Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., is the holder of a motor vehicle dealer license issued by the Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("the Department"). Richard R. Borst ("Borst") is the president of Respondent Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., and one of two stockholders in the company. At all times material hereto, the Respondent maintained a business address at 110 N.W. 18th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Borst also operates an auto parts business at the same address as the motor vehicle dealership. On or about June 9, 1989, Borst appeared before the Honorable James C. Payne, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, and entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen motor vehicle parts in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2314 & 2 in Case Number 89-6032- Cr-PAYNE-(01), United States v. Richard Borst,. Based on the plea entered and the plea agreement then before the court, Borst was adjudicated guilty in a Criminal Judgment dated June 28, 1989. Imposition of a sentence of confinement was suspended and Borst was placed on probation for a period of three (3) years. Borst was also fined Fifty Dollars ($50.00). Borst's conviction arose in connection with his purchase of auto parts from a "chop shop" (i.e., an operation which dismantled stolen cars and sold the parts,) in the Connecticut area. The purchase took place in May, 1987. In April, 1988, Borst met with state and federal investigators and agreed to fully cooperate with a task force set up to investigate the operation. He also agreed to testify against the individuals involved. While Borst was in Connecticut waiting to testify, the other defendants entered guilty pleas. In Respondent's initial dealer license application dated September 24, 1987, Borst stated under oath that he was not facing criminal charges. On April 27, 1989, Borst, as president of Respondent, signed an application to renew Respondent's license, stating under oath: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application. On January 18, 1989, Borst and his attorney signed a "Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence", in United States v. Richard Borst, Criminal No. B-89-6-(TFGD), United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the "Connecticut Case"). This document expressly acknowledges that an Information was pending against Borst in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that Borst wished to plead guilty to the offense charged, and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Florida. The Information entered in the Connecticut Case, charged Borst with violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, for transporting motor vehicle parts in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen. The date of this Information was not established, but it was clearly on or before January 18, 1989. Thus, sometime prior to January 18, 1989, Borst was charged with criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, and these charges were pending when Borst signed and filed Respondent's renewal application for 1989. Petitioner contends that Borst's conviction is directly related to the business of being a motor vehicle dealer, especially since Borst operates a motor vehicle parts business in conjunction with his motor vehicle dealership. However, the evidence presented provided only a very limited factual background regarding the conviction, none of Petitioner's representatives talked with the investigators or prosecutors in the criminal case and no evidence was presented regarding the Respondent's role in the transactions leading to Borst's conviction. At the time of the hearing, Borst was fifty-three (53) years of age. Within the last twenty-four (24) months, he has suffered numerous health problems including a nervous breakdown which necessitated an eighteen (18) week period of confinement to his residence for rest. He currently undergoes twice- weekly therapy with a psychiatrist and has been taking an antidepressant prescription. In addition, in October of 1989, he was admitted to the hospital for a heart condition. Subsequently, a balloon angioplasty was performed on him. He was later re-admitted to the hospital for five (5) days as a result of post surgery complications. He is also an insulin dependent diabetic. He attributes most of these health problems to the stress and turmoil of his criminal conviction. In light of his emotional and physical condition, he has been required to reduce his work load. Borst has been actively trying to sell the existing business in order to retire the outstanding indebtedness on the business and the property on which it is located. There is no evidence that the Respondent and/or any of its duly elected officers or stockholders have ever been subjected to any other complaints and/or investigations by the Department or by any other investigatory or regulatory agency during the past seventeen (17) years since it was originally licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order which finds Respondent not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1990.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should be licensed as an independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation of fact, the parties agreed: Petitioner applied for a motor vehicle dealer's license for a dealership to be operated at 2401 Central Avenue in St. Petersburg, Florida. The application was denied by the Department because it appears the applicant has no experience in the motor vehicle business and, in fact, applied for the license to allow an individual by the name of Lloyd Blocker to operate and have continued involvement in the motor vehicle business. Petitioner was aware at the time of his application that Mr. Blocker had been denied a motor vehicle license in Florida in February 1994 and had been convicted of a felony in Alaska involving the unlawful rolling back of odometers in motor vehicles. In addition, Mr. Rinier was aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles would not allow Mr. Blocker to hold a license to deal in motor vehicles in Florida. Mr. Rinier and Mr. Blocker have an ongoing business dealing with the sale of motor vehicles. Mr. Rinier knows and knew at all times pertinent hereto that Mr. Blocker could not operate such a business on his own. The Department of Motor Vehicles contends that Mr. Blocker cannot operate or be involved in any facet of the motor vehicle business in any capacity. If Mr. Rinier were to provide written assurances that Mr. Blocker would not be involved in any way with a business operated under a license if issued, it would issue a license, assuming Mr. Rinier were otherwise qualified for licensure. Mr. Rinier is unwilling to provide that assurance in writing. However, Petitioner contends his sole desire is to make money from the operation of a dealership. If the license were issued, ownership of the business would be and remain in the Petitioner's name. He had already paid lease costs and all other costs relating to the business, and he will not operate it without Mr. Blocker's participation in some form. The present relationship with Mr. Blocker involves sale of the buildings where the dealership would operate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order denying a motor vehicle dealer license to Petitioner, Harvey G. Rinier. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Waller, Esquire John L. Waller, P.A. 467 Second Avenue, North _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1997. St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Gabrielle L. A. Taylor, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact Facts Stipulated to by the Parties: Respondent Platinum Motor Cars, Inc. (Platinum), holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, number VI-17331, issued by the Department. Joseph A. Camino III was formerly the principal and licensee of an entity known as J & J Auto Sales. The Department filed two Administrative Complaints against J & J Auto Sales, Case Nos. DMV-88-42 and DMV-90-01. After informal hearings on each of those Complaints, J & J Auto Sales was assessed and subsequently paid civil fines. No license held by Joseph A. Camino III has ever been revoked by the Department. Joseph A. Camino III has never been convicted of a crime which resulted in his being prohibited from continuing to hold a motor vehicle dealer license under Section 320.27(9)(s), Florida Statutes. Lynette Bowman Camino was listed as an officer and director of Platinum Motor Cars, Inc., on the initial application for licensure filed by the corporation. Lynette Bowman Camino is the wife of Joseph A. Camino, III. Lynette Bowman Camino has never held a motor vehicle dealer license in her individual name. Lynette Bowman Camino has never been convicted of a crime which would prohibit her from holding a motor vehicle dealer license under Section 320.27(9)(s), Florida Statutes. Before the issuance of the license to Platinum, Lynette Bowman Camino withdrew as an officer or director of the corporation. The Department advised Platinum in a letter dated April 8, 1992, that its application was initially denied for the reasons set forth in that letter. On April 13, 1992, Michael J. Smith, President of Platinum, executed an affidavit as a condition of the Department's approval of the application for license. The salient portions of that response to the April 8, 1992 denial letter are set out in Finding 22 below. Joseph A. Camino III is currently employed by Platinum as a motor vehicle buyer and is an authorized agent of Platinum at the Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction, an auction for dealers and wholesalers. Joseph G. Camino, father of Joseph A. Camino III, was a co-owner of J & J Auto Sales. Joseph G. Camino, father of Joseph A. Camino III, has never been associated with Platinum in any capacity. Joseph A. Camino III was not the licensee, owner or undisclosed principal of International Motor Cars. At the time of the issuance of Platinum's license, all shares in the Respondent corporation were jointly held by Michael J. Smith and Sandra J. Smith. To date, the Department has not sent notice to Lynette Bowman Camino individually of any right to request a hearing on the agreement between the Department and Platinum embodied in the April 13, 1992 affidavit of Michael J. Smith. (See Finding 22 below). To date, the Department has not sent notice to Joseph A. Camino, III individually of any right to request a hearing on the agreement between the Department and Platinum embodied in the April 13, 1992 affidavit of Michael J. Smith. (See Finding 22 below). The April 8, 1992 letter disclosing the Department's "Intent to Deny License Application" contained a clear point of entry for Platinum giving notice that the applicant could request a Chapter 120 proceeding to contest the Department's expressed intention to deny the license sought. Joseph A. Camino III as an authorized agent of Platinum, is authorized to transact business, including vehicle sales and purchases, on behalf of the Platinum at Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction, Inc. The affidavit executed by Michael J. Smith, President of Platinum (Joint Exhibit 1), contains the following paragraphs: That as of this date, neither LYNETTE BOWMAN CAMINO, JOSEPH A CAMINO, III, JOSEPH A. CAMINO, JR., nor any other member of said Camino family has any interest or position whatsoever in or with Platinum Motorcars, Inc. That from this day forward, no member of the aforesaid Camino family shall be involved with Platinum Motorcars, Inc., on a financial management, operational or sales basis. That affiant acknowledges and understands that if any member of the aforesaid Camino family shall in the future be involved with Platinum Motorcars, Inc., on a financial, management, operational or sales basis, such involvement shall result in the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles taking administrative action to revoke the license to do business of Platinum Motorcars, Inc. (underlining added; capitalization and boldface in original) As the authorized agent for Platinum with the authority to buy and sell vehicles at the Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction, Joseph A. Camino III is involved with the Respondent on an "operational or sales basis." Based upon the foregoing Finding, Platinum has breached its undertaking embodied in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Smith Affidavit set out above in Finding 22. The authorization of Joseph A. Camino III to act for Platinum contained in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 is dated April 22, 1992, only nine days after Joint Exhibit 1 (the affidavit quoted in Finding 22) was signed under oath by Platinum's President. Based on this, I infer that the promises set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit were made with no intention of honoring them. The affidavit was executed in bad faith and constitutes a willful misrepresentation made in an attempt to obtain licensure, and to avoid a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the licensure application of Platinum Motor Cars, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order revoking the Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of July 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Barbara K. Sunshine, Esquire 2395 Davie Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504
Conclusions This matter came on for determination by the Department upon submission of an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the Notice of Settlement And Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, copies of which are attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File, and thel Notice of Settlement And Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall carry out the terms of the Settlement Stipulation. The Department acknowledges that on December 7, 2010, Respondent paid the civil fine of $1,000 to the Department. Filed January 14, 2011 QJ Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this __@3 _ day of January 2011| at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0600 Sandra C. Lambert, ck Director Filed in the official records of the Division of Motor Vehicles this day_pf January 2011. Nalini naval, Dealer iministrator’ NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or i any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In des to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Rules|of Appellate Procedure. SCL:jde Copies furnished: Gary Konopka Regional Administrator Dealer License Section John H. Trevena, Esquire 801 West Bay Drive, Suite 509 Largo, Florida 33770
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Stipulation to Dismiss with Prejudice along with an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Linzie F. Bogan an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, copies of which are attached and incorporated by reference in this order. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. DONE AND ORDERED this aia day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this Be ay of November, 2013. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Kicense Administrator Filed November 26, 2013 3:54 PM Division of Administrative Hearings NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Copies furnished: Richard N. Sox, Esquire Bass Sox Mercer, P.A. 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Randall L. Oyler, Esqurie Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg, LLP 200 West Madison Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Linzie F. Bogan Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator acy. ae
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent represented to Ms. Renee Benton that she had to purchase an auto club in order to buy automobile insurance, which is not true, contrary to the law, and a violation of various statutes.
Findings Of Fact 1 On February 1, 1991, Renee Benton went to Mid County Insurance Agency in Jacksonville, Florida for the purpose of obtaining automobile insurance. At all times material hereto, Mid County Insurance Agency was a general lines insurance agency licensed by the State of Florida. Respondent, Eric Thomas Fromme, was the President and owner of Mid County Insurance Company. On February 1, 1991, Complainant, Renee Benton, purchased an automobile insurance policy from Mid County, more specifically from its owner, Eric Thomas Fromme. Complainant, Renee Benton, testified that the Petitioner told her that he could not sell her automobile insurance unless she purchased a membership in a motor club. Respondent, Eric Thomas Fromme, testified that he personally dealt with Complainant, Renee Benton, and that he did not tell Renee Benton that he could not sell her insurance without Motor Club Coverage. Complainant, Renee Benton, was in a hurry on the day and time she went to Mid County to purchase automobile insurance and as a result did not read any of the documents she signed on February 1, 1991. Renee Benton did not complain about the contract and was unaware of the matter until approached by agents of the Department. Until she reviewed the policy documents, she was unaware that she paid $100 to join the auto club. At the time of the purchase the automobile insurance policy from Respondent, Renee Benton paid Respondent $153.00 and entered into a premium finance agreement to finance a portion of the policy premium. That agreement stated that Renee Benton had paid a $53.00 down payment. (Pet. No. 4.) A fee of $100.00 for the motor club was deducted from her payment at the time she purchased the insurance and motor club. (Testimony of Renee Benton.) At the time that she purchased the automobile insurance, Renee Benton executed a form which stated that a motor club purchase was voluntary and that she was not required to purchase a motor club in order to purchase that insurance. (Pet. No. 7.) Renee Benton testified she would not have financed any of premium, had she been able to purchase the automobile insurance without purchasing a motor club. (Testimony of Renee Benton.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, recommended that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0019 The parties presented proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following findings, as indicated, were adopted, or rejected for the reason stated: Petitioner's Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1-3 Rejected in favor of Respondent's statement of these facts. Paragraph 4,5 Rejected as conflicting with more credible evidence. Paragraph 6-9 Adopted, but reordered. Respondent's Findings of Fact: Paragraphs 1-8 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Shane C. Maddox, Esquire 337-C East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner on October 6, 1997, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for regulating the business of insurance in the State of Florida. Section 624.307, Florida Statutes. This power extends to the licensing and discipline of insurance agents. Sections 626.291, .611, and .621, Florida Statutes. Howard Irvin Vogel ("Respondent") is, and was at all times material to this action, licensed as a general lines agent (2-20) and a health insurance agent (2-40); Respondent is also currently licensed as a Florida Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association representative (0-17). Respondent is, and was at the times material to this action, the president of Federal Auto Ins., Inc., 1/ ("Federal Insurance"), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located in Lake Worth, Florida. He is, and was at the times material to this action, the only officer of the corporation who is a licensed insurance agent. In 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, Respondent was a director of the corporation and its designated primary agent. Respondent is, and was at the times material to this action, also the only licensed insurance agent who has the authority to sign checks drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account. At the times material to this action, Federal Insurance employed at least two licensed insurance agents in addition to the Respondent. The Respondent regularly worked full-time in the Federal Insurance office during 1993, 1994, and 1995, and he was aware of the way in which the agents he employed sold insurance. All monies received by the agents were turned over to the agency, and the Respondent approved all refunds and signed all refund checks. The Respondent ran the day-to-day operations of the insurance agency and supervised the agents who worked there. At the times material to this action, it was the practice at Federal Insurance to impose a service charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance 2/ if a customer indicated he or she would need certificates prepared throughout the year. It was also the practice not to charge customers for the preparation of the first three certificates, but the agents employed there had the option, depending on the person and on the amount of the premium, of charging $5 for each certificate prepared in excess of the three free ones or of charging a flat fee of $100 per year. The charge was imposed to cover the costs of preparing the certificates. The agents employed by Federal Insurance were expected to explain the charge to the customer and to make it clear that the $100 was an additional charge and not part of the insurance premium. The fees received for the preparation of certificates of insurance were deposited in Federal Insurance's trust account. Some insurance agencies do not charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance on behalf of their customers. At the times material to this action, Federal Insurance sold automobile towing coverage provided by L.N.V., Inc., a Florida corporation whose directors since its incorporation in 1987 have been Howard and Alicia Vogel. L.N.V., Inc., reimburses its members for the expense of towing an insured vehicle if an accident occurs during the period the customer's automobile insurance policy is in effect. Federal Insurance had, at the times material to this action, a separate application for the towing coverage, which applicants for the coverage were required to sign. The agents employed by Federal Insurance were expected to explain the nature of the coverage and to make it clear to the customer that the charge for the towing coverage was separate from the premium charged for the underlying automobile insurance policy. The membership fees received for the towing coverage were deposited into a separate account for L.N.V., Inc. The Respondent is the only licensed insurance agent authorized to sign checks on this account. Michael Clark On December 19, 1993, Michael J. Clark went to the office of Federal Insurance to purchase a commercial general liability insurance policy and to renew his commercial automobile insurance policy. He met with Lee Vogel, who was a licensed general lines agent employed by Federal Insurance. Lee Vogel quoted Mr. Clark an annual premium of $776 for the renewal of his commercial automobile insurance policy for a vehicle used in his business, Eastern Electric. Mr. Clark applied for the policy, which was written by the Granada Insurance Company ("Granada"); $776 was the correct premium for the coverage Mr. Clark requested. Mr. Clark paid Federal Insurance a down payment of $330 and signed a Premium Finance Agreement and Disclosure Statement in order to obtain financing for the balance of the premium. When Mr. Clark signed the premium finance agreement, the portion identified as the Federal Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement had not been completed by Lee Vogel, so the form did not reflect the amount of the down payment. Mr. Clark and Lee Vogel used a worksheet when they were discussing the coverage and the cost of the policy. The worksheet Lee Vogel prepared during these discussions shows that he added $100 to the $776 premium for the commercial automobile insurance policy and stated a total of $876 on the worksheet. Mr. Clark signed the worksheet on which the $100 charge is shown, and he apparently did not question at that time the purpose of the additional $100 charge. Several weeks after he purchased the commercial automobile insurance policy, Mr. Clark received the documents and payment book from the premium finance company. These documents reflected that he had been credited with a down payment of only $230 rather than the $330 down payment Mr. Clark thought he had made on the policy. At the same time he purchased the commercial automobile insurance policy, Mr. Clark purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy. Lee Vogel quoted Mr. Clark a premium of $281 for a policy which would be written by the American Surety and Casualty Insurance Company ("American Surety"). Mr. Clark applied for this policy and paid Federal Insurance $381 as payment in full for the general liability policy. The worksheet prepared by Lee Vogel shows a $100 charge added to the $281 premium quoted to Mr. Clark. Although Mr. Clark claims that Lee Vogel did not explain the $100 charge to him, Mr. Clark did not question Lee Vogel about the additional $100 charge. He signed the worksheet and paid Federal Insurance $381 for the general liability coverage even though he was quoted $281 as the premium for the coverage. Lee Vogel added the $100 charge to the $776 and $281 premiums for the automobile and general liability policies as a service charge to cover the costs of preparing any certificates of insurance Mr. Clark might request during the policy year. According to Lee Vogel, customers are not charged for the preparation of certificates for commercial automobile insurance policies because certificates of insurance are not usually prepared for such policies. If they are, it is in conjunction with certificates of insurance prepared to confirm commercial general liability coverage. At the time he purchased the policy, Mr. Clark requested that four certificates of insurance be prepared, and, on December 20, 1993, Howard Vogel signed four certificates of insurance verifying that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety. During the 1993-94 policy year, Federal Insurance prepared a total of seventeen certificates of insurance on behalf of Eastern Electric, which certified that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety. Five of the seventeen certificates of insurance confirmed both that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety and that Eastern Electric had automobile insurance coverage with Granada Insurance Company. No separate certificates of insurance were prepared by Federal Insurance for the commercial automobile insurance policy written by Granada Insurance Company. Mr. Clark testified that he was not informed of the $100 service charge added to the premiums for the commercial automobile insurance policy and the commercial general liability insurance policy. He was in a hurry when he purchased these policies, and, when Lee Vogel gave him two or three papers to sign, he signed the papers without really reading them. Except for his signature appearing on several of the certificates of insurance prepared by Federal Insurance for Eastern Electric, the Respondent's only direct involvement with Mr. Clark's case was a letter the Respondent wrote to the Department, dated June 20, 1994, in which he complained about the way in which the investigation of Mr. Clark's complaint was being handled. Cheryl Lee Andrews On February 23, 1994, Cheryl Andrews purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy for her husband's lawn care business, Tropic Green Lawn Care, through Federal Insurance. After having spoken with him on the telephone, Ms. Andrews met with Bryan Sanders, a licensed general lines insurance agent employed by Federal Insurance, who quoted Ms. Andrews a premium of $673 for a policy written by American Surety. The wholesale broker in this transaction, with whom Federal Insurance had a contract, was Amelia Underwriters, Inc. Ms. Andrews made a down payment of $271 on the policy, and she was given a receipt which indicated that she had paid a $271 payment on a "GL" policy with "Amelia." When she paid the down payment on the policy, Ms. Andrews also signed a Premium Finance Agreement to finance the remainder of the premium through Del Rio Discount Corp. When Ms. Andrews signed the premium finance agreement, the portion identified as the Federal Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement had not been completed by Mr. Sanders; the premium finance agreement contained only the number of payments, the amount of each payment, and the date the first payment was due. Soon after, Ms. Andrews spoke with the Respondent on the telephone and requested a copy of the premium finance agreement with a completed disclosure statement. The Respondent sent her a copy of the agreement by facsimile transmittal, but it was not legible. Ms. Andrews telephoned the Respondent again and requested that he send her a copy by mail. When she did not receive another copy from Federal Insurance, she contacted American Surety, which contacted Amelia Underwriters, and the underwriters provided a completed copy of the Premium Finance Agreement. The down payment identified in the agreement was $171. On the day she purchased the insurance policy, Mr. Sanders asked if she wanted any certificates of insurance. At that time, Ms. Andrews did not know what this was, and Mr. Sanders told her it was proof of insurance. She asked that he prepare one certificate of insurance for Tropic Green Lawn Care on February 23, 1994. A second certificate of insurance was prepared by Federal Insurance for Tropic Green Lawn Care on March 28, 1994. Mr. Sanders did not discuss with Ms. Andrews at any time a charge for preparation of certificates of insurance. When she questioned the Respondent during a telephone conversation about the additional $100 she had paid Federal Insurance, he told her that it was a charge for certificates of insurance and other service charges and that, if she wanted any information, she should ask in writing. She then wrote a letter to the Respondent, dated June 10, 1994, requesting a breakdown of these charges, but she did not receive a response. In a letter dated July 26, 1996, written to the Department, Mr. Sanders confirmed that Federal Insurance charged $100 Ms. Andrews for preparation of certificates of insurance. Tropic Green was reimbursed $100 by Federal Insurance by a check drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account and dated January 8, 1996. Virginia Davidson On August 17, 1994, Virginia Davidson applied for personal automobile insurance through Federal Insurance. She dealt with a woman whose name she does not remember and who has not been identified in these proceedings. The policy was to cover a 1985 Chrysler, and she told the woman that she wanted insurance only for a short time because she intended to sell the car in the near future. At the time of this transaction, Ms. Davidson was in her late sixties. Ms. Davidson was told she needed to buy a one-year policy, and she recalled being quoted a price of $386 for an automobile insurance policy written by Armor Insurance Company ("Armor"). She paid the $386 by check dated August 17, 1994, and made payable to Federal Insurance; she was given a receipt that indicated that she had paid in full the premium on the Armor automobile insurance policy for one year. In fact, the premium for this policy was initially computed as $281 on the Brokerage Auto Application form. Although Ms. Davidson signed the application form on which this quote appeared, her signature appeared only on the reverse of the application form, while the quote appeared on the front. Ms. Davidson does not recall that anyone on August 17, 1994, explained that the $386 quoted to her included a separate $100 charge for towing coverage to be provided by L.N.V., Inc. At the time she purchased the insurance policy, Ms. Davidson was a member of AAA and would not have knowingly purchased towing coverage. Ms. Davidson's signature appears on a separate application form which clearly displayed the terms "Towing Coverage" and "LNV Corp." The "membership fee" for this coverage was shown on the form as $100. Ms. Davidson was asked to sign a number of documents when she applied for the automobile insurance policy, and she does not recall signing the application form for towing coverage. In a notice from Armor dated September 16, 1994, Ms. Davidson was notified that she owed an additional premium of $116 on her automobile insurance policy. The additional premium was due as a result of Armor's investigation of Ms. Davidson's driving history. In a letter to Armor dated October 11, 1994, Ms. Davidson requested that the policy be cancelled and that she receive a refund of unearned premium. Armor sent Federal Insurance a check dated October 31, 1994, in the amount of $163.70, representing the unearned premium on Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy. Mr. Vogel signed a check to Ms. Davidson on the Federal Insurance trust account, dated November 11, 1994, for $163.70. Ms. Davidson did not receive this check, and a replacement check was prepared, dated December 5, 1994. Ms. Davidson does not recall receiving this check, and neither of these checks has cleared Federal Insurance's account. The Respondent refused to issue another replacement check unless Ms. Davidson waited six months for the checks to clear the bank or paid Federal Insurance the $25.00 fee charged by the bank to stop payment on the replacement check. During December 1994, the Respondent recalculated the amount of the refund owing Ms. Davidson, including for the first time the agency's unearned commission and a pro rata refund of the $100 fee for the towing coverage. The Respondent issued a check to Ms. Davidson, drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account and dated December 26, 1994, in the amount of $117.20. The check specified that it was for "cancellation in full" of Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy. Ms. Davidson did not cash this check because she disputed that it was the full amount of the refund owed to her. Armor subsequently issued a check to Ms. Davidson in the amount of $184.80, which included the $163.70 and an additional amount of unearned premium which Armor had neglected to include in its calculations. Ms. Davidson does not recall receiving this check. All of the checks were sent to Ms. Davidson at her correct address in West Palm Beach, Florida. The Respondent was involved in the transaction involving Ms. Davidson only after she cancelled her automobile insurance policy. The Respondent signed the refund checks issued in her name, and, after Ms. Davidson filed a complaint with the Department, he responded to the Department's inquiry regarding the refund due to her. After having reviewed the files of Mr. Clark, Ms. Andrews, and Ms. Davidson, the Respondent was satisfied with the way the agents employed by Federal Insurance transacted business with these individuals. Summary The evidence is uncontroverted that the employees of Federal Insurance are supervised on a daily basis by and are under the direct control of the Respondent. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Michael Clark was unaware that he was charged $100 in addition to the premiums quoted on the commercial automobile insurance policy and commercial general liability insurance policy he purchased through Federal Insurance. Although he may not have been told the purpose of the extra charge, Mr. Clark was quoted premiums of $776 and $281, respectively, for the insurance policies. The worksheet he signed clearly shows that $100 was added to each of these premiums; in fact, Mr. Clark paid $381 as payment in full for the commercial general liability insurance policy when he knew that the premium for the policy was $281. On the other hand, the evidence presented is sufficient to establish that Lee Vogel deducted a $100 service charge for certificates of insurance from Mr. Clark's down payment of $330 on the commercial automobile insurance policy even though this charge was not imposed on commercial automobile insurance policies because separate certificates of insurance are not prepared for such coverage. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Bryan Sanders did not inform Cheryl Andrews of the $100 service charge added to the premium for the general liability insurance policy she purchased for Tropic Green Lawn Care and to establish that Ms. Andrews could reasonably believe that the entire down payment of $271 would be applied to the insurance premium. However, the evidence is uncontroverted that, when she spoke to the Respondent by telephone, he told her that the charge was for preparation of certificates of insurance and other services. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that, even though she signed an application form for towing coverage to be provided by L.N.V. Corp., Ms. Davidson was not told of the purpose of the application, the nature of the coverage, or the $100 fee for the coverage. In fact, the receipt for $386 that she received from Federal Insurance did not make any reference at all to the towing coverage or to L.N.V. Corp. The evidence presented by the Department is, however, not sufficient to establish that the Respondent refused to refund the monies owing to Ms. Davidson; under the circumstances presented, it was not unreasonable for Federal Insurance to refuse to issue a second replacement check. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that the Respondent instituted the practice of charging a $100 service fee for the preparation of certificates of insurance for commercial general liability insurance purchased through Federal Insurance. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Federal Insurance was prohibited by agreement or contract from imposing a service charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that the Respondent instituted a policy at Federal Insurance requiring customers to purchase towing coverage from L.N.V., Inc., as a condition of purchasing an automobile insurance policy or that the Respondent developed a sales scheme whereby the application for and explanation of the towing coverage was hidden. The evidence is sufficient to establish only one instance in which an unidentified person employed at Federal Insurance failed to disclose the particulars of the towing coverage. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish a pattern at Federal Insurance of agents failing to disclose the $100 service charge for preparing certificates of insurance, of agents imposing the service charge to policies for which no certificates of insurance are prepared in the normal course of business, or of failing to inform customers of the nature of and charge for ancillary coverage such as towing coverage. Finally, the evidence presented by the Department does not establish that the Respondent or the agents involved in the transactions at issue in this proceeding failed to remit any portion of the premiums owing to the insurance companies for the policies sold to Mr. Clark, Ms. Andrews, or Ms. Davidson. In the case of Mr. Clark and Ms. Andrews, the premiums quoted to them were correct and the premiums set forth on the premium finance agreements were correct; it is irrelevant in this respect that Mr. Clark and Ms. Andrews may have believed that their $330 and $271 down payments were to be applied solely to the premiums owed on the policies. Likewise, the full amount of the premium initially calculated for Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy was paid to the insurance company by Federal Insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order dismissing all three counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Howard Irvin Vogel. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1998.
