The Issue Whether Allstate Construction's (Allstate) bid was delivered in time. Whether Florida State University (FSU) had the authority to waive the lateness of Allstate's bid if it was late. Whether the failure by Allstate to acknowledge receipt of Addendum No. 2 was a bidding irregularity. Whether Allstate's failure to acknowledge receipt of Addendum No. 2 could be waived by FSU.
Findings Of Fact Florida State University requested bids for repairs to the roof and walls of Thagard Student Health Center on July 2, 1992. Thereafter, two addenda were issued. The first addendum was issued on July 27, 1992, and the second on July 28, 1992. Item #1 of Specifications in Addendum No. 1, which is attached, changed the date the bids were to be presented to August 6, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. in Room 124-D of Mendenhall Maintenance Building at FSU. Item #1 to Specifications in Addendum No. 2, which is attached, changed the specifications of ringlets and counterflashings published in Item #4 to Specifications in Addendum No. 1; and Item #2 in Addendum No. 2 changed the specifications of the materials in the cants published in the original specifications. On August 6, 1992, representatives of Harrell, Southeast, and FSU were present in Room 124-D, Mendenhall Maintenance Building prior to 2:00 p.m. Harrell and Southeast had already presented their bids to Sallie Dixon, FSU's representative. One of the persons present had called upon Ms. Dixon to call time and open the bids, but she had not done so when Dot Mathews and Joe O'Neil entered the room. Mr. O'Neil announced to those present that Ms. Mathews was late because he had misdirected her to another part of the building when Ms. Mathews's had entered the office he was in, Room 124, and had asked directions. Ms. Mathews immediately handed Allstate's bid to Ms. Dixon, and Ms. Dixon received it. Immediately, Ms. Dixon opened, tabulated, and posted the bids. Allstate had the lowest responsible bid. Allstate's bid did not acknowledge receipt of Addendum No. 2. FSU's rules on bidding provide that the official time will be that of the clock in the reception area of the Purchasing Department; however, the opening was held in Mendenhall Maintenance Building because of repairs to the Purchasing Department, and the university's officials were uncertain whether the reception area and clock existed at the time of the opening. It was the clear impression of all present, except Ms. Mathews, that the bid presented by Ms. Mathews was after 2:00 p.m. The estimates of the time varied, but none placed the time beyond 2:04 p.m. FSU generally sent an acknowledgment form with an addendum which required the bidders to acknowledge receipt of the addendum; however, in this instance, the addendum was sent by the supervising engineer, and an acknowledgment form was not sent with the addendum. The specifications did not require acknowledgment of addenda. The essence of the substantial amount of testimony received on the impact of the changes was (1) that the change in thickness of materials had a negligible impact, and (2) the real change in costs was the result of the requirement that the paint finish be by the manufacturer. The requirement that the materials be painted by the manufacturer was part of Addendum No.1. Further, the bidders are deemed manufacturers, and the finish that they put on the manufactured items is "by the manufacturer". Although testimony was received that Petitioner would have manufactured the items and then had them coated thereby increasing their total costs, an alternative method of manufacture was described by Allstate's representative in which the painted raw materials are retouched after being cut and welded into the finished structures. Petitioner's choice of the first method was explained by its representative to be its effort to comply with the bid requirement that the winning contractor guarantee the finish for twenty years. Intervenor's choice was to use the second method. To the extent that one method may have been more expensive that the other, there was no prohibition of the Petitioner to adopt the less expensive method; and, therefore, there was no economic advantage to Allstate. In the absence of an economic advantage to Allstate, Allstate's failure to acknowledge Addendum No. 2 was a minor irregularity. FSU waived the lateness of Allstate's bid and Allstate's failure to acknowledge Addendum No. 2, and awarded the bid to Allstate.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's Petition be dismissed, and the bid be awarded to Allstate Construction, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX CASE NO. 92-5465BID Florida State University and Allstate Construction, Inc. submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Florida State University's Proposed Findings: Para 1-4 Adopted. Para 5-7 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 8 Adopted. Para 9-11 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 12-24 Adopted. Para 25 Not necessary/irrelevant. Allstate Construction's Proposed Findings: Para 1,2 Adopted. Para 3 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 4-8 Adopted. Para 9 Not necessary/irrelevant. Para 10-15 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Wendell Parker Mike Harrell Harrell Roofing, Inc. P.O. Box 20421 Tallahassee, FL 32316 Sonja Mathews Florida State University 540 W. Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL 32306-4038 Davisson F. Dunlap, Jr. 3375-A Capital Circle, N.E. Tallahassee, FL 32308 Jeff Miller Route 16, Box 1307 Tallahassee, FL 32310 Dale W. Lick, President Florida State University 211 Westcott Building Tallahassee, FL 32306-1037 Gerold B. Jaski, General Counsel Florida State University 540 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL 32306
Findings Of Fact In November, 1990, the Respondent, the Department of State, sought proposals for the lease of office space for its Division of Licensing. On or prior to December 7, 1990, the proposal opening date, at least six proposals were received by the Respondent. Those proposals were designated by the Respondent as "Tallahassee Associates" (the Petitioner's proposal), "Crossland Agency" (the Intervenor's proposal), "Woodcrest A", "Woodcrest B", "T.C.S." and "DeVoe". On January 2, 1991, the Respondent posted a standard form Bid Tabulation indicating that the following scores had been awarded to the following proposals: Proposal Score Woodcrest A 82 Woodcrest B 82 Tallahassee Associates 73 Crossland Agency 85 DeVoe 54 The proposal of T.C.S. was not evaluated by the Respondent because it was determined to be non-responsive. The Respondent also posted a copy of a memorandum dated January 2, 1991, with the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The memorandum was from John M. Russi, Director of the Division of Licensing, to Ira Chester, Chief of the Bureau of General Services. Mr. Russi indicated in the memorandum that the Intervenor would be awarded the lease. Attached to Mr. Russi's January 2, 1991, memorandum was a Lease Evaluation Worksheet which indicated the scores which had been awarded by the evaluation committee to the responsive bidders for each of the criteria to be considered in determining the winning bidder. Printed at the top-center of the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation was the following notice: FAILURE TO FILE A PROTEST WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 120.53(5), FLORIDA STATUTES, SHALL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CHAPTER 120, FLORIDA STATUTES. . . . The January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation was posted at 1:00 p.m., January 2, 1991. Therefore, pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, any bidder desiring to contest the Respondent's proposed award of the lease was required to file a notice of protest with the Respondent no later than 1:00 p.m., January 5, 1991, and a formal written protest on or before January 15, 1991. T.C.S. filed a notice of protest and a formal written protest to the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation within the time periods prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. T.C.S. contested the Respondent's determination that it was not responsive. The Petitioner did not file a notice of protest or a formal written protest to the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation within the time periods prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, the Respondent reviewed the formal written protest filed by T.C.S. and agreed that T.C.S. was responsive. After agreeing that T.C.S. was responsive, the Respondent evaluated T.C.S.'s proposal and awarded points for each of the criteria to be considered. Toward the end of January, 1991, after deciding that T.C.S.'s proposal was to be evaluated, the Respondent notified all other bidders of its decision in a document titled Posting of Notice of Agency Decision. The Posting of Notice of Agency Decision was signed by the Respondent's General Counsel and was addressed to "All Responsive Bidders". The Posting of Notice of Agency Decision provided, in pertinent part: Notice is hereby given that the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing, is reviewing the bid tabulation which was posted at 1:00 P.M., January 2, 1991 for Lease No. 450:0070. The revised bid tabulation will be posted at 8:00 A.M. on February 4, 1991 at the Purchasing Office of the Department of State . . . . Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any person interested in the new tabulation should contact . . . after the posting time listed above. The Petitioner filed a notice of protest and a formal written protest challenging the Posting of Notice of Agency Decision within the times prescribed by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The Respondent dismissed this formal written protest by final order dated February 22, 1991. On or about January 31, 1991, more than four weeks after the posting of the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, Ocie Allen spoke by telephone with Phyllis Slater, the Respondent's General Counsel. Ms. Slater told Mr. Allen that all proposals would be reevaluated as a result of T.C.S.'s protest. Mr. Allen was a lobbyist for the Petitioner in January, 1991. On February 4, 1991, the Respondent posted another standard form Bid Tabulation indicating that the following scores had been awarded to the following proposals: Proposal Score Crossland Agency 83 Woodcrest A 80 Woodcrest B 80 Tallahassee Associates 71 T.C.S. 71 DeVoe 51 The differences in the scores of the proposals which had been listed on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, which are reflected in the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation were caused by automatic changes in the scores resulting from the addition of T.C.S. and the fact that T.C.S. had the lowest priced bid. The points awarded for the "rental" criterion, which was worth up to 25 points, were determined by a mathematical formula by which the scores of each bidder are calculated based upon the proposed rental charges of all bidders. The award of points for this criterion was determined objectively based upon the mathematical formula. By adding another bidder, T.C.S., the points awarded to all the proposals automatically changed. The scores of the proposals which had been listed on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation, were not otherwise changed. Nor were the proposals of any bidder reevaluated. The Respondent also posted a copy of a memorandum dated January 24, 1991, with the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The memorandum was from John M. Russi, Director of the Division of Licensing, to Ira Chester, Chief of the Bureau of General Services. Mr. Russi indicated the following in the memorandum: Pursuant to the settlement stipulation signed by Counsel for T.C.S. Associates on January 23, 1991, in reference to the Bid Protest filed January 11, 1991, the attached "Lease Evaluation Work Sheet" is provided for you to re-post. After reevaluating six bid proposals, the evaluating committee concludes that Crossland Agency should be awarded this bid. Each bidder needs to be notified by certified mail of this action. . . . . Attached to Mr. Russi's January 24, 1991, memorandum was a Lease Evaluation Worksheet which indicated the scores of the responsive bidders which had been awarded by the evaluation committee for each of the criteria to be considered in determining the winning bidder. On February 6, 1991, the Petitioner filed a notice of protest to the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The Petitioner filed a Formal Written Protest, Request for Formal Hearing and Motion for Stay with the Respondent on February 18, 1991. These documents were filed within the time periods specified in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's Formal Written Protest was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent on February 28, 1991. Crossland Agency, Inc., was allowed to intervene in the proceeding. On March 1, 1991, the Respondent and Intervenor filed a Motion to Dismiss. A motion hearing was conducted on March 6, 1991, to consider the Motion to Dismiss.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Respondent granting the Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this case, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3, 5 and 9. 2 12-13. 3 15-16 and 18-21. See 14. 15. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the scores of the bidders for the "option period" criterion reflected on the January 2, 1991, Bid Tabulation were modified or reconsidered on the February 4, 1991, Bid Tabulation. The suggestion that "the department had discretion to change scores in any of the remaining eight categories" is a conclusion of law and is rejected. These proposed facts are not relevant to the issue raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Nor was any evidence presented to support these proposed findings. 12. The last sentence is a conclusion of law and is rejected. Proposed Findings of Fact of the Respondent and Intervenor Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 3 and 7. 5-6 and hereby accepted. 4 8-12. 5 See 14. 6 15 and 17. 18. The last sentence involves an issue not raised in the Motion to Dismiss or at the motion hearing. Nor was any evidence presented to support these proposed findings. See the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire 1589 Metropolitan Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Benjamin E. Poitevent Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact On December 24, 1986, respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), gave notice to qualified and interested contracting firms that it was accepting bids from firms interested in providing construction and maintenance services on State Job No. 08150-3412. Such bids were due on or before January 21, 1987. The job description read as follows: At State Bridge Nos. 080025 and 000026 over the Withlacoochee River North of Tampa. Work consists of Furnish and Install Integral Pile Jackets (port. cement grout filled); Remove and Replace Sections of Bridge Deck; Floating Turbidity Barrier; and Incidental Items. Length 0.066 Mile. (B.I. 1144013) Stated in plainer language, the project called for repairs to two bridges on I-75 which span the Withlacoochee River southwest of Ocala in Hernando County. The bidders were also provided with a copy of the specifications and bid form dated November 4, 1986 regarding the contract. In response to this offer, petitioner, CSA Marine Services, Inc. (CSAMS), a contractor with offices at 759 Parkway Street, Jupiter, Florida, filed a bid proposal by the established deadline. Its bid totalled $123,347.59. Also filing a bid proposal was Seig and Ambachtsheer, Inc. (SAI), a contractor in Orange City, Florida. Its bid price was $137,209.50. The bid form itself was prepared by DOT and merely required the contractor to fill in the blanks where appropriate. The first two columns were labeled "item number" and "approximate quantities" and were already completed by DOT. For those items having a quantity of only one, the words "lump sum were written in the second column. Where quantities exceeded one, they were expressed in such terms as linear feet, cubic yards and pounds together with the approximate numerical quantities. The third column was labeled "item description and unit or lump price (written in words)." The fourth column read "unit price (in figures)" and required the bidder to indicate the unit price of each line item in figures. The fifth or final column was labeled "amounts" and required the bidder to reflect the lump sum price of each line item in figures. Columns three through five were filled in by CSAMS where necessary. The total price of the bid was to be listed on a bid blank which was attached to the bid form. On its face, the third column on the form offered petitioner the option of either using a unit or lump sum price. In addition, section 2-5.1 of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, 1986 Edition, which governs the awarding of contracts and has been incorporated as a part of the bid documents, provides as follows: Proposals shall be submitted on the form described in 2-2. Unit or lump sum prices for all bid items shall be shown in words and figures, and all extensions shall be carried out. Notwithstanding the form and instructions, according to a DOT representative, a lump sum price may be used only when the quantity in column two is one item. If more than one item is reflected in column two, then DOT expects a contractor to use the unit price. However, there is no written rule, instruction or provision in the specifications that sets forth this requirement. CSAMS properly opted to use lump sum price under column three on at least two line items even though the quantities exceeded one. Of particular interest was line item 8400-3-4 which, according to column two, required 20.800 cubic yards of concrete for a "superstructure." Relying upon the optional language on the form, petitioner wrote the words seven thousand, one hundred, fifty five dollars and 00/100 cents" in column three (which was a lump sum price), and a unit price of $344.00 in column four. It then used the figure of $7,155 in the final column of that item, which is the approximate sum of $344 times the quantity (20.800). Because of the volume of bid lettings each month, DOT uses a computer to total the numbers in each line item for each bid. If the amount in column five does not agree with the figures in columns three and four, the computer flags the item, and a manual review of the line item is made. While reviewing line item 8400-3-4 of petitioner's bid form, the computer found the numbers did not agree. More specifically, when 20.800 in column two was multiplied times $344.00 in column four, it equalled $7,155.20 and not $7,155.00 as reflected in column five of petitioner's bid form. This twenty-cent disagreement arose because petitioner had rounded off the unit price from $343.99038 to $344.00 in column four. The disagreement prompted a manual review of petitioner's bid form and a recalculation of the line item. On January 30, 1987 DOT bureau chief J. Ted Barefield prepared a letter to CSAMS styled "Notice of Switch in Apparent Low Bidder" indicating in part: Due to mathematical error(s) on the bid of CSA Marine Services, Inc. and Continental Shelf Associates, Inc., the apparent low bidder, whose bid amount was $123,347.59 is now $265,016.59. Therefore, the apparent low bidder is Seig & Ambachtsheer, Inc. The change in amount was the result of DOT increasing the unit price in column four from $344 to $7,155 (to agree with column three) and multiplying the quantity (20.800) times the sum specified in words in column three ($7,155) to arrive at a total in column five of $148,824. This caused an increase of $141,669 over the original bid price. In making the above change, DOT relied on Section 3-1 of the 1986 Edition of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction. Section 3-1 provides in relevant part as follows: In the event of any discrepancy in the three entries for the price for any item, the unit price as shown in words shall govern unless the extension and the unit price shown in figures are in agreement with each other, in which case they shall govern over the unit price shown in words. (Emphasis added) Here, because of the twenty-cent discrepancy in the entries for line item 8400-3-4, DOT used the "unit price as shown in words" in column three to recalculate the item since the extension ($7,155.00) and the unit price shown in figures ($344.00)" did not agree. In doing so, DOT did not first evaluate the price written in words to see if it was a lump sum or unit price. After receiving the above letter, CSAMS and DOT representatives met in early February 1987 to discuss the CSAMS proposal. It was represented to CSAMS that it should have used a unit price in words in column three rather than a lump sum price. Petitioner was also provided with a copy of a letter previously sent to it on September 6, 1985 by DOT which noted the following irregularity on a bid: "Unit prices as written in words and figures do not agree (Item 8457- 70)." However, the letter did not contain explicit advice as to DOT's unwritten policy. On February 5, 1987 Barefield wrote a second letter to CSAMS indicating that there were several discrepancies in its bid proposal. These included: (a) the name on the cover sheet (CSAMS and Continental Shelf Associates, Inc.) did not agree with the name (CSAMS) in other parts of the bid, (b) unit prices as written in words and figures did not agree, (c) an incomplete affidavit was filed, and (d) an incorrect MBE Certification and incomplete Utilization Sheets were submitted. The latter two errors were related to the discrepancy in the names. However, the letter stated that "no further action is requested by you at this time," and that the letter was to serve as a reminder that in the future the irregularities could cause petitioner's bid to be rejected. Petitioner's bid was accepted as being appropriate but with the substantially higher bid price of $265,016.59. The error made by CSAMS is a common one. Indeed, it was stated the same mistake is made by contractors on "several bids during each letting." Even so, DOT has not considered providing some special instruction or rule to clarify this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner be awarded the contract on State Job No. 08150- 3412. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1987.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's proposed award of a contract pursuant to an Invitation to Bid for the management of the citrus groves at Lake Louisa State Park to Intervenor is fraudulent, dishonest, arbitrary or illegal. Whether Respondent improperly notified Petitioner of the intent to award the contract. Whether the Respondent violated the terms of the Invitation to Bid (ITB) by doing any of the following: Determining that the bids were within five (5) percent of each other. Requesting additional information. Using 80 points to be awarded for percentage of return. Considering grove equipment in the evaluation. Assigning ten (10) points to the category "equipment." Not considering financial stability of the bidders. Not assigning points to either bidder for financial stability. Computing the points assigned to each bidder incorrectly. Computing years of experience for both bidders incorrectly. Failing to use a committee of three, one of whom was an accountant. Whether the Respondent was obligated to accept the bidder who would provide the most revenue, considering all the other factors. Whether a partnership existed between the Petitioners, and if so, how many years of experience to award to it. Whether Petitioners, as a partnership, have standing to bring this protest.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, is an agency of the State of Florida which operates and manages state parks under its jurisdiction, pursuant to chapter 258, Part I, Florida Statutes, through its Division of Recreation and Parks (“Division”). Kenneth Walker and R. E. Oswalt (Petitioner, Walker/Oswalt) are general partners for various ad hoc business ventures. Earl Drawdy (Intervenor) is an individual. The Invitation to Bid (ITB) Lake Louisa State Park contains approximately 300 acres of citrus groves, of which, 167 acres are active trees (“Lake Louisa Groves” f/k/a “Dixie Lake Groves”). The groves had been abandoned for about a year prior to the state’s purchase of the land. In 1994, Earl Drawdy bid and was awarded a one-year contract to care for and harvest the groves. The contract was extended for one year and Drawdy maintained the groves until this bid protest. In preparing the Invitation to Bid (“ITB”), the goal of the Department was to obtain a 10-year contract with a third party who would care for and rehabilitate Lake Louisa Groves. The bid specification language was assembled mainly from the prior contract. A new scope of work was added and the draft agreement for the ITB was prepared. On January 3, 1996, Draft Specifications for a 10-year extension option for the Dixie Lake Groves in Lake Louisa State Park (Draft Specifications) were sent to interested bidders including, but not limited to, Kenneth Walker. The Respondent’s legal department subsequently prepared and approved the final specifications. The final specifications are entitled “Specifications for the Management of the Lake Louisa Orange Groves at Lake Louisa State Park” (“the ITB”). The ITB was posted at the Division’s District 3 office, located in Apopka at the Wekiva Springs State Park from April 24 through May 1, 1996, and sent to prospective bidders, including Petitioner and Intervenor. The original deadline stated in the ITB to file sealed bids was May 5, 1996. On May 3, 1996, the Department notified all interested bidders, including Petitioner and Intervenor, by letters sent by Federal Express, that the deadline to bid had been extended to May 10, 1996. By May 10, two bids had been received, one from petitioner and one from Intervenor. Both bids were timely. The bids were opened on May 13 and evaluated on May 15, 1996. On May 15, 1996, the Respondent notified Petitioner and Intervenor by facsimile that it required additional information from them, giving them a deadline to respond of May 31, 1996. The Respondent requested a resume and an equipment list from Intervenor, and it requested an equipment list and a letter of intent that a partnership would be formed from Petitioner. Both Intervenor and Petitioner responded timely to the request. The ITB provided in pertinent part: EVALUATION OF BIDS Bids shall be evaluated by a committee composed of at least three representatives of the Department. At least one of the three members will be an accountant who will evaluate the financial statements for compliance with this bid request. Evaluation will be based on the percent of return, past performance, experience, and financial stability. Up to ninety (90) percent of the points will be awarded based on the percentage of return for the Department, and the other ten (10) percent will be based on experience and financial stability. In cases where proposers submit bids that are determined equal or very nearly equal (within 5 percent of each other), the evaluation committee at its option may request proposers to submit additional clarification of information contained in the bid or give oral presentations in a final evaluation process. The committee and the Florida Park Service have no obligation except to select the bid which they consider best suited for operation of the grove. * * * The Department also reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in bids, providing such action is in the best interest of the State. Minor irregularities are defined as those that have no adverse effect on the State’s interest and will not affect the outcome of the selection process by giving a Proposer an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other Proposers. The Florida Park Service also reserves the right to reject all bids. The bid specifications allow a committee of more than three persons so long as one of them is an accountant. Pursuant to the provisions of the ITB, a committee was formed to evaluate the bids, consisting of Rosi Mulholland, district biologist; Cheryl Sweeney, district accountant; Norman Edwards, operations consultant manager; and Carla Ridge, administrative assistant. The committee consisted of four persons, one of whom was an accountant. Cheryl Sweeney was qualified to serve as the committee accountant by virtue of her position and experience. Bids were opened on May 13, 1996, by Ms. Ridge and Ms. Mulholland. Intervenor’s bid called for sharing 36 percent of gross proceeds of fruit sales with Respondent. Petitioner’s bid called for sharing 38 percent of the gross with Respondent. Between May 13 and May 15, Ms. Mulholland, Ms. Ridge and Mr. Edwards met and discussed the bids. Those members of the committee agreed that, based on the fact that the bids were nearly equal, the committee should request additional information from the bidders. Ms. Sweeney concurred with that decision after the fact. On June 3, Ms. Mulholland and Ms. Ridge met and prepared a proposed point score for the two bidders. Later that afternoon, the full committee met for at least an hour to evaluate the bid information and proposed point score. The committee reviewed, discussed, and concurred on the point evaluation which had been prepared by Ms. Mulholland and Ms. Ridge. The committee evaluated the following criteria: percentage of return, past performance, experience, financial stability, and equipment. Requesting Additional Information The ITB states: In cases where proposers submit bids that are determined equal or very nearly equal (within 5 percent of each other), the valuation committee at its option may request proposers to submit additional clarification of information contained in the bid. Ms. Ridge subtracted 36 percent from 38 percent and got 2 percent, which she interpreted to be “within 5 percent of each other.” The rest of the committee concurred, and determined that the bids were equal or very nearly equal, and that additional information should be requested. This determination was proper under the bid specifications. Dividing 2 by 38, with a result of 5.26 percent, as Petitioner calculated, rounds to 5 percent. A 5.26 percent difference on a scale of 100 percent is very nearly equal and within 5 percent of each other. More information was needed about the intended formation of a limited partnership. Petitioner would have had to submit more information on that issue in any case. Equipment The bid specifications provide: Up to 90 percent of the points will be awarded based on the percentage of return for the Department, and the other ten percent will be based on experience and financial stability. The committee concluded, after having all the information before it, that the percentage of return should receive 80 points, so that points could be given for equipment. The committee determined that since the language said “up to 90 percent” the committee could reduce the points allotted for that category. The language “up to 90 percent” necessarily implies that some figure less than 90 percent could be used. The committee had not firmly fixed the 90 percent figure, and the bid specifications language put the bidders on notice that a figure less than 90 percent may be used. The committee’s use of 80 percent of the points for this category was proper and reasonable under this clause. The committee considered equipment in its evaluation of the bids. This category was added to the bid specifications by letter of May 15, 1996 to all bidders. Although the letter was not specifically labeled an addendum, the Respondent’s intent was to add “equipment” to the categories to be evaluated. Addenda are allowed under the bid specifications. Petitioner received notice that equipment would be considered, and submitted a list of equipment owned by or available to them. The committee members determined that certain types of equipment were necessary to perform the contract. For such a contract, it was appropriate for the committee to consider the equipment each bidder has to perform the necessary tasks. Without the proper equipment, a bidder could not perform the contract, no matter what the bid amount. The committee determined that 10 percent of the points should be assigned to the category “equipment” because equipment was necessary to perform the contract. Additionally, the grove was old stock and not irrigated and would require specialized care. The committee very strongly felt that equipment was an important and meaningful category. Assignment of ten percent of the points for equipment was not unreasonable or excessive. The committee considered and evaluated, through different members, the financial stability of the bidders. After receiving all the information, the committee determined that the ten percent of the points to be allotted to “experience and financial stability” should be allotted to experience alone. The committee determined that financial stability included the partnership issue, which was never resolved by them. The committee determined that the unresolved partnership issues would have a negative impact on the financial stability, points awarded on the basis of financial stability would have favored Intervenor. The committee considered past performance of Intervenor as a part of his experience. The committee did not give extra points to Intervenor for his past experience. The consideration of past performance was proper. Intervenor Drawdy was awarded 33 years of experience. This was based on Intervenor’s letter in his bid package in which he stated that he began in the citrus industry in 1963. 1963 was subtracted from 1996, which resulted in 33 years. Based on this, Intervenor was awarded a full 10 points. Notwithstanding the questions the committee had about the partnership’s experience, the committee decided to give Petitioners points for experience in the citrus business of each individual partner. Walker was awarded 0 points. Oswalt was awarded 29 years of experience. This determination was based on Oswalt’s biographical profile submitted with the bid, in which he stated that he began citrus management in 1967. 1967 was subtracted from 1996, with a result of 29 years. A ratio of 29 to 33 was applied, with a result of 9 points given to Petitioners. The committee’s calculation of the experience of Petitioners and Intervenor was flawed, but was not fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. The tabulation of points computed by the committee was posted at the District 3 office on June 3, 1996, in the same location the original bid was posted. This was in accordance with the bid specifications. Petitioners were notified by telephone, and a copy of the tabulation was sent to them via facsimile. Petitioner had actual notice on the date the bids were posted that the Respondent intended to award the contract to Intervenor. No written notice was required by the bid specifications. Notice was properly given to Petitioner by the Respondent. The point system was qualified by the Respondent, which stated: The committee and the Florida Park Service have no obligation except to select the bid which they consider best suited for the operation of the grove. The committee also determined that Intervenor was best suited to care for the grove, based on all the information available to it on June 3. The committee believed that it could make such a determination in the ultimate decision. Petitioner filed a timely notice of intent to protest the award on June 5, 1996, by facsimile. Petitioner filed a timely written petition for formal hearing on June 13, 1996 by certified mail. The Respondent notified Intervenor by letter on or about June 13, 1996, that a bid protest had been filed. Intervenor has not been awarded the contract. Attempts to resolve the bid protest informally were made at a meeting on July 19, 1996, and by letters and phone calls made between July 1 and August 20. There was no resolution. Standing/Formation of Partnership Petitioners intended to form a limited partnership to care for the Lake Louisa Groves, if they were awarded the bid. An unwritten general partnership was formed for this purpose at the time the bid was submitted. The Petitioners had previously formed partnerships in the past and have shared profits and losses. For each different venture, a new oral partnership was made. Most of the committee members did not know whether the bid was responsive or not on the issue of the limited partnership, and so made the request for additional information. Petitioner Walker signed the bid proposal on behalf of the partners. The bid was not a responsive bid since the entity which submitted the bid did not intend to perform the contract if it was the successful bidder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the protest of the Petitioners be dismissed and the contract for the Lake Louisa Groves be awarded to the Intervenor, Earl Drawdy. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan B. Brantley, Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Edward P. Jordan, II, P.A. 13543 East highway 50 Clermont, Florida 34711 Kim Booker, Esquire 2752-A Enterprise Road Orange City, Florida 32763 Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issues are (1) the amount of attorney’s fees and costs that Respondent must pay to Petitioner for the appeal in French v. Department of Children and Families, 920 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), and (2) Petitioner’s entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the proceeding that gave rise to the appeal.
Findings Of Fact This case concerns the amount of attorney’s fees and costs that are due to Petitioner for the appeal in French, supra, and Petitioner’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs for the DCF hearing that gave rise to that appeal. The parties stipulated at the outset of the proceeding as to Petitioner’s entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees and costs for the DCF hearing. On October 24, 2006, the parties reached an agreement as to the amount of the attorney’s fees and costs that Petitioner is due for the appeal and the underlying DCF hearing.3 There are no other disputed issues of material fact between the parties on the issues remanded by the appellate court.
The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Respondent's decision to rescind a previous notice of award of a bid to Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc., on the basis that the original bid was nonresponsive, was appropriate. If rescission of that bid award was proper, a secondary issue is whether Respondent was also justified in rejecting the competing bid submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc.
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an Invitation To Bid in order to obtain a leasehold of 15,397 square feet of office space to house operations of its child support enforcement office in Lakeland, Florida, for a term of seven years with an option to renew the lease for two additional three year periods. The Invitation To Bid (ITB) states Respondent's reservation of the right to reject, if in the best interest of the State of Florida, any and all bids. Further, the invitation states a number of conditions that submitting bidders must meet in order for their bids to be deemed responsive. Among the stated conditions is the requirement that bids be submitted on the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB in compliance with conditions specified on that form. Further, bidders are directed to complete the bid submittal form providing acknowledgements requested by the form. Another stated condition of the ITB is the requirement that a bidder be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas offered for lease; or, if a lessee seeking to sublease, submit with the bid proposal documentation of authority to sublease the facility and parking areas. A further ITB condition requires each bid to be signed by the owner, corporate officers or legal representative of the bidding entity. Corporate, trade or partnership titles of the bidding entity are to be stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature. Bid submissions signed by an agent are required to be accompanied by written evidence from the owner of record documenting the agent's authority. All bid submittal signatures are to be notarized. Page 4 of the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB requires, in paragraph 11, that any bid offering premises for consideration (including parking areas), which are presently occupied or which will covered by other active leases on the anticipated lease effective date, must be accompanied by documentation executed by those tenants indicating their acknowledgement of the bid and their ability to vacate the premises by the proposed lease effective date. Submitting bidders are required to indicate whether this requirement is applicable to their bid. Page 4 of the standard bid submittal form contains a number of other conditions which require agreement by the submitting bidder. Proof of the bidder's agreement to those conditions is to be documented by the bidder's initials on each page of the bid submittal package and the bidder's notarized signature on page 16, the submittal form's concluding page. Among the conditions on Page 4 of the form is the agreement of the successful bidder to provide leased space to Respondent for exclusive use on a 24 hour basis, seven days per week during the term of any lease resulting from the bid. This condition further explicitly states that the space to be leased will be fully occupied during normal working hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. during the week and may be fully or partially occupied at other times as necessary in Respondent's discretion. Respondent's bid request specified that bidders must offer a minimum of 65 parking spaces in conjunction with premises proposed for lease. Of those spaces, two spaces were required to meet requirements of accessibility for handicapped parking. Of the remaining spaces, 52 spaces were required to accommodate full size automobiles. All parking was required to be provided as part of the lease cost to Respondent and under the "control of the bidder, off street, suitably paved and lined." On May 16, 1989, five bids were opened, including those submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc. (DSJ), and Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc. (MASTER). Out of the five bids opened, only the bids of MASTER and DSJ were determined to be responsive. After evaluation of the bids by Respondent's personnel, the bid was awarded to MASTER on July 6, 1989. On July 11, 1989, and in response to the award to MASTER, a notice of intent to protest the award was filed by counsel for Dale S. Jones, as trustee; DSJ; and Elizabethan Development, Inc. (ELIZABETHAN). By letter dated July 12, 1989, Alan Taylor filed a protest of the lease award to MASTER. That letter simply stated its efficacy as a protest with the words "[w]e hereby protest the award of lease # 590:2087 to First Master Lessors, Inc." No particular factual or legal basis for the protest was stated. Taylor is associated with ELIZABETHAN and his letter is typed on stationary of that business entity. Taylor, designated the bidder on page one of the DSJ bid submittal, was authorized to act solely on behalf of DSJ in the submission of its bid by its president, Dale S. Jones, Jr. Documentation of that authority is contained in a May 8, 1989 memorandum attached to the bid package. There is no documentation in the bid submittal package of DSJ that Taylor was empowered to act on behalf of ELIZABETHAN, or that ELIZABETHAN was authorized to act on behalf of any entity in regard to the bid submittal. While not set forth in the bid package, testimony at the final hearing establishes that Jones is the sole owner of DSJ. Subsequent to the filing of the DSJ protest, Respondent determined to reject the bids of MASTER and DSJ as nonresponsive. By letter dated August 28, 1989, Respondent informed both counsel for DSJ and MASTER of this decision. As set forth in the August 28, 1989 letter, Respondent's decision to reject the bid of DSJ was based upon the failure of DSJ's bid submittal to reflect that its agent, Alan Taylor, or the proposed lessee designated in that bid submittal, DSJ Realty Company, had control of the property offered for lease to Respondent. The August 28, 1989 letter also stated Respondent's rejection of MASTER's bid due to a lack of control of the property sought to be leased, specifically control over parking spaces to be provided in conjunction with the premises to be leased. MASTER's bid submittal stated that the bid requirements in paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form requiring documentation of acknowledgements by any existing tenants of the premises (including parking areas) offered for lease, and ability of those existing tenants to vacate the premises, was not applicable. In response to the bid requirement for 65 parking spaces, MASTER's bid proposed 17 "exclusive" spaces on site and 48 "nonexclusive" spaces off site. An attachment to the bid response was a copy of a letter dated June 10, 1983, from the First Christian Church to a predecessor of MASTER, First Bank of Lakeland. The church, located across the street from the site proposed to be leased to Respondent by MASTER, granted "permission to the First Bank of Lakeland to use our parking lot for the convenience of their employees." Subsequent to the opening of bids and receipt of DSJ's bid protest, MASTER provided Respondent with another letter from the church reciting permission for MASTER to use 48 spaces within the church parking lot for the parking of Respondent's employees and clients, provided that the church reserved the right to use those spaces at any time upon the giving of one week's written notice to MASTER. The church also reserved the right to cancel the agreement at any time upon the giving of 60 days written notice. The letter was dated May 15, 1989. Also, as established at the final hearing, yet another letter was sent to MASTER's authorized agent from the church. That letter documents the rejection by the church of any "formalization" of a reciprocal parking arrangement with regard to the premises proposed to be leased by MASTER. However, the letter, dated July 20, 1989, restated the church's consent to the use of the parking lot by tenants of the premises proposed for lease by MASTER in accordance with its previous letter of May 15, 1989. Another letter attached to the bid submittal of MASTER, is also dated May 15, 1989. Directed to Respondent's facilities services manager, this letter is signed by an individual named Geneva Pettus as "[a]gent for First Master Lessors, Inc." The letter signed by Pettus references the 1983 letter from the church and states in pertinent part: We further guarantee your parking requirements during the term of the lease and will accommodate such spaces either within our own building or other locations if changes in the above parking facilities should occur. The MASTER bid submittal contains no documentation of authority of Geneva Pettus to act as agent for MASTER. Further, as established by the proof at final hearing, the vast majority of on site spaces controlled by MASTER are leased to present tenants or their employees. Remaining unencumbered parking spaces are inadequate to meet Respondent's bid requirements. The "guarantee" by Pettus, absent her lack of authorization to act for MASTER, is further invalidated by failure of MASTER to provide acknowledgements, as required by paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form, from the existing lessees of those parking spaces controlled by MASTER which would have to be vacated in order to comply with bid requirements. The proof establishes that MASTER did not have control of a portion of the property submitted for lease consideration by Respondent, specifically the proposed parking areas. Such lack of control is nonresponsive to Respondent's bid requirements. Notably, the May 15, 1989 date of Pettus' letter coincides with the May 15, 1989 letter to MASTER from the church. Respondent's facilities service manager, involved in evaluation of the bid submittals, was understandably concerned that this letter's existence was not disclosed to Respondent's personnel prior to August 17, 1989. The position of the church as reflected in the letter caused Respondent's personnel to reevaluate the issue of whether MASTER's bid demonstrated the requisite control over the property submitted for bid consideration and concluded that such control was absent. The DSJ bid submittal contains the notarized signature of Dale S. Jones, Jr., in the space on page 16 reserved for the signature of the bidder. His signature is followed by the title "PARTNER." That term is not further described, nor is a partnership or connection of that partnership with Jones identified in the bid package. At the final hearing, Jones confirmed his signature. However, the proof fails to establish that the required initials on each page of the DSJ bid package are those of Jones. Jones was unacquainted with the bid package submitted on his behalf, having merely looked through the package before affixing his signature. Further, the bid submittal form, on page 16, has a blank space for insertion of the name of the bidder submitting the bid package. The bid package submitted on behalf of DSJ contains no name in this portion of the submittal form. Page 16 of the bid submittal form also requires that the bidder indicate the name of the entity in whose name the subsequent lease is to be written, if that entity is one other than the bidder. The bid, signed by Jones and submitted by Taylor on behalf of DSJ, contains the statement that any future lease resulting from the bid should be titled in the name of "DSJ REALTY COMPANY as managing and Leasing Agent for Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Also attached to the DSJ bid submittal package is a copy of an instrument entitled "DEED TO TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST AGREEMENT." By terms of that instrument, the fee simple title to the property and appurtenances of the site of the building proposed to be leased by DSJ, was purportedly conveyed to Dale S. Jones, Jr., as "Trustee under Land Trust Agreement dated June 15, 1987". By terms of the deed, Jones is granted specific authority to convey, lease or otherwise exercise those rights to property which are commensurate with ownership. The grantor of the deed, dated July 7, 1987, is Florida Southern College. The bid package of DSJ contains no documentation that either Jones or DSJ is authorized to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Further, the bid package of DSJ offers no explanation as to the identity of this entity. As established by Jones' testimony at hearing, the entities "Dale S. Jones, Trustee" and DSJ Realty, Inc., are not interrelated businesses. The DSJ bid submittal further contains no documentation of authority for ELIZABETHAN or Taylor to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." It is found that the bid submittal of DSJ is nonresponsive to the requirements of Respondent's ITB. In response to Respondent's letter rejecting the bids of Petitioners, counsel for both parties filed petitions dated September 8, 1989, protesting the decision and requesting administrative proceedings. The petition filed on behalf of DSJ, ELIZABETHAN, and Dale S. Jones, as Trustee, was entitled "PETITION FOR FORMAL HEARING AND FORMAL BID PROTEST" and alleges the submitting bidder to be ELIZABETHAN. The document, in support of the July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award to MASTER, sets forth specific grounds for that protest. Further, it is alleged in the petition that DSJ was appointed to act as the agent of Dale S. Jones, as trustee, in appointing ELIZABETHAN as his agent. It is found that these allegations, with regard to the identity of the submitting bidder, are not supported by any competent substantial proof; that Dale S. Jones, as trustee was not a submitting bidder; and that ELIZABETHAN was not a submitting bidder. Each petition filed in opposition to Respondent's August 28, 1989 rejection letter, was accompanied by a $5,000 cashier's check payable to Respondent. MASTER subsequently substituted this check with a surety bond. DSJ's July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award was not accompanied by any bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the bids of MASTER and DSJ to be unresponsive; finding the cancellation of the award to MASTER to be justified; dismissing ELIZABETHAN and Dale S. Jones, as trustee, as petitioners in this proceeding; and rejecting all bids. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner Master's Proposed Findings. Petitioner MASTER's proposed findings consisted of 21 pages encompassing unnumbered paragraphs dealing with an intertwined mixture of legal conclusions, argument and proposed factual findings. Therefore, MASTER's submission cannot be treated by the Hearing Officer in this appendix on an individualized basis for each proposed finding. However, MASTER's submission has been reviewed and addressed, where possible, by the findings of fact set forth in this recommended order. Otherwise, all disputed issues of material fact have been addressed by the evidence adduced at the hearing held in this cause. Petitioner DSJ's Proposed Findings. Addressed in substance, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 7.-1I. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Adopted by reference. Adopted in substance. 16.-21. Not relevant inasmuch as Jones, in an individual capacity or the legal capacity of trustee or partner, was not a bidder. 22.-23. Adopted in substance. Rejected, legal conclusion, relevancy. Addressed in substance. 26 Rejected, not supported by the evidence. Taylor was authorized to act on behalf of DSJ Realty, Inc., by the corporate president. 27.-28. Rejected, not supported by the evidence; no evidence that Jones was a bidder. 29.-32. Rejected as unnecessary in view of result. 33.-42. Adopted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-12. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 4000 West Buffalo Avenue 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, FL 33614 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, Esq. General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Bruce Marger, Esq. 1700 66th Street, North Suite 501 St. Petersburg, FL 33710 David H. Simmons, Esq. 120 South Orange Avenue P.O. Box 67 Orlando, FL 32602 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Prior to April 1987, the Department of Corrections (DOC) determined that it needed 2,300 square feet of office space for its parole and probation office in Santa Rosa County, Milton, Florida. Since the desired square footage of the office was more than 2,000 square feet, DOC was required to seek competitive bids for the proposed office. Towards that end, Wendell Beall, Region I Budget Manager for the Department, prepared a Request for Proposal and Bid Proposal Submittal Form package on lease number 700:0378. This package contained various specifications for the type building DOC wished to lease, as well as weighted, bid evaluation criteria and the numerical points given to each of those criteria. The desired initial term of the lease was five years with an option to renew the lease at the end of the primary term for three years. On April 2, 1987, DOC held a pre-proposal conference for lease number 700:0378 in the Probation and Parole Office in Milton, Florida. The purpose of the meeting was to hand out the Request for Proposal and Bid Proposal Submittal Form package and to answer any questions interested parties may have regarding the bid and bid package. Both Petitioner and Jay Mortgage Co. (the ultimate successful bidder) were present through their representatives. At the pre-proposal conference, the area within which the leased premises must be located was questioned. Specification A.3 defined the area for the leased premises by referring to a map of Santa Rosa County. Normally, such a map would have the acceptable area delineated by a circle or a boundary line drawn on the map. No such delineation was on the Santa Rosa map. Therefore, a more precise definition of the mandatory acceptable area was sought by the potential bidders. Mr. Beall explained that the meaning to be attributed to specification A.3 was that any building within five to ten minutes of the courthouse would be acceptable, i.e., responsive. At this time, no mention of the relative points to be given a location closer to the Courthouse vis. a location farther away was discussed. The enumerated bid evaluation criteria allowed ten points for "location as to clients served" and zero points for "location as to other Department activities." Also at the preproposal conference Mr. Beall reminded those present of the importance of complying with the handicapped requirements. Handicap compliance was stressed because the present landlord could not meet those requirements. He also cautioned all bidders to initial all applicable spaces on the bid submittal form. He further explained that the weighted evaluation criteria in the bid submittal form were the means of ranking the proposals on a point system for purposes of comparison of the respective bids to be submitted. Mr. Beall described the ranking system he preferred as an example of how the individual bid committee members might evaluate the bids. That system was to take the total number of points for a given evaluation criteria, divide by the number of proposals submitted to yield the deduction to be given a building of lesser quality under that criteria. The bids submitted were to be reviewed and graded by a lease committee. The lease committee was not bound by Mr. Beall's preference in awarding or deducting points under a given bid criteria. The individual members could develop their own ranking system based on their best judgment. On April 16, 1987, three bids were received by DOC. The bids were opened at the Probation and Parole Office in Milton, Florida. At that time, Mr. Beall checked the last page of each of the three bids timely submitted, read the first year rental rate per square foot, checked for the bidder's signature and the required attachments on each. The bids were submitted by Jay Mortgage Co., the apparent low bidder, Northrup Building Partnership, the apparent second lowest bidder, and D & C Partners, the apparent third lowest bidder. Mr. Beall accepted the three bids and stated that they appeared to be in order and that he would present them to the lease committee who would then make the final award. On May 14, 1987, the Region I lease committee met. The committee consisted of T. H. Young, Dura Williams, and W. E. Beall. Prior to said meeting, Wendell Beall reviewed all of the bids and transferred appropriate information to a Bid Synopsis sheet. On the synopsis sheet he proposed preliminary point assignments for the three bids under the evaluation criteria set forth in the bid package. Further, Mr. Beall reflected on the synopsis sheet that Petitioner had failed to initial Specification A.12(a), acknowledging the requirement that the leased premises comply wish the State's requirements for Handicapped Facilities. At the lease committee meeting, each of the bid packages were reviewed. The committee decided that the Petitioner's bid and the D & C Partners bid were non-responsive because of the bidders failure to acknowledge (initial) certain bid specifications. Beyond a rudimentary discussion of the rejected bids they were not considered further by the lease committee. The point awards proposed by Mr. Beall were not utilized. Only the Jay Mortgage bid was determined responsive by the committee. Jay Mortgage, therefore, was deemed to be the lowest and best responsive bid by default and was awarded the lease. Petitioner's bid was found to be nonresponsive because Petitioner had inadvertently failed to initial Item A.12(a). The committee felt that Petitioner's failure to initial Specification A.12(a) was material and could not be waived as a non-material item even though some of the committee members were aware that Petitioner's proposed building already had handicap facilities in place at the time the members inspected Petitioner's property. The evidence demonstrated that it was the lack of the initials and not the actual compliance with the specification that the committee found material. The committee felt it could not look to outside evidence or promises of compliance from Petitioner. However, the committee did accept such promises from Petitioner regarding the floor to ceiling walls which did not exist at the time of inspection, but were promised by Petitioner. It is difficult to see how the committee may look behind the bid proposal in one instance and refuse to look behind the bid proposal in another instance. Such inconsistency can be nothing but arbitrary on the part of DOC. This is especially true since the lack of initials was an oversight on Petitioner's part, and the absent floors and ceilings were promised but not present and the handicap facilities were a concrete reality. Moreover, petitioner had initialed in no less than two other places in the bid package specifications requiring compliance with all federal and state requirements and any space requirements of DOC. 1/ The redundancy of the bid package in this regard renders the lack of initials on specification A.12(a) immaterial. In essence, the department was assured at least twice that continuing compliance with the State's handicap requirements would occur. To refuse to waive such a minor deficiency on these facts is arbitrary and capricious. Such an immaterial item should have been waived by DOC and the Petitioner's bid should have been considered and compared to the Jay Mortgage bid. Since the bids submitted by Petitioner and Jay Mortgage, Co., were not compared by the lease committee, but were challenged as to who submitted the lowest and best bid, that comparison is now ripe for decision in this de novo review of DOC's action. The first relevant bid evaluation criterion deals with the comparative rental value for the initial term of the lease on the two bidders' properties, reduced to present value. Seventy points were awardable for this criteria. In this case, Petitioner was the lowest bidder on the initial lease term by 78 cents per square foot. The victory in the primary term was only achieved by Petitioner in the first three years of that term. In the last two years of the primary term, Jay Mortgage Co. was lower, but not by enough to offset Petitioner's lead. Petitioner was, therefore, lower by at least a minimal amount and to that extent would be the better bid. The difference, however, should only be reflected in a minimum deduction of two points from Jay Mortgage Co. /2 The awarded points should, therefore, be seventy points for Petitioner and 68 points for Jay. The second relevant criterion was the conformance of the building space to efficient utilization and layout. Two points were awarded for this criterion. Both bidders adequately met this criterion. Therefore, the maximum of two points should be awarded to each bidder. The third relevant criterion was for street level parking space. Ten points were awardable under this criterion. In this instance, a minimum of fifteen off-street parking spaces were required by DOC. Both bidders met this minimum requirement. However, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner offered considerably more parking space at its location. The evidence further demonstrated that DOC experienced periods when it conducted an unusual amount of business with its clients, requiring more parking than usual. In that respect, Petitioner offered the better property. However, the probation offices unusual requirements occurred about once a month for only two or three days. Therefore, a minimum difference of one point should be deducted from Jay Mortgage. The awarded points should, therefore, be ten points for Petitioner and nine points for Jay. The fourth relevant criterion was the proximity of the lease site to the clients served by the parole and probation office. In this regard, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Petitioner had the better location for the county-wide area serviced by Petitioner. Respondent's main business was the supervision of probationers and community controllees. Most of this "service" is conducted by DOC at its office or county-wide in the field. Petitioner clearly has easier and better access to its location than the downtown location offered by Jay Mortgage, Co. Therefore, Petitioner's location would be far more proximate and convenient to the probation offices clients than would the downtown location offered by Jay Mortgage. At the hearing, DOC felt that the preferential location under the fourth criterion was the location closest to the courthouse because some of the probation officer's work must be done at the courthouse and an officer may be summoned to the courthouse at any time by a judge. Therefore, a building within walking distance of the courthouse such as Jay Mortgage's building was more convenient for the probation office's personnel as compared to one which requires driving to the courthouse, such as Petitioner's building. The reasons given by DOC for their selection of Jay Mortgage under the fourth criterion at the hearing do not fall within a reasonable interpretation of "proximity to clients served by the Department." DOC's reasons would fall under another separate evaluation criterion. The criterion which would approximately cover DOC's reasons deal with the proximity of the offered space to the other activities of the Department. These "other" activities would include attendance at court for probation revocation hearings or for sentencing of offenders. "Convenience for the personnel" is relevant under these other activities and there is no question that "convenience for the office personnel" is a valid reason for distinguishing between bidders. However, the evaluation criterion which covers these reasons was assigned zero points. DOC cannot go outside its bid criteria. Therefore, no distinction can be made between the bids based on the above grounds. The only points awardable are the ten points assigned under the fourth relevant criterion outlined in paragraph 14 above. DOC's reasons do not fall within the fourth criterion. No other evidence was presented by Respondent to support a preference for Jay Mortgage Co. over Petitioner under the fourth criterion proximity to clients. Petitioner presented evidence which clearly demonstrated that it was the better bid under the fourth criterion. The difference between the bids is significant since client service is the DOC's main business. The only formula available for rating the value of the difference is Mr. Beall's. Therefore, utilizing Mr. Beall's methodology, the points awardable for the fourth relevant criterion should be ten points for Petitioner and seven points for Jay. The fifth relevant criterion was for moving costs. No evidence was submitted by Petitioner or Respondent as to this criterion. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn about the effect of such costs. No points should be awarded under this criteria. The sixth relevant criterion dealt with the option period rental rate. Six points were awarded for this criterion. Jay Mortgage Co. was the lower of the two bids. The actual difference between the two bids was approximately 25 cents a square foot. That difference appears in the last year of the option term. 3/ In the first two years of the option term the bidders reflect the same rental rate. Since 25 cents is a minimal difference only a minimum deduction of one point should be made. 4/ Therefore, the points awardable for the sixth relevant criterion should be six points for Jay and five points for Petitioner. The overall result would be as follows: CRITERIA PETITIONER JAY MORTGAGE CO. 1. Basement 70 68 2. Space 2 2 3. Parking 10 9 4. Clients 10 7 5. Moving Costs 0 0 6. Option Rent 5 6 TOTAL 97 92 As can be seen from the above table, Petitioner submitted the lowest and best responsive bid under a consideration of all the weighted evaluation criteria established by DOC. Petitioner should, therefore, be awarded the bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner be awarded the lease contract as the lowest and best responsive bid. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of December 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December 1988.
Findings Of Fact Lamar submitted a permit application for a location 120 feet west of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida, on the south side of U.S. 98, on November 25, 1985, and resubmitted that application on December 16, 1985. On January 8, 1986, DOT denied the application solely because of spacing conflicts with permit Nos. AD089-10 and AD090-10 held by Headrick. That denial was made in a Memorandum of Returned Application. The Memorandum of Returned Application contained the following statement: PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT IF YOU BELIEVE YOUR APPLICATION HAS BEEN INAPPROPRIATELY DENIED, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING UNDER SECTION 120.57, FLORIDA STATUTES, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE. THE SUBMITTED HEARING REQUEST SHALL GIVE A BRIEF STATEMENT SETTING FORTH THE REASON(S) FOR REVIEW. SUCH HEARING REQUEST MUST BE FURNISHED TO: THE CLERK OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 605 SUWANNEE STREET, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 Lamar requested an administrative hearing by letter dated March 13, 1986. On March 12, 1986, Headrick applied for a permit for a sign to be located on the south side of U.S. 98, 285 east of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida. By letter dated March 31, 1986, the Headrick application was returned unapproved because of a pending administrative hearing requested by Lamar concerning the location of permits AD089-10 and AD090-10. This letter did not advise Headrick of its rights to an administrative hearing. Headrick did not request a hearing for these applications. Lamar applied for a permit for a sign location on the south side of U.S. 98, 120 feet west of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida, again on March 13, 1986. A Memorandum of Returned Application, dated April 3, 1986, was sent to Lamar, denying the application because of a spacing conflict with Permits AD089-10 and AD090-10 located 100 feet westerly of Hickory Avenue on the eastbound (south) side of U.S. 98. This Memorandum contained the same language as that set forth above and, by letter dated April 18, 1986, Lamar requested an administrative hearing. This request resulted in Case No. 86-1707T herein. Another case, with DOT as Petitioner, Headrick as Respondent, and Lamar as Intervenor, Case No. 85-4165T, resulted in a Final Order dated September 2, 1986, revoking Permits AD089-10 and AD090-10. The Final Order was based upon findings that Headrick was advised on August 9, 1985, by the property owner, that the property was being sold and that Headrick had thirty (30) days to remove its sign. Further, by letter dated October 17, 1985, the property owner advised DOT that Headrick no longer had a valid lease for the signs and the signs had been removed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the December 16, 1985, application filed by Lamar Advertising company for a location on the south side of U.S 98, 120 feet west of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida, be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1043T The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Lamar Advertising Company Each of the following proposed findings are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(1); 3(2); 4(2); 5(2); 6(1); 7(3); 8(3); 9(1 and 3); and 10(4). Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Transportation 1. Each of the following proposed findings are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); and 4(4). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Headricks Outdoor Advertising 1. Each of the following proposed findings are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 2(2); 3(2); 4(1); 5(1); and 6(4). COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara W. Palmer, Esquire Beggs & Lane 700 Blount Building Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William G. Warner, Esquire 565 Harrison Avenue Post Office Drawer 335 Panama City, Florida 32402 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanne Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On February 28, 1990, Respondent issued an invitation to bid (ITB) on a construction project referred to as Florida Atlantic University Modulars. The ITB required a base bid and bids on five alternates to the base project. Each bidder was instructed that it must bid on the base project and on each alternate for its bid proposal to be considered responsive. On March 19, 1990, Addendum 1 to the ITB was issued to all prospective bidders. This was an informational addendum and advised the date, time, and location of the posting of the award recommendation. Addendum 1 was not required to be returned by the bidder as a part of the response to the ITB. On March 21, 1990, Addendum 2 to the ITB was issued to all prospective bidders. This was also an informational addendum and advised as to a non- mandatory, pre-bid conference to be held March 27, 1990. Addendum 2 was not required to be returned by the bidder as a part of the response to the ITB. On March 30, 1990, Addendum 3 to the ITB was issued to all prospective bidders. This addendum advised that the date and time for the bid opening had been changed to April 9, 1990, at 2:00 p.m. Addendum 3 also contained modifications, explanations and corrections to the original drawings and specifications which impacted the cost and scope of the project. Immediately above the signature line on the cover page of Addendum 3 was the following: This document must be returned in it's [sic] entirety with the bid. Please sign below to verify that you have read and understand all the changes. Item 2 on page ADD-1 of Addendum 3 required each bidder to submit its per unit price structure with its response to the ITB and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: ... The unit price shall not be included in Base Bid. Submit a separate sheet with bid package. The following instructions are given in Paragraph 1(c) of the Instructions to Bidder: NO ERASURES ARE PERMITTED. If a correction is necessary, draw a single line through the entered figure and enter the corrected figure above it. Corrections must be initialed by the person signing the bid. Any illegible entries, pencil bids or corrections not initialed will not be tabulated. The instructions are repeated in Paragraph 1 of the General Conditions of the ITB: EXECUTION OF BID: ... No erasures are permitted. If a correction is necessary, draw a single line through the entered figure and enter the corrected figure above it. Corrections must be initialed by the person signing the bid. Any illegible entries, pencil bids, or corrections not initialed will not be tabulated. The following is contained as part of the Instructions to Bidder: Failure to complete, sign, seal and return the required documents will result in rejection of your bid. Any questions should be directed to Susan Kuzenka, (305) 761-7460, Purchasing Department, Broward Community College. (Emphasis in the original.) Paragraph 8 of the General Conditions portion of the bid package provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 8. AWARDS. As the best interest of Broward Community College may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all bids and to waive any irregularity in bids received ... On April 9, 1990, Petitioner submitted a bid to Respondent in response to the ITB. Petitioner had received the complete bid package, including all instructions and addenda to the bid package. At the pre-bid conference held March 27, 1990, an employee of Respondent emphasized to the attendees that it was necessary for the bidders to return Addendum 3 in its entirety. Petitioner did not attend the non-mandatory, pre-bid conference. The base bid submitted by Petitioner was $1,085,790.00. The base bid of Double E Construction Co., the next low bidder and the bidder to whom Respondent intends to award the contract, was $1,113,300.00. Petitioner's bid for each of the alternates was lower than that of Double E Construction Co. Petitioner failed to return the entire Addendum 3 as instructed. On page four of the bid package Petitioner acknowledged that it had received Addendum 3, and it signed and returned the cover sheet to Addendum 3 under the language quoted in the foregoing Paragraph 4. Respondent considered this an important requirement because it wanted to prevent a bidder from later claiming that it had not received Addendum 3 or that it had received information different than that contained in Addendum 3. Petitioner made a correction to its bid for Alternate Number 3 found on page 5 of 13 of Petitioner's bid. Petitioner's bid for this alternate was $88,000. In the space for the written amount of the bid, Petitioner's president inserted by hand the words "Eighty-eight Thousand". In the space for the numerical insertion of the bid he initially wrote the sum $125,000 (which was the amount of Petitioner's bid for Alternate 4). He struck through the figure $125,000 and wrote above the stricken figure the figure $88,000. He did not initial his change. Respondent has never accepted changes to price quotations which were not initialed because it is concerned that uninitialed corrections on bids may result in challenges to the integrity of the bid process and may expose its staff to charges of collusion from a disgruntled bidder. Pioneer did not include a unit price structure in its bid as required by Addendum 3. The unit price structure is an informational item that is not separately considered by Respondent to determine the lowest bidder on this project. On April 6, 1990, Petitioner's estimator on this bid telephoned Susan Kuzenka regarding the unit price structure sheet to inquire as to the format that should be followed in submitting the unit price structure. Ms. Kuzenka is named in the Instructions to Bidder as the person in Respondent's purchasing department to whom questions about the bid process should be directed. Petitioner's estimator was told that the unit prices would be required to be submitted by the successful bidder at the pre-construction meeting after the bids were opened, but that the unit price structure need not be submitted with the bid. Petitioner's president verified this information on April 9, 1990, prior to the bid opening, during a telephone conference with the project engineer employed by Respondent for this project. In reliance on the information that was supplied by Respondent's agents, Petitioner did not submit its unit price structure sheet with its bid. Following its examination of all bids, the bid of Petitioner was disqualified on three grounds. The first reason cited by Respondent was that Petitioner failed to return the entire Addendum (3) as required. The second reason was that Petitioner did not initial a correction to a quoted price figure. The third reason was that Petitioner did not include the unit price structure as required in Addendum (3). Petitioner thereafter timely protested its disqualification and the intended award of the contract to Double E Construction Co. Petitioner contends that the reasons cited by Respondent for its disqualification are minor irregularities that should be waived by Respondent. Additionally, Petitioner contends that the third reason should not disqualify it because Petitioner acted in reliance upon the instructions of Respondent's agents in not submitting the unit price structure along with its bid package. This proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Broward Community College, enter a final order which denies the bid protest of Petitioner, Pioneer Contracting, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioners. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2. 6 and 7 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 10. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings in the last sentence of paragraph 4 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached because of the clear instructions contained in Addendum 3. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings in the last two sentences of paragraph 5 are supported by the evidence, but are not adopted as findings of fact because they are unnecessary to the conclusions reached. All proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent are adopted in material part. Copies furnished: Eric L. Dauber, Esquire Beyer & Dauber Suite 5300 2101 W. Commercial Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33309 James D. Camp III, Counsel Broward Community College Fort Lauderdale Center 225 East Las Olas Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Janet Rickenbacker Director of Purchasing Broward Community College Fort Lauderdale Center 225 East Las Olas Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
