Findings Of Fact During the period covered by the tax audit, Petitioner published and distributed free of charge two Jacksonville area editions of a weekly magazine entitled TV Facts. This magazine contains substantial advertising which provides all revenues. In addition to the advertising, television schedules and feature stories are included to interest the general public in the publication. Petitioner obtained a second class postal permit for the magazine, but has never used the mails for distribution. During the period at issue, the magazine was prepared in a three step process. The rough layout without television schedules was prepared by Petitioner and forwarded to Composition Compound, Inc., a Miami company. This company obtained the television schedules and prepared the final layout. Composition Compound then photographed this layout and sent the negatives to Sun 'N' Fun Printing, a Clearwater company. Sun 'N' Fun then printed the magazine and delivered it to Petitioner. Petitioner paid Composition Compound for all services provided by that company and Sun 'N' Fun. Thus, there was no direct business relationship between Petitioner and Sun 'N' Fun. Petitioner believed it qualified for the newspaper exemption and was neither charged nor paid any sales taxes until it learned through Respondent's audit of Composition Compound that such taxes were due. Respondent seeks to assess Petitioner sales taxes in the amount of $5,830.56 with penalty of $1,457.64 plus 12 percent interest to the date of payment for the audit period December 1, 1977, through November 30, 1980. Petitioner does not contest these computations, but believes the tax due, if any, should be reduced by the amounts it paid to Composition Compound to cover the sales tax billed by Sun 'N' Fun. Petitioner submitted Sun 'N' Fun invoice (Exhibit 7) to demonstrate that Composition Compound was billed for about $2,700.00 in sales taxes by Sun 'N' Fun for printing Petitioner's magazine between December 29, 1978, and December 29, 1979. Composition Compound separately computed its costs and profits which it billed to Petitioner (Exhibit 6). However, there was no separate brochure of the sales tax shown on the Composition Compound invoices, nor was any additional tax charged on the value added by that company.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order holding Petitioner liable for $5,830.56 in taxes assessed on December 11, 1980, and for interest computed at the rate of 1 percent per month thereafter until said tax is paid to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1981.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner owes additional sales and use tax, interest, and penalties, pursuant to a Notice of Proposed Assessment.
Findings Of Fact Ivan Soberal is the president and sole owner of Petitioner. Mr. Soberal started the business of Cycle Ivan's 12 years ago. At first, he operated as a sole proprietorship. He incorporated the business in 1997. This case commenced with Respondent's issuance of a Notice of Proposed Assessment dated October 23, 2002. The Notice of Proposed Assessment proposes the assessment of $26,917.69 in additional sales tax, $13,458.88 in penalty, and $9,417.61 in interest through October 23, 2002, for a total of $49,794.18. The notice warns: "If you choose to request either an administrative hearing or judicial proceeding, your request must be filed no later than FEBRUARY 20, 2003 or 60 days from the date the assessment becomes a Final Assessment." The notice adds: "The petition for an administrative hearing must be filed with the Department." Petitioner requested an administrative hearing by letter dated February 20, 2003, and received by, and filed with, Respondent on February 24, 2003. The audit period in this case is December 1, 1996, through November 30, 2001. During this time, Petitioner's business has been the sale and repair of motorcycles and scooters. Petitioner does not sell any new motorized vehicles with an engine displacement larger than 50 cc because doing so would require a dealer's license. Thus, most of the new motorized vehicles sold by Petitioner are small scooters manufactured in China or Japan. Petitioner sells used motorcycles on consignment. Over the years, Petitioner's business has transformed from primarily repairs to a greater emphasis on consignment sales to the present emphasis on part sales. This is an inadequate-records case. For the most part, the auditor used federal income tax returns and corporate income statements to calculate Petitioner's tax liability. The auditor had no cash register receipts, no journal entries, and limited bank statements (none for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001 and only two months in 1999 and three months in 2000). During the audit period, Petitioner used primarily repair orders to record sales of goods or services. After the audit period, Petitioner computerized its recordkeeping for inventory and sales, but, until then, the available records are extremely limited. Respondent's auditor tried to use samplings of Petitioner's invoices to determine any sales tax deficiencies, but the records were poorly maintained. Taking a sample over the first six months of 2000, the auditor was unable to find invoices totaling thousands of dollars, thus making it appear that Petitioner over-reported taxable sales during these months. Obviously, Petitioner did not over-report taxable sales, but instead had removed invoices from the records that it had provided the auditor. Recognizing the impossibility of reassembling Petitioner's actual taxable sales from its incomplete and nonexistent records, the auditor resorted to Petitioner's federal income tax returns and, for 2001, corporate income statements. By these means, Respondent's auditor determined Petitioner's gross sales, treated them entirely as taxable sales, and calculated the sales tax due on these gross sales. After having done so, the auditor subtracted the taxes actually remitted by Petitioner during the audit period, and the remainder is the sales tax deficiency in this case. Petitioner's basic claim is that many of its sales during the audit period are exempt. However, Petitioner's manner of calculating exempt sales during the audit period was no better than its recordkeeping. Each month, Petitioner subtracted its taxable sales, or what it deemed to be its taxable sales, from its bank deposits, and the remainder was its exempt sales. This method, of course, results in potentially vast overstatements of exempt sales. Petitioner lacks resale or consumer certificates of exemption to support its exemption claims. Mr. Soberal admitted at the hearing that he did not keep records of exempt sales. Exempt sales for Petitioner would also include parts sold to locations outside of the United States, but the nature of Petitioner's business suggests that this type of transaction would not produce significant sales. The only significant exemption in this case is service-only repairs, such as when parts are not required for the repair or the customer provides the parts. The best way of accounting for service-only repairs is to calculate them from the auditor's workpapers for the six months in early 2000 that he sampled. These workpapers identify which invoices are for service only and which invoices include parts, accessories, or other tangible personal property. After calculating the total of service-only repairs, it is possible to derive a fraction with the numerator being the total price of the service-only repairs and the denominator being the total sales reported by Petitioner, which, for each month, was higher than the total gross sales shown on the invoices that Petitioner produced for the auditor. Because this fraction is based on sales during the first half of 2000, which is relatively late in the audit period, it probably represents a fair allocation of service versus sales. As noted above, service transactions predominated early in the audit period, but sales transactions (first of vehicles and later of parts) predominated later in the audit period. Thus, the reduction of total gross sales for the entire audit period by this fraction generated the most reliable estimate of taxable sales during the audit period from available records and still does not reward Petitioner for its failure to maintain records. For January 2000, the service-only repairs total $1052.50 out of total reported sales of $8095.88. For February 2000, the service-only repairs total $1739.99 out of total reported sales of $10,311.55. For March 2000, the service-only repairs total $372.50 out of total reported sales of $11,654.93. For April 2000, the service-only repairs total $796.76 out of total reported sales of $8877.07. For June 2000, the service-only repairs total $595.50 out of total reported sales of $15,970.71. For July 2000, the service-only repairs total $409.95 out of total reported sales of $10,280.58. For these six months, service-only repairs total $4967.20 out of total reported sales of $65,190.72. The resulting reduction is 7.6 percent. Applying the reduction to the sales tax deficiency proposed in the Notice of Proposed Assessment, the resulting tax deficiency is reduced by $2045.74 to a new total of $24,871.95.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's protest as untimely and sustaining the total amount set forth in the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated October 23, 2002, or, in the alternative, reducing the additional sales tax due to $24,871.95 and recalculating the penalty and interest accordingly. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 George B. Grosheim Qualified Representative Accounting Services of South Florida. 1210 Southeast 5th Street Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441 Nicholas Bykowsky Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts, legal issues, and their respective contentions, as follow: "1. At all times pertinent to this action, Petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc., was a Florida Corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this action, Respondent Department of Revenue, State of Florida, was an agency of the State of Florida exercising duties relating to the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent conducted an audit of tran- sactions involving Petitioner for the period November 1, 1972, through October 31, 1975. As a result of that audit, Respondent claims that as of September 17, 1976, the Petitioner had a balance due to the Depart- ment of Revenue of $17,383.58 in taxes, interest and penalties. The assessment indicating the above amount is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner is in agreement that if the assessment is upheld, Petitioner owes to the Respondent the amount of $17,383.58 plus interest calculated to date of payment to Respondent. The tax assessment in this case is based upon two factual situations: Petitioner, manufactured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities consisting of cities, towns, municipalities, counties, school boards, junior colleges and others. Petitioner also hauled the asphalt to the job cite (sic) at a fixed ton/mile rate determined by bid. Petitioner, as a subcontractor, manu- factured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities above described. The general contractor contracted with the political entities in various fashions but the Petitioner's duties were always the same and included manufacture, installation and hauling of asphaltic concrete based on a rate certain per ton and per ton mile. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is correct in contending that the Petitioner must pay a sales and use tax on the produced asphalt which it uses in the performance of the construction contract jobs described in paragraph 6. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was remitted, by the Petitioner on the produced asphalt. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was paid by the instant customers to the Petitioner. It is Respondent's contention that, pursuant to the above-cited rules, the Peti- tioner is required to pay sales or use tax on the produced asphalt which is used to construct real property pursuant to a con- tract described in Rule 12A-1.51(2)(a), F.A.C. It is Petitioner's contention that the above-cited rules do not apply in the instant case since the customers involved in the instant fact situations are political subdivision or because the transaction was of the type described by Rule 12A-1.51(2)(d), F.A.C. Petitioner is entitled to rely on the earlier 1967 audit by Respondent because neither Petitioner's method of doing business, nor the law, has changed materially since 1967. Respondent agrees that this is an issue but fails to agree that Petitioner is so entitled to rely." All purchase orders or invitations for bid received by petitioner from political subdivisions stated that the entity was exempt from federal and state sales taxes and that such taxes should not be included in the bid. Typical bid forms entitled "Specifications for Asphaltic Concrete" called for a lump-sum price per ton for delivery and placement of the material by the vendor plus a sum per ton per mile for transportation costs. No breakdown of amounts for the cost of materials and cost of installation is reflected in the bid documents. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook, Exhibits 3, 7 (late filed)) Respondent audited petitioner's operations in 1967 and, although it had had previous transactions with governmental entities prior to that date, no assessment for back taxes was issued for failure to pay sales tax on such transactions nor was petitioner advised to do so in the future by state officials. After 1967, petitioner did not seek information from respondent concerning the subject of sales tax. As a consequence of the 1967 audit, petitioner believed that it was unnecessary to charge or pay sales tax on such transactions with political subdivisions. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook) As of April 1, 1977, Brevard County had a population of over 250,000. Although it is a large county in terms of size, respondent has only two auditors in the sales tax division to cover the entire county. (Testimony of Alberto, Cowan, Exhibit 4)
Recommendation That the petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc. be held liable for sales tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in respondent's proposed assessment. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Brown, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Andrew A. Graham, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Should the Department of Revenue grant Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit and request for refund of sales and use tax which has been paid under protest? See Section 212.08(5)(a) and (b)3a, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner opened a new commercial laundry facility in Pompano Beach, Florida, in 1993. Petitioner installed in the new facility machinery and equipment costing approximately $1,400,000.00 for the purposes of cleaning and processing linens used by hospitals in the south Florida area (the "Laundry Equipment"). Petitioner charges a fee to hospitals in the south Florida area for cleaning and processing the hospitals' linens with the Laundry Equipment. The new facilities are additional, not replacement, facilities. The Laundry Equipment: Qualifies as "industrial machinery and equipment", as defined by Section 212.08(5)(b) and (6)(c), Florida Statutes; Was purchased by Petitioner for use in a new business; Processes items of tangible personal property, the hospital's linens, at a fixed location; Was purchased before Petitioner first began its productive operations and delivery was made within 12 months of that date; and Has increased productive output at Petitioner's commercial laundry facility. The equipment included a tunnel washer system, conveyers, feeders/folders, ironers, a boiler, and air compressors. By application dated September 3, 1993, Petitioner applied for a temporary tax exemption permit with respect to the Laundry Equipment which it planned to purchase for use in its new business. Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer obtain that permit to receive the exemption. The Department denied Petitioner's application. On August 22, 1994, Petitioner paid to the Department, under protest, the sum of $18,095.36, which represented the tax of $16,773.98, plus interest of $1,321.38, on Petitioner's purchase of the Laundry Equipment. Petitioner timely filed its claim for refund, which the Department denied. Respondent denied Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit, and Respondent denied Petitioner's refund claim based upon Rule 12A- 1.096, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's request for a tax exemption permit and Petitioner's refund claim are based upon the exemption provided in Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, which applies to a new (as opposed to an expanding) business.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies the request for a tax exemption permit and a refund in the amount of $18,095.36. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Pierce, Esquire Emily S. Waugh, Esquire MACFARLANE, AUSLEY, FERGUSON & MCMULLEN Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James McAuley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 18-4475RX, whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.044(5)(a) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.1/ As to DOAH Case No. 18-4992RU, whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") Standard Audit Plan, Vending and Amusement Machines--Industry Specific, section 1.1.3.3 ("SAP") is an unadopted rule in violation of sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Audit Period GBR is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. Gilda Rosenberg is the owner of GBR and a related entity, Gilly Vending, Inc. ("Gilly"). GBR and Gilly are in the vending machine business. At all times material hereto, Amit Biegun served as the chief financial officer of the two entities. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. This case concerns the audit period of January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2014. GBR's Provision of Vending Machine Services Prior to the audit period, the school boards of Broward and Palm Beach County issued written solicitations through invitations to bid ("ITB"), seeking vendors to furnish, install, stock, and maintain vending machines on school property. The bids required a "full turn-key operation." The stated objectives were to obtain the best vending service and percentage commission rates that will be most advantageous to the school boards, and to provide a contract that will be most profitable to the awarded vendor. The stated goal was that student choices from beverage and snack vending machines closely align with federal dietary guidelines. GBR operates approximately 700 snack and beverage vending machines situated at 65 schools in Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties. Of these 65 schools, 43 are in Broward County, 21 are in Palm Beach County, and one is in Miami-Dade County. The snack vending machines are all owned by GBR. Beverage vending machines are owned by bottling companies, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Of the 700 vending machines, approximately 60 percent of the machines are for beverages and the remaining 40 percent are for snacks. GBR has written vending agreements with some schools. In these agreements, GBR is designated as a licensee, the school is designated as the licensor, and GBR is granted a license to install vending machines on school property in exchange for a commission. Furthermore, GBR is solely responsible to pay all federal, state, and local taxes in connection with the operation of the vending machines. Ownership of the vending machines does not transfer to the schools. However, in some cases the schools have keys to the machines. In addition, designated school board employees have access to the inside of the machines in order to review the meter, monitor all transactions, and reconcile the revenue from the machines. GBR places the vending machines on school property. However, the schools control the locations of the vending machines. The schools also require timers on the machines so that the schools can control the times during the day when the machines are operational and accessible to students. The schools also control the types of products to be placed in the machines to ensure that the products closely align with the federal dietary guidelines. The schools also control pricing strategies. GBR stocks, maintains, and services the vending machines. However, Coca-Cola and Pepsi may repair the beverage machines they own. GBR is solely responsible for repairing the machines it owns. The schools require that any vendor service workers seeking access to the vending machines during school hours pass background checks. GBR route drivers collect the revenue from all of the vending machines and the revenues are deposited into GBR's bank accounts. In exchange for GBR's services, the schools receive from GBR, as a commission, a percentage of the gross receipts. However, neither GBR nor the schools are guaranteed any revenue unless sales occur from the machines. On its federal income tax returns, GBR reports all sales revenue from the vending machines. For the tax year 2012, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $5,952,270. Of this amount, GBR paid the schools $1,363,207, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2013, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,535,362. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,122,211, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2014, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,076,255. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,279,682, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. Thus, for the audit period, and according to the federal tax returns and general ledgers, GBR's gross receipts or sales were $18,563,887. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $3,765,100, as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. The Department's Audit and Assessment On January 27, 2015, the Department, through its tax auditor, Mary Gray, sent written notice to GBR of its intent to conduct the audit. This was Ms. Gray's first audit involving vending machines at schools. Thereafter, GBR provided Ms. Gray with its general ledger, federal returns, and bid documents. On October 28, 2015, Ms. Gray issued a draft assessment to GBR. The email transmittal by Ms. Gray to GBR's representative states that "[t]he case is being forwarded for supervisory review." In the draft, Ms. Gray determined that GBR owed additional tax in the amount of $28,589.65, but there was no mention of any purported tax on the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. However, very close to the end of the audit, within one week after issuing the draft, and after Ms. Gray did further research and conferred with her supervisor, Ms. Gray's supervisor advised her to issue the B03 assessment pursuant to section 212.031 and rule 12A-1.044, and tax the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. Thus, according to the Department, GBR was now responsible for tax in the amount of $246,230.93, plus applicable interest. Of this alleged amount, $1,218.48 was for additional sales tax (A01); $4,181.41 was for purchase expenses (B02); $13,790 was for untaxed rent (B02); and $227.041.04 was for the purported license to use real property (B03). Ms. Gray then prepared a Standard Audit Report detailing her position of the audit and forwarded the report to the Department's dispute resolution division. On January 19, 2016, the Department issued the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") against GBR for additional tax and interest due of $288,993.31. The Department does not seek a penalty against GBR. At hearing, Ms. Gray testified that the Department's SAP is an audit planning tool or checklist which she used in conducting GBR's audit. Employees of the Department are not bound to follow the SAP, and the SAP can be modified by the auditors on a word document. The SAP was utilized by Ms. Gray during the audit, but it was not relied on in the NOD.4/
The Issue Whether or not, on or about December 2, 1976, investigation revealed that Robert W. Pope, licensed under the Beverage Laws of the State of Florida, failed to file and pay his State Sales Tax for the licensed premises, known as Kitty's, located at 1020, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Florida, in violation of 212, F.S., thereby violating 561.29, F.S.
Findings Of Fact Robert W. Pope is and at all times pertinent to this cause has been the holder of license no. 62-512, series 4-COP, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to trade as Kitty's, located at 1020, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. When the Respondent, Pope, began to operate the licensed premises he was given a registration sales tax number by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This number was provided in accordance with 212, F.S. That law required the remittance of the collected sales tax on a month to month basis, the period beginning with the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. The remittance was due on the first day of the following month and payable by the 20th day of the following month. Failure to pay by the 20th would result in a 5 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month. The sales tax remittance due from the licensed premises for July, 1976 through November, 1976 was not made to the Department of Revenue. In December, 1976 the Department of Revenue filed a lien against the licensed premises to collect an amount due at that time of $2,200.66. As an aid to the collection of the account, the Department of Revenue levied the subject liquor license. Subsequently, in February, 1977 the Respondent made a $10,000 initial payment and three monthly installments to satisfy the lien on this licensed premises and another licensed premises which the Respondent owned. At present all taxes due and owing under 212, F.S. are current. The above facts establish that the Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of 212, F.S. pertaining to the remittance of sales tax from the Respondent to the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This violation, thereby subjects the Respondent to the possible penalties of 561.29, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Robert W. Pope, be required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $750.00 or have the license no. 62-512, series 4- COP, suspended for a period of 20 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 611 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., is liable for the payment of $10,176.18, together with a penalty of 5 percent and interest accruing daily as claimed in the audit by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, for the period September 1, 1975, through August 31, 1970.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc.`s challenge to the tax audit conducted by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, covering the period September 1, 1975, through August 31, 1978. The claim of the audit is for sales tax due pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and its supporting rules found in the Florida Administrative Code. The audit document showing the Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit A admitted into evidence. Although the audit document originally claimed tax in the amount of $29,600.37, at the commencement of the hearing the amount remaining in dispute was $15,288.75, together with a penalty of 5 percent and interest accruing until date of payment. During the hearing, a stipulation was entered into between the parties to the effect that, of the remaining disputed tax, penalty and interest, $5,112.57, together with the applicable penalty and interest was acknowledged to be owed by the Respondent. Therefore, there remains in dispute the amount of $10,176.18, with a 5 percent penalty and interest accruing until date of payment. This amount of tax, penalty and interest claimed represents the difference between the tax rate which the Petitioner has applied in this assessment process and the tax rate that the Respondent claims to be applicable. The Petitioner claims that a tax rate of 4.5 percent against total receipts, in keeping with the authority of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent counters that position by offering its own formula arrived at in view of the nature of its prices charged its customers, and that tax rate is 4.1666667 percent. The sales in question during the audit period pertain to sales of alcoholic and malt beverage in the lounges of the Respondent's licensed premises located in Dade County, Florida. The facts reveal that the sale of all alcoholic beverages in the time period at issue were made in increments of a quarter dollar ($.25). These quarter-dollar increments included the imposition of sales tax. As example: SALES PRICE TAX TOTAL $ .48 $.02 $ .50 .72 .03 .75 .96 .04 1.00 1.20 .05 1.25 1.44 .06 1.50 1.68 .07 1.75 Although the tax was computed on the sales price and this system was made known to the public by prominently displaying the price list, which list indicated that the beverage prices included tax; the Respondent did not separate the increment of the total price into categories of sales price and tax at the time of each transaction. Consequently, the books audited in the process of making the claim for assessment only demonstrated the total sales price of a given day's alcoholic beverage sales as an aggregate and did not reflect the tax as a separate item from the sales price. To this aggregate amount the Respondent applied its tax rate formula of 4.166667 by taking the amount of total receipts for the day and dividing by 1.04666667 to get gross sales. The gross sales were then subtracted from the amount of total receipts to obtain the figure for tax collected. This method was rounded off to the nearest penny on each day of computation. The Petitioner, as stated before, relies on Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a basis for its claim that the rate of tax should be 4.5 percent. That provision states: (3) Dealers in alcoholic and malt beverages are required to remit the actual tax collected to the State. In some instances, however, it may be impractical for such dealers to separately record the sales price of the beverage and the tax collected thereon. In such cases, dealers may elect to report tax on the following basis. Package stores who sell no mixed drinks should remit the tax at 4.3 percent of total receipts and dealers who sell mixed drinks or a combination of mixed drinks and packaged goods should remit the tax at the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts. In those instances where the sales price and the tax have not been separately recorded but where it can be demonstrated that the public has been put on notice by means of price lists posted prominently throughout the establishment that the total charge includes tax, the dealer may deduct the tax from the total receipts to arrive at the appropriate tax and gross sales figures using the method shown below: Total receipts divided by the tax rate = gross sales. For example, a package store which sells no mixed drinks and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.043 percent = gross sales $1,917.54 tax collected 82.46 A dealer who sells drinks or a combination of drinks and package goods and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.045 percent = gross sales $1,913.87 tax collected 86.12 When the public has hot been put on notice through the posting of price lists that tax is included in the total charge, tax shall be computed by multiplying total receipts by the applicable rates referred to in this rule. In the mind of the Petitioner, by failing to segregate the total amounts collected into the categories of sales price and tax and then to remit the tax collected as a separate item, the Respondent is relegated to the utilization of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, in remitting its tax. Under its theory, the Petitioner has taken the total receipts recorded in the Respondent's work sheets and divided those total receipts by the formula 1.045 percent to get gross sales and then subtracted the gross sales from the amount of total receipts to get the amount of tax that should have been collected, and then made a further subtraction of the tax which the Respondent remitted, from the tax formula which the Petitioner claims to be due on the transactions to arrive at the tax presently outstanding. This amount being the figure referenced above. From that computation, the amount of penalty and interest has been claimed. (By its position the Petitioner does not seem to question the fact that the public has been put on notice by price lists posted throughout the establishment that the total charge reflected on the price lists includes tax, as referred to in the subject Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code.) According to the Respondent, the reason for the utilization of the rate of 4.1666667 percent was the fact that all beverages having a break in price increments of a quarter-dollar ($.25), it is mathematically impossible for the proper effective rate being charged on all beverages sold in the lounges to vary from their tax rate of 4.1666667 percent because each increment of increase has the same ratio of sales price to tax. The Respondent argues that to claim a rate of 4.5 percent causes the collection in excess of the amount allowed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. After considering the position of the parties, the Respondent is found to be correct in its position. The overall scheme of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, calls for the taxation of sales of tangible personal property at a rate of 4 percent, see Section 212.05, Florida Statutes. A further refinement of that theory is found in Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, which creates a bracketing system for sales representing the various fractions of a dollar in amount. This bracketing system thereby causes imposition of a sales tax greater than 4 percent in some transactions. The Petitioner is granted further authority to refine the system of taxation by those provisions of Subsections 212.17(6) and 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, which state in turn: 212.17(6) The department shall have the power to make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, or the other laws, or the constitution of this state, or the United States, for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder, and such rules and regulations shall when enforced be deemed to be reasonable and just. 212.18(2) The department shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the taxes, interest, and penalties imposed by this chapter. It is authorized to make and publish such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, as it may deem necessary in enforcing its provisions in order that there shall not be collected on the average more than the rate levied herein. The department is authorized to and it shall provide by rule and regulation a method for accomplishing this end. It shall prepare instructions to all persons required by this chapter to collect and remit the tax to guide such persons in the proper collection and remission of such tax and to instruct such persons in the practices that may be necessary for the purpose of enforcement of this chapter and the collection of the tax imposed hereby. The use of tokens in the collection of this tax is hereby expressly forbidden and prohibited. It can be seen that the Petitioner has the authority to promulgate the necessary rules for the accomplishment of the purpose of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, but is restricted in this task by being prohibited from making rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this chapter or other statutes within the laws of the State of Florida or the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida and it is further restricted from imposing rules or regulations which cause the tax to be collected on the average more than the rate levied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. While it is clear that the legislature intended to keep the effective rate of tax as near the 4 percent level as possible, it is also evident that the system contemplated a segregation of the amount collected in a sale as sales price, and the amount of tax applied to the sale at the point of the transaction. This is a means of accountability that helps insure that the proper remittance of tax due on each and every retail sales occurs. However, the preeminent charge to the Petitioner is the duty to collect the tax at a rate which most closely approximates the 4 percent called for, without abandoning responsibility or the close monitoring of the records of a given taxpayer. When considered in the overall context of the purpose of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the method which the Respondent used to collect and remit tax, does not violate the conditions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, nor the rules designed to enforce that chapter. The tax rate of 4.1666667 percent has been proven to be correct, in the sense of more closely approximating the 4 percent tax rate called for than the application of a tax rate of 4.5 percent. The correctness is established because the increments charged for alcoholic beverages are always in the amount of a quarter-dollar ($.25) and each increment of increase carries the same tax rate. This fact, when considered with the additional fact that the break-out of the tax in the price structure as established by the Respondent, is in keeping with the tables of the bracket system found in Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, is sufficiently convincing to demonstrate the propriety of the Respondent's position. Nonetheless, a further examination of the Petitioner's argument is indicated. The focus of the Petitioner's position is Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, and a detailed reading of this rule reveals that dealers who have properly put the public on notice that their sales prices include tax, "may" elect to remit tax by using the formula of the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts as the tax due. The use of the word "may" in this instance creates an option on the part of the Respondent, an option which it has elected not to proceed under and by the facts of this case, the alternate method which the Respondent used in computing this tax, i.e., the rate 4.1666667 percent is efficacious. Finally, the Petitioner has advanced the argument that the formula found in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, is unique to that rule and may not be utilized unless the prerequisite factors are shown and unless the tax rate factor 4.5 percent is part of the formula. Even though the formula as expressed in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, may have legitimate application to some cases, it is not preemptive in its scope and it would not prohibit the Respondent in this case from using the formula and substituting the rate of tax of 4.1666667 percent for the rate of 4.5 percent in that part of the formula. In summary, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate its entitlement to the tax, penalty and interest under its claim founded on Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. (Petitioner in this cause had submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommendation in the case styled, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., Petitioner, vs. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Respondent, D.O.A.H. Case No. 70-1003R, and in doing so made reference to matters which have been considered in the present case. Therefore, to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order they are specifically rejected. The Respondent has also submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommended Order and to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order they are specifically rejected.)
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., be relieved from further responsibility to pay the amount of tax, $10,176.18 and the 5 percent penalty and interest accruing on that amount of tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Martha J. Cook, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 422, Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Watson, Esquire c/o Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell 1190 Union Commerce Building Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Mark J. Wolff, Esquire and Howard E. Roskin, Esquire First Federal Building, 30th Floor One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Gainesville Amateur Radio Society, Inc. (GARS or petitioner), a Florida non-profit corporation, was incorporated on December 31, 1975. Its stated purpose is to promote an interest in amateur radio operation. Among other things, GARS provides preparation for Federal Communication Commission licensing examinations, supports community activities with free communication services, and encourages public awareness of ham radio activities through the publication of a monthly newsletter called the GARS-MOUTH. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the state tax code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions involving "scientific organizations." In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified scientific organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In the case of petitioner, a certificate would enable it to save a hundred or so dollars per year. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization, GARS filed an application with DOR on December 21, 1993. After having the application preliminarily disapproved by DOR on the ground it did not expend "in excess of 50.0 percent of the . . . organization's expenditures toward referenced charitable concerns, within (its) most recent fiscal year," a requirement imposed by DOR rule, GARS then amended its application to claim entitlement on the theory that it was a scientific organization. Although DOR never formally reviewed the amended application, it takes the position that GARS still does not qualify for a certificate under this new theory. Is GARS a Scientific Organization? Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.c., Florida Statutes, a scientific organization is defined in relevant part as an organization which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A DOR rule tracks this statute almost verbatim. Accordingly, as a matter of practice, in interpreting this statutory exemption, DOR simply defers to the final determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the IRS grants an organization a 501(c)(3) status based on the determination that it is a scientific organization, then DOR accepts this determination at face value. DOR does not make an independent determination whether the organization is "scientific" or question the decision of the IRS. This statutory interpretation is a reasonable one and was not shown to be erroneous or impermissible. GARS received a federal income tax exemption from the IRS regional office in Atlanta, Georgia by letter dated August 12, 1993. The record shows that GARS was granted an "exempt organization" status as a "charitable organization" and as an "educational organization" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3). However, GARS did not receive an exempt status as a "scientific organization" nor did the IRS make that determination. Therefore, GARS does not qualify as a scientific organization within the meaning of the law. While petitioner submitted evidence to show that it engages in what it considers to be a number of scientific endeavors, these activities, while laudable, are irrelevant under Florida law in making a determination as to whether GARS qualifies for a sales tax exemption as a scientific organization. Therefore, the application must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1200 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. 4. Rejected as being cumulative. 5-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 13-14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 16. Covered in preliminary statement. 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 18-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Sidney Schmukler, Esquire 3922 N. W. 20th Lane Gainesville, Florida 32605-3565 Olivia P. Klein, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for sales and use taxes, penalties, and interest and, if so, how much.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner operated a bar and grill in Punta Gorda that served beer, wine, liquor, and food at retail. In the course of business, Petitioner collected tax from the customers. Petitioner reported to Respondent sales tax collections for May 1996, November 1996, March 1997, November 1997, and December 1997. In connection with these collections, Petitioner remitted to Respondent seven checks representing the net tax due Respondent. These checks totaled $6700.64. The bank on which the checks were drawn dishonored them. The remittance of net sales tax proceeds by payment through checks that are later dishonored implies a fraudulent, willful intent to evade the payment of these sums. Respondent has issued five warrants concerning the unremitted taxes, penalties, and interest. Warrant 953620064 shows that Petitioner owes $1171 in sales tax remittances for the five months from July through November 1995. With penalties and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $1832.37. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.35. Warrant 467049 shows that Petitioner owes $2940.25 in sales tax remittances for the following months: April 1996, October 1996, December 1996, and January 1997. Petitioner purportedly paid each of these remittances with five (two in January) checks that were later dishonored. With penalties, including the 100 percent penalty for fraud, and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $7480.12. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.95. Warrant 971680037 shows that Petitioner owes $1301.85 in sales tax remittances for the following months: December 1995, June 1996, July 1996, September 1996, November 1996, and February 1997. With penalties and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $2669.69. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.43. Warrant 471481 shows that Petitioner owes $2912.48 in sales tax remittances for October and November 1997, for which Petitioner made remittances with two dishonored checks. With penalties, including the 100 percent penalty, and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $6751.49. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.95. Warrant 989840034 shows that Petitioner owes $8077.76 in sales tax remittances for the following months: August 1997, September 1997, December 1997, January 1998, and February 1998. With interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $8285.21. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $2.65. Totaling the five warrants, Petitioner owes a total of $27,018.88 in taxes, penalties, and interest through June 5, 1998, and $5.33 per day for each ensuing day until the amount is paid.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $27,018.88 in taxes, penalties, and interest through June 5, 1998, and $5.33 per day for each ensuing day until the amount is paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John N. Upchurch Nicholas Bykowsky Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Judith Crown, President Tombstone, Inc. Suite P-50 1200 West Retta Esplanade Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue herein is whether the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against West Broward Chamber of Commerce as a result of the purchase of promotional books by the Chamber from Creative Public Relations and Marketing, Inc., is valid.
Findings Of Fact The West Broward Chamber of Commerce (Petitioner) entered into an oral contract with Mr. Randy Avon, a representative of Creative Public Relations, to purchase a promotional booklet pertaining to the West Broward area for distribution to the public. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1). Creative Public Relations in turn contracted with International Graphics to print the booklet. Mr. Bernard Fox, the Department of Revenue's (Respondent Area Manager in the Fort Lauderdale office and Mr. James W. Darrow, who worked with International Graphics during the time the transaction in question took place, testified and established that Mr. Randy Avon secured a sales tax number for the purchase of the promotional books in issue and presented the sales tax number to International Graphics. International Graphics sold the books to Mr. Avon for resale, without tax. The Department of Revenue issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales tax, penalty and interest due on the purchase of the books in question by Petitioner in the total amount of $1,307.56. Evidence reveals that said assessment was due as of December 20, 1978, and that since that time interest is accruing at a daily rate of $.31. This assessment was based on a total purchase price of $24,214.10, which, according to Mr. Fox and the statements contained in Respondent's Exhibit #1, was the price that Mrs. Gail Duffy, Petitioner's Executive Director informed the Respondent that the Chamber paid for the promotional booklets. Petitioner's treasurer, Helen Kerns, also testified that the total purchase price paid by Petitioner for the books was $22,104 and that part of the purchase price was paid directly to Creative Public Relations due to a dispute with an officer of the contracting entity, International Graphics. Mrs. Kerns testified that commissions were, however, paid by the Petitioner to Creative Public Relations, which commissions were not included in the purchase price as testified to by Mrs. Kerns. James W. Darrow, a witness who was allegedly privy to the agreement and understanding between the Petitioner and the seller, Creative Public Relations, testified that the oral contract price specifically included sales taxes on the transaction. Additionally, Mrs. Duffy testified that in her opinion, the sales taxes due on the purchase by Petitioner had been paid because she under stood that the total purchase price paid to Creative Public Relations by Petitioner included the sales tax. No sales invoices, receipt, or other tangible evidence of sales were offered into evidence at the hearing herein. Petitioner contends that the sales tax in question was included in the total purchase price. Based thereon, Petitioner contends that Creative Public Relations is now liable for the tax. Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position that the taxes from the sales transaction can be imposed on either the seller or the purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against Petitioner be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Moore, Esquire 1265 Northwest 40th Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. White, Esquire 5460 North State Road #7, Suite 220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33319
