The Issue Whether Petitioner's license to operate a family day care home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: The Parties Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child care facilities, including family day care homes. Respondent routinely conducts inspections of licensed family day care homes to determine whether the homes are in compliance with the applicable statutes and rules. Any problems found during the inspections are noted on a report, which is provided to the home's operator immediately following the inspection. When appropriate, the inspection report provides a time frame within which the problems must be corrected. Regular inspections are conducted approximately twice a year. More frequent inspections--monthly or every six weeks-- are conducted on family day care homes which have a provisional license rather than a standard license. Respondent also conducts inspections in response to complaints it receives, and it has the authority to inspect family day care homes at any time with or without notice. Petitioner is the owner and operator of a licensed family day care home located at 1502 North Kettles Avenue, Lakeland, Florida (hereinafter "Petitioner's facility" or "the facility"). Petitioner resides at that address as well. Petitioner has operated a day care home at the above address for approximately three years. Petitioner has taken all required training in order to be licensed. As a result, she is, or should be, familiar with the rules regulating family day care homes. Petitioner keeps children in her home, and children also play in Petitioner's backyard. This area is enclosed by a fence. Inspections and Resulting Actions by Respondent Petitioner's facility was inspected on February 4, 2003, by Respondent's inspector, Timothy Graddy, who found Petitioner caring for children. Several areas of noncompliance were identified during this inspection. Violations noted included unsafe and unsecured storage of materials dangerous to children, namely, bleach and other household cleaning chemicals were left out in the kitchen and a bathroom cleaning product was observed in the tub; paper and trash were littered around the home's back door which leads to the playground area; water that had collected in the sandbox, which presented a drowning hazard; no written evidence of a fire drill having been conducted on a monthly basis; and some of the children's immunization records were found to be out-of-date, which presented a health safety issue. A re-inspection was conducted on February 6, 2003, all violations had been corrected, and no fine or other penalty was imposed at that time. On August 26, 2004, Respondent's inspector, Tricia Step, went to Petitioner's family day care home to carry out a routine inspection, and she observed five children in the home at that time. Several areas of noncompliance were identified. The lock on a kitchen cabinet did not catch, allowing children access to household cleaning products stored there; the children's play area contained litter (empty chip bags and soda cans); an extension cord was lying on the ground in the playground area; the play areas in the home were not clean and stacked against a wall were toys and "stuff," which could fall on the children; at the time of the inspection, children were observed sleeping on blankets with no mats under them, which is in violation of the requirement that each child be provided with a mat, at least one inch thick, covered with an impermeable surface; Petitioner could not provide a record of fire drills being conducted within the previous six months; and an up-to- date and age-appropriate immunization record was missing for a child in her care. After Ms. Step completed her inspection, she discussed the results with Petitioner and provided Petitioner a copy of the inspection report. Petitioner made the corrections required prior to the due date listed on the report. Petitioner's premises were inspected for re-licensure by Mr. Graddy on January 15, 2004, and several areas of noncompliance were identified. Mr. Graddy observed a hammer, motor oil, and a plastic garbage bag on the front stoop area, which are hazardous and dangerous to children; litter, including aluminum cans and paper, was observed in areas where children play; a gap in the required 4-foot fence was observed, which would permit children in the outdoor play area access to a trafficked street; a written record of fire drills for the months of December 2003 and January 2004 were not provided; Petitioner was unable to produce a student health examination file on two children in her care; and the current enrollment information was incomplete on four children. The results of the inspection were discussed with Petitioner, and she was given a copy of the report. Graddy then went back to his office and discussed the results of the inspection with his supervisor, Patricia Hamilton. Based upon the results of the January 15, 2004, inspection and the prior incidents of noncompliance at Petitioner's facility, Ms. Hamilton determined that Petitioner's license should not be renewed. Although Petitioner attempted to do so, Respondent did not give Petitioner an opportunity to bring her home into compliance with the minimum standards in Respondent's licensing rules and standards before deciding to issue a letter of denial. Thereafter, on March 2, 2004, Mr. Graddy sent a letter to Petitioner informing her that her license was not being renewed and advising Petitioner of her right to "appeal" that decision through the administrative process. At the hearing, Ms. Hamilton testified that she was particularly concerned about Petitioner's repeat violations, namely Petitioner allowing the children access to toxic and other dangerous materials, repeated failure to conduct fire drills, and to keep health and enrollment records current. She characterized these as serious child safety violations. These were the primary reasons she recommended that Petitioner's child care license not be renewed. Petitioner, in her testimony, did not deny committing the violations noted in the inspections of February 4, 2003, August 26, 2003, and January 15, 2004. However, she did demonstrate that a re-inspection of her facility listed her to be in compliance with all violations listed in the report. Petitioner's testimony is credible, especially when bolstered by her friends, family, and client's testimonials, that she is a loving and caring person who goes out of her way to care for the children she keeps in her home. The evidence is clear and convincing that Petitioner violated several code provisions, including repeated violations of the rules regarding toxic and hazardous materials; trash and dangerous conditions in the children's play area; failure to conduct fire drills; and failure to have current health and enrollment records on file for each child. Respondent withdrew its allegation that Petitioner was not a person of good moral character. Petitioner has shown mitigating evidence that she is a concerned and loving caregiver and has demonstrated that her license for a family day care home should not be denied or revoked but that a lesser penalty should be imposed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order as follows: Finding Petitioner guilty of violating the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rules 65C-20.010(1)(b) (three counts), 65C-20.010(1(e) (three counts), and 65C-20.010(3)(b)4. (three counts). Finding Petitioner not guilty of violating the provisions of Section 402.301, Florida Statutes. Issuing Petitioner a provisional license. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Sabra Portwood, is entitled to register her home as a family day care home under the provisions of Chapters 402 and 435, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 10, 2000, Petitioner was married to Randy Shoaff. She had two children, twins, by him and is currently pregnant with another of his children. Although estranged at present, they remain married. Petitioner is in the preliminary stages of dissolving the marriage and intends to complete the dissolution process. Petitioner and Mr. Shoaff have had a rocky relationship. On October 4, 2000, less than two months into their marriage, Mr. Shoaff struck Petitioner several times in the head from behind. She was pregnant at the time of the attack. The incident was reported to law enforcement. On March 12, 2001, Petitioner swore out a Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, naming her husband as Respondent. The essential facts to which she swore and testified to at hearing were as follows: On February 23, 2001, at 705 W. Wilcox the Respondent Randolph Shoaff told me that the only reason I was still alive was because I was pregnant and that I have 3 other children. He said that he wanted to shoot me & then kill himself. Because of his actions before I have been afraid of him on 3 or 4 different occasions, and I would just be quiet & not say anything & wait for him to go to work. On Oct. 4th (there should be a police report) there was a dispute between us & he started hitting me in the head repeatedly when I was 3 months pregnant & had only been home for 3 hrs from the doctor because I was bleeding during pregnancy. I am afraid because I asked his coworker if his (Randy's) gun was under the counter & he said it wasn't there. As a direct result of Petitioner's request for a domestic violence injunction, the Third Circuit Court issued a Temporary Injunction. Subsequently, the injunction was conditionally dissolved. However, Mr. Shoaff was ordered to have no personal contact with Sabra Portwood at her home. A third Order was subsequently entered in order to facilitate visitation with his children, allowing non-hostile contact between the parties. Mr. Shoaff does not live with Petitioner. However, Petitioner and Mr. Shoaf are presently married. Therefore, Mr. Shoaf is currently a member of Petitioner's family and is required to undergo background screening for Petitioner's registration. Mr. Shoaff did not pass the background screening because of the injunction based on domestic violence entered against him. No exemption from disqualification was sought. Because of the failed background screening, Petitioner, who was the victim of domestic violence and took steps to protect herself from that violence, was denied registration based on the actions of her estranged husband.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying Petitioner's request to register her home as a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street Building A, Suite 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Sabra Portwood 140 Regina Road Perry, Florida 32348 John Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a license to operate a family day care home, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.008.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Shaguandra Ruffin Bullock, is an applicant for a family day care home license for the Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing family day care homes in Florida. § 402.312(1), Fla. Stat. Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding A "family day care home" is an occupied residence in which child care is regularly provided for children from at least two unrelated families and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, whether or not operated for profit. § 402.302(8), Fla. Stat. On or about July 6, 2017, Petitioner filed an application to operate a family day care home. Respondent reviewed the application and determined that it was incomplete, pending completion of the background screening required by sections 402.313(3), 402.305, and 402.3055.2/ On or about December 8, 2017, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny Family Day Care Home Licensure ("NOI"), informing her of Respondent's intent to deny her application for a family day care home. The NOI stated, in pertinent part: On October 10, 2017, the Department received background clearance letters from child care personnel at Respondent's Family Day Care Home. Pursuant to Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat., childcare personnel in family day care homes are subject to applicable screening provisions. Pursuant to Section 402.302(15), Florida Stat. and Section 39.201(6), Florida Stat., The Department assessed the background of child care personnel at Respondent's family day care home including, but not limited to information from the central abuse hotline. The Department's assessment revealed the Respondent did not meet minimum standards for child care personnel upon screening which requires personnel to have good moral character pursuant to Section 402.305(2)(a), Florida Stat. The foregoing violates Rule 65C- 22.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code,[3/] Section 402.305(2)(a), Fla. Stat. and Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat. Based on the foregoing, Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home's, [sic] pending licensure application will be denied. Evidence Adduced at the Hearing At the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that the background screening for Petitioner and her husband, Marlon Bullock, did not reveal that either had ever engaged in any of the offenses identified in section 435.04, Florida Statutes, which establishes the level 2 screening standards applicable to determining good moral character in this proceeding, pursuant to section 402.305(2)(a).4/ Rather, Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's license application solely based on two confidential investigative summaries ("CIS reports") addressing incidents—— one involving Petitioner that occurred over 11 years ago, and one ostensibly involving Marlon Bullock that allegedly occurred almost 11 years ago. The CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 addresses an incident that occurred on or about January 16, 2007. Petitioner acknowledges that the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 occurred. Petitioner testified, credibly and persuasively, that at the time of the incident, Petitioner and her then-husband, Bernard L. Johnson, were going through a very difficult, emotionally-charged divorce. Petitioner went to Johnson's home to retrieve their minor children. An argument between her and Johnson ensued, and she threw a car jack through the back window of Johnson's vehicle. As a result of this incident, Petitioner was arrested. However, she was not prosecuted, and the charges against her were dropped. Respondent's witnesses, Ann Gleeson and Suzette Frazier, both acknowledged that they did not have any independent personal knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01. The other CIS report, for Intake No. 2007-455485-01, addresses an incident that ostensibly took place on September 7, 2007, involving Marlon Bullock, who is now Petitioner's husband. Petitioner was not married to Bullock at the time of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007- 455485-01. She credibly testified that she was completely unaware of the incident, and had no knowledge of any aspect of it, until she saw the CIS report in connection with this proceeding. Gleeson and Frazier both acknowledged that they did not have any independent knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01.5/ The CIS reports and their contents are hearsay that does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule.6/ The CIS reports and the information contained therein consist of summaries of statements made by third parties to the investigators who prepared the reports. The investigators did not have any personal knowledge about the matters addressed in the reports. It is well-established that hearsay evidence, while admissible in administrative proceedings, cannot form the sole basis of a finding of fact in such proceedings. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the CIS reports do not constitute competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in this proceeding regarding the matters addressed in those reports. Thus, Petitioner's testimony constitutes the only competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01. Respondent has not adopted a rule defining the term "good moral character." Therefore, it is required to determine an applicant's "good moral character" based on the definition of that term in statute. As noted above, section 402.305(2)(a) provides that "good moral character" is determined "using the level 2 standards for screening set forth in" chapter 435. Ann Gleeson reviewed Petitioner's application for a family day care home license. She testified that based on her review of the CIS reports for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 and Intake No. 2007-455485-01, she "didn't feel comfortable" recommending approval of Petitioner's application for a family day care home license, and she recommended that the license be denied. As noted above, Gleeson did not have any personal knowledge of any of the matters in the CIS reports. She relied on the reports and their contents in making her recommendation to deny Petitioner's application. Suzette Frazier, Gleeson's supervisor, made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's application for the license. At the final hearing, Frazier testified that she determined that Petitioner's license should be denied based on the matters addressed in the CIS reports. Frazier testified that Petitioner's application raised particular concerns because of the two CIS reports, even though the CIS report for Marlon Bullock contained a "Findings – No Indicator" notation.7/ Frazier testified that it is Respondent's "policy" to deny an application for a family day care home license in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. According to Frazier, this policy applies even if the background screening shows that the applicant does not have a history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. Further to this point, when Petitioner asked Frazier at the final hearing what she (Petitioner) could do to demonstrate that she has good moral character for purposes of obtaining her license, Frazier told her that although she could reapply, she would never qualify to get the license because of the CIS reports. Frazier testified that, in her view, the CIS reports contain information indicating that both Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition,8/ defines "propensity" as "a natural inclination or tendency." A "tendency" is "an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something." Id. An "inclination" is a "tendency toward a certain condition." Id. A "predisposition" is a "tendency to a condition or quality." Id. Frazier's view that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior is not supported by the competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in the record. To the extent Frazier relies on the information contained in the CIS reports to conclude that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior, neither of these reports constitutes competent substantial evidence regarding the matters addressed therein. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner acknowledges that she engaged in the conduct addressed in CIS report Intake No. 2007-310775-01, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence shows that this incident——which was an isolated event that occurred in the context of an extremely emotional and difficult personal event in Petitioner's life——simply does not establish that she has a "tendency" or "inclination" or "predisposition" toward violent behavior. To the contrary, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that this was a one-time event that happened over 11 years ago, that Petitioner did not have any instances of violent behavior before then, and that she has not had any instances of violent behavior since then. Far from showing a "propensity" toward violent behavior, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner has exhibited an otherwise completely non-violent course of conduct throughout her life. Additionally, as previously noted, the evidence shows that neither Petitioner nor Marlon Bullock have any history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Petitioner has engaged, during the past 11-plus years, in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record establishing that Marlon Bullock has ever engaged in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children. To the contrary, the competent substantial evidence establishes that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are law-abiding citizens. Petitioner is employed as the manager of a department for a Wal-Mart store. Marlon Bullock is, and has worked for 23 years as, a chef. Petitioner credibly and persuasively testified that she is a Christian who attends, and actively participates in, activities with her church. Petitioner also credibly and persuasively testified that she has raised her four sons from her previous marriage to be law-abiding, upstanding citizens. None of them has ever been arrested or involved in any criminal behavior, and her three adult children are all gainfully employed. Petitioner posits, persuasively, that her children are testaments to the stability of her character and her ability to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the care of children. Frazier testified that Respondent's review of Petitioner's application showed that apart from the good moral character requirement, Petitioner's application met all other requirements to qualify for a family day care home license.9/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Although Respondent has adopted a rule, detailed in its Handbook, which establishes the background screening process for purposes of determining good moral character, Respondent has not adopted a rule defining "good moral character" or establishing, apart from the standards set forth in section 402.305(2)(a), any other substantive standards for determining "good moral character." Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 402.305(2)(a), the level 2 screening standards set forth in section 435.04 are the standards that pertain in this proceeding to determine good moral character. Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact, and based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are of good moral character. Conversely, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record does not support a determination that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock do not have good moral character. As noted above, Respondent determined, in its review of Petitioner's application, that other than the good moral character requirement, Petitioner met all other statutory and rule requirements for a family day care home license. Because it is determined, in this de novo proceeding under section 120.57(1), that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock meet the good moral character requirement, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a family day care home license pursuant to sections 402.305(2)(a), 402.312, and 402.313 and rule 65C-20.008. Finally, it is noted that Respondent has not adopted as a rule pursuant to section 120.54(1)(a), its "policy" of denying applications for family day care home licenses in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(e)1., Respondent cannot rely on or apply this "policy" to deny Petitioner's application for a family day care home license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's license for a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for licensure to operate a family day care home should be denied.
Findings Of Fact On June 6, 2008, Petitioner applied for a license to operate a family day care home in Bartow, Florida. As part of the licensure process, the Department is required to conduct an inspection of the home where Petitioner's proposed family day care would be operated. The inspections are conducted by the Department's family safety counselors. Patricia Step was the family safety counselor initially responsible for conducting the licensure inspection of Petitioner's home. On February 20, 2009, prior to conducting the actual inspection, Ms. Step completed a preliminary walk-through of Petitioner's home. The purpose of the walk-through was to advise Petitioner of areas of her home and property that were not in compliance with required standards and needed to be corrected or addressed prior to the licensure inspection. After completing the initial walk-through, Ms. Step listed the areas that needed to be corrected or addressed prior to the licensure inspection in preliminary review notes, which she gave to Petitioner. Those areas were as follows: (1) a fence at least four feet high was needed around the playground area in the backyard; (2) the alarm on one of the two doors in the master bedroom, specifically, the master bathroom door leading to the pool, needed to be repaired; (3) the screen door needed to be locked from the inside so that a child playing outside could not access the swimming pool5; and (4) locks needed to be placed on kitchen cabinets containing cleaning supplies and other harmful items, and knives needed to be placed in upper cabinets. On February 27, 2009, a week after the initial walk-through, Ms. Step conducted a licensure inspection of Petitioner's home. This date was mutually agreed upon by Petitioner and Ms. Step on February 20, 2009, after Petitioner indicated that she could have the four areas of non-compliance corrected or addressed in a week. During the licensure inspection, Ms. Step determined that Petitioner had addressed and/or corrected three of the four items listed in the preliminary review. The one item that had not been addressed was the "pool alarm on the [master bathroom] door" leading to the swimming pool. The alarm on the master bathroom door was part of Brinks' alarm system that included all the other doors in the house which led outside or to the pool area. Petitioner and her husband had this "high tech" alarm system installed after the April 23, 2006, incident discussed below. The alarm system could be programmed to allow each interior door to cause either the alarm to sound or a "chiming sound" when anyone opened the interior door to exit the house. At the time of the inspection, all the interior doors leading to the pool were programmed so that when the alarm system was turned on, the alarm would sound if anyone opened those doors.6 Except for the master bathroom door, the alarm on all the other doors leading to the pool were working properly. Ms. Step recorded the results of the February 27, 2009, inspection on the Department's Inspection Checklist form ("Inspection Checklist"). Of the 38 areas listed on the Inspection Checklist, Ms. Step indicated that Petitioner's application and/or home were non-compliant in two areas-- background screening and swimming pools. In the area of background screening, Ms. Step noted that there was no local criminal background check on file for Carlos Granados, Petitioner's cousin who was temporarily living in Petitioner's household. In the area of swimming pools, Ms. Step noted two areas of non-compliance: (1) the swimming pool at Petitioner's home was not properly maintained; and (2) the "pool alarm" was inoperable. Although the Inspection Checklist noted that the "pool alarm" was inoperable, Ms. Step never told Petitioner that a "pool alarm" needed to be in the swimming pool. Rather, Ms. Step spoke to Petitioner only about the need to repair the alarm on the master bathroom door that led to the pool.7 Based on Ms. Step's statements to Petitioner about the "alarm" and her preliminary review notes, both Ms. Step and Petitioner understood the reference to "pool alarm" on the Inspection Checklist to mean the alarm on the master bathroom door. The Inspection Checklist completed on February 27, 2009, specified that the "due date" to correct the non-compliant areas was April 3, 2009. After completing the licensure inspection on February 27, 2009, Ms. Step intended to return to Petitioner's home to determine if the non-compliant areas had been brought into compliance. However, Ms. Step never returned to Petitioner's home. Instead, Vicki Richmond, a family safety counselor, followed up on Petitioner's progress in addressing the non-compliant areas8 while she was at Petitioner's home conducting a complaint investigation.9 On March 13, 2009, nine months after Petitioner submitted her licensure application, Ms. Richmond conducted a Central Abuse Hotline search on Petitioner and her husband as part of the application review process. The Department is required to search the records of the Central Abuse Hotline for reports of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. This search provides information as to whether Petitioner's name appears in those records, and, if so, whether there were "verified" indicators of maltreatment of children. Both Petitioner and her husband consented to this search. The Central Abuse Hotline search revealed a verified report for inadequate supervision by Petitioner and her husband and some indicators of maltreatment, asphyxiation. The report involved an incident that occurred on April 23, 2006, in which Petitioner and her husband's then three-year-old daughter almost drowned. On or about March 13, 2009, Ms. Richmond notified Ms. Step of the report and advised her that the verified findings needed to be addressed prior to proceeding with the license. On March 20, 2009, while driving across Highway 60 in the Bartow area, Ms. Richmond saw a sign with the name of Petitioner's prospective family day care home and her address and telephone number. Concerned that the sign did not include a license number, Ms. Richmond contacted the licensing office to verify whether Petitioner's home was a licensed family day care home. She was advised that Petitioner's licensure application was "pending" and had not been approved. Ms. Richmond then called Ms. Step to check the status of Petitioner's licensure application. During that conversation, Ms. Step reminded Ms. Richmond that this was the applicant for whom she (Richmond) had recently done the Central Abuse Hotline search. On March 23, 2009, as part of the complaint investigation about Petitioner's sign, Ms. Richmond made an unannounced visit to Petitioner's home. Ms. Richmond advised Petitioner that it was illegal for her to post a sign advertising her home as a family day care home before it was licensed. In response, Petitioner informed Ms. Richmond that after the February 27, 2009, licensure inspection, she (Petitioner) had been told that she could put a sign up and start a waiting list of people interested in day care services. After hearing Petitioner's explanation, Ms. Richmond then told Petitioner that "if" she put up a sign prior to licensure, the sign had to "at least" include in bold letters, "License Pending." On March 23, 2009, immediately after addressing the "sign" issue, Ms. Richmond conducted an unannounced or inspection walk-through of Petitioner's home and discussed issues with Petitioner that Ms. Richmond believed were of concern to the Department. During the walk-through, Petitioner advised Ms. Richmond that the "door alarm" had not yet been repaired. Among the issues Ms. Richmond raised and discussed with Petitioner were: (1) the need to install either a pool alarm or portable pool barriers; (2) the pool was not clean and was only partially filled with water; (3) the spa in the backyard needed a cover; (4) the local criminal background check for Petitioner's cousin had not been received. Ms. Richmond described to Petitioner and her husband two options related to the swimming pool--the "portable pool barriers" and a "pool alarm." In describing the "pool alarm," Ms. Richmond indicated that it was a device that was placed in the pool. She further explained that with this type of "pool alarm," if a child fell in the swimming pool, the alarm would sound. Although the alarm on the master bathroom door was not working on March 23, 2009, Petitioner's husband was making efforts to get the door alarm repaired. However, that day, Ms. Richmond told Petitioner and her husband that even if the alarm on the master bathroom door was repaired, they still needed to have an alarm in the pool. In response to this directive, Petitioner agreed that they would install a "pool alarm" in the swimming pool. After completing the March 23, 2009, walk-through, Ms. Richmond informed Petitioner that the items she had discussed needed to be corrected prior to a license being granted. However, no written documentation was provided to Petitioner regarding the areas of non-compliance discussed during the walk-through or inspection. Ms. Richmond returned to Petitioner's home on March 27, 2009, for her second unannounced visit, which was described as a follow-up to her "complaint investigation." Once there, Ms. Richmond observed that the sign advertising the family day care home was still displayed. However, Petitioner's husband came home while Ms. Richmond was there and immediately took down the sign. During the March 27, 2009, unannounced complaint investigation visit, Petitioner told Ms. Richmond that the alarm on the master bathroom door was not working. About that time, Petitioner's husband arrived and told Ms. Richmond that he had purchased a pool alarm and even showed her the alarm. The "pool alarm" was purchased in response to Ms. Richmond's directive during the March 23, 2009, walk-through but had not been put in the pool, because the pool had not yet been cleaned.10 At the end of the March 27, 2009, unannounced visit, Ms. Richmond talked to Petitioner and her husband about the verified abuse/neglect report regarding the April 23, 2006, incident in which their daughter almost drowned. The findings in the report were "verified" for inadequate supervision by Petitioner and her husband. Given the implications of the abuse/neglect report, Ms. Richmond explained that although Petitioner needed to address the areas of non-compliance, the most pressing and immediate concern was the abuse/neglect report. Petitioner's husband testified credibly that during the conversation described in paragraph 23, Ms. Richmond told him and Petitioner that because of the abuse/neglect report, there was "no way" Petitioner would get a family day care home license. Based on that comment, Petitioner and her husband reasonably believed that Petitioner's application would be denied because of the abuse/neglect report. On March 27, 2009, after being told about the abuse/neglect report and the ramifications of that report, Petitioner and her husband "stopped moving forward" on the areas of non-compliance related to the swimming pool (i.e., cleaning the pool and installing the pool alarm).11 Believing the abuse/neglect report would result in denial of her licensure application, Petitioner and her husband began to focus on issues related to the report. They were also concerned and had questions about the Department's licensing process as it related to the abuse/neglect report. Ms. Richmond's third visit to Petitioner's home was on April 7, 2009. The sole purpose of that visit was to answer the "real" questions that Petitioner and her husband had about the abuse/neglect report and the licensing process. Ms. Richmond answered their questions as best she could, but recommended that they schedule an appointment with the licensing supervisor at the licensing office.12 That same day, Petitioner and her husband scheduled a meeting and met with Sheila Nobles, administrator and supervisor for child care licensing, to discuss, ask questions about, and review the abuse/neglect report. On April 8, 2009, Ms. Richmond finalized her "report" on the complaint investigation regarding the sign. Ms. Richmond's notes in the "comment" section of the pre-printed "Notice to Cease and Desist" form described the events of March 20, 23 and 27, 2009, as they related to the sign issue.13 Decision to Deny Application As the family safety counselor responsible for reviewing Petitioner's application and conducting the licensure inspections, Ms. Step recommended to Ms. Nobles that Petitioner's license be denied. Ms. Step's recommendation was based on the verbal reports provided to her by Ms. Richmond, which indicated that the areas of non-compliance on the Inspection Checklist had not been corrected. Prior to making a decision about Petitioner's application, Ms. Nobles reviewed the application file, the abuse/neglect report, the Inspection Checklist and the preliminary review notes. Ms. Nobles testified that she considered the "five different inspections"14 of Petitioner's home and property by the two licensing counselors, the areas of non-compliance that had not been corrected, and the abuse/neglect report with a "verified" finding of inadequate supervision. The Central Abuse Hotline Report Applicants seeking licensure to operate a family day care home are required to undergo a Level II screening. That screening included a check to determine if the applicant had a report in the Central Abuse Hotline. Due to concern for the safety of children, the Department is authorized to deny a family day care home license if the applicant has a verified abuse/neglect report. Because of its concern about the safety of children in Petitioner's care, the Department alleges that the abuse/neglect report revealed during a Central Abuse Hotline search is ground for denying Petitioner's license. As it relates to the abuse/neglect report, the denial letter states in relevant part: The Department has documented a verified abuse neglect report whereby your then 3-year-old daughter was not supervised correctly on June 21, 2006.[sic][15] These actions allowed your child to wonder [sic] outside the family swimming pool were [sic] she was found after an undetermined time under water and not breathing. During the investigation it was determined that the lock to get access [presumably to the pool] had been broken for a few days. The abuse/neglect report was initiated when a call was received by the Central Abuse Hotline on April 23, 2006. According to the intake-report, an incident occurred at Petitioner's and her husband's home in which their then three- year-old daughter ("child") almost drowned. Jermaine Turner, a child protective investigator ("CPI"), was assigned to investigate the incident. As the investigator, CPI Turner was responsible for making contact with the family of the child and other appropriate individuals. During the investigation, CPI Turner worked under the supervision and direction of Terry Lynn Reinhardt, a child protective supervisor. As CPI Turner's supervisor, Ms. Reinhardt had contact with CPI Turner and gave him directives related to follow-up activities on case-related matters. The abuse/neglect report includes a summary of notes which purport to summarize interviews CPI Turner conducted with Petitioner and her husband on May 18, 2006, about a month after the subject incident. Petitioner's husband recalled that this interview was conducted by telephone. Ms. Reinhardt testified that CPI Turner interviewed the child's parents and also made telephone contact with them to follow-up on an issue involving a "broken door." Ms. Reinhardt was not present at the interviews that CPI Turner conducted with Petitioner and her husband. Thus, she had no first-hand knowledge of what, if anything, they said to CPI Turner. Rather, Ms. Reinhardt relied on CPI Turner's verbal reports to her and the notes and summaries in the abuse/neglect report attributed to him. CPI Turner did not testify at this proceeding. Moreover, no competent evidence was presented regarding any entries (i.e., notes, comments, and/or interview summaries) in the abuse/neglect report attributed to CPI Turner. The case was closed on June 21, 2006, and the findings and conclusions in the matter were summarized in a two-page document titled, Investigative Summary. The Investigative Summary includes an "updated" note dated June 6, 2006, that provided: "The child . . . was left to watch cartoons; however, she was found face down in a swimming pool. The lock to get access from the pool to the house had been broke [sic] for approximately two day [sic]. They stated they planned to fix the lock but never got around to it." No evidence was presented as to who made the "updated" note or the source of the information in that note. After the investigation was complete, Ms. Reinhardt concluded that there were "some indicators" of maltreatment, asphyxiation, and verified findings of inadequate supervision as to both parents. In reaching that conclusion, Ms. Reinhardt relied on information provided by Mr. Turner and then applied the Department's CFOP 175-28 in reaching those conclusions. Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-30.001(6) incorporates by reference the "Allegation Matrix" set forth in the Department's CFOP 175-28. Pursuant to that rule, the "Allegation Matrix" is a document that defines specific types of abuse, neglect or abandonment; guides staff in determining whether abuse, neglect or abandonment has occurred; and assists in ensuring that all factors are considered when assessing each type of maltreatment. The Department's CFOP 175-28 was not offered into evidence during this proceeding. Based on the conclusion reached by Ms. Reinhardt, the abuse/neglect report was closed on June 21, 2006, with the finding of some indicators of maltreatment, asphyxiation, and verified findings of inadequate supervision. Notwithstanding those findings, the Investigative Summary reflects that there was no prior history of abuse or neglect and no criminal history. Moreover, the Investigative Summary indicated that no intervention services were needed, no placement outside the home was required, and no judicial action was required. Finally, Petitioner and her husband were not given any safety plan to implement. The April 23, 2006, incident was also investigated by the Polk County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office"). That investigation included at least two or three detectives and/or officers taking and tape recording sworn statements from Petitioner, her husband, and her father-in-law. All of these sworn statements were "in-person" interviews taken within 24 hours of the incident. Petitioner's husband testified credibly that the written summaries of the sworn statements taken by the Sheriff's Office detectives, particularly that of Detective Wharton, accurately reflect not only the substance of the interviews, but also what actually occurred on April 23, 2006. Petitioner's husband testified credibly about the facts related to the April 23, 2006, incident and the accuracy of written summaries of the tape-recorded sworn statements taken by detectives as set forth below in paragraphs 51 through 60. On April 23, 2006, Petitioner was in the family pool with her then three-year-old daughter. While Petitioner and her daughter were in the pool, Petitioner's husband and his father arrived at the house. Petitioner then went into the house to prepare dinner and her husband stayed at the pool with the child. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner's husband removed the child from the pool, took off the floatation device the child was wearing while in the pool, took her into the house, and then closed and locked the bottom lock of the door. Once in the house, Mr. Best put on a movie for his daughter in her bedroom and then told his wife that the child was in the room watching a movie. The child left the bedroom and went to the kitchen where her mother was preparing dinner. For some time, the child went back and forth between the kitchen, playing near her mother and/or "helping" her mother, and the living room where she (the child) was sitting on the floor watching cartoons on television. The kitchen and living room were adjacent rooms with a large opening between them which allowed a person in one room to see into the other room. When Mr. Best and his daughter went into the house, his father (the child's grandfather) was taking a shower. A few minutes later, after taking his shower and getting dressed, the child's paternal grandfather got out his new video camera and went to the kitchen/living room area to videotape his granddaughter while she was playing. He videotaped her playing for several minutes and then went to the bedroom to put away the video camera. It took the child's grandfather about two or three minutes to put away his video camera and return to the kitchen area. When the grandfather returned to the kitchen/living room area, he asked Petitioner where the child was. Believing the child was in the living room, Petitioner told her father-in-law that the child was in the living room looking at television. Petitioner then went into the living room to look for the child and discovered she was not there. Petitioner then immediately went outside to the patio and saw the child laying face down in the pool. Petitioner screamed for help, jumped in the pool and lifted the child from the water. Petitioner's husband was close enough to the kitchen/living room area that he heard the exchange between his father and Petitioner about the child's whereabouts and Petitioner's subsequent scream. Within a few seconds, Petitioner's husband ran from the house, jumped in the pool, removed his daughter from the pool, and placed her on the pool deck. Once the child was on the pool deck, the child's father and her grandfather immediately began administering CPR while Petitioner called 911. They continued performing CPR on the child until the emergency medical services and the fire department arrived on the scene. Both parents reported to detectives investigating the incident that the child knew how to open and unlock doors. Based on the facts established at or near the time of the incident, it was concluded that the child slipped out of the house and went undetected for about two or three minutes. Petitioner and her husband described the child's "slipping out of the house" as unusual and something she had never done prior to April 23, 2006. Until that day, the child had never gone off on her own and had been fearful of and never gotten into the swimming pool at that house. (Petitioner and her family had moved to this house only two or three months before the incident.) Based on its investigation, which included sworn statements by Petitioner, her husband, and her father-in-law, the Sheriff's Office concluded that the April 23, 2006, incident was an accident. The Department does not disagree with the conclusion reached by the Sheriff's Office (i.e., the April 23, 2006, incident was an accident). Nevertheless, according to Ms. Reinhardt, irrespective of whether the incident was an accident or done on purpose, the Department still found "verified" indicators of inadequate supervision, because the child got out of the house and into the pool and almost drowned. The factual allegations in the report upon which the Department relied were not established by competent and substantial evidence. In absence of such evidence, the Department's verified finding of inadequate supervision has not been proven. The record in this case is devoid of any evidence to establish the Department's finding of any indicators of maltreatment. Therefore, the Department's findings that there were "some" indicators of maltreatment has not been proven. Alarm on the Master Bathroom Door The Department alleges that during the applicable time period, the swimming pool at Petitioner's home did not comply with the requirements in Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.010(1)(i). That rule requires that swimming pools at least one-foot-deep have either a barrier at least four-feet- high around the pool, separating the pool from the house, or a pool alarm that is operable at all times when children are in their care. There was conflicting and inconsistent information provided to Petitioner as to whether a "pool alarm" that floats in the swimming pool was required instead of a door alarm, which is also apparently referred to as a pool alarm. Despite any confusion that may have been caused by the different representations made to Petitioner, it is undisputed that the preliminary review notes and the Inspection Checklist clearly indicate that Petitioner was required to repair the alarm on the master bathroom door which led to the pool. It appears that Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.010(1)(i) refers to door alarms as pool alarms. Petitioner's husband testified credibly that he attempted to have the door repaired by service personnel of the alarm company that installed the alarm system, but has been unsuccessful in doing so. In light of these futile attempts, Petitioner's husband purchased a battery-operated door. However, it is unknown when the battery-operated door was purchased, whether it has been installed, and, if so, how it works. The alarm on the door of the master bathroom had not been repaired by the April 3, 2009, "due date" or any time thereafter, nor had any acceptable alternatives been installed. Maintenance of the Swimming Pool The Department alleges that the swimming pool at Petitioner's home was not clean and maintained as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.010(1)(j). That Rule requires that if a family day care home uses a swimming pool, it shall be maintained by using chlorine and other suitable chemicals. Petitioner acknowledges that, at all times relevant hereto, the swimming pool at her home was not clean and properly maintained. Some time after the denial letter was issued, Petitioner's swimming pool was emptied, a full-processed cleaning was completed, and the pool was filled with water. However, a leak in a light in the pool was discovered. In order to repair that leak, the pool had to be emptied. At the time of this proceeding, the leak was being repaired. Once the leak is fixed, the pool can be filled with water and the "pool alarm" that floats in the pool can be installed. Local Law Enforcement Background Check The application process requires that each person living in the home that will serve as the family day care home have a background screening. Such background screening includes a check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE"), and a local criminal history check. In February 2009, Petitioner's cousin, Carlos Granados, was living with Petitioner and her husband. Accordingly, Mr. Granados was required to have a local criminal history check, and a copy of that criminal history check was to be provided to the Department. Petitioner testified credibly that she submitted all the documents for completion of Mr. Granados' background checks and could not explain why the Department did not receive the local criminal history check for Mr. Granados.16 The evidence established that Mr. Granados no longer lives in Petitioner's home. Therefore, the Department does not need, and is not required to have, a local criminal history check for him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order: (1) finding that Petitioner, Best Family Day Care Home, failed to meet the standards in Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.010(1)(i) and (j); and (2) denying Petitioner's application for a family day care home on those grounds. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the parties' stipulated facts, the following facts relevant to these proceedings are found: Upjohn operates a number of home health agencies throughout the State of Florida, as well as in other states. Prior to 1975, a patient served by a proprietary home health agency could not obtain reimbursement under the Medicare program. Such agencies were not able to obtain a Medicare "provider number" unless they were licensed under State law. In 1975, the Legislature enacted the Home Health Services Act, Chapter 400, Part III, Florida Statutes, providing for the licensure of proprietary home health agencies. On July 1, 1977, the "establishment of a new home health agency" became one of the projects subject to Certificate of Need review. HRS's rules pertaining to Certificate of Need review were amended in October of 1977, to include the "establishment of a new home health agency or a new subunit of any agency" as projects subject to review". During the rule adoption process, HRS specifically considered the suggestion that expansions of service areas by existing home health agencies without new facilities be subject to Certificate of Need review. This suggestion was rejected on the belief that such a requirement was not statutorily authorized. Confusion existed within the various offices of HRS as to whether additional licensure and/or Certificate of Need review as required when an existing home health agency desired to extend the provision of services to other counties without opening a new subunit or other physical facility in the new county. Prior to 1982, officials within the Office of Community Medical Facilities the office responsible for the Certificate of Need program, generally took the position that the mere geographical expansion of services by an existing certificated and licensed home health agency did not require further Certificate of Need review as long as additional physical facilities were not contemplated. For example, in September of 1981, Upjohn was informed by the OCMF that a Certificate of Need was not required for the provision of home health services from its Jacksonville, Duval County, office to patients residing in Nassau, Baker or St. Johns Counties, as long as subunits or other physical facilities were not opened in those counties. The above four counties were all located within the same health service area. On the other hand, the Office of Licensure and Certification generally took the position that each county served must appear on the home health agency license. On occasion, the OLC required home health agencies to build new offices if it was found that an agency was geographically overextending itself in terms of appropriate supervision or quality of care concerns. It appears to have been the policy of the OLC, on most occasions, to defer to the OCMF the determination of whether additional Certificate of Need review was required prior to the issuance of a license listing additional counties or service areas. However, in January of 1980, the Director of the OLC took the position that petitioner's licensed Marion County home health agency could not provide services to Citrus County residents without applying for and obtaining a Certificate of Need, and thereafter having its license extended to operate in Citrus County. The record in the instant proceedings does not reflect that the OCMF was requested, either by the OLC or by Upjohn, to render a specific opinion as to whether additional Certificate of Need review was required for the extension of home health services from Marion County to Citrus County. In October of 1981, Upjohn requested advice from the OLC as to whether it could provide services from its Broward County office to patients in Palm Beach County. Noting that it was the understanding of the OLC that a Certificate of Need would be required to authorize any expansion of home health services, the OLC referred Upjohn's request to the OCMF. The matter was thereafter referred to the HRS legal staff. James M. Barclay, an attorney with the Office of Health Planning and Development, issued Legal Opinion 82-2 on the issue of whether a Certificate of Need was required before a home health agency, licensed to operate in certain counties within a health service area, could provide services to additional counties within the same health service area. It was Mr. Barclay's opinion that a licensed home health agency could provide services to additional counties within the same health service area without an additional Certificate of Need. The rationale for this opinion as that when the original Certificate of Need review occurred, the review criteria were applied to the entire health service area and thus the original Certificate was evidence of a need within the entire health service area. Based on this opinion, the OLC informed Upjohn that it could not expand its Broward County services to Palm Beach County without Certificate of Need review since the two counties were located in separate health service areas. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Planning and Development, Gary J. Clarke, disseminated the Barclay opinion to the Directors of the Health Systems Agencies. In his cover letter, dated April 7, 1982, Mr. Clarke noted that "the memorandum clarifies existing law; namely, that a home health agency in one county may offer services in an adjoining county without obtaining a CON." Based upon the Barclay opinion and the Clarke cover letter, Upjohn informer its various Florida office managers that its existing home health agencies, though licensed only for a particular county, could deliver services in additional counties within the health service area without the need for further Certificate of Need review. Subsequent to the Barclay opinion and the Clarke distribution letter, there were changes in the Certificate of Need law, as well as leadership changes within HRS. The former Health Systems Agencies were abolished and replaced with District Councils, local involvement with the Certificate of Need process was virtually eliminated and the "health service areas" were changed to "districts," some with different boundaries. These changes prompted the Director of the OLC, Jay Kassack, to request of the new Deputy Assistant Secretary a clarification of the policy regarding Certificate of Need review for expansion of home health agency service areas. In order to be consistent with regard to home health agencies and to make clearer to HRS officials, applicants and the public how HRS would be applying the statutes and rules, HRS developed a "home health agency review matrix." Basically, the, review matrix limited geographical expansion of services (without Certificate of need review) to those counties in which the applicant could demonstrate that the criteria for review had been applied by the appropriate reviewing bodies, either the OCMF or the former local Health Systems Agencies. The former OCMF policy, as expressed in the Barclay/Clarke documents, of allowing carte blanche expansion within the health service area once a Certificate of Need had been obtained had thus changed to allowing expansion only when the applicant could demonstrate that the review criteria had been previously and actually applied to the specific county in which expansion was desired. The matrix was developed in February or March of 1983, and was distributed internally within HRS. Upjohn had several license applications for geographical expansion of services in early 1983. While advised in late March that a "revised ruling" was going into effect, Upjohn had no knowledge of the development of the review matrix. By letter dated April 8, 1983, Upjohn was advised that its license application to expand services from its Pinellas County office to the Counties of Hillsborough, Manatee and Pasco was denied for failure to obtain a Certificate of Need or exemption from review. By "OPLC Policy Letter No. 33-83" dated April 8, 1983, addressed to "All Home Health Agencies" and "Home Health Agency Association," the Director of the OLC, Jay Kassack, gave notice of the OLC position with regard to expansion of services in counties other than those noted on a home health agency license. The addressees were advised that "it is illegal to provide services in any area not covered under your current license." This policy letter was written in direct response to the review matrix. It was not until May, 1983, that Upjohn became aware of the existence of the review matrix. By letter dated May 5, 1983, the Medical Facilities Consultant Supervisor, Nathaniel Ward, advises counsel for Upjohn that, "we have a matrix which we must apply (Exhibit 1) when determining whether a Certificate of Need is required for expansion into the service area." Upjohn's Marion County home health agency obtained a "statement of need" (the statutory predecessor of the present Certificate of Need) in 1977, and received a license for that agency in 1978 which it has renewed on an annual basis. From and after August, 1982, and in reliance upon the Barclay opinion and the Clarke memorandum, Upjohn extended the provision of home health services, without adding new physical facilities, from its Marion County office into Citrus, Lake and Sumter Counties. These three counties are located within the same "health service area" and "district" as Marion County, but have not been specifically named in either a statement of need, certificate of need or license issued to Upjohn. Under protest and pursuant to the Kassack policy letter referred to in paragraph (10) above, Upjohn filed an application with the OLC to renew its Marion County home health agency license and to add to said license the counties of Citrus, Lake and Sumter. The OLC issued and renewed the Marion County license from August 1983 to August 1984, but denied Upjohn's request to list Citrus, Lake and Sumter Counties on the face of the license. As the sole ground for denial of the request, the OLC stated that Upjohn had failed to obtain a Certificate of Need or exemption from review for those counties pursuant to the Certificate of Need statutes and rules. In spite of the OLC's demands that Upjohn cease providing home health services in Citrus, Lake and Sumter Counties, Upjohn continued to provide such services. 0n August 30, 1983, HRS issued an Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Upjohn's Marion County license, or impose other penalties, on the ground that the Marion County home health agency had been providing home health services in Citrus and/or Lake Counties without a license that lists those counties on its face. The review criteria of the Certificate of Need law is necessarily geographic intensive in measuring the needs, feasibility, accessibility and availability of alternative services of a particular area. HRS and the local health planning agencies utilize counties and service districts as the geographic unit by which to measure need for health services and facilities. One of the reasons counties are chosen is because population and other demographic data and statistics are readily available and obtainable for such geographical units.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Upjohn's application to add Citrus, Lake and Sumter Counties to its Marion County license to operate a home health agency be DENIED until such time as a Certificate of Need is obtained for such services (Case No. 83-3059), and The Administrative Complaint dated August 30, 1983, be DISMISSED (Case No. 83-3248). Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of October, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Wing, Esquire Barbara R. Pankau, Esquire P.O. Box 3239 Tampa, FL 33601 Robert P. Daniti, Esquire (Former) Assistant General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a license to operate a family day care home under the provisions of Chapter 402, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact On February 16, 2004, the Department notified Petitioner that her application for a license to operate a family day care home was denied. The denial was based on information obtained by the Department as part of the background check it conducted in review of Petitioner's application. The denial letter advised Petitioner that the family day care home license was denied based on information contained in Abuse Hotline Report No. 2002-132739 (2002 Abuse Report). According to the 2002 Abuse Report, Petitioner failed to take her daughter to the doctor for a follow-up visit three weeks after he removed a cast from her arm, so that the doctor could insure that the injury was healing properly. As a result of the foregoing allegations, the 2002 Abuse Report concluded that there were "some indicators" of medical neglect by Petitioner. The Department's background investigation revealed that Petitioner's husband, Darrell Faniel, who resided with her, pled nolo contendre to the charge of selling cocaine, a felony offense, and was adjudicated guilty of that offense in 1991 in Case No. CF90-5739 in the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, Criminal Division. As a result of this felony conviction on July 25, 1991, Mr. Faniel was placed on probation for five years, but was discharged from probation about 16 months early pursuant to a court order which stated that Mr. Faniel "has complied with the rules and regulation of probation and is no longer in need of supervision." The family day care home license for which Petitioner applied would allow her to care for up to ten children in her home. Given the foregoing information obtained by the Department as part of its background investigation, the Department had doubts about whether Petitioner could provide a safe day care home for children. Accordingly, the Department denied Petitioner's application. The foregoing facts have not been refuted by Petitioner, nor did she present any evidence to demonstrate that she is eligible for licensure as an operator of a family day care home. As noted in the Preliminary Statement, Petitioner did not appear at hearing, and no evidence was presented on her behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner a license to operate a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Cutina Faniel 2404 Temple Circle Haines City, Florida 33884 Paul F. Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
