment sellers on a periodic basis. The prior examinations by the Department revealed no violations by Interamerican before the examination that is the subject of this proceeding. Throughout this examination by the Department, Interamerican furnished the Department with all the information and documents requested, made no attempt to conceal anything from the examiner, and was cooperative throughout the examination. This is consistent with Ms. Hernandorena's belief that on the credit life insurance charges, Interamerican had done nothing wrong.
Recommendation A final order should be entered finding Interamerican guilty of violations of Sections 520.995(1)(a), (b) and (c) and 520.07(4), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.) as alleged in Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Administrative Complaint, and dismissing the charges made in Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the Administrative Complaint. The Department has suggested that the appropriate penalty in this case is to find Interamerican guilty of all allegations made in the Administrative Complaint and impose a cease and desist order enjoining Interamerican from future violations of the Retail Installment Sales Act, and to impose an administrative fine of $1,000 for each violation. It is difficult to determine whether the Department suggest a fine of $6,000.00, one for each paragraph in the Conclusions of Law in its Administrative Complaint (Paragraphs 11-15), or whether a separate fine of $1,000.00 is meant to be imposed for each violation alleged in each contract containing a violation, which would be a fine of approximately $16,000.00. Based on the belief that Interamerican was guilty of all the violations alleged, the Department also recommended that the retail installment sellers license of Interamerican be revoked. It seems pointless to enter an order that Interamerican desist from future violations of the act, and at the same time revoke its authority to engage in business under the act. The penalty of revocation is too draconian. Revocation is certainly a penalty available under the statute, but revocation is appropriate where there is a pattern of misconduct which indicates that the licensee will not conform to applicable rules and statutes in the future, or that the misconduct is so egregious that, without consideration of the likelihood of future misconduct, severe discipline is warranted. This is not such a case. Moving from the less serious to more serious charges, the three instances of failure to attach documentary stamps to contracts is only proof of lack of attention to detail, since a sufficient supply of stamps had been purchased from the Department of Revenue. There was no violation of the disclosure requirements of Section 520.07(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.). With respect to charging, in four instances, credit life insurance premiums in excess of those permitted by the uniform rates filed with the Department of Insurance, in those four cases the amount of each overcharge was approximately $10.00. Interamerican should be required to refund the excess amounts due to the borrowers, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the contract. Due to the small amounts involved, for each instance Interamerican also should be assessed a fine of $250.00, for a total fine of $1,000.00 for that class of violations. No penalty can be imposed on the allegation that Interamerican charged excess finance charges, because it did not do so. Neither can a penalty be imposed for failure to maintain credit insurance acknowledgment forms, since no insurance was placed to be acknowledged by an insurer. Although it is true that those forms were not maintained, the real violation, which is the most serious violation, is the failure to have purchased the insurance at all. The Administrative Complaint alleges in Paragraph 7 four instances where charges were made for credit life insurance where no insurance was actually purchased. Ms. Hernandorena had mistakenly decided that by charging the amount permitted for credit life insurance, without purchasing it, and waiving the right of Interamerican to obtain payment from any borrower who died after paying for credit life insurance, the borrowers were receiving what they paid for. In a rough sense, this was true, but the transaction documents simply were not structured that way. Had the evidence been convincing that borrowers were being charged for credit life insurance as a ruse to obtain additional money from them, when they were receiving nothing in return, I would not hesitate to recommend that the Department revoke the license of Interamerican, especially when the evidence demonstrates that the overcharge occurred not only in the four cases alleged, but in 96% of all contracts Interamerican entered into. On the other hand, Interamerican's evidence was persuasive that the borrowers were receiving something of value for the credit life insurance premiums, even though the insurance was never purchased. The testimony of Ms. Hernandorena was sincere, and I simply do not believe that her explanation of what was done was an after-the-fact justification concocted in an attempt to excuse Interamerican's misconduct. Ms. Hernandorena made a serious error in doing what she did, but she did not engage in a scheme to defraud borrowers. On this charge, Interamerican should be required to repay the amount of credit life insurance premiums plus interest at the legal rate to the four borrowers listed in Paragraph 6 of the Administrative Complaint, and to review its records and make similar refunds to all borrowers who paid for credit life insurance, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of each contract. An administrative fine in the amount of $4,000.00 should also be imposed, the maximum fine for the four instances of overcharge alleged and proven. Had the Department undertaken to allege and prove additional instances of overcharges, the fine would be larger, but that is not how the complaint was drafted. Although the conduct proven does not rise to the level of an intentional scheme to defraud, the misconduct is sufficiently serious that a significant penalty, less severe than revocation, ought to be imposed. That Interamerican has otherwise conducted its affairs over the years in conformity with the law weighs in its favor. The appropriate penalty here is to suspend the licensure of Interamerican for 30 days, to place its licensure on probation for the following 11 months, and to restrict its licensure to prohibit the "waiver of liability" plan created by Ms. Hernandorena and to require submission of all credit life insurance premiums to an appropriate insurer. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of December, 1992. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN DOAH CASE NO. 92-4404 The following are my rulings on findings proposed by the parties: Findings proposed by the Department: 1.-4. Adopted in Findings of Fact (FOF)1. 5. Adopted in FOF 5. 6.-7. Rejected as unnecessary. 8.-9. Adopted in FOF 5. 10.-11. Rejected as recitations of testimony, not findings of fact. Adopted in FOF 6. Implicit in FOF 6. Adopted in FOF 3. Adopted in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in FOF 4. Adopted in FOF 8. Adopted in FOF 13 and 14. Adopted in FOF 7. Adopted in FOF 4. Adopted in FOF 13. Rejected as unnecessary-Interamerican never contended it was an insurance company. Findings proposed by Respondent: Adopted in FOF 1. Adopted in FOF 2 and 4. Adopted in FOF 5. Adopted in FOF 3, 4 and 6. Adopted in FOF 7. Adopted in FOF 9. Adopted in FOF 10. Adopted in FOF 12. Adopted in FOF 13 and 14. The Borrower was the insured, Interamerican was the beneficiary. Adopted in FOF 11. Adopted in FOF 13. Adopted in FOF 15. Adopted in FOF 16. Adopted in FOF 17. Adopted in FOF 18. Adopted in FOF 19. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven R. Walker, Esquire Office of Comptroller Suite 708-N 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Ted Bartlestone, Esquire Suite 1550, 1 Biscayne Tower 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Respondent violated the law as charged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency with the statutory authority and duty to license and regulate insurance agents in Florida. Respondent has been licensed as a life including variable annuity and health agent, life insurance agent, and life and health insurance agent. At the time of the events which are the subject of this case, Respondent held the aforementioned licenses and was the president of Seniors Financial International, Inc., an insurance agency located in Vero Beach. Storfer is licensed to sell fixed annuities for most of the insurance companies licensed to transact business in the State of Florida, including Allianz, IMG, Aviva, North American, Old Mutual, and American Equity. Storfer keeps himself abreast of the suitability requirements and features of annuities by regularly attending and participating in the quarterly, if not monthly, training presented by insurance companies. The companies also provide seminars at Storfer's office. He goes to their offices or views webinars that can last two-to-three hours. The companies also offer assistance by providing people in-house to answer questions about their products. Even though Storfer could have the option for each client to submit cases to the companies for the company to help prepare and work to find a suitable product for each customer/individual, there was no testimony he did so with the individuals in this case. He also testified that he understood and was knowledgeable about all the products sold, relating to the three clients, from which the AC stems. Storfer regularly holds luncheon/dinner workshops and seminars at restaurants in and around Vero Beach that focus on financial issues. He invites the attendees by mailing them a flier. Each attendee receives a free meal while listening to Storfer's financial presentation. During the luncheons, Storfer does not offer any investment products for sale. However, attendees are asked to complete a "Senior Financial Survival Workshop Evaluation Form" and are invited to request an in- office appointment if they are interested in discussing specific investment products. The form elicits information including family background, financial history, current expenses, and tax liabilities. The attendees are asked to put "yes" or "no" at the top of the form. If an attendee puts yes, then a follow-up appointment is scheduled in Storfer's office. Storfer's wife picks up the forms and sets the appointment. Storfer's procedures at the appointment typically start by filling out a client profile. He goes through the form with the client and asks the client questions to obtain the details regarding age, contact information, beneficiaries, health, estate, plans for money, rate of return, percentage of life saving willing to lose, risk tolerance, liquidity, income needed form investment accounts, what needs to be fixed, income, assets and liability inventory, life insurance, and long-term care insurance/disability insurance. After completing the profile, Storfer reviews the documents that he has requested the client bring in to the appointment. This includes tax returns, an investment portfolio, and list of how much money they have and where it is, including life insurance or long-term care. There is no fee for the appointment. Typically, after the first meeting, Storfer reviews the documents and the client returns for a second appointment. At the client's next appointment, Storfer has reviewed everything and put together a product that he wants to sell the client. He also provides an illustration of the product demonstrating the product's growth and how it would work. If the client decides to go forward and invest in one of the products Storfer has recommended, Storfer gets an application for the product and his wife fills it out.2 After the application has been completed, Storfer's office procedure is to submit it to the company the same day to await approval. Once the application has been approved, then the policy is funded either by transferring from another type of product (direct transfer rollover) or by a 1035 exchange. The policy can not be issued if not funded. Once the policy is funded and issued, the company mails the policy and the documents for the client to sign to Storfer, as the agent to deliver. Storfer's operating procedure is to call the client to set an appointment for policy delivery. The appointment's purpose is to go over the policy with the client, including the amount of money that went into the policy, where the funds came from and what the policy will do for them, including liquidation and charges. Storfer keeps documents which he refers to as client notes in each client's file. After client meetings, he uses a service to dictate what he wants as a summary of the client meeting. The service types up what he says and emails it back to him. It is printed, reviewed, and scanned into his system. Alberto and Celina Grubicy Celina Grubicy ("C.G."), a native of Argentina, was born on April 6, 1940. She was married at age 19 to Alberto Grubicy ("A.G."), who was also born and raised in Argentina. They moved to the United States in 1965; English is their second language. The Grubicys opened a repair shop in New York in 1964. Then, they went in the construction business in Connecticut for about ten years before retiring to Florida. In both successful businesses, C.G. handled the paper work and kept the books. The Grubicys retired in the early 90's and purchased a condominium in Florida, where they now reside. On February 5, 2007, the Grubicys attended Respondent's luncheon seminar at Carrabbas Italian Grill in Vero Beach. At the seminar, the Grubicys listened to the presentation and completed the seminar evaluation form confirming an estate in excess of one million dollars. At the time, A.G. was 65 years old and C.G. was 66 years old. The Grubicys thought the presentation sounded good, so they made an appointment to see Storfer in his office. Prior to any interaction with Storfer, C.G. was the owner of a Transamerica variable annuity with a contract date of September 23, 2002, an AXA Equitable variable annuity with a contract date of June 17, 2005, and a Hartford variable annuity with a contract date of July 25, 2005. Each of the annuities was doing well and approaching dates when surrender charges would no longer apply. The Grubicys met with Storfer on February 7, 2007. At the meeting, the Grubicys informed Respondent that their investment goals were two-fold. They explained that their primary financial goal was safety. Their plan included selling their residential building complex from which they were currently collecting rental payments for income.3 Their goal in five years was to have an investment that would provide their income after they sold the property.4 The Grubicys wanted an investment to replace the rental money that they would no longer receive after the sale of their building. The Grubicys also stressed to Storfer that the security of the investment was a paramount concern. C.G. wanted out of variable annuities because she was concerned about the stock market risk and did not want annuitization to take place. At their second meeting on February 12, 2007, knowing the Grubicys' goals, Storfer misrepresented the advantages for the product he recommended with a graphic illustration on a blackboard. He showed the MasterDex annuity with Allianz in such a fashion, that, when the market advanced in relation to a base line, the return on the annuity would also advance, up to a three percent cap per month on the gain, but that when the market fell below the base line, there would be a zero percent return, but never a loss of the gain made in the previous months, or a loss of invested capital. Storfer recommended and proceeded to sell the Grubicys the Allianz MasterDex 10 ("MasterDex") policy, being fully aware of the Grubicys' goals. He insisted that was the way for the Grubicys to invest because they would never lose their principal compared to the other annuities that have high risk plus excess fees. Storfer did not provide the Grubicys any other investment option. The annuity was a long-term investment that provided for surrender penalties on a declining scale for fifteen years even though Storfer told the Grubicys that the Allianz annuity would mature in five years from the day it started.5 Storfer assured the Grubicys that they were not going to lose anything by investing in the MasterDex annuity with Allianz. They were not accurately informed of the provisions in the contract by Storfer during the meeting nor did Storfer fully review the relevant terms and conditions, including the length of the policy.6 The Grubicys knew that when they surrendered the three variable annuities there would be surrender charges. However, Storfer told them that the product he was selling them had a 12 percent bonus that would offset the monetary lost from surrender penalties of the transferring funds.7 The Grubicys decided to follow Storfer's recommendation with his assurances that they wouldn't lose money, and they surrendered their three annuities to purchase two MasterDex annuities in excess of about one million dollars. After Storfer completed the numerous forms and documents, the Grubicys authorized the transfers of money to Allianz by way of assignment on or about March 2, 2007, and authorized him to buy the new policies. Storfer allocated 100 percent to the Standard & Poors ("S&P") 500 instead of allocating the total investment among three possible choices in smaller increments. Respondent's 100 percent allocation choice on the Supplemental Application contravenes both of the Grubicys' requests on each of their Liquidation Decision forms, which specifically state "the decision to liquidate . . . based solely on . . . desire to eliminate market risk and fees " The annuity product Storfer sold the Grubicys provided for three different values: annuitization value, cash surrender value, and guaranteed minimum value. The Statement of Understanding provided: * * * Annuitization value The annuitization value equals the premium you pay into the contract, plus a 10% premium bonus and any annual indexed increases (which we call indexed interest) and/or fixed interest earned. This will usually be your contract's highest value. Withdrawals will decrease your contract's annuitization value. Cash surrender value The cash surrender value is equal to 87.5% of premium paid (minus any withdrawals) accumulated at 1.5 percent interest compounded annually. The cash surrender value does not receive premium bonuses or indexed interest. The cash surrender value will never be less than the guaranteed minimum value (which we define below). The cash surrender value will be paid if you choose to receive a) annuity payments over a period of less than 10 years for Annuity Option D and five years for Alternate Annuity option IV, or over a period of less than 10 years for all other annuity options, b) annuity payments before the end of the first year for Alternate Annuity Option IV or before the end of the fifth policy year for all other annuity options, or c) a full surrender at any time. Guaranteed minimum value. The guaranteed minimum value will generally be your lowest contract value. The guaranteed minimum value equals 87 5% of premium submitted, minus any withdrawals. The guaranteed minimum value grows at an annual interest rate that will be no less than 1% and no greater than 3%. (emphasis in original) The Grubicys signed the numerous forms and documents without reading them because they trusted Storfer and he sounded as if he knew what he was talking about. They relied on his advice. Storfer sold the Grubicys a policy completely different from what he had described.8 The monthly cap was opposite of the way Storfer explained it. A description of the "monthly cap" stated: Although there is a monthly cap on positive monthly returns, there is no established limit on negative monthly returns. This means that a large decrease in one month could negate several monthly increases. Actual annual indexed interest may be lower (or zero) if the market index declines from one month anniversary to the next, even if the market index experienced an overall gain for the year. (emphasis in original) The Grubicys later learned that the advice Storfer provided them regarding how the MasterDex annuity worked was erroneous. Respondent provided them misleading representations regarding the sale of the annuity products. On April 5, 2007, C.G. received her annuity contract for a MasterDex annuity for approximately $1,123,000, and she executed a Policy Delivery Receipt, Liquidation Decision Form and a Policy Review and Suitability Form. On April 12, 2007, A.G.'s annuity contract for a MasterDex annuity for approximately $35,000 was delivered and he executed a Policy Delivery Receipt, Liquidation Decision Form and a Policy Review and Suitability Form. The sale of the Allianz annuities generated commissions of approximately $95,000.00 for Storfer or his agency, Senior Financial International, Inc. The Grubicys became concerned about the MasterDex product Storfer sold them while watching television at home one day, and seeing a class action lawsuit advertisement about their purchased product. They called Storfer immediately to discuss Allianz. He set up an appointment with the Grubicys to meet with him about their concerns. When Storfer met with the Grubicys, he assured them that they didn't need to change anything, their product was fine. He also informed them that their product was six percent up and not to worry because if the S&P 500 went down, they didn't have to worry because they had already made six percent. In May 2007, the Grubicys went to Connecticut and attended another investment seminar. Afterwards, they set up a meeting with the financial advisor, Mr. Ray ("Ray"). The Grubicys took their investment paperwork to Ray and he reviewed it. Ray explained how the MasterDex worked and called an Allianz customer service representative while they were in the office to further explain how the product worked. The Grubicys were informed that there was a monthly cap of three percent when it went up but no monthly cap on stock market losses. Such a description of the cap combined with the description in the contract support a finding that the MasterDex annuity did not meet the Grubicys' financial goals and was not a suitable investment for them. In particular, the Grubicys had been clear that they did not want to have any market risk. Subsequently, the Grubicys contacted Storfer again and questioned his declaration regarding the cap on stock market losses. Respondent continued to describe the crediting method incorrectly and told them Ray was just trying to sell them something. He insisted that the S&P 500 is the way he explained it earlier and that Ray's interpretation was wrong. Ray eventually sent the Grubicys an article from the Wall Street Journal, which they testified reemphasized that the investment worked completely different from what Storfer continued to tell them. The Grubicys requested a refund from Allianz. Approximately one year later, Allianz eventually set the contract aside and refunded the investment principal, surrender charges for the three annuities, and some interest. The evidence convinces the undersigned that Storfer knowingly made false representations of material facts regarding the MasterDex annuity and its downside cap. Kikuko West Kikuko West ("K.W."), a native of Japan, was born in 1933. She marrried a U.S. soldier and moved to the United States when she was 18 years old. Together they had four children. She is now married to Robert West ("R.W."). K.W.'s employment history started with her working in a bakery, then as a waitress in a Chinese restaurant, and her ultimately owning and operating a successful flower shop for over 30 years in West Warwick, Rhode Island. She sold it in 2006. K.W. sold her house in Rhode Island and used the money to invest in a Smith-Barney mutual fund and an AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company (AXA) annuity (contract # 304 649 121), which she purchased in June 30, 2004. West purchased a condominium in Florida and has been a permanent resident for the past five years. On January, 15, 2008, Robert and Kikuko West ("Wests") attended Respondent's seminar. They scheduled an appointment for January 23, 2008, but didn't show. They attended a second workshop on or about June 3, 2008, and scheduled a meeting for July 9, 2008, but didn't show. The Wests rescheduled their appointment with Storfer on August 4, 2008, and met with him in his office for the first time. Even though K.W.'s husband attended the meeting, the focus of the meeting was her finances. K.W. explained that their monthly income was $2,900 and their monthly living expenses were $2,100, but a majority of it came from her husband's pension so she was worried about income if he passed. She only received $600 a month in social security and wanted income in the future. She had $100,000 for emergencies in a money market account. K.W. also informed Storfer that when she dies she wants her four daughters and six grandchildren to inherit her money. K.W. wanted to stop receiving various statements from each of her numerous investment accounts and bundle her assets. She told Storfer that she wanted to keep everything that she had and would be happy with a rate of return of four or five percent. She emphasized she had zero risk tolerance. K.W. provided the following information for her asset/liability inventory: an AXA variable annuity(non- qualified) in the amount of about $119,589.58; mutual fund (non- qualified) of $253,289.55; IRA (qualified) $80,039.33; CDs (nonqualified) for $25,000 and $35,000; a Fidelity and SunTrust (nonqualified) totaling $40,000; and a Vanguard equaling $60,000. West explained that she didn't have life insurance but had prepaid funeral. Her husband had three life insurance policies. K.W. had a second meeting with Storfer on August 6, 2008. At that meeting, K.W. provided income tax and other paperwork to detail the stocks that she wanted consolidated into one statement.9 Storfer went over the financial illustrations and company profiles he had compiled as proposed investments. Unbeknowest to the Wests, Storfer's plan for restructuring K.W.'s reinvestments was to transfer funds from her variable annuity (approximately $215,000) to a fixed annuity and transfer assets from K.W.'s existing brokerage accoung (approximately $80,000) to a new brokerage account, which were both with American Equity. During the meeting, Storfer also introduced the Wests to Kevin Kretzmar, a broker for Summit Brokerage Services, by speakerphone.10 The discussion consisted of how the money would be transferred.11 The Wests thought Kretzmar worked for Storfer as his assistant and were unaware that he brokered for a separate company. Storfer brought Kretzmar into the transaction to handle the brokerage account because he was not a broker, but he did not make this plain to the Wests. In the meeting, Strofer emphasized to the Wests that K.W. was paying too much in income tax and her investments should be set up to reduce the income tax. Storfer also informed the Wests that K.W. would get a guaranteed eight percent interest each year and would be able to withdraw 10 percent a year with no penalty,12 which K.W. relied upon in deciding to follow Storfer's recommendation to purchase the American Equity annuity selected by Storfer. Respondent provided two letters to K.W. on Seniors Financial International, Inc., letterhead that stated: Kikuko: This would replace the Mutual Funds $253, 289.00. You will receive a bonus w[h]ich is added the first day of $25,329.00. Your account will start with $278,618.00. With an 8% guaranteed growth for income. With no risk. Mitchell Kikuko This would replace the AXA Variable Annuity $119,589.00. You will receive a bonus w[h]ich is added the first day of $11, 959.00. Your account will start with $131,548.00. With an 8% guaranteed growth for income. With no risk. Mitchell After the meeting, the Wests decided to go forward with Storfer's recommendation for K.W.'s investments. On August 8, 2008, the Wests returned to Storfer's office and K.W. agreed to transfer the funds. She signed the applications and contracts including 14 documents, which would transfer the money and invest in the annuity. K.W. did not read everything that she was signing because she couldn't understand all the terminology and trusted and relied upon Storfer. Storfer told K.W. that even after she signed, if she didn't like the product, she could call and everything would get put back to the way it was before. K.W. thought she was purchasing one policy. Respondent sold her two policies numbered 693752 ("the SunTrust transfer" or "the 80K contract") and 693755 ("the AXA transfer" or "the 215K contract"). Both applications indicate each is replacing an AXA policy. K.W.'s SunTrust is not mentioned in the 80K application. The documents attached to the applications K.W. signed without reading also detail that the American Equity Bonus Gold (BG) has a 10 percent bonus; Various "values"; and the minimum guaranteed interest rate is only one percent. The Lifetime Income Benefit Rider (LIBR) document states "a lifetime income that you cannot outlive" is tied to the owner's age. On the BG contract, the income account value (IAV), the second option, was checked at a rate of eight percent rider guaranteed income. The cash surrender penalty listed for the BG contract in the application is 80 percent of the first year premiums.13 The BG application also described a nine percent interest crediting method. Out of the nine options listed, Respondent admitted that he chose the S&P monthly Pt. to Pt. w/Cap & AFR for K.W. The option was not defined in the application, and K.W. had to rely solely on Storfer to define and explain the product. Specific terms and conditions of the annuity such as the penalty free withdrawals14 were defined in the policy contracts, which K.W. never received.15 In the car on the way home from the August 8, 2008, meeting, K.W. looked at the back page of the brochure for American Equity Insurance and read that she could only earn one percent a year with the annuity. This caused her some concern. Subsequently, K.W. called her son-in-law, a director at Merrill Lynch on Wall Street, who agreed to review the documents during K.W.'s upcoming visit to New York. K.W. then called Storfer's office back and left a message not to process the applications. The Wests also attempted to fax Storfer a letter that stated, "I do have to hold off on any changes . . . do no process until I review all papers." On Saturday, August 9, 2008, the Wests met briefly with Storfer in his office16 to request the original paperwork back that had been signed on Friday and stop the process. K.W. instructed Storfer to do nothing until her son-in-law approved it. She and her husband were pleased that Storfer agreed not to process the forms until her son looked at them and said that the investment was good.17 Stofer gave K.W. a yellow manila envelope with copies of the paperwork West had signed and a note. At some point, Storfer processed K.W.'s application for the purchase of the American Equity annuity, contrary to his agreeing not to finalize the purchases until the Wests gave the go-ahead.18 The Wests left for North Carolina to start their vacation on Sunday, August 10, 2008. While on vacation, K.W. opened the manila envelope and discovered that it did not contain the originals of the signed forms she had requested. Additionally, a letter was enclosed dated August 11, 2009,19 on Seniors stationary that stated: Dear Kikuko, Attached is transfer paperwork to transfer the brokerage account from Suntrust to us. We will not sell any investments until you approve them. If you and your son in law have any questions please contact me I will be more then happy to assist. Sincerely, K.W. had her son-in-law review the investment paperwork and requested that he talk to Storfer. After K.W. talked to her son, she decided the investment was not good for her. Ultimately, K.W. learned that her money had been transferred out of the Suntrust account without her permission. She called Storfer's office numerous times to get him to cancel the annuity transactions, but was unable to reach him.20 K.W. was eventually provided Kretzmar's contact information and he instructed her how to reverse the transfer of funds. K.W. had communications with Kretzmar and representatives from American Equity that lead to her funds being refunded. The American Equity annuities were ultimately cancelled. Viewing the evidence as a whole, the undersigned determines that Respondent made false promises not to process K.W.'s annuity applications in connection with the investments and did so contrary to K.W.'s instructions, as well as made false misrepresentations to her regarding the details of the annuity. Doris Jorgensen Ms. Doris Jorgensen ("Jorgensen") was born in New York City on December 20, 1921. She grew up in Connecticut. She married William Jorgensen. While married she owned and operated an antique shop out of her house in Connecticut. She started investing with her husband, William, before he passed in 1999. She and her husband would discuss their investments and decide how to invest together. She has no children and lives alone in Sebastian, Florida. Prior to meeting with Storfer, Jorgensen was the owner of an Integrity Life Insurance Company (Integrity) variable annuity with a contract date of July 28, 2003, and Aviva Life and Annuity Company (Aviva; formerly AmerUs) deferred annuity with a contract date of December 26, 2003. Jorgensen's net worth, before meeting Respondent was approximately a million dollars. Jorgensen attended two luncheon seminars presented by Respondent on April 2, 2007, and on October 23, 2007. She was 86 years old at the time. At the first seminar, Jorgensen filled out a Senior Financial Survival Workshop Evaluation Form, indicating she was a widow, had an estate from $25,000-$200,000, and had concerns in the area of Social Security Tax Reduction, Variable Annuity Rescue, and Equity Index Annuity. When Jorgensen attended the second workshop, she filled out the form identical to the previous one, except she also circled Asset Protection from Nursing Home as a concern. On or about November 5, 2007, Jorgensen met Storfer in his office for the first time. Storfer prepared her client profile and Jorgensen described her risk tolerance as "none" and indicated that she was unwilling to lose any of her life savings through investments. She also informed him that she intended to leave her entire estate to numerous charities and had set up a trust for that purpose. Jorgensen provided Storfer income information at the meeting that indicated that she lived off her monthly social security and pension payments, a total monthly income of $1,800.00, and her expenses were $1,100.00. She also had $120,000 cash and a net worth of $900,000.00. At another meeting, Jorgensen provided Storfer her financial portfolio to review. One meeting Jorgensen had with Storfer was attended by her brother, who did not provide her any advice regarding what to do with her investments. Ultimately, Storfer recommended and sold Jorgensen an Allianz Life Insurance Company Equity Indexed Annuity. Upon his advice, Jorgensen surrendered her $208,015.74 Integrity Life Policy #2100073292 issued on July 28, 2003. The transfer resulted in the initial funding of the Allianz MasterDex,21 which became effective November 16, 2007. Jorgensen told Respondent that she had a problem with monetary loss and Storfer said he could make it up with the Allianz Life. The policy provided that she could start withdrawing the money in five years and then must annuitize the policy and withdraw the money over a 10-year period. The Allianz annuity was delivered on December 12, 2007. The Allianz Life contract, a MasterDex, contract #70610993, included a 10 percent bonus. Respondent placed 100 percent of Jorgensen's funds in the S&P 500 index like the Grubicys. Later, on or about January 16, 2008, Storfer also had Jorgesen authorize an additional transfer of $306,507.21 in funds from her Aviva/AmerUS policy purchased December 1, 2003, to Allianz. The policy was $330,137.95. Surrender charges on the AmerUs annuity would have expired December 1, 2014. On February 4, 2008, the money was sent to Allianz into contract #70610993. Together, Jorgensen's transfers totaled over half-a million dollars and she incurred surrender charges totaling in excess of $29,000. Jorgensen was unable to understand the annuity application and contract language. She trusted Storfer and took him at his word and signed a lot of forms without filling them out or asking questions. Jorgensen testified that she always followed the directions of whoever gave her business advice. Jorgensen also testified in this matter that she was "not certain," "I don't really remember," and "I have no idea whether it was or not" regarding numerous questions relating to the transactions and policy receipts. At some point, Jorgensen attended another investment seminar presented by insurance agent, Ms. Jones ("Jones").22 On February 11, 2008, Allianz gave Jorgensen a receipt for her payment of $306,423.03. Jorgensen contacted Allianz and directed the company to return the transferred funds to Aviva. Jorgensen directed Allianz to "rescind this policy in full." On or about February 14, 2008, Jones also helped Jorgensen with a typewritten letter dated February 15, 2009, from Jones' office to Allianz following up the request. Jorgensen ultimately dealt with Storfer instead of Jones regarding rescission of the Aviva/AmerUs to Allianz transaction. Storfer ultimately placed the funds with Old Mutual/OM Financial annuity ("OM"). An application, transfer/1035 exchange, was executed in Jorgensen's name and other documents relating to the OM annuity on or about March 14, 2008. The policy is signed Doris Jorgensen not "Doris R. Jorgensen." Jorgensen testified she typically signs her name to include the middle initial "R" "Doris R. Jorgensen" on official papers.23 Jorgensen discovered the policy when she received the annuity confirmation letters from OM. Respondent earned a commission of nearly $7,000 on the OM transaction. The policy delivery receipt dated May, 1, 2008, six weeks after the purchase date of the OM policy, also has a signature without a "R" initial and Jorgensen denies the signature is hers. Storfer's signature is not on OM's required policy delivery certification form. The Delivery Receipt for the OM policy is dated May 1, 2008. Jorgensen still has the OM annuity. The undersigned finds that the evidence fails to show that Storfer misrepresented the sale of the two annuities or made false representations regarding the annuities sold to Jorgensen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the final order be entered by the Department (1) finding that Mitchell Storfer violated the provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, described, supra, and (2) revoking his licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2009.
The Issue Did Mr. Carter violate sections 627.4554(4)(a), 627.4554(4)(c)2., 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), 626.611(13), 626.621(2), 626.621(6), 626.9541(1)(a)1., and 626.9541(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2006, 2009, 2010); section 626.9521(2), Florida Statutes (2006, 2010); sections 626.9541(1)(k)2., 626.9541(1)(l), and 626.9521(2), Florida Statutes (2009, 2010); section 626.621(9), Florida Statutes (2010); and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-215.210? If so, what discipline should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the Legislature has vested the Department with the authority to administer the disciplinary provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. § 20.121(2)(g) and (h)1.d., Fla. Stat. (2011). At all times material to his proceeding, Mr. Carter was licensed by the Department as a Florida life (including variable annuity) agent (2-14), life including variable annuity and health agent (2-15), life insurance agent (2-16) and life and health agent (2-18). He has been appointed as an agent for several different life insurance companies, including Allianz, EquiTrust and Great American, but not RiverSource. Counts I through V--W.K. and J.K. 2006, J.K. and W.K., and the MasterDex 10 J.K. was born in 1937 in Madrid Spain, where she finished high school. Spanish is J.K.'s native tongue. She cannot write in English and does not speak or understand English well. When J.K. was 17, she met W.K., a member of the United States' armed services. They married in Spain. Six months after the marriage, the newlyweds moved to Brooklyn, New York, W.K.'s home. They later relocated to Florida. W. K. constructed a mall in New Port Richey containing 18 stores that included a restaurant and a frame shop. J.K. ran the frame shop. Wal-Mart eventually bought the mall. By 2006, J.K. and W.K. had accumulated approximately two million dollars in brokerage investments. Until the decline of his health and mental faculties in 2008, W.K. handled all financial matters for the couple. J.K. did not understand them or have any interest in them. In 2006, J.K. and W.K. met Mr. Carter, who began marketing annuities to them. J.K.'s testimony demonstrated that her memory was significantly impaired. That fact, combined with the fact that W.K. had died several years before the hearing, limit the ability to determine what representations Mr. Carter made to J.K. and W.K. or what information or instructions they gave him. On July 25, 2006, W.K. applied for a MasterDex 10 annuity policy from Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America. He paid an initial premium of $603,470.34 for the policy. W.K. was 73 years old at the time. W.K. obtained the money to fund the policy from the couple's Merrill Lynch brokerage account. Mr. Carter knew this. As part of the annuity application process, Mr. Carter submitted an Allianz "Product Suitability Form" for W.K. Completion of the form is a prerequisite to processing the application and issuing the policy. The stated purpose of the form is "to confirm that your [the applicant's] annuity purchase suits your current financial situation and long-term goals." The form, signed by W.K. and Mr. Carter, stated that an annuity was the source of the funds for payment of the annuity's premium. This statement was not accurate. Mr. Carter knew that it was not accurate. Signing and submitting the application with the suitability form containing this known incorrect statement was a willful deception by Mr. Carter with regard to the policy. Signing and submitting the application with the suitability form containing this known incorrect statement was a dishonest practice in his conduct of the business of insurance. The suitability form also indicated that W.K. expected the annuity to provide him a steady stream of income in six to nine years. Allianz accepted the application and issued the policy. Mr. Carter received a commission of $66,381.73. The MasterDex 10 is a complex financial product with many difficult to understand restrictions, conditions, interest options, bonuses, penalties, and limitations. The MasterDex 10 that W.K. and J.K. purchased paid interest linked to the performance of the Standard and Poors 500 stock market index. It also guaranteed interest of at least one percent. A "Nursing Home Benefit" was one of the options the MasterDex 10 provided. The "benefit" permitted the policy holder to receive payments of the full "annuitization" value of the policy over a period of five years or more if the holder was confined to a nursing home for 30 out of 35 consecutive days. The "annuitization value" is the maximum value that the policy can reach. It is the total of all payments that would be made to the holder if he either (1) let the premium and interest earned accumulate for a minimum of five contract years and then took ten years of interest only payments, followed by a lump sum payment of the annuitization value or (2) equal payments of principal and interest over ten or more years. Policy holders could make additional premium payments to increase the policy value. The policy also permitted limited withdrawals without penalty. After holding the policy for 12 months after the most recent premium payment, a holder could, without penalty, withdraw up to ten percent of the premium paid once a year until a maximum of 50 percent of the premium had been withdrawn. This meant that after one year passed, W.K. could make five annual withdrawals of $60,347.03. The policy also provided for loans on the annuity. In the years following this transaction, Mr. Carter maintained contact with W.K. and J.K. by periodically asking them to join him at a restaurant for lunch. Decline of W.K.'s Health While visiting his mother in Greece in 2008, W.K. fell and hit his head. Afterwards his health declined. On June 3, 2008, W.K. was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and determined to be unable to make sound financial and medical decisions. From June 2008, forward, J.K. was very worried about W.K.'s health, caring for him, and making him as comfortable as possible. On November 5, 2008, W.K., at Mr. Carter's suggestion, executed a Durable Power of Attorney, prepared for her by a lawyer, giving J.K. broad authority to act on his behalf in financial matters. At some point, W.K. was admitted to the Bear Creek Skilled Nursing Center and resided there for a period of time. On April 4, 2010, he was discharged from Bear Creek. W.K. resided in Bear Creek for a period of time. Although there is some hearsay evidence about when W.K. entered Bear Creek, the evidence does not corroborate direct evidence or hearsay evidence that would be admissible over objection in circuit court, sufficient to prove when W.K. entered Bear Creek. Consequently, the evidence does not establish the length of time that W.K. spent in the facility and does not establish that W.K. would have been eligible for the "Nursing Home Benefit" described in paragraph 16. After W.K. returned home in April, J.K. engaged an enterprise called "Granny Nannies" to provide caretakers at home. The services cost approximately $12,000 per month. During this period J.K.'s health also declined markedly. Among other things, she had appendicitis and breast cancer. Treatment of the cancer required chemotherapy, which left her in pain and exhausted. During this time Mr. Carter obtained a copy of the power of attorney executed by W.K. in favor of J.K. On June 18, 2010, the court appointed Paula Rego as guardian for W.K and J.K. with authority to act on their behalf in all matters affecting property rights. On November 26, 2010, W.K. died in hospice care after a short hospital stay. The Events of 2010 In December 2009, J.K. met with insurance sales agents and sisters Kimberly Trotter and Chandra Valdez. J.K. had responded to a mail solicitation by them. During the meeting, J.K. and Mss. Trotter and Valdez realized that J.K. knew them because J.K. and W.K. had rented space to the sisters' parents. Capitalizing on the connection and J.K.'s concerns about paying the monthly costs of care for W.K., Ms. Trotter and Ms. Valdez began providing financial advice and marketing annuity products that they sold. They advocated liquidating W.K.'s and J.K.'s existing annuities, including the MasterDex 10. In December 2009, Ms. Trotter and Ms. Valdez sold W.K. and J.K. two annuities with Great American for approximately $661,098. On January 28, 2010, W.K. authorized J.K. and Ms. Trotter to access policy information. In January 2010, Ms. Trotter attempted to liquidate the MasterDex 10 policy and transfer the funds to Great American. Allianz notified Mr. Carter of this in February 2010. He intervened to stop the transfer. On March 3, 2010, Allianz received another request to liquidate the MasterDex 10 from J.K. Allianz sent her what it calls a "conservation letter." The purpose of the letter is to "conserve" the business with the company. The letter also identified needed information, including a copy of J.K.'s power of attorney for W.K. On March 4, 2010, Allianz notified Mr. Carter of the liquidation request. He contacted J.K. and began a successful effort to obtain a letter asking to reverse the liquidation. On March 17, 2010, Ms. Trotter or Ms. Valdez again convinced J.K. to liquidate the MasterDex 10 funds and transfer them to Great American. Again Mr. Carter acted to stop the liquidation. On March 23, 2010, J.K. signed a letter written by Mr. Carter asking for William Pearson to be her new financial advisor. Mr. Carter sent the letter to RiverSource, a company that issued another annuity policy of J.K's. J.K. did not know who Mr. Pearson was. She only signed the letter because Mr. Carter told her that it would help her save money. On March 26, 2010, J.K. submitted a liquidation request form for the MasterDex 10 signing it on behalf of herself and W.K. J.K. submitted the request at the urging of Ms. Trotter and/or Ms. Valdez. Allianz received the request on March 31, 2010. It began processing the full liquidation of the annuity policy. On April 1, 2010, Mr. Carter sent Allianz a letter saying that J.K. did not want to liquidate W.K.'s MasterDex 10 policy. The letter claimed that this was the second time that competing agents had tried to cancel the policy. Allianz reinstated the policy. On April 1, 2010, Mr. Carter sent a handwritten letter to Great American stating that J.K. did not want the MasterDex 10 policy canceled. The letter refers to having previously provided the power of attorney. Mr. Carter signed the letter. J.K. signed the letter on behalf of W.K. and herself. On April 7, 2010, Great American received a typewritten letter addressed to "To Whom It May Concern" stating that J.K. and W.K. wanted to transfer their funds to Great American since "December and January" and that J.K. did not see Mr. Carter on April 1 and did not sign a letter that he sent. On April 9, 2010, Mr. Carter wrote and sent a letter, signed by J.K. at his request, asking Great American to cancel the policies sold by Ms. Trotter and Ms. Valdez and waive all surrender charges. The letter states that J.K. is fighting cancer and that the agents forced her to sign the policy documents. Mr. Carter included with the letter a Withdrawal/Surrender Request Form completed by him and signed by J.K. On April 23, 2010, Mr. Carter wrote a letter to Allianz stating that J.K. needed more than ten percent of the value of the MasterDex 10 policy (the penalty-free withdrawal permitted) to provide the funds needed to take care of W.K. The letter states that W.K. and J.K. wished to change ownership of the policy to J.K. only and then to fully surrender the policy. Mr. Carter's letter is signed by J.K. on her behalf and on behalf of W.K. Mr. Carter enclosed forms with the same date, which he prepared for J.K.'s signature, requesting the change of ownership and liquidation. Allianz sent J.K. a letter, with a copy to Mr. Carter, on April 29, 2010, identifying alternatives to liquidating MasterDex 10 for getting the money needed to care for W.K. The Allianz letter also disclosed that liquidating the policy would result in a substantial loss of money. In part, the letter stated: We understand you wish to surrender your annuity policy. As we review your request, we want to be certain you are aware of all the alternatives that are available to you. This information can help you make an informed decision based on your best financial interests. It is possible for you to access a portion of your policy's value while your policy remains in deferral. This would allow its value to continue to grow tax-deferred, and still provide the cash you need. Your annuity may permit you to take a free withdrawal, policy loan, or partial surrender. Finally, it's important to realize exactly how much you will be giving up should you decide to fully surrender your policy. Your policy's current Accumulation Value is $751,566.07 and its Surrender Value is $585,014.49. By surrendering your policy now, you are giving up the difference between these two values [$166,551.58]. Any one of these options could provide you with needed cash while allowing you to receive your full accumulation value in cash after your policy's 10-year surrender charge period. The letter provided a ten-day period, called a conservation period, during which J.K. could withdraw her request to liquidate the policy. Mr. Carter called Allianz on April 30, 2010, and spoke to Amber Hendrickson. In the recording of the conversation, Mr. Carter sounds agitated and speaks forcefully. J.K. participated in the telephone call. She is quiet and deferential. In the call, J.K. waives the ten-day "conservation" period. Mr. Carter insists that Allianz process the surrender swiftly. Allianz processed the liquidation of the MasterDex 10 on April 30, 2010. It wired funds from the liquidated annuity to J.K.'s Regions Bank account the same day. On April 30, 2010, J.K. signed a check for $475,000 to EquiTrust Life Insurance Company to purchase an annuity. Mr. Carter wrote the check. Also on April 30, 2010, J.K. signed an EquiTrust annuity application completed by Mr. Carter. The form indicates that the policy is not replacing an existing annuity contract. This is not an accurate representation. On April 30, 2010, Mr. Carter also completed an Annuity Suitability Questionnaire for J.K. to sign and submit with the EquiTrust application. He indicated that J.K. had income from a pension. Mr. Carter knew that this was not accurate. Mr. Carter also indicated that J.K.'s income was adequate to cover all expenses, including medical. He knew this was not accurate because he was fully aware of the cost of W.K.'s caregivers and J.K.'s concern about them. The form, as completed by Mr. Carter, is misleading about the source of the funds for purchase of the annuity. He made the technically correct representation that the funds come from a checking account. But the funds were from the liquidation of the MasterDex 10 and were placed in the checking account the same day the application was completed. The funds were actually from the liquidation of the MasterDex 10 annuity. The form also stated that the proposed annuity would not replace any product. Mr. Carter knew this was not accurate also. He knew that the EquiTrust annuity was replacing the MasterDex 10, albeit in a lower amount, because J.K. kept some cash and lost a good deal of money in surrender costs. A letter Mr. Carter sent to EquiTrust on August 16, 2010, when it was investigating complaints about J.K.'s purchase of the annuity, demonstrates that he knew the EquiTrust annuity was replacing the MasterDex 10. Mr. Carter's letter described the surrender and purchase this way: "An amount of $475,000 was placed into the EquiTrust Annuity (Market Power Bonus Index's Fixed account), the remaining balance of $110,038.75 was sent to her checking account, plus two other accounts valued at $50,000 that were closed, and a Jefferson National check that wasn't cashed for $3,500." Also, on April 23, 2010, J.K. signed, on behalf of herself and W.K., a Surrender/Withdrawal Request to RiverSource asking for the full withdrawal of the net accumulation value of their annuity contract with RiverSource. RiverSource sent J.K. a check for $26,430.07. It deducted $2,158.32 for a withdrawal charge and $295.98 for a "rider charge" from the full value of $28,884.37. On May 5, 2010, EquiTrust received J.K.'s policy application documents and check. EquiTrust required additional documents including a financial needs analysis form. Mr. Carter sought an exception to the requirement for a financial needs analysis form. He did not receive the exception. On May 6, 2010, Mr. Carter sent EquiTrust the required financial needs analysis form. He completed the form for J.K., who was 72 at the time. J.K. also signed this form. The form repeats some of the incorrect statements of the previous forms. It is also includes additional incorrect statements. The instructions for the section about "Replacements" states, "complete if an existing life insurance policy or annuity contract will be used to fund this product." Mr. Carter checked "no" as the response to the question: "Is the agent assisting you with this annuity purchase the same agent on the life insurance policy or annuity contract being replaced?" This indicates he is aware that the policy replaces the MasterDex 10. The response was also a representation that he knew to be false, because he was the agent on the policy being replaced. Mr. Carter also indicated on the needs analysis form that the source of funds for the EquiTrust annuity purchase was "Stocks/Bonds/Mutual Funds." Mr. Carter knew that this representation was not correct. It was also inconsistent with the statement on the suitability questionnaire that the funds came from a checking account. On May 18, 2010, J.K. signed a letter, written by Mr. Carter, asking for William Pearson to be her new financial advisor. Mr. Carter sent the letter to Genworth, a company holding another annuity policy of J.K's. J.K. did not know who Mr. Pearson was and only signed the letter because Mr. Carter told her that it would help her save money. J.K. signed a letter, dated May 20, 2010, instructing EquiTrust to cancel the annuity she had with it. On May 23, 2010, Mr. Pearson submitted a form, signed by J.K., using the power of attorney, asking Genworth to liquidate an annuity held for W.K. On May 26, 2010, EquiTrust received the request to cancel J.K.'s policy and advised Mr. Carter. On May 31, 2010, Mr. Carter sent EquiTrust a letter saying that J.K. did not want to cancel and enclosed a letter he prepared, dated May 26, 2010, and signed by J.K. asking EquiTrust to withdraw the cancelation request. The letter also stated that an agent who provided her untruthful information initiated the request. On June 2, 2010, at Mr. Carter's urging, J.K. sent EquiTrust a letter saying she wanted to keep the EquiTrust policy. On June 2, 2010, Mr. Carter sent, by facsimile, a letter written by him and signed by J.K. asking Great American to make Peter Gotsis her annuity agent. J.K. did not know Peter Gotsis and only signed the letter because Mr. Carter asked her to. On June 29, 2010, EquiTrust received a check for an additional $90,302.19 premium for J.K.'s policy. In July 2010, with the assistance of employees at her bank and others, J.K. contacted an attorney. The attorney, Joan Hook, contacted Mr. Carter and the various companies with annuities. Due to the efforts of Ms. Hook, J.K.'s guardian, Ms. Rego, Ms. Karen Ortega of the Department, and others, the series of transactions were undone and J.K. returned to her position before the liquidation of the MasterDex 10 annuity. From December 2010 forward, it was clear to Mr. Carter or anyone else having regular dealings with J.K. that she is confused, uninformed about financial matters, compliant, reasoning poorly, and not capable of making sound decisions. J.K.'s testimony demonstrated that her memory was significantly impaired. That fact combined with the fact that W.K. died several years before the hearing, makes it impossible to determine what representations Mr. Carter made to W.K. and J.K. and to determine what information or instructions they gave him. Much of the evidence related to Counts I through V is hearsay evidence that would not be admissible over objection in a civil action. In addition, there is no expert testimony evaluating the facts of record and analyzing the suitability of the investments advocated by Mr. Carter. Also, there is no evidence of the life expectancy of W.K. and J.K., which is an important factor in evaluating suitability of annuity products. Consequently, the record is inadequate for determining the reasonableness or suitability of the various products promoted by Mr. Carter or of the liquidation of the MasterDex 10. Mr. Carter willfully misrepresented information with regard to the applications for the Allianz and the EquiTrust annuities. This was dishonest. In the process, Mr. Carter also demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. These willful misrepresentations were false material statements knowingly delivered to Allianz and EquiTrust. Count VI--G.D. and K.D. G.D. lives in New Port Richey, Florida, where she moved from New York about 40 years ago. She was born on January 17, 1935, and has a ninth-grade education. G.D. had worked as a courier. Her investment experience consists of funding certificates of deposit (CDs), placing money in a mutual fund, and purchasing a Transamerica annuity. She is frugal and a conservative investor. G.D. is married to K.D. who was born April 12, 1927. Both are retired. G.D. met Mr. Carter in January 2010, when she responded to a postcard that he sent suggesting that he could save her money on taxes on social security payments. At that time, G.D. was 75 years old and K.D. was 83. G.D. was and is in bad health due to having suffered four strokes. She had difficulty speaking to Mr. Carter during his sales presentations. G.D. and K.D. disclosed to Mr. Carter that their total monthly family income, including social security and K.D.'s pension income, was approximately $2,400.00. They also disclosed that their assets included approximately $325,000.00 in CDs held with Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union. G.D. and K.D. each owned an annuity, one with Hartford and one with Transamerica, which they told Mr. Carter about. Together, the annuities had a value of approximately $85,000. G.D. and K.D. also had approximately $66,000 in a money market account. Mr. Carter convinced G.D. and K.D. to liquidate their CDs to purchase two Allianz annuities called a MasterDex 10 Plus. One required payment of a $38,219.39 premium. The other required payment of a $287,365.00 premium. The couple applied for the annuities for G.D., with K.D. as the beneficiary, because he was the older of the two. Mr. Carter completed the applications, which they signed. Part six of the applications is titled: "Replacement (this section must be completed)." It asks two questions. The first is: "Do you have existing life insurance or annuity contracts?" Mr. Carter checked "no" as an answer. This was not correct, and he knew it. The second question asks: "Will the annuity contract applied for replace or change existing contract or policies?" This Mr. Carter correctly answered "no." Section six also asks for the amount of coverage in force. Mr. Carter did not provide this information. Mr. Carter also completed the Florida Senior Consumer Suitability Form Questionnaire for G.D. and K.D., which they signed. The form accurately reflects the couple's net worth, liquid assets, and income. It reports correctly that they owned or had owned CDs, fixed annuities, and variable annuities. The completed form also accurately reflects the couple's desire for guaranteed income. The form discloses that the annuity must be owned a minimum of 15 years to receive its maximum value. The MasterDex 10 Plus annuity is a complicated financial product with a ten percent "bonus" that the buyer does not receive unless she holds the policy for 15 years. In fact, holding the policy for 15 years is the only way to get the full benefit of the policy. While money may be withdrawn earlier, that results in losses of the benefits and in some cases penalties. For instance, if a policy holder chooses to liquidate the policy, the value she receives is only 87.5 percent of the premium paid with one percent interest for the period held. These provisions have a substantial financial effect on the benefits of the annuity. For example, in the fifth year, the cash surrender value of the $38,219.49 premium policy is $36,027.00. About ten months after purchasing the annuities, G.D. and K.D. began having second thoughts about the purchase of the annuities. G.D. consulted with the financial advisor "Wayne" at her bank. G.D. later concluded that she had also misunderstood the interest rate. Mr. Carter had shown her sales material with the ten percent "bonus," which generated a high interest rate of 13.3 percent for one year. But G.D. did not understand that the interest rate only applied in one year, and the money was not immediately available. On November 17, 2010, G.D., with Wayne's help, composed a complaint letter to Allianz that summarized her complaints and requested that her premium payments be returned without fees. On November 28, 2010, Carter responded with a letter to Allianz defending his annuity sales. On December 17, 2010, Allianz's employee, Mary Lou Fleischacker, advised G.D. by letter that the "free look" period for cancelling the contracts had passed. But Fleischacker did request further information about the sales. By two letters dated January 10, 2011, Allianz advised G.D. that she would suffer over $80,000 in penalties if she canceled the contracts. G.D.'s efforts to terminate the annuities prompted Carter to come uninvited into G.D.'s home and insistently demand that G.D. telephone Allianz and cancel her attempt to rescind the contracts. He also asked her, without explanation, to wait one week before liquidating the policies. G.D. refused. Carter repeatedly telephoned G.D. and returned uninvited to the house several times making the same demand. G.D. refused to answer her door. Mr. Carter came to G.D.'s daughter's house uninvited one evening, told her that her mother was going to lose a lot of money, and revealed her mother's financial matters to her. Mr. Carter demanded that G.D.'s daughter deliver to her mother for signature a letter he wrote rescinding the liquidation requests. G.D.'s daughter agreed to get Carter to leave. G.D.'s daughter feared for her mother's safety because of Mr. Carter's harassing telephone calls to her and her mother. She urged her mother to call the police. G.D. called the police and a New Port Richey officer told Mr. Carter to cease the harassment, and then filed a report on January 13, 2011. Mr. Carter did not contact G.D. or her daughter after that. Eventually, with the assistance of Department Investigator Ortega, G.D. was able to obtain the return of her funds from Allianz. There is no expert testimony evaluating the facts of record and analyzing the suitability of the investments advocated by Mr. Carter. Also, there is no evidence of the life expectancy of G.D. and K.D., which is an important factor in evaluating suitability of annuity products. Consequently, the record is inadequate for determining the reasonableness or suitability of the liquidation of the CDs and purchase of the MasterDex 10 Plus annuities as promoted and sold by Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter willfully misrepresented information with regard to the applications for the MasterDex 10 Plus annuity. This was dishonest. In the process, Mr. Carter also demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. These willful misrepresentations were false material statements knowingly delivered to Allianz. Mr. Carter's repeated, persistent, and overbearing efforts to require G.D. to speak with him about the cancelation and withdraw it demonstrate a lack of fitness to engage in the business of insurance. Count VII--G.B. G.B. was born on January 14, 1930. She has a high school education. G.B. worked at and retired from Lucent Technology wiring telephone boards. She receives a small pension. Her husband, K.B., managed their financial affairs before he died ten years ago. Before K.B.'s death, the couple maintained investment accounts with Schwab. After K.B.'s death, Schwab employee, Barry Tallman, recommended that G.B. seek financial advice from Christopher Trombetta, CPA. She did so. Mr. Carter and a colleague, Christopher Drew, met with G.B. on June 29, 2010. She was 70 years old, timid, and easily confused. G.B. had responded to a promotional postcard she received from them purporting that the law governing taxes on social security income had changed and that they could lower her taxes. Mr. Carter was the person who presented G.B. information and persuaded her to purchase an annuity in the course of a meeting that lasted one to two hours. The evidence does not permit a determination of what representations and information Mr. Carter presented in his sales meeting with G.B. Her memory of the meeting was not distinct. She was confused about the meeting and did not remember facts precisely or explicitly. Mr. Carter completed applications for EquiTrust annuity products. G.B. signed the applications. Mr. Carter also completed financial needs analyses. G.B. signed them also. A box that asks if the applicant is aware that the annuity may be "a long-term contract with substantial penalties for early withdrawal" was checked "yes." The form also accurately represented that the source of funds for the annuity premium was stocks, bonds, or mutual funds. The other representations in the form were accurate. Mr. Carter persuaded G.B. to purchase two EquiTrust Market Power Plus annuities. G.B. signed two EquiTrust annuity contracts ending with 29F (E-29F) and 30F (E-30F). The initial premium for E-29F was $458,832.71. The initial premium for E-30F was $118,870.34. Both annuities were designed to provide G.B. with income in 2036. The funds for the premium came from the liquidation of her stock brokerage account. Both contracts had 20 percent surrender charges for the first two years of ownership. G.B. could not have surrendered the contract with its full financial benefits without a penalty until she was 95 years old. Mr. Carter delivered the annuity contracts to G.B. on August 6, 2010. The contracts provided G.B. the right to cancel the annuity by returning it within 15 days of the date she received it. Soon afterwards, Barry Tallman notified G.B. that her Schwab accounts had been liquidated. Transamerica Agent William Pearson had liquidated the accounts to transfer the money for purchase of the EquiTrust annuities. She was surprised. G.B. grew concerned about the annuities and consulted Mr. Trombetta and a financial advisor named Judith Gregory on September 20, 2010. With their assistance, G.B. wrote a complaint letter to EquiTrust asserting that Mr. Carter had assured her, among other things, that the annuities would protect her money should she enter a nursing home. G.B. wanted to cancel the annuities and have her full premium returned. G.B.'s letter to EquiTrust said, "I do not want any calls or visits from the agent or the agent's office." Mr. Carter learned of the effort to cancel the annuities. On November 15, 2010, at Mr. Carter's suggestion, he and Mr. Drew returned to G.B.'s home uninvited and unannounced. Mr. Carter insisted on entering and speaking to G.B. Mr. Carter began loudly and forcefully arguing with G.B. She telephoned Mr. Trombetta and asked that he speak to Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter yelled at Mr. Trombetta. Mr. Trombetta credibly describes part of the conversation as follows: And before I could barely get that out, Rick exploded on me. He snapped and he started cursing up and down. F'n me up one side and down the other. And "you don't F'n know what you are talking about. You don't care about this person. You don't f'n know what you are doing;" and this and that. When G.B. returned to the telephone to speak with Mr. Trombetta, he advised her to call the police if Mr. Carter did not leave her house within five minutes. Mr. Carter and Mr. Drew left. EquiTrust eventually returned over $600,000 to G.B. There is no expert testimony evaluating and analyzing the suitability of the investments advocated by Mr. Carter. Also, there is no evidence of G.B.'s life expectancy which is an important factor in evaluating suitability of annuity products. Consequently, the record is inadequate for determining the reasonableness or suitability of the two annuities Mr. Carter sold G.B. Mr. Carter's conduct, in his unannounced visit to G.B. to try to persuade her to change her plans to liquidate the annuities and his conversation with Mr. Trombetta, demonstrated a lack of fitness to engage in the business of insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order revoking the licenses of Richard Edward Carter. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in conduct proscribed by the Insurance Code as is particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed December 7, 1993.
Findings Of Fact During times material, Respondent, Nelson Speer Benzing, was licensed with Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, as a life insurance and as a life and health insurance agent. During times material, Respondent was an employee of U.S. Savings Trust Management (herein USSTM). During times material, Respondent was never appointed with Petitioner to represent Wisconsin National Life Insurance Company (herein Wisconsin). However, Respondent did attend a workshop sponsored by Wisconsin. At some time prior to March 5, 1992, Respondent met with George Cantonis, President of Mega Manufacturing, Inc. (herein Mega) in order to obtain Cantonis' permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. Cantonis granted Respondent permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. On March 5, 1992, Respondent made a sales presentation to Mega's employees. The purpose of said presentation was to enroll the employees of Mega in a "savings plan" offered by USSTM. The presentation lasted approximately 15- 30 minutes. Employees were told that the plan, as presented, incorporated an insurance savings plan which had a "liquid" component as well as a long term savings component. At no time during this sales presentation did Respondent explain to employees of Mega that he was a licensed life insurance agent. During the course of his presentation, Respondent described USSTM's product variously as an "insurance saving plan", as an "investment in insurance companies" and as a "retirement savings plan". At no time during the presentation did Respondent specifically state that he was selling life insurance. At the conclusion of the presentation, Respondent enrolled all interested employees in USSTM's plan. During the enrollment procedure, Respondent told the employees to complete portions of at least three documents which included a form entitled "Employee History", a Wisconsin's life insurance application, and an employee payroll deduction authorization. Cantonis enrolled through the above procedure and signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application. Subsequent to the group sales presentation, Respondent made a similar presentation to Tina Netherton, Mega's office manager, who was working in the office and answering the telephone. At the conclusion of the presentation to Netherton, she enrolled in the plan and also signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application pursuant to instructions from Respondent. Both Netherton and Cantonis believed that the "savings plan" consisted of both a short term "liquid cash element and a long term investment". Neither were aware that they had purchased life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis had, in their opinion, adequate life insurance at the time of Respondent's sales presentation, and would not have purchased additional life insurance if they had been told (by Respondent) that they were purchasing life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis executed beneficiary designations on their belief that such was needed so that disbursements, if any, could be made to their designee in the event of their death. Approximately three weeks after enrollment, Netherton and Cantonis received brochures from USSTM which acknowledged their enrollment and detailed the benefits of the "savings plan". The brochure advised that Netherton and Cantonis had enrolled in an insurance "savings plan" and failed to state that they had purchased life insurance. Cantonis and Netherton attempted to withdraw funds from the liquid portion of the plan and were unable to do so. Four to five months after their enrollment, Cantonis and Netherton received life insurance policies from Wisconsin. Pursuant to the insurance applications, Cantonis and Netherton were issued Wisconsin life insurance policy numbers L00566485 and L00566483, respectively. Cantonis and Netherton maintained their Wisconsin policies in order to realize some gain from their overall loss in dealing with Respondent and USSTM. At the time that Respondent made his presentation to Mega's employees and officials, he had never before made sales presentations in order to enroll employees in plans offered by USSTM. Respondent's general manager, Vincent Radcliff, was the agent of record of Wisconsin. The insurance application and policies issued to Cantonis and Netherton were signed by an agent other than Respondent. Respondent's supervisor, Vincent A. Radcliff, III, was disciplined by Petitioner and Respondent cooperated with the Petitioner in investigating the complaint allegations filed against his supervisor, Radcliff. Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner on November 15, 1989. Respondent has not been the subject of any prior disciplinary actions by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's life and health insurance licenses for a period of three (3) months. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner order that Respondent engage in continuing education respecting the manner and means of soliciting on behalf of insurance companies, and to the extent that he completes the required courses within an acceptable time frame, that the suspension be suspended pending the outcome of Respondent's satisfactory completion of such continuing education courses. 1/ RECOMMENDED this 1st day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1994.
