The Issue In treating Ms. Cottrell's English bulldog on May 15, 1987: Whether Respondent knowingly concealed information relevant to violations of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes; Whether Respondent knowingly prepared a false report or record; Whether Respondent performed or prescribed unnecessary treatment; Whether Respondent was negligent or guilty of misconduct in this treatment; Whether Respondent falsified records pertaining to this treatment; and Whether Respondent was incompetent or unprofessional in his dealings with Ms. Cottrell.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Phillip F. Habib, Respondent, was licensed as a doctor of veterinary medicine as alleged. On May 15, 1987, Ms. Sandra Cottrell came home from work at approximately 5:00 p.m. and observed her three-year-old English bulldog "Jake" to be lethargic, which was unusual. Being familiar with English bulldogs and aware that their state of health can change rapidly, Ms. Cottrell called her veterinarian, Dr. LaDue, who advised her to take the dog's temperature, keep a close watch on the dog and call back with temperature results and any changes in the dog. At this time Ms. Cottrell was living at her mother's home and did not have a thermometer with which to take Jake's temperature. She called Dr. LaDue back to report she was unable to take Jake's temperature but he seemed to be in no present distress. Shortly thereafter Ms. Cottrell decided to take Jake for a walk. By the time they reached the end of the driveway she realized that Jake was acting abnormally and she became concerned. She aborted the walk and decided to take Jake to her veterinarian. By this time Jake had begun to have difficulty breathing. Ms. Cottrell then decided that Jake's condition required emergency intervention and had her sister-in-law look in the telephone book for the nearest animal clinic. That clinic was Hope 'n Happiness Animal Clinic in Clearwater, Respondent's place of business. Ms. Cottrell, accompanied by her sister-in- law, drove Jake to this clinic. Both Hope Habib, wife of Respondent, and Respondent testified that Ms. Cottrell told them upon her arrival that she had been playing frisbee with Jake when he became ill. The only activity of Jake that Ms. Cottrell testified to was attempting to take Jake for a walk. Ms. Cottrell was not called as a rebuttal witness (although she was still present) to confirm or deny the frisbee testimony. Although Respondent testified he didn't know what a frisbee was until he later asked his six-year-old child, the Habibs' testimony is not deemed credible. If, in fact, Respondent was told that Jake had been chasing a frisbee when he became ill this presented a conclusive reason for suspecting Jake was suffering from hyperthermia. Upon arrival at the clinic Jake was carried into the reception area and Hope Habib showed them into an examination room. During this time Jake was wheezing and having difficulty breathing. Respondent promptly started examining Jake with Ms. Cottrell present. English bulldogs are very susceptible to heat prostration or hyperthermia. Up to 50 percent of English bulldogs who get hyperthermia die. This phenomenon is widely known among English bulldog owners and veterinarians. Temperatures above 103 degree F. for English bulldogs need to be reduced quickly. At no time while Jake was being examined and treated by Respondent did Ms. Cottrell see the Respondent take Jake's temperature. Nevertheless, Respondent entered temperature of 103.0 degrees on the medical record (Exhibit 5). He also recorded Jake's weight at 80.0 pounds. Jake's normal weight is 67- 68 pounds. At no time did Ms. Cottrell observe Respondent weigh Jake. When first interviewed by Petitioner's investigator Respondent admitted that he had estimated the dog's weight. Shortly after commencing his examination of Jake, Respondent advised Ms. Cottrell that Jake was having a heart attack and that she had killed her dog by letting him get too fat. Subsequently he diagnosed Jake as having a diaphragmatic hernia which required immediate surgery. X-ray equipment needed to diagnose such a hernia was not available at Hope 'n Happiness Clinic on May 15, 1987. Respondent referred Ms. Cottrell to an emergency animal clinic in Clearwater several blocks distant for surgery. Respondent also called this clinic to alert them of the referral. While treating Jake, Respondent administered some 750 mg soludeltacortef, which is a recommended treatment for animals suffering heat prostration (Exhibit 6). This drug serves to reduce the effects of shock to the animal and it is recommended to be given IV (Exhibit 6). Respondent testified, and his medical record indicate, that soludeltacortef was administered intravenously. Ms. Cottrell testified that Respondent was unable to locate a vein for an IV injection and that several "shots" were given Jake in the hip muscle. In his notes, apparently written later that evening (Exhibit 5), Respondent lists possible diagnoses of: shock, "lung damage or diaphragmatic hernia, heart problem and maybe other diagnosis." He does not include heat prostration as a possible diagnosis. To demonstrate the diaphragmatic hernia Respondent pressed on Jake's abdomen which caused the animal to regurgitate. X-rays subsequently taken in Tampa did not confirm a diaphragmatic hernia. The existence of a diaphragmatic hernia cannot be determined by palpitating the abdomen. During the treatment of Jake by Respondent attempts to administer oxygen were made by placing a face mask over Jake's nose. This was unsuccessful and further agitated the animal. This effort was discarded and Ms. Cottrell was referred to the emergency clinic. Respondent and his wife's testimony that the oxygen given Jake revived him to the extent that he could stand on the floor without assistance and could have walked out of the Respondent's clinic is not credible under the circumstances. During the 30-45 minutes Jake that was being treated by Respondent, Ms. Cottrell was very upset and crying due to her concern for her dog's health. However, she remained in the examining room the entire period but for a few seconds when she went to the lobby to get her sister-in-law to come to the examining room. Hope Habib testified that Ms. Cottrell was in and out of the examining room frequently to make telephone calls while Jake was being treated. Considering the circumstances and the potential bias of the witness the testimony of Ms. Cottrell is deemed more credible. When Ms. Cottrell asked Respondent how long Jake would live she was told anywhere from 30 minutes to 5 hours or more. Upon leaving Respondent's clinic Ms. Cottrell decided to take Jake to Tampa to the clinic of her regular veterinarian. This was a trip of 30-35 minutes as compared to the 5-10 minute ride to the emergency clinic to which she had been referred by Respondent. The weather on May 15, 1987 was normal for that time of year with a high of 83 degrees F. and a low of 71 degrees F. The temperature recorded by the Department of Commerce at the St. Petersburg-Clearwater airport at 5:50 p.m. and 6:51 p.m. was 74 degrees F. (Exhibit 10). Although Ms. Cottrell's car was not air-conditioned, she had the windows down during the drive from Clearwater to Tampa and Jake was in the front seat on the passenger's side during this trip. At the time Jake departed Respondent's clinic, Respondent believed that Jake was being taken to the emergency animal clinic in Clearwater. When he called this clinic to see if Jake had arrived and learned he had not, he then called Ms. Cottrell's home phone where he learned that Jake had been taken to the Tampa clinic. Respondent then called the Tampa clinic and advised the doctor there treating Jake that Respondent had given Jake soludeltacortef and to inquire about the dog. The medical records pertaining to the treatment given Jake by Respondent (Exhibit 5) were prepared after Jake arrived at the Tampa clinic. Respondent's testimony that these notes were prepared that evening is otherwise unrebutted. Upon arrival at the Tampa clinic Jake's temperature was 107 degrees F. and emergency treatment for hyperthermia was begun. The animal was immediately hosed down in an attempt to reduce his temperature. Temperature readings were taken frequently during this period until Jake's temperature was reduced to 103 degrees F. and at a wider spaced interval after that temperature was reached. No evidence was presented regarding the possibility or likelihood of Jake's temperature rising from 103 degrees F. while at Respondent's clinic to 107 degrees F. some 30-45 minutes later when he arrived at the Tampa clinic. The conditions under which this 35-40 minute ride was made was in a non air conditioned but open car with the outside temperature of 74 degrees F. The dog was closely monitored at the Tampa Bay Animal Center after being taken there Friday evening, May 15, 1987. Ms. Cottrell visited the center to see Jake on Saturday, May 16, 1987 when the dog appeared to be semicomatose; and Jake died Saturday evening. Respondent's method of writing medical records in the third person led some witnesses to conclude that these records had been prepared after charges of malpractice were made. Respondent's testimony that he always prepared medical records after the close of the clinic was unrebutted as was the testimony of other witnesses who had reviewed many of Respondent's records that Respondent writes all of his medical records in the third person. After learning of the complaint filed in this case, Respondent telephoned Ellen Trapp, D.V.M., the veterinarian who treated Jake at Dr. LeDue's Tampa clinic, and Dr. LeDue; and indicated that they, as veterinarians needed to stick together. When Dr. LeDue responded that Respondent had failed to properly diagnose Jake's condition by failing to take his temperature, Respondent hung up on him. Respondent also stated to Dr. Trapp that he would not be held responsible for his actions if something happened at the end of this court hearing. To Petitioner's investigator Respondent subsequently denied ever contacting any veterinarian regarding this case.
Recommendation It is recommended that the license of Phillip F. Habib as a doctor of veterinary medicine be revoked. It is further recommended, that the revocation be stayed for a period of 3 years probation under such terms and conditions as the Board of Veterinary Medicine deems appropriate, and that, at the expiration of the three years probationary period, unless sooner vacated, the revocation be set aside and Respondent restored to good standing. ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4691 Treatment accorded Petitioner's proposed findings: Included in H.O. #1. Included in H.O. #2, 3, 4. Included in H.O. #4, 5. Included in H.O. #7. Included in H.O. #10. Included in H.O. #9. Included in H.O. #9. Included in H.O. #13. Included in H.O. #11, 12. Included in H.O. #9, 14. Accepted. Accepted in H.O. #10, 15. Accepted. Accepted in H.O. #17. Included in H.O. #15, 16, 18. Included in H.O. #9. Accepted. However, this statement was made long after Jake's death was determined to have resulted from hyperthermia. 18-19. Included in H.O. #11. Accepted. Included in H.O. #22. 22-23. Accepted as conclusions of law. Included in H.O. #8. Accepted Accepted insofar as included in H.O. #12. Accepted only insofar as included in H.O. #13. Included in H.O. #13. Rejected as irrelevant. 30-32. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. However, Respondent testified that only a date was added to the record. Rejected as unsupported by credible evidence. Accepted. Treatment accorded Respondent's proposed findings. Included in H.O. #2, 3, 4. Included in H.O. #5. Included in H.O. #8, 14. Accepted as testimony of witness. Accepted insofar as included in H.O. #5, 15. Included in H.O. #14. Included in H.O. #3, 9. 8-9. Rejected as irrelevant. Included in H.O. #16. Accepted. Included in H.O. #3, 9. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Dr. LaDue was not involved in treatment of Jake. Accepted Included in H.O. #15. Accepted. Rejected as irrelevant when decision made. Included in H.O. #3 and 6. Included in H.O. #10. Accepted insofar as no one could explain the missing X-ray. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected as unsupported by Douglas' testimony. First sentence accepted. Last sentence rejected. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as repetitious (see 12). Accepted but irrelevant. Accepted but irrelevant. Rejected. Record shows dog's weight as 80.0 pounds. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Dr. Douglas never saw the dog. Irrelevant because of duplicity. Accepted. Accepted but irrelevant. Accepted but irrelevant. Rejected except to the extent that almost anything is possible. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as testimony of Mandelker. Irrelevant. Accepted in part. Manner in which Habib prepared records only part of basis for Green's opinion. Irrelevant. Rejected. Accepted but irrelevant here. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Rejected. No evidence submitted that Jake was ever hypothermic on May 15, 1987. Term hypothermia misused or reporter error. Accepted. Irrelevant. Rejected as unsupported by Cottrell's testimony. Accepted-insofar as in H.O. #13. Rejected. Accepted insofar as included in H.O. #14. Rejected. See H.O. #13. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See H.O. #21. Included in H.O. #21. Accepted. Rejected. Habib's testimony in this regard differs from that of his wife. However, the accuracy of the testimony is not material. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. See H.O. #13. 71. See H.O. #15. Irrelevant. Included in H.O. #17. Included in H.O. #17. 75. See H.O. #21. Accepted. Accepted. Trapp didn't see the dog until he was presented that evening. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted insofar as included in H.O. #12. Accepted but irrelevant. Irrelevant. Included in H.O. #17. Repetitious. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Cottrell was not working at the LaDue clinic in May 1987 and was getting no discount at that time. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted as Goldston's opinion. Accepted as Goldston's opinion. Rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura P. Gaffney, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Louis Kwall, Esquire 138 North Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 34615 Kenneth Easley Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Linda Biedermann Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 =================================================================
The Issue The cause was initiated upon the filing of a Petition for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs, pursuant to Florida Statutes 57.111. A formal hearing was originally scheduled for Gainesville, Florida, however, pursuant to agreement of the parties it was dispensed with. The parties stipulated to the record to be considered in this proceeding, agreeing upon exhibits and upon a time period for submission of proposed final orders. The appearances were as follows.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Samy H. Helmy, was a licensed veterinarian in the State of Florida at all times pertinent hereto. The license was suspended by Final Order of the Board of Veterinary Medicine on or about August 3, 1990 and the suspension was upheld on appeal. That Final Order became a Final Decision upon the Court’s Mandate and Notice issued on December 26, 1991. On or about February 21, 1992 Mr. Henry Scheid, in his capacity as an investigator for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine, (DBPR) set up a “sting operation” in which he attempted to apprehend the Petitioner in activities which could be construed as unlawfully practicing veterinary medicine with a suspended license. Mr. Scheid’s investigative report is an exhibit by stipulation in this proceeding. Mr. Scheid acknowledges in this report that another person, Dr. S. Strahler was present on the Petitioner’s veterinarian practice premises at the time he made his investigation. Mr. Scheid also recounts in his investigative report that although the Petitioner examined the animal which was involved in the sting operation, when it became necessary to give an injection to the animal, an employee of the veterinary practice who proved to be Dr. Strahler, was called in to actually perform the injection. It does appear that the investigator, Mr. Scheid, was aware that a licensed veterinarian was practicing on the premises. He would thus seem to have been aware that Dr. Strahler may have been in a position to supervise Dr. Helmy’s practice under his suspended license. However, there is also contained in the investigative report a statement by the investigator to the effect that he interviewed Dr. Strahler. Dr. Strahler indicated that he had only worked on Dr. Helmy’s premises for several days in February 1992 and that indeed, Dr. Helmy had performed surgeries without Dr. Strahler’s assistance, which could reasonably be interpreted by Mr. Scheid that Dr. Helmy might have been performing veterinary practice in an unsupervised way. In the investigator’s report, page 10, reference is made to his interview with RFS (Dr. Strahler) as follows: “On February 27, 1992 investigator made phone contact with RFS. He advised he had only worked for subject; February 14, 1992, Friday, all day; February 15, 1992, Saturday, one-half day; and February 21, 1992, Friday, all day. During questioning RFS, with hesitation, did advise that subject was conducting surgeries, with or without RFS assistance. Further advised, he would cooperate as the last day he worked subject, he found out that subject’s license was suspended. After contacting investigator Sowder, Marion County Sheriff’s Office, a meeting with State Attorney for a sworn statement was set for March 4, 1992, at 2:00 p.m.” There are a number of interviews of animal owners who took their animals to Dr. Helmy, for examination and/or treatment. Descriptions of these interviews are recounted in the investigator’s report. The results of those interviews indicate that Dr. Helmy, was performing veterinary practice in terms of diagnosing, taking blood samples, and performing various aspects of treatment. (See the Respondent’s proposed Findings of Fact numbers six through sixteen, adopted here by reference). Although Dr. Helmy, could perform veterinary practice. under the statute cited below, so long as he was supervised by a duly licensed veterinarian in good standing with the Board, the interview of Dr. Strahler (“RFS”) indicates that indeed he may have been practicing without any supervision on some occasions. The important point is that the investigator had sufficient investigative facts to have a good faith belief that he had discovered the Petitioner, practicing with a suspended license, without proper supervision by a duly licensed veterinarian on the premises. He could thus reasonable conclude then that the Petitioner was not in compliance with the statute concerning supervision cited below. After his visits to the premises and contact with law enforcement authorities, Mr. Scheid filed the subject report on approximately April 19, 1992. Thereafter, the investigation apparently remained an open or active investigation, but as far as the evidence in this case shows, no administrative complaint was filed for a substantial period of time. In fact, on September 10, 1993 Nancy M. Snurkowski as chief attorney for the agency signed a document called a “Closing Order” on behalf of George Stuart, Secretary of the Department. That Closing Order indicates that the complainant, the agency, had alleged that the subject, Dr. Helmy, had violated Sections 474.213(1)(f) and 474.215(3), Florida Statutes (1991) for operating a veterinary establishment when the responsible veterinarian’s license had been suspended, or by knowingly employing an unlicensed person or persons in the practice of veterinary medicine. The Closing Order implies that the investigation substantiated the complaint in that the subject was a veterinary establishment operated by Dr. Helmy when his license to practice had been suspended. The Closing Order accounts that he continued to practice despite that suspension. The Closing Order states that he continued to practice despite that suspension. The Closing Order also states that: “[T]he establishment now lists Robert F. Strahler, DVM as a responsible veterinarian. Robert F. Strahler, DVM is a Florida-licensed veterinarian in good standing with an active license. He acquired the facility and premises permit number of VE0002026 on August 27, 1992. The previous permit number VE0001793 is no longer valid.” “The law: “Based on the foregoing, probable cause does exist at this time to believe that the subject was in operation while its responsible veterinarian’s license was suspended and it employed unlicensed individuals in the practice of veterinary medicine. However, since the unlicensed activity has been stopped and the responsible veterinarian holds a valid active license in good standing, this case will be closed.” Thus on September 16, 1993 apparently the agency elected to terminate the prosecution with this “Closing Order”. The agency however, does not admit in that Closing Order that probable cause to believe that unauthorized veterinary practice done by the Petitioner did not exist. Rather, it merely indicates that, since the investigation was commenced, Dr. Strahler had become a licensed supervising veterinarian, or a “responsible veterinarian” in good standing for the establishment. Therefore the violation previously believed to have been found by Mr. Scheid had been alleviated at that point. That Closing Order appears to have been merely the determination of the investigation at that point. The evidence before the Administrative Law Judge does not actually indicate that a formal administrative complaint, based upon a probable cause finding by the Board, had been made at that time or previously. Nevertheless, in a probable cause panel meeting of November 30, 1993 (by telephone conference call) (the transcript of which is stipulated into evidence in this proceeding as Exhibit 3) probable cause to file an proceed on the administrative complaint which gave rise to this case was found by the Board of Veterinary Medicine. This may seem a harsh determination, since the Chief Attorney with the Board had recommended terminating the prosecution prior to that probable cause finding. However, the investigative report and related documents indicate that there was adequate reason to believe that unauthorized veterinary practice by Dr. Helmy had been conducted on the premises on and around the time when Mr. Scheid made his visitor visits to the premises and interviews of customers and others. Thereafter, prosecution of the administrative complaint proceeded, (albeit slowly). Thus the Board litigated this case in 1993 until 1996. There is no question with attorney’s fees and costs were incurred by the Respondent (Dr. Helmy) in that administrative complaint case during that time. In fact, there is no dispute about the reasonableness of the fees and costs claimed in this proceeding. After attempting to conduct a hearing, but after at least one continuance, and before the case proceeded to formal hearing, the complaint was voluntarily dismissed by the prosecuting agency on June 5, 1996. Dr. Helmy made no admissions or agreements at any time to prompt the Department of file the motion for dismissal on the basis of a negotiated settlement. A related criminal case was proceeding during 1992 through 1994 in the Fifth Judicial Circuit for Marion County Florida. Dr. Helmy was being prosecuted by the State based upon the same set of factual circumstances developed by Investigator Scheid. A Motion to Dismiss was filed by defense counsel in that case and the Circuit Court granted that motion based upon an undisputed set of facts which are the same underlying facts that gave rise to the administrative complaint in the formal proceeding underlying this attorney’s fee case. The circuit judge in that proceeding dismissed the criminal case against Dr. Helmy on January 27, 1995, finding that Dr. Helmy was providing supporting assistance under the supervision of responsible, duly- licensed veterinarian, who acted as a responsible veterinarian as defined by Chapter 474 Florida Statutes. The Circuit Judge found that the Petitioner’s actions at the times pertinent to the criminal proceeding and the administrative prosecution were lawful since they were done under the supervision of a duly- licensed, active practicing veterinarian. The Administrative Law Judge ruled upon the Motion to Dismiss, and a subsequent motion, which raised the issues of collateral estoppel Res Judicata made by Dr. Helmy’s attorney in the formal proceeding underlying this attorney’s fee case. It was thus determined that the principals of collateral estopped and Res Judicata did not apply due to lack of mutuality of parties, etc. Accordingly, the administrative proceeding continued to remain active for sometime until the agency, on its own motion, voluntarily dismissed the matter on June 5, 1996. It is true as Petitioner contends, that a deputy sheriff from Marion County, as well as Mr. Scheid, testified by deposition that their opinions concerning Dr. Helmy’s guilt of unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine would be different if they assumed that his actions were performed under the immediate supervision of a licensed veterinarian. Dr. Gary Ellison, an expert witness for the Department in the Helmy case acknowledged, in his deposition, essentially the same thing that if “everything in the complaint” had been done under the immediate supervision of a licensed veterinarian then Dr. Helmy would not have broken the law. The fact remains, however, that at the time the investigation was commenced and Mr. Scheid conducted his interviews and conducted his operation on the then Respondent, Dr. Helmy premises, he had a reasonable belief that a violation had taken place. His conversation with Dr. Strahler himself could give him a good-faith belief that Dr. Strahler indeed did not truly supervise Dr. Helmy. Thus, the Board, at the time probable cause was found in the administrative complaint was filed, had a reasonable basis in fact and in law to proceed against Dr. Helmy, even if it was later determined that in fact, his practice on those premises had been lawful. While it may seem unduly harsh for the Board to find probable cause after its chief attorney had recommended closing of the investigation, the fact remains that, at the time probable cause was found there was substantial justification for the Board to believe that unauthorized veterinary practice had been conducted by the Petitioner on the premises. The language of the “Closing Order” does not obviate such a finding. Finance evidence into this proceeding in the form of Dr. Helmy’s tax returns for 1993 and 1994, as well as other evidence (see Exhibit 12) show that the Petitioner does not have a net worth of more than $2,000,000. The evidence, in its totality also shows that Dr. Helmy was operating a sole proprietorship of a professional practice dispensing veterinary services, at “Highway 200 Animal Hospital” at the time of the initiation of the Board’s action. This is documented in the investigative report and by the registration certificate for the veterinary establishment included in the record of this case as stipulated Exhibit 12. In fact, Dr. Helmy had entered into a business lease for the premises where he located to Highway 200 Animal Hospital with the lease specifying that the premises were to be occupied for a veterinary office, and the lease beginning June 15, 1990 and continuing through June 14, 1995. Thus, at all times pertinent hereto, Dr. Helmy had a lease for a business establishment operating as a veterinary practice from 1990 through 1995. His veterinary practice was not incorporated nor was it a partnership. It can only be inferred from the evidence available that it was a sole proprietorship of Dr. Helmy.
Recommendation Accordingly, having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the preponderant evidence of record and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore ORDERED that the petition of Samy Helmy, D.V.M. is denied.DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of January, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Rush, Esquire 426 N.E. First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 James E. Manning, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1997. 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Susan Foster Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Respondent violated Section 585.80, Florida Statutes, by selling or offering to sell animal products that were adulterated, misbranded, or uninspected, and, if so, a determination of the appropriate administrative fine to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is engaged in the business of selling meat products at its location at 1221 Northwest 40th Avenue, Lauderhill, Florida 33313, and holds Food Permit No. 55403, pursuant to Section 500.12, Florida Statutes. On February 12, 1993, a United States Department of Agriculture Compliance Officer performed an inspection at Respondent's facility. During this inspection, the Compliance Officer examined and placed under detention approximately 63 pounds of uninspected meat product, including cow feet, cow tails, cow head meat, goat stomachs, and beef blood. Goat stomachs may not be sold as human food under any circumstances in the State of Florida. The stomachs at issue were also adulterated with ingesta, or the contents of the stomach at the time the animal was slaughtered. Respondent purchased the meat at issue from a farmer in Avon, Florida, and had sold approximately 415 pounds of the same product to its customers prior to the Compliance Officer's inspection. 1/ At the time of Respondent's selling and offering for sale of the adulterated and uninspected meat products, Respondent's owner was aware of the illegality of his actions. By means of the Department's letter dated June 2, 1991, Respondent has previously received a formal notice of warning concerning a separate violation of the same statutory prohibition, namely the sale and offer for sale of 253 pounds of uninspected goat meat. The Florida meat inspection program requires an animal to be inspected both before and after slaughter. Antemortem inspection is necessary to determine the general health of the animal, while postmortem inspection may reveal pathological conditions and diseases. The tissue is also examined for evidence of abscess, parasites, and tuberculosis. These steps must be taken to safeguard the consumer from exposure to contaminated and diseased meat products.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Section 585.80(2), Florida Statutes, by selling uninspected animal products and adulterated animal products: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Section 585.80(2), Florida Statutes, by offering for sale uninspected animal products and adulterated animal products; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 for each of the two violations mentioned above, for a grand total of $2,000.00 in administrative fines. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 29, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic woman who was employed by Respondent from December 1997 until her termination on October 2, 2002. She worked in Alachua County Animal Services (Animal Services) as an animal control officer. Animal Services control officers are supervised by the Animal Services field supervisor who reports to the director of Animal Services. Petitioner received a bachelor's degree in 1983 in agriculture with a concentration in animal production and agricultural management courses, has experience in animal nutritional research, and has one published paper in that field.2/ Prior to working for the Alachua County, Petitioner managed a small pest control business. By the time she applied for the supervisory position, she had obtained Florida Animal Control Association (FACA) Level I, euthanasia, and chemical immobilization certifications. An animal control officer is responsible for enforcing state laws and county ordinances regarding small animals. Animal control officers impound animals at-large, issue warnings and citations, handle citizen complaints, and investigate animal bites and cruelty to animals. Petitioner served as interim Animal Services supervisor for a little over one month in June 2000. When the position of Animal Services field supervisor became vacant in December 2001, Petitioner applied for the job. Penny Lefkowitz, a newly hired Animal Services officer, also applied for the job. At that time, Ms. Lefkowitz had seven years of animal control experience in Arizona as lead officer. In that capacity, she was a sworn officer with firearm authority, a field training officer, and handled over 1,000 calls per year in that position. She held National Animal Control Association (NACA) Level I and II certifications. She was euthanasia- certified and had 25 years' experience breeding dogs and horses. Ms. Lefkowitz has a high school diploma. Ms. Lefkowitz was placed in the interim field supervisor position for a period of approximately three months, during which time she received supervisory pay. The record is not clear whether there was a separate application process for the permanent position following the appointment of the interim supervisor position. In any event, Respondent hired Bill Burris as Animal Services supervisor in March 2002. At the time he applied, Mr. Burris had nine years of animal control experience in Arkansas, where he was the animal control officer and shelter assistant. He held a high school G.E.D. Additionally, he held NACA Level I, II, and III certifications. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination regarding failure to promote only references Ms. Lefkowitz's appointment to the interim director position, "[i]n December 2001, a newly hired officer, white female with less experience was hired as interim supervisor." It does not reference Mr. Burris as being hired in the director position. Her Petition for Relief alleges, "[t]hose less qualified individuals were hired and promoted in violation of county/company policy." Thus, it is not clear that Respondent hiring Mr. Burris for the permanent position is properly within the scope of this case. Nonetheless, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding Mr. Burris' qualifications is addressed herein. Mr. Burris held the position of field operation supervisor from March 2002 until his resignation in September 2003. Based upon the evidence in the record, at the time the decision was made to place Ms. Lefkowitz in the temporary supervisory position, she and Petitioner met the qualifications for the job. Ms. Lefkowitz had significantly more supervisory and field experience than Petitioner. At the time he was placed in the job, Mr. Burris met the qualifications for the job and had significantly more supervisory experience than Petitioner. Petitioner held a college degree, which neither Ms. Lefkowitz or Mr. Burris had. However, according to Mr. Burris, a college degree was not a minimum requirement of the job, but two years' animal control or animal shelter experience were required. There is nothing in the record to contradict his testimony in this regard. When Mr. Burris became field supervisor, he held a staff meeting and told the animal control officers he supervised that he would start fresh as far as performance and discipline issues. He handed them an empty folder and informed them that he would only consider their past performance if he saw a pattern that caused him to look at past personnel records. Mr. Burris called staff meetings to discuss policies that were not up-to-date or in need of updating. Prior to the staff meeting, Mr. Burris sent a memorandum to the animal control officers informing them that there would be a staff meeting. Officers were expected to attend and were excused only if they were on an emergency call. If an officer was absent from a meeting, Mr. Burris would promptly notify them in memorandum format as to what happened at the meeting. When changes were made in policies or procedures, Mr. Burris would put a copy of the policy changes in every officer's box. Each officer had his or her box where they would receive their mail. Each officer was expected to check that box daily. The boxes were accessible to everyone so that when there was a confidential document, such as payroll information, that document was placed in an envelope and then put in the officer's box. Petitioner's mid-year performance review was due in April 2002, approximately six weeks after Mr. Burris became the supervisor. Petitioner received an overall rating of "exceeded expectation." There are five categories of performance ratings, and "exceeded expectation" is the second highest category. That rating was consistent with ratings Petitioner received from previous supervisors. On April 24, 2002, Mr. Burris held a staff meeting to discuss a new policy regarding issuance of warnings and citations. The new policy required officers to give animal owners in violation of vaccination or licensing requirements 15 days to come into compliance. Previous to this, some officers had given animal owners 30 days to come into compliance. Under extenuating circumstances and upon seeing reasonable attempts to achieve compliance, the officer could extend an owner's deadline by 15 more days. Testimony is conflicting as to whether Petitioner attended this meeting. Petitioner insists she was not at this meeting. Mr. Burris insists that she was and that this issue was discussed in great detail. In any event, Mr. Burris put the new policy in writing a few days after the April 24, 2002, meeting, and the new written policy was given to all the officers. The weight of the evidence establishes that even if Petitioner did not attend the April 24, 2002, meeting, she would have been notified of the policy change shortly thereafter. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner issued a warning to a dog owner, which allowed the dog owner 30 days to achieve compliance with licensing and vaccinations for 24 dogs. According to Petitioner, she considered 30 days to be ample time for the owner to come into compliance. Petitioner maintains that at the time she issued this warning, she was not aware of the change in policy from 30 to 15 days. She acknowledges that Mr. Burris later explained the change in policy to her. It is clear that Mr. Burris informed Petitioner of this policy change and directed her to follow these procedures. In June or July 2002, Mr. Burris designed a policy and procedure manual incorporating all policies and procedures. A manual was issued for each truck used by the animal control officers. On July 31, 2002, Mr. Burris issued a memorandum entitled, "Bite Priority," to the animal control officers. Following a staff meeting where this memorandum was given to the officers, an informal discussion took place around the dispatch area. During this informal discussion, Petitioner questioned Mr. Burris as to whether he had ever read a document called the rabies compendium. Mr. Burris described Petitioner as speaking in a disrespectful, challenging tone. Ms. Lefkowitz witnessed the exchange and described it as disrespectful and condescending.3/ This statement made in front of other officers was inappropriate. The "Bite Priority" memorandum reads, in pertinent part, as follows: All Bites will be priority. Stand-by officers will be required to respond if the bite is after hours during their on-call shift. Bites will not be passed on to the next day. Shifts are 10 hour shifts, not 9 1/2 hours, if you end up working over you are compensated. Officers will not pass calls off to the stand-by person. Priority calls will be taken by Officers during their regular shift. The remainder of the memorandum dealt with off-premise bites. In early August 2002, Mr. Burris decided to "work the roads on a Saturday to take up some of the slack" because the animal control officers were overworked. Late one afternoon, Mr. Burris attempted to reach Petitioner on the radio, but was unable to do so. He asked the dispatcher to contact Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledges that she was contacted by the dispatcher and received Mr. Burris' request to fill up the truck she was driving and to leave the keys and the fuel card on Mr. Burris' desk. Petitioner had already filled up the truck that day in the late morning. She did not fill up the truck again at the end of the day, but described the truck as being seven-eighths full at the end of her shift, after making ten to 12 calls after stopping for fuel. Petitioner believed her actions complied with Mr. Burris' instructions. Mr. Burris described finding the truck the next morning as half-full of gas. Mr. Burris concluded that Petitioner did not follow his instructions. Mr. Burris' conclusion in this regard was not unreasonable. The truck incident gave rise to Mr. Burris' first written warning about her conduct. On August 5, 2002, Mr. Burris issued a memorandum to Petitioner for "failure to follow verbal instruction." The memorandum noted a safety concern in that he was not able to reach Petitioner by radio and his concern that she did not follow his directive. On August 6, 2002, Mr. Burris called Petitioner into his office to discuss the written memorandum. Mr. Burris described Petitioner's behavior when he handed her the memorandum to be disrespectful. As a result, Mr. Burris went to the director's office to explain the circumstances surrounding this incident. This resulted in a meeting in the director's office at which the director, Mr. Burris, and Petitioner were present. Petitioner acknowledges that she made the statement, "I guess one out of a hundred is unacceptable" during this meeting, and that she said it using a sarcastic tone. Later on August 6, 2002, Mr. Burris issued Petitioner another in-house written warning, the subject of which was "improper conduct" about her conduct in the director's office, which read in part: I informed Dr. Caligiuri of Blanca's discourtesy and or improper conduct. I had Blanca meet with me in Dr. Caligiuri's office to discuss her comment and the way in which it was stated. During our conversation in Dr. Caligiuri's office Blanca used mild sarcasm, expressing, "I guess one time out of a hundred is unacceptable" as we discussed the importance of responding to her radio. At this time, I do not want to write this up as a group I #19 Discourtesy to another employee or a Group II #7 Improper conduct which would effect the employees relationship with co-workers. However, if this behavior continues I will be left with no alternative. I know Blanca is capable of doing her job in a professional manner. I only want this as a written documentation of what occurred on this day, to prevent future occurrences of this same behavior. Petitioner refused to sign the August 6, 2002, memorandum. On August 13, 2002, Animal Services received a call about a dog bite at a residence. Animal control officer Jay Butts was dispatched on the call. When he arrived, he saw two or three dogs inside the home, and he could not determine which dog was involved in the reported bite. The owner of the dog was not at home. He left without leaving a written warning because, "I did not have the correct owner or dog, so I didn't know which dog or which owner to leave a written warning to. . . So I wanted to come back and find out which dog actually was involved in the bite." The following morning, Mr. Butts received information from the Health Department regarding the dog's owner and learned that the dog was not currently vaccinated or licensed. Mr. Butts returned to the residence where the bite occurred. He posted a notice to the dog's owner. Apparently the owner was still not home because he posted a warning which included the following necessary corrective action: "Your dog must be placed into quarantine by 5:00 pm on 8-14-02 at our shelter or a licensed vet. If you do not have this done today your animal will be impounded and you will receive a citation of $200.00 per day." The warning required the owner to correct the violation by 5:00 p.m. that day. Officer Butts proceeded to handle other calls until his shift was over. He did not make contact with the dog's owner before his shift ended. His shift ended before 5:00 p.m. The dog's owner called Animal Services after 5:00 p.m. on August 14, 2002. Petitioner took the call. After speaking to the dog's owner, she called a veterinarian and learned that the dog's vaccination had expired by a few months. She did not pick up the dog. She gave the following reason: Yeah, it happened on property. The dog was confined to his property. We had contacted the owner. And basically even though the vaccination had expired, even a one-year vaccination is good for three years. This is a known fact of any vaccine, any rabies vaccine manufactured in the United States, a one-year vaccine has an efficacy of three years. So I take all that matter into consideration when I have to make a decision as to what to do with a bite dog. Petitioner told the dog's owner that he had to comply with the written warning given by Mr. Butts. According to Petitioner, she told the dog's owner that he had to quarantine the dog off the property either at the shelter or at a veterinarian clinic. She also informed him that the only person who could reverse that decision was her supervisor. The next morning, August 15, 2002, the dog's owner called Mr. Burris. Mr. Burris spoke to the dog's owner and then questioned Petitioner to get her side of the story. He then instructed Petitioner to pick up the dog. She did not pick up the dog as instructed; another officer picked up the dog later that day. Mr. Burris gave a verbal warning to Officer Butts regarding his handling of the dog-bite incident. Mr. Butts had received previous disciplinary actions, including suspensions, prior to Mr. Burris becoming the field supervisor. However, on August 20, 2002, Mr. Burris initiated a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action (Notice) to Petitioner in which he recommended a three-day suspension without pay. The reasons referenced in the Notice were willful negligence in the performance of assigned duties or negligence which would endanger the employee, other employees, or the public; and refusal to perform assigned duties or to comply with written or verbal instructions of a higher level supervisor. The narrative of the Notice referenced the dog-bite incident and the August 6, 2002, improper conduct memorandum. Mr. Burris explained his decision to give different disciplinary actions to Officer Butts and Petitioner: Q What should she have done with the dog? A She should have impounded it immediately. If the owner refused her, she should have issued him a citation for failure to comply. Q Jay Butts participated in this. We had some testimony about that. Jay Butts participated in this event two days prior and one day prior to Ms. Carbia getting involved. Why wasn't Butts given any suspension on the same matter? A Jay Butts was given the same verbal consultation that Officer Carbia had received. The only thing Jay Butts could have done differently would have perhaps left a posted notice the day of or given a notice to the roommate with generic information. Jay Butts received consultation pertaining to that. He did not receive disciplinary action because he never made any contact with the owner. The officer that made contact with the owner and had the first opportunity to take the dog was Officer Carbia. Q So there is a difference in the seriousness of her offense and Jay Butts' offense? A Absolutely. Q Hers was more serious? A Yes. As a result of the Notice, a grievance hearing took place on August 26, 2002, in the director's office. Wayne Mangum, who at that time was the union steward, Mr. Burris, and Petitioner were there, as well as the director, Dr. Caligiuri. During the meeting, Petitioner explained her position. At some point in the meeting, Dr. Caligiuri made a comment to the effect that 80 years ago women could not vote.4/ Petitioner found that comment to be discriminatory toward women. When asked whether Dr. Caligiuri's demeanor in that meeting was aggressive or not cordial, Mr. Mangum replied that his demeanor was "uncordial." In any event, Dr. Caligiuri's comment was offensive and inappropriate. During the August 26, 2002, meeting, Mr. Burris instructed Petitioner to discontinue striking the word "within" from the form used when giving an animal owner a time frame within which to bring in an animal to be impounded. She had not been instructed regarding that previously. Mr. Burris received a copy of a warning form dated August 28, 2002, on which Petitioner had crossed out the word "within" contrary to his instructions. He took no action at the time since he thought it might have been a "slip of the pen." He then received another warning form dated September 9, 2002, regarding a dog bite which Petitioner had again altered by crossing out the word "within." Petitioner had written on the form that the warning had been posted. Posting is a procedure officers follow when the animal owner cannot be found. The notice is posted on the door of the residence for the owner to find upon returning home. Based upon his telephone call to the dog's owner and the information on the form, Mr. Burris was of the belief that the form had not been posted, and that Petitioner's indication on the form that it had been posted was inaccurate. Mr. Burris met with Petitioner regarding this incident. Petitioner acknowledged at hearing that she spoke to the dog's owner, but was intimidated and confused when questioned by Mr. Burris about whether or not she had spoken to the owner. Petitioner contends that she did not lie to Mr. Burris, that initially the owner did not come to the door but later did come to the door. According to Petitioner, she simply neglected to cross out the word "posted" or ask the owner to sign the form. On September 18, 2002, Mr. Burris signed and provided a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action to Petitioner which proposed her termination from employment. The stated reasons for the proposed action were willful negligence in the performance of assigned duties or negligence which would endanger the employee, other employee, or the public; deliberate falsification and or destruction of county records; and refusal to perform assigned duties or to comply with written or verbal instruction of a higher level supervisor. The Notice referenced the August 28, 2002, warning notice with the word "within" crossed out; the September 10, 2002, warning notice with the word "within" crossed out; the written word "posted" on a warning when she had personally spoken to the dog's owner; and the meeting on August 26, 2002, which resulted in her three-day suspension. The Notice concluded: This is the same type of circumstance concerning the same written instruction after meeting with Blanca and her union rep. This time Blanca was untruthful in her statements, even after I gave her three opportunities to tell me that she had personally spoken to the dog owner. By writing "posted" on the notice which indicates the owner was not home, she falsified a county document. Blanca hand delivered the notice to the dog owner and did not impound the dog when she had the opportunity. Petitioner was terminated from her employment with Respondent effective October 2, 2002. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner complained to anyone that she felt she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender or national origin. The only evidence presented regarding her national origin was Petitioner's brief testimony: Q Were there any other Hispanics employed at animal services during the time frame that Mr. Burris was there? A No. Do you feel that your national origin had something to do with the way Mr. Burris treated you? A Certainly just—basically I felt that I was treated differently, yeah.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent's License to practice veterinary medicine should be revoked or suspended for alleged violations of Sections 474.31(6) & 474.31(12), Florida Statutes. An Order was issued on December 5, 1975, consolidating this case for hearing with the case of Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine vs. Cristobal M. Gonzalez Mayo, D.V.M., Docket No. 751925, because the cases involve similar issues of law and fact. At the hearing, Respondent was advised of his right to employ legal counsel to represent him at his own expense and he elected to represent himself. He also was advised of other rights under the Administrative Procedure Act, including the right to testify as a witness, if he so desired. Respondent indicated his understanding of these rights as explained to him by the Hearing Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds license no. 231 issued by the State of Florida, Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine, which he received on March 30, 1944. The license is currently in effect (Petitioner's Exhibit l). Respondent has been a veterinarian for some 29 years and practices his profession at 3520 N.W. 36th Street, Miami, Florida (Testimony of McGee). Respondent employed Sergio Gutierrez, D.V.M., a veterinarian with approximately 25 years of experience, but who was not then licensed by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine, on December 6, 1974, for a period of approximately 3 months. At the time he was hired, Dr. Gutierrez exhibited various licenses from other jurisdictions to the Respondent and the latter gained the impression that Dr. Gutierrez held a temporary Florida license, even though he did not ask that it be shown to him. At that time, Dr. Gutierrez had submitted his license application to the Board of Veterinary Medicine, but it had not been acted upon by the Board (Testimony of Gutierrez, McGee). On December 6, 1974, James Gillece, an investigator with the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, took a cat to the Respondent's place of business in order to investigate a complaint that an unlicensed veterinarian was employed there. Upon arrival, he informed the receptionist that the cat was sick and asked her assistance. He was referred to Dr. Gutierrez who gave the cat inoculations for rabies and distemper. Gillece thereupon paid $19.00 for the services and received a receipt. He returned on December 13, presented his identification to Dr. Gutierrez and asked him if he was licensed to practice veterinary medicine. Dr. Gutierrez informed him that, although he was licensed in 40 states, he was not so licensed in Florida. Although Respondent was not present when the cat was treated, Dr. Gutierrez testified that Respondent exercised general supervision over his activities during his employment (Testimony of Gillece, Gutierrez, McGee) On March,4, 1975, Chery Lynn Correa, along with Dr. Calvin Dugas, D.V.M., both employees of the Knowles Animal Hospital in Miami took a Doberman Pinscher to Respondent's Clinic. Their visit was prompted by a request of their employer, Dr. Knowles, who had asked them to check a complaint that there were unlicensed veterinarians working for the Respondent. Without disclosing their purpose, Correa informed the Respondent's receptionist that she had brought the dog to get rabies and distemper shots and to have some bumps on its neck checked. She and Dr. Dugas were referred to Dr. Cristobal Gonzalez Mayo, in the treatment room. Mayo checked the dog and told them that the bumps were due to an improper diet. He then administered inoculations for rabies and distemper and checked the animal for worms. He also looked at the dog's throat and diagnosed tonsilitis for which he prescribed tetracycline pills. He also procured liquid shampoo called Tergex for a skin problem and gave instructions to bathe the dog once a week. He gave two more injections of antibiotics and cortisone. The receptionist signed Respondent's name to the certificate of rabies vaccination and to a form for issuance of a Dade County dog tag. Dr. Mayo signed Respondent's name to a Canine Interstate Health Certificate reflecting the administration of the inoculations. Correa paid the bill of $43.00 and then she and Dr. Dugas departed. During the time they were at Respondent's clinic, they did not see the Respondent on the premises (Testimony of Correa, Dugas, Petitioner's Exhibit 3). However, Respondent was in the back office at the time in question suffering from a headache and had asked his receptionist, to have Dr. Mayo give routine shots to animals during the day and only call him if a diagnosis was necessary. In view of Dr. Mayo's lack of a Florida license, Respondent did not permit him to diagnose, treat, or incise skin of an animal without supervision. In accordance with these directions, Respondent Mayo always checked with Respondent on a diagnosis and the latter would then prescribe the proper treatment. Dr. Mayo followed this procedure with respect to the dog brought to the clinic by Correa and received instructions from Respondent as to the treatment that was thereafter performed. Dr. Mayo was not licensed by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine until, July 27, 1975. Respondent professed the belief at the hearing that since secretaries could sign distemper and rabies certificates, he felt Dr. Mayo could sign an interstate health certificate although he normally signed such documents himself. Dr. Mayo testified that he had worked for the local humane society for over nine years and, during that period, had signed his own name to interstate health certificates by authorization of the board of directors of the society. The receptionist took the interstate health certificate in question to Dr. Mayo to sign because he had administered the shots to the animal. She was unaware of the fact that he was unlicensed (Testimony of McGee, Mayo, Uriquize, Petitioner's Exhibit 2).
Recommendation That the charges against Harold M. McGee, D.V.M., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire 101, E. College Avenue P.O. Box 1752 Tallahassee, Florida Harold M. McGee, D.V.Mp. Miami Veterinary Clinic 3520 Northwest 36th Street Miami, Florida 33142
Findings Of Fact In 1978, Wendy Weil obtained a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine degree, from the University of Bologna (Italy) , a school approved by the Board. She filed an application for licensure and paid the prescribed fee in January, 1979. She was issued a temporary license by the Board in May, 1979, pending completion of her examination which she took in August, 1979. She was advised in September, 1979, that she had failed a portion of the examination and that her temporary license had been revoked. Petitioner retook this portion of the examination in August, 1980 and was informed that she had passed in September, 1980. At the October, 1980 meeting of the Board, a decision was reached to deny Petitioner's application for licensure, and an order to this effect was issued October 16, 1980. The Board reconsidered its decision after discovering that the original investigative report contained forged affidavits unfavorable to Petitioner. The Board ordered a second investigation which was conducted in January, 1981. The report of the second investigation was presented to the Board which affirmed its earlier denial of Petitioner's application. Wendy Weil requested an administrative hearing on the Board's original denial under Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by petition dated November 6, 1980. The request for hearing was forwarded by Respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings by letter dated January 6, 1981. Petitioner has been employed continuously at the Oakland Animal Hospital, Ft. Lauderdale, since January, 1979, except for a brief period around March, 1980. She initially served as a veterinary technician until receiving the temporary veterinary license in May, 1979. She thereafter performed veterinarian duties until October, 1979, when her temporary license was revoked and she reverted to veterinary technician status. Petitioner presented the expert testimony of six licensed veterinarians, including her employer, Dr. R. A. Johnson, owner of the Oakland Animal Hospital. This evidence established that unlicensed persons, usually referred to as veterinary technicians, are permitted to conduct a variety of medical functions under the supervision of licensed veterinarians. Such supervision does not necessitate the physical presence of the licensed veterinarian during performance of these tasks, but does require that he be immediately available. The tasks assigned veterinary technicians depend largely on individual skills. As a result of her training, Petitioner is authorized by her employer to perform any procedure which does not involve the actual practice of veterinary medicine, i.e., diagnosis, prognosis, prescribing treatment and performing surgery. While Petitioner held her temporary license she was permitted to practice veterinary medicine with the restriction that such practice be under the responsible supervision of a licensed veterinarian. Her employer, Dr. R. A. Johnson, provided this supervision. Petitioner sought the advice of Board members in October, 1979, regarding use of the title Doctor and limitations on her employment as a veterinary technician. As a result of her inquiry, Petitioner concluded that she could not properly use the title Doctor and thereafter discouraged such use by hospital personnel and clients. However, the title continued to be used on occasion in paging her within the clinic and on hospital forms. Petitioner's use of the title Doctor is associated with her degree in veterinary medicine and does not depend on grant of a license to practice. However, the use of the title Doctor in any context associated with her work at the Oakland Animal Hospital was misleading to the public and to clients of the animal hospital after her temporary license was revoked in October, 1979. Petitioner is identified in the yellow pages of the 1980 Ft. Lauderdale telephone directory as a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine associated with the Oakland Animal Hospital. This ad was placed by Petitioner's employer without her knowledge or approval. Similarly, stationery and business cards which identified Petitioner as a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine associated with the Oakland Animal Hospital were prepared and distributed without her approval. Some twenty coworkers and hospital clients called as witnesses by Petitioner attested to her efforts to accurately represent her status to the public. However, Respondent's witnesses Sharkey, Vilchez, Wright and Miller were clients of the hospital after October, 1979, and believed that Petitioner was a licensed veterinarian through their contacts with her. Witnesses Sharkey and Vilchez brought their pets to the Oakland Animal Hospital in March, 1980. Petitioner told Sharkey she was an intern, which Sharkey believed meant that she was a veterinarian. She did not tell Vilchez that she was or was not a licensed veterinarian, but Vilchez reasonably assumed so because Weil examined her dog, told her it had stones and that surgery would be required. Neither client saw anyone other than Petitioner except administrative personnel and technicians. However, Dr. Johnson subsequently called Sharkey at home to discuss her pet's condition. Witness Miller's dog was examined by Petitioner in April, 1980. Following an examination which included the taking of blood and fecal samples and the insertion of a swab in the animal's rectum, Petitioner informed Miller that the animal was hemorrhaging internally and should be left at the hospital for treatment. Miller assumed that Petitioner was a veterinarian as she heard her referred to as Dr. Weil, and saw no licensed veterinarian during her visit. Witness Wright, who is the mother of witness Miller, took her own dog to the Oakland Animal Hospital in April, 1980, where the animal delivered nine puppies by Caesarean section, all of which subsequently died. Wright had seen only Petitioner upon taking her pet to the Oakland Animal Hospital and was later called by Weil regarding the birth and death of the puppies. Wright therefore assumed Petitioner had performed the surgery. However, the testimony of Dr. Johnson established that he, and not Weil, had performed all surgical procedures.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be granted a license to practice veterinary medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry V. Bishins, Esquire 4548 North Federal Highway Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 William F. Casler, Esquire 6795 Gulf Boulevard St. Petersburg Beach, Florida Tina Hipple, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Christopher Rolle, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1602, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this cause are fashioned by an amended administrative complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent. By the first count to this complaint, Respondent is charged with knowingly employing and otherwise encouraging his wife, Nadia Said Helmy, to practice veterinary medicine in Florida without the benefit of a license. The second count to the amended administrative complaint was dismissed at the commencement of the hearing. By count three, the Respondent is charged with inappropriate advertising in association with his veterinary practice.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine (Petitioner) is empowered by Chapters 455 and 474, Florida Statutes, to regulate the practice of veterinary medicine in Florida. Samy H. Helmy, D.V.M (Respondent), is and has been a licensed veterinarian in Florida during the pendency of the allegations set forth in the amended administrative complaint. Respondent's wife, Nadia Said Helmy, is not now licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida, nor has she been during the time sequence contemplated by the amended administrative complaint. Respondent and his wife owned and operated Wildwood Animal Clinic in Wildwood, Florida, from a period before January 1985 until June 1985. Respondent and his wife were also the owners and operators of Citrus Fair Animal Hospital in Inverness, Florida, from January 1985 through September 19, 1986, the date upon which Respondent gave a deposition in this cause. During the time frame in which both animal clinics were open, Respondent was principally located at the Inverness facility, while his wife was working in the Wildwood facility. Nadia Helmy was working under the supervision of the Respondent in her activities at Wildwood. Sometime in May 1985, a Ms. Goheen took her cat to Dr. Leigh McBride, another veterinarian licensed to practice in Florida. Ms. Goheen claimed that her cat had been treated by a veterinarian at the Wildwood Animal Clinic. She described that veterinarian as being a female. Dr. McBride was unfamiliar with a female veterinarian at the Wildwood Animal Clinic, being of the understanding that Respondent, a man, was the practicing veterinarian in that facility. This circumstance in which it was possible that someone was practicing veterinary medicine without the benefit of a license led to an investigation of that possibility on the part of Petitioner. Eventually, A. L. Smith, an investigator for Petitioner, was assigned to undertake the investigation. Smith borrowed a cat from Dr. McBride. Stogie, the cat, had come into Dr. McBride's veterinary clinic with a broken shoulder which Dr. McBride had repaired. Following this episode, the cat walked with a slight limp. Around May 22 or 23, 1985, in furtherance of his investigation, Mr. Smith took Stogie to the Wildwood Animal Clinic. He had in mind ascertaining whether Nadia Helmy was practicing veterinary medicine without a license by seeing if she would practice on the cat. He deliberately picked an occasion in which Ms. Helmy was alone in the Wildwood Animal Clinic in his effort to determine her willingness to practice veterinary medicine. Once inside the Wildwood Animal Clinic, Mr. Smith confirmed that Nadia Helmy was the only person in attendance. Smith asked to see a veterinarian, remarking to Ms. Helmy that his cat was suffering lethargy and was limping more than usual and that he needed the cat to be examined by a veterinarian. Ms. Helmy directed Smith to take the cat to an examination room and showed him the location of that examination room. At that point, Smith said that Nadia Helmy commenced "the examination." He further described that while the cat was on the examining table ". . . she [Nadia Helmy] was looking at it and looking into its eyes." He indicated that the examination he was observing was what he would expect a veterinarian to give an animal. On the other hand, this is the first instance in which Mr. Smith had ever done undercover investigation of alleged unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine and there is no other information that has been presented which would lead to the conclusion that Mr. Smith knew what techniques would be employed in an examination conducted by a veterinarian. Under the circumstances, there being no further indication of the factual details of the examination, absent the remark concerning Nadia Helmy's looking into the eyes of the cat, it cannot be concluded what details were involved in the alleged examination process and whether in fact the kind of examination conducted by veterinarians was occurring. The telephone rang, and Nadia Helmy left the examination room and answered the phone. She was gone for. three or four minutes. Mr. Smith could hear Nadia Helmy's end of the conversation, in which she spoke in some foreign language. Nadia Helmy testified in the course of the hearing that she spoke with her husband on the telephone regarding the symptoms of Stogie, among other matters. Having examined her demeanor in the course of the hearing and all her answers provided under interrogation, no credence is afforded her version of the telephone conversation. Consequently, no facts are found as to the nature of that conversation. Nonetheless, it is concluded that a conversation was held between Nadia Helmy and Respondent. Following the telephone conversation, Nadia Helmy returned to the examination room and looked at the cat again. Mr. Smith admitted that the cat seemed to be better and Ms. Helmy agreed with him and stated that the cat was just suffering from extended travel. Nadia Helmy said that the cat would be better after returning home. This was in response to Mr. Smith's representation that he was travelling between Tallahassee and Naples, Florida. Mr. Smith described the remarks by Nadia Helmy, concerning the fact that the cat was suffering from extended travel to be some form of diagnosis. Again, it not being identified that the investigator could speak to matters of what constitutes a diagnosis and the nature of those remarks by Nadia Helmy not being clearly a form of diagnosis which might be recognized by a lay person, the remarks are not received as stating a diagnosis. Throughout the exchange between Mr. Smith and Nadia Helmy on the date that the cat was brought to the Wildwood Animal Clinic, Mr. Smith referred to Nadia Helmy as "doctor." Although Ms. Helmy did not correct Mr. Smith in his reference, she did not affirmatively state that she was in fact a veterinarian licensed by Florida to practice veterinary medicine. In the course of the events in the examination room, Nadia Helmy did not take the temperature of the cat, did not take a case history on the cat or provide any form of treatment. Following the conversation in the examination room, Investigator Smith asked Nadia Helmy "how much" for her service. She replied five dollars. Nadia Helmy gave Investigator Smith a receipt for the payment of the five dollars. A copy of the receipt may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. It is on a form of the Wildwood Animal Clinic, which has a portion related to the character of service. This portion of the receipt is not filled out. The only thing that is reflected is the amount of charges and Mr. Smith's name and a date, May 22, 1985. Under these circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the five dollar charge was for provision of veterinary services. After leaving Wildwood Animal Clinic, Investigator Smith went to Citrus Fair Animal Hospital at Inverness. While there, he discussed with Respondent the facts of his visit to the Wildwood Animal Clinic and the nature of events related to Respondent's wife and the fact that the investigation was in answer to allegations made about the wife's practice of veterinary medicine. In the course of this conversation, Respondent stated that his wife was a graduate of veterinary medicine and was qualified to examine animals and run the clinic but that he did all of the surgery. He stated that his wife was qualified to give shots and to determine what was wrong with animals. Concerning the wife's actions, Respondent stated that his wife was too busy raising three children to get all the classes and under this circumstance hadn't passed an examination. Nonetheless, according to Respondent, the wife was completely qualified in that she was a graduate of veterinary medicine school. This acknowledgment by Respondent as to the general arrangement between the Respondent and his wife concerning the operation of the Wildwood Animal Clinic does not revitalize the Petitioner's claim that the wife was practicing veterinary medicine on the specific day in question. Evidence was presented in the course of the hearing concerning the fact that Nadia Helmy would not treat an animal of one Ralph Benfield when the animal had been offered for treatment at the Wildwood Animal Clinic. However, this situation occurred at a time when the Wildwood Animal Clinic was being phased out and it is not clear what significance that fact had in the decision by Nadia Helmy not to offer assistance to the animal. In January 1985, Respondent entered into a one-year advertising contract with the Citrus County Chronicle, a local newspaper. This was for the placement of advertisements pertaining to his Citrus Fair Animal Hospital. One of the ads placed in the paper, at the instigation of the Respondent, can be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence. The date of the advertisement is March 31, 1985. It advertised free fecal check and a free office visit, but did not contain the 72-hour disclaimer language contemplated by Section 455.24, Florida Statutes. Having been advised of this problem related to the lack of disclaimer, Respondent, by correspondence of August 26, 1985, acknowledged his violation and modified the format of his advertising. The letter of August 26, 1985, and the new format of advertising may be found as Petitioner's second exhibit admitted into evidence. This letter had been dispatched based upon a complaint which was filed on August 9, 1985, by a Dr. Asaad. This led to action by the Petitioner attempting to have Respondent rectify the problems with his advertising. Following the circumstance in which Respondent had been made aware of the problem with his advertising, he took steps to ensure that the advertising was in compliance with law by contacting the Citrus County Chronicle. Although the employee of the Citrus County Chronicle who testified in the course of the final hearing was uncertain about whether the March 31, 1985, advertising copy was specifically approved by the Respondent, it was the practice of the newspaper to provide Respondent with a proof prior to publication. Circumstantially, it is concluded that Respondent did not oppose or question the acceptability of the March 31, 1985, advertising. Support for this position is found in the fact that Respondent conceded his violation by his August 25, 1985, correspondence.
