The Issue The issue is whether plan amendments adopted by Respondent in Ordinance No. 5-1998 are not in compliance, for the reasons set forth in the Statement of Intent that is incorporated into the Petition of the Department of Community Affairs.
Findings Of Fact The Plan and the Adoption Ordinance Petitioner challenges Respondent's redesignation of a 198-acre parcel (Parcel) from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial on the future land use map (FLUM) of Respondent's comprehensive plan. This is the Plan amendment that is the subject of the present case. Respondent's comprehensive plan consists of a document that was restated through 1990 (Petitioner Exhibit 22) and a set of plan amendments adopted on October 13, 1997 (Petitioner Exhibit 13). This recommended order will refer cumulatively to the 1990 restated plan and the 1997 plan amendments as the Plan. Two conditions govern reliance upon Petitioner Exhibits 22 and 13 as the sources of Plan provisions. First, Petitioner Exhibits 22 and 13 do not contain all of the textual Plan amendments adopted by Respondent between 1990 and 1997. For example, Text Amendment T-1 in Plant City Plan Amendment 95-1, as adopted by Ordinance 34-1994 on October 10, 1994, is missing from Petitioner Exhibit 22. It is unlikely, though, that the missing Plan provisions would have a bearing on the present case. Second, and more important, Petitioner Exhibit 13 contains proposed plan language that Respondent never adopted. Similarly, Respondent did not adopt the plan language or recommendations for the addition, deletion, or amendment of plan language contained in Petitioner Exhibits 6 and 8. Petitioner Exhibit 6 is Respondent's evaluation and appraisal report (EAR). Required by law to be prepared at stated intervals, the EAR is the document by which a local government assesses the performance of its comprehensive plan and recommends needed amendments. In this case, Petitioner objected to portions of the EAR, so Respondent adopted a revised EAR (REAR), which is Petitioner Exhibit 8. After Petitioner determined that the REAR was sufficient, subject to the conditions noted below, Respondent adopted Plan amendments by Ordinance 23-1997, as adopted October 13, 1997; these amendments are contained in Petitioner Exhibit 13, which, as already noted, is part of the Plan. However, Petitioner Exhibit 13 is a composite exhibit and contains plan language that Respondent did not adopt. It is not entirely clear from the exhibit exactly what Respondent is adopting because Ordinance 23-1997 does not contain, identify, or describe the Plan amendments, nor is a copy of the Plan amendments attached to the ordinance. As incorporated into Petitioner Exhibit 13, the adopted Plan amendments precede the ordinance. These amendments change the Public Facilities Element (PFE), Intergovernmental Coordination Element, and Capital Improvements Element (CIE), including the schedule of capital improvements, and substitute a comprehensive set of definitions for the sets of definitions that previously were contained in several of the elements. Incorporated into Petitioner Exhibit 13 between the adopted Plan amendments and the ordinance are a small number of pages concerning legal advertising and regional plan review, but these pages, which are irrelevant to the present case, were not adopted. Following the ordinance are additional pages concerning advertising and county plan review and a set of documents entitled, "Section A, Summary of Proposals for Plan Amendment Group 97-01." It is unclear to what Section A is supposed to be attached, but most likely Section A contains the proposed amendments that Respondent submitted to the Hillsborough County Planning Commission. In any event, Respondent never adopted Section A, as such. About six months later, Respondent adopted the Plan amendment that is the subject of this case. By Ordinance 5-1998, adopted April 13, 1998, Respondent adopted "amendments" to the Plan. The finding that this ordinance contains the subject Plan amendment is not entirely free of doubt because it is based on inference and implied stipulation; as is apparently Respondent's practice, the actual amendment is in no way identified in Ordinance 5-1998. The ordinance states only that a "copy of [the] amendment is filed in the office of the City Clerk . . .." Nothing in the record actually describes the contents of Ordinance 5-1998, but the parties and reviewing agencies, such as the Hillsborough County Planning Commission, have treated this ordinance as the one that adopted the redesignation of the Parcel, so the administrative law judge will too. The title of the adoption ordinance is: "AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE CITY OF PLANT CITY, FLORIDA; REPEALING ALL ORDINANCES OR PARTS OF ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT HEREWITH; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE (97-1)." This is the only reference to "97-1" in the ordinance. Respondent attached several documents to the submittal package to Petitioner. The amendment is identified as Amendment 97-2 in the minutes of the City Commission meeting at which Respondent adopted the ordinance; however, the ordinance does not mention this amendment number. The amendment is identified as Amendment 97-2, Map Amendment 1, in the resolution of the Hillsborough County City-County Planning Commission, which approved an amendment changing the designation of 198 acres on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial. The amendment is identified as proposed Amendment 98-1 in Respondent's responses to the Objections, Recommendations, and Comments of Petitioner, although the context of these responses reveals that they pertain to the redesignation of 198 acres from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial. The submittal package also includes a map that shows the area to be redesignated Industrial from Suburban Density Residential and a staff report that includes a textual and graphic analysis of the land uses surrounding the Parcel. Background The west boundary of the Parcel abuts Jim Johnson Road and a main north-south railroad line, the south boundary abuts an east-west railroad line, and the east boundary abuts Coronet Road. The Parcel is designated Suburban Density Residential, although, according to the staff report, a poor legal description leaves some doubt as to whether the westernmost part of the Parcel might already be designated Industrial. This recommended order treats the entire Parcel as Suburban Density Residential. The Parcel lies at the extreme southeast corner of Plant City. The surrounding land in Plant City is entirely Industrial. The Parcel lies at the southeast corner of one of the two largest areas designated Industrial in Plant City. Both of these areas are in the city's southern half, which is otherwise devoted to medium- and high-density residential and commercial uses. The vast portion of low-density residential, which is designated Suburban Density Residential, is in the city's northern half, which also includes some commercial, medium- and high-density residential uses. The staff report analyzes the surrounding existing land uses within this Industrial area of Plant City. On the eastern half of the north border of the Parcel is "expansive wooded fenced pasture land" with one single-family home and some stored mobile homes. On the western half of the north border and the northern half of the west border is a Food Lion distribution center on a 150-acre parcel. Immediately west, across Jim Johnson Road, is a developed industrial park. On the east border is a golf course, a power plant, and vacant, wooded land. On the south border, within Plant City, is a small area of Suburban Density Residential not proposed for redesignation. This area appears to be wooded and adjoins another wooded area that adjoins a residential area a short distance to the east. On the south border, within unincorporated Hillsborough County, of which Plant City is a part, are low- density residential uses in an area designated in the Hillsborough County plan for up to six dwelling units per acre. (All references to density shall state a ratio with the number of dwelling units followed by the number of acres; in this case, the density is 6:1). The Parcel contains fenced pasture land, one single- family residence, and a rail spur leading from the south border to the south boundary of the Food Lion distribution center. The Parcel contains three areas of wetlands totaling about 37 acres. The wetlands are at the south and west side of the Parcel, the middle of the Parcel, and the east side of the Parcel. The wetlands are contiguous and convey water to the upper part of the Howell Branch, which empties into the South Prong of the Alafia River. The Alafia River runs west through Hillsborough County and empties into Hillsborough Bay or upper Tampa Bay. The record provides no basis to infer that the railroad track running along the southern boundary of the Parcel has impounded stormwater runoff. To the contrary, the presence of culverts and elevated tracks suggest that the spur crossing the Parcel and ending at the Food Lion property does not cut off the flow of surface water. However, the record does not contain much detail as to the level to which the onsite wetlands function as natural drainage or habitat. The economic value of the Parcel would be enhanced if its designation were Industrial rather than Suburban Density Residential. However, the record does not permit the inference that development would take place sooner in the event of such a redesignation. Jim Johnson Road is scheduled to be expanded to four lanes from a point to the north down to nearly the south end of the Food Lion parcel. At this point, Jim Johnson Road, which continues farther south as a two-lane road, intersects the eastern terminus of the four-lane extension of Alexander Street. The Parcel is not presently served by central wastewater, but, by 2000, such service should be extended to within one-half mile of the Parcel. The nearest lift station operated at only nine percent of capacity in 1988. The unadopted text accompanying the Plan states that Plant City, which is about 20 miles east of Tampa and 10 miles west of Lakeland, has experienced "steady industrial growth over the past years with almost total utilization of its industrial park . . .." Plan, Future Land Use Element, p. 20. The central business district of Plant City is at the intersection of State Road 39 and U.S. Route 92. When this central business district began to form over 100 years ago, it occupied the intersection of important rail lines traveling north-south and east-west--the two lines that continue to operate in the vicinity of the Parcel. Decades later, the interstate highway system added to Plant City's industrial development. Interstate 4, which runs east-west, passes just north of the central business district. Interstate 75, which runs north-south, is a little over 10 miles west of Plant City. In the 1970s, Respondent annexed the land in the southwest part of the city for the mixed-use planned residential development known as Walden Lake. In the same decade, Respondent annexed the land in the western part of the city for industrial uses in the vicinity of the city airport. Ensuing industrial development in the Walden Woods Business Center, of which the Parcel is a part, has resulted in the location of a distributor of bottled detergents on a two-acre parcel, a boxmaker on a 20-acre parcel, and an automated operation to upgrade used cars on another 20-acre parcel. In the 1980s, as the western industrial lands developed, Respondent facilitated the industrial development of land in the eastern part of the city. Recent industrial development has shifted toward the east, absorbing land between Plant City and Lakeland. The unadopted text in the Plan predicts strong industrial growth in the future: Recent events have indicated that Plant City will have a significant expansion in its industrial base through the location of major industrial employers to the east of the city providing jobs and revenue to Plant City. This will, of course, have an effect upon the facilities of Plant City in maintaining current levels of service and the concurrent provision of facilities with the impacts of development as the City's currently adopted plan requires. Due to the impact that industrial developments have upon adjacent land uses, including residential areas, the City will require all future industrial developments to be planned development. Plant City is expected to maintain a suburban, commuter and local job market through the planning period. Job growth in the reserve area will create more nearby employment opportunities for the city's residents with the workforce travelling shorter distances to employment centers in the immediate area. Plan, Future Land Use Element, p. 20. The testimony at the hearing established that Plant City occupies the I-4 technology corridor. Aided by the efforts of the University of South Florida, in Tampa, and the University of Central Florida, in Orlando, this corridor is designed to attract high-tech manufacturing. Plant City and Lakeland are important segments of this corridor because they have sufficient utilities to serve such manufacturers. Persons involved in the marketing and developing of industrial land contend that, from a marketing standpoint, there is a shortage of affordable, usable industrial land in Hillsborough County. Land in Tampa is expensive, and relatively little land exists in unincorporated Hillsborough County. One broker/developer estimated that there has not been so little land of this type in this area since the early 1980s--a situation exacerbated by the conversion of some industrial office parks to office and residential uses. Respondent has enjoyed favorable newspaper publicity concerning its industrial growth. In its Responses to Petitioner's Objections, Recommendations, and Comments, dated March 23, 1998 (ORC Response), Respondent's staff summarized numerous newspaper articles noting the number of high-paying jobs attracted to Plant City by its proximity to Interstates 4 and 75, the Tampa port and railroad lines, 75 percent of all food- distribution sites in Florida, a new technical-education center, major universities in Tampa and Orlando, and Respondent's pro- industrial policies, including reduced fees on new construction to pay for infrastructure. ORC Response (part of Petitioner Exhibit 4), pp. 9-12. The unadopted text in the Plan analyzes the relationship of allocations to future needs by residential and nonresidential categories. As of 1990, the projected population for Plant City for 2010 was 27,700, and the residential designations on the FLUM accommodated a buildout population of 29,921. For nonresidential calculations, Respondent determined the potential employment-generating capacity of Respondent's available Commercial and Industrial land by considering square feet per acre, vacancy rates, and employees per square foot. Respondent concluded that the Commercial and Industrial future land use designations could accommodate an additional 36,694 employees to its employment base by 2010. Referring to the employment capacity stated in the preceding paragraph, the unadopted text concludes: This capacity is significantly greater than the estimated employment growth potential for the city and could potentially contribute to a dramatic change in the city's future socio- economic profile. Plan, Future Land Use Element, p. 32. As Petitioner considered the subject FLUM amendment, it became readily apparent that Petitioner and Respondent differed as to the extent of analysis required to support the conversion of 198 acres of Suburban Density Residential to Industrial. In its REAR, Respondent updated its acreage allocations by future land use category, showing 1989 and 1995 acreages. From 1989 to 1995, Suburban Density Residential increased from 1215 acres, or 9.8 percent of the City, to 2272, or 15.7 percent of the City. (Annexations raised the total acreage in the City from 12,344 acres to 14,452 acres.) During the same period, Industrial increased from 3573 acres, or 28.9 percent, to 4385 acres, or 30.2 percent. After Suburban Density Residential, the largest percentage change during this period was Environmentally Sensitive, which decreased from 1958 acres, or 15.9 percent, to 1433, or 9.9 percent. Addressing wetlands-protection issues, the REAR states that the Conservation Element in the Plan, "as implemented through the City's Land Development Code and the requirements and processes of the Environmental Protection Commission," is "consistent with the new State requirements." Petitioner Exhibit 8, p. 9. The REAR asserts that the Conservation Element protects wetlands through discussion in the unadopted text of the Plan and "outlines wetlands protection strategies in the adopted portion of the [Conservation Element], Objective C and Policies C.1-C.9. Wetlands protection is also addressed in the FLUE [Future Land Use Element]." Petitioner Exhibit 8, p. 9. However, the REAR promises an expanded Conservation Element with mapping of the wetlands on the FLUM. The REAR contends that: [u]pon adoption of revised [Plan] provisions, all wetlands in the City will be protected by the [P]lan, by existing or revised Land Development Code provisions, by the [Environmental Protection Commission's] Wetlands Rule (which includes more stringent protection for more types and sizes of wetlands than that available at any other level of government), by the state through its Environmental Resources Permit (ERP) process, and by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and various other laws and procedures. The City believes that this system will ultimately offer an extremely high level of [P]lan-based wetlands protection. Petitioner Exhibit 8, pp. 9-10. The REAR contains a table showing proposed changes to the Plan. Among the proposed changes is FLUE Policy 6.B.4, which was proposed to provide: The City may allow wetland encroachment as a last option only when other options to avoid wetland impacts are unavailable. When this occurs, the City in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County, shall ensure the permitted activities are compatible with maintaining the area as a viable productive vegetative and wildlife habitat that protects its natural function based on the following criteria: allow only minimum impact projects such as piers, docks, walkways in wetlands; require development to be transferred to adjacent uplands outside wetland areas; restrict density in wetland areas to one residential unit for each identified wetland area. Petitioner Exhibit 8, p. 32. Petitioner determined that the REAR was in compliance, although on the condition that Respondent agree to work on the issues of wetlands, urban sprawl, and transportation. The Plan amendments adopted on October 13, 1997, did not address many of the issues discussed in the EAR and REAR. Notably, the Plan amendments did not include the revised FLUE Policy 6.B.4, quoted above. Following Respondent's transmittal of the subject Plan amendment, Petitioner submitted objections, recommendations, and comments. In its ORC Response, Respondent stated: The consideration of this plan amendment does not rest on a need to show a demand generated by residents of the City for more industrial land. The City has shown that it has provided for, and can continue to provide for, adequate provision of residential and other uses. ORC Response, p. 3. Using updated figures, the ORC Response states that Respondent had an excess residential designation of over 12,000 persons by 2015. The designation change of the Parcel would still leave an excess residential capacity of 10,443 persons. Using an updated population projection of 36,300 persons by 2015, the removal of the Parcel from Suburban Density Residential reduces Plant City's residential overallocation, in 2015, from 33.1 percent to 28.77 percent--which is still in excess of Petitioner's 25-percent guideline for residential overallocations. Addressing wetlands-protection issues, the ORC Response states that a developer could not develop Industrial land until it showed that "environmental damage would not occur" and compliance with the requirements of the Southwest Florida Water Management District, County Environmental Protection Commission, and Florida Department of Environmental Protection. ORC Response, p. 5. Citing a provision of Respondent's land development regulations, the response adds that Respondent would require a "detailed site plan." Id. The ORC Response acknowledges that Petitioner was seeking the adoption of additional Plan provisions, in accordance with Rule 9J-5.013, Florida Administrative Code, to "exclude future land uses which are incompatible with the protection and conservation of wetlands and wetland function." ORC Response, p. 5. The ORC Response assures that Respondent will propose language requiring the developer to document the environmental conditions at the time of a proposed Plan amendment, rather than at the time of the issuance of a development permit, as the Plan reportedly provides at present. The ORC Response adds that, at the time of the issuance of a development permit, the new language will require that "an environmental review would ensure than the proposed development, under the applicable land use category, does not impact any natural resources located on the site. The protection rests with the site plan review process, detailed in the City's Land Development code." ORC Response, p. 5. Addressing transportation issues, the ORC Response relies on the concurrency provisions of the Plan to ensure that adequate traffic capacity will exist to serve the industrial development of the Parcel. Addressing buffering issues, the ORC Response assures that adequate buffering with nearby residential areas will result from the requirement, in the land development regulations, that the developer provide adequate buffering through a "detailed site plan." The Plan The definitions define Industrial as: The future land use plan category used to designated geographically on the Future Land Use Map and/or textually in the Future Land Use Element those areas in the City that are potentially suitable for industrial activities that create a minimal degree of impact to the surrounding area, particularly in terms of non-objectionable levels of noise, vibration, dust, and/or odor, and for convenience commercial uses that are limited to serving the development. All new development and major expansions of existing uses are subject to site plan review with the intent to integrate and minimize adverse impacts upon adjacent land uses. No new residential development is allowed. Development in these areas is subject to the Goals, Objectives and Polices of the Comprehensive Plan and applicable development regulations pursuant thereto which allows [sic] up to a floor area ratio (FAR) of .50 and a maximum commercial area limited to 10 [percent] of the planned development industrial building square footage. Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-21. The definitions define Suburban Density Residential as: The future land use plan category generally used to designated geographically on the Future Land Use Map and/or textually in the Future Land Use Element those areas that are best suited for single family detached residential uses although other housing approaches and compatible related uses such as churches and public utilities serving the neighborhood can be integrated in the area, subject to the Goals, Objectives and Policies of the Comprehensive Plan and applicable development regulations pursuant thereto. A density range of 0-4 dwelling units per gross acre may be achieved within SDR. Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-39. The definitions section defines "Environmentally Sensitive Overlay Areas (E), Future Land Use Category" as: The future land use plan category is generally used to designate, geographically on the Land Use Map and/or textually in the Future Land Use Element, those areas in the City that are potentially environmentally sensitive and thereby subject to classification as Conservation or Preservation areas under the provisions of the Conservation . . . Element The Environmentally Sensitive Overlay Areas future land use plan category on the Future Land Use map is generalized and not exhaustive of all environmentally sensitive sites. Therefore, actual on-site environmental evaluations must occur for any specific project review, and development of any lands containing environmentally sensitive areas is restricted by applicable federal, state, and/or local environmental regulations and by the applicable Goals, Objectives, and Policies of the Comprehensive Plan. (Refer also to the definitions of Preservation Area and Conservation Area and to the polices, land use category description, and density computation provisions related to environmentally sensitive areas). In conjunction with on- site environmental evaluation, the adjacent land use designation shall provide guidance as to the development potential that may be considered once environmentally sensitive areas are surveyed and mapped on site. Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-16. The definitions define "Environmentally Sensitive" as: Descriptive of lands which, by virtue of some qualifying environmental characteristic (e.g., wildlife habitat) are regulated by either the Florida Department of Natural Resources (FDNR), the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD), or any other governmental agency empowered by law for such regulation. Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-15. The definitions do not define "Preservation Area," except to refer to "Conservation Area." Petitioner Exhibit 13, B9-31. For "Conservation Area," the definitions state: Means land designated to: protect the following preservation areas from any further development, except in extreme cases of overriding public interest: --Critical habitat for species of endangered, threatened, or rare status; --Class I and II waters; --Unique environmental features such as springs, steep natural slopes, cavernous sinkholes, and major natural rock outcrops. be environmentally sensitive areas in the Comprehensive Plan and the City's Land Development Code. Development of these areas is limited to conservation uses. be set aside specifically for the protection and safekeeping of certain values within the area, such as game, wildlife, forest, etc. Preserved areas may or may not be outdoor recreation areas, depending on the use allowed therein. Petitioner Exhibit 13, pp. B9-10 and 11. The definitions define "Conservation Uses" as: Activities within the land areas designated for the purpose of conserving or protecting natural resources or environmental quality and includes areas designated for such purposes as flood control, protection of quality or quantity of groundwater or surface water, floodplain management, fisheries management, or protection of natural vegetative communities or wildlife habitats. [F.A.C. 9J-5.003(30)] Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-11. The definitions define "Wetlands" as: those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface water or ground water at a frequency and a duration sufficient to support, and under normal circumstances, do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soils. Soils present in wetlands generally are classified as hydric or alluvial, or possess characteristics that are associated with reducing soil conditions. The prevalent vegetation in wetlands generally consists of facultative or obligate hydrophytic macrophytes that are typically adapted to areas having soil conditions described above. These species, due to morphological, physiological, or reproductive adaptations, have the ability to grow, reproduce or persist in aquatic environments or anaerobic soil conditions. Florida wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bayheads, bogs, cypress domes and strands, slough, wet prairies, riverine swamps and marshes, hydric seepage slopes, tidal marshes, mangrove swamps and other similar areas. Florida wetlands generally do not include longleaf or slash pine flatwoods with an understory dominated by saw palmetto. The delineation of actual wetland boundaries may be made by any professionally accepted methodology consistent with the type of wetlands being delineated but shall be consistent with any unified statewide methodology for the delineation of the extent of wetlands ratified by the legislature. [F.A.C. 9J-5.003(149)] Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-43. The definitions define "Planned Development" as: "Development governed by the requirements of a site plan zoning district." Petitioner Exhibit 13, p. B9-31. FLUE Policy 1.C.3 states: Higher intensity non-residential land uses that are adjacent to established neighborhoods shall be restricted to collectors and arterials and to locations external to established and developing neighborhoods. FLUE Goal 2 is: To sustain the viability of existing and emerging commercial and industrial park areas to achieve an integrated land use fabric which will offer a full range of employment, shopping, and leisure opportunities to support the city's residential areas. FLUE Policy 2.A.3 provides: Buffer residential uses from the negative impacts of non-residential development (physical, visual, or auditory), through the use of walls, berms, landscaped areas. FLUE Objective 2.E is: Support the downtown, stadium, community college, hospital, airport and the industrial areas of the city as the major employment and regional attractors of the Plant City area. FLUE Policy 2.E.1 states that Respondent will ensure that "adequate transportation, water, sewer, solid waste, and drainage facilities will be provided concurrent with the impacts of development " FLUE Policy 6.A.4 provides: The City shall regulate land use and development in all areas subject to flooding by prohibiting all development within the 100 year floodplain which is not in strict conformance with the provisions of the City of Plant City Flood Hazard Ordinance. FLUE Policy 6.A.6 is: The City shall investigate incentives to encourage the clustering of development away from environmentally sensitive lands. FLUE Objective 7.A states: In all actions of the City, urban sprawl shall be discouraged and a compact urban pattern of development shall be provided for in a manner which will promote the full utilization of existing public infrastructure and allow for the orderly extension and expansion of municipal facilities in a fiscally responsible manner. FLUE Policy 7.A.3 provides: The City shall permit new development which lies contiguous to existing urbanized lands only if public facilities are available or can be provided concurrent with the impacts of the development. All development shall be consistent with and maintain the adopted levels of service. FLUE Objective 7.B restates the concurrency requirement at the time of "approving new development and redevelopment." FLUE Policy 7.B.1 prohibits the issuance of "development orders or permits" that would result in "a reduction of the level of service (LOS) established for public facilities as adopted in the Capital Improvements Element." FLUE Objective 7.E restates the commitment to serve all new development and redevelopment with public facilities at or above the adopted LOS standard. FLUE Objective 7.F again restates this commitment, as it pertains to roads. The Goal of the Conservation Element is to: Preserve, conserve, restore, and appropriately manage the natural resources of the City of Plant City, in order to maintain or enhance environmental quality for present and future generations. Acknowledging the role of land-use planning in protecting natural resources, the Conservation Element states: In past decades, land use decisions were based primarily upon socio-economic and demographic factors, with little consideration given to preserving or conserving the natural attributes of the land. As a result, urban land uses were often allowed to replace or permanently alter environmentally sensitive lands and natural systems. With a better understanding of the ecological impacts of land uses, it has become clear that the natural carrying capacity of the land must be carefully considered in land use decisions if the natural attributes and functions of the environment are to be maintained for future generations. Policies and regulations that appropriately preserve or conserve valuable natural resources, while allowing for orderly economic growth, are needed. Petitioner Exhibit 22, Conservation Element, pp. 63-64. The Conservation Element contains 12 objectives under eight categories--air quality, surface water, soil, hazardous materials, flora and fauna, natural preserves, land uses, and minerals. The objectives are specific and measurable. However, the policies in the Conservation Element are vague and unlikely to contribute significantly to the attainment of the Conservation objectives. Only 11 policies (A.7, B.1, B.7, C.2, E.2, E.6, E.7, F.6, H.2, H.4, and L.1) specifically describe a program or activity that will assist in the attainment of any objective. The remaining policies require Respondent only to "cooperate" (14 times), "promote" (9 times), "participate" (5 times), "request" (4 times), "support/encourage" (4 times), "assist" (3 times), and even "consider requiring" (1 time). Other policies promise compliance with the law, public education, and recommendations. Six policies promise some action in the land development regulations or the "land use planning process"-- evidently referring not to the preparation of the Plan, but to some part of the permitting process that may be described in the land development regulations, but is not described in the Plan. Several of the Conservation provisions more directly affect the present case. Acknowledging that "more stringent regulations for stormwater discharges should be considered," Conservation Objective B states: By 1990, discharges to all natural surface water bodies in the City of Plant City shall meet or exceed State water quality standards . . .. Cognizant that increased growth will continue to pressure wetlands, a "significant percentage" of which have already been lost, Conservation Objective C states: "By 1992, no net loss of natural wetland acreage and 100-year floodplain storage volume shall occur in the City." However, Conservation Policy C.3 implements this promise through reliance on the activities of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission and the previously described, unspecified permitting process that appears to be part of Respondent's land development regulations. Conservation Policy C.4 defers to "appropriate environmental regulatory agencies" the responsibility of developing a comprehensive wetland mitigation and restoration program. Conservation Policy C.9 states that Respondent will cooperate with Hillsborough County and the Southwest Florida Water Management District to develop comprehensive floodplain management regulations for the 100-year floodplain. In the restated 1990 plan, Public Facilities Element (PFE) Objective 1.C provided: By 2000, the City will implement mandatory requirements for discontinuing the use of all septic tanks[,] providing sanitary sewer facilities for the affected residents is available. In the 1987 amendments, Respondent weakened this objective by substituting for it the following: The City shall encourage the discontinuance of all on-site wastewater systems and private water wells upon the availability of public sanitary sewer facilities and public water utilities for the affected residents. However, PFE Policy 1.C.1, also part of the 1987 amendments, somewhat limits the circumstances under which landowners may continue to use onsite wastewater disposal systems. PFE Objective 1.A states: By February 1, 1990, the City . . . will implement procedures to ensure that at the time a development permit is issued, capacity consistent with the level of service standards is available or will be available when needed to serve the development. PFE Policy 1.A.1 adopts LOS standards of 89 gallons per capita per day for residential sewer, 7 gallons per employee per day for commercial sewer, and 43 gallons per employee per day for industrial sewer. Traffic Circulation Element (TCE) Policy A.1 adopts LOS standards for city roads. TCE Objective B requires Respondent to adopt land development regulations to ensure that transportation improvements further the provisions of the FLUE. TCE Policy D.1 is to provide transportation infrastructure to accommodate the impacts of growth consistent with the requirements of the provisions of the Capital Improvements Element (CIE). CIE Objective 1 is to set LOS standards for each public facility and identify the capital improvements needed to ensure that the adopted LOS standards are met. CIE Objective 2 is to provide needed public facilities that are within Respondent's ability to fund. CIE Policy 2.B attempts to allocate the costs of additional public facilities between existing and new development; ensuing policies largely assign the responsibility for curing deficiencies to existing development and adding capacity to new development. CIE Objective 3 is to provide needed public facilities to compensate for depletion and to accommodate new development and redevelopment. Ultimate Findings of Fact Adequacy of Ordinance On its face, Ordinance 5-1998 provides no basis whatsoever for inferring that it implements a change in the Parcel's designation on the FLUM. The contents of the ordinance presumably emerges only upon examination of the original ordinance file kept in the City Clerk's office. Supporting Data and Analysis--General Need for Conversion from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial Designation As for the need for more Industrial land, Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the data and analysis fail to support this Parcel's redesignation from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial. Petitioner contends that this change in designation is not supported by the data and analysis because it results in an overallocation of Industrial. This argument fails for several reasons. First, Petitioner failed to prove any standards by which to determine an overallocation of Industrial, at least given the circumstances of this case. Already characterized by considerable industrial development, Respondent has successfully promoted more industrial development. Perhaps most important, Respondent's unique locational advantages promise more industrial development, given Respondent's proximity to the major population areas of East Central Florida, the Tampa Bay area, and Southwest Florida and its proximity to the large-scale transportation facilities of two major interstates, two rail lines, the Tampa port, and the airports of Tampa and Orlando. Second, under these unique circumstances, Petitioner failed to prove that market demand coupled with the need for larger blocks of land do not justify the new Industrial designation for the Parcel. Third, Petitioner failed to prove that the redesignation from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial is not supported by the data and analysis because this redesignation reduces an overallocation of residential land while adding to employment opportunities for present and future residents of Plant City. 2. Wetlands and Conversion from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial Designation As for the protection of wetlands, Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the data and analysis fail to support the Parcel's redesignation from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial. This finding is not based on the strength of the wetland-protection provisions in the Plan. To the contrary, the Plan is remarkably free of such provisions. Rather, this finding is based on the lack of evidence that an Industrial designation would more greatly imperil the wetlands than does the Suburban Density Residential designation. The record provides little basis to compare the effects on the wetlands of the Industrial intensity of .5 FAR as opposed to the Suburban Density Residential density of 4:1. Respondent's contentions that it permits only light industrial are more notable for their recurrence, rather than their support, in the record. The Plan contains no such limitation. In fact, the Plan's definition of Industrial minimally limits uses only in terms of common-law nuisance--e.g., noise, vibration, sound, and dust; nothing in the definition or elsewhere in the Plan limits Industrial uses in terms of effects on wetlands or other natural resources. Perhaps Respondent's land development regulations may further restrict industrial uses, but such easily-amended land use restrictions are irrelevant to a Plan case. Respondent also contends that Industrial requires site- planning. The Plan permits Respondent to require site-plan review, but does not require it to do so. Presumably, Respondent would be free to do so for a large-scale residential development, even though its Plan does not expressly mention the possibility. Although the Plan does not prohibit Industrial use of septic tanks, it is more likely that 4:1 residential development would rely on septic tanks than would .5 FAR industrial development. The three wetlands in question would likely fare better in the absence of a proliferation of nearby septic tanks, as would be permitted under Suburban Density Residential. Internal Inconsistency Future Land Use Element Petitioner failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Objectives 7.A, 7.B, 7.E, and 7.F, and the policies supporting these objectives, as well as FLUE Policies 2.A.3 and 2.E.1. These Plan provisions address buffering residential uses from nonresidential uses, urban sprawl, the efficient provision of public facilities, conformance to adopted LOS standards, and concurrency. As for buffering, the buffering requirement of FLUE Policy 2.A.3 is sorely tested by the presence of a railroad line running through the Parcel. Converting the designation of the Parcel from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial, to the railroad track, serves the purpose of this policy. The problem here is not the railroad track, but the Suburban Density Residential designation; if anything, FLUE Policy 2.A.3 militates for the elimination of an arguably inappropriate residential designation immediately south of the railroad line. As for urban sprawl, the redesignation from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial does not encourage the kind of inefficient land uses targeted by the Plan provisions discouraging urban sprawl, nor does the redesignation encourage an inefficient or costly extension of infrastructure. This recommended order has already found a viable functional relationship between the Parcel, if designated Industrial, and the larger region of which the Parcel and Plant City are a part. This is the key finding on the urban-sprawl issue. This order cites Petitioner's rule as it identifies the indicators and relevant development controls that are relevant to an urban-sprawl analysis. Although the Plan is nearly free of useful development controls, all of the urban- sprawl indicators suggest either that the new Industrial designation, as compared to the Suburban Density Residential designation, will discourage urban sprawl or have no effect on urban sprawl. The greater weight of the indicators suggests that the new designation will discourage urban sprawl. These indicators are the encouragement of a functional mix of uses, absence of excessively large areas of single use, absence of Industrial uses in excess of demonstrated need, absence of development forms (such as leapfrog and radial) suggestive of premature development, absence of poor accessibility among related uses, and achievement of a separation of rural and urban uses. Inconclusive indicators involve the protection of natural resources, agriculture, and open areas, the effective use of existing and future public facilities, and the discouragement of infill development. The commitment of FLUE Objectives 7.B, 7.E, and 7.F and FLUE Policy 2.E.1 to provide each public facility at its adopted LOS concurrent with new development is not compromised by either designation. A designation of Suburban Density Residential or Industrial is merely a future land use designation; it is not a development order. When Respondent issues a development order for the Industrial Parcel, the Plan's adequate concurrency provisions ensure that public facilities must be available at the time of the impacts of development. However, Petitioner correctly contends that concurrency is no substitute for the correlation or coordination of future land uses with the planned availability of public facilities. If Respondent's planning strategy were to rely on concurrency to time the issuance of development orders for the Parcel, then Respondent would be inviting a sudden and possibly catastrophic disruption of its real estate market and economy. At its worst, such a planning strategy would probably cause the plan to fail to achieve consistency with the criterion of financial feasibility, but Petitioner makes no such allegation in this case. On the present record, though, it is equally possible that Respondent will timely revisit its schedule of capital improvements in order to serve the Parcel with the necessary public facilities, such as roads, or Respondent may timely exact money from its taxpayers, the developers, or the ultimate purchasers through the wide variety of means available to fund infrastructure. In any event, Respondent's planning strategy for public facilities is not, to the exclusion of fair debate, internally inconsistent with the cited Plan provisions under the present circumstances, including the unambiguous requirements of the Plan's concurrency provisions, relatively small area involved (198 acres), economic likelihood in a tight market for industrial land that Respondent can exact from the developer and/or purchasers sufficient contributions to meet the demands of concurrency, and planned extension of central wastewater into the general area by 2005. Another distinguishing factor is that, according to Respondent's unrebutted analysis, only a worst-case development scenario would violate the traffic LOS standards and trigger concurrency. 2. Conservation Element Petitioner failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with Conservation Objectives C and J, and the policies supporting these objectives. Conservation Objective C is to ensure no net loss of natural wetlands or 100-year floodplain storage, and Conservation Objective J is to ensure the protection of the functions of the natural environment. The policies under these objectives are so vague as to be irrelevant. The focus in this case is not on the Plan itself, but on the Plan amendment; the sole question is therefore whether Petitioner has proved to the exclusion of fair debate that the redesignation from Suburban Density Residential to Industrial is inconsistent with objectives to ensure no net loss of natural wetlands or floodplain and to ensure the protection of the functions of the natural environment. As already noted, despite clear deficiencies in the Plan in its treatment of these natural resources, Petitioner has failed to prove how this redesignation negatively impacts any of these natural resources. 3. Traffic Circulation and Capital Improvements Elements For the reasons already discussed, Petitioner failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with TCE Objective B, the TCE policies supporting this objective, TCE Policy D.1, CIE Objectives 1, 2, and 3, or the CIE policies supporting these objectives. Inconsistency with Other Criteria Future Land Use Map Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with the criteria of depicting on the future land use map conservation uses (Rule 9J-5.006(4), Florida Administrative Code) and wetlands and floodplains (Rule 9J-5.006(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code). The FLUM does not depict any conservation uses or floodplains. As for wetlands, the FLUM, according to its legend, depicts only those larger than 40 acres. Placing these omissions in the context of the entire Plan does not alter this inconsistency finding. When not omitted, Plan provisions addressing natural-resources criteria are vague. Many of such Plan provisions repeatedly relegate to the land development regulations or delegate to federal, state, regional, or local agencies the responsibility for protecting wetlands and other natural resources. Especially for a relatively small municipality like Respondent, the entire FLUM must contain these required natural resources. Even if Respondent had added the missing natural resources to the 198-acre area subject to this amendment, the omission of these natural resources from the rest of the FLUM would have rendered the Plan amendment inconsistent with the criteria covered in this section. The requirement of depicting on the FLUM wetlands, floodplains, and conservation uses includes the requirement that FLUM graphically inform as to their size, scale, and proximity--relative to all other items required to be depicted on the FLUM and relative to the site that is the subject of a plan amendment. Provisions Protecting Wetlands and Floodplains Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with the criteria of an objective ensuring the protection of natural resources (Rule 9J-5.006(3)(b)4, Florida Administrative Code), an objective protecting and conserving the natural functions of floodplains and wetlands (Rule 9J-5.013(2)(c)6, Florida Administrative Code), and a policy protecting wetlands (Rule 9J- 5.013(3), Florida Administrative Code). Although stronger Plan provisions protecting natural resources might have saved this flawed FLUM amendment, a FLUM amendment does not raise issues concerning the consistency of other Plan provisions, as such. As already noted, Conservation Objectives C and J ensure the protection of wetlands and floodplains and their natural functions. Although no policy provides effective protection of wetlands, this is a deficiency of the Plan, not the Plan amendment. The failure of the Plan to contain the required policy protecting wetlands does not affect the change in designations. 3. Urban Sprawl Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with the criteria of supporting data and analysis because it fails to discourage urban sprawl, establish an efficient land use pattern, coordinate land uses with the availability of facilities and services, protect agriculture and natural resources, ensure a separation between urban and rural land uses, promote a mixed-use development or compact urban form, and avoid the designation of vast areas of single-use development, overallocation of Industrial land, and leap-frog development of rural areas at great distances from urban areas. Petitioner has alleged that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with the criteria of objectives to discourage urban sprawl (Rule 9J-5.006(3)(b)8, Florida Administrative Code) and to use innovative land development regulations and mixed uses (Rules 9J-5.006(3)(b)10 and (4)(c), Florida Administrative Code) and a policy to provide for the compatibility of adjacent land uses (Rule 9J-5.006(3)(c)2, Florida Administrative Code). Petitioner has alleged that the Plan amendment does not discourage urban sprawl (Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g)1, Florida Administrative Code). For the reasons already discussed, the Plan amendment is not inconsistent with these urban-sprawl provisions. 4. Transportation Facilities Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to update the Capital Improvements and Traffic Circulation elements at the time of adopting the Plan amendment is inconsistent with the criteria of basing the Plan amendment on a land use suitability analysis (Rule 9J-5.006(2), Florida Administrative Code); including all of the required elements in a future land use map (Rule 9J-5.006(4), Florida Administrative Code) (except with respect to the omitted items already found to result in an inconsistency); basing the Plan amendment on data concerning needed transportation improvements (Rule 9J-5.016(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code); basing the Plan amendment on analysis concerning the fiscal implications of public-facility deficiencies and a prioritization of needed public facilities by type of facility (Rule 9J-5.016(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code); including objectives to use the capital improvements element to accommodate future growth (Rule 9J-5.016(3)(b)1, Florida Administrative Code), to coordinate land use decisions and available or projected fiscal resources with a schedule of capital improvements that maintains adopted level of service standards and meets the existing and future facility needs (Rule 9J-5.016(3)(b)3, Florida Administrative Code), to demonstrate the ability to provide or require the provision of the improvements identified as necessary elsewhere in the Plan and to manage the land development process so that public facility needs created by previously issued development orders or future development do not exceed Respondent's ability to fund and provide or require provision of the needed capital improvements (Rule 9J-5.016(3)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code); and to coordinate the transportation system with the FLUM and ensure that existing and proposed population densities, housing and employment patterns, and land uses are consistent with the transportation modes and services proposed to serve these areas (Rule 9J-5.019(4)(b)2, Florida Administrative Code); and including a policy to set peak-hour LOS standards to ensure that adequate facility capacity will be provided to serve the existing and future land uses (Rule 9J-5.019(4)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code). For the reasons already discussed, the Plan is not inconsistent with these provisions. Inconsistency with State Comprehensive Plan For the reasons already discussed, Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan amendment is inconsistent with the cited provisions of the State Comprehensive Plan.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that, pursuant to Section 163.3184(10), the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the plan amendment is not in compliance due to the omissions of conservation uses, wetlands, and floodplains from the future land use map and the failure of the adoption ordinance to comply with Section 166.041(2), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen R. Fowler Assistant General Counsel David Jordan Deputy General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Kenneth W. Buchman City Attorney City of Plant City 212 North Collins Street Plant City, Florida 33566 Steven M. Seibert Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Administration Commission Growth Management and Strategic Planning 2105 Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact The Department as the State Land Planning Agency is charged with the responsibility of reviewing the Comprehensive Plans submitted by local governments. Following such review conducted pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, the Department is to determine whether the plan submitted is "in compliance" or "not in compliance" with applicable statutes and rules employed in the review process. McIntosh is a local government which adopted its Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. The McIntosh Comprehensive Plan was adopted was received by the Department on July 24, 1992. On September 4, 1992, the Department published Notice of Intent to find the Comprehensive Plan "in compliance" with applicable statutes and rules. McIntosh is a town of approximately 450 acres in size, which had a residential population in 1990 of 411 and was projected to increase population by the year 2000 to 418 people. Single family residential and agricultural land uses are the predominant land uses in the community. Petitioner Harris owns property within the incorporated limits of McIntosh. He owns and operates Sportsman Cove, a business located on Orange Lake. Portions of Orange Lake are found within the corporate limits of McIntosh where Harris conducts his business. Harris owns blocks 35 and 36 and portions of blocks 37, 53 and 54 within the corporate limits. His business involves 49 licensed mobile home sites and a number of "RV" sites located on approximately 4.648 acres along the shore of Orange Lake. He also operates a fish camp there. When the Comprehensive Plan was being prepared Harris submitted written and oral comments, objections and recommendations pertaining to the plan. He is a person affected by the adopted Comprehensive Plan. Colwell owns property in the incorporated limits of McIntosh. She owns and operates the McIntosh Fish Camp which has 8 mobile home sites and 5 "RV" sites along the shore line of Orange Lake within the town limits. Colwell submitted written and oral comments, objections and recommendations during the process of review and adoption of the Comprehensive Plan. Colwell is a person affected by the adopted Comprehensive Plan. The fish camp operations and "RV" sites of Harris and Colwell are classified in the Comprehensive Plan as lakefront commercial. The Stott's own property in the incorporated limits of McIntosh. That ownership includes blocks 1, 2, 13, 14 and 15 constituted of 13.6 acres, a portion of which is located on the shore of Orange Lake. In 1986 part of their property was used as a restaurant for about a year. The Stott's engaged in a bait business for approximately a year beyond that point. In the past prior to the plan adoption, there had been a fish camp located at blocks 1 and 15 with cabins and camper sites. These blocks are located adjacent to Orange Lake and are classified lake front residential in the Comprehensive Plan. At the time of hearing the property was not being operated as a fish camp. In the past lots 2, 13 and 14 had been used by the Stott's for unspecified light industry. The Stotts submitted written and oral comments, objections and recommendations during the plan review and adoption process. The Stotts are persons affected by the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan. The notice that was provided on September 4, 1992 concerning the intent to find the Comprehensive Plan "in compliance" made mention that the adopted plan would be available for public inspection Monday through Friday, with the exception of legal holidays. The location contemplated for inspection was the McIntosh Town Hall, Clerk's Office, at 5975 Avenue G, McIntosh, Florida. A problem arose concerning the opportunity to inspect the adopted Comprehensive Plan. The problem was occasioned by an illness to the Town Clerk. This influenced petitioners' ability to review the adopted plan and to timely submit their challenges to the decision to find the Plan in compliance. Under the circumstances a slight delay in conforming to the 21 day requirement for filing the petitions in challenge to the Comprehensive Plan is acceptable. With some inconvenience to Petitioners, persons other than the Town Clerk offered assistance in making the adopted plan available for inspection. Nonetheless, petitioners were afforded sufficient opportunity to apprise themselves concerning the contents of the adopted plan when considered in the context of their participation in the overall process for adopting the McIntosh Comprehensive Plan. The complications experienced in reviewing the adopted Comprehensive Plan did not compromise the ability of these petitioners to advance their claims in a setting in which other procedural requirements for plan adoption, review and approval have been met. The inconvenience experienced by the petitioners in reviewing the adopted plan do not evidence a quality of prejudice that should form the basis for deciding that the plan is not in compliance with applicable statutes and rules. When the Town Council adopted the plan and established Policy 2.1.4.5 it intended to use the word "abandonment" where the written text found within the adopted plan at Page 2-23 uses the word "suspension." This mistake is evidenced by the minutes of the meeting for adoption where a motion was made to change the word "suspension" to "abandonment." In the course of the hearing the attorney for McIntosh stipulated that this was an error and that the written text would be changed to reflect the proper wording. With that change Policy 2.1.4.5 would read: Provisions in the Land Development Regulations shall discourage the continuance of existing inconsistent land uses within designated land uses. These provisions shall limit the expansion of inconsistent land usage and, upon a 90 days abandonment of the incompatible land use, require reversion to designated land uses. Petitioner Harris is not satisfied that the Figure 2-6, Page 2-11, which is a map of the wetlands within the incorporated town limits, in the Comprehensive Plan, is accurate. He claims that a lobe, which is an RV site on his property known as site 9C is not within the wetlands as shown on that map. He also takes issue with the designation in Figure 2-9, page 2-17, of the future land map which shows this lobe of property as conservation/open space. He perceives this property at site 9C to be uplands. By virtue of his own activities in May 1991 in which he arranged to have a survey performed on his property in the incorporated limits of McIntosh, Harris asserts that site 9C was not found to be wetlands then and is not wetlands now. When McIntosh designated the wetlands in the community through the use of the wetlands map and identified conservation/open space in the future land use map it was acting in accordance with legal requirements incumbent upon it in adopting the Comprehensive Plan. The specific designations of wetlands and conservation/open space areas are based upon appropriate data and analysis. The data was taken from a professionally accepted existing source and was the best available data. The work that was done in preparing the wetland mapping requirements was done by the same consulting firm which Harris had employed in May 1991, that is to say Environmental Service and Permitting, Inc. In preparing the wetlands survey for McIntosh the private consulting firm used ground-truthing, as well as a review of wetland mapping data sources to delineate the wetlands. The data consulted included the U.S.D.A. Soil Conservation Service Soil Survey of Marion County, U.S.G.S. Quadrangle maps for the Town of McIntosh, as well as a review of the McIntosh Land Planning Agency Drainage Map. Although Harris takes issue with the clarity of some of the maps depicting the lobe of property for his site 9C, the adopted plan is acceptable as it describes wetlands and conservation/open space to include his site 9C. Objective 7.1.1 at Page 7.4 establishes wetland setbacks within the town where it states: The Town of McIntosh shall protect the natural drainage features within and adjacent to the Town limits, by the establishment of the wetland setbacks, and compliance with State Water Quality standards, to be a part of the Land Development Regulation. In furtherance of this Objective, Policy 7.1.1.1 is set out at page 7- 4 where it states: Setbacks shall be established from the limit of wetlands landward to buildings, septic tanks and land coverage. The following setbacks shall be a part of the Land Development Regulations. Buildings shall be set back at a minimum of 75 feet. Septic tanks and drain fields shall be set back at a minimum of 200 feet. Impervious areas shall be set back at a minimum of 50 feet. Drainage Retention Areas shall be set back 25 feet. These set backs were arrived at by the Town Council having heard from the petitioners. In the face of remarks by the petitioners made in the adoption process the council reduced the set backs. While no specific data and analysis was offered to support the set backs, they are within limits which would be recommended by the Department to protect the wetlands resources. According to the Department, from a planning viewpoint, the mere existence of wetlands is sufficient to promote protections through the use of set backs. The set backs found within this Comprehensive Plan are appropriate. Moreover, the set backs associated with the protections of wetlands have the additional benefit of protecting Orange Lake, a Class III Outstanding Florida Water Body, entitled to special water quality protection. Protection of that water body is the responsibility of McIntosh in its comprehensive planning, together with other local governments and environmental regulators. Future land use classifications in the Comprehensive Plan are set out at Page 2-14. Property which abuts Lake Orange is classified as lake front residential and lake front commercial. Lake front residential is defined as: [T]his category allows a maximum of 2 units per acre. Dwelling units includes: single family houses and mobile homes. Maximum coverage of 35% and maximum building height of 35 feet. Lake front commercial is defined as: this category allows fish camps, marinas, and recreational vehicle parks. Maximum coverage of 50% and a maximum building height of 35 feet." These classifications and densities protect natural resources to include the wetlands and Orange Lake and are appropriate. Petitioners Harris and Colwell may take advantage of the lake front commercial for their fish camp operations and "RV" sites. Stott is not entitled to take advantage of the lake front commercial classification in that her property did not include a fish camp and recreational vehicle operations at the time the plan was adopted. Petitioners have failed to show to the exclusion of fair debate that the adopted Comprehensive Plan is not "in compliance" with applicable statutes and rules concerning the issues raised in the challenges to the determination to find the Comprehensive Plan "in compliance."
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds the Town of McIntosh Comprehensive Plan to be "in compliance" and dismisses the petitions. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties: Harris' Facts: This paragraph is not relevant in that it was not alleged in the petition. This paragraph in its various parts concerning available low and moderate income housing and the densities is rejected in its suggestion that the Comprehensive Plan is not acceptable. This paragraph is rejected in its suggestion that the seasonal population for dwelling units affiliated with fish camp operations should cause a reconsideration of the classifications and densities for land use. This paragraph is ejected in its legal conclusion. 5-8 These paragraphs are not relevant in that these issues were not set out in the petition. 9, 10 To the extent that paragraphs 9 and 10 describe concerns about the treatment in the Comprehensive Plan of wetlands and comment critically on wetlands protections, the proposed findings of facts are rejected. Colwell's Facts: The unnumbered facts proposed are subordinate to facts found, with the exception that the changes in Orange Lake described even if true do not persuade that the wetlands protection of Orange Lake contemplated by the Comprehensive Plan is inappropriate. Stott's Facts: 1-2 Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. 3-5 Constitute legal argument. 6 It is acknowledged that the Orange Lake is used for fishing. 7-11 To the extent that paragraphs 7 through 11 suggest inappropriate identification and protection of the wetlands through the adopted Comprehensive Plan, the proposed facts are rejected. McIntosh's Facts: A-E, A-C, A-E Are subordinate to facts found with exception that the word "increase" in fact should be "decrease" when describing residential density. Department's Facts: 1, 2 Subordinate to facts found. Subordinate to facts found with exception that the reference to the property being within "unincorporated" limits should read "incorporated" limits. - 6 Subordinate to facts found. Subordinate to facts found with exception to the suggestion that the petitioners had to contact city council members to obtain a copy of the adopted plan in the absence of the clerk. - 20 Subordinate to facts found. Not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. - 26 Subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Jerry Harris P. O. Box 107 McIntosh, FL 32664 Anna Colwell P. O. Box 135 McIntosh, FL 32664 Thomas C. Stott Marie Stott P. O. Box 551 McIntosh, FL 32664 David Wilcox, Esquire 425 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, FL 32652 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
The Issue The issue is whether the proposed site is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances.
Findings Of Fact NOTICE In compliance with Rule 17-17.151(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, notice of the hearing was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 2, 1992. A news release containing notice of the hearing was given to the media on September 21, 1992, and October 21, 1992. A copy of the public notice was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the chief executives of the local authority responsible for zoning and land use planning in Dade County, in compliance with Rule 17-17.151(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the public notice was posted at the site in compliance with Rule 17-17.151(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, notice was published on September 25, 1992, in the Miami Review, a newspaper of general circulation in Dade County, in compliance with Rule 17-17.151(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. LAND USE AND ZONING CONPLIANCE The proposed expansion of Dade County's Resource Recovery Facility, as set forth in its Site Certification Application, will be within the confines of the certified site of the existing resource recovery facility. Hence, that existing site carries a presumption that its current use is consistent with land use considerations. The site of the proposed expansion is consistent with the Dade County Comprehensive Development Master Plan (Dade Master Plan) pursuant to the Growth Management Act of 1985. More particularly, the site has a land use designation of "Institutional and Public Facility" on the Future Land Use Plan Map of the Dade Master Plan. The "Institutional and Public Facility" designation permits the construction and operation of a resource recovery facility. Also, the proposed expansion of Dade County's Resource Recovery Facility is consistent with: Objective 5 and Policies 5-A and 5-B as set forth in the interpretive text to the Land Use Element of the Dade Master Plan; Objective 3 and Policies 3-A, 3-B, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E and 3-F of the Conservation Element of the Dade Master Plan; and Policies 1-K and 4-B of the Water, Sewer and Solid Waste Elements of the Dade Master Plan. The existing site is presently within the GU interim district. Resolution R-569-75, which granted county approval for the existing site, satisfies the need to show compliance with the zoning ordinance. The proposed expansion of the Dade County Resource Recovery Facility is consistent with the zoning code found in Chapter 33 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County as well as Resolution R-569-75.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Siting Board, enter a Final Order determining that the site of the proposed Dade County expansion of its resource recovery facility is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of November, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMNENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4672EPP The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Applicant, Dade County Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1); 5(2); 6(4); and 7(5). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross McVoy, Attorney at Law Fine Jacobson Schwartz Nash & Block 215 South Monroe, Suite 804 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1859 Stanley B. Price, Attorney at Law Fine Jacobson Schwartz Nash & Block 100 Southeast 2nd Street Suite 3600 Miami, Florida 33131-2130 Representing the Applicant Richard Donelan Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Representing DER Hamilton S. Oven, Jr. Office of Siting Coordination Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Gail Fels Assistant County Attorney Metro Dade Center, Suite 2800 111 Northwest First Street Miami, Florida 33128 Representing Dade County Lucky T. Osho Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Representing DCA William H. Roberts Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Representing DOT Toni M. Leidy Attorney at Law South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Representing SFWMD Michael Palecki, Chief Bureau of Electric & Gas Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Representing PSC M. B. Adelson IV Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., MS-35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Representing DNR James Antista, General Counsel Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission Bryant Building 630 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Representing GFWFC Carolyn Dekle, Executive Director Sam Goren, Attorney at Law South Florida Regional Planning Council 3440 Hollywood Boulevard, Suite 140 Hollywood, Florida 33021 Representing South Florida Regional Planning Council David M. DeMaio Attorney at Law One Costa del Sol Boulevard Miami, Florida 33178 Representing West Dade Federation of Homeowner Associations Honorable Lawton Chiles Honorable Jim Smith Governor Secretary of State State of Florida State of Florida The Capitol The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Robert A. Butterworth Honorable Tom Gallagher Attorney General Treasurer and Insurance State of Florida Commissioner The Capitol State of Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Honorable Gerald A. Lewis State of Florida Comptroller The Capitol State of Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Conclusions An Administrati ve Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
The Issue Whether the amendment to the Wakulla County Comprehensive Plan adopted by the Board of Commissioners of Wakulla County in Ordinance No. 2002-28 is "in compliance" as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Wakulla County Wakulla County sits on the western side of the Big Bend, an area of Florida that joins its panhandle to the state's peninsula separating the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Bounded on the north by Leon County, on the east by Jefferson County, on the west by Franklin and Liberty Counties, and on the south by the Gulf, more than 67 percent of the land area of Wakulla County is in public ownership. The bulk of publicly owned lands is in the Apalachicola National Forest. The land area of the County under public ownership is designated Conservation on the County's Future Land Use Map (the FLUM). Under the County's Comprehensive Plan only publicly- owned lands may be designated Conservation. The publicly-owned land lies mostly in the western portion of the County although it extends into the eastern half at the County's southern edge along the coast. Accordingly, almost all of the land area available for development to serve the population, including the City of Crawfordville, lies within the eastern portion of the County. There are two Urban designations under the County's Comprehensive Plan: Urban-1 and Urban-2. There are three areas in the eastern half of the county that have received Urban designations: Panacea and Shell Point, on the coast, and an area in and around the City of Crawfordville. Viewed on a percentage basis, Wakulla County has emerged recently as one of the fastest growing counties in the state. Professionals and retirees account for some of this growth and have served to increase the demand for new subdivisions with homes larger than traditional homes in the county. Geomorphology One of the most distinctive aspects of the County is its geomorphology. It lies entirely within the Gulf Coastal Lowlands physiographic province described by Florida Geological Survey's Bulletin No. 60 as: . . . characterized by generally flat, sandy terrain [that] extends from the coast inland to approximately the 100 foot contour line. In the panhandle of Florida, the east-west trending Cody Scarp forms the boundary between the Gulf Coastal Lowlands and the topographically higher Tallahassee hills to the north. In Wakulla County, the Gulf Coastal Lowlands include the poorly-drained pine flatwoods, swamps, and river basins that extend from the Gulf north into Leon County . . . . [T]he Gulf Coastal Lowlands are locally divided into a series of geomorphic subzones. (Petitioners' Ex. 60, p. 4). A geomorphic subzone that occupies almost all of the eastern half of Wakulla County is the Woodville Karst Plain. The Woodville Karst Plain With extensions into southern Leon County and western Jefferson County, the Woodville Karst Plain takes up almost all of the eastern part of Wakulla County, that is the portion of the county east of the Apalachicola National Forest. It is described by the Florida Geographical Survey, (FGS) an entity within the Department of Environmental Regulation as follows: East of a line drawn roughly north-south through the towns of Crawfordville and Panacea, the topography is comprised of an essentially flat veneer of sand overlying karstic limestone bedrock. Elevations average less that 35 feet above [mean sea level]. * * * The Woodville Karst Plain comprises the entire eastern portion of Wakulla County. Bounded on the west by the Apalachicola Coastal Lowlands, it extends eastward into Jefferson County and north to the Cody Scarp. A surface veneer of generally less than 20 feet of quartz sand lies on the karstic St. Marks Formation and Suwannee Limestone. The result is a topography of low sand dunes and sinkholes sloping gently towards the coast. Vegetation patterns on the plain vary with the degree of drainage. High and well-drained relict sand dunes at the north edge of the plain support a flora of pines, black-jack, and turkey oak trees. In contrast, wetter areas to the south are populated by cypress and bay trees . . . . Id., p. 7. The distinctiveness of the geomorphology of eastern Wakulla County is due to the Woodville Karst Plain's numerous karst features. Karst Features Karst features result when the limestone bedrock has been eroded by acidic rain water. If the erosion is sufficient to dissolve through the limestone sub-strata in a vertical fashion, there occur sinkholes or "Karst windows," a direct connection between the surface water and the aquifer. A wetland may be a karst feature, as well, although geologic tests are necessary to confirm whether a wetland is, in fact, a karst feature. A karst aquifer like the one below the Woodville Karst Plain is a limestone aquifer where extensive dissolution of limestone has occurred as the result of the acidic water interacting with it. If one were to examine the plain from above with the perspective of seeing the holes in the rock that lead to the aquifer, the plain would look like Swiss cheese. Because of the scattering of karst windows, sinkholes, caves and other features that give Karst topography a resemblance to Swiss cheese, Karst topographies like the Woodville Karst Plain are "typically highly vulnerable to contamination." Id. In karst settings where the aquifer is unconfined, as in the case of the Woodville Karst Plain, common contaminants such as fertilizers or household chemicals that reach or are deposited on the land surface are rapidly recharged to the aquifer through percolation or overland flow to a sinkhole. The Woodville Karst Plain's nature as an area of high recharge to the Floridan Aquifer is also promoted by its thin layer of clean sand that overlies the limestone. There are karst features, such as sinkholes, caves, springs and wetlands associated with these features throughout the State of Florida. These features put the state in a "fairly unique position." (Tr. 365). Among the prominent karst features in the Woodville Karst Plain that were the subject of evidence at the hearing are three: Wakulla Springs, the Spring Creek series of submarine spring vents, and Swirling Sink, the sinkhole into which Lost Creek flows at its termination not far from the Property at issue in this proceeding. Wakulla Springs A prominent feature of the Woodville Karst Plain, Wakulla Springs is a system of caves or conduits through which underground water flows before reaching the surface. It is located to the northeast of the Property at issue in this proceeding. Pollutants affecting Wakulla Springs come from the City of Tallahassee upgradient from the Springs. The contamination "stems from storm events, rain events, and runoff from the City of Tallahassee." (Tr. 391). The evidence in this proceeding did not establish that development on the Property will create adverse impacts to Wakulla Springs because the Property is downgradient from Wakulla Springs. There is another set of springs at issue in this proceeding for which the evidence leads to different conclusions: the fresh water springs the waters of which flow from Spring Creek through Karst features to discharge into the salt waters of the Gulf. Spring Creek Springs The Spring Creek submarine group, a series of seven spring vents that discharge fresh water into the Gulf of Mexico, begin at Spring Creek, five or six miles to the southeast of the property. Like Wakulla Springs, water flows through caves and conduits before emerging. Unlike Wakulla Springs in which the water flows only to the surface of land, waters from the Spring Creek group flow into the Gulf of Mexico. Freshwater springs in the state of Florida are estimated to number nearly 600. A first magnitude spring is one that "produce[s] the greatest amount of water." Petitioners' 54, p. 9. Of Florida's 33 first magnitude springs, the Spring Creek submarine group is the largest. The Spring group, therefore, is also the largest spring of the 600 or so in our State, the totality of which "may be the largest concentration of freshwater springs on Earth." Id., at 1. "Florida's Springs, Strategies for Protection and Restoration," prepared for the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation and the Citizens of the State of Florida, by The Florida Springs Task Force in November of 2002, was data available to the County and DCA when the Amendment was considered. It states: A spring is only as healthy as its recharge basin . . . The groundwater that feeds springs is recharged by seepage from the surface through direct conduits such as sinkholes. Because of this, the health of spring systems is directly influenced by activities and land uses within the spring recharge basin. (Petitioners' Ex. 54, p. 11). The Florida Geological Survey is in the Division or Resource Assessment and Management in the Department of Environmental Protection. Its Special Publication No. 47 (the Special Publication), is entitled "The Spring Creek Submarine Group, Wakulla County, Florida," and is dated 2001. It states that "[g]round-water flow in the karst drainage system of the upper Floridan aquifer system of the Woodville Karst Plain is likely controlled in part by the fracture (lineament) pattern in the carbonate bedrock . . . ." Petitioners' No. 61, p. 10. A lineament is a "geologic term for a linear fracture or fault that typically is observed either in the field or through photographic analysis." (Tr. 395). The question "would . . . karst features be part of what caused a geologist to conclude that a lineament was present," elicted this response from Tim Hazlett, Ph.D., an expert in hydrogeology: Yes. The karst features and the lineaments typically coincide in karst environments because the lineaments provide preferential pathways for flows, so you'll get sinkholes, for example, that line up along a lineament. That's very typical in a karst situation. Id. The narrative in the Special Publication refers to Figure 7 which shows the fracture pattern of lineaments that run along Lost Creek and then continues in a southeasterly direction to Spring Creek. The Figure indicates "[p]ossible underground flow from Lost Creek to Spring Creek." Petitioners' No. 61, p. 11. The Special Publication states that "[b]ased on the predominant ground-water pattern of the Woodville Karst Plain, and the trend of the lineaments associated with both Lost Creek and Spring Creek, it is postulated that the upgradient source of groundwater supplying the Spring Creek springs is, at least in part, the surface water from Lost Creek. Lost Creek Originating in the Apalachicola National Forest just north of the county line, Lost Creek flows to the southeast. After crossing the Leon County line, it rambles roughly nine miles through forested lands in Wakulla County. The creek terminates when it turns underground into Swirling Sink, a sinkhole at a point southwest of the center of Crawfordville. As Intervenor Suber states in review of Petitioner Lambou's testimony, "Lost Creek is a surface stream that flows from Leon County, southeast through western Wakulla County to the western edge of the Woodville Karst Plain, where it disappears underground approximately a mile west of Crawfordville at a bridge at U.S. 319." Intervenor's Proposed Recommended Order, Para. 53, p. 15. When Lost Creek floods, waters to the southeast of the point at which the creek "disappears" form a sump or bowl in an area of low elevation that is contained within the bounds of State Road 319, State Road 98 and Rehwinkle Road. Also contained within these bounds and in the midst of the sump is the site of that with which this proceeding is concerned: the Property. The Property The Property is a 266-acre undeveloped tract located in the County off of Rehwinkel Road southeast of the City of Crawfordville. Formerly owned by St. Joe Timber Company, it is now owned by David F. Harvey, Rhonda K. Harvey, and L. F. Young. The timber company had used the Property for silviculture. The owners intend to sell it to Brad Suber for development purposes. The Property is bisected by a bay/cypress wetland. It occupies "on the order of 85 . . . [to] 86 acres" (tr. 580) of the Property. The wetland is described by others including Intervenor Suber as "large" (Suber PRO, p. 4, para. 13). The acreage it occupies on the Property will be referred-to in this order as the "Large Wetland." A report entitled "Environmental Report on Vegetation Communities, Wetlands, Protected Species and Wildlife on Rehwinkel Road Parcel Wakulla County, Florida" was prepared by Florida Environmental & Land Services, Inc., at the request of Intervenor Suber. On page 3 of the report, the Large Wetland is described: AREA 5 - Large bay/cypress wetland through center of parcel. This area comprises approximately 85 acres of the parcel. The swamp characteristics were similar throughout the swamp (except in AREA 9). Dominant tree species include bald cypress, black gum, red maple, sweetbay magnolia, and swamp tupelo. Many of the titi individuals were large enough to consider in the canopy layer. There were few shrubs other than titi and young individuals of the canopy species. There was essentially no groundcover layer because of long inundation periods, the winter sampling and a closed canopy. The trees showed evidence of long periods of inundation such as lichen lines, buttressing, hummocking, and stained trunks. There was heavy inundation within the access roads. No flows were evident. Joint Ex. 2, p. 367, (e.s.) The reference to the acreage of the Large Wetland was not intended to be a "definitive wetland delineation," rather "it was intended to just give an idea of [the] size . . . of the [Large] [W]etland . . . " (Tr. 859). Other evidence of record, however, establishes that the approximation was quite accurate. (See paragraphs 56 and 57, below). The Large Wetland occupies at least 85 acres of the Property. A delineation using an acceptable current methodology could yield a figure significantly more than 85 acres. Portions of the Large Wetland are within the 100-year flood plain and are subject to flooding. The Large Wetland extends roughly from the east side of the Property to the west where it connects with the Lost Creek watershed. The Property also contains a portion of an isolated cypress swamp and numerous small wet depressional areas, each less than two acres in size, on the Northern Portion of the site. The acreage of wetlands in the Northern Parcel is not included in any reference in this order to the acreage of the Large Wetland. The Property does not currently contain any significant residential or non-residential development or structures. Near-by Land Uses The Property is contiguous to land with the following FLUM designations: Urban-1 and Agriculture to the north; Rural- 1 and Rural-2 to the east and southeast; and Agriculture to the southwest and west. Lands located to the north, east and southeast of the Property are developed with scattered low density residential uses or are vacant. These lands include nearby agricultural land and a 1,100-acre tract recently re-designated Rural-1 from Agriculture. Land use bordering the property on the south, southwest and west is Agriculture. There is also a golf course to the south. The designation of use of the land bordering the Property on the southeast is Rural-2. Rural-1, Rural-2, and Agriculture Rural-1, also referred to by the Wakulla County Comprehensive Plan (the Plan) as "Agriculture/Rural Fringe," is a conventional agriculture and low density residential designation. Residential densities in the Rural-1 future land use category are one unit per five acres on paved County or state roadways, or one dwelling unit per ten acre on unpaved roadways. Rural-2, the designation of twenty of the acres of the Property re-designated by the Ordinance, is described in the Plan: Description - This designation provides for development of rural areas near emerging urban areas with a range of agricultural, residential, and supporting limited commercial activities. In addition, this classification includes some existing subdivisions. Specific areas for residential and commercial development in this designation are not shown on the map but are governed by the policies in this section which include criteria for the different kinds of development. (Joint Ex. 3, FLUE-8). The description states that existing rural enclaves, those "isolated from traditional rural or urban services such as central water and sewer service" (id.), are also identified by the Rural-2 designation. Industrial uses are prohibited in Rural-2. Commercial development on arterial and collector roads subject to conditions is permitted. Public land use including schools subject to certain conditions is permitted. Residential development is permitted, as are "[g]eneral agriculture and forestry activities . . . along with accessory activities." Id. The density limitations for residential in Rural-2 are "up to one (1) unit per two (2) acres with central water service or one (1) dwelling unit per five (5) acres without." Id., at FLUE-8 and 9. Actual density permitted, however, is based on access: Where average lot sizes (exclusive of open space in cluster or PUD developments) are less than (5) acres, each lot shall have frontage on a paved public road or on a private road maintained by an owners association and meeting the standards of Traffic Circulation Element Policy 2.3. Where average lot sizes . . . are greater than five (5) acres but less than ten (10) acres, each lot shall have frontage on a public road or on a private road meeting [certain standards]. Where average lot sizes . . . are ten (10) acres or more, access shall be provided. Id., at FLUE-9. The Plan has requirements for calculating residential density in areas that are wetlands or habitats for threatened or endangered species or wetlands. Habitat density is "maintained at the residential land use density for that land use designation." Id. Wetland density is "at an overall density of one (1) unit per twenty (20) acres." Id. Agriculture is also referred to in the Plan as "Primary Agriculture." Description - This designation is designed to address large scale timber industry and/or farming activities on privately owned property, along with limited non- agricultural uses. Joint Ex. 3, p. FLUE-4, Future Land Use Policy 1.2.2.(1). Uses allowed include forestry and agricultural uses and processing activities, including ancillary processing uses such as sawmills, residential uses at a maximum overall density of one unit per 20 acres, and public uses. Id., Policy 1.2.2.(2) and (3). Application for a Map Amendment The process that led to the Ordinance's passage in October of 2002 commenced on December 28, 2001, with the submission of the Owners' application for a comprehensive plan map amendment. The Owners applied for an amendment that changed all 266 acres, the 246 acres of Agriculture and the 20 or Rural- 2, to Urban-1. Urban-1, is also referred to in the Plan as "Urban Fringe." Description - This designation provides for higher density development in rural areas which are near urban areas or which are intended to become urban during the planning period. When full urban services are in place, an area designated for Urban-1 shall be converted to Urban-2 through the plan amendment process. This designation also accommodates existing clusters of development not strictly consistent with the Rural designation. Joint Ex. 3, p. FLUE-10, Future Land Use Element Policy 1.2.5.(1). Permitted uses under Urban 1 include residential and commercial development. Public uses including schools are permitted under certain circumstances. Light industrial and manufacturing uses may be permitted subject to location and compatibility standards. Among the density/intensity limitations in 1.2.5 of the Plan are residential at one unit an acre where no central sewer is available and at two units an acre where soil tests determine suitability for septic tanks and where central water is available. Under the proposed amendment, therefore, the maximum density allowable on 266 acres of Urban-1 would be 524 units. As explained elsewhere in this order, however, only 202 acres were re-designated Urban-1, making 404 units the maximum density pursuant to the re-designation. Transmission to DCA The proposed map amendment and two proposed text amendments were transmitted to DCA for review on May 6, 2002, with copies to various review agencies. Included in the plan amendment transmittal package was a copy of a recorded agreement entered by the property owners and Wakulla County entitled "A Development Agreement Restricting the Density of a Comprehensive Plan Amendment." Joint Ex. 1, p. The agreement restricts development on the 266-acre property "to facilitate the Owner's request" to "residential density maximum of one dwelling unit to the acre of uplands and developed on central sewer and water" Joint Ex. 1, p. 65. The restriction "shall run with the land and permanently restrict the use of the said land." Id. p. 66. Despite the maximum density allowable under the Amendment of 404 units, the Development Agreement restricts maximum density to 202 units. Development Agreements are data. Nonetheless, as explained by Charles Gauthier, the DCA's Chief of the Bureau of Local Planning, The review of future land use map amendments needs to be based on the maximum development potential available through the comprehensive plan. Development agreements, while important information, are outside the plan, so the level of development or other commitments in a development agreement aren't part of the direct plan or review, but its important information to understand the specific development agreement that's occurring. (Tr. 118, 119). This testimony is taken to mean that DCA review of a Comprehensive Plan Amendment must be conducted on the basis of maximum allowable density under the Amendment even if that density is restricted by the Development Agreement. Other data in the agreement, however, such as data related to provision of public services is relevant to a "compliance" determination. Regional Planning Council Objection On June 13, 2002, the Apalachee Regional Planning Council (RPC) issued its report. The RPC objected to the map amendment proposed by the Owners on four grounds, each followed by a recommendation. The first three objections related to density, commercial use and access. The RPC recommended density of no more than one unit per acre, retention of square footage policies concerning commercial development and provision of additional access. The fourth objection and recommendation concerned wetlands and floodplain areas: Objection 4: Of the 266 acres proposed to be changed to Urban 1, approximately 100-110 acres are wetland and 130-140 acres are within the 100 year floodplain. Recommendation: Do not include the wetland and floodplain areas in the land use change. Joint Ex. 2, p. 204. State Agencies Other Than DCA The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) reported its review of the proposed change in a letter dated June 18, 2002. It provided comments and recommendations, also expressing concern about wetland and flood plain area protection: As indicated in the site assessment reports provided, a significant portion of the Rehwinkel Road Parcel is located within Flood Zone A on the Wakulla County Flood Insurance Rate Map, Panel #120315 0250 B (1983). The flood plain wetlands at the center of the site contain drainage soils (primarily Lakeland, Otela and Ortega sands). The uplands to the north also contain numerous wet depressional areas - likely karstic sinkhole features. The Department recommends that the proposed residential development be limited to upland areas outside of Flood Zone A and that wetland/floodplain areas be given a conservation designation to prevent encroachment after initial construction. Prior to finalizing infrastructure development plans for the subject parcel, delineation and state verification of the landward extent of wetlands should be obtained, in accordance with the guidelines of Rule 62-340, F.A.C. Because the proposed development would be located on highly- permeable soils adjacent to seasonally inundated areas, we recommend that the applicant consider a full range of planning strategies to buffer wetlands/floodplain, limit impervious surfaces and treat stormwater to protect groundwater and nearby surface water resources. The proposed central water and sewer systems will reduce potential water quantity and quality impacts from potable water well withdrawals and septic tank system contamination. Early coordination of project plans with the Department's Northwest District Branch Office in Tallahassee is recommended to facilitate infrastructure design and prevent future permitting problems. Joint Ex. 2, p. 205. The Department of State reported that an archaeological site is recorded as a "general vicinity" site adjacent to the Property and that "aboriginal 'house' sites" are reported throughout the area. Id., p. 192. It stressed the "county's responsibility to ensure its historic sites and properties are considered when land use changes occur" and recommended "that the county sponsor a systematic survey of this parcel before allowing any changes in land use which will increase its density or intensity." Id. The Department of Transportation (DOT) had no objections, comments or recommendations as of its June 4, 2002, communication by letter with DCA. The communications from the RPC, DEP, Department of State, and DOT were reviewed by DCA prior to its issuance of an ORC Report. ORC Report Issuance of an "Objections, Recommendations and Comments" Report (an ORC) by the Department of Community Affairs is done whenever DCA has problems with a comprehensive plan amendment that could lead to a finding that the amendment was not in compliance if left unresolved. An ORC was issued to Wakulla County for the proposed FLUM amendment. The ORC, under cover of a letter to the Chairman of the Wakulla County Board of Commissioner dated July 18, 2002, stated the following: Objections, Proposed Amendment 3: The proposed map amendment does not demonstrate the suitability of this site for development considering the extensive wetlands and floodplains in the areas that are proposed for conversion to the Urban-1 Future Land Use Category. The proximity to the water table to the land surface, existing karst sinkhole features, extensive wetlands and 100 year floodplain indicate a high potential for water quality degradation and ground water contamination. Development of the southwestern portion of the site would require constructing road access through extensive wetlands and would place the singe access road within the 100 year floodplain. Potential isolation of this site during floods creates the potential for public safety, emergency management and evacuation problems. The proposed amendment is not consistent with Rule 9J-5.006(2)(b)1. and (2)(e), FAC, concerning site suitability; Rule 9J-5.-- 6(3)(b)4, requiring protection of natural resources; Chapter 163.3178(d)(d) concerning public evacuation during natural disasters; and Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c) and Chapter 163.3177(6)(a) concerning need analysis. Recommendations: The land use change should be limited to the northern parcel with road access. The large, contiguous areas of wetlands and floodplain areas and the southern isolated parcel should not be included in this proposed land use change to the Urban-1 Future land Use Category at this time. Designation of the wetland areas as Urban on the FLUM implies a development potential. Wetlands and floodplains should be designated appropriately on the FLUM to prevent encroachment from incompatible land uses. Currently, the Conservation Future Land Use Category as written in the County's comprehensive plan is intended only for publically [sic] owned lands. This category could be amended to also afford protection to environmentally sensitive, privately owned land. A needs analysis of the Urban 1 and 2 areas of Crawfordville should be done to support the need for the proposed land change. Consistency with Chapter 187, Florida Statutes. The proposed amendment is not consistent with the following provisions of Chapter 187, FS: !87.201(10), FS, [sic] concerning the protection of ecological systems such as wetlands. 187.201(16), FS, concerning direction development to areas that can accommodate growth in an environmentally acceptable manner and the separation of urban and rural uses. By addressing the objections noted in Section I., these inconsistencies with Chapter 187, FS, can be addressed. Joint Ex. 2, p. 223-4. An ORC Report provides an opportunity for DCA to raise questions about a proposed plan amendment and seek additional information. If the local government rejects DCA's recommendation, that does not necessarily mean that a plan amendment will be found not in compliance. Response to the ORC In response to the ORC, the County left 64 acres of the Large Wetland under the Agriculture designation. It did so after determining the Large Wetland to constitute 63.8399 acres of the Property. In computing the size of the Large Wetland, the County did not follow DEP's recommendation that it use the delineation methodology prescribed by Rule 63-340, Florida Administrative Code. Instead, the County used a Florida Land Use, Cover and Forms Classification System map, (the FLUCCS), the source of which was "FDEP," that shows the Large Wetland to be "63.8399 acres," (Joint Ex. 2, p. 196, 197), or slightly less than 64 acres. No data other than the FLUCCS was used by the County in determining the size of the wetland. The 64 or so acres identified on the FLUCCS was omitted from the proposed land use change and was left under the pre-amendment Agriculture designation as suggested by DCA in its ORC. Other available data, existing at the time of the Amendment, such as an orthoquad aerial depiction, demonstrate that the Large Wetland is significantly larger than 64 acres. Using soil maps and a planimeter, as explained by Petitioners' witness Craig Diamond: . . . generated large[] numbers. The flood plain is far greater than the wetlands on site, and the soils maps . . ., includes some . . . soils that are saturated or that exhibit moderate constraints with regard to drainfields. You . . . end up with number greater than 85 acres . . ., it's up in the hundred acre-plus range. (Id.) The decision of the County to leave only 64 acres of the Large Wetland was not based on the best available data. Use of available data existing at the time of the Amendment and that is better than the FLUCCS, such as aerial photography, soil maps, topographical maps and floodzone maps would have yielded a much higher number of acres than 64, just as did the approximation submitted with the proposed plan amendment by Mr. Suber. The size of the Large Wetland is at least 85 to 86 acres, and may be significantly greater. The Future Land Use Map Amendment On October 21, 2002, Wakulla County amended its Future Land Use Map (the FLUM). The Amendment was accomplished with the passage of Ordinance Number 2002-28, (the Ordinance) by the Board of County Commissioners of Wakulla County. The Amendment is described in the body of the Ordinance in technical terms: Future Land Use Map: Herein adopts the FLU Map revision as shown on the FLU Map dated October 21, 2002, consisting of: A revision or modification resulting from the adoption of the proposed County FLU Map Amendment Application Number CP01-05 of Amendment Cycle 2002-02, as cited in the ORC report by the Department of Community Affairs, from Agriculture and Rural-2 to Urban-1 Land Use Designation; Joint Ex. 1, Ordinance Number 2002-28, Amendment Ordinance, Page Three, Section 2. In essence, the Amendment changed to Urban-1, two FLUM designations of the Property in Eastern Wakulla County. The designations were changed from Rural-2 as to 20 acres of the Property and from Agriculture as to 182 acres of the Property. The 64 acres of the property not re-designated as Urban-1 remained designated as Agriculture. Given the configuration of the 64 acres of the Property left under the Agriculture designation, there are three separate parcels in the Property that were re-designated Urban- One is a portion on the Property north of the parcel (the Northern Parcel) that contained the 20 acres that had been Rural-2, as well as acres that had been agriculture. The second is a small portion to the northwest of the property (the Sliver) that is surrounded, for the most part by the Large Wetland. The third is a portion on the Property south of the Large Wetland (the Southern Parcel). Transmission to DCA, Review and an "In Compliance" Determination The Map Amendment was transmitted to DCA for review on November 1, 2002. On December 11, 2002, DCA issued its Notice of Intent to find the adopted Map Amendment in compliance. On January 30, 2002, the Apalachee Regional Planning Council approved a recommendation from its staff that the Amendment was consistent with the Apalachee Strategic Regional Policy Plan. In the meantime, on January 2, 2003, DCA received the petition for formal administrative hearing that initiated this proceeding. The Parties Petitioners Robert Alessi, Ronald Capron, Chad Hanson, Victor Lambou, and David Westmark are all residents of Wakulla County and owners of property in the county. Alessi and Capron live adjacent to the site of the FLUM Amendment that is the subject of this proceeding. All five of the Petitioners submitted written or oral comments to Wakulla County during the period of time between transmittal of the Amendment to the Department for review and final adoption of the Amendment by Wakulla County. Wakulla County (the County) is a local government subject to the provisions of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. The County adopted the Amendment found "in compliance" by DCA that is the subject of this proceeding. The Department of Community Affairs (DCA or the Department) is the state land planning agency. It has the authority to administer and enforce the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (the Growth Management Act). Among its responsibilities is the review of local government comprehensive plans and amendments pursuant to the Growth Management Act. The Department's Notice of Intent to find the contested Amendment "in compliance" is the agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Intervenor Brad Suber is a resident of Wakulla County. He is the developer and contract vendee of the property that is the subject of this proceeding. Mr. Suber's contract with the Property's Owners obligates him to pursue the Amendment, zoning and permits for development of the property at his sole expense. Mr. Suber hired experts necessary to prepare and process the plan amendment application. Like the Petitioners, he also submitted written and oral comments to the County during the period of time between transmittal of the Amendment to DCA and final adoption of the Amendment by Wakulla County. The parties agree that the Petitioners and Intervenor Suber are affected persons as defined by the Growth Management Act with standing to participate in this proceeding. Petitioners' Challenge Petitioners raise issues that fall into seven categories: (1) failure to protect wetlands and other environmental resources; (2) lack of water and sewer; (3) flooding (4) lack of supporting data and analysis; (5) urban sprawl (6) lack of need for the amendment; and, (7) internal inconsistency with the existing Wakulla County Comprehensive Plan. Wetlands and Environmental Resources The County requires protection of the 100-year flood plain, prohibits disturbance of wetlands except to avoid a taking, requires that predevelopment water quality of wetlands be maintained, and requires that the water quality of Wakulla County's groundwater resources be maintained at or above state standards. Development is allowed in flood plains under the County's Plan, and flood plains are common throughout the eastern part of the County. The Comprehensive Plan's Objectives and Policies mitigate the impacts of a future land use map amendment. They do not excuse, however, an FLUM amendment that is based on data that is convincingly incorrect. The DRASTIC Maps referred to in Infrastructure Element Policy 1.3.1(2), show that all of eastern Wakulla County is in one of the environmentally sensitive categories. The Plan allows the use of septic tanks in these areas because if septic tanks were prohibited in environmentally sensitive areas, the limitation on development in eastern Wakulla County would be severe. The applicant submitted an environmental assessment of the property with the original plan amendment application. Figure 3 in the environmental report identifies the soil types and soil distribution on the property based on the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Soil Survey of Wakulla County, Florida, the data source referenced in Future Land Use Element Policy 5.12. Table 8 in the Soil Survey indicates whether the various soil types have slight, moderate, or severe constraints for the use of septic tanks for various types of buildings. The southern parcel is comprised of Lakeland sand and Otela fine sand. Both are considered upland soil types with only slight constraints for the use of septic tanks for dwellings without basements. The northern parcel consists of several soil types with the following constraints for use of septic tanks for dwellings without basements: 21 Lakeland Sand (predominant type) slight 17 Ortega fine sand slight 14 Ridgewood fine sand moderate 7 Otela fine sand slight 35 Rutledge severe Each of the above soil types is considered to be an upland soil, except for Rutledge soil located in the flood plain portion of the northern parcel. In addition, Plummer soil with severe constraints for use of septic tanks are located on the small area to the west of the northern parcel. These are not large areas compared to the remaining property and are not proposed for development in Mr. Suber's conceptual site plan. Soils with severe constraints are subject to state and local permitting standards at the development stage to insure that groundwater is not adversely affected. The Urban-1 future land use category authorizes residential uses at a density of two units per acre where soil tests determine suitability for septic tanks and where central water is available. The use of septic tanks on the property could adversely affect water quality by increasing the level of nitrates in the groundwater. The Wakulla County Comprehensive Plan contains the following objectives and policies related to septic tanks and water quality: OBJECTIVE 5: Development activities shall ensure the protection of natural and historic resources, and shall be limited where severe topographical and/or soil conditions exist. The land development codes shall be revised to implement this objective and the following policies: Policy 5.12: Proposed development in areas of severe soil limitations or topographic conditions, as identified in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Soil Survey of Wakulla County, Florida (dated March 1991), shall be subject to density limitations and performance standards. The land development regulations shall establish these limitations and standards, including, but not limited to, the requirement that all development not served by sewer systems meet Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) standards for septic systems, Rule 10D-6, F.A.C., and requirements that certification of soil suitability be submitted for the technical review process prior to permitting of commercial buildings. Policy 7.5: All development in areas without central sewer services shall be governed by the provisions of section 381.0065, F.S., regulating on-site sewage disposal systems, and Chapter 64E-6, F.A.C., which regulates the installation of individual sewerage disposal facilities, unless otherwise specified. (Joint Ex. 3, pp. FLUE-23, 26, 28, Future Land Use Element.) OBJECTIVE 1.3: The County will implement mandatory requirements for inspections, operations and maintenance of on-site wastewater treatment systems. Policy 1.3.1: Use of on-site wastewater treatment systems shall be limited to the following conditions: * * * (2) Use of septic tank systems or alternative systems for new development will be allowed subject to modification in areas that are environmentally sensitive based on FDEP's "DRASTIC" map and other sources deemed appropriate. Policy 1.3.3: Issuance of all development orders or permits will be conditioned upon demonstration of compliance with applicable federal, state and local permit requirements for on-site wastewater treatment systems. (Joint Ex. 3, pp. IE-3, 4, Infrastructure Element.) Findings related to Wetlands and Natural Resources are in paragraphs 6-26 and 28-33, above. Sewer and Water Currently, there are no water or sewer services at the site of the Property. Subject to amendment of the City of Sopchoppy's Comprehensive Plan, water to the Property can be provided by City of Sopchoppy Water, as stated in the plan amendment application and as relayed to the County Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners by Mr. Suber's engineer. County sewer lines are located within one or two miles of the Property in two locations. Although the provision of sewer services to the Property is the responsibility of Wakulla County, any sewer lines run to the Property will be constructed at the expense of the owners or developer. The lines will be conveyed to the County. Joe Richey, the County's Director of Community Development, testified that Wakulla County is the sewer provider, and that capacity is available to serve development of the subject property. Capacity is a term that relates to the size of the sewer plant. The existence of "capacity" does not mean the County has a plan or intends to provide sewer lines. Department staff recommended that DCA not find the amendment in compliance in part because there was no corresponding amendment to the capital improvements schedule setting out the time frame for when public facilities would occur, who was going to pay for them and who was responsible for maintaining them. While the County may not have a plan, the developer would be responsible for running sewer lines to the property and would turn the lines over to the County under the Development Agreement between the County and the property owners. The agreement reflects the commitment of both that the subject property be served by central sewer. There is no requirement that a local government have a future conditions map for water and sewer facilities. At some time before development on the subject property occurs, the County's Plan should be amended to reflect the provision of sewer services to the property if it is developed on sewer. It is not necessary, however, that Wakulla County amend its Capital Improvement Element of its Plan to reflect the provision of sewer service to the property concurrent with the subject future land use map amendment. The plan amendment application, the Development Agreement and the testimony at hearing reflect that the Property will be developed with central water and sewer. Flooding Department staff testified there was not enough information provided by the County on flooding problems associated with the Amendment: great deal of Wakulla County is in various hurricane evacuation zones . . . because of the limitations of the site being in a hundred-year flood plain and in a wetlands system, . . . if a hurricane or a storm event came through and the property was flooded, there would be difficulty evacuating the residents from that property. [DCA Staff] felt like the County had not provided us information to refute that. (Tr. 91, 92). But Joe Blanchard, Director of Wakulla County Emergency Management, testified that there is adequate road capacity on Rehwinkel Road to evacuate residents of 404 units, the maximum allowed under the Amendment. Director Blanchard also testified that if 404 units were built on the Property and were to be evacuated in the event of flooding, that there is not currently capacity to shelter them but that there is hope to have adequate shelter soon: We probably do not [have adequate shelter for 404 new units at the Property] . . . [T]hrough a grant hopefully we will have the Shadeville School very soon approved. It is now approved as a shelter, it just doesn't have the shutters in place. Once the Shadeville School is complete, we will have a surplus of shelter space. (Tr. 1089). He was not asked a question about current capacity to shelter residents of the 202 units to which the Property is restricted by the Development Agreement. "Storm surge is the abnormal rise in water level caused by the wind and pressure forces of a hurricane or tropical storm. Storm surge produces most of the flood damage and drownings associated with storms that make landfall or that closely approach a coastline." Petitioners' Ex. 21, Introduction. Most of the Property would be inundated by storm surge during a Category 2 Hurricane, a hurricane with less force and storm surge than a Category 3. (See Petitioners' Ex. 21, Plate No. 5. Petitioners offered no evidence at hearing, other than Mr. Blanchard's reference to evacuation in the event of a Category 3 hurricane, of the contents of an applicable county or regional hurricane evacuation plan. Data and Analysis Following the staff recommendation, DCA determined that "the data was somewhat weak and the analysis was weak, but . . . relevant, and given the nature of the amendment, ultimately appropriate." (Tr. 117). The data concerning the size of the Large Wetland was not merely weak. It was incorrect. It was also determined above the staff level at DCA that "there was a lack of adequate issues . . . adverse impacts to find the amendment not in compliance . . . essentially . . . there was a lot of smoke but no real fire with the amendment . . . [because] the staff recommendation was more based on the incomplete analysis." (Tr. 120, 121). From this record, it appears that with regard to wetlands incorrect data was used by the County. This data was not corrected when DCA conducted its review that led to its finding of "in compliance." Furthermore, the analysis conducted after the staff recommendation did not include available data and analysis that indicate adverse impacts to natural resources related to the Large Wetland. It must be recognized that each future land use category in the County's Plan that allows residential use contemplates that wetlands will be included in the category and limits densities in those wetlands. Furthermore, there is no express statutory or rule prohibition against including wetlands in a land use category that authorizes development, and the County's Plan, which does just that, has been found in compliance. That is not to condone, however, an amendment that is founded on incorrect data or incomplete analysis. This record demonstrates that the amendment designated at least 21 acres of the Large Wetland as Urban-1 and that the designation poses a potential for pollution to groundwater and surface waters. The amendment is not supported by available data and analysis concerning the wetlands and the impact development could have on natural resources. The County did not react to available data with regard to the wetlands and natural resources in an appropriate way when it designated 202 acres of the Property Urban-1. Need Both Intervenor's expert land use planner and the County's Director of Community Development testified that there is a need for the map amendment. The opinion of Intervenor's expert is generally based upon the location of the property adjacent to the urbanizing Crawfordville area; the fact that the number of units potentially authorized by the map amendment is largely offset by urban lands acquired by the state and federal governments in the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA) that are no longer available for urban development; continuing state acquisition efforts in environmentally sensitive areas; the relatively few future land use map amendments for residential uses that have occurred since Plan adoption; and an analysis of population projections compared to the residential development potential of the various future land use categories under the County's Comprehensive Plan. Rule 9J-5.006(2)(b) provides: (2) Land Use Analysis Requirements. The element shall be based upon the following analyses which support the comprehensive plan pursuant to subsection 9J-5.005(2), F.A.C. * * * An analysis of the character and magnitude of existing vacant and undeveloped land in order to determine its suitability for use, including, where available: 1. Gross vacant or undeveloped land area . . . . Wakulla County has not tracked development and does not have information available on undeveloped land. Since Rule 9J-5.006(2)(b)1. expressly requires an analysis of vacant or undeveloped land area only if the data is available, the amendment cannot be found not "in compliance" for failure to comply with Rule 9J-5.006(2)(b)1. Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c) requires: An analysis of the amount of land needed to accommodate the projected population, including: The categories of land use and their densities or intensities of use; The estimated gross acreage needed by category; and A description of the methodology used. The Property is located immediately adjacent to the City of Crawfordville urban area and other lands designated Urban-1 on the County's Future Land Use Map. The Courthouse in Crawfordville is the center of the County and is approximately 1.2 miles from the property. Crawfordville is the County seat where public buildings and services are located. It is the County's employment center, with banks, grocery stores, beauty salons, and other businesses, all within a few miles of the property. The only other areas of the County designated for urban development are in Panacea and Shell Point. Both of these areas are within the CHHA. The County's Comprehensive Plan contains policies to discourage high-density growth in the CHHA, direct population concentrations away from the CHHA, and limit public expenditures that subsidize development in the CHHA. It is more appropriate to encourage development adjacent to the growing Crawfordville area than in the CHHA or other areas of the County. In 1999, the State of Florida acquired 41 acres in the CHHA in Panacea for conservation and recreation land uses. This land is designated Urban-2 on the County's Future Land Use Map. The maximum potential residential density on the 41 acres acquired by the State was 164 dwelling units. In 2001, the federal government acquired 90+ acres near Shell Point for a wildlife refuge. This property is also in the CHHA and is designated Urban-1 on the County's Future Land Use Map. The maximum potential residential density on this 90+ acre acquisition is at least 180 dwelling units. Wakulla County is in the process of preparing a plan amendment to change the use of land for all government acquisitions of land that have occurred in the County. Based on the Future Land Use Map, all such acquisitions are redesignated to the Conservation future land use category, which is consistent with the public purposes for which the lands are acquired. The Amendment at issue in this case will result in a maximum potential increase of 375 residential units on the property, based strictly on the density limitations in the future land use categories. The combined maximum potential density on the properties acquired by the State and federal governments is 344 residential units. If the maximum development potential on the subject property is offset by the maximum development potential of the recently acquired public lands, the Amendment will increase the overall maximum potential residential density in Wakulla County by only 31 dwelling units. The analysis of Intervenor's expert contained a number of computational errors. These errors did not affect the offset of the loss of residential land purchased by government. Urban Sprawl When taken as a whole, the Amendment does not contribute to urban sprawl. The property abuts urban areas near the "downtown" section of Crawfordville. It is within a development corridor for the County. It is a relatively small parcel of land. Internal Inconsistency Petitioners contend that the Amendment produces an internal inconsistency because policies of the conservation element relied upon for protection against adverse impacts to wetlands and natural resources have not been implemented by the County through the adoption of land development regulations. The Department responded with an explanation of its scope of review of amendments to comprehensive plans: [DCA's] assumption and . . . review [is] based on the policies in the plan, and [the] premise that these polices were followed through on. The Department does not have any direct purview over land development regulations or development permits . . . [I]f third parties believe the County had not put land development regulations in place or had in place inconsistent regulations or was issuing inconsistent development permits, Chapter 163 offers different challenge mechanisms for those matters. [DCA] review is . . . based on the corners of the plan and the policies of the plan . . . (Tr. 178, 179).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the amendment to the Future Land Use Map of Wakulla County's Comprehensive Plan passed by Ordinance 2002-28 of the Board of Commissioners of Wakulla County be determined to be not "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Colleen M. Castille, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David Jordan, Acting General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Terrell K. Arline, Esquire 3205 Brentwood Way Tallahassee, Florida 32308-2705 Debra A. Swim, Esquire 1323 Diamond Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna Biggins, Esquire 515 North Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Craig Varn, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Law Offices of Robert C. Apgar, P.A. 320 Johnston Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues to be considered here concern whether Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3, adopted by Ocala on June 23, 1992, by Ordinance No. 2254 is "in compliance" with requirements of law as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. In particular the determination on compliance is limited to an analysis of Paddock Park's stated reasons for finding the plan amendment "not in compliance." In summary those allegations are as follows: The Future Land Use Map (FLUM) amendment is inconsistent with provisions of Section 163.3177(3)(a), Florida Statutes and Rule 9J-5.006, Florida Administrative Code, for the reasons specified in Sections I.A.1.(a)(b) and (d) of the DCA's May 1, 1992 objections, recommendations and comments (ORC). The FLUM amendment is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 163.3177(6)(b), Florida Statutes and Rule 9J-5.007, Florida Administrative Code for the reasons speci- fied in Section I.A.2.(a) of the ORC, and by reason of an erroneous assumption that 80 percent of the traffic generated on the 39.44 acre parcel which is at issue would impact State Road 200 rather than S.W. 42nd Street, resulting in a material miscalcula- tion of the impact on the latter roadway by the proposed reclassification contem- plated by the FLUM amendment. The FLUM amendment is inconsistent with both Potable Water and Sanitary Sewer sub- elements and is inconsistent with the provi- sions of the Capital Improvement Element of the Ocala Comprehensive Plan, in that the reclassification results in estimates of potable water and sanitary sewer usage in excess of that contemplated by Ocala's Water and Waste-water Master Plan for which no provision is made in the Capital Improvement Element of the Comprehensive Plan. The FLUM amendment is inconsistent with Objectives 1 and 2 and Policy 3.3 of the Inter-governmental Coordination Element of the Ocala Comprehensive Plan in that the FLUM amendment was made without notification or opportunity for input from Marion County as it influences the impact of the land use reclassification on the level of service on S.W. 42nd Street, a roadway alleged to be under the jurisdiction of Marion County or upon the land use classifications of property lying immediately east and west of the 39.44 acre parcel at issue and the entire area lying south of S.W. 42nd Street, which latter parcel lies within the jurisdiction of Marion County.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Paddock Park is a Florida corporation. It has its principal place of business in Ocala, Florida. It is the developer of Paddock Park, a Development of Regional Impact (DRI). Part of the DRI lies immediately north and east of the parcel of land which is the subject of the dispute. Paddock Park by submitting oral and written comments during the review and adoption proceedings associated with the subject Comprehensive Plan Amendment established itself as an affected person. DCA is the state land planning agency which has the responsibility for reviewing comprehensive plans and amendments to those plans in accordance with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Ocala is a local government in Florida. It is required to adopt a comprehensive plan consistent with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the State and Regional Plans. Any amendments, such as the present amendment at issue, must also comply with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the State and Local Plans. Ocala is located in the south central part of Marion County, Florida. It is the largest urban area in the county. It is comprised of approximately 18,820 acres of land area. In 1990 Ocala had an estimated population of 45,130 with a projected increase of population to 73,309 persons by the year 2015. Comprehensive Plan Amendment: Description, Preparation, Adoption and Review Ocala submitted its Comprehensive Plan to DCA on October 30, 1991. On December 14, 1991, DCA published a notice determining that the plan was "in compliance" with legal requirements. On January 24, 1992, Ocala submitted proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-1 to DCA for ORC review. The overall purpose of that amendment was to incorporate annexed property into Ocala's existing plan. One of those parcels is the subject of this dispute. The proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-1 included six FLUM changes. Each of those changes was addressed by separate ordinance. The FLUM change which is specifically at issue in this case was described as Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. It is a parcel of approximately 59 acres in size. Within that parcel Ocala has classified 20.15 acres for retail services land use and 39.44 acres for professional services land use. The overall 59 acre parcel described in the proposal is located 200 feet south of State Road 200. That roadway is a principal arterial roadway. The 59 acre parcel extends southward to S.W. 42nd Street. The latter roadway is a collector roadway which is maintained and operated by Marion County in the immediate vicinity of this parcel. The collector roadway terminates at I-75, an interstate highway to the west and first intersects S.W. 27 Avenue a roadway within the Ocala corporate limits to the east. The ownership of the 59 acres is held by different property owners. The southern most parcel, "Tri-Star Parcel", is the 39.44 acres bordered by S.W. 42nd Street. At all relevant times that parcel has been undeveloped. The northernmost parcel, "Pearson Parcel", is 20.15 acres in size and it is partially developed with a now defunct mobile home park in the northern reaches of that property. The overall 59 acres is surrounded by other parcels within Ocala, excepting parcels basically to the south which are within unincorporated Marion County. Surrounding properties to the north of the 59 acres are designated for retail services that include a real estate office, a gas station and a bank. To the west, property is designated for retail services and includes the Hilton Hotel complex. To the east parcels are designated for professional services as well as retail services, to include a regional shopping mall, offices and a multi-family residential development of approximately 400 units. The Paddock Park property described before is located in this area and offers professional services land use. Preliminary to the submission of proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3, the Ocala Planning Department had considered the designation of land uses for the 20.15 acres and 39.44 acres. The Ocala Planning and Zoning Commission as the local planning agency reviewed the proposed land use designation by the Ocala Planning Department. The land planning agency then made a recommendation to the Ocala City Council, the governing body, concerning the appropriate land use for the two parcels. The Ocala City Council made its initial determination on the designation of the 39.44 acre parcel at a transmittal hearing held on January 4, 1992. It was at that juncture that the designation of the 39.44 acres as professional services was initially addressed by the Ocala City Council. Ocala then submitted the proposed amendment for DCA review and comment. On May 1, 1992, DCA responded to the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3, together with the other proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendments under consideration by issuing an ORC report. On June 18, 1992, the Ocala City Council held a workshop to consider the ORC report directed to the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendments. Ocala also filed a written response to the ORC report. On June 23, 1992, the Ocala City Council held a public hearing to consider adoption of Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 together with other council business. Paddock Park was represented at that hearing by an attorney, counsel in the present action. At the public hearing counsel made known Paddock Park's opposition to designating the 39.44 acres, "Tri-Star Parcel", as professional services land use. In particular counsel questioned the assumption that 80 percent of the traffic generated by activities on the 39.44 acres would be routed to State Road 200, in that there was no existing access to State Road 200 from that parcel. Instead counsel stated his belief, in behalf of his client, that the access from the 39.44 acres parcel would be to S.W. 42nd Street. Counsel made mention that S.W. 42nd Street had a capacity as a collector roadway of about 12,500 trips for level of service "E". Counsel stated that he anticipated this parcel would generate 10,267 trips leaving only approximately 1,900 trips available on S.W. 42nd Street for any development which Paddock Park wished to undertake and for the development of Red Oak Farms and Ocala Stud Farm properties which lie to the south of S.W. 42nd Street. Counsel mentioned that the property south of S.W. 42nd Street carried a low density residential designation. Mention was made by counsel that a large amount of professional services land use contemplated for development of the 39.44 acres would effectively destroy Paddock Park's ability to develop by overloading S.W. 42nd Street. Counsel for Paddock Park requested the Ocala City Council to leave the land use designation for the 39.44 acres as agricultural or change it to some form of low density residential as opposed to professional services land use. Other discussions were held between counsel and the Ocala City Council concerning the implications of designating the 39.44 acres as professional services land use. A motion was made at the June 23, 1992 meeting to adopt City of Ocala Ordinance No. 2254 which dealt with the subject of the 20.15 acres and 39.44 acres which had been described in proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. That motion gained a second. A vote on the motion was delayed while further discussion was made concerning the 39.44 acres. In this interval an attempt was made by one councilman to amend the motion to adopt by changing the 39.44 acres from professional services to medium density residential. That attempt at amendment died for lack of a second. The Ocala City Council then voted to adopt City of Ocala Ordinance No. 2254. This constituted the adoption of amendments to the Ocala Comprehensive Plan which was received on August 7, 1992, reviewed by DCA and found to be "in compliance" by notice given by DCA on September 18, 1992. Included within that series of amendments was adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 dealing with the 39.44 acre parcel as professional services land use. In addition to the oral remarks by counsel made during the June 23, 1992 public hearing concerning adoption of the subject amendment to the Comprehensive Plan, counsel filed written objections on that same date. As basis for those objections counsel incorporated some objections to the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 as stated in the ORC report, specifically the objection that Ocala had failed to demonstrate the need for an additional 40 acres of professional land services use to accommodate the projected population. Other reasons for objecting set forth in the correspondence included objection based upon the belief that a medium density residential designation of Paddock Park property to the east and low density residential use assigned by Marion County to the south were inconsistent with professional services designation of the 39.44 acres. Written comment was also made concerning the expected overtaxing of S.W. 42nd Street. Other than the data and analysis in support of the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3, the ORC report which addressed the data and analysis contemplated by the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 and the oral and written remarks by counsel for Paddock Park, the Ocala City Council had no other basis for understanding the possible impacts of the traffic generated by activities on the 39.44 acres under professional services land use classification as they would pertain to S.W. 42nd Street and other roadways that would be impacted by that development. The change contemplated by the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 and the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment related to those parcels was from a current zoning of B-2 (community business) related to the 20.15 acres to retail services and from A-1 (agricultural) for the 39.44 acres to professional services. The adopted Ocala Comprehensive Plan Amendment 92-3 changed the data and analysis from what was submitted with the proposed plan amendment concerning the anticipated impacts on roadways brought about by designating the 39.44 acre parcel as professional services land use. As stated, those differences were not known to the Ocala City Council when it adopted the subject Comprehensive Plan Amendment on June 23, 1992. Nonetheless, the data had been available prior to the June 23, 1992 adoption hearing or available sufficiently contemporaneous to that date to be proper data for determining the land use classification impacts on affected roadways. The data was professionally obtained and analyzed as submitted to DCA with the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. Similar explanations pertain to the demands on potable water and sanitary sewer services for the parcels described in Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. The procedures used by Ocala and the DCA in addressing the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 on the subject of impacts to roadways and potable water and sanitary sewer services were not irregular when considering the underlying data and analysis that was prepared by Ocala, submitted to the DCA and approved by the DCA in finding the Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 "in compliance". When DCA received the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 it disseminated that information to Marion County to include the associated data and analysis accompanying that proposal. Marion County did not respond to the opportunity to comment on the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 for the benefit of DCA in preparing the ORC report and in keeping with Marion County's statutory duty to consider Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 in the context of the relationship and affect of that amendment on any Marion County comprehensive plan element. Marion County did not communicate the results of any review conducted concerning compatibility of the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 with Marion County Comprehensive Plan Elements. No specific information concerning Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 in its proposed form or in its adopted form was provided from Ocala to Marion County. Nor was any other contact made by Ocala with Marion County concerning Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. The record does not reflect any attempt being made to discourage Marion County from offering comments concerning Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. At the time that the Ocala City Council considered the plan amendment adoption on June 23, 1992, to designate the 39.44 acres as medium density residential would have promoted an over-allocation of that land use classification by 70 percent, whereas in classifying the property as professional services Ocala increased the percentage of professional services land use allocation from 93 percent to slightly in excess of 100 percent within the Ocala corporate limits. These facts together with the compatibility between a professional services land use designation and the uses for nearby parcels roughly north, east and west of the subject property supports classifying the 39.44 acres as professional services land use. In addition to the concern for proper allocation of land uses, Ocala recognized that the professional services land use classification would allow citizens other than those who resided in Ocala to be served. Notwithstanding the nature of some existing low density residential and agricultural land uses in the vicinity of the 39.44 acres designated by the amendment for professional services land use, especially property roughly to the south of that 39.44 acres across S.W. 42nd Street in Marion County, it was not inappropriate to designate the subject 39.44 acres as professional services land use. Paddock Park did not prove to the exclusion of fair debate that the designation of the parcel as professional services land use was a decision not in compliance with applicable statutes and rules. Allegation One The objections offered by DCA to proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 which are described in the first allegation to the petition by Paddock Park states: The above-cited proposed Future Land Use amendments are not based on data and analysis as cited below: Existing land use map depicting the existing generalized land uses of the subject properties, the generalized land uses of land adjacent to the amended boundaries of the City, and the boundaries to the subject pro- perties and their location in relation to the surrounding street and thoroughfare network is not included; The appropriate acreage in the general range of density and intensity of use for the existing land use of the subject pro- perties are not included; * * * (d) An analysis of the amount of land needed to accommodate the projected population, in- cluding the categories of land use and their densities and intensities of use, the esti- mated gross acreage needed by category and a description of the methodology used in order to justify the land uses assigned to the sub- ject properties. The basis on which land uses are assigned to the subject properties is not included in the documentation suppor- ting the amendment. To meet the criticisms offered by DCA in its ORC report, thereby avoiding any violation of Section 163.3177(3)(a), Florida Statutes and Rule 9J- 5.006(1)(2), Florida Administrative Code, DCA made these recommendations: Include an existing land use map depic- ting the existing generalized land uses of the subject properties, the generalized land uses of land adjacent to the amended bound- aries of the City, and the boundaries of the subject properties and their location in relation to the surrounding street or thoroughfare network. Expand the data and analysis supporting the proposed amendments to identify in tab- ular form the approximate acreage and the general range of density and intensity of existing land uses of the subject properties. In addition, the existing land use data tables in the Comprehensive Plan should be updated to reflect these annexed parcels. * * * (d) Include an analysis of the amount of land needed to accommodate the projected population, identifying the categories of land use and their densities and intensities of use, the estimated gross acreage needed by category and the methodology used in order to justify the land uses assigned to the sub- ject properties. The City should also take into consideration any existing over-alloca- tion of land uses. The over-allocation of land for any use should be reasonably related to the projected growth needs and allow for a certain amount of flexibility in the market place. When the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 was submitted to DCA for compliance determination it included maps that depicted the existing land uses of the annexed areas, the existing land uses of parcels adjacent to the annexed areas and identification of surrounding street networks. The maps attached to the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 generally address the requirements of Section 163.3177(3)(a), Florida Statutes and Rule 9J- 5.006(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code. This information together with preexisting knowledge by DCA satisfied its concerns in this area of criticism and led to the favorable response to Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. In addition Ocala, in the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3, provided revised background information which served as data and analysis to support the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3. This information was to the following affect: BACKGROUND: The parcel designated for a Retail Service land use was once developed as a mobile home park. Though not part of the annexation, that parcel includes access to S.R. 200. Other considerations justifying the land use designations include: the lack of environmental constraints - the site is on previously developed land; the compatibility with surrounding properties, contributing to infill development along an established comm- ercial corridor which has been designated in the Comprehensive Plan as an activity center in which development should be promoted; the access to a major arterial roadway with excess capacity able to accommodate the land use; and the availability of adequate water and sewer. The rear parcel is appropriate for develop- ment in a Professional Services land use, which would be compatible with the surround- ing land uses. The amendment adds 20.15 acres to the comm- ercial acreage of the City, changing the over- allocation in the Retail Services sub-cate- gory from 133 percent to 135 percent (See Table 1). Adding additional acreage in the commercial land use category is justified in this instance since retail uses, particu- larly in this area, serve not only the exist- ing and future city residents but also non- incorporated county residents as well as residents of neighboring counties [objection 1.b.] The second parcel adds 39.44 acres to the Professional Services sub-category, changing the percentage from 93 percent to 101.5 percent for this sub-category of comm- ercial land uses (See Table 1). Adding add- itional acreage in the commercial land use category is justified due to the current under-allocation of Professional Services land use acreage, and due to the probability that the proposed that the proposed office uses will serve a larger population than just City residents. [objection 1.b] With the submission of the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 Ocala included Table 1 that identified projected and existing allocations of acreage pertaining to need due to population increases and the anticipated impacts of this Comprehensive Plan Amendment on percentages of allocation of land use for the year 2002. Concerning Allegation One, Paddock Park has failed to show to the exclusion of fair debate that the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 is not "in compliance" with applicable statutes and rules. Allegation Two In its objections to proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 DCA stated: The traffic circulation analysis for the above-cited proposed Future Land Use Map amendments are incomplete because of the following reasons: The analyses do not address all the road- ways that will be impacted by the development of the subject properties. In most cases, the analyses only address the roadways that provide direct access to these properties. DCA recommended: Revise the traffic circulation analyses from the above-cited FLUM amendments to address the following: All roadways that will be impacted by the development of the subject properties. In the statement concerning the data and analysis associated with the roadways set out in the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 Ocala stated the following: ROADWAYS: Development of The annexed area has an impact on S.R. 200, a 6-lane state roadway classified as a principle arterial, on S.W. 27th Ave., a 4-lane minor arterial, on S.W. 42nd St., a 2-lane roadway classified as a local street. S.R. 200 was operating in 1990 at LOS D with 30,932 trips (using the most recent traffic counts available). Capa- city at adopted LOS D is 46,300 trips. Traffic counts are not available for 42nd St., but the total capacity for local street generally is 12, 100 trips per day. Capacity on S.W. 42nd St. may be less. The affected segment of S.R. 200 is expected to remain at LOS D by 1997, with 35,363 trips (Ocala Comp- rehensive Plan.) Splitting the area with a Retail Services land use in the north part and with a Profe- ssional Services and use replacing the exist- ing A-1 zoned area in the south, the 20.15 acres of commercial land use in the north parcel could generate 239,445 193,979 GLA square footage (based on 31 percent building coverage, the maximum possible due parking requirements) which could generate 12,19710, 693 trips on S.R. 200 (assuming 100 percent use and no passer-by or diverted trips). [Objection 2(b)] Subtracting 30 percent trips for passer by traffic which would be on the road in any case results in a predicted increase of 7,485 trips due to the commercial development and a total of 38,417 trips and LOS D. The addition of 12, 197 trips would not decrease the LOS of S.R. 200 below the adopted LOS of D on the frontage segment, and would not decrease the LOS be- low C on the other impacted segments. South- west 27th Ave. would not change from its existing LOS of A. [Objection 2(b)] In any case, the addition of this many additi- onal trips due to retain development is un- likely due to the large number of existing retail uses on S.R. 200. In other words, it is unlikely that any new retail develop- ment would attract a large number of people who don't currently use the roadway. Impact from development of the 39.44 acre south part in a Professional Services land is difficult to assess, due to a lack of data on mixed use developments (ITE Trip Generation, 5th Edition). Analyzing the 39.44 acre south parcel, and Using the trip estimates for an office park development in the ITE manual and splitting the traffic with 80 percent on S.R. 200 and 20 percent on S.W. 42nd St., an estimated additional 6,024 8,280 trips would result on S.R. 200 at full development. Due to the lack of traffic counts on S.W. 42nd St., the impact on the adopted LOS of E of an additional 6,024 trips is difficult to assess. However, a windshield survey indicates current traffic volumes on S.W. 42nd St. is far less than the 6,086 trips that would be necessary, with the addition of the estimated 6,024 from full development in a Professional Services land use, to degrade the adopted LOS, Adding 7,845 trips from the commercial development results in a possible 16125 added trips on S.R. 200 from full development on the annexed area in this land use, which would result in 47,057 total trips when added to the 1990 traffic count of 30,932 and degrade the aff- ected segment of S.R. 200 below LOS D (Total trips can not fall below 46,300. Trips on 42nd St. would increase by 1,987 total trips. Using the trip estimates for a business park development, rather than for an office park development as above, results in 5,924 trips from the proposed Professional Services land use area. Adding the 4,739 (80 percent of 5,924) trips to the 7,845 Retail Services land use esti- mated trips results in 12,584 estimated add- itional trips on S.R. 200, for a total of 43,516 which would keep the roadway segment at LOS D (46,300 maximum). To summarize, development on either parcel is not expected to degrade the LOS on the affected roadways below adopted levels of service. In any case, the concurrency system would not allow a development to be permitted which causes the roadway to degrade below the adopted LOS standard. Through the data and analysis submitted with the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3, Ocala has spoken to the impacts on collector and arterial roads and sufficiently concluded that the levels of service on those roads will not be lowered by the projected development impacts. Paddock Park's attempt to prove that other roadways such as S.W. 41st Street, S.W. 42nd Avenue, S.W. 33rd Avenue and S.W. 27th Avenue should have been included with the data and analysis and to prove more generally that the traffic impact data and analysis submitted by Ocala was insufficient did not demonstrate to the exclusion of fair debate that the supporting data and analysis submitted with the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 was inadequate. Furthermore, development may not take place that compromises the level of service on roadways because of the protections afforded by the requirement for concurrent facilities to be provided. While Ocala determined that its original assumption concerning the traffic division for 80 percent to State Road 200 and 20 percent to S.W. 42nd Street projection for traffic generation was erroneous, this miscalculation did not preclude Ocala from further analysis concerning the impacts to roadways which has been previously described. Nor was Ocala prohibited from further considering the development pattern within the overall professional services land use classification expected to transpire within the 39.44 acre parcel, in particular as it pertains to automobile traffic generation. Finally, Ocala was entitled to correct any mathematical errors in calculations performed in the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 when submitting the data and analysis concerning impacts to roadways which accompanied the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 sent to DCA for review and compliance determination. As described, the data and analysis performed in submitting the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 need not have been available to the Ocala City Council when it voted to approve to adopt the subject Comprehensive Plan Amendment on June 23, 1992. Given that the opportunity was presented to change the assessment concerning impacts to the roadways from the point in time in which the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 was submitted until the place at which the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 with associated data and analysis was transmitted for review and compliance determination, and upon the basis that the data and analysis performed to support the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 has not been shown to be inadequate when considered to the exclusion of fair debate, Ocala's willingness to correct perceived errors in its assumptions associated with the data and analysis submitted with the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 is condoned by this process and acceptable. Allegation Three As with the discussion concerning the roadways, it is the data and analysis performed to support the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 which pertains. It states: POTABLE WATER: The area is served by City water. The area is within 1/4 mile of exist- ing water lines and would have to connect upon development. Development as above could generate 43 gpm (1,055 gallons per acres per day X 17.8 acres) with all non-resi- dential uses and 29.7 gpm with a mix of retail and residential uses of the property. New distribution pipes and treatment facil- ities would not be required. since S.R. 200 is already served by a 16" main and the in- creased water demand represents at most .0619 mgd, or 1.2 percent of the projected avail- able potable water capacity in 1997. [Objec- tion 3] Costs related to development using water plant capacity would be offset by the hook-up fees charges when new developments connect to water and sewer. SANITARY SEWER: The area is served by City sanitary sewer. The area is within 1/8th of a mile of existing service and would have to connect to the City sewer system upon deve- lopment Using the 51.7 percent ratio of water to wastewater flows contained in the Comprehensive Plan, flows of 22.2 gpm nd 15.3 gpm, average flow, and 88.8 gpm and 61.2 gpm peak flow, respectively, could be expected which represent .032 mgd or 1.2 per- cent of the projected available sewer plant capacity in 1997. [Objection 3] Through this data and analysis it has been established that there is adequate sewer and potable water capacity to service the development of the Tri- Star Parcel. Paddock Park has failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that the Potable Water and Sanitary Sewer Elements within the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 are inconsistent with applicable statutes and rules and the Potable Water and Sanitary Sewer Elements and the Capital Improvement Element to the overall Ocala Comprehensive Plan, the controlling requirements when considering the amendment's acceptability. Allegation Four Within the Ocala Comprehensive Plan within the Inter-governmental Coordination Element, Objective one states: The City of Ocala shall maintain applicable level of service standards with the entity having operational or maintenance responsi- bility for the facility. The review and coordination of level of service standards will begin as of May, 1992, or at the adop- tion of the concerns of City management system, which ever occurs first, and will be a continuing process. Objective Two states: The City of Ocala shall coordinate its Compre- hensive Plan with that of the long-range objectives of Marion County and the Marion County School Board. The coordination mechan- ism between the City and the County shall con- sist of plan amendments and additional plan elements. Policy 3.3 in the Ocala Comprehensive Plan Inter-governmental Coordination Element states: The City of Ocala will continue to provide means of notification, review and input, in writing, regarding proposed development and zoning changes between itself and Marion County. It shall be the responsibility of City officials. In adopting Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 Ocala has not interfered with the applicable levels of service standards pertaining to operational or maintenance responsibility for any facility over which Marion County or the City of Ocala have responsibility. By virtue of the provision of the proposed Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 to Marion County through DCA, Ocala has met Objective Two and Policy 3.3 to the Inter-governmental Coordination Element within the Ocala Comprehensive Plan.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 to be "in compliance" and dismisses the petition by Paddock Park. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6257GM The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: Paddock Park's Facts: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 in its first two sentences are subordinate to facts found. The remaining sentences in that paragraph are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 6 through 9 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 10 is contrary to facts found in its suggestion that the decision to classify the parcel in question as professional services was inappropriate or that the data and analysis addressing impacts to roadways made at the time the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 was submitted was inadequate. Otherwise Paragraph 10 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of its suggestion that the adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 failed to adequately address land uses of properties adjacent to the 39.44 acre parcel, to include location of roadways. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the third objective is not relevant to the inquiry in that it was not identified as an allegation in the petition as amended at hearing. Paragraph 14, while no specific attempt was made to coordinate and review the impact of the adopted Comprehen-sive Plan Amendment #92-3 as it impacted levels of service on S.W. 42nd Street and Southwest 27th Avenue through discussions with Marion County, Paddock Park did not show that the activities envisioned by adopted Comprehensive Plan Amendment #92-3 would inappropriately influence the operational and maintenance responsibility concerning those facilities. Paragraphs 15 and 16 constitute conclusions of law. Paragraph 17 is contrary to facts found to the extent that it asserts inadequate identification of land uses and roadways in the adopted Comprehensive Plan. Ocala's Facts: Paragraphs 1-3 are subordinate to facts found Paragraphs 4-6 constitute legal argument. Paragraphs 7-17 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 18 through 20 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 21 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 22 through 32 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 33 through 37 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 38 through 46 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 47 and 48 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 49 through 54 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 55 through 59 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 60 through 65 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 66 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 67 through 70 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 71 is rejected as contrary. Paragraph 71 is not factually correct. Paragraphs 72-74 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 75 through 77 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 78 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 79 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 80 through 82 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 83 is rejected to the extent that it suggests that it was necessary for Paddock Park to offer remarks about potable water and sanitary sewer at the June 23, 1992 public hearing. Paragraph 84 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 85 through 88 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 89 through 98 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. DCA's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through the first sentence in Paragraph 14 are subordinate to facts found. The second sentence in that paragraph is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences in Paragraph 14 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 15 through 19 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 22 through 24 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 25 through 27 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 28 through 33 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 35 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 36 and 37 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 38 through 40 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 41 and 42 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 John P. McKeever, Esquire McKeever Pattillo and McKeever Post Office Box 1450 Ocala, Florida 34478 Patrick G. Gilligan, Esquire 7 East Silver Springs Boulevard Concord Square, Suite 405 Ocala, Florida 34474 Ann Melinda Parker, Esquire Bond Arnette and Phelan, P.A. Post Office Box 2405 Ocala, Florida 34478 Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the amendments to Miami- Dade County’s Comprehensive Development Master Plan (CDMP), adopted through Ordinance Nos. 08-44 and 08-45, are “in compliance” as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state land planning agency and is statutorily charged with the duty to review amendments to local comprehensive plans and to determine whether the amendments are “in compliance,” pursuant to Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes. The County is a political subdivision of the State and has adopted a local comprehensive plan that the County amends from time to time. 1000 Friends is a Florida not-for-profit corporation that maintains its headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida. Its corporate purpose is to ensure the fair and effective implementation of the Growth Management Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, through education, lobbying, research and litigation. 1000 Friends has approximately 3,500 members, 174 of whom live in the County. NPCA is a foreign, not-for-profit corporation that is registered to do business in Florida. Its headquarters are in Washington, D.C. It has a branch office in Hollywood, Broward County, Florida. NPCA’s purpose is to protect and preserve national parks, including Everglades National Park. NPCA has approximately 340,000 members, 1,000 of whom live in the County. Barry White and Karen Esty are residents of the County. Lowe’s is a for-profit corporation that owns and operates a business in the County. David Brown, along with his father and brother, is a co-applicant for the Brown amendment. For the purpose of this Recommended Order, the Department and the Intervenors aligned with the Department will be referred to, collectively, as Petitioners. Standing Lowe’s filed the application with the County that resulted in Ordinance No. 08-44 (Lowe’s Amendment). Lowe’s submitted comments to the County concerning the Lowe’s Amendment during the period of time from the County’s transmittal of the amendment to the County’s adoption of the amendment. Brown filed the application with the County that resulted in Ordinance No. 08-45 (Brown Amendment). Brown resides in the County. Brown is a manager/member of BDG Kendall 172, LLC, which has a contract to purchase the larger of the two parcels on the application site. Brown is also a manager/member of BDG Kendall 162, LLC, which owns and operates a business in Miami-Dade County. Brown submitted comments to the County at the transmittal and adoption hearings. 1000 Friends submitted comments to the County during the period of time from the transmittal of the amendments to their adoption. 1000 Friends presented its comments to the County on behalf of its members who reside in the County. 1000 Friends does not own property or maintain an office in the County. 1000 Friends does not pay local business taxes in the County and did not show that it is licensed to conduct a business in the County. 1000 Friends has engaged in fundraising, lobbying, and litigation in the County. Its activities include efforts to promote growth management, affordable housing, and Everglades restoration. 1000 Friends did not show that its activities in the County subject it to the provisions of the CDMP. NPCA submitted comments to the County during the period of time from the transmittal of the amendments to their adoption. NPCA presented its comments to the County on behalf of NPCA members who reside in the County. NPCA does not own property or maintain an office in the County. No evidence was presented to show that NPCA pays business taxes in the County or that it is licensed to conduct business in the County. NPCA did not show that its activities in the County subject it to the provisions of the CDMP. Barry White and Karen Esty are residents of the County. They submitted comments to the County regarding the amendments during the period of time from the transmittal of the amendments to their adoption. The Amendment Adoption Process The applications which resulted in the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments were submitted to the County during the April 2007 plan amendment cycle. The County’s review process for comprehensive plan amendments includes a public hearing before the community council which has jurisdiction over the area of the County where the affected lands are located. Following the public hearings on the proposed Lowe’s and Brown Amendments, the community councils recommended that the Board of County Commissioners approve the amendments. The County’s Planning Advisory Board also reviews proposed amendments before the transmittal and adoption hearings. Following public hearings on the proposed Lowe’s and Brown Amendments, the Planning Advisory Board recommended that the Board of County Commissioners approve the amendments for transmittal and for adoption. The County planning staff recommended that the proposed amendments be denied and not transmitted to the Department. The principal objection of the planning staff was that the expansion of the Urban Development Boundary (UDB), an aspect of both proposed amendments, was unjustified. In November 2007, the Board of County Commissioners voted to transmit the amendments to the Department. The Department reviewed the proposed amendments and issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) Report on February 26, 2008. In the ORC Report, the Department stated that expanding the UDB would be internally inconsistent with the CDMP because the need for the expansion had not been demonstrated. In addition the Department determined that the Lowe’s Amendment was inconsistent with CDMP policies regarding the protection of wetlands, and the Brown Amendment was inconsistent with CDMP policies regarding the protection of agricultural lands. When the amendments came before the Board of County Commissioners after the ORC Report in March 2008, the County planning staff recommended that the amendments be denied, repeating its belief that the expansion of the UDB would be inconsistent with the CDMP. Under the County’s Code of Ordinances, an expansion of the UDB requires approval by a two-thirds vote of the Board of County Commissioners. The County adopted the amendments through Ordinances No. 08-44 and 08-45 on April 24, 2008. On April 30, 2008, the Mayor Carlos Alvarez vetoed the ordinances, citing inconsistencies with the UDB policies of the CDMP. His veto was overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Board of County Commissioners on May 6, 2008. On July 18, 2008, the Department issued its Statement of Intent to Find Comprehensive Plan Amendments Not in Compliance. The Lowe’s Amendment The Lowe’s Amendment site consists of two parcels located in close proximity to the intersection of Southwest 8th Street, also known as Tamiami Trail, and Northwest 137th Avenue. The easternmost parcel, Parcel A, is 21.6 acres. The adjacent parcel to the west, Parcel B, is 30.1 acres. Neither parcel is currently being used. About 50 percent of both Parcels A and B are covered by wetlands. The wetlands are partially drained and show encroachment by exotic vegetation, including Melaleuca and Australian pine. The Lowe’s site is located within the Bird Trail Canal Basin, which the CDMP characterizes as containing “heavily impacted, partially drained wetlands.” Both Parcels A and B are currently designated Open Land under the CDMP, with a more specific designation as Open Land Subarea 3 (Tamiami-Bird Canal Basins), and can be used for residences at densities of up to one unit per five acres, compatible institutional uses, public facilities, utility and communications facilities, certain agricultural uses, recreational uses, limestone quarrying, and ancillary uses. East of the Lowe’s site is another parcel owned by Lowe’s that is designated Business and Office and is within the UDB. North and west of the Lowe’s site is Open Land. The Lowe’s site is bordered on the south by Tamiami Trail, a six- lane road. Across Tamiami Trail is land designated Business and Office. The Lowe’s amendment would reclassify Parcel A as Business and Office and Parcel B as Institution, Utilities, and Communications. The Lowe’s Amendment would also extend the UDB westward to encompass Parcels A and B. The Business and Office designation allows for a wide range of sales and service activities, as well as compatible residential uses. However, the Lowe’s amendment includes a restrictive covenant that prohibits residential development. The Institution, Utilities, and Communications land use designation allows for “the full range of institution, communications and utilities,” as well as offices and some small businesses. Parcel A is subject to another restrictive covenant that provides that Lowe’s shall not seek building permits for the construction of any buildings on Parcel A without having first submitted for a building permit for the construction of a home improvement store. The use of Parcel B is restricted to a school, which can be a charter school. If a charter school is not developed on Parcel B, the parcel will be offered to the Miami-Dade County School Board. If the School Board does not purchase Parcel B within 120 days, then neither Lowe’s nor its successors of assigns have any further obligations to develop a school on Parcel B. The Brown Amendment The Brown Amendment involves four changes to the CDMP: a future land use re-designation from “Agriculture” to “Business and Office”; an expansion of the UDB to encompass the Brown site; a prohibition of residential uses on the site; and a requirement that the owner build an extension of SW 172nd Avenue through the site. The Agriculture designation allows agricultural uses and single family residences at a density of one unit per five acres. The proposed Business and Office land use designation allows a wide range of commercial uses, including retail, professional services, and office. Residential uses are also allowed, but the Declaration of Restrictions adopted by the County with the Brown Amendment prohibits residential development. The Brown Amendment site is 42 acres. Some of the site is leased to a tenant farmer who grows row crops. The balance is vacant and not in use. The Brown site has a triangular shape. Along the sloping northern/eastern boundary is Kendall Drive. Kendall Drive is a major arterial roadway, a planned urban corridor, and part of the state highway system. On the site's western boundary is other agricultural land. There is commercial development to the east. Along the southern boundary is the 1200-unit Vizcaya Traditional Neighborhood Development, which is within the UDB. The entirety of the Brown site has been altered by farming activities. In the southwest portion of the site is a four-acre, degraded wetland that is part of a larger 28-acre wetland located offsite. The wetland is not connected to any state waters and the Army Corps of Engineers has not asserted jurisdiction over it. The wetland is not on the map of “Future Wetlands and CERP Water Management Areas” in the Land Use Element of the CDMP. The dominant plants in the wetland are exotic species. There is no evidence that any portion of the site is used by any threatened or endangered species. The Urban Development Boundary and Urban Expansion Area The principal dispute in this case involves the application of Policies LU-8F and LU-8G of the CDMP regarding the expansion of the UDB. Policy LU-8F directs that adequate supplies of residential and nonresidential lands be maintained in the UDB. If the supply of lands becomes inadequate, Policy LU-8G addresses where the expansion of the UDB should occur. The UDB is described in the Land Use Element: The Urban Development Boundary (UDB) is included on the LUP map to distinguish the area where urban development may occur through the year 2015 from areas where it should not occur. Development orders permitting urban development will generally be approved within the UDB at some time through the year 2015 provided that level- of-service standards for necessary public facilities will be met. Adequate countywide development capacity will be maintained within the UDB by increasing development densities or intensities inside the UDB, or by expanding the UDB, when the need for such change is determined to be necessary through the Plan review and amendment process. The UDB promotes several planning purposes. It provides for the orderly and efficient construction of infrastructure, encourages urban infill and redevelopment, discourages urban sprawl, and helps to conserve agricultural and environmentally-sensitive lands. The County only accepts applications for amendments seeking to expand the UDB once every two years, unless they are directly related to a development of regional impact. In contrast, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, allows two amendment cycles in a calendar year, Amendments that would expand the UDB must be approved by at least two-thirds of the total membership of the Board of County Commissioners. Other types of amendments only require a majority vote of the quorum. Outside the UDB are County lands within the relatively small Urban Expansion Area (UEA), which is described in the CDMP as “the area where current projections indicate that further urban development beyond the 2015 UDB is likely to be warranted some time between the year 2015 and 2025.” The UEA consists of lands that the CDMP directs “shall be avoided” when the County is considering adding land to the UDB. They are (1) future wetlands, (2) lands designated Agriculture, (3) hurricane evacuation areas, and (4) lands that are part of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. The “future” wetlands on this list are existing wetland areas delineated by the County on Figure 14 of the Land Use Element. A far larger area of the County, mostly west of the UDB and UEA, consists of lands that the CDMP directs “shall not be considered” for inclusion in the UDB. These are water conservation areas, lands associated with Everglades National Park, the Redland agricultural area, and wellfield protection areas. Policy LU-8F Policy LU-8F of the Land Use Element provides: The Urban Development Boundary (UDB) should contain developable land having capacity to sustain projected countywide residential demand for a period of 10 years after adoption of the most recent Evaluation and Appraisal Report (EAR) plus a 5-year surplus (a total 15-year Countywide supply beyond the date of EAR adoption). The estimation of this capacity shall include the capacity to develop and redevelop around transit stations at the densities recommended in policy LU-7F. The adequacy of non- residential land supplies shall be determined on the basis of land supplies in subareas of the County appropriate to the type of use, as well as the Countywide supply within the UDB. The adequacy of land supplies for neighborhood- and community- oriented business and office uses shall be determined on the basis of localized subarea geography such as Census Tracts, Minor Statistical Areas (MSAs) and combinations thereof. Tiers, Half-Tiers and combinations thereof shall be considered along with the Countywide supply when evaluating the adequacy of land supplies for regional commercial and industrial activities. There is no further guidance in the CDMP for determining the “adequacy of land supplies” with respect to nonresidential land uses. Neither Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, nor Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5 requires that local governments use a particular methodology to determine the adequacy of nonresidential land supplies. The County’s usual methodology for determining need is described in the Planning Considerations Report that the County planning staff prepared for the 2007 amendment cycle. A report like this one is prepared by the staff for each amendment cycle to evaluate the adequacy of the CDMP to accommodate growth and to evaluate pending amendment applications. The County compares a proposed use to its immediate surroundings and the broader area of the County in which the proposed use is located. The basic geographic unit used in the County’s need analysis is the Minor Statistical Area (MSA). Larger planning areas, called Tiers, are groupings of MSAs. The County is divided into 32 MSAs and four Tiers. The Lowe’s Amendment site is in MSA 3.2, but it is on the border with MSA 6.1, so the two MSAs were consolidated for the County’s need analysis regarding the Lowe’s Amendment, even though MSA 3.2 is in the North Central Tier and MSA 6.1 is in the South Central Tier. The Brown Amendment is in MSA 6.2, but it is close to MSA 6.1, so the County combined the two MSAs for its need analysis for the Brown Amendment. Both MSAs are in the South Central Tier. The Planning Considerations Report contains a 2007 inventory of commercial land. The only vacant land used in the analysis of available commercial land supply was land zoned for business, professional office, office park, or designated Business and Office on the Land Use Map. Although it is stated in the Planning Considerations Report that lands zoned or designated for industrial uses are often used for commercial purposes, this situation was not factored into the calculation of the available supply of commercial lands. The County also excluded any supply that could be gained from the redevelopment of existing sites. Petitioners contend, therefore, that the County’s need for commercial land is less than the planning staff calculated in the Planning Considerations Report. On the other hand, Respondents contend that the County’s need for commercial land is greater than the planning staff calculated in the Planning Considerations Report because the County planning staff did not apply a “market factor” for commercial lands as it does for residential lands. A market factor is considered by some professional planners to be appropriate for commercial land uses to account for physical constraints and other factors that limit the utilization of some vacant parcels, and to prevent situations where the diminished supply of useable parcels causes their prices to rise steeply. The CDMP recognizes the problem in stating that: impediments can arise to the maximum utilization of all lands within the boundaries [of the UDB]. In some urbanized areas, it may be difficult to acquire sufficiently large parcels of land. In other areas, neighborhood opposition to proposed developments could alter the assumed density and character of a particular area. The County used a market factor of 1.5 (50 percent surplus) to determine the need for residential land. The County did not use a market factor in its analysis of the need for commercial land. The Department’s expert planning witness, Mike McDaniel, testified that the Department generally supports use of a 1.25 allocation (25 percent surplus). The County’s most recent UDB expansions for nonresidential uses (other than Lowe’s and Brown) were the Beacon Lakes and Shoppyland amendments in 2002. The Beacon Lakes and Shoppyland UDB expansions were approved despite the fact that the County did not project a need for more industrial land within the planning horizon. The need determinations for these amendments were not based on the use of a market factor, but on a percieved2`` need for the particular land uses proposed – warehouses and related industrial uses on large parcels to serve the Miami International Airport and the Port of Miami. The evidence indicates that the County’s exclusion from its analysis of industrial lands that can be used for commercial purposes, and additional commercial opportunities that could be derived from the redevelopment of existing sites, is offset by the County’s exclusion of a market factor. If the supply of commercial land had been increased 25 percent to account for industrial lands and redevelopment, it would have been offset by a 1.25 market factor on the demand side. The calculations made by the County in its Planning Considerations Report would not have been materially different. The Planning Considerations Report analyzes commercial demand (in acres) through the years 2015 and 2025, and calculates a “depletion year” by MSA, Tier, and countywide. A depletion year is the year in which the supply of vacant land is projected to be exhausted. If the depletion year occurs before 2015 (the planning horizon for the UDB), that is an indication that additional lands for commercial uses might be needed. The County planning staff projected a countywide depletion year of 2023, which indicates there are sufficient commercial lands in the County through the planning horizon of 2015. The County then projected the need for commercial land by MSA and Tier. MSA 3.2, where the Lowe’s site is located, has a depletion year of 2025, but when averaged with MSA 6.1’s depletion years of 2011, results in an average depletion year of 2018. The North Central Tier, in which the Lowe’s Amendment site is located, has a depletion year of 2023. The County’s depletion year analysis at all three levels, MSA, Tier, and countywide, indicates no need for more commercial lands in the area of the Lowe’s site. MSA 6.2, where the Brown site is located, has a depletion year of 2017, but when combined with MSA 6.1’s depletion of 2011, results in an average depletion year for the two MSAs is 2014. The South Central Tier, in which the Brown Amendment site is located, has a depletion year of 2014. Therefore, the County’s depletion year analysis, at the MSA and Tier levels, indicates a need for more commercial lands in the area of the Brown site. The County also analyzed the ratio of commercial acres per 1,000 persons by MSA, Tier, and county-wide. The countywide ratio is not a goal that the County is seeking to achieve for all Tiers and MSAs. However, if a Tier or MSA shows a ratio substantially lower than the countywide ratio, that MSA or Tier might need more commercial lands. The countywide ratio of commercial lands per 1,000 persons is projected to be 6.1 acres per 1,000 persons in 2015. MSA 3.2, in which the Lowe’s site is located, has a ratio of 11.3 acres per 1,000 persons. MSA 6.1 has a ratio of 2.6 acres. The average for the two MSAs is 6.95 acres. The ratio for all of the North Central Tier is 6.3 acres per 1,000 persons. Therefore, a comparison of the countywide ratio with the MSAs and Tier where the Lowe’s site is located indicates there is no need for additional commercial lands in the area of the Lowe’s site. MSA 6.2, where the Brown site is located, has a ratio of 4.1 acres per 1,000 persons. When combined with MSA 6.1’s ratio of 2.6 acres, the average for the two MSAs is 3.35 acres. The ratio for all of the South Central Tier is 4.5 acres per 1,000 persons. Therefore, a comparison with the countywide ratio of 6.1 acres indicates a need for additional commercial lands in the area of the Brown site. The County’s need analysis treated the Kendall Town Center as vacant (i.e., available) commercial land, but the Kendall Town Center is approved and under construction. If the Kendall Town Center had been excluded, the County’s projected future need for commercial land in the area of the Brown site would have been greater. The Planning Considerations Report does not discuss parcel size in its commercial need analysis. Lowe’s contends that the County should have considered whether there is a need for larger “community commercial” uses in the area of the Lowe’s site. Policy LU-8F refers only to the need to consider (by “Tiers, Half-Tiers and combinations thereof”) the adequacy of land supplies for “regional commercial activities.” Lowe’s planning expert testified that there are few undeveloped commercial parcels in MSAs 3.2 and 6.1 that are ten acres or more, or could be aggregated with contiguous vacant parcels to create a parcel bigger than ten acres. Lowe’s submitted two market analyses for home improvement stores, which conclude that there is a need for another home improvement store in the area of the Lowe’s site. The market analyses offered by Lowe’s differ from the County’s methodology, which focuses, not on the market for a particular use, but on the availability of commercial lands in appropriate proportion to the population. Even when it is reasonable for the County to consider the need for a unique use, the County’s focus is on serving a general public need, rather than on whether a particular commercial use could be profitable in a particular location. Some of the assumptions used in the market analyses offered by Lowe’s were unreasonable and biased the results toward a finding of need for a home improvement store in the study area. The more persuasive evidence shows that there is no need for more commercial land, and no need for a home improvement store, in the area of the Lowe’s site. Lowe’s Parcel B is proposed for use as a school. The elementary, middle and high schools serving the area are over- capacity. Lowe’s expects the site to be used as a charter high school. Using an inventory of lands that was prepared by the County staff, Lowe’s planning expert investigated each parcel of land located within MSAs 3.2 and 6.1 that was over seven acres2 and determined that no parcel within either MSA was suitable for development as a high school. The record is unclear about how the Lowe’s Amendment fits into the plans of the County School Board. The proposition that there are no other potential school sites in the area was not firmly established by the testimony presented by Lowe’s. The need shown for the school site on Parcel B does not overcome the absence of demonstrated need for the Business and Office land use on Parcel A. It is beyond fair debate that that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policy LU-8F. The County’s determination that the Brown Amendment is consistent with Policy LU-8F is fairly debatable. Policy LU-8G Policy LU-8GA(i) identifies lands outside the UDB that “shall not be considered for inclusion in the UDB. Policy LU- 8G(ii) identifies other lands that “shall be avoided,” including (1) future wetlands, (2) lands designated Agriculture, (3) hurricane evacuation areas, and (4) lands that are part of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. A peculiarity of the UEA is that it is composed entirely of lands that “shall be avoided” when the County considers adding lands to the UDB. The Department contends that “shall be avoided” means, in this context, that the County must make “a compelling showing that every other option has been exhausted” before the UDB can be expanded. However, the CDMP does not express that specific intent. The CDMP does not provide any direct guidance about how compelling the demonstration must be to expand the UDB. Policies LU-8F and LU-8G appear to call for a balancing approach, where the extent of the need for a particular expansion must be balanced against the associated impacts to UEA lands and related CDMP policies. The greater the needs for an expansion of the UDB, the greater are the impacts that can be tolerated. The smaller the need, the smaller are the tolerable impacts. Because the need for the Lowe’s Amendment was not shown, the application of the locational criteria in Policy LU- 8G is moot. However, the evidence presented by Lowe’s is addressed here. Within the meaning of Policy LU-8G(ii)(a), the wetlands that “shall be avoided” are those wetlands that are depicted on the Future Wetlands Map part of the Land Use Element of the CDMP. About 50 percent of the Lowes site is covered by wetlands that are on the Future Wetlands Map. Petitioners speculated that the construction of a Lowe’s home improvement store and school on the Lowe’s site could not be accomplished without harm to the wetlands on the site, but they presented no competent evidence to support that proposition. The wetland protections afforded under the environmental permitting statutes would not be affected by the Lowe’s Amendment. Nevertheless, this is a planning case, not a wetland permitting case. It is a well-recognized planning principle that lands which have a high proportion of wetlands are generally not suitable for land use designations that allow for intense uses. The Lowe’s Amendment runs counter to this principle. Policy LU-8F(iii) identifies areas that “shall be given priority” for inclusion in the UDB: Land within Planning Analysis Tiers having the earliest projected supply depletion year; Lands contiguous to the UDB; Locations within one mile of a planned urban center or extraordinary transit service; and Lands having projected surplus service capacity where necessary services can be readily extended. The Lowe’s site satisfies all but the first criterion. The Lowe’s site is in the Tier with the latest projected supply depletion year. It is beyond fair debate that that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policy LU-8G. Because a reasonable showing of need for the Brown Amendment was shown, it is appropriate to apply the locational criteria of Policy LU-8G. The Brown Amendment would expand the UDB into an area of the UEA that is designated Agriculture. The single goal of the CDMP’s Land Use Element refers to the preservation of the County’s “unique agricultural lands.” The CDMP refers elsewhere to the importance of protecting “viable agriculture.” Brown argued that these provisions indicate that the County did not intend to treat all agricultural lands similarly, and that agricultural activities like those on the Brown site, that are neither unique nor viable, were not intended to be preserved. Petitioners disagreed. The County made the Redland agricultural area one of the areas that “shall not be considered” for inclusion in the UDB. Therefore, the County knew how to preserve “unique” agricultural lands and prevent them from being re-designated and placed in the UDB. The only evidence in the record about the economic “viability” of the current agricultural activities on the Brown site shows they are marginally profitable, at best. The Brown site is relatively small, has a triangular shape, and is wedged between a major residential development and an arterial roadway, which detracts from its suitability for agricultural operations. These factors also diminish the precedent that the re-designation of the Brown site would have for future applications to expand the UDB. The Brown site satisfies all of the criteria in Policy LU-8G(iii) to be given priority for inclusion in the UDB. The County’s determination that the Brown Amendment is consistent with Policy LU-8G is fairly debatable. Policy EDU-2A Policy EDU-2A of the CDMP states that the County shall not purchase school sites outside the UDB. It is not clear why this part of the policy was cited by Petitioners, since the Lowe’s Amendment would place Parcel B inside the UDB. Policy EDU-2A also states that new elementary schools “should” be located at 1/4 mile inside the UDB, new middle schools “should” be located at least 1/2 mile inside the UDB, and new high schools “should” be located at least one mile inside the UDB. The policy states further that, “in substantially developed areas,” where conforming sites are not available, schools should be placed as far as practical from the UDB. Petitioners contend that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policy EDU-2A because Parcel B, the school site in the Lowe’s Amendment, would be contiguous to the UDB if the Lowe’s Amendment were approved. However, when a policy identifies circumstances that allow for an exception to a stated preference, it is necessary for challengers to show that the exceptional circumstances do not exist. It was Petitioners’ burden to demonstrate that there were conforming school sites farther from the UDB in the area of the Lowe’s site. Petitioners did meet their burden. The County’s determination that the Lowe’s Amendment is consistent with Policy EDU-2A is fairly debatable. Urban Sprawl 1000 Friends and NPCA allege that the Brown and Lowe’s Amendments would encourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. The Department did not raise urban sprawl as an “in compliance” issue. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) identifies 13 “primary indicators” of urban sprawl. The presence and potential effects of multiple indicators is to be considered to determine “whether they collectively reflect a failure to discourage urban sprawl.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J- 5.006(5)(d). Indicator 1 is designating for development “substantial areas of the jurisdiction to develop as low- intensity, low-density, or single use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need.” It was found, above, that the County had a reasonable basis to determine there was a need for the Brown Amendment, but not for the Lowe’s Amendment. Therefore, this indicator is triggered only by the Lowe’s Amendment. Indicator 2 is designating significant amounts of urban development that leaps over undeveloped lands. The facts do not show that undeveloped lands were leaped over for either of the amendments. Indicator 3 is designating urban development “in radial, strip, isolated, or ribbon patterns.” The Lowe’s and Brown Amendments do not involve radial or isolated development patterns. What would constitute a “ribbon” pattern was not explained. Not every extension of existing commercial uses constitutes strip sprawl Other factors need to be considered. For example, both the Lowe’s and Brown sites are at major intersections where more intense land uses are commonly located. Under the circumstances shown in this record, this indicator is not triggered for either amendment. Indicator 4 is premature development of rural land that fails to adequately protect and conserve natural resources. This indicator is frequently cited by challengers when an amendment site contains wetlands or other natural resources, without regard to whether the potential impact to these resources has anything to do with sprawl. In the area of the Lowe’s site, the UDB generally divides urbanized areas from substantial wetlands areas that continue west to the Everglades. The Lowe’s Amendment intrudes into an area dominated by wetlands and, therefore, its potential to affect wetlands is an indication of sprawl. In the area of the Brown Amendment, the UDB generally separates urbanized areas from agricultural lands that already have been substantially altered from their natural state. The Brown Amendment invades an agricultural area, not an area of natural resources. Therefore, the potential impacts of the Brown Amendment on the small area of degraded wetlands on the Brown site do not indicate sprawl. Indicator 5 is failing to adequately protect adjacent agricultural areas and activities. Because this indicator focuses on “adjacent” agricultural areas, it is not obvious that it includes consideration of effects on the amendment site itself. If this indicator applies to the cessation of agricultural activities on the Brown site, then the Brown Amendment triggers this primary indicator. If the indicator applies only to agricultural activities adjacent to the Brown site, the evidence was insufficient to show that this indicator is triggered. Indicators 6, 7, and 8 are related to the orderly and efficient provision of public services and facilities. Urban sprawl is generally indicated when new public facilities must be created to serve the proposed use. Petitioners did not show that new public facilities must be created to serve the Lowe’s or Brown sites. The proposed amendments would maximize the use of existing water and sewer facilities. Petitioners did not show that the amendments would cause disproportionate increases in the costs of facilities and services. Indicator 9 is failing to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. The Lowe’s Amendment would create an irregular and less clear separation between urban and rural uses in the area and, therefore, the Lowe’s Amendment triggers this indicator. The Brown Amendment does not trigger this indicator because of it is situated between the large Vizcaya development and Kendall Drive, a major arterial roadway. The Brown Amendment would create a more regular separation between urban and rural uses in the area. Indicator 10 is discouraging infill or redevelopment. The CDMP delineates an Urban Infill Area (UIA) that is generally located east of the Palmetto Expressway and NW/SW 77th Avenue. Petitioners did not demonstrate that the Brown and Lowe’s Amendments discourage infill within the UIA. Petitioners did not show how any particular infill opportunities elsewhere in the UDB are impaired by the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments. However, the expansion of the UDB would diminish, at least to a small degree, the incentive for infill. This indicator, therefore, is triggered to a small degree by both amendments. The CDMP promotes redevelopment of buildings that are substandard or underdeveloped. Petitioners did not show how any particular redevelopment opportunities are impaired by the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments. However, the expansion of the UDB would diminish, at least to a small degree, the incentive to redevelop existing properties. This indicator, therefore, is triggered to a small degree by both amendments. Indicator 11 is failing to encourage or attract a functional mix of uses. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this primary indicator is triggered. Indicator 12 is poor accessibility among linked or related uses. No evidence was presented to show that this indicator would be triggered. Indicator 13 is the loss of “significant” amounts of open space. These amendments do not result in the loss of significant amounts of open space, whether measured by acres, by the percentage of County open lands converted to other uses, or by any specific circumstances in the area of the amendment sites. Evaluating the Lowe’s Amendment using the primary indicators of urban sprawl and the criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(h) through (j), it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Evaluating the Brown Amendment using the primary indicators of urban sprawl and the criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(h) through (j), it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment does not fail to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Land Use Analysis The Department claims that the Lowe’s and Brown Amendments are inconsistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c), which requires that the land use element of a comprehensive plan be based on an analysis of the amount of land needed to accommodate projected population. The Department believes the analyses of need presented by Lowe’s and Brown’s consultants were not professionally acceptable. Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no need for the Lowe’s Amendment. Therefore, the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c). A preponderance of competent, substantial, and professionally acceptable evidence of need, in conformance with and including the methodology used by the County planning staff, demonstrated that the Brown Amendment is consistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c).3 Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5 - Natural Resources Petitioners contend the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5, which require that the land use element of every comprehensive plan contain a goal to protect natural resources, and that every conservation element contain goals, objectives, and policies for the protection of vegetative communities, wildlife habitat, endangered and threatened species, and wetlands. Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the CDMP does not contain these required goals, objectives, and policies. Therefore, Petitioners failed to prove that the Lowe’s amendment is inconsistent with these provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5.4 The State Comprehensive Plan Petitioners contend that the Lowe’s and Brown amendments are inconsistent with several provisions of the State Comprehensive Plan. Goal (9)(a) of the State Comprehensive Plan and its associated policies address the protection of natural systems. Petitioners contend that only the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its policies. For the reasons stated previously, Petitioners showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its policies. Goal (15)(a) and its associated policies address land use, especially development in areas where public services and facilities are available. Policy (15)(b)2. is to encourage a separation of urban and rural uses. Because the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policies LU-8F and LU-8G of the CDMP, the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and policy. For the reasons stated above, Petitioners failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies Goal (16)(a) and its associated policies address urban and downtown revitalization. Although the expansion of the UDB diminishes the incentive to infill or redevelop, Petitioners did not show this effect, when considered in the context of the CDMP as a whole and the State Comprehensive Plan as a whole, impairs the achievement of this goal and its associated policies to an extent that the proposed amendments are inconsistent with this goal of the State Comprehensive Plan and its associated policies. Goal (17)(a) and its associated policies address the planning and financing of and public facilities. For the reasons stated previously, Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the proposed amendments is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Goal (22)(a) addresses agriculture. Policy(b)1. is to ensure that state and regional plans are not interpreted to permanently restrict the conversion of agricultural lands to other uses. This policy recognizes that agricultural landowners have the same right to seek to change the use of their lands, and that engaging in agricultural activities is not a permanent servitude to the general public. The policies cited by Petitioners (regarding the encouragement of agricultural diversification, investment in education and research, funding of extension services, and maintaining property tax benefits) are not affected by the Brown Amendment. For the reasons stated above, Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Goal (25)(a) and its associated policies address plan implementation, intergovernmental coordination and citizen involvement, and ensuring that local plans reflect state goals and policies. Because the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Policies LU-8F and LU-8G of the CDMP, and was found to contribute to the proliferation of urban sprawl, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that when the State Comprehensive Plan is construed as a whole, the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with the State Comprehensive Plan. Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that when the State Comprehensive Plan is construed as a whole, the County’s adoption of the Brown Amendment is inconsistent with the State Comprehensive Plan.. Strategic Regional Policy Plan Petitioners claim that the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with Goals 11, 12, and 20 of the Strategic Regional Policy Plan of the South Florida Regional Planning Council (SFRPC) and several policies associated with these goals. The SFRPC reviewed the proposed Brown Amendment and found it was generally consistent with the Strategic Regional Policy Plan. Goal 11 and its associated policies encourage the conservation of natural resources and agricultural lands, and the use of existing and planned infrastructure. For the reasons stated previously, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with this goal and its associated policies. Goal 12 and its associated policies encourage the retention of rural lands and agricultural economy. The CDMP encourages the retention of rural lands and agricultural economy. Because it was found that the Lowe’s Amendment was inconsistent with Policies LU-8F and LU-8G, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment was inconsistent with this regional goal and its policies. Goal 20 and its associated policies are to achieve development patterns that protect natural resources and guide development to areas where there are public facilities. Because it was found that there is no need for the Lowe’s Amendment and that it constitutes urban sprawl, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County’s adoption of the Lowe’s Amendment is inconsistent with these regional goal and policies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that: Ordinance No. 08-44, the Lowe’s Amendment, is not in compliance, and Ordinance No. 08-45, the Brown Amendment, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Ultimately at issue in this case is whether certain comprehensive plan amendments, adopted by Lee County Ordinance No. 94-30, are "in compliance" with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. As reflected in the Preliminary Statement, many of the subordinate issues raised by parties seeking to have the plan amendments found to be "not in compliance" have been withdrawn, and others have been stricken as not timely raised or for other reasons. The remaining issues are addressed in this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact The FLUM and the Overlay. Lee County adopted its first Comprehensive Plan with a land use map in 1984. On January 31, 1989, the County adopted an amended version of the 1984 Plan intended to plan for growth up to the year 2010 and to comply with the 1985 Growth Management Act requirements. Essentially, the 1989 Plan was very similar to that drafted in 1984. Some major differences were provision of development timing and concurrency, creation of the privately-funded infrastructure overlay, elimination of the fringe land use category, and a variety of other new goals, objectives, and policies (GOP's). Most of the land use categories in the 1984 Plan were carried forward to the 1989 Plan. Almost all of the land use categories are mixed land use categories that allow residential, commercial and in some cases also light industrial uses without any percentage distributions or other objective measurements of distribution among uses. The DCA took the position that the 1989 Lee Plan was not in compliance with the Growth Management Act and filed a petition under Section 163.3184(10). The Department's objection to the 1989 Plan flowed in large part from the alleged overallocation of land for development by the year 2010 that resulted from the categories in the future land use map series (FLUM). Using the County's data and analysis, the DCA concluded that the 1989 map provided for 70 years of growth, to the year 2060, instead of 20 years, to the year 2010. To resolve the 1989 Plan dispute, the County agreed to adopt a 2010 Overlay and create a Density Reduction/Groundwater Resource future land use (FLUE) category (DRGR). The 1989 Plan Compliance Agreement included the following provisions: Amend the Future Land Use Map series by designating the proposed distribution, extent, and location of the generalized land uses required by Rule 9J-5.006(4)(a)1.-9. for the year 2010. These designations will include acreage totals and percentage distributions (illustrated by a bar graph) for about 125 discrete sub-districts encompassing all of Lee County, which, once designated, shall be changed only by a formal amendment to the Lee Plan. The data for these designations shall be consistent with the Lee Plan's population pro- jections for the year 2010. This amendment shall be accomplished by the adoption of over- lay or sub-district maps for the entire County using the concepts developed therefor by Thomas H. Roberts of Thomas H. Roberts Associates and presented publicly to the Board of County Commissioners of Lee County on September 12, 1989, and to the Department of Community Affairs on September 22, 1989. Adopt a policy which will provide that no development approvals for any land use category will be issued in any of the sub- districts described above that would cause the acreage total set for that land use category in 2010 to be exceeded. In accordance with the 1989 Plan Compliance Agreement, the County created a 2010 Overlay. The County first projected future growth in Lee County to the year 2010, using a basic assumption that historic patterns of growth in Lee County, including historic densities, would continue. The County's 2010 population estimate was 757,370 for the entire unincorporated County. The County then assigned acreage allocations for different land uses allowed in each planning subdistrict. In accordance with the 1989 Plan Compliance Agreement, the County adopted the resulting 2010 Overlay, as well as a DRGR FLUE category with a density range of one unit per ten acres, as part of the 1990 remedial plan amendments. The Overlay consisted of Maps 16 and 17, which were added to the FLUM, along with implementing policies in the Future Land Use Element. The 2010 Overlay is, in the words of the 1994 Codification of the Plan, "an integral part of the Future Land Use Map series." Map 16 is a map which divides Lee County into 115 subdistricts. "Map" 17 is not a true map; it is a series of bar tables and pie charts that correspond to acreage allocations for land uses within the subdistricts. Each subdistrict is allocated a specific number of acres for each of the following land uses: residential, commercial, industrial, parks and public, active agriculture, conservation, passive agriculture and vacant. The land use acreage allocations for each Overlay subdistrict are the maximum amount of land which can be developed in that subdistrict. The intent of the 2010 Overlay was to match the amount of development that could be accommodated by the 2010 FLUM with the projected County-wide population for the year 2010. The 2010 Overlay accomplished this in part by assigning percentage distributions, in the form of acreage allocations, to the various uses in the many mixed use categories in the FLUM. Under the Overlay, once the acreage allocation for a particular land use is exhausted, no more acreage can be developed for that land use in that subdistrict unless the Lee Plan is amended. Policy 1.7.6 was adopted to establish an ongoing mandatory review procedure for evaluation and amendment of the 2010 Overlay. On September 6 and 12, 1990, Lee County adopted the 1990 Remedial Plan Amendments and officially revised the original data and analysis supporting the Plan. As the support documents for the 1990 remedial amendments stated: The future land use map series currently contained in the Future Land Use element of the Lee Plan depicts 18 land use categories and has an estimated 70-year population holding capacity. A future land use map series is re- quired by state law and is also a useful and necessary part of the plan in guiding land use and related decisions. The Year 2010 Overlay makes this map series even more useful as a decision-making guide by providing a 20-year horizon in addition to its present longer- term horizon. * * * In addition to this "pure planning" function of the 2010 Overlay, a regulatory function will be added. No final development orders or building permits for any land use category will be issued in any subdistrict that would cause the acreage total for that category in 2010 to be exceeded. The Dwelling Unit Counts and Projections charts in the support documents for the 1990 amendments demonstrate that the 2010 Overlay was designed to greatly limit the number of dwelling units that could be constructed by 2010 compared to the number allowed by the 2010 FLUM without the Overlay. On or about October 29, 1990, DCA published a Notice of Intent to find the 1990 Remedial Plan Amendments in compliance. However, a citizen challenge to the County's 1990 Remedial Plan Amendments resulted in an Administration Commission Final Order that the amendments were not in compliance and that the County had to take certain remedial actions to bring the Plan amendments into compliance. Final Order, Sheridan v. Lee Co. and DCA, 16 FALR 654 (Fla. Admin. Com. 1994)(the "Sheridan Final Order"). The Sheridan Final Order required the County to apply the 2010 Overlay at the development order stage, rather than at the building permit stage. As a result, no development order could be issued which caused the acreage allocations for any given individual subdistrict to be exceeded. The Sheridan Final Order also held that the County had not properly calculated the amount of development allowed by the 2010 Overlay and adopted the following analysis from the hearing officer's Recommended Order: The calculation of a density allocation ratio is part of the determination whether data and analysis support the residential densities in a plan. The analysis misses the point of the process if the maximum densities authorized by a plan are reduced to reflect historic densities. The question is whether the densities authorized by a plan are supported by data and analysis, not whether data and analysis support densities some- where between the maximum authorized densities and historic densities. Especially where historic densities reflect an inefficient use of land, as is clearly the case in Lee County, analysis of a plan based in part on historic densities invites the repetition of past planning failures. * * * The purpose of the density allocation calculation, as part of the process of determining if the plan is supported by data and analysis, is not to predict the actual density that will occupy the planning jurisdiction at buildout. The purpose of the density allocation calculation is to compare the maximum density allowed by the plan with the projected population, and consider the extent of the overallocation in the light of other factors in the planning jurisdiction, including plan provisions and relevant data and analysis. The ratio is not required to be 1:1 to satisfy the criterion of supporting data and analysis. But the ratio must be ascertainable in order to determine if the density allocations in a plan, in view of other plan provisions, are supported by data and analysis. Sheridan Final Order, 16 FALR at 689. As a result, one of the remedial amendments required by the Administration Commission was: To address the density calculation issue the County shall revise the data and analysis to include the maximum allowable densities in determining the amount of development allowed by the 2010 overlay and to show that the amount of development allowed is based on the expected growth. Sheridan Final Order, 16 FALR at 661. The County adopted 2010 Overlay remedial amendments in October, 1994. In December, 1994, the DCA determined that the remedial amendments were in compliance. (The revised data and analysis were not made a part of the record in this case.) On July 1, 1994, the County adopted an Evaluation and Appraisal Report (EAR) for its Plan and subsequently submitted to the DCA the EAR, along with the proposed EAR-based amendments for the year 2020. Among other things, the proposed EAR-based amendments eliminated the 2010 Overlay. Among other things, the DCA's Objections, Recommendations and Comments (ORC) Report objected to the elimination of the 2010 Overlay, taking the position that, without the Overlay, the EAR-based plan had the same allocation-related problems that had been in the 1989 plan. On November 1, 1994, the County adopted a modified version of the EAR- based amendments--still without any Overlay--and submitted these to the DCA, together with its staff response to the DCA's ORC Report. On December 28, 1994, the DCA issued a Statement of Intent to find the EAR-based amendments not in compliance. FLUM Population Accommodation Data and Analysis. The evidence in this case includes data and several different analyses comparing the population accommodated by the plan amendments at issue--i.e., the FLUM without any Overlay--with the population projected for the year 2020. Figure 14. Lee County's proposed population accommodation data and analysis is included in the EAR in Figure 14. Based on Figure 14, the County concluded that the 2020 FLUM accommodates 802,655 persons, or 128 percent of the projected 2020 population (an accommodation ratio of 1.28). Although the FLUM's many mixed use categories do not establish percentage distributions or other objective measurements of distribution among uses, Figure 14 assumes that certain percentages of the many mixed use categories will develop in residential use, based on historic growth patterns. Also based on historic growth patterns, Figure 14 assumes that residential density will be less than the maximum of the standard residential density range allowed in each category although the GOP's allow residential development at much higher densities. Since Figure 14 is based on historic patterns of growth that are expected to continue into the future, Figure 14 appears to predict future growth as accurately as is possible at this time. It probably is the best possible estimate of how Lee County will build out under the proposed amendments. However, the ability to make truely accurate predictions over such a long period of time--25 years--is questionable. Figure 14 assumes that only a fraction of the new Vested Community land use district (Lehigh Acres) will be developed by the end of the planning timeframe. Most of the Vested Community district consists of subdivisions which were approved and platted several years before the adoption of the earliest Lee Plan, and which are vested from the restrictions of the Lee Plan. The Vested Community district contains over 130,000 vested lots which can accommodate at least 271,700 residents. In addition, the Vested Community district contains some land which is not actually vested from the Lee Plan but is allowed to develop at four density units per acre (du/ac). Figure 14 assumes that 45,888 residential units accommodating 95,906 persons will be developed in Lehigh Acres by 2020. There is no goal, objective or policy in the Lee Plan which would prevent the development of more lots vested or allocated in the Vested Community district. Lee County's Figure 14 analysis assumed that the Rural and Outer Islands categories will develop at their maximum residential density of one du/ac. In fact, the Lee Plan includes a Planned Development District Option ("PDDO") which allows: landowners outside the Future Urban Areas to increase allowable densities for development that will be totally independent of county- subsidized facilities and services. (Objective 1.8) The PDDO increases the maximum theoretical residential density of the Rural and Outer Islands districts from 1 du/ac to 6 du/ac. However, due the requirements for use of the PDDO, realistically it cannot be anticipated that much Rural or Outer Islands land will utilize it. Lee County's Figure 14 analysis did not include any residential allocation for the General Interchange category. The General Interchange category allows residential development of 100 residential units at 8 du/ac for every 100,000 square feet of commercial development. If the residential option applied to all 1,436 acres of the General Interchange category, the Lee Plan would accommodate another 13,209 persons in that category. However, for the residential option, the category requires 160 acres under common ownership. Currently, there is only one case in which the requirement is met, and it is a development of regional impact (DRI) that does not allow residential at this time. Figure 14A. Figure 14A is part of the County's response to the DCA's ORC report. It was supposed to adjust Figure 14 by assuming the maximum residential density allowed by each land use category in accordance with the Sheridan Final Order. The Figure 14A accommodated population rises to 1,325,568, and the so-called allocation ratio rises to 2.11. Actually, Figure 14A does not take into account the actual maximum residential density in Intensive Development (22 du/ac), Central Urban (15 du/ac), and Urban Community (10 du/ac). Instead, it uses the top of the "standard density range" in those categories. Figure 14 B. Figure 14B also is part of the County's response to the DCA's ORC report. It adjusts the Figure 14A analysis by estimating the total residential development allowed by the Vested Community category at 170,732 dwelling units, which will accommodate 356,829 persons. Adding those Vested Community numbers to the Figure 14A numbers, Figure 14B estimates the population accommodated by the 2020 FLUM as 1,586,491 persons, or an accommodation ratio of 2.53. Maximum Theoretical Residential Potential. The DCA proposes an analysis of the data using maximum theoretical residential potential for each land use category. Under the DCA analysis, there is enough land available for residential development accommodate a population of approximately 2.5 million people--401 percent of the expected County population in 2020 or, expressed as a ratio, 4.01. In contrast to Figure 14B, the DCA's preferred analysis takes into account all of the residential development capacity in Lehigh Acres. In addition, it assumes residential development in the Vested Intensive Development part of the Lehigh Vested Community at the maximum density of 14 du/ac and in the Vested Central Urban part at the maximum density of 10 du/ac. These assumptions add to the FLUM population accommodation analysis the capacity to accommodate approximately 246,000 more people, over and above the Figure 14B capacity. The DCA's preferred analysis also assumes that all Rural and Outer Islands land will utilize PDDO and develop residentially at 6 du/ac. Use of this assumption more than doubles the population accommodation in those categories, adding approximately 500,000 people to the analysis. While theoretically possible, as previously stated, this assumption is unrealistic. The DCA's preferred analysis also assumes that 13,209 people are accommodated in residential development in the General Interchange category. This assumption, too, is theoretically possible but not realistic. Finally, the DCA's preferred analysis assumes that, although most of Lee County's future land use categories allow a mix of uses, the land will develop at the maximum potential residential densities over the entire land area--i.e., that no other type of permitted use, such as commercial, parks, schools or even roads would occur in any of the land use categories. Finally, it disregards the actual existence of non-residential uses and residential uses at lower densities; instead, it assumes redevelopment at the maximum potential residential densities over the entire land area. County's 2010 Overlay Analysis. It seems obvious that deletion of the 2010 Overlay must increase population accommodation, at least up to the year 2010. Up to the time of the final hearing, the DCA had not requested, and no party did, an allocation ratio analysis of the 2010 Overlay similar to the one the DCA prefers for the 2020 FLUM without any Overlay for purposes of making a comparison between the two. The County's chief planner testified that he performed such an analysis during the course of the final hearing using the maximum residential and maximum density assumptions. Neither the details nor the results of the analysis were clear. However, it appears to indicate that the 2010 Overlay accommodated a 2010 population of 1.06 million, apparently including 282,000 assumed to be accommodated in Lehigh Acres, an allocation ratio of 2.11. Assuming that the County's 2010 Overlay analysis included Lehigh, it can be roughly compared to the Figure 14B analysis and the DCA's preferred "maximum theoretical residential potential" analysis by removing the Lehigh component from each. Subtracting the Lehigh component from the County's 2010 Overlay population accommodation analysis results in a 2010 population accommodation of 778,000. Removing the Lehigh component from Figure 14B results in 2020 population accommodation of 1,229,662. Removing the Lehigh component from the DCA's analysis results in 2020 population accommodation of 2,008,927. Meanwhile, the County's projection of future increased by only about 70,000 between 2010 and 2020 for the entire unincorporated county. RGMC Alternative 2010 Overlay Accommodation Analysis and Comparision. RGMC proposes its own alternative analysis for comparing the population accommodated under the 2010 Overlay to the population accommodated without it. Using the County's population projection for 2020 of 626,860 in the unincorporated county and the accepted 2.09 people per unit, it can be estimated that approximately 300,000 units will be needed in the year 2020. Subtracting the 127,000 units existing in 1990, approximately 173,000 additional units will be needed over the 30 years from 1990 to 2020 to accommodate the expected population, or approximately 5,800 additional units per year. At that average rate, 116,000 units would be added by the year 2010 (5,800 units per year times 20 years). Adding the new units to the 127,000 units existing in 1990 results in a total of approximately 244,000 units in 2010. Since it is agreed that the Overlay was designed to accommodate, and accommodated, approximately the population expected in the year 2010, it can be estimated that the Overlay accommodated approximately 244,000 units. In the sense that all units accommodated under the 2020 FLUM without the Overlay are available for development before 2010, a rough comparison can be made between the population accommodated under the 2010 Overlay and the population accommodated according to the other analysis methodologies: according to Figure 14, the amended 2020 plan accommodates 384,045 units for the year 2020; according to Figure 14A, the amended 2020 plan accommodates 634,243 units for the year 2020; according to Figure 14B, the amended 2020 plan accommodates 759,086 units for the year 2020; and according to the DCA's preferred "maximum theoretical residential potential" methodology, the amended 2020 plan accommodates 1,201,973 units for the year 2020. Calculation and Use of the "Allocation Ratio". The technique of determining a residential density allocation ratio was described in an article entitled "Expanding the Overallocation of Land Use Categories," which appears in a June, 1995, publication of the Department of Community Affairs called "Community Planning." "Community Planning" is published by the Department of Community Affairs "to provide technical assistance to Florida's counties and cities and implement any requirements of Florida's growth management laws." The article announces how the Department reviews the question of "overallocation" in determining whether a plan is in compliance with statutory and rule requirements regarding urban sprawl. According to the article, the Department suggests that a comprehensive plan should allocate up to 125 percent of the amount of land needed to accommodate the projected future population. The article does not explain how the "allocation ratio" should be calculated. The Sheridan Final Order seems to say that maximum densities should be assumed. See Finding 11, above. But neither the "Community Planning" article nor the Sheridan Final Order indicate what other assumptions should be made. The "Community Planning" article and the Sheridan Final Order also do not specify whether, in calculating the allocation ratio, population accommodation capacity should be compared to the total expected population or to the incremental growth expected in the population. The DCA has accepted a 1.25 allocation ratio applied to the total expected population as being reasonable. A major treatise in this area known as Urban Land Use Planning, Fourth Edition, by Kaiser, Godchalk, and Chapin, suggests that an allocation ratio of up to 2.05 can be considered reasonable; however, when doing so, the authors were evaluating plans with a closer planning horizon (one to five years), and they were comparing the population accommodation capacity to the incremental growth expected in the population. When calculating an allocation ratio for a 20-year planning horizon, they suggest that a 1.20 allocation ratio that compares population accommodation capacity to the incremental growth expected in the population would be reasonable. By accepting a 1.25 allocation ratio that compares the population accommodation capacity to the total population expected on a 25-year planning horizon, the DCA seems to have been misapplying the allocation ratio analysis. Clearly, an accommodation ratio comparing the population accommodation capacity to the incremental growth expected in the population would be much than one comparing to to the total population expected. There was no data and analysis as to exactly how much higher, and it is difficult to say based on the record in this case. However, an example of the difference between the too methodologies is suggested by one of RGMC's alternative analyses. It is known that approximately 300,000 units of residential development will be needed for the population expected in the year 2020. See Finding 36, above. The evidence was that there were approximately 143,000 units existing in 1995, so approximately 157,000 additional units will be needed by the year 2020 to accommodate the expected population. Meanwhile, using the County's Figure 14 assumptions, the FLUM without the Overlay makes 384,045 units available for development by the year 2020, or an accommodation of an additional 241,045 units over what was in existence in 1995. Comparing incremental accommodation for growth to the incremental population growth expected by the year 2020 would result in an "accommodation ratio" of approximately 1.54, versus the ratio of 1.28 calculated in Figure 14 comparing to total population expected. By way of further examples, using the same method of comparison: Figure 14A's 2.11 "accommodation ratio" would become a ratio of 3.13, comparing incremental accommodation for growth to the incremental population growth expected by the year 2020; Figure 14B's 2.53 "accommodation ratio" would become a ratio of 3.92; and the DCA's "accommodation ratio" of 4.01 would become a ratio of 6.75. It should be noted that the Urban Land Use Planning treatise also speaks of the use of the allocation ratio as a safety factor to provide a choice of location for housing type and to avoid artificially increasing land and housing prices. Rather than being a device merely to avoid the overallocation of land, the safety factor also is said to be necessary to ensure that enough land is allocated and that the limitations of forecasting approaches do not exacerbate the need for affordable housing. It also should be noted that neither the "Community Planning" article nor the Sheridan Final Order specify that allocation and urban sprawl issues should be determined from the simple calculation of a residential density allocation. To the contrary, the Sheridan Final Order would indicate that, once the allocation ratio is obtained, full consideration should be given to all pertinent factors "in order to determine if the density allocations in a plan, in view of other plan provisions, are supported by data and analysis." Analyses Not Conducted. The plan amendments do not only eliminate the 2010 Overlay. They also decline to retain the Overlay concept and extend it another ten years to the year 2020. There is no data or analysis in this case comparing the population accommodated by the FLUM without any Overlay to the population that would be accommodated in the year 2020 if the Overlay were extended another ten years to 2020. Such data and analysis would most clearly illuminate the impact of eliminating the 2010 Overlay, and abandoning the Overlay concept, on the residential allocation of the plan for the year 2020. There may be tens of thousands of, up to perhaps almost a hundred thousand, residential units in DRI's that have been approved but not yet built. There was inadequate data and analysis of how many of the residential units that will be needed by the year 2020 can be supplied in these DRI's. Lehigh Acres. Clearly, Lehigh Acres presents a special problem for Lee County and the DCA. Lehigh Acres was platted in the 1950s and 1960s. It covers approximately 97 square miles, which is slightly more than 62,000 acres. Since its inception, Lehigh has had all the attributes of urban sprawl. It is a large, sprawling, almost entirely residential community that was created in an area remote from urban services. It is characterized by grid patterns of development, a poorly-designed transportation network with large numbers of small local roads and no four-lane roads, huge amounts of land allocated to residential development and a relatively small amount of land allocated to commercial development. The roads in Lehigh are built. Virtually all of Lehigh has been subdivided into relatively small single family residential homesites, and almost all of these homesites have been sold to buyers all over the world. By virtue of the platting and sale of the land into homesites, Lehigh is a vested community. Over the years, the County has considered a number of potential solutions to the Lehigh Acres dilemma. Ultimately, the County decided to take a multi-pronged approach: (1) creating restrictions on additional subdivision and attempting to reduce densities to no more than four units per acre; (2) continuing the privately-funded infrastructure overlay as the means of providing infrastructure in Lehigh; and (3) utilizing sector planning to work toward a better transportation system and larger areas of commercial allocation to create a more balanced community. Based on the new treatment of Lehigh Acres, the County engaged in different assumptions about how Lehigh will build out. In 1989, Lehigh was shown as "central urban" and "urban community," together with the rest of the Lee Plan future land use categories. Under the 2010 Overlay, the County purported to reduce acreage allocations in Lehigh, but in fact there was little impact on residential potential due to vesting. In the EAR-based amendments, Lehigh is shown under "Vested Community," a separate land use category. Through the vested community category, the County attempted to restrict additional subdividing of lots and, with a few limited exceptions, set a maximum density of four units per acre. Based on the different treatment of Lehigh in the Plan, the County projected a population for Lehigh based on the amount of growth actually expected to occur by Year 2020. To do this, the County utilized eight different methodologies and averaged the projections to come up with a 2010 population for Lehigh of 95,906. These assumptions are reflected in the County's Figures 14 and 14A. Neither the Department's rules nor the "Community Planning" article provide specific guidance as to how vested areas are to be treated in making a calculation of a plan's "allocation ratio." The vast area of Lehigh has the capacity to absorb virtually all the anticipated future population growth in unincorporated Lee County through the year 2020. In fact, it may be appropriate for Lee County to increase overall density in Lehigh if necessary to support the infrastructure and transportation needed to convert Lehigh Acres into a more balanced, multi-use development. Lee County's approach to Lehigh essentially was to attempt to satisfy the Department's desire for an acceptable "allocation ratio" by estimating how many residents will actually live in Lehigh by 2020, assuming the Plan's treatment of Lehigh, and treating those estimates as Lehigh's population accommodation. By studying historic rates of growth, the Lee Planning Division believes that number will be approximately 96,000 people. No evidence was presented by the Department or any intervenor in contradiction of this estimate. The results of the County's approach to Lehigh are reflected in the County's Figures 14 and 14A. Another approach would be to attempt to reduce residential development in other parts of the County. It would be poor planning to reduce densities "across the board" throughout the County just to achieve a lower allocation ratio. Such an approach could direct population concentration away from urban areas into poorly-served rural areas, thereby discouraging the efficient use of land and encouraging sprawling uses. Depending on the densities, it could direct growth to remote areas of the county. Additionally, if Lee County attemped to limit residential growth based on incorrect assumptions regarding future densities, it could seriously underallocate land uses. Underallocation can greatly inflate land costs to the detriment of the general public. On the other hand, a better approach might be to couple sector planning in Lehigh with a reduction in densities in certain other parts of the County. If successful, such an approach could both create more balanced development in Lehigh Acres and direct future growth to Lehigh and away from coastal high hazard areas (CHHA), DRGR and other environmentally sensitive areas, and Open Lands and Rural land (especially rural lands not situated so as to be potential future urban infill or expansion), including important wildlife habitat. Commercial Allocations. The 2020 Lee Plan, without the 2010 Overlay, has some guidance for the location of commercial development, especially retail commercial. But it does not have percentage distributions or other objective measurement of the distribution of commercial and other uses allowed in its many mixed land use districts. Policy 6.1.2 of the 2020 Lee Plan consists of site location criteria which apply to retail commercial development, such as shopping centers, restaurants, gas stations, and other commercial development generating large volumes of traffic. Non-retail commercial development, such as office, hotel and motel or wholesale commercial development, may be developed at the identified intersections or anywhere else in the land use categories which allow commercial development. Even retail commercial can be developed at locations which do not meet the location criteria under discretion granted to the Board of County Commissioners. According to Lee County's EAR, the Commercial Site Locations Standards Map (Map 16) identifies 52 full intersections and 15 half-moon intersections which comply with the site location standards for Community Commercial and Neighborhood Commercial. They represent 9,520 acres of land designated for retail commercial development. Using the standard planning conversion rate of 10,000 square feet per acre, average, there is room for approximately 95,000,000 square feet of commercial development in the commercial sites depicted on Map There also may be other intersections which meet the criteria for Community Commercial or Neighborhood Commercial but are not shown on Map 16. In addition, there are numerous intersections which meet the criteria for Minor Commercial which are not shown on Map 16. Map 16 also does not include Regional Commercial development. The report by Thomas H. Roberts & Associates on Commercial Land Use Needs In Lee County (Jan. 10, 1987), indicates that the retail space ratio in Lee County is 26 square feet per capita. Just counting the 95,000,000 square feet of retail commercial development allowed in the land shown on Map 16, the 2020 Lee Plan has enough retail commercial capacity to accommodate 3.7 million people. Without even considering the non-retail commercial uses that can be developed at any location in the several land use districts which allow commercial uses, or the unknown amount of retail commercial that can be developed at the numerous intersections which meet the Minor Commercial location criteria, the 2020 Lee Plan without the 2010 Overlay allows commercial development far in excess of the amount needed to accommodate the projected 2020 population. Industrial Allocation Policy 7.1.4 in the 2020 Lee Plan provides: The [FLUM] shall designate a sufficient quantity of land to accommodate industrial development that will employ 3 percent of the county's population in manufacturing activities by the year 2010. The 2020 FLUM, without the 2010 Overlay, designates 6,062 acres in the Industrial Development category. Three percent of the 2020 County population represents approximately 19,000 people. The 1984 Roberts industrial land analysis for Lee County suggested a ratio of seven industrial workers per acre for industrial related activities. Most industrial land uses employ more workers per acre, and the national average is about 17 employees per acre. But even using the ratio suggested by the Roberts analysis, Lee County would need only approximately 3,000 acres of industrial land to accommodate three percent of the 2020 County population in industrial employment. Analysis in the EAR indicates that enough additional industrial land is needed to serve the needs of municipal populations that probably cannot or will not be supplied within the cities themselves and that this additional land accounts for the apparent excess in industrial lands allocated in the county. However, it is not clear from the data and analysis how this determination was made. In addition, light industrial development is permitted in several other mixed land use categories. For example, the existing approximately 2,800 acres of Airport Commerce (AC) located to the northwest of the airport is intended to include light industrial activities. There was no data or analysis as to how much additional industrial use will be made of land in those categories. There are no percentage distributions or other objective measurements of the distribution of land uses in the mixed land use districts that allow light industrial use. The Mixed Land Use Districts. As has been seen, the Lee Plan without any Overlay makes extensive use of mixed land use districts without percentage distributions or other objective measurements of distribution among uses. Much of the dispute between the parties as to residential accommodation and allocations of land for commercial and industrial uses results from the lack of percentage distributions or other objective measurements of distribution among uses in the plan's mixed land use categories. Although the County predicts development of only a percentage of these districts as residential, it remains possible for much larger percentages to be developed residential. On the other hand, it is possible for practically all of mixed land use districts to develop commercially or even industrially. The 2010 Overlay attempted to address the lack of percentage distributions or other objective measurements of distribution among uses in the plan's mixed land use districts by limiting the acreage that could be developed in particular uses by the year 2010. Without the Overlay concept, no percentage distributions or other objective measurements of distribution among uses remain in the plan. Because of the plan's extensive use of mixed use districts, the County's ability to control development through the plan is seriously undermined. Other Urban Sprawl Considerations. Unincorporated Lee County contains approximately 685 square miles. Lehigh Acres and the DRGR areas, combined, are approximately 199 more square miles, 29 percent of the total area of unincorporated Lee County. Except for the growth that will occur in the Vested Community of Lehigh, much of the future growth in Lee County will occur in the I-75, U.S. 41 corridor, which is oriented in a generally North-South direction and contains most of the urbanized areas of the County, including the City of Fort Myers. Because this area is already largely urbanized, most of the growth in it will result in either the expansion of existing urbanized areas or in-fill between existing urban areas. Certificated water and sewer franchise areas also generally coincide with the north/south urban core in which growth is expected to continue. The presence of water and sewer franchise areas in the north/south urban core and in Lehigh Acres encourages utilization of these areas through the ability to provide urban services. The absence of water and sewer franchise areas in other portions of the County will act as a hindrance to development in areas which are undeveloped and either in conservation or agricultural use. A review of County DRI approvals, together with approved development orders, also appears to indicate a trend toward development in the north/south core. The absence of development orders in most of the outlying areas, indicated as either agricultural, vacant, or conservation use, indicate that probably relatively little growth will occur in those areas. Platted subdivisions also appear to show a trend toward development in the north/south urban core. In general, there also appears to be a correlation between existing land uses and those factors which can reasonably be expected to establish future growth trends in the north/south urban core. Growth in the north/south I-75, U.S. 41 corridor across the county line to the south in Collier County tends to encourage similar growth at the southern end of Lee County. Meanwhile, there are hindrances to development across the county line to the east and southeast by virtue of the presence of agricultural lands and regional wetland systems such as the Corkscrew Swamp and the Everglades. The County has also made use of sector planning. The County's sector plans represent extensive and detailed planning studies which in many cases are reflected in both the FLUM and the policies in the Plan. However, currently there is no sector plan for Lehigh Acres. Policy 1.5.5, creating the Vested Community category for Lehigh, states a sector plan for Lehigh will be developed beginning in 1996. In terms of land uses, the Plan seems to be fairly well functionally related, both in terms of what is shown on the FLUM and the relation between the FLUM and the Plan policies themselves. A good example of this is the commercial site location standards, which establish a strong functional relationship between transportation and regional commercial facilities. There is also a good functional relationship between existing land uses. The Plan mixed use categories appear to recognize and attempt to encourage sound functional relationships between home, work, and shopping. The Plan also has compatibility standards that help maintain functional relationships. However, without the Overlay, the many mixed use categories in the Plan do not contain a percentage distribution or other objective measurement of distribution among mixed uses within the mixed use districts. In terms of land use suitability, the County generally appears to be designating for development those areas which are most suitable for development. However, because it allows development of all kinds throughout the County in excess of what is needed by 2020, the Plan allows development in less suitable areas. A variety of methodologies and assumptions leads to the conclusion that the Lee Plan generally is an urban development plan, not a rural development plan. For instance, under the Figure 14 methodology, 80 percent of the population is directed toward urban land uses, and 12 percent into rural. Under Figure 14B, which unrealistically assumes that all of Lehigh Acres will be built out within the planning time frame, 90 percent of the population is directed to urban areas, and only 10 percent to rural. Even assuming that 100 percent of the land will be used for residential purposes, and that all of Lehigh will build out within the planning time frame, 92 percent is directed to urban areas, and only 8 percent to rural. Finally, even assuming 100 percent of the land to residential at maximum densities, and also that all rural land uses will use the PDDO option at six units per acre, only 4 percent of the population will be directed to rural areas in the FLUM. Notwithstanding the overall patterns of growth in Lee County, it clearly is indicated in the Sheridan Final Order that land in Lee County historically has been used inefficiently and that, without the Overlay, the plan allows inefficiency to continue unabated. This is due in large part to the extensive use of mixed land use categories that do not contain a percentage distribution or other objective measurement of distribution among mixed uses within the mixed use districts, together with the overallocation of land that also results in part from their use. By comparing the FLUM's since 1984 with the current Existing Land Use Map (ELUM) (Lee 56), it is apparent that rural designations have not preserved agriculture. Significant parts of county that have been designated rural since 1984 actually have been developed residential or non-agricultural use. In Range (R) 25 East (E), Township (T) 45 South(S), Sections 31 and 32 are residential, while 33 is a golf course. Similarly, R 25 E, T 47 S, Sections 14, 15 and 23 have developed significantly residential and part of Section 14 is now designated Outlying Suburban. In addition, significant residential development has occurred in areas of Pine Island that have been designated rural since 1984. On the other side of the coin, much of the "New Community" still is in rural use (R 35 E, T 45 S, Sections 1, 2, 3, parts of 10, 11, and 12; R 26 E, Sectons 5-8, 17 and 18.) Some "Industrial Development" land is actually still in rural use or vacant--R 25 E, T 46 S, Section 3 west of I-75, and Sections 4- There is significant land that actually is rural or vacant adjacent to wetlands and Estero Bay in R 24 E, T 45 S (Sections 28, 29, and 31-35), together with Sections 3-5, 8-10, and 15 in R 24 E, T 46 S, that are designated for Suburban or Outlying Suburban uses. Land designated rural, open land or fringe in 1984 has been redesignated for urban uses over the years. A large block straddling Daniels Parkway east of the 6 Mile Cypress Strand has been designated Outlying Suburban. Approximately between Buckingham Road, Orange River Boulevard and I-75, rural land has been redesignated as Rural Community Preserve. Large blocks of land, one at the extreme north end of the county between U.S. 41 and I-75, and the other east of I-75 near the river, have gone from rural to Outlying Suburban. A large amount of what was rural and fringe between Bonita Springs and San Carlos Park, west of U.S. 41, has become Suburban and Outlying Suburban. CHHA and Hurricane Evacuation and Shelter. Objective 75.1 of the amended Lee Plan defines and delineates Coastal High Hazard Areas (CHHA) for the first time. Previously, the plan referred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) "A Zone," which encompasses somewhat more land than the new CHHA. Policy 75.1.4 of the amended Lee Plan, which formerly applied to the "A Zone," states: Through the Lee Plan amendment process, land use designations of undeveloped areas within [CHHA] shall be considered for reduced density categories (or assignment of minimum allowable densities where density ranges are permitted) in order to limit the future population exposed to coastal flooding. In this round of amendments, the County did not consider either reducing density categories, or assigning the minimum allowable densities in categories with a range of densities, in undeveloped land in the CHHA. In prior rounds of amendments, the County reduced densities in areas that would be inundated by Category 1, 2 and 3 hurricanes (which would include CHHA). Assuming maximum allowable densities together with the other Figure 14A assumptions, the density reductions reduced population accommodation by 13,000 units in those areas. Elimination of the 2010 Overlay opened additional land to immediate development in the CHHA. There was no data and analysis on the amount of new land opened to immediate development or the additional population accommodated in the CHHA that would result. Goal 79 in the Lee Plan, as amended, is to "provide evacuation and shelter capabilities adequate to safeguard the public against the effects of hurricanes and tropical storms." Objective 79.1 of the Lee Plan, as amended, is to restore evacuation times to 1987 levels by 2000, and to reduce the clearance time portion of evacuation time to 18 hours or less by 2010. Previously, the plan's objective was to achieve 1987 evacuation times by the year 1995. Lee County has among the best hurricane planning efforts in southwest Florida. Nonetheless, as of the time of the final hearing, evacuation times still exceeded 1987 levels, and clearance times exceeded 18 hours. Little progress had been made toward the previous objective to achieve 1987 evacuation times by the year 1995. That is why the objective was extended five more years until the year 2000. It may be that the 2010 Overlay was not designed with hurricane evacuation times in mind. It also is true that the County's evacuation plans are updated every three years based on actual development data. But it also is true that additional development in the CHHA due to elimination of the 2010 Overlay may make it more difficult to achieve Objective 79.1, even as amended. Objective 79.2 of the Lee Plan is to make adequate shelter space available by the year 2010 "for the population in the Hurricane Vulnerability Zone at risk under a Category 3 storm." There was no data and analysis of the impact of eliminating the 2010 Overlay on the County's ability to achieve either Objective 79.1 or Objective 79.2. There also was no data and analysis of the impact of amending Objective 75.1 and 75.1.4 to reduce the size of the coastal area subject to consideration for land use density reductions on the County's ability to achieve either Objective 79.1 or Objective 79.2. Change of Alico Property from DRGR to AC. Another significant FLUM amendment in the EAR-based amendments was to change the designation of 1400 acres of property owned by Alico, Inc., from DRGR to Airport Commerce (AC). Uses allowed in the AC district include light manufacturing and assembly, warehousing, distribution facilities, ground transportation and airport related terminals or transfer facilities, and hospitality services. Suitability. Policy 1.4.5 of the plan, as amended, defines DRGR as "upland areas that provide substantial recharge to aquifers most suitable for future wellfield development" and as "the most favorable locations for physical withdrawal of water from those aquifers." Although previously designated DRGR, more recent data and analysis calls this designation into question. The amendment property does provide some recharge to both the water table (surficial) aquifer and the underlying Sandstone aquifer, but it does not provide above-average groundwater recharge for either aquifer (or any recharge to any of the deeper aquifers). In addition, it is not a good site for the development of a wellfield in either the water table or the Sandstone aquifer. The water table aquifer is not especially thick, and there are too many wetlands on the site for production from the water table aquifer. (Pumping from the water table aquifer next to the airport also could be problematic in that the stability of the soil under the airport could be affected. (Cf. Finding 100, below.) In the Sandstone aquifer, groundwater flows away from the site, making it unsuitable for production. Despite the questions raised by the new data and analysis, the amendment property may still be suitable for designation as DRGR. But that does not necessarily make it unsuitable for AC use. In terms of location, the amendment property is perfectly suited to AC use. I-75 and other AC-designated property is to the immediate west of the amendment property. The Southwest Florida International Airport is to the immediate north of the amendment property. A second runway and a new cargo handling facility are planned for construction to the south of the existing airport runway. When built, the new facilities will practically be touching the northern boundary of the amendment property, and the proposed new south airport access will cross the amendment property and intersect Alico Road, which is the southern boundary of the amendment property. Commercial and industrial use on the property would not pose an unreasonable threat to contaminate either existing or future potable water wells. Theoretically, stormwater from the amendment property could contain contaminants which could eventually migrate to a drinking water well. But the threat of such contamination is small. Permitting criteria adopted and imposed by the South Florida Water Management District will require all construction on this site to conform to surface water quality standards through Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and permitting rules of the Water Management District within Chapter 40, Florida Administrative Code. These rules will require on-site detention and retention of stormwater which will greatly reduce the threat of surface contaminants leaving the property. Additionally, all surface water runoff from the property, and most groundwater, will be intercepted by the Alico Road Canal, which drains in a westerly direction away from any existing drinking water wells. If any contaminants from the amendment property were to enter the groundwater, avoid the Alico Road Canal and leave the property, they would have to migrate a considerable distance to reach a potable water wellhead. The only wellfield pumping, or planned to pump, from the water table aquifer which contaminants possibly could reach would be the existing Gulf Utilities wellfield approximately one mile and a half southeast of the amendment property. Contaminants within the groundwater move at a slower speed than the water itself. Most contaminants move at a much slower speed than the water. Thus, the chances are very slight that contaminants from the amendment property would threaten the Gulf Utilities wellfield. Any metals in the groundwater would attach to soil particles and migrate extremely slowly. Other potential contaminants would eventually break down within the soil as they slowly migrated away from the site. It was estimated that the travel time from the closest portion of the amendment property to the Gulf Utilities well field would be in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 years. If any such contaminants did reach the wellfield they would be in such dilute concentrations that they would pose no health hazard. The only other wellfield that is reasonably close to the proposed site is the Florida Cities well field to the northeast. This wellfield taps the Sandstone aquifer. The Sandstone aquifer is separated from the water table aquifer by an approximately 40 foot thick semi-confining layer. This layer is composed of silt and clay which provides hydraulic separation between the aquifers. There are no known breaches of the semi-confining layer in this area. The direction of flow and the nature of the semi-confining layer also make it extremely unlikely that contaminants from activities on the amendment property and discharged from the site by stormwater could migrate to the Florida Cities water wellfield. The groundwater in the water table aquifer flows generally southwest, and the confining layer has low leakance values. Additionally, safety measures required for the development of the amendment property include the installation of monitoring wells and the requirement to use the best environmental management practices. The data and analysis includes panther sitings in the vicinity of the amendment property. There also is evidence that the amendment property is part of land that has been labeled as "Panther Priority 2." The significance of this label was not clear from the evidence. In any event, while part of the "Panther Priority 2" land, the amendment property clearly also is surrounded by uses not particularly suited for panthers. Currently, rock mining is occurring on property to the east and to the south of the amendment property. Rock mining on the amendment property itself also is allowed under its previous DRGR designation. The airport is immediately to the north, and both other AC property and I-75 are immediately to the west. In light of those developments, the "Panther Priority 2" designation does not make the amendment property unsuitable for AC designation. Need. The County has a legitimate need to diversify its economy so that it is not so dependent on tourism. It is the County's perogative to attempt to develop its regional airport into an international trade center. In view of the suitability of the amendment property for AC, and its projected role in furthering the County's plans to develop its regional airport into an international trade center, the amendment property should be viewed as a valuable economic resource in need of protection. It is appropriate, when trying to protect a resource, to plan for the needs of generations to come. If the amendment is not approved, there is a good chance that the land eventually will be used for a rock mine. Residential use in that location is incompatible with airport noise. A public gun range is a permissible use of DRGR property, but there are no plans for a public gun range on the amendment property, and such a use also would not be compatible so close to the airport and would be unlikely. Although agricultural use as pasture is possible, ultimate use of the property for pasture seems less likely than rock mining. As previously mentioned, the land immediately to the east of the subject parcel and to the south of the subject parcel is being utilized as rock pits. If the amendment property eventually is used for rock mining, the land would be excavated into what becomes deep lakes. In all likelihood, such a use would permanently preempt the land in question from being a commercial resource that could be utilized in conjunction with the airport. Of the 1400 acres of amendment property, approximately 800 acres are jurisdictional wetlands; only about 600 acres of uplands actually can be used for AC purposes. Meanwhile, approximately 173 acres of industrial land has been rezoned to other uses within Lee County between 1990 and the date of the hearing. Another 300 acres of AC are to be incorporated into the new airport expansion. But there was no data or analysis as to how much of those 473 acres consist of wetlands. Utilizing the 1984 Roberts methodology, the County has analyzed the need for industrial land in the County and has concluded that the addition of the amendment property is necessary to meet those requirements. However, as previously mentioned, it is not clear how the County's analysis was conducted or what the actual needs for industrial land in the County are. In addition, several mixed land use categories permit light industrial use but do not establish percentage distributions or other objective measurements of the distribution among the mixed uses within those categories. Taken as a whole the data and analysis does not establish that the AC amendment is necessary to meet the need for industrial land in the County. Adequate data and analysis to establish those needs is necessary to determine whether other land where industrial use is permitted should be redesignated if the AC amendment is to be adopted. As previously discussed, Lee County has much more land designated for commercial development than will be needed to accommodate the projected 2020 population. See Findings 58-68, above. In support of their position that the AC map amendment is needed in order to meet the demand for airport-related industrial and commercial development that will be generated by the expanding Southwest Florida International Airport, Lee County and Alico point out that international airports serve a larger area than a single County, and that a larger AC district near the Airport will serve the Southwest Florida region. With its new runway and larger terminal with new cargo handling facility, the Airport Authority intends, and the County would like to encourage, a large increase in airfreight handled by the Airport by 2020. Alico prepared a Response to DCA's ORC, which attempted to compare the acreage of approved, large-scale commercial and industrial development near the Orlando International Airport to the amount of acres proposed for Airport Commerce near the Southwest Florida International Airport. However, the Alico Response failed to take into account the amount of approved development near the Orlando Airport which is vacant. According to the Alico Response, the Orlando International Airport handled 233,587 tons of airfreight in 1994. Also according to the Alico Response, 7,152 acres of industrial and commercial development, including ten DRI's, are located near the Orlando Airport. The ten DRI's located near the Orlando Airport include 55,464,770 square feet of approved industrial and commercial development. But as of June of 1995, only 3,386,744 square feet of industrial and commercial development, or 6.11 percent of the approved industrial and commercial square footage, had been constructed. Applying the percentage of approved industrial and commercial in DRI's actually developed by 1995 (6.11 percent) to the acreage approved for industrial and commercial (7,152 acres), it can be determined that 440 acres of existing industrial and commercial development were supporting the 233,587 tons of airfreight handled by the Orlando Airport in 1994. Based upon the Orlando Airport experience, it would appear that each acre of industrial and commercial development near an airport supports 534.54 tons of airfreight each year. The Southwest International Airport projects that 196,110 tons of airfreight will be handled by the Airport by 2020. Dividing the projected 2020 tonnage by the 534.54 tons of airfreight per acre from the Orlando Airport experience, it would appear that the air freight activities projected for the Southwest Florida International Airport by the year 2020 will support only about 367 acres of AC. The Lee Plan FLUM already includes approximately 2800 acres of AC located to the northwest of the Airport. (It is not clear whether the 300 acres consumed by the runway expansion should be deducted from the 2850 acres of AC said to currently exist.) The existing AC district is essentially undeveloped. The AC which already exists to the northwest of the Airport is more than sufficient to support the airfreight which the Airport expects to handle by 2020. Zemel FLUM Amendment. Background. The Zemels own approximately 8600 acres of land in northwest Lee County. The 1990 Comprehensive Plan amendments which resulted from the settlement between Lee County and DCA, designated Zemel property as DRGR with a residential density of one unit per ten acres. The DRGR designation for the Zemel property was determined to be in compliance with the Growth Management Act. Zemel v. Lee County & DCA, 15 FALR 2735 (Fla. Dept. Comm. Aff. 1993), aff'd, 642 So. 2d 1367 (Fla.1st DCA 1994). Based in part on data and analysis which were not available at the time of adoption of the DRGR category, a circuit court determined that the Zemel property did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the DRGR category. The circuit court ordered that: The property is hereby restored to the Rural land use classification on the Future Land Use Map of the Lee Plan, including restoration of the subject property's density to 1 du/acre and use of the Planned Development District Option for the property. This action shall not preclude the County from amending its plan, including the 2010 Overlay, as it pertains to the Zemel property, pursuant to Chapter 163, Fla. Stat., subject to constitutional limita- tions and other requirements of law. Placement of Zemel Property in Open Lands Classification The 1994 EAR-based amendments changed the land use designation of the Zemel property to Open Lands. Open Lands is a new category created by the EAR- based amendments in Policy 1.4.4. The residential density allowed in the Open Lands category is one unit per ten acres, except a density of one unit per five acres is permitted if the planned development process is used to prevent adverse impacts on environmentally sensitive lands (as defined in Policy 77.1.1.4). (Commercial and industrial uses are permitted in the Open Lands category in accordance with the standards in the Rural category.) Of the 8,600 acres owned by Zemel, approximately 1,900 acres are wetlands and 6,700 acres are uplands. Lee County chose the Open Lands category for the Zemel property because it was the least intensive land use category available after the circuit court determined that the DRGR category was not appropriate, and because the County did not wish to exacerbate the overallocation of the FLUM. According to new Policy 1.4.4: Open Lands are upland areas that are located north of Rural and/or sparsely developed areas in Township 43 South. These areas are extremely remote from public services and are characterized by agricultural and low-density residential uses. It was not proven that the Zemel property does not meet the Policy 1.4.4 definition of Open Lands. The Zemel property clearly is in Township 43 South. It is north of areas that can be said to be "sparsely developed." The Zemel property clearly is characterized by agricultural use. Finally, although some of the Zemel property is not "extremely remote" from some public services, all of the Zemel property can be said to be "extremely remote" from at least some public services, and some of the Zemel property can be said to be "extremely remote" from all public services. Placement of the Zemel property in the Opens Lands category was based on adequate data and analysis. To the extent that data and analysis in the EAR may have been lacking, the evidence at final hearing included adequate data and analysis. Using the Figure 14 methodology, the County calculated that Open Lands category would accommodate 2,073 people, as compared to 8,293 people at the Rural density. However, assuming development of all of the Zemel property at the one du/ac standard density allowed by the Lee Plan for Rural, 14,003 people (1 du/ac x 6700 upland acres x 2.09 persons/unit) would be accommodated. In the case of the Zemel property, such an assumption would be less unrealistic than in many other parts of the County since it is a large, vacant tract. The evidence also was that the Zemel property is one of the few parcels of land in the County in which use of the PDDO is a realistic possibility. Assuming maximum densities under the PDDO, the Zemel property under the Rural designation could accommodate 84,018 people (6 du/ac x 6700 upland acres x 2.09 persons/unit). Under the Open Lands category, even at the maximum density allowed for planned developments, the Zemel property could accommodate only 2,801 people (1 du/5 ac x 6700 upland acres x 2.09 persons/unit). Dependence of Open Lands on Deletion of Overlay Section 10 of the Lee County Ordinance 94-30, which adopted the plan amendments in issue in this case, purported to defer, until after the conclusion of these proceedings, the decision as to which adopted plan amendments would become effective. Although all of the parties now agree that the attempted deferral of this decision was "ultra vires," the evidence was that one purpose of Section 10 of the ordinance was to insure that intended packages of amendments would remain together and either become effective together or not at all. Specifically, there was evidence that the amendments to the FLUM and to FLUE Policy 1.4.4, changing the land use designation of certain property to "Open Lands," was intended to remain together with the amendments which delete the FLUM 2010 Overlay, and to either become effective together or not at all. Otherwise, there would be no development authorized in property redesignated "Open Lands" because there was no land use category called "Open Lands" at the time of adoption of the 2010 overlay, and no express authorization for development of any kind in "Open Lands." Planning Timeframe. Clearly, the EAR-based Lee Plan amendments are intended to plan through the year 2020. The year 2020 was chosen for the amendments to enable the County to make use of the best available demographic projections being generated by the Metropolitan Planning Organization for that time frame. The Parks, Recreation and Open Space Element of the plan, as amended, retains Map 11. Map 11 depicts "Future Recreational Uses within Generalized Service Boundaries." It is the map that was generated in 1989 and used in the 1989 and subsequent plans for the year 2010. However, it was not proven that the map does not accurately depict "Future Recreational Uses within Generalized Service Boundaries" for the year 2020. The County concedes that the Community Facilities and Services Element of the plan, as amended, projects waste generation and recycling rates only from 1991 to 2015. The County contends that these projections are easily extrapolated to the year 2020, and no party disputes this. The County's response to the DCA's ORC report indicates that the Hurricane Shelter/Deficit analysis for the Conservation and Coastal Management Element is for shelter needs to the year 2000. However, the County cannot accurately project shelter needs much further in the future. The evidence is that the better practice is to plan for shorter periods of time and continually update the projections. This is what the County does. It was not proven that the County is planning for the wrong timeframe or that its plan is defective for that reason. Other alleged uses of the wrong planning timeframe actually arise from questions as to the allocation of land to meet the needs of the County through the year 2020. There is no question whether the County's intent is to plan for the year 2020. The dispute is whether land has been overallocated. Other Alleged Internal Inconsistency. Amended Objective 100.1 in the Housing Element uses data for the County, including municipalities, in projecting the number of housing units needed for the 2020 timeframe. It is true that EAR Figures 14, 14A and 14B, which analyze the FLUM, identify the number of units which may be accommodated for the unincorporated area. But EAR Figures 12 and 13, which also analyze the FLUM, are directed to the entire county, including municipalities. Besides, it is clear that the County understands its obligation is only to implement affordable housing with respect to the unincorporated county. Water Supply. The Regional Water Supply Master Plan (RWSMP) serves as supporting data for several amended policies in the Potable Water sub-element of the Community Facilities and Services Element. The purpose of the RWSMP was to ensure an adequate, reliable and cost-efficient supply of potable water to meet the current and future needs of Lee County to the Year 2030 and beyond, considering both economic and environmental factors. The County's reliance on implementation of the RWSMP for this purpose is justified. Preparation of the plan was a very complex undertaking. In preparing the population projections on which the Regional Water Supply Master Plan relies, the County's consultant attended the technical staff meetings of the individuals with the Metropolitan Planning Association (MPO) charged with preparing the MPO population projections. The MPO Countywide population projections utilized in the RWSMP were prepared by estimating the number of permanent residents and taking into account a number of other economic characteristics and social characteristics such as the number of children per household, historic and expected natural and State trends, and the degree to which these trends will affect the future of Lee County. The Lee Plan, as well as the Comprehensive Plans of the other governmental jurisdictions in Lee County, were utilized in preparing the RWSMP. It was a plainly spelled out requirement for preparation of the Master Plan that it had to be consistent with the Comprehensive Plans of the County and cities in Lee County. The MPO population projections are reasonably accurate, and they are the best available data for purposes of planning water supply. The MPO projections are preferable to the "maximum theoretical" population accommodation used in the DCA's residential allocation analysis. Regardless of the appropriate analysis for purposes of determining whether a plan overallocates land, it would not be appropriate to plan water supply based on unrealistic population projections. The RWSMP uses MPO 2020 population projections that are somewhat different from, but reasonably close, to the 2020 population projections reflected in Figure 14 and used to support the FLUE of the Lee Plan. The special purposes of the RWSMP projections justify the differences. Besides, the differences are not large enough to prove beyond fair debate that the plan is not internally consistent. Wetlands Protection. Prior to the County's adoption of the EAR-based amendments, Goal 84 in the Conservation and Coastal Management Element of the Lee Plan and its objectives and policies included guides for local land development regulations in the protection of wetlands by establishing allowable land uses and their densities, and by establishing design and performance standards for development in wetlands. The County modified Policy 84.1.2 (renumbered 84.1.1) in part by deleting a prohibition against the construction of ditches, canals, dikes, or additional drainage features in wetlands. Ditches, canals and dikes could be constructed in wetlands to have beneficial effects. For example, a ditch could be built to increase the hydroperiod of a wetland and result in a benefit. A dike could enhance a mitigation area, which would also result in environmental benefits. Thus, the repeal of this prohibition could benefit wetlands. The 1984 data and analysis contained in the EAR recommended that the prohibition be deleted and instead suggested the use of performance standards for the construction of ditches, canals, dikes, or other drainage features in wetlands. The EAR-based amendments to the Lee Plan do not include performance standards for the construction of ditches, canals, dikes, or other drainage features in wetlands. Instead, the County has modified Policy 84.1.1 (renumbered 84.1.2) in part by deleting the following language: Wetland regulations shall be designed to protect, conserve, restore, or preserve water resource systems and attendant biological functions, including: Preventing degradation of water quality and biological productivity. Preventing degradation of freshwater storage capabilities. Preventing damage to property and loss of life due to flooding. Preventing degradation of the viability and diversity of native plants and animals and their habitats. Assuring the conservation of irretrievable or irreversible resources. In place of those performance standards, the EAR-based Policy 84.1.2 provides: The county's wetlands protection regulations will be amended by 1995 to be consistent with the following: In accordance with F.S. 163.3184(6)(c), the county will not undertake an independent review of the impacts to wetlands resulting from development in wetlands that is specifically authorized by a DEP or SWFWMD dredge and fill permit or exemption. No development in wetlands regulated by the State of Florida will be permitted by Lee County without the appropriate state agency permit or authorization. Lee County shall incorporate the terms and conditions of state permits into county permits and shall prosecute violations of state regulations and permit conditions through its code enforcement procedures. Every reasonable effort shall be required to avoid or minimize adverse impacts on wet- lands through the clustering of development and other site planning techniques. On- or off-site mitigation shall only be permitted in accordance with applicable state standards. Mitigation banks and the issuance and use of mitigation bank credits shall be permitted to the extent authorized by applicable state agencies. As a part of the EAR-based amendments, the County also modified Policy 84.1.4 by deleting language that addressed permitted uses in wetlands and their densities, but that issue is now covered under renumbered Policy 84.1.1. The amendments added to Policy 84.1.4 the following provision: Land uses in uplands will be regulated through the implementation of the Land Development Code to avoid degrading the values and functions of adjoining and nearby wetlands. New Policies 84.1.2 and 84.1.4 in effect defer performance standards covering development in wetlands to the state and water management district permitting processes. The Lee amendments in part are an attempt to avoid duplicating what state agencies accomplish through their permitting programs. The evidence is that the state and water management district permitting processes include newly adopted Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) rules. These rules consider the type, value, function, size, condition and location of wetlands in determining how to protect them. The ERP rules also require proposed development to avoid or eliminate wetland impacts or, if not possible, to minimize and mitigate for them. The ERP rules also require consideration of the cumulative and long-term adverse impacts of development on wetlands in a comprehensive manner within the same water basin. The DEP and the Southwest Florida Water Management District also have adopted supplemental ERP rules covering only the jurisdiction of that water management district, which includes Lee County. By including a requirement that every state environmental permit shall be incorporated into county permits and that violations of a state permit also are violations of the county permit, the Lee Plan commits the County to assist the State in enforcing environmental permits in Lee County. Through this new emphasis on compliance and enforcement, Lee County will be providing valuable assistance to state environmental protection. Lee County's efforts will assist those agencies by devoting staff to compliance and enforcement efforts. Prior to the EAR-based amendments, the County had two wetland land use categories under the Lee Plan. These were described as the Resource Protection Areas (RPA) and Transition Zones (TZ). Guidelines and standards for permitted uses and development in the RPA and TZ were found in the policies under Objective 84.1 and 84.2, respectively. As a part of the EAR-based amendments, the County replaced the RPA and TZ categories with a single Wetlands category. This new Wetlands category includes all lands that are identified as wetlands under the statewide definition using the state delineation methodology. The County's definition of "wetlands" in the plan amendments covers more area than the areas previously known as "resource protection" and "transition zones." To that extent, the present amendments to the Lee Plan give greater protection to wetlands than the previous version of the Lee Plan. The Lee Plan, as amended, also contains other GOP's. Taken together, the GOP's ensure the protection of wetlands and their natural functions. Reservation of Future Road Right-of-Way. As a part of the EAR-based amendments, the County has deleted or amended certain policies in the Traffic Circulation Element of the Lee Plan regarding the acquisition and preservation of rights-of-way. Deleted Policy 25.1.3 provided that the County would attempt to reserve adequate rights-of-way for state and county roads consistent with state and county plans. The County also deleted Policy 21.1.7, which addressed the possibility of acquiring future rights-of-way through required dedications of land. Policy 21.1.7 provided: The previous policy encouraging the voluntary dedication of land for future right of way needs shall not be construed so as to prohibit the adoption of regulations requiring such dedication. However, any such regulations must provide for a rational nexus between the amount of land for which dedication is required and the impact of the development in question, and must also provide that such dedication, when combined with other means which may be used to offset the impact of development (such as, for example, the imposition of impact fees), does not exceed the total impact of the develop- ment in question upon the county's transportation network. The "previous policy encouraging the voluntary dedication of land for future right of way needs," referenced in Policy 21.1.7, above, was Policy 21.1.6, which has been renumbered 21.1.5. As modified, that policy provides: In order to acquire rights-of-way and complete the construction of all roads designated on the Traffic Circulation Plan Map, voluntary dedications of land and construction of road segments and inter- sections by developers shall be encouraged through relevant provisions in the development regulations and other ordinances as described below: Voluntary dedication of rights-of-way necessary for improvements shown on the Traffic Circulation Plan Map shall be encouraged at the time local development orders are granted. In cases where there are missing segments in the traffic circulation system, developers shall be encouraged to also construct that portion of the thoroughfare that lies within or abuts the development, with appropriate credits granted towards impact fees for roads. However, site-related improvements (see glossary) are not eligible for credits towards impact fees. Policy 21.1.7 provided policy guidance for LDRs in establishing required dedication of future rights-of-way as a means of acquisition, if the County chose to use that measure. Policy 21.1.6 (renumbered 21.1.5) provides policy guidance for LDRs in establishing voluntary dedication of future rights- of-way as another means of acquisition. By deleting Policy 21.1.7, the Lee Plan, as amended, is left with a policy that establishes only the voluntary dedication measure as a means towards acquiring future rights-of-way to facilitate the construction of roads designated on the Traffic Circulation Plan Map of the Lee Plan. The County has made these changes because legally it appears that reservation of future right-of-way may no longer be a viable option after the decision in Joint Ventures, Inc., v. Dept. of Transportation, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990). The County's plan does more than just encourage voluntary dedication of rights-of-way. There are numerous policies in the Lee Plan that, taken together, adequately address the acquisition and preservation of rights-of-way. The following policies relate and achieve right-of-way protection: Policy 1.3, 1.6, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 6.1.5, 16.3.5, 21.1.5, Objective 21.2, Policies 21.2.1, 21.2.3, 21.2.5, 21.2.6, 21.2.7, Policy 23.1.2, 23.1.4, 23.2.3, Policy 25.1.1, and 25.1.3. Under these policies, all new projects receive a review for voluntary dedication as against the Lee County official trafficways map and the facility need identified for the planning horizon of the future traffic circulation element and map. In addition, all new developments are required to mitigate off-site impacts through a payment of impact fees. They are also required to address and mitigate site-related impacts through the provision of site-related improvements at the developer's expense. Payment of impact fees and additional revenues generated through mitigation of site-related impacts, both generate revenues for the capital improvements programming process for purchase of rights-of-way. Accomplishing necessary site-related improvements pursuant to the Lee County program also frequently results in County acquisition of rights-of-way at the developer's expense. Mitigation of site-related impacts, as well as payment of proportional share and impact fees, are generally accomplished through Policy 1.8.3, Subsection 1, Policy 2.3.2, Objective 3.1, Policy 3.1.3, Policy 7.1.2, Policy 14.3.2, Objective 22.1, 23.1, and the policies thereunder, Policy 23.1.1, 23.1.3-.7, 23.2.6, Objective 24.2, Policy 25.1.2, Objective 28.2, and Policy 70.1.1, Subsection A-7. The County's primary method of acquisition of rights-of-way is through the Capital Improvements Element. The Capital Improvements Element does include projected costs to purchase needed rights-of-way. The Lee County Capital Improvements Program is accomplished through Goal 70 of the Lee Plan, which expressly includes acquisition of rights-of-way. Objective 77.3 - Wildlife. Before the EAR-based changes, Objective 77.3 of the Lee Plan was to: "Maintain and enhance the current complement of fish and wildlife diversity and distribution within Lee County for the benefit of a balanced ecological system . . .." In pertinent part, the EAR-based amendment deleted the phrase "current complement of." The change does not alter the meaning of the objective. The concept of a baseline expressed by the deleted phrase also is inherent in the words "[m]aintain and enhance" and remains in the amended objective. Policy 77.11.5 - Endangered and Threatened Species. The EAR-based amendments deleted Policy 77.11.5, which stated: Important black bear and Florida panther use areas shall be identified. Corridors for public acquisition purposes shall be identified within these use areas. The corridor boundaries shall include wetlands, upland buffers, and nearby vegetative communities which are particularly beneficial to the Florida panther and black bear (such as high palmetto and oak hammocks). Data and analysis supports the deletion of the first two sentences. The use areas and public acquisition corridors have been identified. To reflect the new data and analysis, Policies 77.11.1 and 77.11.2 also were amended to provide for updating of data on sitings and habitat for these species and to encourage state land acquisition programs. The last sentence of former Policy 77.11.5 has been transferred and added verbatim to Policy 77.11.2. Related Policy 77.11.4 was also amended to reflect new data and analysis and to provide that, instead of just encouraging the acquisition of the Flint Pen Strand, the County shall continue an acquisition that is in progress. The Adoption Ordinance. As mentioned in connection with the Zemel amendment, Section 10 of the Lee County Ordinance 94-30, which adopted the plan amendments in issue in this case, purported to defer, until after the conclusion of these proceedings, the decision as to which adopted plan amendments would become effective. All of the parties now agree that the attempted deferral of this decision was "ultra vires." All of the parties except for the Zemels agree that, under Section 8 of the ordinance, the "ultra vires" part of the adopting ordinance is severable from the rest of the ordinance, which remains valid. The Zemels take the positions (1) that the state circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the remainder of the ordinance is valid and (2) that the remainder of the ordinance is invalid. Section 8 of Ordinance 94-30 provided: [I]t is the intention of the Board of County Commissioners . . . to confer the whole or any part of the powers herein provided. If any of the provisions of this ordinance shall be held unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, the decision of such court shall not affect or impair any remaining provision of this ordinance. It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent of the Board of County Commissioners that this ordinance would have been adopted had such unconstitutional provisions not been included therein. The evidence was that, notwithstanding Section 8 of Ordinance 94-30, one purpose of Section 10 of the ordinance was to insure that intended packages of amendments would remain together and either become effective together or not at all. As discussed in connection with the Zemel amendment, the evidence was that one such package consisted of the amendments to the FLUM and to FLUE Policy 1.4.4, changing the land use designation of certain property to "Open Lands," and the amendments which delete the FLUM 2010 Overlay. There also was some less compelling evidence that amendments creating the Commercial Site Location Standards Map, FLUM 16, were intended to remain together with the amendments which delete the FLUM 2010 Overlay. No other examples of similar "packages" of plan amendments was shown by the evidence or argued by any party. RGMC's Standing. The Responsible Growth Management Coalition, Inc. (RGMC), was formed in 1988 to insure compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, and F.A.C. Rule Chapter 9J-5 and to conserve resources. RGMC has offices in Lee County and conducts educational programs in Lee. In addition, at the time of the hearing, RGMC had 157 members residing throughout Lee County, most or all of whom own property in Lee County. RGMC participated in the process leading to the adoption of the Lee plan amendments in issue in this case and submitted oral or written comments, recommendations or suggestions between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the plan amendments.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administration Commission enter a final order finding that the Lee Plan amendments are not in compliance and requiring as remedial action: That the FLUE's mixed land use categories be amended to include percentage distribution or other objective measurements of the distribution among allowed uses, whether by use of an appropriate 2020 Overlay or by other appropriate means. That a sector plan be adopted for Lehigh Acres, including appropriate plans for provision of infrastructure, to create more balanced development in Lehigh and, to the extent possible, to direct future population growth to Lehigh and away from CHHA, DRGR and other environmentally sensitive areas, and Open Lands and Rural land (especially rural lands not situated so as to be potential future urban infill or expansion), including important wildlife habitat. Such a sector plan could include minimum densities and target densities to support mass transit along transit corridors in Lehigh. That consideration be given to increasing densities in central urban areas and along transit corridors while at the same time reducing densities or adopting other plan provisions, such as the prohibition of certain kinds of development, to afford more protection to CHHA, DRGR and other environmentally sensitive areas, and Open Lands and Rural land (especially rural lands not situated so as to be potential future urban infill or expansion), including important wildlife habitat. One example would be the prohibition, or staging, of non-farm development in some or all rural areas. That, in accordance with Policy 75.1.4, undeveloped areas within CHHA be considered for reduced density categories (or assignment of minimum allowable densities where density ranges are permitted) in order to limit the future population exposed to coastal flooding. That the data and analysis supporting the remedial amendments account for units approved but not built and include both a population accommodation analysis based on maximum densities and an explanation of how the GOP's in the remedial amendments justify the resulting allocation ratio. That the remedial amendments include data and analysis of the impact of the resulting plan, as amended, on hurricane evacuation and clearance times and shelter planning, especially if, as part of remedial amendments, the 2010 Overlay is removed (or replaced). That the remedial amendments be based on data and analysis as to the need for commercial and industrial land, including the Alico amendment property. That the data and analysis extrapolate solid waste projections to 2020. That the sub-elements of the Community Facilities and Services Element (and other parts of the plan, as appropriate) be consistent with and based on data and analysis of future population predictions in light of any remedial amendments to the FLUE and FLUM. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0098GM To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1995), as construed by the decision in Harbor Island Beach Club, Ltd., v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 476 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: DCA's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-17. Accepted. 18. There is a legal issue whether Ordinance 94-30 was adopted validly; otherwise, accepted. 19.-28. Accepted. Conclusion of law. Rejected in part: plan includes "guides" (but no "objective measurements"); and Commercial Site Location Standards Map 16 implies that other uses are required elsewhere in the districts where these sites are located. Otherwise, accepted. Last sentence, rejected. (Assumptions are in part "based on" the GOP's, but they also assume less development than permitted by the GOP's.) Otherwise, accepted. Accepted. Characterization "conservative" rejected as argument; otherwise, accepted. 34.-35. Accepted. 36. Accepted as being theoretically possible, but not likely to happen. 37.-38. Accepted. 39. Accepted as approximation of maximum theoretical residential capacity. 40.-46. Accepted. (However, as to 45 and 46, these numbers do not take into account industrial land needed to serve municipal populations that probably cannot or will not be supplied within the cities themselves.) First sentence, conclusion of law. Second sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. (The plan is "based on" the population projections, but allocates more land than needed to accommodate the population.) First sentence, conclusion of law; second sentence, accepted. 49.-50. Conclusions of law. 51.-52. First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, accepted. 53. First sentence, conclusion of law; second and third sentences, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence; last sentence, accepted. 54.-55. First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 56. First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, accepted. 57.-58. First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. First sentence, conclusion of law; second, accepted; third, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. First sentence, conclusion of law; second, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence; third, accepted (but does not prove non- compliance with the state plan.) First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 63.-64. Accepted. As to b.1. not timely raised; accepted as to b.2. (but easily extrapolated five more years to 2020); otherwise, rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. First two sentences of a. and b., accepted; otherwise, rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. (As to b., the discrepancies are not significant enough to create "internal inconsistency.") First sentence, rejected as not proven beyond fair debate; rest, accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that deletion of the Overlay "accelerated development." (Rather, it allows--and, under certain conditions, would result it--development of more acreage sooner.) First sentence, accepted; rest, conclusion of law. First sentence, accepted; second, rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. First and third sentences, accepted; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (The population projections are easonably accurate and certainly more realistic than the "maximum theoretical" populations used in the DCA's residential allocation analysis.) Last sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (The RWSMP population projections are reasonably close to the Figure 14 projections. See also 66., above.) First sentence, accepted; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. See also 71., above. 74.-77. Accepted. 78. 2850 rejected as somewhat high (does not take into account some acreage removed from AC); otherwise, accepted. 79.-81. Accepted. 82.-83. Accepted. However, last sentences assume: (1) accurate inventory of developed acres in Orlando comparable to the land uses in AC under the Lee Plan; (2) 2850 acres of AC; and (3) developability of all AC acreage--including wetlands--for AC use. Those assumptions are not, or may not be, reasonable. 84. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. See 82.-83. 85.-87. Accepted. However, as to 87., it is noted that the words "area," "surrounded by," and "nearby" are imprecise. Accepted; however, the degree of the sandstone aquifer's "susceptibility" to impacts depends on many factors. Last sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that existing sources cannot produce any more; however, proven that new sources will be required, and otherwise accepted. Accepted. Last sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that groundwater moves "to" the existing and planned wellfields. Otherwise, accepted. First sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence; rest, accepted. Fourth sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence; rest, accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the circuit court judgment was based entirely on new data and analysis; otherwise, accepted. 97.-98. Accepted. Characterization of methodology as "flawed" rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (It depends on the use being made of the results of the methodology.) Otherwise, accepted. Accepted. Last sentence, legal conclusion. (Legally, it appears that reservation of future right-of-way may no longer be a viable option, and the County's amendments presume that it is not.) Rest, accepted. 102.-105. Accepted. 106. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that voluntary dedication is not "effective" as one of several policies. Otherwise, accepted. 107.-108. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. Second and third sentences, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the state regulations are supposed to serve as "guidelines" or "guidance" for LDR's; rather, they are to serve in the place of duplicative County LDR's on the subject. Otherwise, accepted. Accepted. (However, appropriate comprehensive planning for wetlands occurs in other parts of the plan; the state regulations take the place of performance standards that would be duplicated in plan provisions and LDR's.) Last sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence and as conclusion of law. Rest, accepted. (However, state regulations apply to some uplands that adjoin or are near to wetlands.) First sentence, accepted. (They don't guide the establishment of design and performance standard kinds of LDR's for any development in any wetlands; the state regulations take the place of design and performance standards that would be duplicated in plan provisions and LDR's.) Second sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence (that they are the "core wetland policies in the plan.") Third sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence and as conclusion of law. RGMC's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-8. Accepted. 9. Conclusion of law. 10.-15. Subordinate; conclusion of law; argument. 16. Accepted but subordinate. 17.-18. Rejected as not supported by record evidence. 19.-35. Accepted. 35(a). Conclusion of law. 36.-40. Accepted. 40(a). Conclusion of law. 41. Accepted. 41(a). Conclusion of law. 42.-44. Accepted. Accepted; however, the option to consider assignment of the minimum of a range of densities is in parentheses after the primary option to consider reducing densities. Largely argument. The objective and policy is "triggered" by any plan amendment, before and after the change from "A Zone" to "CHHA." See 47. Accepted. 47(a). Rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. (It is a question of internal consistency.) Accepted. 48(a). Argument and recommended remediation. Accepted. 50.-59. County motion to strike granted. (Issue not raised timely.) 60.-62. Accepted. See rulings on DCA proposed findings. County motion to strike granted. (Issue not raised timely.) 65.-66. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (The population projections are reasonably accurate and certainly more realistic than the "maximum theoretical" populations used in the DCA's residential allocation analysis.) 67.-73(a) County motion to strike granted. (Issue not raised timely.) See rulings on DCA proposed findings. Accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. 77.-78. 2800 rejected as somewhat high (does not take into account some acreage removed from AC); 1000 rejected as 400 low; otherwise, accepted. 79.-81(a). Accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. 82(a). Accepted. Conclusion of law. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. Accepted but "between" is imprecise. Accepted, but not likely. Accepted that two are mutually exclusive; otherwise, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. Accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the lands are "adjacent"; otherwise, accepted. 93.-94. Accepted. Rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. See rulings on DCA proposed findings. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that it is "the reasonable professionally acceptable methodology." Rejected as unclear and as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (Whether it is appropriate to apply a safety margin factor just to projected new growth can depend on the safety margin factor used and how far out the projection.) Rejected as unclear and as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Rejected as being hypothetical argument. (Also, the ratios do not convert to percentages, i.e., 25:1 does not convert to a safety margin factor of 25 percent.) 104.-111(a). Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that "overallocations" occur in the earlier years of the planning timeframe; the relevant inquiry relates to the planning horizon. Also, as to 111., the reference should be to the year 2020. (Also, again the ratios do not convert to percentages.) Otherwise, accepted. 112.-118. Accepted as being paraphrased from part of the Sheridan Final Order. 119.-128. Accepted as being the adjustments to Figure 14B to yield unrealistic "maximum theoretical" capacity. 129.-130. Conclusions of law. 131. Accepted. 132.-133. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (The plan does not "propose development"; its projections on which the County bases its facilities and services are more realistic that the "maximum theoretical" capacity projections.) Also, these specific issues were not timely raised, and County motion to strike granted. 134. Accepted. 135.-140. Descriptions of what the various FLUM's show and what development has occurred over the years, accepted as reasonably accurate. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that there were either official or unofficial "urban expansion lines." (It was not clear from the evidence whether the so-called "Proposed EAR Urban Boundary" shown on Lee Exhibit 53 was either an official or an unofficial "urban expansion line," and there was no other evidence of any "urban expansion lines.") Also, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that there was a "failure to maintain" them, or that the Southwest International Airport or the Westinghouse Gateway DRI "breached" the alleged "1988 urban expansion line." (The Westinghouse Gateway DRI was vested prior to 1984, and the regional airport development appears on FLUM's prior to 1988.) Also, development that occurred in earlier years is not particularly probative on the issues in this case (in particular, the amendment eliminating the Overlay). 141.-142. Accepted. 142(a). Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Also, the specific issue of failure to establish an "urban expansion line" is not raised by amendments at issue in this case (in particular, the elimination of the Overlay), and was not timely raised by any party. 143.-146. Densities in land use categories, accepted as reasonably accurate. The rest is rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. The plan provisions (or lack of them) in question have been determined to be in compliance. Primarily, with deletion of the Overlay, the amendments at issue open up for development in accordance with these plan provisions more acreage of non-urban land uses prior to 2010. They also do not extend the Overlay to 2020. 147.-150. Accepted. For the most part, the plan provisions (or lack of them) in question have been determined to be in compliance; however, failure of the plan to include objective measures for distribution of uses in mixed land use districts contributes to the overallocation without the Overlay. 150(a). Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence; also, conclusion of law. Conclusion of law. In part, accepted; in part conclusion of law. For the most part, the plan provisions (or lack of them) in question have been determined to be in compliance; however, failure of the plan to include objective measures for distribution of uses in mixed land use districts contributes to the overallocation without the Overlay. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence; also, conclusion of law. 154.-160. Accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (It remains to be seen how effective they will be in the long term.) Accepted. For the most part, the plan provisions (or lack of them) in question have been determined to be in compliance; however, with deletion of the Overlay, the amendments at issue open up for development in accordance with these plan provisions more acreage in potential wildlife habitat and corridor areas prior to 2010. (They also do not extend the Overlay to 2020.) See rulings on DCA proposed findings. 164.-168. Rejected because issues not raised timely. 169. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence and as conclusion of law. 170.-174. County motion to strike granted. 175.-179. Accepted. 180.-182. Conclusions of law. 183.-184. Rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. 185. Accepted. 186.-188. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. 189. First clause, rejected (see 186.-188.); second clause, accepted. 190.-191. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. 192.-193. Rejected as not proven beyond fair debate. 194. Conclusion of law. 195.-196. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. 197.-198. Except for typographical errors, accepted. (However, the last sentence of former Policy 77.11.5 was transferred verbatim to amended Policy 77.11.2.) Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence to be the entire justification. (Also justified by updated data and analysis--namely, that the habitats have been identified and mapped--and by amended Policies 77.11.1 and 77.11.2, which respond to the new data and analysis.) Argument. 201.-204. Cumulative. (See 154.-157.) 205.-206. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. 207.-208. Accepted. Accepted (although not demonstrated by Lee Exhibit 49). Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected as not clear from the evidence that the Zemel property is connected to and part of the Cecil Webb Wildlife Management Area. Otherwise, accepted. 213.-216. Accepted. 217.-218. Not an issue; but, if an issue, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence (which is not to say that it was proven that the land should be designated for higher densities, or that 1 unit per 5 acres or lower densities are not suitable.) 219.-222. Not an issue; but, if an issue, rejected as not proven beyond fair debate (which, again, is not to say that it was proven that the land should be designated for higher densities, or that 1 unit per 5 acres or lower densities are not suitable.) 223. Not an issue; but, if an issue, rejected. See 217.-222. Zemels' Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Accepted; however, relatively little of the Zemel property abuts either U.S. 41 or Burnt Store Road. 2-10. Accepted. Last clause rejected as not proven beyond fair debate; another option would be to amend the definition. Otherwise, accepted. Last clause, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that they are not "sparsely developed." Otherwise, accepted. 13.-15. Accepted. First sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence; otherwise, accepted. First sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence as to the south; otherwise, accepted but irrelevant to the application of the definition. Accepted; however, not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the Zemel property is not north of "sparsely developed areas." (Emphasis added.) Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. First sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Rest, accepted in large part and rejected in part as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Clearly, at least a good portion of the Zemel property is "extremely remote" from all existing public services. Some portions of the Zemel property are not "extremely remote" from some public services, but not proven by a preponderance of evidence that at least some public services are not "extremely remote" from all portions of the Zemel property. Also, in addition to existing public services, c) and e) also refer to future public services. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that no agricultural activities have been profitable (only that row crop farming has not); otherwise, accepted. Last sentence, not proven by a preponderance of evidence; otherwise, accepted. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence (as to second and third sentences, because of the existence of the Open Lands category.) Accepted (although there also are other data and analysis in the record). First sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (Not all of the statements are "conclusory".) Second, accepted. Third, rejected; see 21., above. 28.-29. Accepted. (However, as to 29., it refers to existing access.) First sentence, accepted. A. - rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the analysis "fails to recognize" the roads in northern Cape Coral (although it clearly does not mention them); otherwise, accepted. B. - rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the analysis "appears to ignore" the water line along U.S. 41 (although it clearly does not mention it); otherwise, accepted. C. - accepted; however, the "proximity" is to a point on the periphery of the property. Last sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Accepted. Second sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence except using the County's methodology. Otherwise, accepted. 33.-34. Accepted. Second sentence, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (The County in effect "borrowed" the DCA's data and analysis.) Rest, accepted. Accepted, assuming the County's methodology; however, there also are other concerns. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; rest, rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. As to the second, there is rural land to the northwest; as to the third, there also is resource protection land in Charlotte County to the north, and the "enclave" is large; as to the fourth, no I-75 boundary would appear to apply to Township 43 even if it might appear to apply to the south. Rejected as not proven by a preponderance of evidence. (The analysis compares the costs and difficulty in Yucca Pen to Lehigh and Cape Coral; in terms of such a comparison, the differences are significant.) 40.-45. Accepted. County's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; third, accepted (assuming "actual bona fide business" means a for-profit commercial enterprise.) Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the DCA "agreed with and relied on" the County's analysis. (The DCA utilized the analysis for purposes of its objection.) Otherwise, accepted. Accepted. First sentence, accepted. Second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the determination was "on a largely subjective basis" (although some determinations necessarily were at least partly subjective); otherwise, accepted. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Overlay was designed "without policy considerations" or that historic growth trends were "simply extrapolated." (The policy considerations already in the plan were utilized, and an effort was made to predict growth in light of those policy considerations. It is true, however, that the Overlay was not designed to further direct growth patterns within the planning districts and subdistricts.) Accepted (but not particularly probative). 11.-14. Accepted. Rejected in part as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that it implies that the impact of the plan was not taken into consideration in predicting future population. See 9., above. Otherwise, accepted. Firsts sentence, accepted. As to second and third, not clear from the evidence what if anything was submitted in the way of data and analysis for the remedial amendments. They were not introduced in evidence or referred to by any party. As to the last sentence, it is not clear from the evidence exactly how the 2.11 factor was derived or whether it took into account the 2010 population accommodation for Lehigh (282,000 people in this analysis). (T. 1267-1269.) If the 507,000 units of accommodation did not include Lehigh, the total accommodation of 1.06 million also could not have included Lehigh. Accepted. First three sentences, argument. Rest, accepted. 19.-20. Accepted. 21. Rejected as unclear what "that allocation" refers to. (Accepted if it means "up to 125 percent"; rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence if it means "200 percent.") 22.-23. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, conclusion of law. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; second, accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Subordinate. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (In addition, a more meaningful comparison would be between the adopted EAR 2020 plan without a 2010 Overlay and a 2020 plan with an overlay extending the 2010 Overlay out another ten years.) Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rest, accepted (as accurate recitation of testimony) but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. 30.-32. Accepted. Conclusion of law. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (As to first sentence, see Sheridan Final Order.) Accepted. First and last sentences, accepted. Rest, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Such an approach would direct population to Lehigh, which might be the best thing to do. (At this point in time, development of Lehigh under a good Sector Plan might be able to change what was classic urban sprawl under past conditions into well-planned growth under present and future conditions.) It might also direct population to other, non- urban areas if densities were not low enough in them. Finally, Nelson suggested other ways of bring the plan into compliance without the Overlay. 38.-42. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The County did not seek to "match the available land to meet that growth"; rather, it checked to see if what was on the FLUM would "accommodate" (i.e., hold) the population projected for 2020. Last sentence, rejected in that RGMC challenged the opinion in its response to this proposed finding; otherwise, accepted. Rejected that the County "cannot alter the future development" of Lehigh or that Lehigh is "beyond the reach of" the comprehensive plan; otherwise, accepted. The 199 acres is part of the 685 acre total. Otherwise, generally accepted. However, significant additional growth can be expected in coastal areas, and there is rural land both within and outside the so-called "I-75, U.S. 41 corridor"; presumably, the existence of this land is the reason the finding is couched in the terms: "the remaining area . . . is largely . . . along the I-75, U.S. 41 corridor"; and "all future growth . . . will predominantly occur." First and third sentences, conclusion of law; second, accepted. Conclusion of law. First sentence, accepted but subordinate; also, the rule citation is incorrect; in addition, they testified to the effect of removing the Overlay. Second sentence, conclusion of law. Accepted. (The effect of the Overlay is in the extent of the indicators that exist.) Accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; second, accepted; third, conclusion of law; fourth, accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; second, accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, conclusion of law. First sentence, accepted. Second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "clear"; also, conclusion of law. 58.-60. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The same conditions exist without the Overlay.) Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted. First sentence, rejected; second, accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Overlay did not have any "true policy bias or consideration built into it"; otherwise, accepted. Accepted. (However, the same conditions exist without the Overlay.) 68.-71. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that "removing Cape Coral . . . reduces the FLUM capacity"; rather, it represents a change in the methodology of evaluating the FLUM capacity. Otherwise, accepted. Accepted. 74.-78. Accepted. However, it appears that the County's treatment of Lehigh essentially was a device to enable it to have the projected population in the year 2020 treated as if it were the capacity of Lehigh in the year 2020. 79.-81. First sentence of 79, unclear; rest, accepted. However, only certain retail commercial are restricted to the locations on Map 16; others can go either there or elsewhere. 82.-85. Conclusion of law. First sentence, conclusion of law; rest, accepted. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the ELUM "represents the growth trends" (rather, it shows what is there now) or that, except for Lehigh, growth only "is occurring in the north/south core." Otherwise, accepted. Accepted. First and last sentences, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. ("Barrier" is too strong; "obstacle" or "hindrance" would be accepted.) Otherwise, accepted. 91.-95. Generally, accepted. Conclusion of law. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as conclusion of law that they are "objective measures" and "responsive to . . . 5(c)"; otherwise, accepted. Accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, accepted (although some higher, urban densities are in coastal areas, and there remains some rural land in the so-called "north/south core"); third, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that a "large impact" is "clear"; fourth, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the "segmentation" is absolute but otherwise accepted. Except for Lehigh, generally accepted. (What is missing are "objective measures.") Generally, accepted. First sentence, conclusion of law; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "nearly identical." Third sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it necessarily is not excessive. The evidence was that it is not necessarily excessive, but it could be depending on many factors, including whether it was calculated based on total capacity on the planning horizon or incremental growth during the planning timeframe, and the length of the planning horizon. Otherwise, accepted. First two sentences, accepted; last two, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 107.-108. Accepted. 109. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; second, accepted. 110.-117. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The effect of removing the Overlay is to allow more development sooner throughout the County. The effect of the increased development would depend on how it occurs. As to 116 and 117, one purpose of the Overlay was to require a mix of uses in mixed land use districts. First sentence, rejected. See 110-117, above. Rest, accepted. Cumulative. Last sentence, subordinate argument; except for apparent typographical error in third sentence, rest accepted. Last sentence, rejected as unclear from the evidence why there has been no agricultural use; otherwise, accepted. Accepted. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. ("Significance" depends on other factors as well, including the amount of acreage in other mixed land use categories that allow light industrial.) Assuming that the "127 additional acres" refers to uplands, the rest is accepted. 124.-125. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and, in part, conclusion of law. There was no evidence of any serious risk of a taking. If these were legitimate reasons to redesignate the Alico property AC, it would be questionable if any DRGR would survive. First sentence, accepted (assuming the County's efforts are otherwise "in compliance"; second, subordinate argument; third, cumulative. Accepted. (However, the County's analysis does not include acreage in other mixed land use categories that allow light industrial.) First four sentences, accepted but irrelevant; penultimate, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "safe to assume"; last sentence, accepted. First two sentences, accepted; third, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that mining would "permanently preempt" commercial use, but accepted that subsequent commercial use would be much less likely; fourth sentence, accepted (except for typos); last sentence, accepted. Second sentence, rejected as not clear that it "won't be available," but accepted that it may not, depending on when it is "needed." Rest, accepted. First sentence, subordinate argument; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "clear" but accepted that it probably "will not pose a significant threat"; third and fourth, accepted; fifth, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that there is no recharge, but accepted that recharge is not better than average; rest, accepted. Accepted (with the understanding that the last sentence refers to surface water runoff). First sentence, accepted; second and third, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Gulf Utilities-San Carlos wellfield is the only wellfield in the water table aquifer (otherwise, the third sentence is accepted). 134.-136. Accepted. Accepted. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (There also were other internal consistency issues concerning the date.) Otherwise, accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 140.-141. Accepted. 142. Irrelevant; issue not timely raised. 143.-144. Accepted. First sentence, accepted (in that DCA and RGMC did not prove internal inconsistency beyond fair debate); second, third and fourth sentences, accepted (but do not rule out the possibility of impacts from removal of the Overlay); rest, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted (but do not rule out the possibility of impacts from removal of the Overlay). 147.-149. Accepted. First two sentences, argument; third, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; last, accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that a reduction in densities is not necessarily positive; rest, accepted. 152.-155. Accepted. First sentence, accepted (assuming it refers to the deleted first sentence of former Policy 84.1.2, now 84.1.1); second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence since its context requires the opposite interpretation. Accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the report "specifically recommends the amendment . . . in the fashion that Lee County has done." Otherwise, accepted. 159.-160. Accepted (159, based on the plan language and Joyce testimony, as well as the Deadman testimony.) First sentence, accepted; second, conclusion of law. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; conclusion of law; subordinate. Accepted; subordinate. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the circuit court judgment was based entirely on new data and analysis; otherwise, accepted. 166.-169. Accepted. Conclusion of law. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Use of the "allocation ratio" is being determined in this case.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that the Sheridan Final Order can be said to be a DCA "publication." Otherwise, accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that Joint Exhibit 17 gives some indication of how to apply an "allocation ratio"; accepted that Joint Exhibit 17 does not fully explain how to apply the "allocation ratio." Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that the Sheridan Final Order constitutes such evidence. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Atlantic Gulf's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted. 4. Accepted (but do not rule out the possibility of impacts from removal of the Overlay). 5.-7. Accepted. 8.-10. In part conclusions of law; otherwise, accepted. (The incorporation of the DEP and SWFWMD permitting requirements only replaces former County permitting requirements; other parts of the amended plan's provisions relating to wetlands protection remain in effect.) Alico's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-13. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the phrase "substantial recharge to aquifers most suitable for future wellfield development" may distinguish DRGR-suitable land from other land by the nature of the aquifer it recharges, not by the relative amounts of recharge. However, the suitability of the AC amendment property for DRGR is questionable, and redesignation to AC is not prohibited. First sentence, accepted; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that it is in the "area" of "most favorable locations for physical withdrawal of water from those aquifers." However, the suitability of the AC amendment property for DRGR is questionable, and redesignation to AC is not prohibited. 16.-19. Accepted. Accepted (assuming it refers to the DCA submitting); subordinate. Accepted. 22.-24. Subordinate argument and conclusion of law. 25.-34. Accepted. 35.-36. Accepted; subordinate. Last sentence, accepted; rest, subordinate argument and conclusion of law. Accepted (except, in s. and u., it should read "Six Mile Cypress Basin.") Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the list is not exhaustive ; otherwise, accepted. 40.-41. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that Policy 7.1.1 just says applications are to be "reviewed and evaluated as to" these items; it does not say that "negative impacts" must be "avoided." Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that Goal 12 and Standard 12.4 under it are renumbered under the current amendments as Goal 11 and Standard 11.4; otherwise, accepted. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that former Standard 14.1 has been transferred to Policy 7.1.1. under the current amendments. See 40 and 42, above. Accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that former designation as DRGR is the only reason why water quality and quantity issues arise; second, cumulative. Cumulative. First two sentences, cumulative; rest, accepted. First two sentences, accepted; rest, cumulative. First sentence, unclear which fact is "in dispute"; rest, accepted. (The AC amendment property probably would not be developed as a producing wellfield.) First sentence, accepted; second, cumulative. First two clauses of first sentence, accepted; rest, conclusion of law. First sentence, cumulative; rest, accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, conclusion of law. 55.-56. Cumulative. 57.-59. Accepted. First two sentences, accepted; rest, cumulative. Accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; second, third and fourth sentences, accepted; rest, cumulative. First sentence, argument; rest, accepted. Accepted. 65.-66. In part, cumulative; otherwise, accepted. 67.-70. Accepted. First sentence, argument; middle sentences, accepted; penultimate sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that he made no blanket concession, instead conditioning interception on water table levels; last sentence, accepted. First sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence (that there's no "realistic way" "you" can do it); rest, accepted. 73.-74. Cumulative. Accepted. Cumulative. Accepted; subordinate and unnecessary. Cumulative. Beginning, cumulative; last sentence, subordinate argument. First sentence, accepted; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the influence of additional pumping has not been analyzed; last, accepted. Accepted. First two sentences, conclusion of law; last, accepted. Subordinate argument. First sentence, conclusion of law; second, accepted; third, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the "performance standards" say to maintain current protection and expand protection "to encompass the entire area." Accepted. (However, it is far from clear that the BMP's referred to in Policy 1.2.2 are the same ones referred to in this proposed finding.) Accepted. 87.-88. Subordinate argument. Cumulative or subordinate argument. Unclear what is meant by "several generations of numbers." Otherwise, cumulative. Cumulative. Accepted but subordinate. Accepted. (However, he also raised the question that the County's analysis did not include acreage in other mixed land use categories that allow light industrial.) 94.-95. Accepted. First sentence, subordinate argument; second, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that they conceded need is not based exclusively on resident and seasonal population, not that it is not based at all on it; third, accepted. First sentence, accepted; rest, subordinate argument. Accepted. Accepted. (Nor was there testimony that there is a need based on population.) Accepted. First sentence, accepted; second, conclusion of law, cumulative, and rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that there was evidence of other motivations for providing the information as well. Accepted. (However, the analysis was limited to Orlando, and Nelson's method resulted in no need found.) Subordinate argument; cumulative. Subordinate argument. Accepted. (As to third sentence, neither did any other witness.) 106.-107. Accepted. Last sentence, subordinate argument; penultimate, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence (or, at least, unclear); rest accepted. Cumulative. 110.-113. Accepted. Cumulative. First sentence, conclusion of law; second, accepted as an excerpt from the dictionary, but argument and conclusion of law that it is the "plain meaning" of the word "need," as used in 9J-5. (Also, citation to Joint Exhibit 11, p. 9, is not understood.) Argument and cumulative. 117.-118. Accepted. 119.-120. Conclusion of law, argument and cumulative. 121. Last sentence, accepted. (It is not clear from the evidence that the designation of the property as "Panther Priority 2" on Lee Exhibit 42, introduced by RGMC, means that the County has identified it as being "in need of conservation.") Rest, conclusion of law, argument and cumulative. 122.-126. Conclusion of law and cumulative. To the extent that accepted proposed findings are not essentially incorporated into the Findings of Fact of this Recommended Order, they were considered to be either subordinate or otherwise unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: David Jordan, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Bridgette Ffolkes, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Timothy Jones, Esquire Thomas L. Wright, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0398 Thomas W. Reese, Esquire 2951 61st Avenue So. St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Elizabeth C. Bowman, Esquire Connie C. Durrence, Esquire Hopping Boyd Green & Sams 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Russell P. Schropp, Esquire Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Charles J. Basinait, Esquire Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Scott Shirley, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Neale Montgomery, Esquire Pavese, Garner, Haverfield, Dalton, Harrison & Jensen Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Steven C. Hartsell, Esquire Pavese, Garner, Haverfield, Dalton, Harrison & Jensen Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Thomas B. Hart, Esquire Humphrey & Knott, P.A. 1625 Hendry Street, Suite 301 Post Office Box 2449 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2449 Michael J. Ciccarone, Esquire Goldberg, Goldstein, & Buckley, P.A. Post Office Box 2366 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Greg Smith, Esquire Governor's Legal Office The Capitol - Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning Administration Commission The Capitol - Room 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Brevard County's 1999 Comprehensive Plan Amendments B.12, B.13, and B.14 (the Plan Amendments) are "in compliance."
Findings Of Fact General Besides the introduction of the Plan Amendments themselves and a few other documents, Petitioners case-in-chief consisted of examination of Susan Poplin, a Planning Manager for DCA, as an adverse witness, and the testimony of Petitioner, Charles F. Moehle. Most of Poplin's testimony was directly contrary to the positions Petitioners were seeking to prove. Moehle's testimony consisted primarily of conclusions and statements disagreeing with the Plan Amendments. Petitioners provided no data or analysis in support of Moehle's statements and conclusions. Often, Moehle's testimony did not identify specific errors allegedly made by the County. Much of Moehle's presentation was disjointed and difficult to understand. Petitioners also challenged several items which should have been challenged following prior amendments to the County's Plan. For example, Poplin testified that all of the wetland provisions in the challenged Conservation Element B.12 amendments were part of a prior plan amendment and were not changed by the Plan Amendments. See Findings of Fact 7-8, infra. Standing Petitioners' allegations of standing are in paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition for Formal Review: EFFECT ON PETITIONERS' SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS Petitioner, MODERN owns property in Brevard County, the value of which will be reduced by THE AMENDMENT. Additionally, petitioners MODERN and MOEHLE own property in Brevard County and pay property taxes in Brevard County. Additionally, THE AMENDMENT will cause property tax receipt's of Brevard County to decline because of the reduction in value caused to MODERN'S, MOEHLE'S, and other similarly situated property in the county. Additionally, THE AMENDMENT will cause MODERN'S and MOEHLE'S property taxes to increase due to the additional government employees required to implement and enforce THE AMENDMENT and due to the fact that the property taxes imposed upon property which are not effected [sic] by THE AMENDMENT will necessarily increase in order to offset the loss of property tax revenue from private property which is devalued as a result of THE AMENDMENT. MOEHLE and MODERN have appeared before the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners at public meetings and hearings as well as communicating (verbally and in writing) with their growth Management/Planning & Zoning Departments concerning these matters for several years. In an attempt to prove Petitioners' standing, Moehle testified that he has been a resident of Brevard County since 1958. He also testified that he is President of and owns a substantial interest in Petitioner, Modern, Inc. He testified that both he himself and Modern own real property in Brevard County, and that, as such, both are taxpayers. Moehle also testified that he is "affected by these regulations." He gave no specifics as to how he is affected. He also did not testify that Modern was affected. Before concluding his brief testimony on standing, Moehle asked the ALJ if he had to "ramble on some more" about standing and was asked whether he submitted "oral or written comments, comments, recommendations or objections to the County between the time of the transmittal hearing for the Plan amendment and the adoption of the Plan amendment." Moehle answered: I submitted during the whole period of this - I attended a number of hearings that I knew about during this whole process and I would say that, yes, I did, but not all hearings. Some were questionable - some of my problems or some of the meetings that the action was taken on. So they do have my comments, they've had my comments from me on various issues complete back before and including the Settlement Agreement. The evidence was that all hearings and meetings relating to the "Settlement Agreement" to which Moehle referred in his testimony occurred prior to the transmittal hearing for the Plan Amendments at issue in this case on November 30, 1999. The referenced "Settlement Agreement" was the Stipulated Settlement Agreement entered into in May 1997 to resolve DOAH Case No. 96-2174GM. The County amended its Comprehensive Plan to implement the Stipulated Settlement Agreement on August 24, 1999, by Ordinance 99-48. By Ordinance 99-52, adopted October 7, 1999, the remedial amendments were clarified to include the correct Forested Wetlands Location Map. Ordinance 99-49 and 99-52 both state that the plan amendments adopted by them "shall become effective once the state planning agency issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance in accordance with Florida Statutes, Section 163.3184(9), or until the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the amendment to be in compliance in accordance with Florida Statutes, Section 163.3184(10)." The stated "Justification" for Policy 5.2 of the B.12 Plan Amendments at issue in this case was: "The above language was part of a stipulated settlement agreement between DCA and the County. This agreement became effective after the transmittal of the 99B Plan Amendments." Apparently for that reason, the B.12 Plan Amendments at issue in this case, specifically under Objective 5 and Policies 5.1 and 5.2, underlined the wetland provisions previously adopted by Ordinance 99-48. This underlining may give the misimpression that these wetlands provisions were being amended through adoption of Ordinance 2000-33. To the contrary, those amendments already had been adopted, and all hearings on those amendments already had occurred prior to transmittal of the Plan Amendments at issue in this case. Other than testifying that he attended hearings and made submittals "before and including the Settlement Agreement," Moehle did not specify when he attended, or what if anything he said or submitted. Nor did he offer any testimony or evidence that he appeared on behalf of Modern. No minutes or other evidence were produced for the record showing his appearance or comments, recommendations or objections. To the contrary, Petitioners' evidence indicates that Moehle was not one of the individuals who offered public comment at either the transmittal hearing on November 30, 1999; the Land Use Citizens Resource Group meeting on November 4, 1999; or the Local Planning Agency Adoption Meeting on May 15, 2000. Paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition, also alleged: that the value of property owned by Modern will be reduced; that the Plan Amendments will cause property tax receipts to decline because of a reduction in the value caused to Petitioners' property; and 3) that the Plan Amendments will cause Petitioners' property taxes to increase due to additional government employees required to implement and enforce the Plan Amendments and due to an increase in taxes for properties not directly affected by the Plan Amendments. None of these allegations were supported by record evidence. Notice Petitioners' allegation of improper notice is contained in paragraph 7.I. of the Amended Petition: Petitioners allege that THE AMENDMENT is subject to the notice requirements of Florida Statute subsections 163.3161(18), 163.3181, 163.3184(15), 125.66(2), and or 125.66(4) and that Respondent COUNTY has failed to comply with said statutes. (Several other paragraphs of the Amended Petition also allege inadequate notice. See Findings of Fact 19, 28, 44, 50, 54, 63, 65, and 76, infra.) Petitioners filed copies of the applicable advertisements. Moehle testified that the type was "wrong" and the size was "wrong" - the exact nature of the alleged error was not stated. But review of the advertisements for the transmittal and adoption hearings reveals that both are two columns wide, and the headline appears to be in a very large, bold type. Other than Moehle's general complaint about the type being "wrong," there was no testimony or other evidence that the type is not 18-point. Other aspects of the advertisements do not appear to be challenged by Petitioners. The advertisements themselves show that the transmittal hearing was held on November 30, 1999 (a Tuesday) and that the advertisement was run on November 22, 1999, eight days prior to the day of the hearing. They also show that the adoption hearing was on May 16, 2000 (a Tuesday). The advertisement for the adoption hearing was run on May 10, 2000, six days prior to the meeting. The proof of publication shows that the advertisements were not in a portion of the newspaper where legal notices or classified ads appear and that the Florida Today is a newspaper of general circulation. The evidence also included advertisements for local planning agency hearings and meetings relating to the Plan Amendments other than the transmittal and adoption hearings. These other advertisements appear to have been published in legal ad sections, and the type is smaller than that used for the transmittal and adoption hearings. It appears that Moehle was referring to these advertisements when he said the type and size was "wrong." Species and Wetlands Preservation Versus Promoting Infill Development Paragraph 7.IV. of the Amended Petition alleges: The challenged provisions of the THE AMENDMENT, as set forth herein below, violate the legislative intent and spirit of Fl. Stat. Ch. 163, Part II because they place species and wetland preservations over the stated policy goal of promoting infill and development in areas which have concurrency and infrastructure available. The challenged provisions promote leap frog development by making the development of parcels of private property which have concurrency and appropriate infrastructure but also have any quantity of listed species habitat or wetlands unusable. Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3177(10)(h), 163.3177(11). No evidence was offered supporting the claim that species and wetland preservation were "placed over" the goal of promoting infill. Nor was there any evidence provided by Petitioners to show that leapfrog development or urban sprawl was caused by protecting wetlands. To the contrary, Poplin's testimony discussed urban sprawl and leapfrog development in terms of impacts to services and facilities. She clearly stated: "[T]here are no set priorities. We look at each individual local government on a case by case basis. . . . So . . . [it] depends on the context in which its based [sic] in the plan." Poplin also testified that the County had levels of service in place for facilities and services pursuant to Rule 9J-5.0055(1)(a), and that the County's Plan and the subject Plan Amendments have level of service standards which meet the requirements of Rule 9J- 5.0055(2). Poplin also testified that the County had a Capital Improvements Element which was in compliance with Rule 9J- 5.0055(1)(b). She also testified that there was coordination of the various comprehensive plan elements as required by Section 163.3177. Thus, she concluded, the conservation and capital improvements (infrastructure) elements interacted properly. There was no evidence to the contrary. Section 163.3177(10)(h) states that it is the intent of the Legislature to provide public services concurrently with development. Section 163.3177(11) discusses the legislative intent to have innovative planning to address urbanization, protection of environmentally sensitive areas, land use efficiencies in urban areas and conversion of rural land uses. No evidence of any kind was presented regarding these provisions. Certainly, no data and analysis showing failure to meet these statutory provisions were presented by Petitioners. Listed Species Definition Paragraph 8.I.A.2 of the Amendment Petition states: Listed Species definition - pg 11. This change should not be made because the updated Glossary of the Comprehensive Plan was not made available timely for public review and public comments per the hearing and notice requirements of Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3161(18), 163.3181, 163.3184(15), 125.66(2) and or 125.66(4). Prior to the Plan Amendments, the Conservation Element had a Directive entitled "Wildlife." The "Wildlife" directive stated in part: "Development projects should avoid adverse impacts to species listed as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern." The directive also included a definition of the term "listed species": "those species which are listed as either endangered, threatened or as species of special concern." The Plan Amendments deleted these provisions. The stated Justification for deleting the first provision was: "Objective 9 embodies the intent of this directive." The stated Justification for deleting second provision was: "'Listed species' have been defined in the updated Glossary of the Comprehensive Plan." As in several other places in the Amended Petition, Petitioners complain about lack of notice and an opportunity for a hearing as to the updated Glossary. Actually, it appears that the Glossary was not updated along with the Plan Amendments. For that reason, there were no Glossary changes to be noticed. Although the Glossary was not updated to provide the definition of the phrase "listed species," as indicated in the Justification for deleting it from the Directives, the phrase is commonly used to refer to species are listed as threatened or endangered under various state and federal regulations. Rule 9J-5.013(1)(a)5. requires identification and analysis of natural resources including "species listed by federal, state, or local government agencies as endangered, threatened or species of special concern." Species that are federally listed as endangered or threatened (50 C.F.R., Section 17.11) fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in accordance with the Endangered Species act of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. Section 1531, et. seq.). Listed and unlisted bird species, other than waterfowl and game birds, are also federally protected by the Migratory Bird Act (16 U.S.C. Section 703 et. seq.). The bald eagle has additional federal protection under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C. Section 668- 668d). Marine animals (including whales, dolphins, and the West Indian Manatee) are also protected by the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. Section 1361 et. seq.) In addition, 24 species of vertebrates are listed by the State as endangered, threatened or species of special concern and are under the jurisdiction of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Chapter 39, Florida Administrative Code. Both snook and Atlantic sturgeon receive further state protection under Chapter 46, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Endangered and Threatened Species Act, 1977, also protects species listed as endangered, threatened or species of special concern under Chapter 372, Florida Statutes (2000). Chapter 372, Florida Statutes (2000), provides additional protection for the American alligator as defined in the Alligators/Crocodilla Protection Act. Sea turtles and the West Indian manatee are further protected by the State through the Marine Turtles Protection Act (Chapter 327, Florida Statutes (2000)) and the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act (Chapter 327, Florida Statutes (2000)). Petitioners did not prove beyond fair debate that the phrase "listed species" cannot be understood without a specific definition within the comprehensive plan. Conservation Element Policy 8.5, Protection Of Vegetative Communities Paragraph 8.I.B. of the Amended Petition states: Policy 8.5 - pg 41. This change should not be made because the justification is not correct. These referenced lists were not made available to the public at the relevant public hearing for review and comment in violation of the requirements of Fl. Stat. Section 163.3184. The modification goes beyond the stated intent to merely improve readability and clarify the existing policy in that it actually modifies existing policy. . . . (The last clause was stricken. See Preliminary Statement.) Again, there were no changes to the Glossary to be noticed for hearing. Before the Plan Amendments, Policy 8.9 of the Conservation Element provided that the County would develop a program for the protection of vegetative communities from inappropriate development by 1992. The former provision was replaced with Policy 8.5, which revises the action date to 2002 and states that the County shall protect vegetative communities from inappropriate development. G1 and G2 vegetative communities, as contained in the Florida Natural Areas Inventory, were added to S1 and S2 communities (which were already in the Plan) for consideration for protection. Poplin testified that the G1 and G2 categories were defined by the Florida Natural Areas Inventory and were synonymous with the S1 and S2 categories which were already defined in the Plan. The adopted "Justification" for new Policy 8.5 itself indicates that the addition of the G1 and G2 categories "did not add additional vegetative communities that may be considered for protection." In other words, nothing actually changed as to the vegetation (or types of vegetation); only the nomenclature or titles of categories changed. Conservation Element, Objective 9 and Policy 9 Species of Special Concern, Crucial/Critical Habitat Paragraph 8.I.C.,D., and E. of the Amended Petition states: Objective 9 and Policy 9, including sub- sections A, B, C, D, E, of 9.2 (species of special concern, crucial/critical habitat) - pg 43. Species of special concern should not be added. It was discussed at a properly advertised public hearing and its addition was rejected. It was added back at a subsequent and not properly noticed workshop meeting and did not allow proper public input. It is unjustifiably onerous to the regulated public as added, in violation of Fl. Stat. 120.52(8)(g). Crucial habitat should not be allowed to [be] substituted for critical habitat because the new glossary of definitions was not completed timely to allow public review and comment. The resource maps to be used are not identified or indicated that they have been created beyond "draft" status or had proper notice, public review or comment. The reduction from 5 acres to 1 acre in 9.2.C was improperly added at a workshop subsequent to the properly noticed public hearing at which this item was disposed of with public hearing and comment and leaving the size of 5 acres. The provision that the "acquisition of land by the Brevard County Environmentally Endangered Lands Program shall be voluntary, and shall not include the use of eminent domain" should not be removed in Policy 9.4 (pg. 45). These new provisions do not meet the requirements of Fl. Stat. Sections 120.58(8) and 120.525, Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3161(18), Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3181, Fl. Stat. Sections 163.3184(15), Fl. Stat. Sections 125.66(2), and or Fl. Stat. Sections 125.66(4). (The identified sentence and references were stricken. See Preliminary Statement.) Again, there were no changes to the Glossary to be noticed for hearing. As to "crucial habitat," amended Policy 9.2 of the Conservation Element requires that an ordinance be developed by 2002 requiring a "crucial habitat" review at the pre-application stage of certain projects. Previously, the plan required development of an ordinance in 2004 requiring a "critical habitat" review in those situations. Apparently, "critical habitat" was defined in the pre-amendment Glossary. (Neither the Glossary nor the rest of the County's Comprehensive Plan prior to the Plan Amendments was put in evidence.) No regulations regarding "crucial habitat" were in effect as of final hearing. A definition of the term "crucial habitat" might well be desirable. (Apparently, an amendment to the Glossary to include such a definition is being considered by someone--it is not clear from the evidence by whom.) But it is possible to use dictionary definitions of "crucial" and "habitat" to derive a useful meaning of the term "crucial habitat" used in Policy 9.2 of the Conservation Element. Petitioners did not prove beyond fair debate that the term "crucial habitat" cannot be adequately understood without a specific definition in the comprehensive plan. "Species of special concern" is a phrase used by Rule 9J-5.013(1)(a)5. in describing natural resources to be identified and analyzed in a local government's conservation element. The "resource maps" mentioned in paragraph 8.I.C., D., and E. of the Amended Petition are not new to the County's Comprehensive Plan. Prior to the Plan Amendments, Policy 10.2.A. stated that the County's Office of Natural Resources Management must "develop resource maps showing potential areas for critical wildlife habitat for threatened and endangered wildlife species." Amended Policy 9.2.A. requires that Office to "use resource maps which show potential areas of crucial wildlife habitat for threatened and endangered wildlife species and species of special concern." While the descriptions of these maps were changed by the amendment, the general manner in which they are identified is the same. It was not proven beyond fair debate that the amendments cannot be adequately understood without identification in a more specific manner or reference to maps already completed. Petitioners' next complaint in paragraph 8.I.C., D., and E. of the Amended Petition was that the threshold for required crucial habitat review in Policy 9.2.C. of the Conservation Element should not have been changed from five-acre projects to one-acre projects. Petitioners' primary argument was that the County discussed this change at a workshop. The only evidence in support of this argument was Moehle's testimony: "[T]he changes that show up in here were rejected in those previous hearings so the public has the impression well, that item is done and settled. Then all of a sudden at a workshop it shows up when nobody - they are not necessarily -- you can't obtain the advance agenda for that and you find a notice in the paper from time to time." In fact, the workshops were noticed in the newspapers. In addition, the transmittal and adoption hearings were noticed. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. As for Petitioners' request for reinstatement of the language regarding voluntary acquisition of environmentally endangered lands, former Policy 10.4 addressed development of an acquisition program; amended Policy 9.4 addresses a continuation of that program. The Justification explains that the amendments were "intended to reflect the achievement of this policy as a result of the EELs [Environmentally Endangered Lands] Program." There was no evidence to support the argument that removal of the voluntary acquisition language in any way changes the EELs Program or creates a compliance issue. Conservation Element Policy 9.13, Species of Special Concern Paragraph 8.I.G. of the Amended Petition stated: Policy 9.13 - species of special concern, habitat rarity, pg 48. This change is inconsistent with the same Florida Statutes and for the same reasons as I.C, I.D, I.E (A, B, C, E, E) and I.F above. Policy 9.13 contains a requirement to develop model management plans for species of special concern dependent on habitat rarity and loss rates. The amendment to former Policy 10.13 merely changes the target date (from 1990 to 2002) and adds "species of special concern" to the other resources sought to be addressed by the model management plans. The provision does not establish new regulations. It merely calls for future action in the development of model management plans. Again, there was no evidence to support the argument that these changes created a compliance issue. See Findings of Fact 32-33, supra. Scrub Habitat Map Paragraph 8.I.H. of the Amended Petition stated: Appendix - List of Maps, pg 52. The Scrub Habitat Map should not be included because it is part of the Scrub Habitat Study done in Brevard County which was not adopted/accepted as a final map by the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners. The map is a "draft" map done over 5 years ago, not finalized, and not accurate. Objections at public meetings, with Brevard County Staff, and with the outside consultants preparing the map have never been addressed on the map. Among the inaccuracies are hundreds (maybe thousands) of acres on government lands. The map is wholly deficient and incorrect to become an official map representing the scrub habitat of Brevard County. It doesn't come close to accurately depicting the scrub situation of Brevard County. The map is not supported by competent substantial evidence, has not been officially adopted by the County Commission, the requisite public notices have not been held. Any policy or regulation based upon the map would be equally erroneous and would result in unnecessary regulatory costs, and would be arbitrary or capricious and would be based upon inadequate standards. At final hearing, Moehle testified: "The scrub habitat map as included in the amendments does not include the best available information which information has been available for a number of years." But the Scrub Jay Habitat map Petitioners sought to use to prove this contention (Petitioners' Exhibit 6) was not admitted into evidence because it was not authenticated. The Scrub Habitat Map apparently added to the Appendix of Conservation Element maps through the B.12 Plan Amendments does not appear to map scrub on federal lands. (At least, no scrub is indicated in the extensive federal lands on the map.) But there was no competent evidence as to the significance of the failure to map scrub habitat on federal lands. (Nor did Petitioners cite to any authority for the proposition that excluding federal lands outside the County's jurisdiction is a violation of Chapter 163 or Rule 9J-5.) While Petitioners never clearly articulated their concerns about the Scrub Habitat Map, it appeared that they might have had concerns about the impact of the map on protection of scrub jays. Specifically, Petitioners seem to contend that some scrub jays will not be protected as a result of the map's omission of scrub on federal lands. But, in that regard, amended Conservation Element Policy 9.2. in the B.12 Plan Amendments provides for the development of an ordinance by 2002 that would provide, among other things, that if any endangered or threatened species or species of special concern are found on a project site, or there is evidence that such a species is onsite, the relevant state and federal agency permits would have to be obtained and documented prior to issuance of a building or construction permit. Once adopted, these regulations would protect scrub jays wherever the birds exist. Another apparent concern was that the Scrub Habitat Map allegedly was over 5 years old. Meanwhile, other maps allegedly have been or are in the process of being developed. But Petitioners' evidence was insufficient to prove beyond fair debate that the Scrub Habitat Map was not the best available data at the time of adoption of the Plan Amendments. Land Use Element, Administrative Policies Paragraph 8.II. of the Amended Petition states: Comprehensive Plan Amendment 1999B.13 The Administrative Policies 1 thru 8 (pg iv) which have been proposed for inclusion in the future Land Use Element by the County Attorney and added by a April 29, 2000 workshop were not timely provided for public review and comment by a properly noticed hearing in violation of the notice requirements of Florida Statutes subsections 163.3161(18), 163.3181, 163.3184(15), 125.66(2) and 125.66(4). They are over- broad, too general in nature, vague, and fail to establish adequate standards for county staff decisions, and vest unbridled discretion in the county staff in violation of Florida Statute 120.54(8). Detailed examples of this include: In Administrative Policy 1 - Brevard County zoning officials, planners and the director of planning and zoning should not be arbitrarily, capriciously, and without adequate defined standards be recognized as expert witnesses. Standards with detailed qualifications should be developed and included for each category of expert before this provision is considered for adoption. In Policy 2 (page iv) county staff recommendation should not automatically be considered expert testimony without qualifications. Page 1 under DIRECTIVES. The Future Land Use paragraph should not be deleted until sufficient emphasis has been placed in the requirement to ensure that sufficient land uses are available to support the anticipated population. It has not been at this time, in violation of Florida Statutes subsections 163.3177(2), 163.3177(3)(a), 163.3177(6)(a) and 163.3177(6)(f). As to 8.II.A., the evidence indicated that the advertisements were published in the time frames required and according to the standards set out by statute. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. Furthermore, Petitioners failed to establish that the Administrative Policies 1-8 were unavailable at the public hearing or that the Board of County Commissioners was not authorized to consider those policies. The language of the last sentence of paragraph 8.II. should have been stricken with similar provisions at the beginning of the final hearing because of its reliance on Section 120.54(8), which addresses rulemaking activities and not the compliance requirements of Chapter 163. There was no competent, substantial evidence to support any of the other allegations in paragraph 8.II.A. As to 8.II.A.(iii), there was only Moehle's statement regarding the lack of land availability while he was questioning Poplin. Poplin testified that the County should provide an adequate amount of different land uses to accommodate a variety of people and activities. She also testified that the County had provided more than enough residential land to accommodate projected populations. Poplin noted that the County's EAR (Evaluation and Appraisal Report) included or referenced several sources indicating that the County has more than enough land to meet their residential and non-residential needs through the planning time frame. In fact, she testified that land allocated for residential use is over 170 percent of the land necessary for the County's projected population. In explaining the "right-sizing" undertaken in the Plan Amendment, Poplin testified that two major changes have occurred since the adoption of the original County Plan. First, the County sold a substantial amount of land to the water management district; this land is now designated as Conservation. Secondly, some developments have been built to less than their full potential. Poplin testified: "My understanding of the County's actions is that this right sizing is to recognize areas that have developed and maybe have developed at lower densities. So by revising the densities on the map, they're recognizing this." Finally, Poplin testified that the future land use map (FLUM) and the policies proposed in the subject Plan Amendment are consistent with previous actions, previous development patterns, and previous purchases that have occurred within the County. As for Section 163.3177(2), cited by Petitioners at the end of paragraph 8.II.A.(iii) of the Amended Petition, the statute requires coordination of the land use elements. Poplin testified that the County has adequate facilities and services to provide for the land use plan proposed in its FLUM. Section 163.3177(6)(f) requires a housing element. There was no evidence that these elements do not exist in the County's comprehensive plan. Land Use Element Policy 1.1, Residential Land Use Designations Almost all of Paragraph 8.II.B. of the Amended Petition was stricken. See Preliminary Statement. Only the title and last sentence remained: Residential Land Use Designations, Policy 1.1 (reduced densities - pg 14). Property owners (including PETITIONERS) whose land use/zoning classification is no longer in compliance with the comprehensive plan amendment have not been notified as required by Florida Statutes subsection 125.66. Petitioners themselves provided evidence establishing that the statutory notice was properly given. See Findings of Fact 12- 14, supra. Land Use Element Policy 1.2, Public Facilities and Services The last sentence of Paragraph 8.II.C. of the Amended Petition was stricken. See Preliminary Statement. The remaining allegation was: Public Facilities and Services Requirements, Policy 1.2 (page 15). In subsection E, the prohibition by use of the words "shall not" are too harsh, restrictive, and confiscatory and should be replaced "shall not be required at the expense of the County." But the language of Criterion F under Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policy 1.2 already states what Petitioners seek. Simply stated, Petitioners want the policy to state that private parties were not prohibited from building additional public facilities. The second sentence of the policy states: "This criterion is not intended to preclude acceptance of dedicated facilities and services by the county through . . . other means through which the recipients pay for the service or facility." Finally, the language of Criterion F under Policy 1.2 existed elsewhere in the Comprehensive Plan prior to the Plan Amendments; it is not new. The Plan Amendments simply changed the location of the language in the Plan. Land Use Policies 1.31 and 1.4 Paragraph 8.II.D. of the Amended Petition stated: Residential 30, Policy 1.31 and Residential 15, Policy 1.4 (pgs. 16, 18). In subsections 1.31.A.1.3 and 1.4.A. respectively, the limitation of this designation to east of Interstate 95 is arbitrary, capricious and is not supported by substantial evidence. It imposes excessive regulatory costs upon regulated property owners. It is confiscatory and fails to recognize the vested rights of property owners. There are areas west of Interstate 95 just as suitable and qualifying as areas east of Interstate 95. This policy fails to recognize existing or new infrastructure which services areas west of I-95 and is therefore inconsistent with other policies. New policy 1.4 is similar and related and also limits densities west of Interstate 95 under all circumstances. This change and any other related restrictions to all areas west of I-95 should be eliminated. FLUE Policies 1.3 (the proper number, not 1.31) and 1.4 deal with residential densities. Pertinent to Petitioners' complaint, Residential 30, allowing up to 30 units per acre, is located east of Interstate 95; generally, maximum residential density west of Interstate 95 is 15 units per acre in Residential 15, except where "adjacent to existing or designated residential densities of an equal or higher density allowance." Petitioners presented no evidence in opposition to these residential densities or designations or the data and analysis supporting them. To the contrary, Poplin testified that there was adequate data and analysis to support the changes. See Finding of Fact 47, supra. The other issues raised, such as excessive regulatory costs, relate to Section 120.52, Florida Statutes (2000), standards and are not at issue in the proceeding. Land Use Policy 2.8, Community Commercial Designation Paragraph 8.II.E. of the Amended Petition stated: Locational and Development Criteria for Community Commercial Uses, Policy 2.8 (pg 38). Subsection B regarding community commercial complexes should not be limited to 40 acres at an intersection for properties that have existing land use or zoning designations compatible to the new Community Commercial designation. The same is true for the limitations of subsections, C, D, and E. These new limitations are confiscatory, fail to recognize existing land use and zoning and vested rights of property owners, are arbitrary, capricious, are not supported by competent substantial evidence, enlarge existing regulations without justification. They impose additional regulatory costs on regulated property owners when the goal of Florida Statutes Chapter 163 could be met by less restrictive and costly regulatory alternatives. Other provisions of Policy 2.8, Table 2.2, Policy 2.9, Policy 2.10 that exceed the present regulation of properties having existing land use or zoning designations or actual use should not be allowed for the same reasons. Additionally, many of these amendments were added at a April 29, 2000 workshop without complying with applicable public notice requirements. Public review and input as to these elements was therefore lacking. The plain language of Criterion B under FLUE Policy 2.8 demonstrates that the restrictions have been relaxed, not increased. Previously, Criterion C under Policy 2.8 stated: "Sites for community commercial complexes should not exceed 20 acres." The letter designation of the criterion was changed, and the criterion was amended to read: "Community commercial complexes should not exceed 40 acres at an intersection." The Justification for the change states: "Site size has been enlarged to 40 acres maximum at an intersection. Previously, this criterion could be interpreted to permit a maximum of 80 acres at an intersection (20 acres at each corner). Forty acres has been chosen as this is the DRI threshold for commercial development." On its face, the purpose of amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8 was twofold: to enlarge the site size restriction from 20 to 40 acres; and to clarify that the restriction (now 40 acres) was meant to apply to all community commercial regardless whether they are located at intersections; locating a project on different sides of the street at an intersection was not supposed to double, triple, or even quadruple the maximum site size. Petitioners' position that amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8 shrinks maximum allowable the site size is based on Moehle's assumption that 80-acre projects were permitted at intersections under prior to amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8. But there was no competent, substantial evidence to support Moehle's assumption. Petitioners also seem to contend that the phrase "at an intersection" is imprecise, leading to uncertainty that undermines the required residential allocation analysis. But it is at least fairly debatable that no more precise definition is necessary. Contrary to Moehle's speculation, it is not reasonable to construe the phrase "at an intersection" to also mean "at an indeterminate distance away from an intersection." Petitioners also took the position that "folding" previous land use classifications into Community Commercial greatly expanded the practical effect of the acreage limitation in amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8. Petitioners' evidence did not explain their position in any detail or specificity. It is possible that they had reference to Criterion D under Policy 4.5 prior to the Plan Amendment, which allowed "regional commercial centers to incorporate up to 100 acres." If so, under the B.13 Plan Amendments, amended Policy 2.12 addresses regional commercial centers by requiring their location in a new Development of Regional Impact (DRI) future land use designation. The Justification for this change was: "With the proposed establishment of a Development of Regional Impact (DRI) land use category, regional uses will no longer be permitted in a commercial future land use designation. Review in accordance with Chapter 380, F.S. standards is intended to simplify readability and maintain consistency with state statutes." Reading amended Criterion B under Policy 2.8 together with amended Policy 2.12, commercial complexes larger than 40 acres are not prohibited under the Plan Amendment; they just have to be developed in a DRI land use category under Chapter 380 DRI standards. The reasonableness of these amendments is at least fairly debatable. Meanwhile, Poplin specifically testified that the data and analysis provided by the County were adequate to support the residential and nonresidential changes, including Community Commercial and Neighborhood Commercial changes. No contrary evidence was provided. Policies 2.9 and 2.10 allow minimal extensions of commercial boundaries. No evidence was presented addressing these items. The clear evidence was contrary to Petitioners' claim of notice violations. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. Transitional Commercial Activities Paragraph 8.II.F. of the Amended Petition states: Transitional Commercial Activities - Community Commercial - General Tourist Commercial (TU-1) - Highway Transient Tourist (TU-2). Existing properties with Mixed Use Land Use Designations and General Tourist Commercial (TU-1) and Highway Transient Tourist (TU-2) zoning classifications have not been protected with their existing regulation constraint in the transformation into the new Neighborhood Commercial and Community Commercial Regulations as has been asserted by the COUNTY in the revised objective and policies in the provisions covering these classifications as asserted by the COUNTY. Either proposed changes should conform or the changes should not be made. The same objections and changes are made for the new confiscatory provisions of the COUNTY for existing Industrial Land Use Designations and Zoning classifications under Industrial Land Uses (Objective 3, Policy 3, pg 55). The same objections and challenges are made for new confiscatory provisions of Agricultural Land Uses (pg 67) for existing Land Use Designations and densities of lands including reductions of densities to 1 unit per 5 acres by changes from a residential classification (including existing recorded subdivision plats). Many new items of the above were made at the April 29, 2000 workshop and proper public notices, review, and comment was not available. Petitioners failed to demonstrate any impact on actual development as a result of these future land use designation changes. No defect in notice was established by the evidence. Rather, the evidence indicated that all advertising requirements were met. See Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. Finally, Poplin testified that the majority of land uses remained the same based on existing uses, and that all changes were supported by data and analysis. Future Land Use Maps Update Paragraph 8.III.A. of the Amended Petition states: Comprehensive Plan Amendment 1999 B.14. The Future Land Use Maps Update Report - The Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps are not consistent with the existing FLUM and RDG maps. There are corrections and amplifications needed before they are acceptable. The COUNTY did not either have available or make available to the public for review and comment the map(s) as transmitted to DCA at any properly noticed Public Hearing. It was asserted by the COUNTY that no Land Use Designations, Zoning, or Density Allocation changes, were being made to property owners. That is not true. Some specific examples are Sections 3 & 15, located within Township 22 South, Range 34 East, which were changed from Residential to Agriculture Use (density from 1 unit per acre to 1 unit per 5 acres) and Sections 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14 within Township 22 South, Range 34 East, from density of 1 unit per acre to 1 acre per 2.5 acres. The FLUM Report explains that the FLUM series was converted from graphic format to computerized geographic information system (GIS) format; as a result, the Residential Density Guidelines (RDG) map series could be combined with the FLUM series. Petitioners failed to establish any facts demonstrating that the new GIS FLUM series was not available or discussed at properly noticed public hearings. As to notice, see Findings of Fact 12-14, supra. There was no evidence of errors on the GIS maps. Petitioners complained that the GIS maps are unusable because they are too hard to read, especially because they were black and white. But actually the FLUM series is in color. There was no competent, substantial evidence that the color maps were too hard to read or unusable. Petitioners generally complained about residential density reductions but failed to present any competent, substantial evidence as to what supposedly was wrong with those reductions. Petitioners seem to believe that they should be able to obtain all information regarding their property from the Comprehensive Plan. There is no regulation cited by Petitioners requiring that the maps be of sufficient detail to enable someone to determine all possible uses of property based solely on a review of the maps. As a practical matter, additional site-specific information is nearly always necessary. In addition, GIS maps are computerized maps which are merely referenced by the Plan. The GIS system must ultimately be consulted regarding site-specific information. Poplin testified that the GIS updating of the FLUM and RDG map series was done primarily to streamline and consolidate the two previously separate maps. Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, Poplin testified that the conversion from two graphic maps to the GIS maps was a very positive change. Mixed Use District Conversion Paragraph 8.III.B. of the Amended Petition stated: Under the MIXED USE DISTRICT CONVERSION (pg 1) - Mixed Use District (MUD) land use designation and zoning classification of General Tourist Commercial (TU-1) or Highway Tourist Commercial (TU-2) existing classifications were not listed as being reclassified (to be designated as Community Commercial). Petitioners base this contention solely on the FLUM Update in the B.14 Plan Amendments. Petitioners' contention ignores FLUE Policy 2.7 in the B.13 Plan Amendments, one of the operative policies relating to the conversion from MUD. Policy 2.7 states which uses are allowed under the Community Commercial designation. Subparagraph "c" lists "Tourist Commercial uses" as being a use under Community Commercial. In their response to the motion for involuntary dismissal, Petitioners finally acknowledged Policy 2.7 but still maintain that it cannot be determined whether TU-1 and TU-2 zoning will be classified as Community Commercial or as Neighborhood Commercial. In making this argument, Petitioners ignore FLUE Policy 2.5, another operative policy in the B.13 section of the Plan Amendment, relating to the conversion from MUD. Policy 2.5 lists "[d]evelopment activities which may be considered within Neighborhood Commercial" and omits any "tourist commercial" development activities. Based on the evidence, it seems clear that both TU-1 and TU-2 zoning will be classified as Community Commercial, and not as Neighborhood Commercial. Petitioners' allegations that they were omitted from the MUD conversion are incorrect. More About the Glossary Paragraph 8.I.V. of the Amended Petition stated: Glossary, Definitions, Thresholds, Maps relating to Comprehensive Plan Amendments 1999 B.12, 1999 B.13 and 1999 B.14. Revised Glossary. A new Glossary and definitions was never completed and made available to the public before any properly noticed Public Hearing to properly allow public review, input, comment, etc. Incomplete or inaccurate data on thresholds and maps relating to Comprehensive Plan Amendments 1999 B.12, 1999 B.13 and 1999 B.14 were also not available. As previously found, the Glossary was not amended, and it would be inappropriate to advertise the Glossary for changes. There is no requirement that a glossary be included in a comprehensive plan. When a glossary is included, not every word in a comprehensive plan must be included. Forested Wetlands Location Map At final hearing, Petitioners asserted that the Forested Wetlands Location Map referred to and incorporated by reference in Policy 5.2.F.3. of the Conservation Element was not the best available data. This issue was not raised in the Amended Petition, and consideration of the merits of the assertion has been waived. In addition, as previously found, the language of Policy 5.2.F.3. was adopted prior to the Plan Amendments at issue in this case. See Finding of Fact 8, supra. On the merits of the argument, three forested wetlands maps were offered into evidence (as Petitioners' Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.) Only Petitioners' Exhibit 2 was admitted into evidence. Petitioners' Exhibit 2 reflects the Forested Wetlands Location Map incorporated by reference as part of the County's comprehensive plan. Without Petitioners' Exhibits 3 or 4 being in evidence, or any other evidence on the issue, Moehle's testimony was insufficient to prove beyond fair debate that the Forested Wetlands Location Map incorporated by reference as part of the County's comprehensive plan was not the best available data at the time of incorporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order dismissing the Amended Petition and finding that Brevard County's Plan Amendments B.12, B.13, and B.14 are "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eden Bentley, Esquire Brevard County Attorney's Office 2725 St. Johns Street Viera, Florida 32940 Andrew S. Grayson, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Charles F. Moehle Modern, Inc. Post Office Box 321417 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32932 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
