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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs LISENBY HOME CARE, INC., 09-003527 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Jun. 29, 2009 Number: 09-003527 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 2009

Conclusions Having reviewed the Notice of Intent to Impose Fine dated March 3, 2009, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("the Agency") has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) with the Respondent and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's fees. The Respondent shall remit to the Agency, within ninety (90) days of this Final Order, the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00). A check should be made payable to the "Agency for Health Care 1 Filed November 9, 2009 11:58 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. Administration." The check, along with a reference to this case number, should be sent directly to: Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS # 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Unpaid amounts will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. The above-styled case is hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this s3 day o tJ-?t?<: ,2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Care Administrat1 A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Ann Lisenby Parmer Lisenby Home Care, Inc. 412 North Cove Blvd. Panama City, Florida 32401 (U. S. Mail) Shaddrick A. Haston Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Finance & Accounting Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #2 Mail Stop Code #14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this _6ay of /}6 , 2009. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 Ce1t1f1ecl Article Number SENDERS RECORD CHARLIE CRIST GOVERNOR March 3, 2009 ANN LISENBY PARMER LISENBY HOME CARE, INC. 412 N COVE BLVD PANAMA CITY, FL 32401 JFlORl AAGENCY F,OR HIcAl.lCH CARE AOMAINISlllATION Better Health Care for all Floridians oqJ521 CASE #: 2009002407 NOTICE OF INTENT TO IMPOSE FINE Pursuant to Section 400.474 (6) (f), Florida Statutes (F.S.), a fine of $5,000 is hereby imposed for failure to submit the home health agency quarterly report within 15 days after the quarter ending September 30. As required in section 400.474(6) (f), F.S., the agency shall impose a fine of$ 5,000. TO PAY NOW, PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN 21 DAYS AND MAil.ED WITH A COPY OF THIS NOTICE OF INTENT TO: Agency for Health Care Administration Finance and Accounting, Revenue Section OMCManager 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #14 Tallahassee, FL 32308 Include License Number: 20651096 and Case Number: 2009002407 in check memo field. EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION OF RIGHTS FORM. Agency for Health Care Administration By: Anne Menard, Manager Home Care Unit cc: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive,MS#34 Tallahassee. Florida 32308 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myfl · • I EXHIBIT I No Theme Page 1 ofl HOME HEALTH AGENCY QUARTERLY REPORT For the Quarter July 1 to September 30, 2008 Send an e-mail with this information to home.ti_ alth@ahca.myflorida.com by 5 p.m. on Wednesday, October 15, 2008 to avoid a $5,000 fme. NAME OF HOME HEALTH AGENCY Lisenby home Care, Inc LICENSE# 20651096 STREET ADDRESS & CITY: 412 N. Cove Blvd, Panama City, Fl 32401 On September 30, 2008, there were _3_ insulin-dependent diabetic patients receiving insulin injection services from my home health agency. On September 30, 2008 there were _36_ patients receiving home health services from my home health agency AND licensed hospice services. On September 30, 2008, there were a total of_77_ patients receiving home health services from my home health agency. The following professional nurses (RNs or LPNs), whose primary job responsibility is to provide home health services to patients, received remuneration from my home health agency in excess of $25,000 between July 1, 2008 and September 30, 2008. NONE Name Florida License Number Insert additional names and license numbers if necessary. http://webmail.att.net/wm/en-US/toolbar/advnotheme.html 10/2/2008 psPS - Track & Confirm Page 1 of 1 • !:fQ!DtltltlJllSlgn.J.n Track & Confirm Search Results Label/Receipt Number: 7160 3901984813801355 Status: Delivered Your item was delivered at 9:48 AM on March 19, 2009 in PANAMA CITY, FL 32401. Track &Confirm Enter Label/Receipt Number. N..-o---t-i--f-i-·c-··d·-·o·-·n- - -Q. rn·t·i01J$------- ---- Track & Confirm by email Get current event information or updates for your item sent to you or others by email. (Bo>) Return Receipt (Electronic) Verify who signed for your item by email. ( tJo>) Copyright© 1999-2007 USPS. All Rights Reserved. No FEAR Act EEO Data FOIA '\:,_· J-i t;.-,pe ; :;•,· • l.\!!.'-'l·/•. ;- t' ip!;,,; http://trkcnfrm1.smi.usps.com/PTSinternetWeb/InterLabellnquiry.do 03/24/2009 STATE OF FLORIDA

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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs TONYA RODREGUEZ REGISTERED FAMILY DAY CARE HOME, 11-000168 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jan. 11, 2011 Number: 11-000168 Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2011

The Issue The issue in the case is whether the application for registration of the Tonya Rodreguez Registered Family Day Care Home (Respondent) should be denied.

Findings Of Fact Since 1994, and at all times material to this case, Mrs. Rodreguez has operated the Respondent, which is located at 2736 Lemon Street, Fort Myers, Florida. On October 25, 2010, Mrs. Rodreguez filed an application with the Petitioner for registration of the Respondent. The previous registration had lapsed. Since 1992, and at all times material to this case, Mrs. Rodreguez has been married to her husband, Terry Rodreguez (Mr. Rodreguez). In 1990, Mr. Rodreguez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and a concealed firearm. Mrs. Rodreguez was aware of her husband's criminal conviction. The registration application included a section where an applicant was directed to list "OTHER FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS." The application filed on October 25, 2010, by Mrs. Rodreguez disclosed only herself and her three children. Mrs. Rodreguez did not list her husband on the application. On June 23, 2010, a child protective investigator (CPI) commenced an unrelated investigation of the Respondent and went to the Lemon Street address. Mr. Rodreguez was present in the home when the CPI arrived. The CPI testified without contradiction that Mr. Rodreguez was uncooperative. She returned to the Respondent later that day accompanied by a law enforcement officer, but, when they arrived, Mr. Rodreguez was no longer present at the Respondent. On June 24, 2010, the CPI returned to the Lemon Street address, and Mr. Rodreguez was again present. During questioning by the CPI on that date, Mr. Rodreguez stated that he resided in the home. Additionally, Mrs. Rodreguez advised the CPI that she and her husband had separated, but acknowledged that she and her husband both resided at the home. At the hearing, Mrs. Rodreguez asserted that she has been separated from her husband for many years; however, she acknowledged that they remain legally married, that he uses her address as his legal address, and that her address is listed on his driver's license. She testified that he is homeless and that he returns to the house to see her children. Mr. Rodreguez was issued several traffic citations between January and July of 2010, and all of the citations identified his address as 2736 Lemon Street, Fort Myers, Florida.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the application for registration of the Tonya Rodreguez Registered Family Day Care Home. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2011.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57402.302402.305402.3055402.313 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.201
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YOLANDA CHEESMON vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 99-003501 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Blountstown, Florida Aug. 18, 1999 Number: 99-003501 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2000

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a license to operate a family day care home should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This licensure proceeding involves a request by Petitioner, Yolanda Cheesmon, for a license to operate a family day care home at 1012 Yates Avenue, Blountstown, Florida. On July 2, 1999, Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), denied the application on the grounds that Petitioner was "previously denied an application to operate a Licensed Day Care Home"; that she had begun "operating at a Day Care Home at 920 Thomas Avenue without being properly registered"; that she had operated for "an unknown period of time" without a telephone, "which is a requirement"; and that she had "requested to become a licensed home and provided [the Department] with false information and a forged letter." The denial of the application prompted Petitioner to request a hearing. The Department regulates three types of day care facilities. In descending order of regulatory oversight, they are a licensed family day care facility, a licensed family day care home, and a registered family day care center. While the first two categories of facilities require annual on-site Department inspections, background screening for all personnel, training, and more extensive paperwork, a registered family day care center involves no Department inspections and only requires that the operator undergo background screening, complete a training course, and provide to the Department certain paperwork, including shot records of the children, in order to secure the registration. On August 19, 1998, Petitioner filed the necessary paperwork to operate a registered family day care center at 1012 Yates Avenue, Blountstown, Florida. She received a registration the same month. In its post-hearing submission, the Department represents that the registration was subsequently "terminated." As noted above, a registered home is the least restrictive type of day care facility, and it only required that Petitioner file an application with the Department, undergo background screening, and provide the Department with certain paperwork. Petitioner was, however, required to conform with certain Department "standards," one of which required that she have a working telephone on the premises of the facility, so that Department personnel could always contact her, if necessary. Whether this requirement is based upon a rule or an informal regulation was not disclosed. In September 1998, a Department licensing counselor, Michelle Barsanti (Barsanti), attempted to contact Petitioner by telephone and learned that the telephone had been disconnected, which violated the unidentified Department requirement. Barsanti then sent a registered letter to Petitioner on October 7, 1998, advising that Petitioner must provide a telephone number. By letter dated October 12, 1998, Petitioner advised Barsanti that after she had received her registration from the Department, she had moved the day care center to 920 Thomas Avenue, Blountstown, Florida, and that she had a new telephone number. This move was made because Petitioner says the Yates property "wasn't properly fixed up and all to pass for the inspection." However, an operator must re-register each time the facility is moved; by operating at the new location without a valid registration, Petitioner contravened a statute which prohibits any person from operating a registered family day care center without a registration. It is fair to infer from the evidence that Petitioner was unaware of this requirement and that the violation was unintentional. On October 23, 1998, Barsanti met with Petitioner to assist her in obtaining a registration for the new location. During that meeting, Barsanti learned that Petitioner now desired to operate a licensed, as opposed to a registered, family day care home at her new address, and that Petitioner leased the property from Judy A. Davis (Davis), an absentee landlord who resided in Riviera Beach, Florida. At some point during this process, Petitioner was also advised that she must close her day care center at 920 Thomas Avenue until she obtained the appropriate license. Rule 65C-20.009(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that if the operator leases the property on which the facility will be located, "[w]ritten approval from the owner of the property must be secured prior to issuance of the license." Accordingly, Petitioner was required to comply with this requirement since she intended to lease the Davis property. In response to the foregoing requirement, Petitioner provided Barsanti with a letter dated October 7, 1998, purportedly written by Davis, and which stated that Davis "[gave] Yolanda Cheesmon permission to operate a Daycare at my appointed residence." Shortly thereafter, Barsanti received an anonymous letter which caused her to question the authenticity of the Davis letter. After Barsanti contacted Petitioner and requested the address and telephone number of Petitioner's landlord, on October 29, 1998, Petitioner sent Barsanti a letter stating in part as follows: I regret to have to tell you that I lied about the letter. I'm very sorry but I was desperate to go ahead without any delay to be licensed so that I can get the insurance policy that my landlord needs. . . . Please forgive me and I hope this doesn't affect my case in any way. And again, I'm very sorry that I thought I had to lie to you. The foregoing admission confirms the Department's allegation that Petitioner provided the Department "with false information and a forged letter," as charged in the letter of denial. Notwithstanding the foregoing admission, Petitioner pursued her application for a license at the Davis property. The application was preliminarily denied on the ground that Petitioner had provided the Department with a forged document. Petitioner requested a formal hearing, and the matter was assigned Case No. 98-5593. After a formal hearing was conducted on April 22, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Steven F. Dean issued a Recommended Order on June 14, 1999, in which he recommended that Petitioner's application be denied, not on the ground that she had made a false statement as alleged by the Department, but rather because the application was moot by virtue of "the passage of time" since Petitioner had by then moved back to her former residence at 1012 Yates Avenue and desired to operate her facility from that location. In addition, at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Dean advised Petitioner to file a new application for licensure using her most current address. Based on that advice, Petitioner filed the instant application. As noted in Finding of Fact 1, the Department has preliminarily denied the second application on numerous grounds. In a Final Order Reversing Recommended Order and Denying Application for Licensure filed on December 27, 1999, the Department rejected the conclusion that the application was moot and instead denied the application on the ground that Petitioner had failed to "meet all of the Department's requirements for licensure." Therefore, Petitioner has had a prior application denied, as alleged in the Department's letter denying her application. In summary, the foregoing facts establish the Department's contentions that Petitioner operated for a short period of time as a family day care home without an appropriate registration; that she operated without a telephone on the registered premises; that she gave false information to the Department when attempting to secure a license; and that she has had a prior application for licensure denied. At the hearing, Petitioner again apologized for filing a forged document; stated it was based on "bad judgment"; argued that the forged document alone is not a sufficient basis to disqualify her from licensure;, and established that she sincerely desires to engage in the day care business. Petitioner has requested that if the license is denied, that she be allowed to retain her registration previously issued in August 1998.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license to operate a family day care center at 1012 Yates Avenue, Blountstown, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Yolanda Cheesmon 1012A Yates Avenue Blountstown, Florida 32424 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, No. 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57402.305402.310402.312402.318402.319 Florida Administrative Code (1) 65C-20.009
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SHAGUANDRA RUFFIN BULLOCK vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 18-000228 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 11, 2018 Number: 18-000228 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a license to operate a family day care home, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.008.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Shaguandra Ruffin Bullock, is an applicant for a family day care home license for the Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing family day care homes in Florida. § 402.312(1), Fla. Stat. Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding A "family day care home" is an occupied residence in which child care is regularly provided for children from at least two unrelated families and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, whether or not operated for profit. § 402.302(8), Fla. Stat. On or about July 6, 2017, Petitioner filed an application to operate a family day care home. Respondent reviewed the application and determined that it was incomplete, pending completion of the background screening required by sections 402.313(3), 402.305, and 402.3055.2/ On or about December 8, 2017, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny Family Day Care Home Licensure ("NOI"), informing her of Respondent's intent to deny her application for a family day care home. The NOI stated, in pertinent part: On October 10, 2017, the Department received background clearance letters from child care personnel at Respondent's Family Day Care Home. Pursuant to Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat., childcare personnel in family day care homes are subject to applicable screening provisions. Pursuant to Section 402.302(15), Florida Stat. and Section 39.201(6), Florida Stat., The Department assessed the background of child care personnel at Respondent's family day care home including, but not limited to information from the central abuse hotline. The Department's assessment revealed the Respondent did not meet minimum standards for child care personnel upon screening which requires personnel to have good moral character pursuant to Section 402.305(2)(a), Florida Stat. The foregoing violates Rule 65C- 22.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code,[3/] Section 402.305(2)(a), Fla. Stat. and Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat. Based on the foregoing, Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home's, [sic] pending licensure application will be denied. Evidence Adduced at the Hearing At the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that the background screening for Petitioner and her husband, Marlon Bullock, did not reveal that either had ever engaged in any of the offenses identified in section 435.04, Florida Statutes, which establishes the level 2 screening standards applicable to determining good moral character in this proceeding, pursuant to section 402.305(2)(a).4/ Rather, Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's license application solely based on two confidential investigative summaries ("CIS reports") addressing incidents—— one involving Petitioner that occurred over 11 years ago, and one ostensibly involving Marlon Bullock that allegedly occurred almost 11 years ago. The CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 addresses an incident that occurred on or about January 16, 2007. Petitioner acknowledges that the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 occurred. Petitioner testified, credibly and persuasively, that at the time of the incident, Petitioner and her then-husband, Bernard L. Johnson, were going through a very difficult, emotionally-charged divorce. Petitioner went to Johnson's home to retrieve their minor children. An argument between her and Johnson ensued, and she threw a car jack through the back window of Johnson's vehicle. As a result of this incident, Petitioner was arrested. However, she was not prosecuted, and the charges against her were dropped. Respondent's witnesses, Ann Gleeson and Suzette Frazier, both acknowledged that they did not have any independent personal knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01. The other CIS report, for Intake No. 2007-455485-01, addresses an incident that ostensibly took place on September 7, 2007, involving Marlon Bullock, who is now Petitioner's husband. Petitioner was not married to Bullock at the time of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007- 455485-01. She credibly testified that she was completely unaware of the incident, and had no knowledge of any aspect of it, until she saw the CIS report in connection with this proceeding. Gleeson and Frazier both acknowledged that they did not have any independent knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01.5/ The CIS reports and their contents are hearsay that does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule.6/ The CIS reports and the information contained therein consist of summaries of statements made by third parties to the investigators who prepared the reports. The investigators did not have any personal knowledge about the matters addressed in the reports. It is well-established that hearsay evidence, while admissible in administrative proceedings, cannot form the sole basis of a finding of fact in such proceedings. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the CIS reports do not constitute competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in this proceeding regarding the matters addressed in those reports. Thus, Petitioner's testimony constitutes the only competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01. Respondent has not adopted a rule defining the term "good moral character." Therefore, it is required to determine an applicant's "good moral character" based on the definition of that term in statute. As noted above, section 402.305(2)(a) provides that "good moral character" is determined "using the level 2 standards for screening set forth in" chapter 435. Ann Gleeson reviewed Petitioner's application for a family day care home license. She testified that based on her review of the CIS reports for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 and Intake No. 2007-455485-01, she "didn't feel comfortable" recommending approval of Petitioner's application for a family day care home license, and she recommended that the license be denied. As noted above, Gleeson did not have any personal knowledge of any of the matters in the CIS reports. She relied on the reports and their contents in making her recommendation to deny Petitioner's application. Suzette Frazier, Gleeson's supervisor, made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's application for the license. At the final hearing, Frazier testified that she determined that Petitioner's license should be denied based on the matters addressed in the CIS reports. Frazier testified that Petitioner's application raised particular concerns because of the two CIS reports, even though the CIS report for Marlon Bullock contained a "Findings – No Indicator" notation.7/ Frazier testified that it is Respondent's "policy" to deny an application for a family day care home license in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. According to Frazier, this policy applies even if the background screening shows that the applicant does not have a history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. Further to this point, when Petitioner asked Frazier at the final hearing what she (Petitioner) could do to demonstrate that she has good moral character for purposes of obtaining her license, Frazier told her that although she could reapply, she would never qualify to get the license because of the CIS reports. Frazier testified that, in her view, the CIS reports contain information indicating that both Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition,8/ defines "propensity" as "a natural inclination or tendency." A "tendency" is "an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something." Id. An "inclination" is a "tendency toward a certain condition." Id. A "predisposition" is a "tendency to a condition or quality." Id. Frazier's view that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior is not supported by the competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in the record. To the extent Frazier relies on the information contained in the CIS reports to conclude that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior, neither of these reports constitutes competent substantial evidence regarding the matters addressed therein. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner acknowledges that she engaged in the conduct addressed in CIS report Intake No. 2007-310775-01, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence shows that this incident——which was an isolated event that occurred in the context of an extremely emotional and difficult personal event in Petitioner's life——simply does not establish that she has a "tendency" or "inclination" or "predisposition" toward violent behavior. To the contrary, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that this was a one-time event that happened over 11 years ago, that Petitioner did not have any instances of violent behavior before then, and that she has not had any instances of violent behavior since then. Far from showing a "propensity" toward violent behavior, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner has exhibited an otherwise completely non-violent course of conduct throughout her life. Additionally, as previously noted, the evidence shows that neither Petitioner nor Marlon Bullock have any history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Petitioner has engaged, during the past 11-plus years, in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record establishing that Marlon Bullock has ever engaged in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children. To the contrary, the competent substantial evidence establishes that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are law-abiding citizens. Petitioner is employed as the manager of a department for a Wal-Mart store. Marlon Bullock is, and has worked for 23 years as, a chef. Petitioner credibly and persuasively testified that she is a Christian who attends, and actively participates in, activities with her church. Petitioner also credibly and persuasively testified that she has raised her four sons from her previous marriage to be law-abiding, upstanding citizens. None of them has ever been arrested or involved in any criminal behavior, and her three adult children are all gainfully employed. Petitioner posits, persuasively, that her children are testaments to the stability of her character and her ability to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the care of children. Frazier testified that Respondent's review of Petitioner's application showed that apart from the good moral character requirement, Petitioner's application met all other requirements to qualify for a family day care home license.9/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Although Respondent has adopted a rule, detailed in its Handbook, which establishes the background screening process for purposes of determining good moral character, Respondent has not adopted a rule defining "good moral character" or establishing, apart from the standards set forth in section 402.305(2)(a), any other substantive standards for determining "good moral character." Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 402.305(2)(a), the level 2 screening standards set forth in section 435.04 are the standards that pertain in this proceeding to determine good moral character. Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact, and based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are of good moral character. Conversely, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record does not support a determination that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock do not have good moral character. As noted above, Respondent determined, in its review of Petitioner's application, that other than the good moral character requirement, Petitioner met all other statutory and rule requirements for a family day care home license. Because it is determined, in this de novo proceeding under section 120.57(1), that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock meet the good moral character requirement, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a family day care home license pursuant to sections 402.305(2)(a), 402.312, and 402.313 and rule 65C-20.008. Finally, it is noted that Respondent has not adopted as a rule pursuant to section 120.54(1)(a), its "policy" of denying applications for family day care home licenses in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(e)1., Respondent cannot rely on or apply this "policy" to deny Petitioner's application for a family day care home license.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's license for a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2018.

Florida Laws (17) 120.52120.54120.569120.57120.60120.6839.201402.302402.305402.3055402.312402.313435.04435.0690.80190.80290.803
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DEBORAH SCURRY vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 04-000713 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 04, 2004 Number: 04-000713 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent proved the allegations contained in its January 30, 2004, notice of revocation of family day care home registration letter to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child care facilities, including family day care homes. Petitioner, by and through aid, assistance, and training of the federally funded Weed and Seed Support Group program of the Fort Myers area, began her family day care home provider training in 2001 and, upon completion of training, was registered as a family day care home from July 25, 2002, to June 30, 2003. On June 23, 2003, Respondent acted upon Petitioner's re-registration application to provide child care in her home for up to ten children, effective June 30, 2003, through June 30, 2004. Respondent acknowledged that at the time Petitioner's registration was acted upon, Leona Mark, Petitioner's identified substitute caregiver, had cleared her for background screening but she had not completed either the minimum or 30 hours of family day care home training prior to caring for children in a family day care home. Notwithstanding the situation with Ms. Marks, Respondent's recommendation was to "Issue registration to Deborah Scurry to provide child care in her home for up to 10 children." Ms. Mark did not testify, and the record contains no evidence that Ms. Mark completed her training at any time prior to Respondent's notice of revocation letter of January 30, 2004. Respondent, by letter dated January 30, 2004, informed Petitioner that her family day care home registration was revoked. The revocation letter gave the following basis for revocation: On December 22, 2003, the licensing unit received a complaint that a nine month old sustained a skull facture while in your care. The complaint also stated that you left your daycare children with your 15 year old daughter. During the investigation, you denied ever leaving the daycare children alone and that you always took them with you. The Department, upon conducting interviews, has determined that you did leave the children with your 15-year-old daughter, which is a supervision violation. The letter cited Subsections 402.302(1) and (7) and 402.313(1)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2003), as the provisions determined to have been violated and the authority for revocation of the registration. The Injured Child D.B. is Petitioner's nephew, and he was routinely placed in her family day care home when his mother was working. On Friday morning at approximately 6:30 a.m., on December 12, 2003, L.B., D.B.'s mother, left D.B., a nine-month-old child, in Petitioner's family day care home. At that time, neither L.B. nor Petitioner noticed a bump on D.B.'s head. According to Petitioner, D.B. became "fussy" during morning breakfast at approximately 7:00 a.m., at which time she noticed a small bump on his head. The bump was soft to her touch, and she thought no more about it. During lunch, Petitioner's daughter noticed that the bump had gotten larger and told her mother, who, by telephone, attempted to reach L.B., but was unsuccessful. When L.B. came to pick D.B. up at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., on December 12, 2003, Petitioner and L.B. discussed the bump on D.B.'s head. L.B. recalled that while playing D.B.'s sibling had hit him on the head with a plastic toy bat at some earlier time and that D.B. had fallen out of bed and hit his head on the floor. L.B. testified that she does not know where D.B. hit his head. It could have happened at home while playing with siblings, when he fell out of bed, or when he was with his father. She was firm in her conviction and belief that D.B. was not injured while in Petitioner's family day care home. There is no evidence of record to account for D.B.'s whereabouts on Saturday and Sunday, December 13 and 14, 2003. On Monday, December 15, 2003, L.B. dropped D.B. off at Petitioner's family day care home. On Tuesday, December 16, 2003, D.B. was again dropped off at Petitioner's family day care home. On Wednesday, December 17, 2003, Petitioner noticed that the bump had gotten larger and called L.B. L.B. came later in the day and carried D.B. to the Emergency Room at Cape Coral Hospital for a medical examination. Medical Examination of the Injured Child A Medical Examination report, dated December 19, 2003, was completed by Susan Sherman (Nurse Sherman), ARNP of the Child Protection Team. The Medical Examination report provides Dr. Michael Weiss' findings, which are as follows: X-RAY FINDINGS: A copy of the report for CT of the head without contrast and a complete skeletal survey are available. These x-rays were read by Dr. Michael Weiss on December 19, 2003. On the CAT scan of the head without contrast, the findings are as follows, "The ventricles are normal in size and midline in position. There is no intracranial hemorrhage. No intra or extra- axial fluid collection. There is a stellate fracture of the left parietal bone. There is also a high right parietal fracture identified. There is no evidence of depression on either side. There is an associated soft tissue hematoma." The impression of the CT scan is as follows: "Biparietal skull fractures, rule out child abuse." Findings and recommendations were reviewed with Dr. Burgett at the time of study. (Dr. Burgett is a pediatrician at the Physician's Primary Care.) . . . (emphasis added) Notwithstanding the findings of Dr. Weiss, Nurse Sherman reported her impression and plan as follows: IMPRESSION: Biparietal skull fractures. From the x-ray report, the skull fracture on the left side of his head is a stellate fracture. There is also a fracture of the parietal bone on the right side of the head. These injuries are consistent with physical abuse. PLAN: The child will be followed medically by his primary care provider. At this time, I do not recommend the child be sheltered. My only recommendation is the child not return to the day care setting. This mother needs to find alternative childcare for [D.B.]. It was reasonable for Nurse Sherman to take the protective approach and recommend that D.B. not return to the family day care home because she believed Petitioner had a history of utilizing substitute caregivers who had not completed required training, and, she also believed that on more than one occasion in the past, Petitioner's child-to-child caregiver ratio was exceeded. An acceptable ratio requires a specific number of caregivers per the number of children within a specific age range. Petitioner had more children than she had certified caregivers required for the separate age range(s) of children found in her family day care home. However, the Department did not charge "past violations of overcapacity" and/or "utilizing substitute caregivers who were not properly qualified" in the January 30, 2004, revocation letter. The evidence of record was inconclusive to demonstrate to any reasonable degree of certainty: first, the date D.B. sustained his injury/injuries; second, whether D.B. was injured while in the care of Petitioner; third, whether D.B. was injured while in the care of his mother; or forth, whether D.B. was injured while in the care of his father. On December 22, 2003, Respondent received a compliant report of a license violation, to wit: over-capacity and background screening. The complaint report was assigned to and investigated by Celeste Davis and a second unnamed person. Ms. Davis closed her report on December 23, 2003. Ms. Davis' investigation found eight children in care: one infant, three preschoolers, and four school-age children. Petitioner was within her ratio at the time of this inspection. Through interviews with the children at the day care, Ms. Davis determined that Petitioner, on occasion, left her day care children alone with L.S., her teenaged daughter, who was not a qualified caregiver. Regarding D.B.'s head injury, Petitioner informed Ms. Davis that the injury did not occur when D.B. was in her care and probably occurred the night before D.B. was brought to her home. Ms. Davis cited Petitioner for one license violation, leaving her day care children alone with her teenage daughter. Ted Leighton investigated an Abuse Hotline Report filed on December 19, 2003. Mr. Leighton did not testify but his written report was introduced into evidence without objection. Respondent argued in its post-hearing submittal that information Mr. Leighton received from his interviews with four minor children, his review of reports from medical personnel and health care providers, and his conclusion that "it was 'probably' on December 15 or 16, 2003, D.B. was injured at the family day care home accidentally by another child when the Petitioner was not present," as fact. Respondent's argument is not based on facts, but upon uncorroborated hearsay, assumptions and conjectures of Mr. Leighton. For those reasons Respondent's argument is rejected. In support of Mr. Leighton's conclusions, Respondent cited the testimony of Nurse Sherman. Nurse Sherman concluded that D.B.'s injuries were "very serious and 'could have' been life threatening, 'could have' happened accidentally 'if' another child jumped off a bed, landing on D.B., while D.B. was laying on the floor with a hard object under his head." The intended purpose of Nurse Sherman's testimony was twofold: to demonstrate the severity of D.B.'s injury and the location D.B.'s injury was sustained. The inference drawn by Respondent was that a lack of supervision was the primary cause of the injury. This argument is likewise not based upon facts found in the evidence of record. Nurse Sherman's conclusions are but an extension of Mr. Leighton's assumptions and conjectures. This argument is likewise rejected. D.B.'s mother recalled one occasion when D.B. had fallen out of her bed at home. She testified that her older daughter told her that while playing with D.B., he had fallen from his bed to the floor on more than one occasion at home. She speculated that D.B. could have been injured at home or by her three-year-old son, who when playing with D.B. had struck him on his head with a plastic toy bat. L.B. testified further that she and Petitioner are related and that her three children have been continuously in Petitioner's family day care home since Petitioner has been qualified as a provider. She was certain that Petitioner did not and would not injure her children. She testified that D.B. "could have" suffered the injury to his head when he was in the care and custody of his father over the weekend. Of the several possibilities of the date, time, place, and in whose custody D.B. may have been when the injury occurred, the mother was not certain. The inconclusive and conflicting evidence regarding D.B.'s whereabouts and the identification of the person or persons who had custody of D.B. when his injury occurred is, as it must be, resolved in favor of Petitioner. Respondent failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that D.B. was injured when in the care, custody, and control of Petitioner while in the family day care home as alleged in its notice of registration revocation dated January 30, 2004. Caregivers supervision and Over capacity Respondent demonstrated that as of June 13, 2002, neither Petitioner's 15-year-old daughter nor any other person present on the days of inspection who was serving as a caregiver was properly trained. By evidence of record, Respondent demonstrated that Petitioner was over capacity, based on the child-to-child caregiver ratio on or about June 2, 2001. With knowledge of the one occasion of over capacity by Petitioner, Respondent approved Petitioner's re-registration application on June 23, 2002, effective through June 30, 2003, and permitted Petitioner to provide care for up to ten children. The approved re-registration increased Petitioner's child care capacity. Respondent's January 30, 2004, letter did not allege an over capacity violation, and no other pleading filed by Respondent contained information from which Petitioner could have been so informed of the over capacity allegation. Respondent failed to prove that D.B. sustained his head injuries while in Petitioner's family day care home. Respondent has shown that Petitioner did on one occasion leave children in the care of a person or persons, including Petitioner's 15-year-old daughter, who were not trained, certified, or qualified as substitute caregiver(s). There is no evidence of record that Petitioner's violation of child-to-child caregiver ratio demonstrated either gross misconduct and/or willful violation of the minimum child care standards within the meaning of the statutes and rules charged. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner did not fully understand the child-to-child caregiver ratio differentiations by age groups. Petitioner's lack of understanding does not absolve her of the obligation to know all rules and regulations. It does, however, provide a reasonable inference that the out-of-ratio situation was not an intentional act on behalf of Petitioner. Weed and Seed Support Group in the Fort Myers Area Petitioner presented the testimony of Susan B. Davis, a family child care specialist employed by the Weed and Seed Support Group of the Fort Myers area. The purpose and organizational goal of this federally funded agency is identification of economically disadvantaged persons who are interested in becoming day care providers in their homes in their respective communities. The methodology of the agency is to first assist those persons identified with acquiring required training and certification. Second, the agency assists the trained candidate(s) with the application process through Respondent. According to Ms. Davis, the federal grant overall objective is twofold: first, to seek, find, and train family day care home providers in the community and second, to provide a source of employment and income to the provider's family. As a direct result of this community service, other families within the economically disadvantaged community will have local and affordable family child care service within their respective communities. By accomplishing the identification and training of community child care providers, employed and unemployed parents in need of day care in the various Fort Myers communities will be the beneficiaries of the available family day care home, thereby enabling some parents to become employed and enhancing employment opportunities for employed parents. The Weed and Seed Support Group of the Fort Myers area offers free help and support to self-employed child care providers. In 2001, Ms. Davis identified and assisted Petitioner in becoming a qualified child care provider. Ms. Davis assisted Petitioner in acquiring her 30 hours of training to become a qualified child care provider. She introduced Petitioner and others to the rules and regulations of Respondent pertaining to child care providers. Thereafter, she would visit with Petitioner and others to whom she rendered assistance only as her time and scheduling permitted. Ms. Davis' last visit with Petitioner occurred sometime before Christmas of 2003. Though she had no knowledge of the injury suffered by D.B., she offered to render assistance and additional training, including assisting Petitioner in acquiring a functional understanding of Respondent's rules, regulations, proper maintenance of required records, and correct completion of required reports and forms, that would enable Petitioner to continue her self-employment status as a qualified child care provider offering daily child care services within her community.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order: Finding that Petitioner left children at her family day care home during her absence from the premises under the supervision, care, and control of unqualified substitute caregivers; and Imposing on Petitioner a fine in the amount of $250.00; and, upon payment thereof, Set aside and vacate revocation of Petitioner's family day care home license/registration; and Issue to Petitioner a six-month provisional license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57402.301402.302402.305402.310402.313402.319
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs SCALLY FAMILY DAY CARE HOME, 16-000736 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 11, 2016 Number: 16-000736 Latest Update: Oct. 18, 2016

The Issue The issue in this matter is whether the Department of Children and Families should deny Respondent’s application for registration as a family day care home.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating providers that are licensed or registered as family day care homes. Family day care homes must register annually with the Department. See § 402.313(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Respondent is owned and operated by Cherrie Scally. Ms. Scally has registered Respondent as a family day care home since 1997. In or about August 2015, Ms. Scally filed an application with the Department to renew Respondent’s registration as a family day care home for 2016. Respondent's registration for 2015 expired on October 30, 2015. Upon receiving Ms. Scally’s application, the Department reviewed whether to renew Respondent’s registration as a family day care home. As part of its determination, the Department examined the Florida Central Abuse Hotline Records Search (“CAHRS”). In CAHRS, the Department identified an Investigative Summary involving Respondent that verified a finding of “inadequate supervision” in March 2015. Based on the CAHRS Investigative Summary, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint in November 2015, revoking Respondent’s registration as a family day care home.2/ The Department determined that it could no longer approve Respondent’s registration “based on the verified finding of inadequate supervision.” The CAHRS resulted from an incident that allegedly occurred on March 5, 2015. On March 6, 2015, the Central Abuse Hotline received an anonymous phone call reporting an injury to a child at Respondent’s family day care home. A four-year-old girl who attended Respondent’s family day care home reported to her mother that another child had hurt her.3/ Jessica Baloy, a child protective investigator with the Department, was assigned to investigate the incident. Her duties include investigating facilities regarding complaints of child abuse and neglect. Ms. Baloy prepared the CAHRS Investigative Summary. Ms. Baloy visited Respondent's family day care home on March 9, 2015, to investigate the allegation. Ms. Scally informed Ms. Baloy that she had no knowledge of how or when the child was injured. Ms. Scally did not learn of the incident until the child’s mother called her the evening after the child was picked up. Ms. Scally thought that the incident may have occurred in her “playroom” while she was in her kitchen either cleaning up another child or preparing snacks.4/ During her visit, Ms. Baloy found that the part of Ms. Scally’s home used for childcare consists of two rooms, a “playroom” and a kitchen. The rooms are located next to each other, but a wall separates them. Ms. Baloy observed that the wall obstructs the view between the playroom (where the injury allegedly occurred) and the kitchen where Ms. Scally believes she was located at the time of the incident. Ms. Scally admitted to Ms. Baloy that, while she is able to hear the children in the playroom from the kitchen, she is unable to see directly from the kitchen into the playroom. In her investigation, Ms. Baloy reported that the child had “no indicator” of physical injury. In other words, Ms. Baloy did not find evidence to suggest the child had sustained an injury. Ms. Baloy personally interviewed the child and did not observe any discomfort or physical injuries. Ms. Baloy also received information from the child’s mother that a doctor had examined the child and determined that she had not suffered any trauma, just “some irritation.” The child’s mother decided that no further medical treatment or examination was needed. In her Investigative Summary, Ms. Baloy reported that “[o]bservations of the home daycare were positive that it was not hazardous for the children.” Ms. Baloy also declared that Ms. Scally “once notified by a parent completed the proper notifications needed in regards to this incident.” However, Ms. Baloy did have “some concerns in regards to supervision.” She found that when Ms. Scally was working/standing in her kitchen, she could not view the children in the playroom. Consequently, if something bad happened, she would not be able to see it. Also during her visit to Respondent, Ms. Baloy observed 11 children in Respondent’s facility. Consequently, Respondent was over capacity by one child. (As discussed below, family day care homes are restricted to a maximum of ten children at one time.) After her visit, Ms. Baloy closed her investigation with “verified findings for inadequate supervision.” Ms. Baloy was not aware of any prior investigations involving Respondent. Dinah Davis is the policy supervisor for the Department’s Office of Childcare Regulation. Her responsibilities include approving applications for family day care home registrations with Samantha Wass de Czege, the Department’s Director for the Office of Childcare Regulation. Ms. Davis expressed that the Department was concerned with Ms. Baloy’s Investigative Summary because the finding of “inadequate supervision” indicated that Ms. Scally left the children unattended outside of her direct supervision. The Department’s “rule of thumb” regarding supervision is that a caregiver must be within “sight and sound of the children and [be] able to respond to emergency situations.” Ms. Davis expressed that a constant sightline is crucial to allow the caregiver to respond to and prevent an emergency or potentially harmful situation. Adequate “sight” supervision means that children should be at least within the caregiver’s peripheral vision. In addition, Ms. Davis explained that, by statute, no family day care home is allowed to care for more than ten children at one given time. Ms. Davis referred to section 402.310 as the Department’s authority to deny Ms. Scally’s application. Although section 402.310 allows the Department to place a family day care home registration on probation status, Ms. Davis stated that the Department did not consider the option to place Respondent on probation. Ms. Wass de Czege also testified regarding the Department’s decision to revoke (deny) Respondent’s application for registration. Ms. Wass de Czege stated that the Department’s action was based on the child protective investigator’s findings of “inadequate supervision” and overcapacity. Ms. Wass de Czege agreed with Ms. Davis that supervision in a family day care home requires “direct sight and hearing of the children at all times” so that the caregiver is “able to respond to meet the needs of the children.” Ms. Wass de Czege explained that based on the floor design of Ms. Scally’s home, “she could not have the children in her sight. So, she was not meeting that parameter of the definition of supervision.” Ms. Wass de Czege explained that the Department’s definition of “inadequate supervision” for family day care homes is found in Florida Administrative Code Chapters 65C-22 and 65C-20.5/ Ms. Wass de Czege also remarked that having more than ten children in care at a family day care home is considered overcapacity. Therefore, having 11 children present in the home at the time of Ms. Baloy’s visit caused Respondent to be out of compliance with the governing regulation. Ms. Wass de Czege also conveyed that registration of a family day care home is basically a paper process. The applicant submits the paperwork. The Department checks off the information listed in section 402.313(1)(a). If approved, the applicant can care for children. Ms. Wass de Czege commented that, because of a lack of manpower and resources, a registered family day care home is not subject to routine inspections by the Department. Consequently, the Department has little regulatory oversight of Ms. Scally’s home. Based on its review of the CAHRS, the Department determined that Respondent failed the background check necessary to register as a family day care home for 2016. Ms. Scally testified on behalf of Respondent at the final hearing. Ms. Scally has operated her family day care home since 1997. She has successfully registered with the state every year since then. She cares greatly for the children entrusted to her. This current matter is the first issue she has encountered regarding her registration. Regarding the incident on March 5, 2015, Ms. Scally did not learn that a child may have been harmed at her home until the child’s parent called her that evening to report an injury. The parent relayed that her daughter told her that another child had poked her in a sensitive area, drawing blood. Upon learning of the injury, Ms. Scally immediately took action. That evening, she spoke with the parents of both children involved to make sure all parties were aware of the situation. The next morning, Ms. Scally called the injured child’s parent back to inquire of her well-being. Ms. Scally also contacted her own pediatrician seeking advice on the situation. Ms. Scally offered to arrange for her pediatrician to examine the child. Ms. Scally herself was the anonymous caller reporting the incident to the Central Abuse Hotline.6/ She called the abuse hotline on the next morning. (The CAHRS Investigative Summary notes that the call was received on March 6, 2015, at 10:38 a.m.) Ms. Scally called the abuse hotline because she knew reporting the injury was the proper and legally required step to take. Ms. Scally commented that the Department would not have learned of the incident but for her phone call. Ms. Scally conceded that, when she is standing in her kitchen, she does not have a direct line of sight with the children in her playroom. Consequently, Ms. Scally admitted that if the child was injured in the playroom while she was in the kitchen, the child was out of her sight for a short period of time. On the other hand, Ms. Scally asserts that she can always hear her children from the kitchen. Furthermore, no child is ever out of her eyesight for more than a couple of moments. Ms. Scally also represented that she has taken steps to ensure that she can maintain “sight and sound” supervision over her children in the future. She has purchased a mirror to place in the hallway between the playroom and the kitchen. This mirror allows her to see into either room from the other. Ms. Scally stated that in her 19 years of childcare, she has never had any incidents in her family day care home. Ms. Scally acknowledged that she might have had 11 children in her care on the occasion of Ms. Baloy’s visit to her home on March 9, 2015. Ms. Scally explained that it was likely during a “transition” period as her children were being picked up and dropped off and was not a regular occurrence or for an extended period of time. Based on this incident, Ms. Scally asserts that she will be extra cautious about the interactions between the children in her care. Ms. Scally presented testimony from several parents whom she serves. They each asserted that Respondent provides a valuable service, and they trust her with their children in her home. Mia Carla Hagins placed her daughter with Respondent from 2009 through 2014. Ms. Hagins testified that Ms. Scally ensures safety, nurturing, and care for the children she supervises. Thomas Breck placed two children with Ms. Scally from 1996 through 2000. Mr. Breck testified that Ms. Scally provided excellent care and demonstrated complete professionalism. Mizanne Brown placed her child with Ms. Scally for ten years. Ms. Brown testified that Ms. Scally was fabulous, nice, and wonderful. Ms. Scally also produced 26 letters of recommendation from parents and teachers of children for whom she has cared. Ms. Scally asserted that these letters show how positively her community views her, her home, and her childcare services. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the Department failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, sufficient grounds to deny Respondent’s application for registration as a family day care home under the provisions of section 402.310. Accordingly, the Department should approve Respondent’s application to register as a family day care home.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order approving Respondent’s application for registration as a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2016.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.5739.201402.301402.302402.310402.312402.313402.31990.801
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs ESPERANZA GALLEGO, 00-002613 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 27, 2000 Number: 00-002613 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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