Findings Of Fact Respondent Felo McAllister and his wife Dorothy own a home and dock on Texar Bayou off Escambia Bay in Pensacola, Florida. A storm sewer with a diameter of 15 to 18 inches empties into the Bayou near the dock. The silt- laden outflow from the storm sewer has resulted in a sand bar or berm two or three feet wide paralleling the shoreline from the McAllisters' property line to the dock. This sand bar separates a ditch caused by the outflow from Texar Bayou. Over the years, silt has accumulated underneath the dock. The McAllisters originally applied for a permit to dredge boat slips at the dock. Andrew Feinstein, an environmental specialist II in respondent Department's employ, evaluated the original application and recommended denial, because he felt extending the dock was preferable to dredging. The McAllisters then modified their application so as to seek a permit for dredging at the mouth of the storm sewer in order that the silt already deposited there would not wash underneath the dock. Mr. Feinstein and Michael Clark Applegate, an environmental specialist III and dredge and field supervisor employed by the Department, testified without contradiction that the Department has reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not violate any applicable rules. The permit DER proposes to issue contemplates that the berm will not be breached. The bottom on which the dredging is proposed to take place belongs to the City of Pensacola. Although under water, it is a part of a dedicated roadway. The City itself does maintenance dredging to ensure the efficiency of storm sewers, but is glad for assistance from private citizens in this regard. J. Felix, City Engineer for Pensacola, is authorized allow dredging on this road right of way, and has done so. See also respondent's exhibit No. 2. The site proposed for placement of the spoil is a low area affected by flooding. Fill there would affect drainage onto neighbors' property.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent DER issue respondent McAllister the permit it proposed to issue in its letter of September 14, 1979, upon condition that the spoil be placed at least 100 feet from the water's edge. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William L. Hyde, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Larry Jay Sauls and Ms. Harriett Tinsley Sauls 14 West Jordan Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Felo McAllister 2706 Blackshear Pensacola, Florida 32503
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1990, Respondent Eckert applied to Respondent DER for a permit seeking authorization to construct a 280-foot single-family recreational dock at 5766 Red Cedar Street in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The dock would extend waterward from that address and lot into Russell Bayou in Escambia County, Florida, a class III water of the State. When objections were filed to the original application for the 280-foot dock, Respondent Eckert amended his permit application and now requests a permit to build a 265-foot dock, meaning that the dock would extend 265 feet waterward from the mean high water line and, therefore, the boundary of the Respondent/applicant's property. The Petitioners are all adjacent or nearby land owners who object to the project, pursuant to Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), asserting that the project is contrary to the public interest in terms of recreational values or navigation. Russell Cove is a relatively-shallow body of water enclosed on three sides, with access to open water on its western end. Its depth fluctuates somewhat. It is tidally influenced, including lunar tides, which cause shallower-than-normal low water. The bottom of the cove is sandy with areas of rolling contours and shifting sandbars. The deepest points in the vicinity of the proposed dock vary between four and five and one-half feet. A 300-foot dock exists on the outward or westward end of Russell Cove. The channel widens to such an extent by the time it reaches the vicinity of that dock, however, that a 300-foot dock poses no navigational problem to boats using the interior of the cove. The applicant contends that the Petitioners who live eastward and "up the cove" from him have plenty of room to navigate past his proposed dock because, as his chart indicates, an apparently wide channel of slightly deeper water traverses the cove, waterward of all the docks in the cove, including that which he proposes to construct, with sufficient width beyond the end of his proposed dock to allow any boats which typically use the cove to navigate by it safely. The Petitioners who live on the interior of the cove, eastward of his proposed dock, and who would have to navigate by it, contend, however, that the safest route for them to navigate is immediately in front of or intersecting the tip of the location of the proposed dock. Ms. Bass testified for Petitioner Wittig. Her boat is equipped with a depth finder, and over the years of navigating in and out of the cove, she has learned that the supposedly wide channel referenced by the applicant is not actually a uniform wide, deep channel. Rather, there are sandbars occurring at various intervals, which sometimes shift in location, which point into the channel from the more southerly part of it, thus constricting it so that the safest passage is really a much narrower route closer to the ends of the docks and the proposed dock jutting into the channel. The safest passage is a slender route directly intersecting the tip of the location of the proposed dock. Ms. Bass established that there is already a narrow margin of maneuverability in the cove due to the intermittently shallow water, and, in stormy or foggy weather, the extra length of the dock might be unsafe. Petitioner Ericson has a non- motorized sailboat which must tack back and forth to enter or leave the cove when sailing into the wind. Thus, he needs a wide area to navigate in or out of the cove under certain prevailing wind conditions. Although DER's expert witness, Mr. Harp, supported the relative depth measurements established by the applicant (adjusted for seasonal tidal variations), he conceded that he had not measured an east/west line in the sandbar area described by Ms. Bass on the southerly side of the channel and jutting into the channel. Rather, he measured a north/south line and an east/west line in the route which Ms. Bass indicated she uses close to the docks and the proposed dock but not an east/west line in the sandbar area. He further conceded that the bottom was uneven or rolling in some areas. The applicant desires the extra dock length, compared to the 210-foot length of the Jones and Johnson piers on either side of him, so that he will be able to cast into slightly deeper water for fishing purposes. However, the depth prevailing at the 210-foot mark waterward from the shoreline is four feet, and the depth at the end of the proposed dock would only be approximately two inches deeper, 55 feet waterward of the other docks. Even out at the 300-foot waterward mark from shoreline, the water would be less than six inches deeper than it is at the 210-foot mark. Consequently, it was not shown how the applicant would gain any particular fishing advantage, in terms of deeper water, by locating the end of his dock some 55 feet waterward of the adjacent docks. Mr. Harp of DER visited the site to determine the water depths referenced above and to determine whether the dock would comply with Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the various pertinent rules concerning water quality contained in Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Harp made a biological appraisal of the site to determine the location and density of seagrass beds and to determine whether the project would adversely affect water quality in Russell Bayou. Seagrasses exist at the site only between approximately 130 and 150 feet waterward of the mean high water mark. The remaining bottom substrate waterward of that point to, including, and beyond the end of the proposed dock is simply bare sand. The dock is narrow enough not to damage seagrasses by shading. Based upon Mr. Harp's uncontroverted expert testimony, it is found that the project will not result in a violation of class III water quality standards and, indeed, no Petitioner disputes that fact. Except indirectly, through navigational impact, the proposed dock does not pose a significant adverse affect on public health, safety, welfare or the property of others. It was not shown that the dock would adversely affect the conservation of fish or wildlife and, indeed, those elements of the "public interest criteria" are undisputed. The proposed dock is considered permanent in nature and will have no significant historical or archeological resource impact. It will not cause a significant adverse effect on fishing values aside from the incidental effect its navigational impact might have on those values. The proposed dock will have some impact on navigation. As shown by Respondent's Exhibit 3, the dock will extend approximately 55 feet more waterward than the existing 210-foot Johnson pier. Although a channel width of four times a boat's length is an adequate margin of safety for an average boat sailed in a competent manner, the fact that the proposed dock would extend 55 feet beyond the extent of the adjacent Johnson dock and the fact, established by Ms. Bass, that there are intermittent shallow sandbar areas which further narrow the channel from the southerly margin of it, reveal that the safe navigational channel is much narrower at the location of the end of the proposed dock, than in other nearby areas. The proposed dock would intersect this narrow "safe channel" at its most constricted point or "pinched area". For this reason, the proposed dock with its length constitutes an impediment to navigation to both the power boat and sailboat navigation described by the Petitioners' witnesses. The pier existing at the westward opening of the cove, although it is 300 feet in length, does not impose an impediment to navigation because the channel is much wider at that point than at the constricted point where the applicant's proposed 265-foot dock would intersect it. The dock would also pose some detrimental effect on the recreational values of the project site to the Petitioners in terms of their passive recreational interest in an unobstructed view. Further, the fact that the dock would infringe on a long-accepted course of travel for boats, which is located some 50 feet or so beyond the end of the existing docks would cause both a navigational and recreational adverse impact in terms of the "public interest criteria" of Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. No other adverse impacts would be occasioned by installation of the dock, however, and these adverse impacts can be alleviated if the dock permit were conditioned upon an alteration so that the proposed dock does not extend more than 210 feet waterward of the mean high water mark. The proposed dock will not cause any significant, cumulative or secondary adverse impacts.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by DER granting the permit sought by Respondent Eckert on the condition that the dock proposed to be constructed, and for which the permit is sought, is restricted to a length of no more than 210 feet waterward of the mean high water mark at the Respondent/applicant's property, including that portion of the dock represented by the terminal platform. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-1181 Petitioner Richard J. and Judith A. Wittig's Proposed Findings of Facts 1-17. Accepted. Petitioner Robert E. and Suzanne E. Stoyer's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-7. Accepted. Rejected as speculative and not supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. Respondent DER's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-12. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by preponderant evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not supported by preponderant evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Accepted but not itself materially dispositive. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by preponderant evidence. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Richard Coates, Esq. Pat Comer, Esq. Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Steven E. Quinnell, Esq. JAMES L. CHASE, P.A. 101 East Government Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Robert E. and Suzanne E. Stoyer 5768 Red Cedar Street Pensacola, FL 32507 S.P. and P.A. Gallup 5660 Innerarity Circle Pensacola, FL 32507 E. P. Ericson 5652 Innerarity Circle Pensacola, FL 32507-8300 Philip E. Johnson 5794 Red Cedar Street Pensacola, FL 32507 Richard J. and Judith A. Wittig 11903 Autumnwood Lane Ft. Washington, MD 20744 Robert Eckert, Jr. 4817 Ravine Court Mobile, AL 36608
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, David E. Musselman, is the owner of Lot 23, Block 22, Cudjoe Gardens Eighth Addition, Cudjoe Key, Monroe County, Florida. The lot measures 127 feet along its front and rear property line, 135 feet along its side property lines and, similar to adjacent lots, its rear property line abuts an artificially created waterway. Currently, most of petitioner's lot enjoys an elevation of six feet; however, from the edge of the waterway landward a distance of approximately 20 feet [to what has been referred to as the "toe of the existing slope" in these proceedings] the surface consists of exposed caprock at an elevation of approximately four inches above mean high water. It is petitioner's desire to construct a single family residence upon such lot and, incident to such construction, to erect a seawall along the edge of the waterway such that the elevation at the waterway will be increased by two feet, and to backfill from the seawall to his home. Such backfilling would require the deposition of approximately 3,540 square feet of fill within the Department's jurisdiction, which was shown to extend from the edge of the waterway to the toe of the existing slope, and would raise the elevation in such area two feet above existing grade. On December 16, 1991, petitioner filed an application with respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (Department), for an exemption from the Department's wetland permitting requirements. If approved, such exemption would allow petitioner to construct the vertical seawall along the waterway, and backfill from the seawall to his proposed home. By notice of agency action dated February 14, 1992, the Department proposed to deny petitioner's application predicated on its conclusion that his proposal did not meet the exemption criteria established by Rule 17- 312.050(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner filed a timely protest to contest the Department's conclusion. The exemption Pertinent to this case, Rule 17-312.050(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code, exempts from permitting the following activities: (g) Construction of seawalls or riprap, including only that backfilling needed to level the land behind the seawalls or riprap, in artificially created waterways where such construction will not violate existing water quality standards, impede navigation or adversely affect flood control. An artificially created waterway shall be defined as a body of water that has been totally dredged or excavated and which does not overlap natural surface waters of the state. For the purpose of this exemption, artificially created waterways shall also include existing residential canal systems . . . . At hearing, the parties stipulated that the waterway which abuts the rear property line of petitioner's lot is an artificially created waterway, as well as an existing residential canal, and that the proposed project will not violate existing water quality standards, impede navigation, or adversely affect flood control. Notwithstanding, the Department contends that petitioner's application should be denied because no need has been demonstrated that would support the construction of the seawall along the edge of the waterway, as opposed to locating it further inland, and therefore the amount of backfill, with its attendant loss of wetlands, is excessive. For the reasons set forth in the conclusions of law, the Department's position is untenable as a matter of law. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving petitioner's application for an exemption to construct a seawall, and to backfill from such seawall to his proposed home, as applied for. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of June 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has an option to purchase property located at 301-307 Island Way Boulevard, Island Estate, Clearwater, Florida, on which he proposes to construct ten townhouses. Initially Petitioner asked for two variances. The first variance was for 25.12 feet to allow construction on a lot only 124.88 feet wide. This variance was granted for this nonconforming lot. The second variance, for 13.24 feet to allow construction of the ten townhouse complex 12 feet from the side property line, was denied by the Clearwater Code Adjustment Board. The Board concluded the variance requested did not meet the requirements of Section 45.24 of the Clearwater Land Development Code. Petitioner presented evidence that if the lot had been 150 feet wide they would have had 90 feet to build on without requesting any variance. However, since the lot was nonconforming, in order to have 89 feet on which to place the building, the requested variance would be necessary. Petitioner also presented evidence that the construction of ten townhouses on this lot is necessary for the project to be on a solid economic basis. Subsequent to the denial of this variance by the Development Code Adjustment Board, Petitioner submitted plans, which have been approved by the City of Clearwater, to erect nine townhouses on this property without any variance needed. However, these townhouses would be smaller than would be the ten townhouses initially proposed and would provide a lesser return on the capital invested.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents Paul Crum, Sr., and Paul Crum, Jr. (the "Crums"), are entitled to the Noticed General Permit issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") for the construction of a single- family residential dock and associated structures.
Findings Of Fact Background The Crums are the owners of the riparian property located at 15696 Shark Road West, Jacksonville, Florida. The Crum property is adjacent to Pumpkin Hill Creek, which lies within the Nassau River-St. Johns River Marshes Aquatic Preserve. Extending from the Crum property into Pumpkin Hill Creek is an existing wood dock approximately 90 feet long and four feet wide, with a platform near the landward end of the dock. Petitioner Brooks owns the property immediately adjacent to and north of the Crum property. Petitioner Brooks has a dock and boat lift. Petitioner Cole owns the property immediately adjacent to and southeast of the Crum property. The Cole property is located on a salt marsh and has no dock. Petitioner Jones lives approximately 3,200 feet north of the Crum property, on a tributary to Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones has fished Pumpkin Hill Creek and the surrounding waters for over 25 years. Noticed General Permits are a type of environmental resource permit granted by rule for those activities which have been determined to have minimal impacts to water resources. Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427 grants by rule a general permit to construct a single family pier, along with boat lifts and terminal platforms, provided certain specific criteria are met. In August 2005, the Crums applied for a Noticed General Permit to extend their existing dock into deeper water. The Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for Noticed General Permit, but later rescinded the authorization after Petitioner Brooks complained to the Department that the landward end of the existing dock is located only 21 feet from her property boundary and, therefore, did not comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(d), which requires that a dock be set back a minimum of 25 feet "inside the applicant's riparian rights lines." In November 2005, the Crums re-applied for a Noticed General Permit. Their revised plans called for removal of the existing dock and construction of a new dock extending approximately 255 feet out into Pumpkin Hill Creek. The proposed dock would be located a minimum of 25 feet inside the Crums' riparian rights lines. On December 6, 2005, the Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Noticed General Permit for the revised dock, stating that the project satisfied the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427, as well as the conditions for authorization to perform activities on state-owned submerged lands set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and for activities in an aquatic preserve under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20. In April 2006, Petitioners filed three petitions for hearing with the Department alleging that the proposed dock significantly impedes navigation by restricting access to a tidal creek and extends more waterward than necessary to access a water depth of (minus) -4 feet at mean low water, which is prohibited for docks in aquatic preserves under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.005(3)(b)3. Petitioners attached to their petitions a copy of a bathymetric survey showing the elevations of the submerged lands in the vicinity of the proposed project. In response to the information contained in the survey, the Crums revised their plans to shorten the dock to its currently proposed length of 186.56 feet. A new Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Notice General Permit was then issued by the Department on October 16, 2006. The final dock project consists of: (a) removal of the existing wood dock; (b) construction of a four-foot wide, 186.56-foot long, single family residential dock consisting of an access pier, a 12-foot by 12-foot terminal platform, and a 14-foot by 20-foot open boat lift with catwalk (the “proposed dock”). The proposed dock will terminate where the water will be four feet deep at mean low water. Navigating in and Near the Tidal Creek To the south of the Crum property is a wide expanse of salt marsh. Within the salt marsh are unnamed tidal creeks. The mouth of one tidal creek that flows to Pumpkin Hill Creek is located approximately 90 feet south of the existing Crum dock. The tidal creek is shallow and is not navigable at or near low tide. Petitioner Jones owns an 18-foot flatboat which he sometimes keeps at his residence and sometimes at Petitioner Brooks' property. The boat draws about one foot of water. Petitioner Jones uses this boat to fish in the tidal creek located near the Crum property about ten times every month. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner Brooks or Petitioner Cole ever navigate in or otherwise use this tidal creek. There are many other tidal creeks located in the marshes associated with Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones boats and fishes in most of them. Petitioner Jones said that, currently, he must wait two hours past low tide for the water depth to be sufficient for him to get into the tidal creek near the Crum property. His usual course to the creek lies just beyond the end of the existing Crum dock. He claims there is a channel there, but no channel is shown on the survey or in any of the parties' photographs. After the proposed dock is constructed, Petitioner Jones' usual course to the tidal will be obstructed. He contends that the new course he would have to take to the tidal creek will take him across shallower areas of Pumpkin Hill Creek so that he will have to wait two more hours (a total of four hours) after low tide to get into the creek. Therefore, Petitioner Jones' alleged injury is the reduction of the hours available to him to navigate in and out of the tidal creek for fishing. The existing Crum dock terminates on a broad mud flat which is exposed at mean low water. However, the bathymetric survey shows the mud flat is at a lower elevation near the end of the dock so water covers this area before it covers the rest of the mud flat. However, the bathymetric survey also shows the elevation of the bottom rising as one moves south from the existing dock. At the mouth of the tidal creek the elevation is 1.0 feet NGVD (National Geodetic Vertical Datum, an official, surveyed reference point). Because the tidal creek drains into the main body of Pumpkin Hill Creek, a reasonable inference can be made that the bottom elevations in the creek generally become higher (and the water depths decrease) as one moves up the creek toward dry land. Prop scars in the exposed bottom at the end of the existing dock indicate that boats have traveled over this area when the water was so shallow that the engine props were striking the bottom. Prop scarring can cause turbidity and damage to benthic organisms. The bathymetric survey indicates that mean high water in this area of Pumpkin Hill Creek is 3.03 feet NGVD, and the mean low water is -1.78 feet NGVD. The mean tidal fluctuation between mean low water and mean high water is thus 4.81 feet. Randall Armstrong, who was accepted as an expert in navigation and piloting, explained that in this area, where there are two daily tides, the water elevation will generally increase by 1/12 of the mean tidal fluctuation in the first hour after mean low water, another 2/12 of the fluctuation in the second, and 3/12 in the third hour. Applying this general rule to the tidal fluctuation here of 4.81 feet results in an estimated 1.2-foot increase in water elevation two hours after low tide and a 2.4-foot increase three hours after low tide. Based on the mean low water elevation of -1.78 feet NGVD, the water elevation would usually be about -0.6 foot NGVD two hours after low tide and 0.6 foot NGVD three hours after low tide. Therefore, the tidal creek (with a bottom elevation of 1.0 foot NGVD at the mouth) would usually be "dry" two hours after low tide and would usually have less than a foot of water three hours after low tide. That evidence contradicts Petitioner Jones' statement that he now navigates into the tidal creek two hours after low tide. That might occasionally be possible, but the bathymetric survey indicates the creek would usually be too shallow at that time. In fact, the evidence suggests that the tidal creek is only reliably navigable without causing prop scars to the bottom by using boats with very shallow draft and waiting until high tide (or shortly before or after) when the water depth at the mouth of the creek would be about two feet. It was Mr. Armstrong's opinion that the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation at the mouth of the tidal creek determines when and how long the tidal creek is navigable, and those times would not be affected by the proposed dock. He described the new course that a boater would use to navigate into the tidal creek after the proposed dock is built. He used the bathymetric survey to show that when the water is deep enough to navigate into the tidal creek, the water depth is also sufficient to navigate the new course. The proposed dock might, as Petitioner Jones alleges, cause boaters to traverse a longer section of the mudflat then they do currently. However, the more persuasive testimony supports the Crums' position that the navigability of the tidal creek is controlled by its shallowest point at the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation and that the proposed dock will not interfere with navigation of the tidal creek by requiring boaters to traverse shallower areas. Petitioner Jones testified that he regularly navigates his boat close to the existing Crum dock. The evidence does not indicate that the proposed dock would cause an unreasonable risk of collision for boaters using the new course to the tidal creek.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that grants Noticed General Permit No. 16-253057-002-EG to the Crums. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Trevey is constructing condominium units on property adjacent to Oyster Creek in Charlotte County, and seeks to develop waterfront facilities for the use of condominium residents. Oyster Creek is a navigable stream flowing into Lemon Bay and thence into the Gulf of Mexico. The proposed site of Dock No. 1 is along the south bank of Oyster Creek in that portion of the stream which constitutes the main channel. Dock No. 2 would be located on a branch or loop off the main channel. The pedestrian bridge would cross this stream near the proposed site of dock No. 2 and would be part of a nature walk on Respondent Trevey's property situated on the south bank of the main channel. At some earlier time the stream was altered by the dredging of a canal which became the main channel and created the island which is the proposed site of the nature walk. In addition to this canal which forms a portion of the main channel, a network of smaller canals has been constructed on the north side of Oyster Creek, generally across from the sites of the construction proposed herein. These canals provide water access for homeowners in this area. Respondent Trevey observed some 92 boats moored in these canals. The main channel of Oyster Creak provides boater access to Lemon Hay and the Gulf of Mexico. Construction of proposed Dock No. 1 in this channel would therefore affect navigation to some degree. Dock No. 1 has a proposed length of 300 feet and a width of 4 feet. The dock would be built two to three feet away from the south bank of Oyster Creek, thus extending about six feet into the channel. The dock would be used to moor boats, on a "parallel parking" basis. Assuming a boat width of eight feet and proper mooring, protrusion into the stream would be approximately fourteen feet. Creek width in the Dock No. 1 site is about sixty feet. The water is shallow and varies with the seasons and tides. Navigation near the north bank opposite the Dock No. 1 site is not possible due to the presence of a large oyster bed. Therefore boat operators tend to maneuver their craft on the (proposed) dock side of the creek center line. The distance from the deepest part of the creek to the south bank where Dock No. 1 would be located averages about 33 feet. The proposed dock and moored boats would take up nearly half of this distance. Since boaters must stay near the deepest part of the channel, as well as avoid the oyster bed on the north bank, navigation around the dock and moored boats could prove difficult. A hazardous situation could occur when boats were passing in opposite directions in the dock area or when any Dock No. 1 boats were improperly moored. Operation of powerboats in the vicinity of Dock No. 2 is not feasible due to shallow waters nor is this branch of the stream utilized for access to open water. Therefore, construction of Dock No. 2 would not impede navigation. The presence in the area of a paved road, bridges, an industrial park, Petitioner's boat ramp and numerous canals contribute to degradation of water quality, disruption of wildlife and soil erosion. Studies made by Respondents established that water quality would not be further degraded by construction of the proposed facilities, nor would any wildlife or vegetation be significantly disturbed. The facilities are designed and located to avoid creating or contributing to soil erosion.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a permit to Howard Trevey for the construction of the proposed pedestrian bridge, nature walk and Dock No. 2, but deny that portion of the application pertaining to the proposed Dock No. 1. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Makela 2642 Titania Road Englewood, Florida 33533 Richard L. Smith, Esquire 2070 Ringling Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 33577 Charles G. Stephens, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether proposals by Richard and Mildred Olson to widen an existing bridge (designated Bridge 1) and construct two new pedestrian bridges (designated Bridges 2 and 4) across Bessey Creek in Martin County, Florida, qualify for the Noticed General Permit established by Rule 62-341.475; and (2) whether Petitioner participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose under Section 120.595(1). (Citations to sections are to the 2000 codification of Florida Statutes. Rule citations are to the current Florida Administrative Code.)
Findings Of Fact Richard and Mildred Olson own property in Rustic Hills Phase III in Martin County, Florida. The Olsons own lots 191, 192, 195, 212, 213, and 214. Each lot is approximately two acres in size. The Olson home is on lot 213, and a rental home is on lot 195. On their property, the Olsons raise miniature goats, guinea hens, and peacocks; they also have ducks, geese, chickens, and dogs. Bessey Creek winds through Rustic Hills and the Olsons' lots. The Olsons propose to use DEP's NGP for Minor Activities established by adoption of Rule 62-341.475 to widen one existing bridge and construct two others for access to their property across Bessey Creek. Bessey Creek is a tributary of the St. Lucie River, through man-made Canal 23. Navigating upstream on Bessey Creek, a boat would have to pass under the Murphy Road Bridge, which is 9 feet, one inch above mean high water (MHW), just before reaching the first of the four bridges involved in this case, Bridge 1. Bridge 1 is a steel span bridge (with no pilings in the water) that connects two portions of lot 191, which is split by the creek. The Olsons propose to widen existing Bridge 1. It is not clear from the evidence whether pilings will be required to widen Bridge 1. But it seems clear that a centerline stream clearance (horizontal width) of 16 feet and a bridge height above mean high water (MHW) (vertical clearance) of 9 feet will be maintained. Proposed pedestrian Bridge 2 is the next bridge upstream, at a point where the creek is only approximately 24 feet wide from MHW to MHW. It is designed to be a 192 square foot piling-supported bridge, with an 8-foot wide by 24-foot long walkway. To support Bridge 2, sets of pilings will placed in the creek bed so as to maintain a centerline stream clearance of 16 feet. The proposed vertical clearance for Bridge 2 is 8 feet above MHW. Existing Bridge 3, the next upstream, is at a point where the creek is approximately 35 feet wide from MHW to MHW. Bridge 3 is a wooden bridge approximately 25 years old. It connects lots 192 and 193 to lot 191. The Olsons use existing Bridge 3 on a daily basis. Bridge 3 was built to span the creek; later, two sets of wooden piles were added. There is a centerline stream clearance of 13 feet between the piles. Vertical clearance is 8 feet above MHW. Proposed pedestrian Bridge 4, the farthest upstream, is designed in the same manner as proposed pedestrian Bridge 2. It is located at a point where the creek is approximately 35 feet wide from MHW to MHW. Bridge 4 will connect lots 195 and 212. Navigability Proposed pedestrian Bridges 2 and 4 are designed to have the same 8-foot vertical clearance as existing Bridge 3; they are designed to have three feet more horizontal clearance than existing Bridge 3. Neither they nor widened Bridge 1 will restrict navigation as much as existing structures, natural conditions (including numerous fallen trees, underwater snags and low, overhanging vegetation), and docked boats. The United States Coast Guard and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FFWC) concur that the bridges would not have any deleterious effect on the navigation in this area of Bessey Creek. While not specifically alleging impedance of navigation, Petitioner alleged that existing Bridges 1 and 3 are lower than measured by the Olsons' environmental consultant. But there was no evidence to support such a finding. Meanwhile, the Olsons' consultant explained how he determined the vertical clearance of those bridges above MHW by measurements adjusted for MHW using NOAA tide charts. Even if existing Bridges 1 and 3 had less vertical clearance than determined by the Olsons' consultant, Bridges 2 and 4 are designed to have the same vertical clearance as the consultant determined Bridge 3 to have. For that reason, even if the consultant's determinations were incorrect, the vertical clearances of Bridges 2 and 4 are designed to be the same as the vertical clearance of Bridge 3, and the vertical clearance of Bridges 2 and 4 will not impede navigation any more than Bridge 3. Flooding Bessey Creek is a typical tidal creek. It has low volume and low velocity. Being influenced by tidal ebb and flow, its flow is not continuously downstream except during and just after times of high precipitation, such as hurricanes. Under these conditions, build-up of debris around pilings of these bridges would not be expected, and none was observed around at the existing bridges. The chances of vegetation or organic matter building up over time in the area of these bridges to create a beaver dam effect and cause flooding are small. The proposed new pedestrian bridges have four pilings, which is typically less than a single-family dock. The pilings of a single-family dock are closer to the shoreline and, particularly with a boat alongside, would have more potential to trap debris and cause flooding than the proposed bridges. The same can be said of the fallen trees and low, overhanging vegetation existing under natural conditions in Bessey Creek. The proposed bridges are not expected to have an adverse impact of a significant nature with respect to off-site flooding. Petitioner did not present any expert testimony regarding allegations of off-site flooding potential. Dan White testified as a lay person that flooding occurs in the area during times of high precipitation and that Petitioner was concerned that the proposed bridges would exacerbate those conditions. But, while the evidence was clear that flooding is a condition to be expected under certain conditions in low-lying areas like Rustic Hills Phase III, White failed to make any causal connection between existing periodic flooding and the bridges, existing or proposed. Improper Purpose Petitioner's request for hearing, by letter dated November 16, 2000, thanked DEP for "this opportunity to contest the granting of a Noticed General Permit to the Olson's [sic]" and also requested "an Administrative Review to ensure your department has all the information needed to make a fair decision regarding this matter." It also requested: "Since we are a small community, I hope the Department will review this petition in light of the author's lack of familiarity with the specific form and format used by the environmental consultants and those who work with you on a regular basis." Petitioner "respectfully submit[ted] the following information which is required to dispute the Department's actions and to request an Administrative hearing if necessary." In response to Petitioner's letter, DEP referred the matter to DOAH. Apparently, Petitioner (and the other parties) did not receive a copy of the Initial Order. Petitioner, which was not represented by counsel at the time, failed to comply with the Amended Initial Order entered on March 23, 2001. But apparently neither did the Olsons, who also were not represented by counsel at the time, or DEP, which was. The Olsons complained by letter filed April 26, 2001, that Petitioner had not contacted them. But there was no indication or evidence that, up to that point in time, the Olsons attempted to contact Petitioner or DEP, or that DEP attempted to contact Petitioner or the Olsons, in response to the Amended Initial Order. The Joint Response to Initial Order filed by the Olsons and DEP on May 1, 2001, recited that Petitioner's contact person-of-record, Treasurer Jim Fyfe, "no longer was associated with Rustic Hills" and that Petitioner's President, Dan White, was "out of town and could not be reached." Based on the Joint Response to Initial Order filed by DEP and the Olson's, final hearing was scheduled for May 24, 2001. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions entered along with the Notice of Hearing on May 3, 2001, required that the parties exchange witness lists and copies of exhibits and file their witness lists by May 14, 2001. Petitioner complied with the requirement to file a witness list and also included a list of exhibits. There was no indication or evidence that Petitioner did not exchange exhibits as well. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions also required: "No later than May 18, 2001, the parties shall confer with each other to determine whether this cause can be amicably resolved." When the Olsons' environmental consultant, Bruce Jerner, went to Dan White's home on May 14, 2001, to provide him a copy of the Olsons' exhibits, he invited White to discuss settlement in accordance with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. White responded to the effect that, even if Petitioner did not have a strong case, Petitioner preferred to go to hearing, and White did not want to mediate or discuss settlement with Jerner. At that point, Jerner indicated that he would be sending White a letter confirming the Olsons' attempt to comply with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. The letter dated the next day requested "an informal conference to determine whether the above referenced case can be amicably resolved and avoid hearing proceedings." Significantly, there was no indication or evidence that DEP complied with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions in any respect. It appears that DEP distanced itself from the dispute between Petitioner and the Olsons, preferring to allow them to settle or litigate as they saw fit. In view of DEP's noncompliance, DEP at least certainly may not rely on Petitioner's noncompliance as a ground for an award of attorney fees and costs. In addition, while DEP's noncompliance does not excuse Petitioner from complying, it helps put Petitioner's actions in context and is relevant on the question whether Petitioner's noncompliance was evidence of improper purpose. In this regard, White testified to his belief that he had complied with all ALJ orders but did not "know why I would be obligated to respond to the consultant for Mr. Olson with regard to hearing or any other matters." While DEP and the Olsons in part cite Petitioner's failure to follow prehearing procedures, they primarily rely on the weakness of Petitioner's presentation at final hearing and posthearing efforts as evidence of improper purpose. But this evidence must be evaluated along with other factors resulting in the weakness of Petitioner's case. Not only did White misinterpret the Order of Pre- Hearing Instructions, the evidence indicated that he was unfamiliar with the administrative process in general and also was confused about the difference between the administrative hearing scheduled for May 24, 2001, and the County permitting proceedings on the bridges which also were on-going. White indicated repeatedly during final hearing that he and Petitioner had just recently learned more about distinctions between the administrative and County permit proceedings. As a result, White was beginning to recognize that several issues Petitioner had attempted to raise in this administrative proceeding may be relevant to on-going County permit proceedings but not this administrative proceeding. When it was established and explained at final hearing that DEP had no jurisdiction to require demolition or repair of existing bridges in this proceeding, White agreed to withdraw that part of Petitioner's request for relief. When it was established and explained that issues Petitioner raised relating to the "public interest" test under Rules Chapter 21-18 were premature, White did not object to those issues being dropped. Later, when Petitioner attempted to raise water quality issues relating to excrement from Olson livestock crossing these bridges, and it was ruled that no such issue was raised in Petitioner's request for hearing, White accepted the ruling. Final hearing proceeded on the only remaining issue specifically raised by Petitioner (alleged off-site flooding) (together with navigability--an issue addressed in the Olsons' presentation but not raised in Petitioner's request for hearing). To use White's words, Petitioner did not "have a very sophisticated presentation." Petitioner had no expert testimony, and White's lay testimony did not make a causal connection between flooding and the bridges. After the presentation of evidence, Petitioner did not withdraw its request for hearing in view of the evidence presented; but, in fairness, neither was Petitioner asked to do so. Petitioner did not order a Transcript, or a copy after the Olsons ordered a Transcript, and did not file a PRO. It is fairly clear from the evidence that Petitioner did not participate in this proceeding primarily to cause unnecessary delay. Even if Petitioner had never requested a hearing, the Olsons did not have all of the authorizations required of DEP for their proposals. In addition, County permits apparently also are required. It seems reasonably clear that, had Petitioner retained a competent expert to evaluate its case, the expert probably would have advised Petitioner that it would not be able to make a causal connection between flooding and the bridges. Had Petitioner retained counsel prior to final hearing, counsel probably would have advised Petitioner not to proceed with its request for hearing because, without a causal connection between flooding and the bridges, Petitioner would not be able to prevail. But there was no indication or evidence that Petitioner had and disregarded the benefit of professional advice. Under the totality of these circumstances, it was not proven that Petitioner's participation in this proceeding was for an improper purpose--i.e., primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or securing the approval of the Olsons' applications.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order: denying Petitioner's challenge to the propriety of the Olsons' use of the NGP for minor activities for their proposals; authorizing the Olsons to use the NGP for their proposals (DEP File Nos. 43- 0137548-002 and 43-0158123-002) subject to the design criteria limitations and other conditions in the applicable general permit rules; and denying the Motion for Attorney's Fees from Petitioner under Section 120.595(1). Jurisdiction is reserved to enter a final order on the part of the Motion for Attorney's Fees seeking sanctions under Section 120.569(2)(e). DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Dan White, President Rustic Phase III Property Owners Association 3337 Southwest Bessey Creek Trail Palm City, Florida 34990 Tim Morell, Esquire 1933 Tom-a-Toe Road Lantana, Florida 33426 Elizabeth P. Bonan, Esquire Cornett, Googe, Ross & Earle, P.A. 401 East Osceola Street Stuart, Florida 32991 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Office of General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David B. Struhs, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for an environmental resource permit to remove two canal plugs in the Cahill canal system should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The proposed project On March 19, 1998, Petitioner Cahill submitted a permit application to the Department to remove two canal plugs in the Cahill Pines and Palms subdivision on Big Pine key. A backhoe would be used to dredge and lower the plugs to a depth of minus five feet mean low water (-5 ft. MLW) for the purpose of providing boating access to the properties now isolated from open water. The Cahill canal system is located within class III waters of the state which open into Pine Channel, a natural waterbody designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW). In 1991 and 1995 Petitioner Cahill submitted permit applications to the Department to remove the same two canal plugs. Those applications were initially denied and the denials were litigated in formal administrative hearings. Those hearings resulted in Department final orders denying both applications.3 Background4 In July, 1991, the Department received a permit application requesting the removal of two canal plugs down to a depth of minus five-and-a-half feet NGVD. A formal administrative hearing was conducted on March 3 and 4, 1994, in Key West, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly designated Hearing Officer (now Administrative Law Judge) of the Division of Administrative Hearings. That initial permit application denial was based upon water quality considerations and the project's failure to meet the public interest test. On May 17, 1995, Petitioner submitted a permit application to the Department which was denied. The basis for the permit denial was that the project was substantially similar to the previously litigated project. On April 23, 1996, a second formal administrative hearing was held in Key West, Florida, before Administrative Law Judge Susan B. Kirkland. Judge Kirkland found that the 1995 permit application did not address the issues raised by the Department in the first administrative hearing. Judge Kirkland also concluded that the 1995 application should be denied on the basis of res judicata. The Department entered a Final Order on September 12, 1996, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied to support the denial of Petitioner's 1995 application. New facts/changed conditions In all material aspects, the proposed dredging activity in the current permit application is identical to the previously proposed dredging activity. Petitioner Cahill seeks to lower the two canal plugs to allow boat access. The documents submitted in support of the current application do not propose any significant changes to what was proposed in the two prior applications. Petitioner Cahill provided copies of provisions of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary Management Plan and two Monroe County Ordinances, in support of the current permit application. This information does not constitute new facts or changed conditions sufficient to characterize the proposed project as substantially different from the previously denied applications. Petitioner Cahill provided a list of "enhancements" in the current permit application seeking to provide reasonable assurance for issuance of an environmental resource permit. These proposed "enhancements" are not binding on the Petitioner Cahill's members and do not constitute such new facts or changed conditions as to make the project substantially different from the previously denied applications. The differences between the current application and the two previously denied applications are primarily cosmetic differences. The substance of the matter is unchanged in any material detail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case denying Petitioner's pending application for an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1998.
The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
