Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida Medicaid provider; provider number 100412. Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program pursuant to Section 409.901-409.920, Florida Statutes. Respondent reimburses hospitals for inpatient services supplied to Medicaid eligible recipients if the services are medically necessary. Services are medically necessary if: ". . . provided in a hospital on an inpatient basis [and cannot], consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type." Florida Administrative Code Rule 10C-7.039. Respondent utilizes the 1986 Interqual ISD criteria to determine the medical necessity of services rendered by Medicaid providers. ISD is an acronym for severity of illness, intensity of service, and discharge screens. Severity of illness indicates the severity of the patient's condition on admission. Intensity of service relates to the diagnostic and therapeutic services the patient receives while hospitalized. Discharge screens indicate the patient's readiness for discharge. Petitioner had actual notice of the applicable ISD criteria to be used in determining Medicaid coverage for inpatient services. The amount of Medicaid benefits at issue in this proceeding, the patients, and the dates of hospitalization to which the benefits apply are as follows: (a) Laura Lakatos, 10/17/89 to 11/9/89, $13,351.27; Jeannette Moore, 3/19/90 to 3/24/90, $2,324.26; Catherine Rosa, 3/16/90 to 3/20/90, $580.49; Cheyenne Williams, 1/20/90 to 2/1/90, $3,482.94; Kimberly Williams, 2/20/90 to 3/6/90, $8,126.86; and (f) Gail Woodley, 8/28/89 to 9/28/89, $17,995.19 Ms. Laura Lakatos was admitted clinically intoxicated. Her drug screens showed cocaine metabolites. The ISD criteria in effect at the time of her admission required the patient to be comatose or in an impending comatose condition prior to any clinical findings and the presence of one of the following clinical findings: delirium and/or mania; impending delirium tremens; or seizures (withdrawal or toxic). Ms. Lakatos' condition upon admission satisfied none of the applicable ISD criteria. She was confused, delusional, and had slurred speech but was neither comatose nor suffering from an impending comatose condition. She did not suffer from impending delirium tremens or seizures. No evidence was introduced that she suffered from delirium and/or mania or was otherwise not in actual contact with reality. Ms. Lakatos could have been treated in more economical setting. Ms. Jeannette Moore's chief complaint on admission was pain in both thighs. The ISD criteria applicable to Ms. Moore at the time of admission required one of the following findings to be present in order to continue inpatient hospitalization for Medicaid reimbursement purposes: monitoring (at least every 2 hours); intravenous medications; or treatments of radioactive materials or plasma, surgery. Ms. Moore satisfied the ISD criteria for one day of inpatient services. On the second day, she did not meet the ISD criteria for intensity of service and should have been released. Ms. Catherine Rosa was admitted on March 16, 1990, to deliver her baby. She had a normal vaginal delivery for which Medicaid covers two days of hospitalization. Ms. Rosa did not satisfy the ISD criteria for continued hospitalization after March 17, 1990, and should have been released on March 18, 1990. Ms. Cheyenne Williams was admitted on January 20, 1990, and placed on a detoxification program with seizure precautions. She was given both oral and intramuscular medication for seizure prevention. While Ms. Williams satisfied applicable ISD criteria upon admission, none of the requisite clinical findings were present after January 24, 1990, and Ms. Williams should have been released from the hospital on January 25, 1990. Ms. Kimberly Williams was admitted on February 20, 1990, for drug addiction. She was agitated, depressed, had delusions of grandeur, a tremor, and an irregular gait. Her toxicology screen showed nicotine and cocaine metabolites. Mr. Williams did not meet the ISD criteria for admission. She was neither comatose nor suffering from an impending comatose condition. She did not meet ISD criteria of delirium and/or mania, impending delirium tremens, or seizures to warrant hospital admission. She could have been treated in a more economical setting. Ms. Gail Woodley was admitted on August 28, 1989, for drug addiction. She had slurred speech and tremors. Her toxicology screen showed cocaine metabolites. The uncontroverted evidence established that Ms. Woodley failed to meet the ISD criteria for inpatient services.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be Respondent the following amounts: of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is issued requiring Petitioner to reimburse Laura Lakatos $13,351.27 Jennette Moore $ 2,324.26 Catherine Rosa $ 580.49 Cheyenne Williams $ 3,482.94 Kimberly Williams $ 8,126.86 Gail Woodley $17,995.19 TOTAL $45,861.01 RECOMMENDED this 12th day of January 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1065 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-2. Accepted in finding 1. 3. Accepted in finding 4. 4. Accepted in finding 5. 5. Accepted in finding 6. 6. Accepted in finding 4. 7. Accepted in finding 7. 8. Accepted in finding 8. 9. Accepted in finding 4. 10. Accepted in finding 9. 11. Accepted in finding 4. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in finding 9. Accepted in finding 4. Accepted in finding 11. Accepted in finding 12. Accepted in finding 4. 18.-19. Accepted in finding 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-2. Accepted in finding 1. 3.-5. Accepted in finding 2. 6. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 7.-8. Accepted in finding 3. 9.-10. Rejected as irrelevnat and immaterial. 11. Accepted in finding 17. 12.-13. Accepted in finding 18. 14.-16. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 17. Accepted in finding 4. 18. Accepted in finding 3. 19.-20. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 21. Accepted in findings 5, 12-13. 22.-25. Acceepted in finding 5. 26.-28. Accepted in finding 7. 29. Accepted in finding 8. 30.-31. Accepted in finding 9. 32.-35. Accepted in finding 10. 36.-37. Accepted in finding 11. 38.-39. Accepted in finding 12. 40.-42. Accepted in finding 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah A. Rogers, R.N. Administrative Director Utilization Management Hialeah Hospital 651 East 25 Street Hialeah, Florida 33013 Gordon B. Scott, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services HRS Medicaid Office 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 234A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the provider, Medilab, was overpaid for medicaid claims as alleged in the letter dated November 3, 1993.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. At all times material to this case, Medilab was a medicaid provider. Medilab enrolled as a physician group provider on or about October 2, 1991. Medilab was not enrolled with the Florida Medicaid program as a diagnostic lab. At all times material to this case, Medilab was owned and operated by Roberto Rodriguez and Jorge Nunez. Mr. Rodriguez handled the administrative duties for Medilab while Mr. Nunez operated the diagnostic portion of the business. Medilab operated several machines for diagnostic evaluations as ordered by a physician. Such machines produced documentation which was then evaluated by another physician. Dr. Carmouze did not perform the service nor interpret the diagnostic results. When Medilab applied for a provider number to enroll in the Medicaid program it represented that services were to be provided by Dr. Arnoldo Carmouze. It was further represented that Dr. Carmouze would treat or supervise treatment of patients on behalf of the Medilab "group." On or about January 11, 1992, Medilab received its group provider number along with a copy of the Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook. Medilab was notified that it could begin billing for services beginning October 2, 1991. Subsequently, the Agency performed an audit of Medilab for the period October 2, 1991 through August 31, 1992. Li-Hsiang Wu, a computer systems project analyst employed by the Agency, generated a random sample of Medicaid recipients by using a computer program to calculate the total number of Medicaid recipients for which claims were submitted during the audit period. Then Medilab's provider number and the dates of the audit were used to generate the total number of Medicaid recipients for whom claims were submitted by Medilab for the audit period. Once the total number of recipients was identified, Ms. Wu generated a list of forty-three recipient numbers which were selected by the computer from the total number claimed by Medilab for the period searched. Mr. Allen then requested and obtained from Medilab the medical records for the same forty-three randomly selected Medicaid recipients. The medical records were first reviewed by Phyllis Stiver, the Agency's registered nurse consultant. Once Ms. Stiver completed her initial review, Mr. Allen requested additional records from Medilab. Specifically, documentation for the office visit and records that established the necessity for the tests performed by Medilab were requested for each of the forty-three recipients. Medilab subsequently submitted additional records to the Agency which were also reviewed by Ms. Stiver. Ms. Stiver determined that based upon her review of the forty-three records, Medilab had violated Medicaid rules and policy as follows: Medilab failed to have all of the medical records signed by a physician and dated; and Medilab failed to document in the medical records to show that certain diagnostic tests were performed. After Ms. Stiver completed her review of the records, Dr. Sullenberger reviewed each of Medilab's medical records for the forty-three patients. Dr. Sullenberger determined, and it is found, that the majority of the tests performed by Medilab were not medically necessary based upon the symptoms documented for each patient, the prior patient histories established by the records, and the absence of other, less expensive testing that would normally be utilized to determine a medical condition. Virtually all of the patient records reviewed recited the same medical complaints: chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitation, numbness or tingling in extremities, and dizziness. Only five of the forty-three patients were over 49 years of age. The ages of the majority of the forty-three were under 50. That age group is rarely afflicted by the types of medical conditions which the Medilab equipment was used to detect. The symptoms and medical histories recited in the medical records did not justify the tests performed by Medilab for the following patients (recipients identified in this record as numbers 1 through 43): 1, 2, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, and 41. With the exception of the electrocardiogram, the symptoms and medical histories recited in the medical records did not justify the tests performed by Medilab for the following patients (recipients identified in this record as numbers 1 through 43): 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 42, and 43. With regard to recipient 8, except for the electrocardiogram and the abdominal ultrasound, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 10, except for the electrocardiogram and the Doppler echocardiogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 14, except for the electrocardiogram and the echocardiogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. With regard to recipient 28, except for the mammogram, the tests performed by Medilab were medically unnecessary. None of the services or testing performed by Medilab were supervised by a physician. Two physicians, Dr. Pozo and Dr. Pereira, radiologists, read the diagnostic results but were not on site to perform or supervise the tests on a daily basis. Dr. Pozo did not supervise the services that were provided at Medilab. Dr. Pereira, who is deceased and whose testimony was not available, did not supervise the services that were provided at Medilab. According to Mr. Nunez, Dr. Pereira had someone from his office courier the tests results and his interpretations to and from the Medilab facility. Dr. Pereira may have visited the facility on occasion but was not there during its full hours of operation. Dr. Carmouze, the treating physician and representative for Medilab's physician group, did not supervise the services at Medilab. Dr. Carmouze treated over 95 percent of the total patients referred to Medilab yet Dr. Carmouze never billed the Medicaid program for the patients' office visits. For the audit period, of the 493 different patients Medilab billed Medicaid for, Dr. Carmouze is the only treating physician identified by the records. The Medicaid Physician's Handbook, supplied to Medilab at the time of its enrollment, specified that to be reimbursable the services performed by a physician group provider had to be medically necessary and supervised by a physician. The Medicaid Provider Agreement required Medilab to keep complete and accurate medical and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered for five years. All tests performed by Medilab were documented with a physician's order for same. Medilab submitted for review all medical and fiscal records it maintained in its attempt to fully justify and disclose the extent of the services it rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Program Integrity Office, issue a final order charging Medilab for the full amounts paid for the audit period as the services rendered were not supervised by a physician and were, therefore, not "physician services." Additionally, the Agency should impose an administrative fine in an amount not to exceed $5,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0096 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, and 12 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 7 is accepted as to the general statement but is rejected as to the amount claimed. Paragraph 8 is rejected as a mischaracterization of testimony; it is accepted Dr. Sullenberger, on further reflection and in an effort to be consistent, gave Medilab the benefit of doubt and modified disallowed items. Paragraph 9 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 10 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 11 is rejected as contrary to weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. That Dr. Carmouze never charged for the alleged office visits that generated the referral for tests was the relevant fact. Paragraph 15 is accurate but is irrelevant in light of the stipulation. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 36, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, and 53 are accepted. Paragraphs 37, 38, 40, 42, and 47 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as hearsay not supported by direct evidence. Paragraph 45 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 51, the first sentence is accepted; the remainder rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Heidi E. Garwood Agency for Health Care Administration 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building B, Room 271 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Monte K. Rassner Rassner, Rassner, Kramer & Gold, P.A. 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue, Suite PH-B South Miami, Florida 33143 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact There is no genuine issue as to any of the following material facts: The Petitioner is 78 years old and, since at least 1995, has been eligible for Medicare based on her age. The Petitioner's monthly income is $594, and she has no assets or resources. Since at least 1995, she has been eligible for Medicaid based on her income and assets. F.A.C. Rule 59G-3.010(4) provides: (b) Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B) The monthly Medicare insurance premium is paid by the Agency directly to the Depart- ment of Health and Human Services for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipient. The deductible and co-insurance under Part B, Medicare, are paid for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipient by the Medi- caid fiscal agent. For physician services, Medicaid will cover the deductible and co- insurance only to the extent that the total payment received by the physician will not exceed the recognized Medicaid payment or, if there is no comparable Medicaid payment, 100 percent of the deductible and 75 percent of the co-insurance. In these situations, whether the physician did nor did not receive a payment from Medicaid, by billing Medicaid he is bound to the Medicaid payment schedule as payment in full. F.A.C. Rule 59G-3.230(6)(e) provides: Payment Methodology for Covered Services. * * * (e) Services provided to individuals who are covered by both Medicare and Medicaid must be billed to Medicare first. Medicaid will consider payment of the deductible and coinsurance, but in no case shall the combined Medicare and Medicaid payments exceed the maximum allowable Medicaid amount for the procedure. Pages 4-1, 4-2, 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6 and Appendix A-34-35 of The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500, Nov. 1994, incorporated by reference in F.A.C. Rule 59G-3.230(8), contain language that essentially implements F.A.C. Rules 59G-3.010(4) and 59G-3.230(6)(e). When rules on this subject initially were adopted on January 1, 1977, they did not include the challenged provisions. The challenged provisions were added by amendment adopted January 6, 1978. The preamble to the adopting rule's description of the impact of the challenged rules states that the rule "could . . . decrease . . . the number of physicians [and] result in Medicaid eligible individuals paying their own deductible and co-insurance, . . . changing physicians, or maintaining the same physician with the physician accepting a loss in income." (Fla. Admin. Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 1, Jan. 6, 1978, at 224-25.) Some Florida physicians who accept other patients, including patients eligible for Medicare based on age but not eligible for Medicaid, do not accept "dual eligible" patients like the Petitioner (i.e., patients eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid) because the physician makes less money providing services for "dual eligible" patients under the terms of F.A.C. Rules 59G-3.010(4) and 59G-3.230(6)(e) and The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook than the physician can make providing services for other patients, including patients eligible for Medicare based on age but not eligible for Medicaid. In 1995, the Petitioner's physician required her to pay him fees for service in addition to the reimbursement he received from the Respondent under the terms of F.A.C. Rules 59G-3.010(4) and 59G-3.230(6)(e) and The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook although those provisions as well as his agreement with the Respondent prohibit him from doing so. The Intervenor asserts that other Florida physicians participating the Medicaid program, likewise in violation of F.A.C. Rules 59G-3.010(4) and 59G-3.230(6)(e) and The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook as well as their agreements with the Respondent, also "attempt to collect Medicare coinsurance and deductibles from patients who are indigent."
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees against Respondent pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a prevailing small business party in DOAH Case 93-4194. Petitioner timely applied for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The statutory cap of $15,000 is a reasonable amount for the award should it be concluded that Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs. In DOAH Case 93-4194, the Petitioner successfully challenged the Respondent's action in temporarily withholding all of Petitioner's payments under the medicaid program. John Whiddon, the Chief of the Florida Medicaid Program Integrity at that time, made the decision to withhold the payments to Petitioner. The information which triggered Mr. Whiddon's decision was a letter from John G. Morris, Jr., who was director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit. Mr. Morris advised that ". . . there is reliable evidence that the [Petitioner] billed for home health care services that were not provided and this investigation will be referred for criminal prosecution". The provisions of 42 CFR 455.23 authorize a State Medicaid agency such as the Respondent to withhold Medicaid payments, in whole or in part, upon receipt of the State agency of ". . . reliable evidence that the circumstances giving rise to the need for a withholding of payments involve fraud or willful misrepresentation under the Medicaid program." In DOAH Case 93-4194, it was concluded that Respondent had failed to establish that it had "reliable evidence" to withhold Petitioner's Medicaid payments. It was further found that even if Respondent had such reliable evidence, it could not withhold all of Petitioner's payments unless it proceeded pursuant to Section 120.59(3), Florida Statutes. Absent such emergency order pursuant to Section 120.59(3), Florida Statutes, it was concluded that any withholding would be subject to the following limitations on the withholding of Medicaid payments contained in Section 409.913(17), Florida Statutes: (17) The department may withhold Medicaid payments to a provider, up to the amount of the alleged overpayment, pending completion of an investigation under this section if it has reasonable cause to believe that the provider has committed one or more violations in relation to such payments. With the exception of providers terminated under the provisions of s. 120.59(3), in which case all payments shall be immediately terminated, the department may withhold payments under this provision, the monthly Medicaid payment may not be reduced by more than 10 percent, and the payments withheld must be paid to the provider within 60 days with interest at the rate of 10 percent a year upon determining that no such violation has occurred. If the amount of the alleged overpayment is in excess of $75,000, the department may reduce the Medicaid payments up to $25,000 per month. The Recommended Order in DOAH Case 93-4194 was adopted in toto by Respondent as a Final Order on January 28, 1994. The Medicaid Program Integrity is responsible for the oversight and regulatory aspect of the Florida Medicaid Program. Program Integrity is a part of the Agency for Health Care Administration and was formerly a part of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) is a part of the Office of the Auditor General. The MFCU is responsible for investigating abuse and criminal fraud pertaining to the medicaid program. Federal regulations require that Program Integrity and MFCU be totally separate and apart from each other. MFCU and Program Integrity operate under a memorandum of agreement which allows them to conduct separate investigations. When MFCU advises Program Integrity that it is investigating a Medicaid provider, Program Integrity routinely stops any investigation it may have started so as not to jeopardize the criminal investigation by the MFCU. Program Integrity is not provided any information about MFCU's criminal investigation until certain kinds of actions have occurred or when MFCU desires certain support. Mr. Whiddon testified that Program Integrity routinely takes administrative action against a Medicaid provider when it learns that MFCU is conducting a criminal investigation against that provider. Mr. Whiddon also testified that information received by Program Integrity from MFCU has historically proven to reliable. Mr. Whiddon did not testify as to the nature of the administrative action that is routinely taken when Program Integrity learns that MFCU is conducting a criminal investigation. There was no evidence as to the rules or statutes, other than a reference to 42 CFR 455.23, upon which Program Integrity bases such administrative actions. Based upon information from the Medicaid claims processing subsystem and the information from MFCU, Mr. Whiddon had reason to suspect that substantial sums were being paid to Petitioner for services for which there was no entitlement. The Petitioner was receiving approximately $28,900 per week from Medicaid when it was decided to temporarily withhold Medicaid payments. After the receipt of the MFCU letter, Mr. Whiddon believed something had to be done and began to review the options that he believed were available to him. Mr. Whiddon concluded that the most appropriate remedy was to withhold Medicaid payments pursuant to 42 CFR 455.23, which provides for a hearing at which the Petitioner could submit information that would justify its billings. Mr. Whiddon did not believe at the time he decided to temporarily withhold Petitioner's Medicaid payments that the issue was one of an overpayment. He also did not believe that it would be appropriate to issue an immediate final order pursuant to Section 120.59(3), Florida Statutes, because of the limited information available to him. Respondent failed to establish that it had reliable evidence to temporarily withhold all of Petitioner's Medicaid payments.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated federal and state laws addressing Medicaid payments, and, if so, what is an appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the single state agency charged with the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and federal law. One of AHCA's duties is to recover overpayments. Overpayments are any amounts paid to providers that were not authorized. Dr. Valente, during all times pertinent, was a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. She was an authorized Medicaid Provider and held provider number 253493200. As such, she was on notice of Medicaid billing policy and rules. AHCA conducted a generalized analysis of obstetricians in Florida who submitted Medicaid claims during the period January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2005. AHCA investigated over-billing in three different categories: (1) excessive prenatal visits, (2) billing for Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening (Screening) more than once during a pregnancy, and billing for the W1992 Screening during the second and third trimesters. The W1992 Screening was and is only applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. Dr. Valente was one of the obstetricians AHCA found to have over-billed in the three categories. With regard to Category 1, excessive prenatal visits, the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook provides, at page 2-53, that "Antepartum visits are limited to a maximum of 10 for low-medical risk recipients and 14 for high-medical risk recipients. Payment for antepartum care is based on a total amount for complete care. Antepartum care is prorated, based on an average standard of 10 visits for a low-medical risk recipient or 14 for a high-risk recipient. Reimbursement for the 10 or 14 visits is the maximum reimbursement for the full course of antepartum care. If additional visits are provided, payment is considered to have already been made, and the provider may not bill the additional visits to Medicaid or the recipient." For Category 1, the audit searched for instances when Dr. Valente billed for excessive prenatal visits 38 times, as follows: Patient 1: This was a high-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 16 visits, which was two more than the 14 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $102.00 more than allowed. Patient 2: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Therefore, according to AHCA, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. However, Dr. Valente stated, and medical records indicated, that Patient 2 was a high-risk patient even though her claimed Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook diagnosis code, 642.43, a code for high risk, did not appear on the billing submission. Upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 3: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente asserted that the patient was a high-risk patient because of high blood pressure. However, in the billing submission there is no code indicating high risk. Dr. Valente claimed at the hearing that it should have been coded 645.13. That is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 4: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente claimed the patient had an iron deficiency and should have been coded 281.2. That is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 5: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. The medical record revealed that Patient 5 was obese with poor sugar control, and Dr. Valente asserted she should have been coded 642.43, which is high risk. She did not use this code in the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 6: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. Dr. Valente stated that this was a high- risk patient because she was suffering from oligohydramnious. Dr. Valente did not code this on the bill. The code she claimed, 656.93, is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 7: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. This patient had lung problems. Dr. Valente asserted she should have been coded 496.0 and 491.2 instead of the V22.0 presented on the bill. Codes 496.0 and 491.2 are not high-risk codes. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 8: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for a patient that was not high risk. Dr. Valente suspected a possible birth defect and coded the patient 759.9 and 655.23. Code 655.23 is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente did not use this code in the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 9: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for only five visits, thus never reaching the ten visit threshold. The assertion that Dr. Valente over-billed with regard to Patient 9 was not proven. Patient 10: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the records revealed decreased fetal movement, codes 655.73 and V28.4. Code 655.73 is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente did not put this code on the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 11: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 12: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $50.00 more than allowed. Patient 13: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 14: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 12 visits, which was two more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $100.00 more than allowed. Patient 15: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 16: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 17: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 12 visits, which was two more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $104.00 more than allowed. Patient 18: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 19: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 20: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 21: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente said this patient was at risk for cervical cancer and entered diagnosis codes 795.0 and 795.09. These are not high- risk codes. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 22: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente stated, and the records revealed, that the patient had a psychiatric disorder and, therefore, should have had a diagnosis code of 648.43, which is high risk. Dr. Valente did not assert this code on the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, the amount billed was permissible. Patient 23: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. This patient's baby had dilated kidneys. The patient was coded 655.0, which is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 24: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente's records indicated that this patient had impending pre-eclampsia, which she coded 642.03, as hypertension. This is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente failed to assert that code on the Medicaid bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, Dr. Valente did not bill more than was permissible. Patient 25: This was a high-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 15 visits, which was one more than the 14 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $50.00 more than allowed. Patient 26: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 27: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the patient had a heart murmur and was asthmatic requiring medicine, which is code 493.0. She billed for 493.0, a high-risk code, and, therefore, was entitled to see the patient 14 times. Dr. Valente only saw the patient 11 times. Therefore, Dr. Valente did not bill more than allowed. Patient 28: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits that she coded V22.0. She said the patient had a childhood seizure disorder and should have been coded 345.0, which is high risk. Therefore, Dr. Valente did not bill more than allowed. Patient 29: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente found this patient to have high-risk viral cells and assigned diagnosis code 622.1. According to the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook, this is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 30: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 31: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 32: AHCA asserted that this was a low- risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which is one more than permitted. Dr. Valente stated that this patient had a mild pregnancy-induced hypertension and should have been assigned diagnosis code 642.43, which is high risk. However, no such code was assigned. The only code assigned on the Medicaid bill was V22.0. This is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 33: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the patient was an alcohol abuser and that the patient developed decreased fetal movement late in the pregnancy. Dr. Valente assigned the code 655.43, which is a high- risk code. The patient was entitled to 14 visits. Dr. Valente billed for 11, which was within the allowed limits. Patient 34: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 35: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 36: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient and that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente decided that the patient's baby was not reactive to a stress test, and the patient had to be induced. Dr. Valente coded this 658.03, which is not high risk. AHCA's witness, Dr. Franz, agreed with this. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 37: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 38: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. The total amount over-billed in Category 1 was $1,602.00. Category 2 addressed billing for the Screening more than once during a pregnancy. The Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook provides for Florida's Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening. It states, "The Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening should be offered at the first antepartum visit. The antepartum visit that includes completion of the Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening is reimbursed once per pregnancy by billing code W1991 antepartum visit plus Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening, or W1992 antepartum visit plus Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening performed during the first trimester of pregnancy." Therefore, for Category 2, the audit searched for situations where there was more than one Healthy Start prenatal visit per pregnancy. In other words, a W1991 might be billed or a W1992 might be billed, but both could not be billed during a single pregnancy. The audit asserts this occurred nine times as follows: Patient 1: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $148. Patient 2: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $98. Patient 3: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 4: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a H1001, which is the Screening during the first trimester for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $104. Patient 5: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 6: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 7: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 8: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 9: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $150. The total amount overpaid in Category 2 was $1,000. Dr. Valente pointed out that even though she over-billed in this category, she should have received $50 on each occurrence for an office visit. Although this may be true, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this forum to make recommendations with regard to that. Category 3 included a search for billings for W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, that were made subsequent to the end of the first trimester. AHCA defines the first trimester as the first 13 weeks of a pregnancy. The Screening form says the first trimester is determined to be 13 weeks (or 91 days) from the date of the last menstrual cycle. The audit asserted 61 instances of billing for the Screening, subsequent to the first trimester. In determining whether the Screening was accomplished later than the first trimester, 181 days were subtracted from the delivery date. This meant that a Screening provided less than 181 days before delivery was, perforce, beyond the first trimester. The auditors found 61 instances where this occurred. Dr. Valente agreed that she screened subsequent to the first trimester for patients number 2-8, 11-14, 16-18, 20-22, 25-31, 33-36, 38, 40, 43-46, 48-49, 51-54, and 56-61. This amounted to 44 over-bills at $50 and two at $49.34, for a total of $2,298.68. When evaluating the audit at this point, it is helpful to recall that the medical records of the patients were not available when the final audit was issued, but they were available at the time of the hearing. The Medicaid bills for the Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening Instruments are typically submitted before the baby is born. Thus, the physician at the time of submission cannot know the actual delivery date with mathematical precision. Accordingly, the physician has to estimate the due date using the date of the last menstrual period (LMP); by ultrasounds; and by following the progress of the pregnancy. Moreover, babies arrive before their predicted due date as well as after. The disputed cases in Category 3 are discussed below. Patient 1: The estimated delivery date (EDD) was July 9, 2003. The actual delivery date was May 15, 2003. The EDD on December 3, 2002, was determined by ultrasound to be nine weeks and by LMP to be ten weeks. The Screening date was December 3, 2002. This was well within the 13-week window for the Screening. Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 9: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 10: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 15: An ultrasound on this patient on June 18, 2003, indicated the patient was nine weeks pregnant. The Screening was accomplished on the same day. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 19: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 23: The Screening for this patient is dated February 26, 2003, according to the Screening form signed by the patient. The delivery date provided to AHCA is incorrect because due to an absence of fetal heartbeat the patient experienced a "Suction D&E followed by sharp D&C of the uterine cavity." This occurred about the 13th week, on March 28, 2003. In other words, there was no delivery. However, the Screening was not signed at the bottom and that is a reason for rejecting payment. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 24: The Screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 32: This patient declined screening, so Dr. Valente over-billed $49.34. Patient 37: The Screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 39: This patient declined screening, so Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 41: The Screening date for this patient was October 30, 2002. The first ultrasound on this patient was provided on the same day and indicated the baby was at 12.7 weeks with an EDD of May 9, 2003. The baby was delivered April 19, 2003, which means it came earlier than anticipated and that the Screening was accomplished during the first trimester. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 42: The screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 47: The Screening for this patient listed on the AHCA spreadsheet was May 8, 2003. However, the form indicates it was signed by the patient on March 27, 2003. The patient's LMP was February 13, 2003, and the first ultrasound indicated the patient was eight and one-half weeks pregnant on April 10, 2003. Even if the Screening was accomplished May 8, 2003, as alleged, it was accomplished in the first trimester. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 55: The alleged Screening was accomplished August 7, 2003. The Screening date is unreadable as to month, but the day is 31. Dr. Valente's testimony is that it was in March and that the patient was at 11 weeks and three days. This appears more correct than AHCA's allegation. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. The over-payment alleged was a total of $3,048.68. The evidence indicates that on five occasions Dr. Valente was correct in her assertion that the Screening for five of the patients, at $50.00 per patient, was actually within the first trimester. Accordingly, it is found that Dr. Valente only owes $2,748.02 for Category 3. A request for records was sent to Dr. Valente via certified mail to the address she maintained on file with AHCA, on or about October 29, 2007. This provided Dr. Valente with the preliminary audit findings and invited her to illuminate or explain the findings so they could be adjusted if appropriate. The letter was returned. AHCA found a more current address and sent the same letter, and it was delivered to that address in Jacksonville on December 6, 2007. The receipt was signed by Dr. Valente's father. Eventually, Dr. Valente received the materials and called AHCA Investigator Terri Dean, who was listed as the contact point in the letter sent to Dr. Valente. Dr. Valente informed Investigator Dean that she could not get the records. Accordingly, the audit became final as written on March 21, 2008, and was provided to Dr. Valente. The report stated that Dr. Valente owed $6,118.68 for overpayments and should pay a $500.00 fine for failure to provide records. Dr. Valente provided the records about six months later, in late September or early October of 2008. AHCA reviewed the records and determined that there were overpayments in the amount of $7,344.00. Because litigation was already underway, AHCA did not attempt to extract the additional amount from Dr. Valente.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order requiring Dr. Grace Valente, M.D.: to pay the sum of $5,350.02 for the purpose of reimbursing improperly billed Medicaid services; to pay a fine of $1,500 for failing to provide medical records in a timely fashion; and to pay interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the sum of $5,350.02, from March 21, 2008, the date of the final audit report; and interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the sum of $1,500 from the date the final order is entered, until the sums are paid completely. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: William Blocker, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grace Valente, M.D. 3474 Paddle Point Spring Hill, Florida 34609 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Petitioner), is entitled to a recoupment for a Medicaid overpayment to Respondent, Humane Minority, Inc. (Humane or Respondent), in the amount of $177,581.26.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As part of its duties, Petitioner attempts to recover Medicaid overpayments from Medicaid providers. At all times material to this case, Humane was licensed to provide various health care services to Medicaid recipients under a contract to AHCA as a Medicaid provider. As provider number 255724000, Humane participated in the Medicaid program from January 1, 2005, to February 8, 2006 (audit period). As a Medicaid provider, Respondent was subject to audit. This case arose when the Discovery Unit of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI) identified that during the audit period Humane billed 1.5 times as much for one week as compared to ten other weeks, which is an indicator of billing irregularities. As a result, the Discovery Unit of MPI recommended a comprehensive audit of Humane. Gary Mosier, a Registered Nursing Consultant employed by AHCA in the bureau of MPI, initiated the audit of Humane after receiving the Discovery Unit’s File #47650 Recommendation memo dated May 19, 2006, referring Humane for a comprehensive audit. On or about June 13, 2006, MPI requested 30 random Medicaid patients' records from Humane’s entire Medicaid patient group for the audit period. Humane complied with the request and supplied records. The submitted medical records included a Certificate of Completeness of Records from Humane stating the documents supplied constituted all of the Medicaid-related records for the 30 patients during the Audit period. After Humane provided the requested medical records to Mosier, he forwarded the records to three physician consultants: Machado, a general practitioner; Edgar, a psychiatrist; and Reisman, an urologist. Each physician consultant reviewed Humane’s records relevant to his area of expertise and filled out agency worksheets detailing why claims should be disallowed. MPI reviewed Humane’s records provided and the worksheets filled out by the three physician consultants and determined that overpayments were made to Humane due to numerous services in whole or in part not being covered by Medicaid, which violated various Medicaid policy guidelines set forth in both the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (General Handbook)1 and the Florida Medicaid Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Physician Services Handbook).2 Humane violated policy by providing documentation that supported a lower level of office visit than the one for which Humane billed and received payment. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payments for some services that were not documented. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services rendered by a practitioner who was not a member of Humane’s group. Humane violated policy by billing for procedure codes that have time requirements but not documenting the time spent providing the service. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services performed by another practitioner who was not enrolled in Medicaid at the time the services were rendered. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. Humane violated policy by billing for radiology services when the reading and interpretation was done by a radiologist outside of the physician’s group. Humane violated policy and was paid for billing and received payment for portable x-ray services where Humane performed only the technical component and an independent interpreter performed the professional component. Humane violated policy and received payment when Humane did not bill according to the current procedural terminology guidelines in certain instances. On March 13, 2007, MPI issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR). The report detailed the Medicaid policy violations, overpayment amounts, and provided Humane the opportunity to submit an explanation or additional documentation demonstrating that some or all of the claims were properly paid. The report also notified Humane that a Final Audit Report (FAR) would be issued identifying the amount of overpayment due. Humane did not respond to the PAR. Consequently, on April 27, 2007, MPI issued a FAR, that included the amount of $177,581.26 that Humane received from Medicaid that was not authorized to be paid. This grand total of $177,581.26 constitutes an overpayment that Humane must return to the agency. A Final Audit Report-Corrected Copy was issued on May 22, 2007, correcting the total amount due.3 In addition to the overpayment amount, Petitioner also seeks a fine in the amount of $3,000.00. The fine is a calculated amount as authorized by rule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Humane to repay the Agency for the principal amount of $177,581.26 together with an administrative fine of $3000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009.
