The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s application for certification should be approved as a result of her successfully completing the Firefighter Minimum Standards MIN. STD. PRACTICAL RETEST retest.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Evans is a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. Ms. Evans attended the Coral Springs Fire Academy (Fire Academy), as a student, from July 11, 2009, through January 9, 2010. During her training at the Fire Academy, she was chosen as the squad leader. A candidate for the certification examination must pass a written and practical examination, with a minimum score of 70 on both the written and practical parts. Pertinent hereto, a candidate must pass the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination (Practical Examination) in order to become certified as a firefighter. The Practical Examination consists of four components: the Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA); the Hose Operation (a/k/a Hose Evolution); the Ladder Operation (a/k/a Ladder Evolution); and the Fireground Skills. The Practical Examination is replicated at the Fire Academy, and students at the Fire Academy must pass the four components. The Fire Academy adopted the State standards for passing the Practical Examination, except that at the Fire Academy the standards for the Ladder Evolution are more strict. Also, pertinent hereto, for the Ladder Evolution, the State’s passing score is 70, but the Fire Academy’s passing score is 80; and the maximum time allowed by the State to successfully complete the Ladder Evolution is two minutes and 20 seconds, but the Fire Academy’s maximum time is two minutes and 10 seconds. Additionally, pertinent hereto, for the Ladder Evolution, the State’s established testing protocol is to permit a candidate to perform a safety inspection of the ladder prior to beginning the timing of the Ladder Evolution, and the timing begins after the candidate touches the ladder again. Consequently, State testing protocol dictates that, during the safety inspection, no timing occurs, but, when the candidate touches the ladder again, the timing begins. The Fire Academy uses this same protocol at testing for the Ladder Evolution. The time limit placed on the Ladder Evolution is designed to replicate actual fire fighting conditions, producing a certain degree of stress upon candidates. At the Fire Academy, Ms. Evans successfully completed the Ladder Evolution on November 11, 2009, receiving a score of 80 and a time of two minutes and three seconds. Again, on January 5, 2010, she successfully completed the Ladder Evolution with a score of 100 and a time of one minute and 53 seconds. Ms. Evans graduated from the Fire Academy and was eligible to sit for the certification examination. On January 10, 2010, Ms. Evans took the Ladder Evolution part of the State Practical Examination in Coral Springs, Florida. A wind gust caused her to lose control of the ladder. She received a score of zero, due to losing control, and, therefore, did not successfully complete the Ladder Evolution. Ms. Evans took a re-test of the Ladder Evolution part of the State Practical Examination on January 28, 2010, in Ocala, Florida. She completed the Ladder Evolution in two minutes and 50 seconds, which was beyond the maximum allowed time of two minutes and 20 seconds. She received a score of zero and, therefore, failed to successfully complete the Ladder Evolution on the re-test. Ms. Evans contends that, on January 28, 2010, the State’s Field Representative began the time during her safety inspection of the ladder. The more persuasive evidence supports this contention. As a result, a finding of fact is made that, on January 28, 2010, the State’s Field Representative began the timing of Ms. Evans’ Ladder Evolution during her safety inspection, which was contrary to the State’s testing protocol. The evidence fails to demonstrate what Ms. Evans’ time on the Ladder Evolution would have been had the timing begun in compliance with the State’s established testing protocol.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order directing the re-testing of Melanie Evans on the Ladder Operation (a/k/a Ladder Evolution) of the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Slotkin, Esquire 600 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 600 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Nic Thornton, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Julie Jones, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue Did Petitioner pass the Mechanical Engineers Examination he took on April 24, 1998?
Findings Of Fact On April 24, 1998, Petitioner took the Mechanical Engineers Examination. He received a score of 69 for his effort. A passing score was 70. The Mechanical Engineers Examination was administered under Respondent's auspices. As alluded to in the preliminary statement, Petitioner challenged the score received on problem 146. The maximum score available for that problem was ten points. Petitioner received eight points. In accordance with the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying Principles in Practice of Engineering Examinations for spring 1998, score conversion table - discipline specific, Petitioner had a raw score of 47 which equated to a conversion of 69, to include the eight raw points received for problem 146. In addition, the examination provided a scoring plan for problem 146, which assigns scores in increments of two points from zero to ten. To pass, it would be necessary for Petitioner to receive an incremental increase of two points, raising his score from eight points to ten points. This would give him a raw score of 49 points. According to the score conversion table - discipline specific, that would give Petitioner 71 points. According to the scoring plan for problem 146 to receive the ten points, Petitioner would have to demonstrate: Exceptional competence (it is not necessary that the solution to the problem be perfect) generally complete, one math error. Shows in-depth understanding of cooling load calculation psychrometrics. Problem 146 required Petitioner to: Determine the required cooling coil supply air quantity (cfm) and the conditions (°F db and °F wb) of the air entering and leaving the coil." Petitioner was provided a psychrometric chart to assist in solving problem 146. The examination candidates were also allowed to bring reference sources to the examination to assist in solving the examination problems. Petitioner brought to the examination, the Air-Conditioning Systems Design Manual prepared by the ASHRAE 581-RP Project Team, Harold G. Lorsch, Principal Investigator. Petitioner used that manual to determine the wet-bulb temperature of the air entering the coil. In particular, he used an equation from the manual involving air mixtures. For that part of the solution he arrived at a temperature of 65.6°F wb. According to the problem solution by Respondent's affiliate testing agency, reference ASHRAE Fundamentals Chapter 26, the coil entering wet-bulb temperature taken from the psychrometric chart was 66.12°F wb. The scorer in grading Petitioner's solution for problem 146 placed an "x" by the answer provided 65.6°F wb and wrote the words "psychrometric chart." No other entry or comment was made by that scorer in initially reviewing the solution Petitioner provided for that problem. This led to the score of eight. The scoring plan for problem 146 for the April 1998 examination taken by Respondent equates the score of eight as: MORE THAN MINIMUM BUT LESS THAN EXCEPTIONAL COMPETENCE Either a) Provides correct solution to problem with two math errors or incorrect dry-bulb or wet-bulb for coil entering or leaving conditions or minor total cooling load error, or b) Provides correct solution to items c and d correctly and minor math errors in items a and b of Score 6 below. Petitioner was entitled to review the results of his examination. He exercised that opportunity on September 21, 1998, through a post-examination review session. Petitioner requested and was provided re-scoring of his solution to problem 146. According to correspondence from the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying to the Florida Member Board from Patricia M. Simpson, Assistant Supervisor of scoring services, the score did not change through re-scoring. In this instance, the October 14, 1998 correspondence on re-scoring states, in relation to problem 146: Incorrect methodology used in calculating coil entering wet-bulb temperature. Incorrect coil entering wet-bulb temperature provided. No calculation provided for coil leaving temperature conditions. The coil leaving wet-bulb temperature in Respondent's proposed solution was 53.22°F wb taken from the psychrometric chart. Petitioner's solution for the coil leaving wet-bulb temperature taken from the psychrometric chart was 53.3°F wb. At hearing Respondent did not provide an expert to establish the basis for point deduction in the original score and the re-scoring of Petitioner's solution for problem 146. Moreover, Respondent did not present expert witnesses to defend the commentary, the preferred written solution in its examination materials. Consequently, Respondent's preferred solution constitutes hearsay about which no facts may be found accepting the validity of Respondent's proposed solution, as opposed to merely reporting that information.1 By contrast, Petitioner provided direct evidence concerning the solution provided for problem 146 in response to the criticisms of his solution that were unsupported by competent evidence at hearing. More importantly the criticisms were responded to at hearing by Geoffrey Spencer, P.E., a mechanical engineer licensed to practice in Florida, who was accepted as an expert in that field for purposes of the hearing. As Petitioner explained at hearing, he used the Air- Conditioning Systems Design Manual equation to arrive at the coil entering wet-bulb temperature, which he believed would provide the answer as readily as the use of the psychrometric chart. (Although the psychrometric chart had been provided to Petitioner for solving problem 146, the instructions for that problem did not prohibit the use of the equation or formula.) Petitioner in his testimony pointed out the equivalency of the process of the use of the psychrometric chart and the equation. Petitioner deemed the equation to be more accurate than the psychrometric chart. Petitioner had a concern that if the answer on the coil entering wet-bulb temperature was inaccurate, this would present difficulty in solving the rest of problem 146 because the error would be carried forward. Petitioner pointed out in his testimony that the solution for determining the coil entering wet-bulb temperature was set out in his answer. The answer that was derived by use of the formula was more time consuming but less prone to error, according the Petitioner's testimony. Petitioner points out in his testimony that the answer he derived, 65.6°F wb, is not significantly different than Respondent's proposed solution of 66.12°F wb. (The instructions concerning problem 146 did not explain what decimal point of a degree the candidate had to respond to in order to get full credit for that portion of the solution to the problem.) Petitioner in his testimony concerning his solution for the coil leaving wet-bulb temperature indicated that the calculation for arriving at that temperature was taken from the psychrometric chart and is sufficiently detailed to be understood. Further, Petitioner testified that the degree of accuracy in which the answer was given as 53.3°F wb, as opposed to Respondent's proposed solution of 53.22°F wb, is in recognition of the use of the psychrometric chart. Petitioner questions whether the proposed solution by Respondent, two decimal points, could be arrived at by the use of the psychrometric chart. In relation to the calculation of the coil entering wet-bulb temperature, Mr. Spencer testified that the formula from the Air-Conditioning Systems Design Manual or the psychrometric chart could have been used. Moreover, Mr. Spencer stated his opinion that the solution for coil entering wet-bulb temperature of 65.6°F wb by Petitioner is sufficiently close to Respondent's proposed solution of 66.12°F wb to be acceptable. Mr. Spencer expressed the opinion that Petitioner had correctly used the formula from the manual in solving the coil entering wet-bulb temperature. Mr. Spencer expressed the opinion that the psychrometric chart is an easier source for obtaining the solution than the use of the formula from the manual. In Mr. Spencer's opinion, the formula shows a more basic knowledge of the physics involved than the use of the psychrometric chart would demonstrate. In relation to the coil leaving wet-bulb temperature, Mr. Spencer expressed the opinion that Petitioner had adequately explained the manner of deriving the answer. Further, Mr. Spencer expressed the opinion that the answer derived was sufficiently accurate. The testimony of Petitioner and opinion of Mr. Spencer is unrefuted and accepted.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which finds that Petitioner passed the Florida Board of Professional Engineers April 24, 1998, Mechanical Engineers Examination with a score of 71. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1999.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner, Christie Beverly, should be certified as a firefighter or, in the alternative, whether Petitioner should be allowed to re-take the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. The Department is the state agency responsible for testing all candidates for certification as a firefighter, for conducting such tests, and for issuing a certification upon the successful completion of the minimum requirements by a candidate. One such examination administered by the Department is the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination (firefighter examination). Petitioner successfully completed her firefighting training at the Manatee Technical Institute (MTI). Jeff Durling is an adjunct instructor at MTI, whose main purpose is to get candidates prepared for the state firefighter examination. During his particular MTI course, Mr. Durling's students were taught the three main types of hose pulls: flat, triple layer, and minuteman. Larry W. Schwartz, Jr., is the fire science coordinator of MTI. He oversees MTI's operations and is directly involved in its curriculum. Although Mr. Schwartz is familiar with the double minuteman hose pull, MTI has not taught it in the past because that particular pull has not been tested. The firefighter examination has a written portion, as well as four practical evolutions or components (self-contained breathing apparatus, hose operation, ladder operation, and fireground skills).2/ In order to be certified, a candidate has to achieve a score of at least 70 percent on each component. On Tuesday, June 14, 2011, at the MTI campus, Petitioner successfully completed all portions of the firefighter examination, except the hose component of the practical examination. Petitioner conceded that she exceeded the maximum time allowed to complete the hose component by eight seconds. At some point, Petitioner was notified that she did not receive a passing score on the hose component in the June 2011 firefighter practical examination. Petitioner was advised she could take the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Retest (retest) within six months of the June 2011 firefighter examination. Petitioner was required to successfully complete the retest or she would be required to re-take the firefighter course before she could take the test again. On Friday, September 23, 2011, Petitioner presented for her retest at the Florida State Fire College (Fire College) in Ocala, Florida. Petitioner arrived by 7:30 a.m. for her retest. There were over 403/ candidates present to take either an original firefighter practical test or a retest. The retest course was not ready at 7:30 a.m. On September 23, 2011, Eric Steves was also a retest candidate at the Fire College. Mr. Steves observed that the retest course was not set up when he arrived at 7:30 a.m. Further, he observed that the retest course was slightly different than the original practical test course in June 2011. There was no walk-through of the retest course prior to starting it, because the retest course was set up after the other candidates took their test and bad weather was approaching. Although Mr. Steves did not pass his retest, his testimony is credible as he has no vested interest in the outcome of this proceeding. Dennis Hackett is the standards supervisor with the Department's Bureau of Fire Standards and Training (Bureau). Mr. Hackett has administered and scored the minimum standard firefighter examination for candidates, including the retest examination. The majority of the candidates were given another practical test, not the retest administered to Petitioner. Mr. Hackett confirmed that the retest course was not ready at 7:30 a.m. on September 23, 2011. The Fire College was capable and did have the equipment to set up two different hose load courses. It is apparent that the Fire College adheres to a strict protocol in the administration of the firefighter testing; yet, it was not adhered to on September 23, 2011. There was a change to the practical testing component of the firefighter examination being implemented. The majority of the candidates on September 23, 2011, took a different practical test than the retest administered to Petitioner and Mr. Steves. Thomas M. Johnson has been a field representative for the Department's Bureau for seven years. As a field representative, Mr. Johnson has administered and scored numerous firefighting examinations and retest examinations. Mr. Johnson testified that Petitioner's retest course "would be set up when we were done with the rest of the students." He further testified that the retest course "would be set up when we were done with the other students who were taking the new evolutions." Although Mr. Johnson testified that Petitioner's retest was administered in a uniform manner, the credible evidence supports the position that the retest was not conducted following the strict protocol of the Fire College. For Petitioner's retest, the course barrels were held in place by field instructors. Petitioner questioned Mr. Johnson regarding their participation, asking: "Is that standard practice?" Mr. Johnson's response of "It was that day," lends credence that it was not standard practice or part of the uniform retest protocol. Further, Mr. Johnson's testimony that Petitioner was "in a hurry" to complete her retest is illogical. Petitioner waited for 40 or more candidates to test before her, and then she had to wait for the retest course to be assembled before she could attempt the course. There was a great deal of discussion about the type of hose pull required during the retest examination. There was no clear definition of a minuteman hose load or a double minuteman hose load.4/ Whether or not the hose pull was a minuteman or a double minuteman is irrelevant as the retest course was not prepared or set up by 7:30 a.m. as required by the Department's own rule. Mr. Johnson scored Petitioner on the retest examination. The score sheet used on the practical retest examination portion reflected three types of Hose Advancements: Flat Load, Triple Layer Load, and Minuteman Load. (An option to pull a double minuteman load is not printed anywhere on the score sheet.) Further review of the Department's score sheet reveals that someone wrote "4 LR"5/ out beyond the phrase: "Hose Advancement (1¾") ~~ Maximum Time 1:25." This phrase, "4 LR," is purported to mean that Mr. Johnson: asked her [Petitioner] to pull the left-side pre-connect, knock down the cone on the left first and then the cone on the right. And the reason it's above the minuteman is because that's the load she pulled, but it was not a minuteman. This "4 LR" phrase is well above the blank line found beside the words "Minuteman Load." The undersigned does not accept the "4 LR" phrase as an indication that the "double minuteman" hose pull was the retest examination option. Further, the score sheet also has blanks to be filled in by the scorer following the phrase: "Your target sequence is RT/Left or Left/RT ." However, the scorer did not fill in either blank. At the bottom of the page, there is an empty blank following "Candidate #," making it uncertain to whom this score sheet applies. On the score sheet, there is a written time of "2:39," the word "Fail" is circled, and there is a zero beside the "Score." The score sheet appears to be incomplete at best. Mr. Johnson was asked to confirm whether or not a double minuteman load was listed on the score sheet, and he confirmed that the phrase "double minuteman" load was not on the score sheet. The words "double minuteman" do not appear on the score sheet, nor is the type of hose load identified. It is impossible to determine what hose load Petitioner was directed to pull during her retest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshal, enter a final order granting Petitioner's request to retest on the hose component of the practical portion of the firefighter examination and that Petitioner should be tested as if she were taking the retest within the six-month window for the retest. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2012.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner successfully completed the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination or the Practical Examination Retest for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. To be certified as a firefighter, a candidate is required to successfully complete the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination (Practical Examination). A candidate is able to take the certification test twice. If a candidate fails the first time, the candidate is automatically afforded an opportunity for a retest. On October 15, 2012, Petitioner initially took the Practical Examination at Daytona State Fire College in Daytona, Florida. The Practical Examination consists of four parts, or evolutions: self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), hose operation, ladder operation, and fireground skills. To successfully complete the Practical Examination, a candidate is required to receive a minimum of 70 points on each evolution and to complete all mandatory steps. Petitioner received more than a minimum of 70 points on the SCBA and hose evolutions, but did not achieve a passing score on either the ladder evolution or the fireground skills evolution. The maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution is four minutes and 30 seconds. Exceeding the maximum time allowed is an automatic failure of the ladder evolution. Petitioner’s time on the ladder evolution was four minutes and 50 seconds, which was 20 seconds more than the maximum time allowed. Petitioner admitted that he exceeded the maximum time allowed to complete the ladder evolution. He blames that failure on the testing instructor, Mr. Johnson, for not being located where Petitioner could hand off a halligan to him in order to complete the test. A halligan is a tool used by firefighters to sound the floor of a burning building for safety. During the ladder evolution, a candidate is required to pick up the halligan prior to ascending a pre-positioned 24-foot extension ladder, sound the floor with the halligan, enter the second floor, descend a set of stairs to the first floor, locate a mannequin, and execute a “rescue” by dragging or carrying the mannequin out of a doorway. When a candidate clears the doorway threshold with the mannequin, the ladder evolution is complete. During testing, Petitioner understood he would be handing the halligan off to Mr. Johnson. However, Mr. Johnson was not there, and, as Petitioner explained, “I had my halligan in my hand and I was looking around for him, but he was nowhere to be found. . . . Well, the time that it took me to look for my instructor, which I am not supposed to do, he was supposed to be there, my time went over –- my time went over.” Because of his failure to pass the ladder evolution and fireground skills evolution, Petitioner failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination. On November 6, 2012, Petitioner took a Practical Examination Retest (Retest) at Florida State Fire College in Ocala, Florida. The Retest consisted of the same four evolutions. He was required to receive a minimum of 70 points on each evolution and to complete all mandatory steps in order to successfully complete the Retest. On the Retest, Petitioner received a perfect score of 100 points on the SCBA and hose evolutions. He received 90 points on the fireground skills evolution, but received no points on the ladder evolution. Petitioner exceeded the maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution. As on the original examination, the maximum time allowed is four minutes and 30 seconds and exceeding the maximum time allowed is an automatic failure of the ladder evolution. Petitioner’s time was four minutes and 38 seconds, which is 8 seconds more than the maximum time allowed. He received zero points on the ladder evolution for exceeding the maximum time allowed. As a result of his failing to pass the ladder evolution, Petitioner failed to successfully complete the Retest. Because Petitioner failed the Retest, the Department denied his certification as a firefighter. In support of his challenge to the Department's determination that he exceeded the maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution, Petitioner testified that his wife was present at the Retest and recorded his time on the ladder evolution as four minutes and 17 seconds, 13 seconds faster than the maximum time allowed. Petitioner explained that his wife was positioned in an automobile at the grounds with a “straight-shot” view of the ground skills course, then drove to the other side of the course to observe and time the ladder evolution. Petitioner introduced into evidence a photocopy of a sheet of notebook paper on which was written “Ricky’s time 3:58” on one line and “4:17” on the next line. Petitioner’s wife neither testified to overcome the hearsay nature of the evidence, nor did she authenticate the evidence. Further, Petitioner admitted that the time his wife recorded was likely not exact, but rather gave him a “ballpark figure of not going over the four minutes and 30 seconds that I had.” Petitioner stated his wife’s recorded time would not be the same as the field representative’s because the field representative started the stopwatch when Petitioner touched the ladder, as per protocol. Petitioner’s wife started her clock when Petitioner gave her the “thumbs up.” Dennis Hackett, Interim Standards Supervisor, testified that it would be impossible for a third party to accurately time a candidate during the ladder evolution at Florida State Fire College. Mr. Hackett explained: There’s just too many obstructions. If they were –- the tower, where the ladder evolution starts, is on the opposite side of where [third party observers] have to stay. Or they could go to another roadway that they could see the ladder evolution started, but there’s a burn building in the way to see the ascension of the ladder to the second floor. You can’t see that. They would have to be a marathon runner to get from where they could see to the second portion where they would come out of the building. [T.53:18 through T.54:2] The time of four minutes and 17 seconds recorded by Petitioner’s wife for Petitioner’s completion of the ladder evolution is not accepted as competent substantial evidence of the actual time in which Petitioner completed the ladder evolution on the Retest. Tuffy Dixon is the Department’s field representative who administered the Retest to Petitioner in Ocala. Petitioner argues that Mr. Dixon may have failed to reset the stopwatch to zero prior to Petitioner beginning the ladder evolution. Petitioner testified that he had been told by unnamed instructors at Daytona State Fire College that mistakes like that had been made. Petitioner failed to present any evidence as to the inaccuracy of the stopwatch used to time the ladder evolution or as to the inaccuracy of the Mr.Dixon’s use of the stopwatch at the Retest. He presented only assumptions or speculation as to the inaccuracy of Mr. Dixon’s use of the stopwatch. Mr. Dixon has administered approximately 500 practical examinations in the two years he has served the Department. He testified that he is certain his stopwatch was functioning correctly on the day of Petitioner’s Retest and that he reset the stopwatch to zero prior to Petitioner beginning the ladder evolution. Mr. Dixon’s testimony is accepted as credible. In further support of his arguments, Petitioner also testified that he never exceeded the maximum time allowed for the ladder evolution during practice runs at the facility. He maintained that the course in Daytona is longer than the course in Ocala, so it does not make sense that he would not complete the ladder evolution within the maximum time allowed. Despite the fact that Petitioner submitted with his petition in this case a list of names and telephone numbers of Daytona State Fire College classmates who could attest to his time on practice runs of the ladder evolution, Petitioner did not present the testimony of any of those candidates. Nor did he introduce any other evidence to corroborate his testimony that he never exceeded the maximum time allowed for the ladder evolution during practice. Further, no evidence was offered as to the comparable length of the two courses. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the amount of time in which Petitioner completed the ladder evolution, as determined by the Department, was incorrect or inaccurate. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed to successfully complete the ladder evolution within the maximum time allowed. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed the Retest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order: Finding that Ricardo Francois failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination Firefighter Retest; and Denying Ricardo Francois’ application for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Linje E. Rivers, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ricardo Francois 778 Jimmy Ann Drive, No. 1011 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to retake the written portion of the examination for state certification as a firefighter (the "firefighter examination").
Findings Of Fact Respondent’s Bureau of Fire Standards and Training (the "Bureau") is located in Ocala, Florida. The Bureau is responsible for certifying firefighters throughout the state. The Bureau is the only entity authorized to schedule and administer the examination for state certification as a firefighter. A person who wishes to become a firefighter must apply to take the examination for state certification. If the application is approved, the person must first complete a minimum standards course certified by the Bureau and given throughout the state prior to each testing period. The minimum standards course consists of approximately 360 hours. Students attend class four days a week Monday through Friday from 6:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m.; and from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. on Sunday. Petitioner satisfactorily completed the minimum standards course conducted from October 26, 1998, through April 2, 1999, at the Mid Florida Tech training center in Orlando, Florida. Upon completion of the course, Petitioner qualified to take the examination given on April 14 and 15, 1999. The examination for state certification as a firefighter consists of two parts. One part is a practical examination, consisting of a physical test, and the second part is a written examination. Candidates must wear their work uniforms for the practical examination and their dress uniforms for the written examination. A person must score 70 percent or greater on each part of the examination to be certified as a firefighter. Petitioner scored 80 percent on the practical examination given on April 15, 1999. However, Petitioner scored only 65 percent on the written examination given on April 14, 1999. A candidate who does not achieve a passing score on either part of the examination is entitled, by rule, to one retest of that part within six months of the original test. If the candidate does not achieve a passing score on the retest, the candidate must submit a new application for certification and re- take the minimum standards course. By letter dated April 23, 1999, the Bureau notified Petitioner that he had not achieved a passing score on the written examination given on April 14, 1999. By letter dated April 26, 1999, the Bureau notified Petitioner that the Bureau had scheduled Petitioner for a retest on May 12, 1999. On May 12, 1999, Petitioner achieved a score of 68 percent on the written portion of the examination. By letter dated May 24, 1999, Respondent notified Petitioner that he did not achieve a passing score on the written examination and denied Petitioner’s application for certification as a firefighter. Petitioner timely requested an administrative hearing. Petitioner does not challenge a question or score used in either written examination given on April 14 or May 12, 1999. Petitioner challenges the procedure used by the Bureau to determine the sequence of the two-part examination given on April 14 and 15, 1999. During the minimum standards course, students generally are told to be prepared for either examination in any sequence. However, Fire Chief Mullins, Petitioner’s course instructor, specifically told Petitioner and his fellow students that the practical examination would be given on April 14, 1999, and that the written examination would be given on April 15, 1999. The written examination in fact was given on April 14, 1999, and the practical examination was given on April 15, 1999. Respondent did not inform Petitioner and his fellow students that the written examination would be given on April 14, 1999, until the morning of the test. Chief Mullins is the agent of Respondent. The Bureau inspects, approves, and certifies each training center, its course curriculum, and its course instructors. Bureau rules and policies are binding on training centers and on training center personnel, including course instructors. The Bureau can decertify training centers and personnel if either violates agency policy. Course instructors have only that authority granted to them by the Bureau and are responsible to the Bureau. The testimony of Respondent’s witness claimed that Chief Mullins did not have actual authority to represent to his students the sequence in which the two-part examination would be given. Assuming arguendo that the testimony is supported by applicable law, the testimony is not dispositive. Chief Mullins had the apparent authority to make each representation to Petitioner and his fellow students, and the students reasonably relied on that representation. Petitioner relied on the representation by Respondent’s agent to Petitioner’s detriment. The detriment to Petitioner consisted of three parts. First, Petitioner was lulled into inaction and lost his opportunity for final preparation before the written examination. Second, the lost opportunity shocked and unnerved Petitioner during the test. Finally, Petitioner was denied an opportunity to take the written examination a second time without being misled by Respondent’s agent. The first part of the detriment to Petitioner occurred on April 13, 1999. In reliance upon Respondent’s misleading representation, Petitioner deferred his final preparation for the written examination until after the practical test which Petitioner believed in good faith would be given on April 14, 1999. Petitioner’s scheduled final preparation for the written examination included a study group that had been prearranged between Petitioner and some of his fellow students to be conducted after the practical examination was completed. When Respondent scheduled the written examination on April 14, 1999, rather than April 15, 1999, Petitioner lost the opportunity Petitioner had scheduled for final study and preparation during the remainder of the day and night following the practical examination. The second part of the detriment to Petitioner occurred to Petitioner’s state of mind during the written examination given on April 14, 1999. Petitioner was shocked and unnerved by the lost opportunity for final preparation before the written examination. The last part of the detriment to Petitioner occurred when Respondent counted the retest on May 12, 1999, as the second test rather than the first test. The test given on May 12, 1999, was the first test not flawed by misleading representations from Respondent’s agent which lulled Respondent into inaction before the written examination. The retest on May 12, 1999, cured the first and second part of the detriment to Petitioner by allowing Petitioner time for final preparation before the written examination. However, the retest did not cure the third part of the detriment to Petitioner. By counting the test given on May 12 as the second test, Respondent did not cure the procedural defect in counting a flawed test as Petitioner’s first test. The detriment to Petitioner is that he would be required to re-apply for certification and take the 360-hour minimum standards course again before he could take a second written examination not flawed by misleading representations that lulled Petitioner into inaction before the written examination. When Petitioner was given the opportunity for final preparation before the written examination on May 12, 1999, his score improved three percentage points from 65 percent to 68 percent. If Petitioner is given a second opportunity for final preparation before the test, he may, or may not, achieve the additional two percentage points needed to score 70 percent on the written examination. Petitioner is entitled, by rule, to a second opportunity to take the written test without being lulled into inaction before the test by misleading representations from Respondent. Respondent argues that tests are frequently rescheduled for weather or other acts of God. However, an act of God was not the reason Respondent rescheduled the sequence of the two-part examination on April 14 and 15, 1999. Respondent scheduled the sequence of the two-part examination at issue in this case for administrative convenience. The Bureau determines the number of days required to give the examination offered to graduates of each training center at the beginning of each training course when the training center sends the Bureau a course roster. The Bureau gives the examination for certification as a firefighter in one day if there are less than 15 applicants enrolled in a training course and in two days if there are 15 to 30 applicants enrolled. If there are more than 30 applicants enrolled, the Bureau gives the examination over three days, adding an additional day for each increment of 15 applicants. The Bureau does not determine the sequence in which the two parts of the examination will be given until the end of the training course, approximately one week before the first test date, and does not inform the test center until that time. The course instructor, therefore, could not have known what the sequence of testing was going to be on April 14 and 15, 1999, when he misled Petitioner and his fellow students into believing the written examination would be given on April 15, 1999. It is equally correct, however, that neither Petitioner nor his fellow students could have known, or should have known, that the course instructor was unaware of the sequence of testing when the course instructor repeatedly misled Petitioner and his fellow students during the training course. The course instructor misrepresented the sequence of testing throughout the course beginning sometime in February 1999 and thereafter until the course was concluded on April 2, 1999. Several times during March 1999, the course instructor represented to Petitioner and his fellow students that the written examination would be given on April 15, 1999. Respondent has no policy that establishes standards for determining the sequence of the two-part examination. Examiners who administer the tests travel from Ocala to each test site. Approximately one week before leaving for the test site, examiners inform someone at the training center of the testing sequence. Respondent failed to explicate any standards for determining the sequence of testing except acts of God, which are irrelevant to the facts in this case; the general principle that firefighters must be prepared for any eventuality, which Respondent failed to explain in the record; and the unbridled discretion of the examiner. Respondent did not explicate why the examiner for the examination given on April 14 and 15, 1999, decided to give the written examination on the earlier date or why the course instructor did not correct his prior misleading representations during the week before the examination. Respondent’s witness testified that Petitioner and his fellow students had no right to know the sequence of testing. While Petitioner and his fellow students may not have had a right to know the sequence of testing, their course instructor volunteered that information and carried out that voluntary agency action in a misleading manner that lulled Petitioner into inaction. Respondent may not have been required to provide notice of the sequence of testing to Petitioner and his fellow students. Once Respondent voluntarily undertook to provide notice of the sequence of testing, Respondent was required to carry out its voluntary action in a fair and adequate manner. The notice voluntarily given by Respondent’s agent was neither fair nor adequate but was misleading, arbitrary, and capricious. The course instructor had no way of knowing the sequence of testing before the telephone call from the test examiner, and the test examiner had no standards to limit his discretion to determine the sequence of testing. Respondent asserts that the changed testing sequence, if any, did not cause extreme hardship to Petitioner. In support of its assertion, Respondent submitted evidence that other students overcame any hardship and passed the written test. Respondent misses the point. If some students were not harmed by Respondent’s misleading notice, the absence of harm does not eliminate the error in the agency notice to those students. It merely means that the error in the notice to those students was harmless error. The lack of harm to those students does not eliminate the prejudice to a student who was harmed by the error in notice. If an agency voluntarily undertakes action and does so in a faulty and misleading manner, the agency properly should suffer the consequences of such action rather than the person who is prejudiced by such action. The harm caused by faulty and misleading notice to a particular student is not measured by the prejudice, or lack of prejudice, to other students. Such harm is personal and is properly measured by the facts and circumstances unique to the individual student and his or her state of mind.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's challenge to the written examination given on April 14, 1999, and granting Petitioner’s request to retake the written examination given on May 12, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bill Nelson, State Treasurer And Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level II Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Shiv Narayan Persaud, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Jonathan C. Anthony 215 Bella Coola Drive Indian Harbor Beach, Florida 32937
The Issue The issue is whether the Department properly denied Petitioner's application for certification as a Florida firefighter due to his not achieving a passing score of 70% on the written portion of the required Firefighter Minimum Standards Examination.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Notkin filed his application for certification as a Florida firefighter on February 4, 2000. As an applicant, Mr. Notkin was required to and did take a state-approved Minimum Standards Course. Upon successful completion of the Florida Minimum Standards Course, applicants must thereafter sit for the Minimum Standards Examination. The examination consists of a written part and a practical part, and applicants must pass each part with a score of 70% or better in order to be eligible for certification. Approximately one-half (180 hours) of the 360 hours of the Minimum Standards Course is dedicated to preparation for the written portion of the Minimum Standards Examination, with the balance of the time devoted to matters to be covered on the practical field work portion of the Minimum Standards Examination. There are 100 questions on the written portion of the Minimum Standards Examination and applicants are able to miss up to 30 questions and still achieve a passing score of 70%. At all times material to this case there were three required texts for students taking the Minimum Standards Course: The Essentials of Fire Fighting, 4th edition, published by Oklahoma State University's Fire School; Medical First Responder, 5th edition, authored by J. David Bergeron; and Initial Response to Hazardous Materials published by the National Fire Academy. Mr. Notkin and his classmates were instructed to study the required text materials and informed that anything found in the text materials could be on the written portion of the Minimum Standards Examination. Students were advised that where information provided in the textbook conflicts with information provided by the instructor, the instructor's interpretation should be followed. Most questions on the Minimum Standards Examination are featured prominently in the required course textbooks. Mr. Notkin successfully completed his Firefighters Minimum Standards course with a score of 85%. He thereafter took his initial written and practical portions of the Minimum Standards Examination on June 13, 2000, at which time Mr. Notkin passed the practical examination with the minimum allowable score of 70%. However, he scored a 67% on the written portion, which is three points below the minimum passing score of 70%. Applicants are permitted two chances to achieve a passing score on the Minimum Standards Examination written portion. If an applicant fails both the initial and retest examinations, that applicant has to retake and successfully complete the 360-hour Minimum Standards Course before being permitted to retake the Minimum Standards Examination. Mr. Notkin re-tested for the written portion of the Minimum Standards Examination on or about August 2, 2000. A score of 70% would have allowed him to be certified as a firefighter without the necessity of taking a second practical examination, or repeating the Minimum Standards Course. Mr. Notkin scored 60% on the August 2, 2000, written examination, ten points below the required minimum for a passing score and certification as a firefighter. Mr. Notkin's examinations were properly graded.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance, Division of the State Fire Marshal, enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a Florida firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Ian Notkin 10809 Northwest 46 Drive Coral Springs, Florida 33076 James B. Morrison, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether Petitioner should receive a passing grade for the Unlimited Electrical Contractors' Examination given on January 29, 1999.
Findings Of Fact On January 29, 1999, Petitioner Ulises A. Garcia (Garcia), sat for the Unlimited Electrical Contractors' Examination given by Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board (Department). The examination consisted of 150 multiple-choice questions, 100 of which were on the morning portion of the examination and the remaining 50 of which were on the afternoon portion of the examination. The questions are based on general trade knowledge and certain reference materials, which are identified to the candidates prior to the examination in the "Candidate Information Booklet for the Electrical Contractors' Examination." The candidates are allowed to bring the reference materials to the examination and to refer to them during the examination. An applicant must receive a score of at least 75 in order to pass the examination. Each question is worth two-thirds of a point. The Department rounds the scores. For example, if a candidate scored 74 and 2/3 points, the Department awards a grade of 75. By examination grade report mailed March 15, 1999, the Department notified Garcia that he had failed the examination with a grade of 74. Garcia requested an administrative hearing challenging questions 20, 53, and 100 on the morning portion of the examination and question 2 on the afternoon portion of the examination. At the final hearing, Garica withdrew his challenge to questions 100 and 2, leaving questions 20 and 53 at issue. Question 20 dealt with service entrance conductors. The parties stipulated that Garcia gave "A" as the answer. The answer which the Department considered to be correct was "C." Garcia stated that he was giving the answer which applied to the general rule concerning service entrance conductors and that he did not consider exceptions to the general rule in his answer. The Department took the position that the question did not specify that only the general rule should be considered; thus, the exceptions should be included. If the general rule is used pertaining to question 20, the correct answer is "A." If some but not all the exceptions are used, the correct answer would be "C." The question, as posed, requires that if exceptions are to be considered all the exceptions should be considered. The multiple-choice question had four possible answers, none of which was the correct answer based upon the testimony of both Garcia's expert witness and the Department's expert witness. Because the correct answer is not included in the choices, Garcia should be given credit for his answer as has been the past practice of the Department when a question is vague or ambiguous. Question 53 dealt with passive infrared detectors, commonly known as motion detectors. The parties stipulated that Garcia answered the question as "B." The Department's position is that the correct answer is "D." The correct answer is "D" as found in Section 10.2 of Understanding and Servicing Alarms Systems, which is listed as reference material in the "Candidate Information Booklet for the Electrical Contractor's Examination." Question 53 is not vague or ambiguous. Eighty-two percent of the 102 persons who took the January 29, 1999, examination answered question 53 correctly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entering finding that Ulises A. Garcia received a passing score of 75 on the Unlimited Electrical Contractors' Examination given on January 29, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Renato Perez, Esquire Law Offices of Perez and Perez 1105 Southwest 87th Avenue Miami, Florida 33174 Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Ila Jones, Executive Director Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner should have received a passing score on the SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) section of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training's Minimum Standards Practical Examination re-test administered on March 1, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On November 15, 2000, after completing a training course at the Broward Fire Academy (where Lawrence Burns was his lead instructor), Petitioner took the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training's Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examinations. He received a passing score on the Written Examination and all sections of the Practical Examination, except for the SCBA section. On March 1, 2001, Petitioner re-took the SCBA section of the Practical Examination. The re-test was administered at the State Fire College in Ocala, Florida. Ralph Chase, a field representative with the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, was Petitioner's examiner. Mr. Chase has been employed as a field representative with the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training for five years. Prior to coming to work for the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, he was a firefighter with the City of Titusville for 21 years. He was a suppression lieutenant at the time he left the city's employ. Petitioner borrowed from the Broward Fire Academy the equipment that he needed for the re-test: two air tanks, a regulator, a harness, and a PASS device. A PASS device is a safety device worn by firefighters entering a hostile environment. When the device is activated in the automatic mode, it will emit a continuous, piercing sound if the firefighter is immobilized for longer than 30 seconds. To place the device in the automatic mode, a plastic switch must be moved into the appropriate position. When properly positioned in the automatic mode, the device makes a brief, chirping sound. It was emphasized to Petitioner during his training at the Broward Fire Academy that it was the responsibility of the student, before leaving the Academy with borrowed equipment, to inspect the equipment to make sure that the equipment was in good working order. Before leaving the Academy with the equipment that he borrowed for the re-test, Petitioner twice inspected the equipment and ascertained that it was in good working order. At the re-testing site, he re-inspected the borrowed equipment. The re-inspection revealed that all of the equipment was in good working order, except for the regulator. Petitioner obtained another regulator, along with a harness, at the re-testing site. He attached the PASS device that he had borrowed from the Broward Fire Academy to the harness and ascertained that "[e]verything was working properly." Before the re-test began, Mr. Chase advised Petitioner that "exceeding the maximum allotted time and/or failure to wear and activate the PASS device in the automatic mode w[ould] constitute an automatic failure for the SCBA evaluation." He further advised Petitioner to "speak loudly and clearly" if Petitioner wanted to tell Mr. Chase "anything during the testing." After Petitioner indicated that he was ready, the re- test began. Throughout the re-test, Mr. Chase stood "only a few feet" in front of Petitioner and watched him intently, focusing upon his hands. Petitioner signaled that he was "done" by clapping his hand. He finished the re-test in one minute and 16 seconds, well within the allotted time. At no time during the re-test, however, did Petitioner make an effort to place the PASS device in the automatic mode. Because he had neither seen Petitioner make such an effort, nor heard the chirping sound that is made when a PASS device is activated in the automatic mode, Mr. Chase walked up to Petitioner after Petitioner had signaled that he was "done" and confirmed that the PASS device switch was in the "off" position. Mr. Chase did not say anything to Petitioner about it. He simply told Petitioner to take off his mask. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner walked up to Mr. Chase and stated, "You know I turned my alert, my PASS alert off." Mr. Chase responded that he did not know what Petitioner meant, to which Petitioner replied, "I wanted you to know that I turned it . . . on and then I turned it off again." After telling Petitioner that he could not discuss the matter with him, Mr. Chase walked away. Petitioner did not at any time during the re-test tell Mr. Chase that he had placed the PASS device in the automatic mode. At no time at the re-testing site, either before, during, or after the re-test, did Petitioner tell Mr. Chase that there was any problem with the PASS device. Petitioner justifiably received a failing score of zero on the re-test because he had not make any effort to place the PASS device in the automatic mode. Petitioner did not report that there was any problem with the PASS device when he returned it to the Broward Fire Academy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered rejecting Petitioner's challenge to the failing score he received on the SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) section of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training's Minimum Standards Practical Examination re-test he took on March 1, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2001.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner successfully completed the Practical Examination for Retention of Firefighter Retest.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Pointon is a candidate for re-certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. In 2004, Mr. Pointon obtained his Firefighter Minimum Standards Training Certification. A certification is valid for three years. Since 2004, he has been unable to find gainful employment as a firefighter. In 2007, Mr. Pointon obtained re- certification. He has been working two jobs, unrelated to firefighting, and has been unable to volunteer as a firefighter. To maintain certification, a certified firefighter, within the three-year period, must either be employed as a firefighter in a career status position or a volunteer firefighter for at least six consecutive months. If a certified firefighter fails to fit within either of the two statuses within the three-year period, the certified firefighter must take the practical portion of the Firefighter Minimum Standards examination, i.e., the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination (Practical Examination) to retain certification as a firefighter. The Practical Examination includes a written examination, as well as four practical components. The four practical components include (a) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA); (b) Hose Operations; (c) Ladder Operations; and (d) Fireground Skills. In order to pass the Practical Examination, a candidate must achieve a score of at least 70 percent on each of the four components. Pertinent to the instant case, the SCBA component is scored using a form listing five mandatory steps, which the candidate must pass, and ten "evaluative component" steps worth ten points each. During the SCBA portion of the examination, a candidate is required to follow the mandatory criteria; the mandatory criteria are required to be completed correctly, including completion of all protective equipment, which includes pulling on the candidate's hood that protects the skin from flash fire; and (c) a candidate is required to complete the mandatory criteria within the maximum allotted time. A candidate, who successfully completes the five mandatory steps, receives a total score of the sum of the points from the ten "evaluative component" steps. A candidate's failure to comply with the mandatory criteria is considered a critical failure. A critical failure is grounds for an automatic failure. A candidate is able to take the re-certification test twice. If a candidate fails the first time, the candidate is automatically afforded an opportunity for a retest. On May 25, 2010, Mr. Pointon took his initial Practical Examination for the re-certification. He completed the SCBA in two minutes and 45 seconds, which was beyond the maximum allowed time of one minute and 35 seconds. Therefore, the Department determined that Mr. Pointon failed to successfully complete that component and, as a result, failed that section of the Practical Examination. Mr. Pointon contends that, on May 25, 2010, during his inspection of the equipment, bottle and air pack, to make sure that it was functioning properly, he discovered that the equipment was not functioning properly. Further, he contends that he made two exchanges of equipment before he obtained properly functioning equipment. Mr. Pointon's testimony is found to be credible. The field representative who administered the initial Practical Examination testified. The field representative did nothing different with Mr. Pointon than he did with any of the other candidates. Furthermore, Mr. Pointon was the eleventh candidate to undergo testing and, by being the eleventh candidate, Mr. Pointon had ample opportunity to test his equipment and ensure that the necessary preparation was conducted before his (Mr. Pointon's) exam began. The field representative's testimony is found to be credible and more persuasive. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Pointon failed to successfully complete the SCBA component within the maximum allotted time. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that, on May 25, 2010, Mr. Pointon failed the SCBA section of the Practical Examination. On September 23, 2010, Mr. Pointon took a retest of the SCBA component. The Department determined that he failed the retest for failure to don all Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), in particular his NOMEX hood. Failure to don all PPE is grounds for automatic failure. As to the retest, Mr. Pointon contends that he was wearing his NOMEX hood. The field representative who administered the retest testified. The field representative observed the NOMEX hood around Mr. Pointon's neck; Mr. Pointon was not wearing the NOMEX hood. The field representative's testimony is more persuasive. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that, on September 23, 2010, Mr. Pointon failed to don all the PPE by failing to don his NOMEX hood. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that, on September 23, 2010, Mr. Pointon failed the retest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order: Finding that Mark Pointon failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination for Retention of Firefighter Retest; and Denying Mark Pointon's application for recertification as a firefighter in the state of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2011.
