The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Publix Super Markets, Inc. (“Publix”), violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes (2014),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race, color, sex, and/or handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male who lives in Deltona, Florida. Despite the assertion in his Public Accommodation Complaint of Discrimination, Petitioner offered no evidence that he has a disability or handicap. Petitioner testified that he had surgery for kidney stones in Daytona Beach on October 20, 2014. Respondent’s urologist prescribed Percocet (oxycodone and acetaminophen), a controlled substance, to control Respondent’s pain. The prescription from Petitioner’s urologist was not placed in evidence. On October 21, 2014, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Fish Memorial Hospital in Orange City and, there, was given a prescription for 12 tablets of Percocet. The prescription directed that the medication be taken once every six hours, meaning that the emergency room physician was prescribing a three-day supply of Percocet. A copy of this prescription was entered into evidence, and the parties agree that this is the prescription that Petitioner later presented to the Publix pharmacy. Petitioner testified that his mother drove him to his surgery and, apparently, to the emergency room. She placed the prescription in her purse for safe keeping. A few days later, when Petitioner wanted to get the prescription filled, his mother could not find the prescription. Petitioner stated that his mother forgot that she had changed purses. When she changed purses again a couple of weeks later, Petitioner’s mother found the prescription. On November 15, 2014, Petitioner presented the emergency room prescription to the pharmacy technician at Publix Store 0667 in Deltona. The technician was aware that the pharmacist gave special scrutiny to emergency room prescriptions. The technician therefore took the prescription directly to the pharmacist, James MacDonald. Mr. MacDonald was the pharmacy manager of Store 0667 and at the time of the events at issue had been a pharmacist for 23 years with no record of discipline against his license. Mr. MacDonald testified that, as a general matter, he performs a prospective drug utilization review on every prescription. Simply put, this process insures that the prescription is for a legitimate medical purpose and that it is being filled for the person who presented it at the pharmacy. Mr. MacDonald stated that he is not required to fill every prescription that is presented to him and that he declines to fill prescriptions seven to ten times per week. The chief reasons for declining to fill prescriptions are the pharmacist’s inability to verify the prescription with the prescribing physician and the pharmacist’s determination that the prescription calls for a type or quantity of a controlled substance that is inappropriate to the patient’s condition. Mr. MacDonald testified that during the two years prior to November 2014, nearby pharmacies at CVS and Walgreens had stopped filling prescriptions for controlled substances, which placed an added burden on Publix to fill these prescriptions. There were several doctors in the area writing prescriptions for large amounts of controlled substances. Mr. MacDonald was also being presented with many prescriptions for controlled substances from people he did not know. All these factors contributed to his caution in filling prescriptions for controlled substances. Mr. MacDonald testified that a prescription from an emergency room visit usually provides for enough medication to get the patient through the emergency period, two or three days, after which the patient is instructed to see his primary care physician. Mr. MacDonald tended to decline to fill emergency room prescriptions that were presented more than a few days after the emergency room visit. When the technician presented him with Petitioner’s prescription, Mr. MacDonald told the technician that he would not fill it because it was more than three weeks old. The technician walked to the front window to convey this response to Petitioner, who did not take it well. Mr. MacDonald could hear Petitioner raising his voice and so went to the front to speak with Petitioner directly. Mr. MacDonald testified that the pharmacy was very busy, that he had customers ahead of Petitioner, and that having to come around and deal personally with Petitioner was putting him even farther behind in his work. Mr. MacDonald explained to Petitioner that the prescription was issued by an emergency room physician and was for a three-day supply of Percocet. He told Petitioner that he would have filled the prescription if he had presented it within a week of his emergency room visit, but that it was now three weeks later and this was clearly no longer an emergency situation. Petitioner testified that he told Mr. MacDonald that the prescription had been misplaced in his mother’s purse. Mr. MacDonald did not recall this explanation. Mr. MacDonald offered to call the emergency room physician and verify the prescription. Petitioner insisted that Mr. MacDonald either call the physician or fill the prescription immediately, and stated that he would not move from the pharmacy window until Mr. MacDonald had complied with his ultimatum. Mr. MacDonald stated that he had customers ahead of Petitioner and could not drop everything to please him at that moment. In light of Petitioner’s persistence, Mr. MacDonald reiterated his refusal to fill the prescription. He handed the prescription back to Petitioner and threatened to call the police if Petitioner did not leave. Petitioner was unmoved. Mr. MacDonald did not call the police but did page the assistant store manager, Christopher Bloyen, to intercede in the situation. Mr. Bloyen testified that he came to the pharmacy. He saw that Petitioner seemed very upset and was speaking very loudly. Petitioner complained that Mr. MacDonald would not fill his prescription. Mr. Bloyen spoke briefly with Mr. MacDonald, who explained why he was refusing to fill the prescription. At the hearing, Mr. Bloyen explained that the pharmacy in any Publix store is an autonomous department and that, as a store manager, he lacks the training or expertise to second- guess the decision of his pharmacist. Publix relies on the professional expertise and discretion of its pharmacists to determine whether or not to fill a prescription. Mr. Bloyen informed Petitioner that he was going to support the decision of Mr. MacDonald not to fill the prescription. At this point, Petitioner left the store. Neither Mr. MacDonald nor Mr. Bloyen had met Petitioner before this incident. Petitioner did not disclose to them that he had any disability or handicap, and none was visibly apparent. Mr. MacDonald testified that his decision not to fill Petitioner’s prescription was not based on Petitioner’s race, color, or sex. In fact, Mr. MacDonald’s initial decision not to fill the prescription was made and announced to the technician before Mr. MacDonald laid eyes on Petitioner. Petitioner’s race, color, sex, and alleged handicap or disability played no part in Mr. MacDonald’s decision not to fill the prescription. Mr. MacDonald did not make any disparaging remarks about Petitioner during their exchange, and no employee of Publix made racially derogatory or racially related comments to Petitioner. Petitioner testified that he was able to get the prescription filled at a Winn-Dixie pharmacy shortly after this incident. Therefore, Petitioner suffered no economic loss or quantifiable damages as a result of Publix’s refusal to fill his prescription. Petitioner testified that he seeks only an apology from Publix. Publix Store 0667 does not contain a restaurant or lunch counter and there is no designated area for customers to consume food on the premises. The store does contain a deli, but the food items sold from the deli are not intended for on- site consumption at Publix. The store has no picnic tables or other seating at which customers might consume food on the premises. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Publix for refusing to fill his prescription. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that the stated reasons for not filling the prescription were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s race, color, sex, handicap, or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Publix discriminated against him in violation of section 760.08.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Publix Super Markets, Inc., is not a public accommodation under the facts of this case or, in the alternative, that Publix Super Markets, Inc., did not commit any unlawful acts of public accommodation discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, Liang Jian and Doinghui Lee (Owners), discriminated against Petitioner, Gabriel Sauers (Sauers), through actions of the Owners’ representative, Joseph Palmer (Palmer), on the basis of Sauers' purported handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Sauers is a young Caucasian male with purported disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder, ADHD, Oppositional Defiance Disorder, and others. He is a high school graduate, having received his education in an exceptional student education class. Sauers did not testify as to whether he is currently employed. He receives food stamps and Supplemental Security Income from the Social Security Administration. That income appears to be his sole means of support. The Owners (who did not appear at the final hearing) are Asians. The property at issue (referred to herein as the Apartments) is a multi-family residential building located at 419 North Wild Olive Avenue. At all times relevant hereto, Sauers was residing in Apartment #7, an efficiency apartment. In October 2012, Sauers rented a one-bedroom apartment from the Owners. Palmer was the manager of the Apartments and handled the negotiations with Sauers for the apartment. After a short time living in the apartment, Sauers asked to rent the efficiency apartment instead of the apartment he had originally leased. There was a difference of about $100 per month in rent between the two apartments. On or about November 1, 2012, Sauers moved into the efficiency apartment, i.e., Apartment #7. Sauers had inspected the apartment and did not list any concerns on his written lease agreement. After living for a short time in the efficiency, Sauers asked for a different refrigerator because the one in the efficiency was too small. He asked that the refrigerator from his prior apartment be moved down to the efficiency or that one be purchased for the efficiency as a replacement. Palmer told Sauers that he (Sauers) could purchase a refrigerator and Palmer would give him a $100 credit on his rent. Sauers never purchased a refrigerator and Palmer did not take any further action on Sauers’ request. While living in the efficiency, Sauers heard loud music being played in one of the other apartments on a regular basis. Sauers’ efficiency was in a building other than where the other apartments were located, but it was in close proximity. Sauers also reported seeing drug transactions taking place around the Apartments. He reported his findings to Palmer, but Palmer just told him to call the police. Sauers called the police on multiple occasions. Sauers had arguments and disagreements with other residents residing in the apartment complex. He admitted that his psychological conditions caused him to argue with other residents from time to time, but said he was singled out by some residents. Sauers raised complaints about the presence of palmetto bugs and roaches in his efficiency. However, the entire complex was under an extermination contract and Ryan’s Pest Control came out regularly to spray for insects. Some invoices and statements from Ryan’s were offered into evidence, but Sauers maintains they only address a few days of his residence at the Apartments. It is likely there were bugs in the efficiency; it is also true that Palmer and the Owners attempted to minimize the problem by having regular pest control service. The stove/oven in the efficiency was improperly grounded when Sauers moved in. He received several electrical shocks when touching the stove. Palmer was made aware of the problem and contracted with Parks Electric Company to remedy the situation. On April 25, 2013, the stove was rewired to alleviate the electrical problem. The Owners had a policy in place that tenants would pay their rent by way of a certified check or money order. Sauers often requested and was allowed to pay in cash. Sauers complained frequently to Palmer about the condition of the efficiency, the dangerous environment around the apartment complex, and other real or imagined problems. Sauers’ father, who helped Sauers move into the apartment complex and notified Palmer about some of Sauers’ disabilities, agreed that the area around the Apartments seemed unsafe. The father, a large man, was accosted on one of his visits to the Apartment, by some unknown person. Sometimes Sauers’ mother would call Palmer to ask questions or raise concerns. She was never able to reach him via telephone, but Palmer returned her calls--to Sauers’ father’s phone--on many occasions. It is abundantly clear that Sauers and Palmer do not get along well. When Sauers was absent from his apartment for several weeks in the summer of 2013, Palmer assumed that the efficiency had been abandoned. He placed a three-day notice on the door of the efficiency, telling Sauers he had to pay the rent which was due or that eviction proceedings would be commenced. When notified that Sauers did not plan to return to the apartment, Palmer went in--only to find that the efficiency was filthy and required significant cleaning. Sauers claims discrimination on the part of the Owners because Palmer had asked him to vacate the apartment at one point in time. The suggestion, made by Palmer, was based on Palmer’s perception that Sauers was extremely unhappy living at the apartment complex. Sauers failed to show that any other residents at the complex were treated differently or that Sauers was denied any reasonable accommodations for his needs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gabriel Sauers in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Paul Kelton, Esquire Paul, Elkind and Branz 142 East New York Avenue Deland, Florida 32724 Gabriel P. Sauers Unit 1 1111 Ocean Shore Boulevard Ormond Beach, Florida 32176 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., denied Petitioners full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered at its place of public accommodation, in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction Petitioners are African Americans who reside in the State of Ohio, who visited Orlando, Florida, in June 2011 and stayed at Lake Eve Resort beginning on June 21, 2011. Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., was the owner of Lake Eve Resort, located at 12388 International Drive, Orlando, Florida, at all times relevant hereto. Each Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission as follows: Jessica Austin – July 20, 2012 Denise Austin – July 21, 2012 Tracie Austin – January 18, 2013 (Amended Complaint)2/ Bonlydia Jones – July 11, 2012 James Austin – July 31, 2012 Dionne Harrington – August 1, 2012 Esther Hall – January 28, 2013 (Amended Complaint)3/ Boniris McNeal – March 27, 2013 Summer McNeal – March 27, 2013 Derek McNeal – March 27, 2013 In each Complaint, the Petitioner alleges that the most recent date of discrimination is June 22, 2011. On June 21, 2012, Petitioners Esther Hall, Summer McNeal, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, and Dionne Harrington, each filed a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) with the Commission. Each TAQ is signed by the named Petitioner, is stamped received by the Commission on June 21, 2012, and contains the specific facts alleged to be an act of discrimination in the provision of public accommodation by Respondent. Allegations of Discrimination On or about May 23, 2011, Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, entered into a Standard Group Contract with Lake Eve Resort (the Resort) to reserve 15 Resort rooms for five nights at a discounted group rate beginning June 21, 2011.4/ The rooms were to accommodate approximately 55 members of her extended family on the occasion of the Boss/Williams/Harris family reunion. Petitioners traveled from Ohio to Orlando via charter bus, arriving at the Resort on the evening of June 21, 2011. Erika Bell, a relative of Petitioners, drove a rental car from Ohio to Orlando. She did not arrive in Orlando until June 22, 2011. Petitioners checked in to the Resort without incident. However, one family member, John Harris, was informed that the three-bedroom suite he had reserved for his family was not available due to a mistake in reservations. He was offered two two-bedroom suites to accommodate his family. Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, dined off-property on the evening of June 21, 2011, to celebrate her wedding anniversary. Petitioner, Bonlydia Jones, left the Resort property shortly after check-in to shop for groceries. Petitioners, Dionne Harrington and Esther Hall, were very tired after the long bus trip and went to bed early on June 21, 2011. Petitioner, Denise Austin, arrived in Orlando with the family on June 21, 2011. On the morning of June 22, 2011, Ms. Jones received a call from Mr. Harris, informing her that the Resort management wanted to speak with them about his room. That morning, Ms. Jones and Mr. Harris met with two members of Resort management, Amanda Simon and Marie Silbe. Mr. Harris was informed that he needed to change rooms to a three-bedroom suite, the accommodation he had reserved, which had become available. Mr. Harris disputed that he had to change rooms and argued that he was told at check-in the prior evening he would not have to move from the two two-bedroom suites he was offered when his preferred three-bedroom suite was not available. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Harris would move his family to an available three-bedroom suite. The Resort provided an employee to assist with the move. Following the meeting with management, Ms. Jones went to the pool, along with Ms. Harrington and other members of the family. After a period of time which was not established at hearing, Mary Hall, one of Ms. Harrington’s relatives, came to the pool and informed Ms. Harrington that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Harrington left the pool and entered the lobby, where she observed police officers and members of Resort management. She approached a member of management and was informed that she and her family were being evicted from the Resort and must be off the property within an hour. Ms. Harrington left the lobby and returned to her room, where her mother, Ms. Hall was sleeping. Ms. Harrington informed Ms. Hall that the family was being evicted from the Resort and instructed Ms. Hall to pack her belongings. Ms. Jones’ cousin, Denise Strickland, came to the pool and informed her that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Jones entered the lobby where she was approached by a member of management, who introduced herself as the general manager and informed her that the family was being evicted. Ms. Jones requested a reason, but was informed by a police officer that the owners did not have to give a reason. In the lobby, Ms. Jones observed that an African- American male was stopped by police and asked whether he was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion. He was not a family member. Ms. Jones observed that no Caucasian guests were approached in the lobby by management or the police. Ms. Austin was on a trolley to lunch off-property on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from her cousin, Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland informed Ms. Austin that the family was being evicted from the Resort and she needed to return to pack her things. Ms. Austin returned to the property, where she was escorted to her room by a security guard and asked to pack her belongings. Ms. McNeal was en route to rent a car and buy groceries on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from Ms. Strickland informing her that the family was being evicted and that she needed to return to the Resort to pack her belongings. Upon her arrival at the Resort, Ms. McNeal entered the lobby. There, she was approached by Resort staff, asked whether she was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion, and informed that the Resort could not honor the reservations and the family was being evicted. Ms. McNeal observed that Caucasian guests entering the lobby were not approached by either the police or Resort management. Ms. McNeal was escorted to her room by both a police officer and a member of management and instructed to be out of the room within 30 minutes. Ms. McNeal inquired why they were being evicted, but was told by a police officer that the Resort was not required to give a reason. Erika Bell received a call from her mother, Ms. Austin, while en route to the Resort on June 22, 2011. Ms. Austin informed Ms. Bell that the family was being evicted from the Resort and asked her to call the Resort and cancel her reservation. Respondent gave no reason for evicting Petitioners from the property. Respondent refunded Petitioners’ money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: Finding that Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., committed an act of public accommodation discrimination in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011), against Petitioners Jessica Austin, Denise Austin, Tracie Austin, James Austin, Bonlydia Jones, Esther Hall, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, Summer McNeal, and Dionne Harrington; and Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work. The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was $198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552. Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015. Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges. Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include: Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract. Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost (above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately $2,000). Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel. Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway. Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately $1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation. General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away. Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.) Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a man. Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/ Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/ Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf. Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs. Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons. Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way. Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of $170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract. In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following: Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost. Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore, Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.) Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner $2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased. Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material. Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality. Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost. Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost. General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found. Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.) Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower. Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race, national origin, or disability at Respondent’s place of public accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a McDonald’s franchisee operating six McDonald’s restaurants in the Orlando area. At issue in this case is the restaurant referred to as the “Lockhart” store. The Lockhart McDonald’s is located on Orange Blossom Trail in Orlando, in a high-crime, low-income area. This McDonald’s has a history of problems with persons using the restaurant for purposes other than purchasing food and drink there to consume onsite. There has been a wide range of “other purposes” in the Lockhart McDonald’s history: sitting at the dining tables without ordering any food or drink; panhandling (asking customers if they have a spare dollar); bringing in drinks purchased elsewhere, topped off with refills stolen from the McDonald’s drink station; soliciting restaurant customers for prostitution; and using the bathrooms to ingest or inject illegal drugs, leaving behind used hypodermic needles and other paraphernalia. On two separate occasions, people overdosed on heroin in the bathrooms. To combat these problems, which hurt business, Mr. Vidler enlisted the help of his brother, an Orange County Deputy Sheriff, who conducted drug and prostitution stings to help clean up the restaurant. In addition, the Lockhart McDonald’s adopted a no-loitering policy, a no-solicitation policy, and a policy requiring that only food and drink purchased there may be consumed there. Notices of these policies are prominently displayed on signs at the restaurant. Respondent’s witnesses testified, credibly and consistently, that these policies are enforced uniformly and strictly, with the goal being to avoid the problems they have had with persons improperly using the restaurant’s facilities. As part of the enforcement procedure, if someone is observed seated at a table without any apparent McDonald’s food or drink items, after a few minutes a manager or other staff member will approach that person and politely inquire whether the person intends to make a purchase. Petitioner is a black woman who has been a customer at the Lockhart McDonald’s. She and her boyfriend, who is not black,2/ have gone there on occasion, made purchases, and enjoyed their meals, without incident. On the day in question, December 28, 2015, Petitioner and her boyfriend went to the Lockhart McDonald’s for breakfast. The restaurant was not very busy or crowded when they arrived, with perhaps one other customer in line and another customer seated at a table in the separate dining area. Petitioner went to the dining area, while her boyfriend went to the counter to place their order. The restaurant is fairly large, with physical and visual separation of the area where customers wait in line to place orders, pick up food, and get drinks at the drink station from the area where customers can go to sit at tables to consume their purchases. Behind the ordering counter on the employee side, there is a door used by employees to enter the dining area. Through a small window at the top of the door, a customer waiting in line at the counter might be able to glimpse a small portion of the dining area, but otherwise would not be able to see or hear what is going on in the dining area. Petitioner took a seat at a table by an outside window. She propped both of her feet up on the Corian window ledge and sat there gazing out the window. Eric Vidler, the operations manager of Respondent’s six restaurants, was in the Lockhart McDonald’s that morning. After Petitioner had taken her place by the window, Mr. Vidler and the Lockhart restaurant manager, Adam Allegroe, entered the dining area together to conduct a cleanliness walk-through. They saw Petitioner, taking note of her unusual positioning, with feet propped up on the windowsill,3/ staring out the window. They also noted that there was no sign of any McDonald’s food or drink purchases on the table or in her hands. After a few minutes, consistent with the restaurant’s policies and procedures, Mr. Vidler approached Petitioner and politely inquired whether she intended to make a purchase. She did not answer him.4/ Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe testified that usually, when they make such an inquiry, the person will respond, but sometimes they do not respond. Since their goal is not to make a scene, offend, or embarrass anyone, under these circumstances they will usually walk away for a short period of time. If the person had no legitimate business there, then the person often will disappear at that point. Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe retreated to the men’s and women’s bathrooms, where they spent three to five minutes conducting their cleanliness inspection. When Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe returned to the dining area, Petitioner was still seated, positioned the same way, with her feet still propped up on the windowsill. She was still staring out the window, and still had no McDonald’s purchases on the table or in her hands. Mr. Vidler went back up to Petitioner, and following up on his prior statement to her, this time he told her, “Ma’am, if you are not going to be making a purchase today, then you are loitering and I need to ask you to leave.” Mr. Vidler testified credibly that this is how he always handles the second approach when the person does not answer his first inquiry. The message, though direct, was delivered in a calm tone. Mr. Vidler did not yell at Petitioner. He did not threaten to call the police or have her arrested. This time, Petitioner responded. She got up, flung a chair in Mr. Vidler’s direction with sufficient force so that the chair traveled some distance with all four chair legs four to six inches off the ground, until it fell against and partially on a half-wall that set off that portion of the dining area.5/ Petitioner also responded verbally, using an elevated voice to express her anger. Mr. Vidler said that she cursed, using a four-letter word. Although more than one year later he did not recall exactly which curse word or words she uttered, he did recall that her words were not nice. Mr. Allegroe corroborated Mr. Vidler’s recollection, testifying that Petitioner stood up, “slung” the chair in their direction, and “started speaking profanity.” (Tr. 83). She then left the restaurant. The testimony of Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe describing their two encounters with Petitioner was corroborated by Shahanna Owensby, a guest services department manager for the Lockhart McDonald’s. Ms. Owensby was seated at a table in the dining area, working on pricing and tagging merchandise, when she noticed Petitioner. She observed Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe conducting their cleanliness walk-through. She observed Mr. Vidler’s initial approach to Petitioner. She heard Mr. Vidler ask Petitioner if she was going to be making a purchase, and confirmed that Petitioner did not respond. She saw Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe keep walking after that, back in the direction of the bathrooms. She observed Mr. Vidler approach Petitioner a second time, estimated at four to eight minutes later. She heard him tell Petitioner that if she was not making a purchase, he needed to ask her to leave. She saw Petitioner stand up, pick up a chair, and fling, throw, or toss it: “It was up in the air and it was off the ground, by her hand.” (Tr. 98). By the time of Petitioner’s stormy exit from the restaurant, a family--a woman with some younger children--had entered the dining area and was seated near Ms. Owensby. After Petitioner left, Ms. Owensby apologized to the family, who had witnessed the scene and had been exposed to the profanity used by Petitioner within their hearing range. After Petitioner left the restaurant, her boyfriend walked into the dining area with the food he had purchased. The boyfriend described what happened next: Jennifer, my wife, was not sitting at the table. I thought she was at the--in the bathroom. I put my tray on the opposite side of the table. I was sitting to the left, I guess, or the right. I was sitting on the other side. And that’s when I saw Mr. Vidler with a surprised face, you know, like wow-- Q. [Mr. Millan]. Uh-huh. A. --what happened here. So he approached me and he said that he didn’t know--that he didn’t know. And I asked him that he didn’t know what. He said that he didn’t know that she was my wife, that she was there with me. (Tr. 108). At that point, Petitioner (whom Robert Millan clarified is his girlfriend, not his wife) knocked on the restaurant window, signaling for him to come outside. He went out to her and asked what happened. She told him that that person [Mr. Vidler] offended her. When asked how he offended her, Robert Milan said that Petitioner responded as follows: She said he told her that what was she doing there, if she was going to buy food or if she was just going to sit there. And those were the same words that he told me that he told her.[6/] And then when I came back inside the store, I went and I asked him, you know, to explain to me what was going on. And he said that. You know, that--he said that he didn’t know that she was there with me. And he apologized to me. He asked me if he -- if he could go apologize to my wife, Jennifer. And I really told him that I think that was beyond apology because she was like, you know, angry. So he said, well here, I give you my card and you can call the office and see what, you know, we can do about it. (Tr. 109-110). For some unexplained reason (perhaps a mistake filling the order or perhaps a request for customized food), Petitioner’s boyfriend waited ten minutes at the ordering counter, where he was not able to see or hear the encounters in the separate dining area. He was not even aware that Petitioner had stormed out in anger, although he confirmed that she was, indeed, angry when he went outside. Robert Millan did call Respondent’s office, as suggested by Mr. Vidler, and spoke with the owner of the franchise. The owner also offered to apologize to Petitioner, but Robert Millan did not think she wanted to speak to anyone. The owner then offered a $50 gift card. The boyfriend said that he would ask Petitioner, but she refused the gesture. No evidence was presented of any racial statements made directly or indirectly to Petitioner, or of any racial overtones to any of the statements made directly or indirectly to Petitioner. The circumstantial evidence presented does not support an inference that Respondent intentionally discriminated against Petitioner based on her race. Instead, all of the circumstantial evidence supports an inference that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her race. Respondent has a no-discrimination, no-harassment policy that is enforced as to its employees, customers and potential customers. The Lockhart McDonald’s has a very diverse staff. A comparison of the number of restaurant employees who are members of the classes of white, black, or Hispanic, the largest category represented by the restaurant’s employees is black; the next- largest category is Hispanic; white employees are in the minority. As to gender, female employees outnumber male employees. Manager positions are spread among white and black males, and white, black, and Hispanic females. The operations manager in charge of Respondent’s six restaurants, Mr. Vidler, is a white male as is the restaurant’s manager, Mr. Allegroe. The other employee testifying at hearing, Ms. Owensby, is the restaurant’s guest services manager and she is a black female. The diversity of the restaurant’s staff is circumstantial evidence, though not particularly weighty evidence, suggesting a general absence of intent to discriminate on the basis of race.7/ More compelling circumstantial evidence was provided by Mr. Vidler, who is the individual accused of discriminating against Petitioner because she is black. Mr. Vidler testified with great sincerity that Petitioner’s accusation is not only unfounded, but it hits a particular sore spot with him. Although he is a white male, his daughter is half-black. He has experienced the pain of discrimination based on race, with unkind questions, or worse, directed to him or to his daughter, because their races do not match. This personal fact shared by Mr. Vidler is compelling circumstantial evidence giving rise to a inference that he would not intentionally discriminate against Petitioner based on her race. The evidence strongly supports a finding, and it is so found, that Mr. Vidler’s December 28, 2015, encounters with Petitioner were the reasonable implementation of Respondent’s reasonable policies for its Lockhart restaurant to ensure that persons using the restaurant’s facilities are there for the purpose of purchasing and consuming food and drink. The credible, consistent testimony of Mr. Vidler and Respondent’s other employees who testified is that the no-loitering policy is applied uniformly to all persons, regardless of race, nationality, gender, disability, or any other classification, who are not apparently customers in that they have no McDonald’s food or drink purchases. These persons are asked whether they intend to make a purchase, and if they do not respond in some fashion that they are indeed there to purchase food and/or drink, they are told that if they are not there to make a purchase, they are loitering and will have to be asked to leave.8/ Petitioner has only herself to blame for not making clear to Mr. Vidler that she was there with her boyfriend, who was in line at the counter ordering their breakfast. That would have ended the matter. That Mr. Vidler only took the action he did because he did not know Petitioner was there with her boyfriend was perhaps most convincingly established by Robert Millan’s testimony describing the utter surprise on Mr. Vidler’s face when he realized that Petitioner had, in fact, been waiting for someone who had been purchasing food. The undersigned finds as a matter of ultimate fact that Respondent did not intentionally discriminate against Petitioner based on her race (the only protected class proven at hearing) or any other classification that might have applied to Petitioner but was not proven at hearing.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner Jennifer M. Foster-Garvey. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was entitled to involuntarily terminate Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Since 1986, Respondent has been employed by the Palm Beach County School Board (School Board) as an elementary school teacher. At all times material to this case, Horn was certified to teach grades 1-6. By Petition for Involuntary Resignation dated March 7, 2003, Petitioner sought the involuntary resignation of Respondent to be effective March 13, 2003. Beginning in February 1994, and continuing through November 2001, Horn was under the care, off and on, of psychiatrist Dr. Janet Scholle (Scholle). Horn was referred to Scholle by a therapist who had, for years, treated Horn for depression. Within a year of commencing to treat Horn, Scholle diagnosed her with bipolar disorder. Bipolar disorder is not inherently disabling. It can, however, cause substantial "mood swings" of the type which Horn frequently demonstrated in the workplace at times material to this case. Individuals who are able to "manage their moods" can function in any job for which they are otherwise qualified. Under Scholle's care, Horn was treated with a variety of psychotropic drugs in an effort to stabalize her moods and control her behavior. Scholle's treatment of Horn was unsuccessful, at least with reference to Horn's ability to function as a teacher. On March 1, 1999, Horn requested "accommodations" from Dr. Richard Hughes, her principal at Highlands Elementary School (Highlands), where she was then employed. She was referred to a personnel officer who provided her with Petitioner's "School Policy 3.06" Concerning Persons with a Disability and Procedures for Accommodation (Policy 3.06). The policy tracks the language of the ADA, and requires that the School District provide "reasonable accommodation to a qualified individual when necessary to enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the position unless such would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the District's business." Thereafter, Petitioner's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) coordinators became involved in Horn's case. Deneen Wellings held the EEO position when Horn's case first came to her office's attention. Wellings was succeeded in that position in July 2001 by Learna Ramsey. Wellings and Ramsey attempted to deal with Horn on the basis that Horn's inability to function at work might be ameliorated with "accommodations" within the meaning of Policy 3.06. In March, 1999, Scholle recommended that Horn take a leave of absence from Highlands. Horn requested and received a leave through June 1999. Later, Horn requested that the leave be extended through the conclusion of the following (2000-2001) school year. Petitioner granted leave beginning at the start of the 2000-2001 school year, but advised that leave would not be extended beyond December 2000. In so doing, Petitioner relied upon Horn's union contract which provided that if a teacher is on a leave of absence for a full school year, she must work for a full school year before being again eligible for a leave of absence. Petitioner has not challenged the legality of this contractual provision under the circumstances of this case, neither did she claim that the contract was enforced in a discriminatory manner when compared with other similarly situated teachers. Thus, in January 2001, Horn was faced with a choice of making herself available for work or leaving Respondent's employ. She chose to return to work. Petitioner was contractually bound to hold Horn's last position at Highlands open and available for her to return. Petitioner fulfilled this obligation. Horn, however, was unwilling to return to Highlands. The evidence established that there were no other teaching positions available. Petitioner elected to offer Horn a job in its personnel office "pending the location of an appropriate assignment for her." Horn did not behave appropriately in the personnel office. On January 22, 2001, Petitioner assigned Horn home with full pay and benefits pending a so-called "fitness for duty evaluation." By letter dated Febraruary 28, 2001, Jane Bonk, a mental health professional employed by Petitioner, summarized to Wellings a conversation Bonk had with Scholle in which Scholle made recommendations for accommodations. Horn exercised very little restraint in talking about her diagnosis with co-workers, yet she insisted upon extraordinary measures to protect her privacy with respect to communicating to Petitioner information needed by his professional staff and which Petitioner was entitled to have from an employee seeking accommodations pursuant to Policy 3.06. Hence, this roundabout method of communication was employed following negotiations between Petitioner and Respondent. Bonk's letter stated in pertinent part: “Dr. Scholle stated that Ms. Horn’s attention deficit disorder can cause her to be disorganized. She said that Ms. Horn would be more effective if she had familiar patterns and concrete plans to follow. Structure helps her be less anxious. Quick rapid changes are not helpful and lack of familiarity will create anxiety. She also said she will feel better if she feels listened to. This will help her to not react to the encounter, which will make her look less pathological.” “Dr. Scholle recommended that Ms. Horn return to teaching on a part time basis since she has been out of work for some time. She feels Ms. Horn would make the transition easier with less stress this way. This would provide Dr. Scholle with an opportunity to assess how she is dealing with the change and make adjustments with her medication if needed.” “Dr. Scholle also stated Ms. Horn might fall apart if she had someone sit in her classroom to do an evaluation. She was not sure she would get a fair evaluation and recommended that an aid (sic) keep an eye on her.” Bonk's letter accurately summarized some of Scholle's recommendations with one exception. Scholle did not use the term "fall apart." Scholle made additional recommendations which were not reflected in Bonk's letter. Scholle felt it necessary for school officials to provide Scholle with daily feedback regarding Horn's on the job behavior so that Scholle could advise Horn's colleagues how to accommodate Horn and advise Horn on how to manage situations. Scholle charges $600 an hour for her services. Other recommendations include providing Horn "an environment which [Horn] felt was somewhat supportive . . . so that she didn't feel like she was going back to be scrutinized or criticized . . ."; ". . . to try and keep her in one classroom teaching maybe one subject or one class so that there wouldn't be so much need for organization . . ."; "to do part- time just because you can gradually increase the amount of stress that they're exposed to. " Scholle further recommended that Horn not be subjected to the same type of disciplinary and evaluation processes which apply to all teachers under Florida law. According to Scholle, even if all of the foregoing recommendations were implemented, Horn could return successfully to full-time teaching only if "everything in her life [had] gone well and there's no other external factors or health issues. " Horn remained home on paid leave through April 2001, when she was assigned to Starlight Cove Elementary (Starlight Cove). Prior to her start day at Starlight Cove, Wellings and Horn met with the school's principal. There was undisputed testimony that on this occasion, Horn used profanity and spoke to the principal in a condescending manner. She also met with teachers at Starlight, at which time she behaved appropriately. Horn was to begin work on April 30 but did not report to Starlight Cove until May 2. By May 4, Horn was the subject of so many complaints that the principal felt the need to remove her. Petitioner placed Horn on unpaid leave through the end of the school year. A meeting was held on July 24, 2001, between Petitioner's representatives and Horn and her counsel. It was agreed that Horn would cooperate with a fitness for duty evaluation to be conducted by psychiatrist Mark Agresti (Agresti). The meeting was held July 24, 2001. Agresti conducted a fitness evaluation in early August 2001. The details of Agresti's evaluation are not in the record, but on August 6, 2001, Agresti rendered an opinion that Horn was fit for duty without any restrictions. Petitioner directed Horn to report to Coral Reef Elementary (Coral Reef) on August 15, 2001. From the start, Horn's behavior at Coral Reef was egregiously inappropriate for an elementary school teacher, or a school staff member of any kind. More specifically, Horn was raising her voice to children and colleagues; discussing highly personal matters with staff; criticizing colleagues; and not following her assigned schedule. The evidence established that the principal would have been justified in removing Horn immediately. Instead, the principal called Horn into numerous conferences to document her infractions, long after it was clear that Horn had no ability to comprehend her situation and to conform her behavior to the requirements of her job. On August 28, 2001, the principal issued a memo to Horn and the teachers working with her requiring that Horn take on the task of instructing students in math and science. Based upon the numerous instances of bizarre behavior exhibited by Horn, it was unreasonable to think she could have performed teaching duties. On August 30, 2001, Horn was again assigned to her residence with pay. The assignment was made in the form of a hand-delivered letter from Petitioner's Chief Personnel Officer. It stated that the ". . . assignment [to her residence with pay] is pending the outcome of an investigation. . . . [F]or the duration of this investigation, you are not to speak to and/or attempt to contact any witnesses or other parties involved in this investigation, to discuss any matters material or in any way related to the allegations/investigation. Any attempt to do so will result in disciplinary action being taken against you." The record does not reflect what was being investigated or why Horn was placed under a broad and non- specific gag order, the violation of which would result in disciplinary action. The tone and content of the letter assigning Horn home render implausible Petitioner's contention that this leave was, as Petitioner contends, an accommodation. For at least this moment in the increasingly tense relationship between Petitioner and Respondent, Petitioner appeared to be considering options other than accommodation. A second fitness for duty evaluation was conducted by psychiatrist Harley Stock (Stock). Stock rendered a detailed and persuasive report dated February 22, 2002, in which he opines that Horn was permanently unfit for duty. Stock's report is hearsay, but substantial portions of the report corroborate other persuasive evidence, including commendably candid testimony provided by Horn regarding her instability, as well as her propensity to engage in inappropriate workplace behavior, and to make ill-advised statements. For example, Horn invited scrutiny and workplace gossip regarding her bipolar diagnosis by disclosing it to colleagues who had no reason to be told and no desire to hear details of her personal life and medical issues. In this and numerous other ways, Horn failed to respect boundaries in the workplace. In so doing, she may have subjected herself to closer scrutiny than was applied to colleagues who did not constantly call attention to their personal problems, but there was no evidence that Horn was treated differently than supervisors would treat any employee who conducted herself at work as Horn did. Scholle attempted to rebut portions of Stock's evaluation in a written response dated July 16, 2002. In the response, and in her testimony at final hearing, Scholle did not challenge any significant factual finding made by Stock. Neither did Scholle nor Horn challenge any significant factual representation made by Horn to Stock in the course of his interviews of Horn. Scholle did not even unambiguously disagree with Strock's ultimate finding that Horn was unfit for duty at times material to this case. Instead, she opined in substance that Horn could perform her job if everything else in her life went well and if Petitioner relieved her of workplace stress. Horn opined that she was a "very, very vital and very successful" teacher until her bipolar diagnosis caused her to be ". . . treated very differently and much more harshly; nothing was ever the same for her. She was placed under more stringent rules and regulations. " To the contrary, clear and convincing evidence, much of it provided by Horn herself, established that at all times material to this case, Horn's behavior created untenable situations and worked a severe hardship upon students and colleagues forced to deal with her. Horn contends that she was not "accommodated" because Petitioner inappropriately "micromanaged" her and indeed, the evidence established that with respect to at least one of Horn's supervisors, no transgression by Horn was too petty to document. It does not follow, however, that Scholle's recommendations could be implemented so as to "accommodate" Horn without undue hardship to the school district. Instead, the record as a whole establishes that no work situation could be structured by Petitioner which would allow Horn to function in a job that would be recognizable as a teacher of elementary school students. Horn testified that in her present employment at Aldelphia Cable (Aldelphia), she is successful and is being promoted. She contends this is so because she ". . . is given constructive criticism at Adelphia when they have any type of concerns and is given a lot of support, and she's succeeding and flourishing in that job." No evidence was offered to corroborate Horn's perception of her job performance at Adelphia. But, assuming she is precisely accurate in her perception, Horn makes no factual argument and offers no legal theory regarding the relevance of her success at Aldelphia to the question of whether Petitioner could provide accommodations recommended by Scholle without undue hardship. There was no evidence that Horn's supervisors at Adelphia are even aware of her bipolar disorder, or of Scholle's recommendations, nor is there evidence that they followed those recommendations. Even if there were such evidence, it would not shed light on whether Petitioner acted unlawfully in terminating Horn. There is no evidence concerning what Horn does at Adelphia, but Adelphia is in the business of providing cable TV, not elementary education. There was no evidence that the workplaces, job descriptions and expectations, and evaluation processes employed at Adelphia and at the school district are in any way similar. An elementary school teacher's job cannot be crafted so as to eliminate stress. Neither can a teacher be exempt from the rules of conduct and the evaluation process which applies by law to all teachers. At the most basic level, Horn cannot be "accommodated without undue hardship" because Horn and her psychiatrist insist that Horn requires part-time work to "ease her transition" back to teaching. But Petitioner does not offer part time elementary school teaching positions, with or without the numerous unrealistic accommodations envisioned by Scholle. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence its part time teaching positions are limited at the elementary level to the areas of speech and language pathology, art, music and physical education where positions are shared between schools. There was no evidence that Petitioner offers part-time employment for elementary school academic teachers. The very nature of the position requires that the teacher provide a consistent presence to her class throughout the school year, and that she be able to manage the myriad stresses inherent in dealing with elementary school aged children. Scholle's description of Horn's attention deficit disorder, standing alone, is sufficient to support a finding that nothing within the Petitioner's power to provide would enable Horn to perform the duties of an elementary school teacher. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Petitioner's determination that Horn could not be accommodated without undue hardship was reasonable, and her involuntary termination was lawful.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Marie Nelson, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Matthew Haynes, Esquire Chamblee, Johnson & Haynes, P.A. The Barrister's Building, Suite 500 1615 Forum Place West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Dr. Arthur C. Johnson, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Honorable Jim Horne Commissioner of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 315 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in Petitioner’s Public Accommodations Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on September 6, 2007, and if so, what relief should be provided.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American woman living in the Jacksonville area. She is married to Wayne Benedict and is the mother of Bryan Benedict. On July 23, 2007, Petitioner went to Wal-Mart to do the family’s grocery shopping. Her son, Bryan, and his friend, Adarious Pickens, also African-American, were with her. When she arrived at Wal-Mart, she proceeded to the deli counter, where she usually begins her shopping trip. On the day in question, the numbering system in the deli was broken. When operating, the numbering system dispenses tickets with numbers on them which determine which customers arrived first and who receives service first. At the time Petitioner approached the deli counter, three Caucasian customers were present and waiting for service. After the three Caucasian customers were served, another Caucasian customer approached the deli counter and was waited upon. Because Petitioner believed that the last Caucasian customer had been served out of turn, Petitioner left the deli area to find a manager. After learning that the manager had gone for the day, she was directed to a person who was “team lead.” She complained to the team lead who apologized to Petitioner. After speaking to the team lead, Petitioner then returned to the deli department and asked one of the deli associates, Jeanne Thornton, to identify the other deli associate. Ms. Thornton identified the other associate as “Trish.” Petitioner again left the deli area. At the time of this incident, Ms. Thornton and Trish were the only two Wal-Mart associates were working at the deli counter. Petitioner acknowledges that the deli appeared to be short-staffed, as she typically sees three or four associates working behind the deli counter. Several minutes later, Petitioner returned to the deli counter and requested service. Prior to this time, Petitioner waited for service, which was not forthcoming, but did not verbally request service. Ms. Thornton then waited on Petitioner, who left the deli area after she was given the food items she requested. Ms. Thornton noticed that Petitioner was angry and upset. The deli counter in question is at least 30 feet long. The deli contains both a cold food section and a hot food section. In addition, there is a lower shelf where items are for sale, which do not require the assistance of deli associates. On any given day, associates are assigned to work in either the hot or cold food sections. At the time Petitioner approached the deli counter, Trish was assigned to the deli’s hot food section, and Ms. Thornton was in the midst of filling a large cold food order. When a deli associate is assigned to cook food in the deli department’s hot food section, it is that person’s responsibility to perform duties related to the hot food. According to Ms. Thornton, “when the food comes up, it has to be temped, logged, and put in the hot bar.” These duties of an associate assigned to the hot food section of the deli take priority over helping customers. If the hot food is not properly temped, logged, and put in the hot bar, the hot food must be thrown away. On those occasions when the numbering system is not working, the deli associates rely on customers to tell them who should be waited on next. This is, in part, because the associates often turn their backs to the customers at the deli counter while they are cutting meat, etc. Food items sold from the deli counter are not intended for on-site consumption. Petitioner did not intend to consume the items purchased from the deli on the premises of Wal-Mart. No employee of Respondent made any racially derogatory or racially related comments to Petitioner. Other than Petitioner’s firm belief that she was overlooked in favor of Caucasian customers, no evidence was presented that the actions of Respondent’s associates were racially motivated.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that dismisses Petitioner's claim of public accommodation discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Barbara J. Staros Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent denied Petitioner access to a public accommodation on the basis of her disability in violation of Pinellas County Code Chapter 70 (the Code).
Findings Of Fact The Department investigated the complaint of Petitioner and issued a determination on April 2, 2009, that reasonable cause exists to believe that Respondent denied Petitioner access to a public accommodation on the basis of her disability. Respondent requested a hearing, and the Department referred the matter to DOAH. Several facts are undisputed. Petitioner is a disabled female confined to a wheel chair. Mr. Chris Maganias is the owner and operator of the respondent company. The principal business of the company is the operation of a skating rink in Pinellas Park, Florida. Petitioner did not present a prima facie case of denial of access to a public accommodation. After the representative for Petitioner was placed under oath, the representative stated the issue that she was there to resolve, but testified to no substantive matters or other evidence. Her testimony lasted less than three minutes. There was no cross-examination. Petitioner did not testify. After excusing Petitioner's representative from her oath, the ALJ asked Petitioner if she wished to testify, and Petitioner stated that she did not want to testify. Petitioner's lone exhibit is a two-page affidavit that lists the allegations which make up the complaint against Respondent. However, the affidavit does not explain or supplement competent and substantial testimony, or other evidence, of the representative or Petitioner at the hearing. This is a de novo hearing and not an appellate review of a determination previously made by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DOAH enter a final order no later than February 3, 2010, pursuant to Section 70-77(g)(13) of the Code, finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations in the complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Leon W. Russell, Director/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Melissa Cook c/o Eleanor Cook Johnson 15047 Georgey Boulevard Clearwater, Florida 33760 Peter Genova, Jr., EEO Coordinator Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Chris Maganias Astro Skate Pinellas Park, LLC 10001 66th Street North Pinellas Park, Florida 33782
The Issue Whether Respondent, a place of public accommodation, violated Chapter 760 and Section 413.08, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to accommodate Petitioner, an individual with a disability.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Ricky Krell, is physically disabled and entitled to the protection of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent is the owner of Dustin's Barbeque, which is a structure for public accommodation. On June 5, 2007, Petitioner, accompanied by his wife and his service dog, Zsa-Zsa, visited Respondent restaurant for the purpose of eating therein. Petitioner and his wife were seated and ordered their meal without incident. Zsa-Zsa was on a leash which was several feet in length, long enough to allow the dog to "sniff" other customers and food. Zsa-Zsa began "sniffing" contiguous customers and their food. The lease was stretched across the aisle between tables. On one occasion, a waitress almost tripped over the leash. Respondent's employees, who were familiar with service dogs having been in the restaurant, opined that the dog did not conduct itself as a trained service dog. As a result of the dog's activities and concern for the health and safety of other customers and employees, Respondent's on-site manager requested that Petitioner control the dog. Petitioner was unwilling or unable to control the dog, and the dog's inappropriate conduct continued. As a result, the manager asked Petitioner to take the dog outside. Petitioner would have been able to complete his meal if he had been able to control the dog or he had opted to take the dog outside and return to his meal without the dog. Petitioner refused the request to take the dog outside and became loud and used profanity. Petitioner finished his meal. The request that Petitioner remove the dog from the restaurant was reasonable under the existing circumstance and did not reflect a discriminatory act against Petitioner. The City of Melbourne police were called and when the officer arrived, she issued a trespass warning to Petitioner and his wife.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Katherine Hurst Miller, Esquire Kelly V. Parsons, Esquire Cobb Cole 150 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2491 Ricky Krell 1889 Cedarwood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32935
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his race, sex or religion.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates the Valu-Lodge Motel located at 4810 West Highway 98, Panama City Beach, Florida. The motel offers rooms for rent to the public and is a "transient public lodging establishment" within the meaning of Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white male. His national origin is American. Although Petitioner’s complaint and petition indicate that Petitioner espouses to be a member of the Church of Christ, there was no evidence presented at the hearing regarding Petitioner’s religion. On September 9, 2004, Petitioner rented a motel room from Respondent at its Panama City Beach motel. The rental term was week to week. At some point, Respondent felt Petitioner had become disruptive to the operation of the hotel and to its guests. On November 25, 2005, Respondent informed Petitioner that it would no longer rent a room to Petitioner and hand-delivered a Notice of Termination of Lease to Petitioner. The Notice stated that Petitioner must vacate the premises by December 1, 2005. Petitioner refused to vacate the motel premises. On December 9, 2005, Respondent hand-delivered a Fifteen Day Notice for Possession of Premises to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that no further rent would be accepted. Petitioner again refused to vacate the premises. Petitioner also did not pay any further rent to Respondent. Respondent filed an eviction proceeding against Petitioner. The first and second eviction proceedings appear to have been dismissed for procedural reasons. However, the third eviction proceeding was successful. During that proceeding, Petitioner had the opportunity to defend against eviction based on the claims of discrimination raised in this matter. However, on June 22, 2007, after hearing, Respondent received a final judgment, awarding the Intown Companies, Inc., $19,213.18 in unpaid rent, plus interest. Respondent also received a Final Judgment of Eviction awarding the Company possession of the premises and court costs. A Writ of Possession was issued on June 25, 2007, and Petitioner vacated the premises on June 27, 2008. There was no evidence presented by Petitioner that demonstrated Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in any manner. There was absolutely no evidence of any racial, nationalistic or religious bias on the part of Respondent. Apparently, Petitioner believes that he is entitled to rent a room from Respondent simply because he is a member of the public and desires to rent a room from Respondent. Neither the facts, nor the law supports Petitioner’s misinformed view of the view of the law. Given the utter lack of evidence presented by Petitioner, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Alan Johnson 20417 Panama City Beach Parkway No. 8 Panama City Beach, Florida 32413 Melton Harrell, Authorized Agent The Intown Companies, Inc. d/b/a Valu Lodge American Motel Management, Inc. 2200 Northlake Parkway S-277 Tucker, Georgia 30084-4023
