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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs MICHAEL M. GILBERT, 93-005972 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 21, 1993 Number: 93-005972 Latest Update: Sep. 29, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine based upon the alleged violation of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed physician in Florida having been issued license number ME 0004260. It is clear that Respondent was licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida sometime prior to 1973. There are some indications in the record that Respondent has been licensed since approximately 1949. However, no conclusive evidence was presented on this point. There is no evidence of any prior disciplinary action against Respondent's medical license except for the charges in DOAH Case No. 93-2858 which was heard immediately after the hearing in this case. A Recommended Order in that case has been issued this same date. Although no conclusive evidence was presented in this case, the record in Case No. 93-2858 established that Respondent is certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and that he also holds a Ph.D. in psychology and is a licensed psychologist. During 1989 and 1990, Respondent encountered a number of personal problems, including the loss of two brothers, the diagnosis of a sister with cancer, involvement in a number of bad business deals and significant tax problems with the IRS. From late 1989 until approximately February, 1990, Respondent treated a patient named Dale Bowlin for migraine headaches. During this period, Respondent saw Mr. Bowlin approximately thirty times in a professional capacity. Respondent knew that Dale Bowlin was an Assistant Director of the Metro-Dade Police Department. On or about August 23, 1990, Respondent called Dale Bowlin and asked Mr. Bowlin to come to his office to discuss an urgent matter. Pursuant to Respondent's request, Mr. Bowlin met with Respondent on or about August 24, 1990 at Respondent's office located at N.W. 31st Avenue and 7th Street, Miami, Florida. During that meeting, Respondent asked Mr. Bowlin to find someone to "plant" illegal narcotics on a local attorney, later identified as Arthur Spiegel, in order to have him arrested. Respondent indicated that Mr. Spiegel was married to the daughter of a social acquaintance of Respondent and stated that he had provided marriage counseling to Mr. Spiegel and his former wife. Respondent expressed a great deal of concern that Mr. Spiegel's alleged ability to manipulate the legal system during a difficult custody battle that occurred when the Spiegels dissolved their marriage. Respondent felt that Mr. Spiegel had been abusive during the marriage and was not a very good father. The evidence presented in this case established that Respondent was obsessed with finding some way to correct what he perceived to be the deferential or favored treatment that Mr. Spiegel received in the custody dispute. Respondent even hinted that Mr. Spiegel should be severely injured or killed. However, the evidence did not establish that Respondent ever seriously pursued those goals. Instead, he focused on having Mr. Spiegel "set up" and arrested. After returning to his office, Mr. Bowlin discussed Respondent's expressed desires with other members of the police department. A plan was devised to send another police officer, Kennedy Rosario, to meet with Respondent and pretend to cooperate with Respondent's requests. All of the subsequent meetings between Respondent and Detective Kennedy Rosario were recorded on audio tape and/or videotapes. Tapes of those meetings have been accepted into evidence. On or about August 27, 1990, Detective Kennedy Rosario of the Metro- Dade Police Department went to Respondent's office. During that meeting, Respondent offered Detective Rosario five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) to falsely arrest Mr. Spiegel for possession of drugs, specifically cocaine. Respondent wrote Mr. Spiegel's name and address on a page of Respondent's prescription pad and gave it to Detective Rosario. Respondent met for a second time with Detective Rosario at approximately 6:30 p.m. on August 27, 1990, at which time Respondent gave Detective Rosario additional information on Arthur Spiegel. Respondent's last meeting with Detective Rosario took place at approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 1990, at which time Respondent told Detective Rosario that the drugs should be found on Mr. Spiegel and Mr. Spiegel should be arrested while Mr. Spiegel had his child with him. During that final meeting, Respondent gave Detective Rosario two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) as partial payment for setting up Mr. Spiegel to be arrested for possession of cocaine. At the conclusion of the August 28, 1990 meeting, Respondent was arrested and subsequently charged in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County with two felony counts of bribery of a public official: one count was for allegedly offering money to Dale Bowlin to falsely arrest Arthur Spiegel, the second count was for allegedly offering money to Kennedy Rosario to falsely arrest Arthur Spiegel. Respondent's arrest and the subsequent criminal proceedings received a great deal of media coverage and notoriety. A jury trial was conducted on the criminal charges following which Respondent was acquitted of the first bribery count involving Dale Bowlin, and found guilty of the second bribery count involving Detective Rosario. The jury did not find that Respondent was insane at the time of the alleged offense. The conviction on the second count was subsequently reversed by an appellate court because the trial judge had incorrectly failed to dismiss a juror for cause. The Dade County State Attorney's Office sought to retry Respondent on the second bribery count. Respondent claimed that any such retrial was precluded because, among other things, it would constitute double jeopardy. Ultimately, the prosecutor's office and Respondent's counsel agreed to a plea bargain pursuant to which the felony bribery count was nolle prossed and Respondent agreed to pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of solicitation which was set forth in an Amended Information. Respondent claims that he only agreed to the plea bargain because the felony charges were dropped and he did not want to subject himself or his family to another trial. In respect to Respondent's motivation for entering the plea, the evidence presented in this case, including the audio and video tapes, conclusively established the facts set forth herein. Respondent formally entered the plea on or about February 23, 1993 in Case No. 90-34903-05 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County. Specifically, Respondent pled nolo contendere to one count of violating Section 777.04(4)(d), Florida Statutes, for requesting Kennedy Rosario to "falsify an official record or official document of the Metro-Dade Police Department with corrupt intent to ... cause unlawful harm to another". Section 777.04(4)(d), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: Whoever commits the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy shall be punished as follows: * * * (d) If the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a felony of the third degree, the person convicted is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.775.082 or s.775.083. The basis for the plea agreement was Respondent's alleged solicitation of Kennedy Rosario of the Metro-Dade Police Department to violate Section 839.25, Florida Statutes. Section 839.25, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "Official misconduct" means the commission of the following act by a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to cause unlawful harm to another: (b) knowingly falsifying or causing another to falsify any official record or official document. * * * "Corrupt" means done with knowledge that act is wrongful and with proper motives. Official misconduct under this section is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.775.083 or s.775.084. The "official document" referred to in the solicitation count was the arrest warrant for Arthur Spiegel. The "unlawful harm to another" described in the solicitation count referred to the harm Respondent intended to cause to Arthur Spiegel by having him falsely arrested. Respondent points out that the Court accepted the plea agreement without any inquiry and without making any specific findings as to the factual or legal basis for the plea. Respondent was not present at the time the plea agreement was accepted by the Court and Respondent did not give any oral allocution as to the factual basis for the plea. The plea agreement was presented to and accepted by the same judge who presided over Respondent's criminal jury trial. After the entry of the plea, the remaining felony count of bribery against Respondent was dismissed and Respondent was released without further conditions as he had already served over a year on house arrest. During the course of the hearing in this case, there were suggestions by the attorneys that at some point in January 1991, Petitioner initiated proceedings against Respondent to determine his sanity as a result of some of the matters that came to light in the criminal case. Respondent was apparently examined by a psychiatrist appointed by Petitioner. The results of that examination are not part of the record of this proceeding. However, it appears that Respondent has been permitted to continue practicing medicine. As a result of the jury verdict in the initial criminal proceeding, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent on August 27, 1991, seeking to impose disciplinary action against Respondent on the grounds that Respondent had violated Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes. After Respondent's conviction was reversed, Petitioner issued a Closing Order on May 23, 1992, dismissing the original Administrative Complaint. This present case was initiated on July 23, 1993 when Petitioner filed a new Administrative Complaint against Respondent following the entry of the nolo contendere plea to the misdemeanor charge.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent's license to practice medicine should be suspended for one (1) year followed by a three- year term of probation. The suspension should be stayed if and when Respondent can demonstrate to the Board that he is currently of good moral character and emotionally stable enough to safely practice medicine. In addition, an administrative fine in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000) should be imposed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 24th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1995.

Florida Laws (8) 120.53120.5720.42458.311458.331775.082777.0490.410
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ROBERT WOOD, P.E. vs THE FLORIDA BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 12-002900RU (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 04, 2012 Number: 12-002900RU Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2014

The Issue The issue for disposition in this case is whether Respondents have implemented agency statements that meet the definition of a rule, but which have not been adopted pursuant to section 120.54.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert Wood, P.E., is a Florida-licensed professional engineer, holding license No. PE 31542. A large part of Petitioner?s work involves the design of aluminum-framed structures. Respondents, DBPR and FBPE, are charged with regulating the practice of professional engineering in the State of Florida, pursuant to chapters 455 and 471, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61G15. The FEMC is a public-private partnership established by the legislature to provide administrative, investigative, and prosecutorial services to the FBPE. By statute, the FEMC operates under a written contract (Contract) with the DBPR, which Contract is approved by the FBPE. Term of the Contract From the creation of FEMC in 1997 until 2000, the legislature provided that the required written contract was to be “renewed annually.” In 2000, the legislature amended section 471.38 to require that the written contract be an “annual contract.” In 2003, the legislature again amended section 471.38 to repeal the requirement that the contract be an annual contract. There is currently no specified term or time for renewal for the required written contract. The DBPR and the FEMC have elected to continue to enter written contracts with a term of one year. Determination of Legal Sufficiency Since its creation in 1997, section 471.038 has provided that “[t]he corporation may not exercise any authority specifically assigned to the board under chapter 455 or this chapter, including determining probable cause to pursue disciplinary action against a licensee, taking final action on license applications or in disciplinary cases, or adopting administrative rules under chapter 120.” The only change to that restriction was made in 2000, when the term “corporation” was changed to “management corporation.” In 2000, the legislature also enacted the Management Privatization Act, section 455.32, Florida Statutes. That Act was intended to establish a model for the creation of non-profit corporations with which the DBPR could contract for “administrative, examination, licensing, investigative and prosecutorial services to any board created within the department.” The similarities between section 471.38 and section 455.32 make it obvious that the latter was largely patterned after the former. Among the duties to be performed by a “corporation” under section 455.32(10) is to: . . . make a determination of legal sufficiency to begin the investigative process as provided in s. 455.225. However, the department or the board may not delegate to the corporation, by contract or otherwise, the authority for determining probable cause to pursue disciplinary action against a licensee, taking final action on license actions or on disciplinary cases, or adopting administrative rules under chapter 120. In previous years, at least through 2001, the written contract between the DBPR and the FEMC provided that “FEMC shall not exercise the police powers inherent in the Department and the FBPE including a determination of legal sufficiency or insufficiency of a disciplinary complaint.” At some time after the passage of the Management Privatization Act, the contractual “police powers” restriction was changed, and now reads, as reflected in the current Contract, as follows: Except when providing those prosecutorial and investigative services set forth in this Agreement, FEMC shall not exercise the police powers inherent in the Department and the FBPE under Chapters 455 or 471, Florida Statutes, including determining probable cause to pursue disciplinary action against a licensee, other than failure to comply with final orders of the Board as set forth in Rule 61015-18.005(2), Florida Administrative Code, taking final action on license applications or in disciplinary cases, or adopting administrative rules under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Prosecutorial servicing shall only be executed in the name of FBPE. That contractual restriction is consistent with the statutory limitation on the powers of the FEMC set forth in section 471.38. In its current form, the Contract establishes the services that are to be provided by FEMC to the DBPR and the FBPE. The list of prosecutorial services to be provided by FEMC include coordinating with investigators, reviewing and taking “appropriate action” on complaints, and preparing cases for presentation to the FBPE probable cause panel. The list of investigative services to be provided by FEMC include receiving complaints, interviewing complainants, witnesses, and subjects of complaints, issuing subpoenas, preparing investigative reports, and taking other actions leading to the prosecution of a case. The Contract does not specifically address the issue of determining legal sufficiency. The typical procedures of the FEMC in performing its investigatory functions are initiated when the FEMC receives a complaint by various means, including telephone, e-mail, or submission of a written complaint. Written complaints are normally directed to the FEMC chief prosecutor, who assigns them to an investigator for initial review. If the complaint is verbal, the investigator fielding the call will ask the complainant to file a written complaint. If a complaint is unaccompanied by information to substantiate the claims, the investigator typically requests supporting documentation, which may be a set of engineering plans, a report, or similar evidence of the facts underlying the complaint. In a procedure implemented by the FEMC in 2012, after receipt of the complaint and supporting documentation, the investigator forwards the complaint to an engineering expert retained by FEMC for a pre-review. The expert prepares a preliminary report which is then considered in the determination of legal sufficiency. Prior to implementation of the 2012 pre- review procedure, the determination of legal sufficiency was made without the benefit of a pre-review report in the manner otherwise described below. After receipt of the complaint, the supporting documentation, and, since 2012, the pre-review report, the investigator presents the complaint to the FEMC chief prosecutor. If the chief prosecutor determines that the complaint is not legally sufficient, the investigator is instructed to draft a memorandum for the chief prosecutor to review, which is in turn submitted to the FBPE Executive Director for signature. If the chief prosecutor determines that the complaint is legally sufficient, he or she verbally authorizes the investigator to place the engineer on notice of the investigation. At that point, the complaint is investigated using the investigative tools available to FEMC as set forth in the Contract. If sufficient evidence that a violation has occurred is found, the investigation culminates in a recommendation to the FBPE probable cause panel for a decision as to whether the panel believes there to be probable cause to proceed with disciplinary action. The decision to proceed with a disciplinary proceeding requiring a point of entry to challenge the action is entirely that of the FBPE probable cause panel. Probationary Project Review On November 4, 2009, FBPE entered a disciplinary final order regarding Petitioner that incorporated a stipulated settlement agreement, and imposed sanctions on Petitioner, including probation. By his entry of the settlement stipulation, Petitioner agreed to a “project review” at six and eighteen-month intervals. The project review consisted of the submission by Petitioner of a list of all completed projects. That list was provided to an engineering expert, who then selected two of the projects for a more comprehensive review. The steps to be performed by Petitioner and the FBPE are generally described in Project Review Process Guidelines that were provided to Petitioner by FBPE as an attachment to the notice of the two projects selected for comprehensive review. As a result of the project review, the two projects were determined to violate engineering standards, which resulted in the FEMC making a recommendation of probable cause to the FBPE probable cause panel. The probable cause panel found probable cause, leading to the issuance of an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner. Petitioner introduced evidence of one other case in which a project review was required as a condition of probation. In that case, an administrative law judge, after having determined that the professional engineer committed violations of section 471.033 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15- 19.001, recommended imposition of “probation for two years with appropriate conditions for this case.” The Final Order, entered on March 12, 2008, imposed the recommended probation “with a plans review at 6 months and 18 months from the date of this Order.” The basis for the imposition of that sanction was not explained. There was no evidence introduced at the final hearing as to any other specific case in which a project review was required, other than the case involving Petitioner. The 2012 FEMC Annual Report, which is a business record of the FEMC, indicated that between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012, the FEMC was involved in the investigation and/or prosecution of 32 cases in which Administrative Complaints were filed against engineers. Disciplinary sanctions imposed against engineers during that one-year period included, among others, twenty-five reprimands, six license suspensions, eight probations, seven license restrictions, two voluntary license relinquishments, and four license revocations. Also included among the sanctions imposed during that period were three project reviews. The sanction of project review is one that is, statistically, used sparingly by the FBPE. There was no evidence introduced to establish the criteria, if any, for the imposition of a project review as a condition of probation, or to demonstrate that it was generally applied in any specific circumstances.

Florida Laws (12) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.68455.225455.227455.2273455.32471.033471.038
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs APRIL D. WHEELER, L.P.N., 09-004646PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 25, 2009 Number: 09-004646PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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GUY MCCANN vs UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA (DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND POLICE), 93-006414 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 04, 1993 Number: 93-006414 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1995

The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings retains jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Charge of Discrimination has not been filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60Y-5.001(a), Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male, who was 58 years of age at the relevant time, and is a former associate professor in the School of Communications at the University of Central Florida. In 1988-89, Petitioner was an untenured professor, with tenure decisions pending the following year. Petitioner alleges that the director of his department began practicing a pattern of discriminatory conduct by placing false information in his evaluation file which ultimately affected his rating and with the intent to deny him tenure. On October 8, 1990, Petitioner discovered that the ratings for 1989-90 had been changed by the director of the department. As a result of this action, Petitioner filed a grievance with the United Faculty of Florida (UFF). Petitioner did not file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) as a result of this event. On May 16, 1991, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of an evaluation by the Chair of the department which Petitioner alleges was inaccurate and incorrect. As a result of this action, Petitioner filed a grievance with the union and with the President's office on June 7, 1991. A Settlement of the grievance was signed on September 6, 1991. On January 8, 1992, Petitioner discovered that the settlement had not been implemented by the university. On July 19, 1991, Petitioner was denied tenure and offered a terminal contract, which indicated that it would not be renewed beyond the indicated date. On August 26, 1991, Petitioner accepted the contract. On March 30, 1992, Petitioner filed with the FCHR a Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner alleged that UCF committed age discrimination against him by filing improper evaluations of his teaching performance in 1990 and again in 1991, and that as a result of that unlawful employment practice he was improperly denied tenure and placed on a terminal contract.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in FCHR Case No. 92-3504 and DOAH Case No. 93-6414 for failure to timely file his original Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Silzer, Esquire University of Central Florida P. O. Box 160015 Orlando, Florida 32816-0015 Mr. Guy McCann 1510 Mizell Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-5.001
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WARREN D. BROWN vs DADE COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 93-003994 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 20, 1993 Number: 93-003994 Latest Update: Aug. 13, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Dade County Police Benevolent Association (Respondent) was the collective bargaining agent for the bargaining unit of the City of Hialeah Police Department (CHPD). Warren D. Brown (Petitioner) is a black male. At all times material hereto Petitioner was a law enforcement officer with the CHPD, a member of the bargaining unit and a dues paying member of the Respondent. On or about May 11, 1992, Petitioner was attempting to exit a secured and locked double doorway located on the east side of the CHPD's building. Upon pushing a switch, a lock mechanism releases the lock, and a door can be opened. However, at this particular time, the lock was not immediately released. Petitioner applied greater force to the door, which caused it to swing open forcefully (when the lock did release) and strike another officer who was attempting to enter the building through the same door. Petitioner was heard to chuckle after exiting the door. Approximately two to three days later (May 13 or 14, 1992), the officer who was struck by the door filed an internal complaint against Petitioner. The officer had discussed the incident with a CHPD sergeant who had had problems with the Petitioner in the past and who had filed several internal complaints against Petitioner. The officer alleged in his complaint that Petitioner intentionally hit him with the door. The internal complaint was referred to CHPD's Internal Affairs for investigation. The investigation included taking statements from Petitioner, the officer and any witnesses. When the internal complaint was filed against Petitioner, he contacted Respondent for assistance, and Respondent's Senior Attorney, James Casey, represented Petitioner. Casey was present with and represented Petitioner at the initial questioning by Internal Affairs. On or about June 16, 1992, Internal Affairs issued its findings to CHPD's Chief of Police (Chief). The Internal Affairs investigator concluded that Petitioner had intentionally hit the officer with the door. On July 7, 1992, the Chief issued a disposition of the complaint. The Chief determined that the complaint against Petitioner was sustained and that the appropriate discipline was a 10-hour suspension without pay. Further, the Chief scheduled a pre-disciplinary hearing for July 21, 1992. On or about July 13, 1992, the Chief had prepared a recommendation to the Mayor of the City of Hialeah that Petitioner be suspended without pay for 10 working hours from the CHPD. The letter included a summary of the incident, the rules and regulations violated by Petitioner and the disciplinary action for such violations. However, the recommendation was never forwarded to the Mayor for his approval. 1/ The pre-disciplinary hearing was held and, as a result of that hearing, a CHPD Captain was requested to view the photographs of the door which were taken at the time the incident occurred and to examine the door itself. On August 3, 1992, in a memorandum to the Chief, the Captain indicated that it was possible that the door did stick and that Petitioner was not aware of the officer's presence. Furthermore, the Captain recommended that one of the doors be labeled for entering and the other for exiting and that a caution zone be established to alert individuals that they should use caution when opening the doors. Casey was also present with and represented Petitioner at the pre- disciplinary hearing. After the pre-disciplinary hearing, Petitioner contacted Respondent almost on a weekly basis inquiring about the status of his case. Each time Respondent had nothing to relate to Petitioner indicating that nothing had been done by the CHPD and the Mayor. In August 1992, Casey terminated his employment with Respondent. He was replaced by Michael Braverman. Petitioner continued his weekly inquiry to Braverman and received the same response as before. On or about October 20, 1992, the Chief changed the discipline to a written reprimand. However, again, this disciplinary recommendation was not forwarded to the Mayor for his approval. On or about November 19, 1992, Braverman recommended to Petitioner that he accept oral counseling, or an oral reprimand, and end the matter. Petitioner refused. Finally, on or about December 6, 1992, Petitioner forwarded an internal memorandum to the Chief inquiring about his case, reminding him that, according to the collective bargaining agreement, the complaint should have been resolved within 60 days and allowing him five working days to resolve the complaint before he appealed to the next level. On or about December 11, 1992, the Chief informed Petitioner that the complaint was sustained for violation of courtesy conduct but that the disciplinary action (a written reprimand) was rescinded due to "unreasonable delay in imposing the written reprimand." Even though the written reprimand was rescinded, the Chief recommended to the Mayor that Petitioner receive oral counseling which was in essence the same as an oral reprimand. The Mayor approved the oral counseling. Petitioner contacted the Mayor who confirmed that the sanction was oral counseling. Article 26, entitled "Disciplinary Review Procedures," Section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the City of Hialeah (City) and Respondent 2/ provides in pertinent part: k. The employee who is the subject of a complaint or allegation shall be promptly notified of the disposition upon the conclusion of the investigation. In any investigation in which the charges against the officer cannot be substantiated, the officer shall be deemed to have been exonerated of any charges. * * * o. Any internal investigation, except where criminal charges are being investi gated, shall be completed within sixty (60) days from the date the officer is informed of the initial complaint. No officer may be subjected to any disciplinary action as a result of any investigation not completed within that time period. Oral counseling is not considered by Respondent or the City as discipline. As a consequence, there is no appeal of such an action against an employee of the City who is also a member of the bargaining unit represented by Respondent. However, oral counseling is considered "progressive discipline" which means, in essence, that CHPD can consider it if another complaint against Petitioner is sustained involving a violation of courtesy conduct and impose a sanction which is considered disciplinary. Because of this possibility of a disciplinary sanction being imposed in the future, Petitioner objected to the oral counseling. Petitioner contacted Respondent to appeal the oral counseling. Petitioner discussed the situation with Braverman, Respondent's attorney. Braverman informed Petitioner that there was nothing to appeal since oral counseling was not discipline but that, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Petitioner could respond in writing to the oral counseling and have the response placed in his personnel file. Consequently, Braverman informed Petitioner that Respondent could provide no representation. Article 44 of the collective bargaining agreement, entitled "Personnel Records," provides: Section 1. Each bargaining unit employee shall have the right to respond, in writing, to any and all derogatory material placed in their personnel file and have that response placed in their personnel file. Section 2. Employees who complete two (2) years of discipline free service shall have all counseling and/or written reprimands removed from their personnel files pursuant to State of Florida Department of Archives guidelines. This complaint against Petitioner was not the first complaint against him but was one of many. The Chief and certain uniformed supervisors of the CHPD have a history of filing complaints for internal investigation against Petitioner. 3/ Respondent was well aware of that history and has, in fact, represented Petitioner in many of the complaints. Historically, Respondent has not been free of discriminatory practices toward black officers. In 1972 a federal court held that the Miami PBA 4/ had discriminated against black officers by not permitting them to become members of the PBA, but permitting white officers to become members. The federal court ordered the Miami PBA to allow black officers to become members and to offer them the same benefits as white officers. Adams v. Miami Police Benevolent Association, 454 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). However, since that federal case, there has been no legal showing of discrimination by Respondent. Contrastingly, through court action, Respondent eliminated a discriminatory practice by the City that benefited a black officer. Sometime in 1980, 5/ several white officers and one black officer 6/ were denied the opportunity to take the examination for police chief by the City. They contacted the Respondent for legal assistance,which represented the officers in a court action against the City. The court ordered the City to administer the exam to the officers. Notwithstanding, the City permitted the white officers, but not the black officer, to take the police chief exam. The black officer again approached Respondent for legal assistance. Respondent denied him such assistance. Respondent's position was that, even though the court had ordered the City to permit him to take the police chief examination, at that point in time the City had already appointed the police chief. Furthermore, Respondent indicated that to pursue the matter further would provide no meaningful redress. Respondent's Policy No. 84-2, entitled "Request For Legal Assistance" (Legal Assistance Policy), controls the Respondent's legal representation of its members. The Legal Assistance Policy defines legal assistance as "the representation of Association members at administrative and disciplinary hearings as well as taking judicial action on behalf of Association members, in accordance with the provisions of this policy." Under this Policy, a member of the Respondent is eligible for legal assistance "if the matter arises out of the scope of the member's employment" and the member was in "good standing" 7/ at the time of the incident and remained in good standing throughout the course of any legal action pertaining to the matter. Also, pursuant to the Legal Assistance Policy, a member who is approved for legal assistance must accept Respondent's attorney for representation. Other counsel may be used only when the Respondent's attorney has a conflict and when approved by the Legal Assistance Coordinator or the Board of Directors. Furthermore, benefits provided pursuant to the Legal Assistance Policy are applicable only to administrative and trial level actions and may be applicable to appellate level actions under certain specific situations. The Legal Assistance Policy also defines "Legal Defense Benefit" as Respondent's Policy No. 3-80 which provides "coverage for members, in good standing, for incidents within the scope of employment resulting in criminal or civil prosecution." Policy No. 3-80 (Legal Defense Benefit Policy) provides that Respondent will provide its members with this benefit "only in those cases where a lawsuit or criminal indictment results from professional acts or omissions which arise out of and in the scope of their duties as a law enforcement officer." Further, it provides that the benefit consists of Respondent paying "attorney's fees and directly related Court costs." Petitioner never requested the Respondent to file an action against the City or the CHPD on the grounds of racial discrimination in the CHPD's disciplinary action(s) against him. Petitioner believed that he was not required to make such a request because it was obvious what the City or CHPD was doing and that the Respondent should have taken the initiative and filed a discrimination action. Even though the Respondent's action of allowing the CHPD to continue the investigation of the complaint against Petitioner for several months beyond the 60-day limitation is suspect, there was insufficient evidence of any disparity presented at hearing to conclude that the Respondent had acted any differently when dealing with the same or similar complaints against white officers who were members of the Respondent. Moreover, there was no evidence presented that the Respondent acted any differently with white officers who had been given oral counseling as a result of a complaint against them. There was no evidence that the Respondent failed to appeal Petitioner's oral counseling because of race, and there was insufficient evidence of any conduct by Respondent from which it can be inferred that the actions of Respondent were based on race. The Respondent's failure to insist upon no disciplinary action against the Petitioner at the expiration of the 60-day investigation limitation was nondiscriminatory. Moreover, the Respondent's failure to appeal Petitioner's oral counseling was legitimate and nondiscriminatory and its denial to appeal was without discriminatory motivation.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order DISMISSING the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of April 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April 1994.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF DENISTRY vs LAMONT CANADA, D.D.S., 00-000716 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Feb. 11, 2000 Number: 00-000716 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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IN RE: JAMES R. ENGLISH vs *, 93-001523EC (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 18, 1993 Number: 93-001523EC Latest Update: Mar. 18, 1994

Findings Of Fact The charter of the City of Tallahassee was adopted in 1919, and its provisions for a city attorney have remained basically unchanged since then. Section 29 of the City of Tallahassee Code states that the city commission shall appoint a city attorney. The code also authorizes the city attorney, with the advice and consent of the city commission, to appoint one or more assistant city attorneys to serve at his pleasure and under his direction and supervision. (Advocate's exhibit #16) Until recent years there was no full-time city attorney. The city commission appointed an attorney who was not an employee of the city, but rather was a member of a law firm. The city and the firm had an arrangement under which the firm was paid a monthly retainer for forty hours work at a set hourly rate. The firm billed the city for any work over forty hours each month at the approved hourly rate. Bryan Henry was appointed city attorney in the early 1970s, around 1971 or 1972. He was a principal and founder of the firm, Henry and Buchanan, which later became Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English. Respondent, James A. "Jim" English (English), worked as a law clerk during law school for Roy Rhodes, the prior city attorney, and then for Bryan Henry. He was hired by the Henry and Buchanan law firm as an associate after law school in 1975. Beginning early in his career, English was involved almost exclusively in legal work for the city; even then, the volume of work exceeded the capacity of any single individual. Between 1974 and 1984, from three to five lawyers in the firm did some work for the city, based on their expertise and experience and based on their assignments from Bryan Henry, the city attorney. In 1977 English became a shareholder in the firm, Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English, P.A., a Florida professional corporation. From that time until he left the firm in 1992, he received distributions of his share of the firm's profits. Bryan Henry became ill in 1980, and most of the duties of the city attorney were performed by English. In September 1983, Bryan Henry resigned and recommended that English be appointed to succeed him. On September 13, 1983, the city commission voted to appoint Jim English as the city attorney. Discussion accompanying the appointment reflected the commission's continued interest in the manner of delivery of legal services to the city. Earlier, in 1981, the commission had discussed alternative methods and had requested research and reports on the experience of other Florida cities. The appointment of Jim English in September 1983 did not immediately change the status quo; that is, the parties continued to operate on the retainer plus fee arrangement and English received no salary nor other benefits from the city. The agreement or arrangement was not evidenced by a written contract. Rather, the commission voted on the hourly rate in its annual budget deliberations. In May 1984, after the city elections, the commission established its priority issues. By this time, there were three lawyers on the commission: Carol Bellamy, Kent Spriggs and Jack McLean. The delivery of legal services was designated a priority or "target" issue. A task force or committee was appointed on June 26, 1984, to study the issue and report back to the commission. The committee, chaired by Commissioner Bellamy, included Commissioner Rudd, the city manager, the director of employee relations, the director of the office of management and budget, and the city attorney (English). Its charge was to report back to the commission on its study of three options: in-house counsel, outside counsel (the existing structure), or a blend of the two (minimal in-house staff, supplemented with outside contract counsel). The task force report is dated September 24, 1984. It compared Tallahassee's legal costs with those of eight other cities in Florida. Tallahassee's costs were ranked second to lowest in "per capita cost", "cost per employee", and "percent of total operating budget". The report detailed advantages and disadvantages of each of the three options it studied, and the report provided a detailed analysis of the legal department's scope of work derived from three months of the city attorney's time slips. The report was placed on the city commission agenda for the October 2, 1984 meeting, but was deferred for the next meeting when the commissioners received a proposed agreement from English. The proposed agreement was adopted by a 4-1 vote on October 9, 1984. The professional services agreement, effective October 15, 1984, provided for English to become a full-time employee of the City of Tallahassee with the same benefits as other appointed officials, except the city manager. With the exception of pro bono work, his professional time was to be exclusively devoted to "the legal work and other obligations of the charter office of the city attorney." (Advocate's exhibit #7) His salary was set at $61,500 per year, and $3,430 per month was established as compensation to his firm for overhead. The salary increased to $7,327.67 per month in 1991, while the overhead covering English's office and support staff at the firm remained constant. The agreement clearly contemplated continued use of the Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English firm. It provided: "All other work performed by the City Attorney's law firm shall be paid for at the hourly rate established by the commission". (Advocate's exhibit #7, p. 2) It also required that the monthly billing of the law firm include the percentage of work actually performed by minority professionals in the firm in that given month. It provided that the number of assistant city attorneys would not be increased without commission approval and that their supervision and performance was the responsibility of the city attorney. The agreement described a mechanism for review by the city attorney of each new case form opened by the firm to insure that no conflict existed between the new client matter and the city. It required that the city attorney continue to file annual statements of financial interests for the law firm indicating clientele of the firm which generated over 10 percent of the firm's income. Nothing in the agreement specified how much city work the firm should get; that was substantially left to English's discretion. The commission was aware of the type of work the firm had been providing and what work was typically performed by other firms; for example, utilities-related legal work and the prosecution of cases before various city regulatory boards were being contracted out to other firms. Between 1986 and 1991, the Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English firm received the bulk of the city's legal business: Fiscal Year Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English Other Legal Counsel 1986 $230,332.75 $ 133,697.00 1987 301,583.47 194,034.56 1988 476,484.66 216,212.95 1989 510,821.82 873,470.61 1990 684,472.55 1,000,368.48 1991 993,384.45 1,434,548.80 (Advocate's exhibit #4) The city was one of the firm's largest clients. (Respondent's exhibit #5, Statements of Financial Interests, Part B) Between 1985 and 1991, English's share of profit distributions from the law firm totaled $86,157.00. He did not receive a salary from the firm. After the complaint was filed in this case, English resigned from the firm and sold his stock shares back to the firm. The resignation was effective May 1, 1992. Although English was familiar with the ethics code, had lectured on it, and had helped draft a city policy based on the code, neither he nor any of the three lawyers on the commission at the time apparently contemplated that his employment status created in 1984 violated the code. Debate and discussion on the provision of legal services was open and vigorous in the years and months immediately preceding the agreement in 1984. In the view of the two former commissioners who testified in this proceeding, Hurley Rudd and Jack McLean, the agreement represented a fair and reasonable solution to the variety of concerns raised by the individual commissioners. Those concerns included accountability, avoidance of conflict with other clients of the firm, the use of minority businesses, quality of services, and, of course, economy. No evidence in this proceeding suggests that the city was, in fact, ill-served by the agreement over the years. The city has more recently authorized the creation of an in-house legal department and has staffed it; and English remains the city attorney and an employee of the city.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Ethics issue its public report and final order finding that Respondent, James R. English, violated sections 112.313(3) and (7), F.S., and recommending a penalty of $5,000.00 restitution, and a civil penalty of $10,000.00, for a total of $15,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1523EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties as provided for in section 120.59(2), F.S. The Advocate's Proposed Findings 1.-2. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3.-4. Adopted in paragraph 2. and paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. 9.-11. Adopted in paragraph 6. 12. Adopted in paragraph 8. 13.-15. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 11. 18.-19. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 11. 22.-23. Adopted in paragraph 12. 24. Adopted in paragraph 15. 25.-26. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 16. Addressed in paragraph 13. The agreement addressed work to be done by the firm, but did not mandate that the firm be used for any given amount. Adopted in paragraph 14. Adopted in paragraph 13. 31.-33. Addressed in paragraph 18. 34.-38. Rejected as argument or unnecessary. The provisions of the ethics code at issue here do not require intent for a violation. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 1. and 2. Adopted in paragraphs 2. and 3., in substance. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. 6.-9. Addressed in paragraph 7., otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 10. Adopted in paragraph 6. 11.-12. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. 13.-14. Adopted in part in paragraph 11., otherwise rejected as misleading or unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as overbroad. If anyone did recognize a conflict, it was not addressed in the commission meeting minutes. Adopted in part in paragraph 17, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 19. 20.-21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in material part in paragraphs 12.-13. and 18. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce A. Minnick, Esquire Mang, Rett & Collette, P.A. 660 East Jefferson Street Post Office Box 11127 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3127 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709

Florida Laws (6) 112.313112.316112.317112.324120.57120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 34-5.010
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, 87-003661RP (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003661RP Latest Update: Aug. 25, 1997

Findings Of Fact Both parties filed proposed findings of fact. Except as noted below, I have incorporated the substance of these proposed findings into my findings of fact. Rejected DOT Proposed Findings of Fact The following proposed findings are rejected because they are not facts but only recitations of testimony: Rule 22I-6.006 - proposed finding 1 - second and third sentence. Rule 22I-6.037 - proposed finding 1 - second sentence. proposed finding 2 - first and second sentence. The following proposed findings are irrelevant to the resolution of this case: Rule 22I-6.006 - proposed finding 4 and 5 because the proposed rule applies to other agencies than DOT. proposed finding 6 because whether another method of notifying all bidders is more efficient is not the standard to determine validity of the rule. Rule 22I-6.037 - proposed finding 3, 5, and 7. Rejected DOAH Proposed Finding of Fact The following proposed finding of fact are rejected because these are more in the nature of legal argument or conclusions of law rather than findings of fact: Proposed finding 5 - sentences 5 and 6. Proposed finding 6 - second paragraph, sentences 1 and 2; third paragraph, sentence 4 and 5; and fourth paragraph Proposed finding 7 - second paragraph; third paragraph; and fourth paragraph, fifth sentence Proposed finding 8 - fourth paragraph; fifth paragraph; and sixth paragraph The follow proposed findings are rejected as being irrelevant to the resolution of the issues presented in this case. Proposed finding 1 - fourth sentence Proposed finding 6 - second paragraph, sentence 5 and 6 Proposed finding 7 - fourth paragraph, sentence 1 through 4 The following proposed finding is rejected as not supported by the record evidence: Proposed finding 6 - fourth paragraph, sentence 4 fifth paragraph, sentence 4 ANALYSIS Standing The first issue that must be addressed is DOT's standing. DOAH asserts that Dot lacks standing to challenge Proposed Rules 22I-6.035 and 22I-6.037. DOT has the burden to establish that it would be substantially affected by the proposed rules should they be adopted by DOAH. Section 120.54(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In order to resolve whether DOT has met its burden, a review of the pertinent decisions on standing is appropriate. 5/ The case cited most often on standing is the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Florida Department of Corrections v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1978). The court held that an inmate who had been confined for committing an assault while in prison lacked standing to challenge an existing rule concerning disciplinary confinement and forfeiture of gain-time. Because the inmate was no longer confined under the rule and had not lost any gain-time when he filed the rule challenge, the court reasoned that the inmate had not suffered an injury in fact at the time of the challenge, end therefore, was not substantially affected by the existing rule. Whether the inmate would be subject to the rule again depended on the likelihood he would commit another infraction. The court deemed this too speculative and subject to conjecture to grant standing. 353 So.2d at 1236. In a later case, the Florida Supreme Court overruled Jerry to the extent it required associations to demonstrate a specific injury to the organization itself rather then to some of its members. Florida Home Builders' Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 412 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1982). In reaching its decision, the court warned against an overly restrictive application of the concept of standing in the rule challenge cases by noting: "Expansion of public access to activities of governmentally agencies was one of the major legislative purposes of the new Administrative Procedure Act." 412 So.2d at 352-53. Standing to challenge proposed agency rules was addressed in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). There, the court held that all women of child bearing age who received medicaid benefits were not substantially affected by a proposed rule denying medicaid payments for abortions except under limited circumstances. In denying standing to a woman who was not pregnant at the time of the rule challenge, the court specifically rejected the argument that standing to challenge a proposed rule under Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1985), is less restrictive than standing to challenge an existing rule under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1985), by stating: There is no difference between the immediacy and reality necessary to confer standing whether the proceeding is to challenge an existing rule or a proposed rule. 367 So.2d at 1052. In Professional Fire Fighters of Florida v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 396 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court held that a group of paramedics had standing to challenge rules establishing additional requirements for renewal of a paramedical certification. There was no showing on any of the individual paramedics had attempted to comply with the new rules or that anything in the new rules would disqualify them from retaining their certification. In rejecting the hearing officer's ruling that these individuals could not claim an injury because they had not yet applied for certification under the new rules, the court stated: The order below would preclude a challenge by anyone who had not first complied with a rule and suffered injury, no matter how clear the rule's applicability to, or substantial its effect on, the challengers... The APA permits prospective challenges to agency rulemaking and does not require that an affected party comply with the rule at his peril in order to obtain standing to chal- lenge the rule. A party may demonstrate standing by showing that a rule has a real and immediate effect upon his case as well as by proving injury in fact. 396 So.2d at 1195-96 (citations omitted) see also 4245 Corp., Mother's Lounge Inc. v. Department of Beverage, 345 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The court distinguished Jerry and Alice P. on the grounds that the petitioners in the case before it were immediately subject to the rule which rendered their continued employment as paramedics unlawful without compliance with the rule. The individuals were presently affected by the rule because they worked in the area to be regulated. 396 So.2d at 1196. In Village Park Mobile Home Association v. Department of Business Regulation, 506 So.2d 426, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the court on rehearing emphasized under the test for standing set forth in Fire Fighters that a party may show "that a rule has a real and immediate effect upon his case, as well as injury in fact." Standing was not found in Village Park for certain mobile home owners to challenge agency approval of the prospectus for a mobile home park because the prospectus only disclosed the method for raising rents and reducing services in the future. It was up to the landlord to implement the prospectus at some unspecified date in the future. 6/ Thus, no standing was found because the alleged injury was contingent upon the future actions of a third party. 506 So.2d at 433-34; see also Boca Raton Mausoleum v. Department of Banking, 511 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In this case, DOT has not alleged that it has suffered an injury in fact by Proposed Rules 22I-6.035 and 22I-6.037. That is not surprising with respect to Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 since it is a new rule that has not been implemented. However, with respect to the proposed amendments to Rule 22I-6.035, dealing with attorney's fees and costs, most of DOT's challenges concern portions of the rule that were not substantially changed in the proposed rule. For example, DOT objects to the provisions requiring an agency to file a response or affidavit and the provisions which allow for a waiver of the right to an evidentiary hearing when one is not affirmatively requested by either party. Rule 22I-6.035 presently contains such provisions. Therefore, the injury in fact test would be applicable. However, DOT has not presented any facts indicating that a prevailing small business party has ever filed a petition seeking costs and attorney's fees from DOT under Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. Consequently, no injury exists. The alternative test for standing is whether the proposed rules would have a "real and immediate effect" upon DOT. With respect to Proposed Rule 22I- 6.035, DOT has not met this test merely by demonstrating that it is a party to pending cases involving small business parties. In order for DOT to be affected by Proposed Rule 22I-6.035, a small business party would first have to prevail against DOT and then file a petition for costs and attorney's fees based upon its belief that DOT was not "substantially justified" in bringing the administrative action. Whether these contingencies, which are controlled by a third party, will occur in the future is open to conjecture and speculation. The type of immediacy envisioned by the court in the Fire Fighters case does not appear to be present with respect to Proposed Rule 22I-6.035. Therefore, DOT does not have standing to challenge this proposed rule. On the other hand, I conclude that DOT has standing to challenge Proposed Rule 22I-6.037. DOT presently has at least nine pending cases involving administrative complaints. The proposed rule on voluntary dismissals would be immediately applicable to DOT's ability to take a voluntary dismissal on those cases without being contingent upon the acts of a third party. Such a real and immediate effect on pending cases involving DOT is sufficient to provide DOT with the requisite standing. DOT does not have to invoke the rule by seeking a voluntary dismissal in order to have standing to challenge the rule as suggested by DOAH. See Professional Fire Fighters of Florida, 396 So.2d at 1195. Invalidity of Proposed Rules 22I-6.006 and 22I-6.037 The Florida Legislature has recently defined what constitutes an invalid exercise of Legislative authority. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-385, Section 2, Laws of Florida, provides: (8) "Invalid exercise of delegated legisla- tive authority" means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply: (a ) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedure set forth in s. 120.54; The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7); The rule enlarges, modifies, or con- travenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7); The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; or The rule is arbitrary or capricious. These standards are similar to those used by the courts in Florida to test the validity of agency rules. See e.g., Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979); Humana Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 469 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In Agrico Chemical Co., the First District Court of Appeal stated: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within that grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its author- ity; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without though or reason or irration- ally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or is despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evi- dence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reason- able person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement that a challenger has the burden of demonstrating agency action to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of administrative discretion is a stringent one. 365 So.2d at 763. In this case DOT has the burden to demonstrate that adoption of Proposed Rules 22I-6.006 and 22I-6.037 would constitute an invalid exercise of legislative authority. Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 DOAH is statutorily authorized "to adopt reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of this act [Chapter 120]." Section 120.65(7), Fla. Stat. (1985). Regarding bid protests, an agency is required to forward a protest to DOAH for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1985), whenever there is a disputed issue a material fact. Section 120.53(5)(d)2, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 120.57(1) sets forth certain procedures for conducting evidentiary hearings and proceedings where the substantial interests of a party are determined. In light of these statutory provisions, DOAH proposes to amend Rule 6.006 by requiring that an agency send a copy of the notice of hearing to all bidders, other than the protesting bidder, and attempt to telephonically notify these bidders of the date, time, and place the hearing. The purpose of this requirement is to give notice of the deadline to file a motion to intervene in the protest proceeding to the successful bidder, as well as all other bidders who had not filed a timely protest. Motions to intervene must be filed within five days prior to start of an evidentiary hearing. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 6.010. DOT persuasively argues that this portion of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 requires an agency to do a useless act because any bidder that has not flied a timely protest is precluded from gaining party status in a bid protest proceeding by filing a motion to intervene. I agree. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes (1985), requires an agency to provide notice of its decision, or intended decision, concerning a bid solicitation. The notice must contain the following statement: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Paragraph (b) of Section 120.53(5), provides: Any person who is affected adversely by the agency decision or intended decision shall file with the agency a notice of protest in writing within 72 hours after the posting of the bid tabulation or after receipt of the notice of the agency decision or intended decision and shall file a formal written protest within 10 days after the date he filed the notice of protest. Failure to file a notice of protest or failure to file a formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120. The formal written protest shall state with particularity the facts and law upon which the protest is based. These statutory provisions are clear and unequivocal. An unsuccessful bidder must file a protest within the 72 hour limitations period in order to participate in further Chapter 120 proceedings. Xerox Corp. v. Florida Department of Professional Regulation, 489 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); see also Capelletti Brothers v. Department of Transportation, 499 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(72 hour deadline applies to protest challenging bid specifications). An adversely affected bidder cannot, and should not be allowed to, gain a back door point of entry to obtain party status in a bid protest proceeding by filing a motion to intervene when the bidder has already waived its right to participate in the proceeding. The only substantially effected entity that would be entitled to intervene in a bid protest proceeding is the successful bidder. Therefore, there would be a valid purpose in adopting a rule that required the successful bidder to receive the notice of hearing so that it would be aware of the deadline for filing a motion to intervene. However, as to all other non-protesting bidders, there is no statutory basis for providing the notice of hearing to them in light of what appears to be a clear prohibition against allowing those bidders to obtain party status after failing to file a timely protest pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). DOAH argues that the need for subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 is dramatized by the case of Spillis Candella and Partners, Inc. v. School Board of Dade County, No. 86-3002 Bid. There, the hearing officer determined that the agency never complied with the notice requirements triggering the 72 hour limitations period. Therefore, the protest filed in that case was determined to be timely since the 72 hour time limit had not expired. This single case does not provide justification for requiring agencies to give notice of the evidentiary hearing to all unsuccessful bidders in all bid protest cases. No evidence was adduced indicating that the failure to provide the requisite statutory notice issue raised in the Spillis Candella case had ever occurred in any other bid protest proceeding that had come before a DOAH hearing officer. Even if this had been a recurring problem, subsection (b) of the Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 could have been more closely tailored to remedy issues similar to that raised in Spillis Candella. The rule should have limited an agency's responsibility to provide a notice of hearing to all unsuccessful bidders if the agency had not previously complied with the notice requirements of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes (1985). 7/ In light of the foregoing, I conclude that subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 is arbitrary because it requires agencies to provide notice of a bid protest hearing to bidders who have waived their right to become parties in the proceeding. The rule also contravenes Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), which contemplates that only timely protestors may participate as parties in a bid proceeding. 8/ Subsection (3) is also invalid because it requires that an agency provide to the hearing officer proof that it has complied with subsection (2). DOT's remaining objections to Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 are without merit. The fact that all agencies involved in bid protests must adopt rules end procedures for the resolution of such protests, and that the Administration Commission shall also adopt model rules on the same subject, does not indicate a legislative intent to preempt DOAH from adopting rules pertaining to the procedures for conducting bid protest hearings. Section 120.53(5)(a) and (f), Fla. Stat. (1955). In addition, Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), does not prohibit non-parties from receiving notice of an evidentiary hearing. Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 DOT advances numerous arguments in support of its contention that subsections (2) and (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 constitute an invalid exercise of legislative authority. I am persuaded by two of these arguments that DOT's position has merit. First, with respect to subsection (2), the proposed rule provides a hearing officer with the discretion to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal "upon such terms and conditions as the hearing officer deems just and proper." This language fails to provide any guidance to a hearing officer or to the parties in an administrative complaint proceeding as to what conditions a hearing officer could impose for allowing the agency to withdraw its complaint without prejudice. Instead, the rule gives the hearing officer unlimited discretion to impose any condition the hearing officer subjectively believes is "just and proper." These words cannot be construed as words of limitation because it must always be presumed that a hearing officer will rule in a manner that he or she believes is just and proper. Thus the elimination of the "just and proper" language from the rule would not give any more discretion to a hearing officer than is presently granted by the proposed rule. The fact that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(2) provides that a trial court may grant a voluntary dismissal filed after submission of a case to the court "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," does not provide a basis for concluding that subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 is valid. The Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted pursuant to the inherent power of the courts, a power that administrative agencies do not possess. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Tampa Heart Institute, 472 So.2d 748, 753-54 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). Agency rules may not violate the standards set forth in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 57-325, Section 2, Laws of Florida. In this case, subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I- runs afoul of paragraph (d) of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended, which provides that a rule is invalid if [t]he rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency." Therefore, subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 is invalid. Subsection (3) of the proposed rule is also invalid but for a different reason. Unlike subsection (2), nothing is left to the parties' imagination as to the consequences an agency will encounter if it files a notice of voluntary dismissal of an administrative complaint containing nonjurisdictional allegations that were previously the subject of a voluntary dismissal. Those nonjurisdictional factual allegations contained in both complaints will be deemed dismissed with prejudice. The issue with regard to this rule provision is whether DOAH has the statutory authority to adopt a rule that requires dismissal of an administrative complaint with prejudice under these circumstances. Although no cases are directed on point, two district court of appeal decisions are instructive. In Great American Bank v. Division of Administrative Hearings, 412 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the First District Court of Appeal revised a hearing officer's order imposing sanctions for a party's failure to make discovery and for a witness' failure to give responsive testimony. The court ruled that certain portions of the model rules, which purported to give such authority to a hearing officer, were invalid because they conflicted with the discovery enforcement provisions found in the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 120.58(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). The Legislature subsequently amended Section 120.58 to specifically grant hearing officers the authority to pose sanctions to effect discovery. Ch. 84-173, Laws of Florida. In Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Tampa Heart Institute, 472 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the Second District Court of Appeal declared Model Rule 28-5.211 invalid to the extent the rule authorized a hearing officer to impose sanctions, including dismissal, to enforce procedural orders. The court rejected the argument that the same general rulemaking authority relied upon by DOAH as authority for Proposed Rule 22I-6.037, Sections 120.53 and 120.65(7), Florida Statutes (1985), authorized the model rule. Rather, any rule that provides a sanction in the form of a penalty must be based upon explicit statutory authority such as that found in Section 120.58(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), or Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). 9/ 472 So.2d at 747-48. Subsection (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 imposes the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. However, in contrast to the specific saction authority granted to hearing officers in Sections 120.58(1)(b) and 120.57(1)(b)5, no provision in Chapter 120 specifically authorizes DOAH to impose a sanction under the circumstances set forth in subsection (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037. Therefore, while I find the purpose of adopting subsection (3) of the proposed rule, to ensure failness, is laudable, this portion of the rule is invalid because DOAH does not possess the requisite legislative authority to adopt such a rule. Section 120.52(5)(b), Fla. Stat., as amended by Ch. 87-358, Section 2, Laws of Florida.

Florida Laws (8) 120.52120.53120.54120.56120.57120.60120.6557.111
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