The Issue Whether the Petitioner’s request for an exemption pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Saunders seeks an exemption for employment in a position for which a security background check is required pursuant to Sections 397.451 and 435.04, Florida Statutes. Presently, Mr. Saunders is employed as an intern human service worker at Reliance House, an adult residential facility located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida. In addition to working at Reliance House, Mr. Saunders is enrolled at Gulf Coast Community College working toward a degree as a Certified Addition Associate Professional. Mr. Saunders sought this exemption so that he could work with children receiving substance abuse services. In 1990, Mr. Saunders was charged with and plead nolo contendere to the charges of burglary, possession of burglary tools, and carrying a concealed weapon. Mr. Saunders was placed on two years' probation. In 1991, Mr. Saunders pled guilty to the charges of burglary of a structure, attempted burglary of a structure, grand theft, criminal mischief, and burglary of a business. In 1992, Mr. Saunders was charged with burglary of a liquor store. Mr. Saunders testified that the burglary charge was reduced to a charge of criminal trespass and that he remained under court supervised probation until October, 1996. Mr. Saunders expressed remorse for his criminal behavior and accepted complete responsibility. He also believes that he shares some of the same problems that are exhibited by the residents of Reliance House and that he would be a good role model because he is attempting to correct his life. Christiane LeClair is a background screening coordinator employed by the Department of Children and Families. As part of her duties, Ms. LeClair reviews employment applications to determine if an applicant is worthy of a position of special trust. Ms. LeClair determined that Mr. Saunders was not qualified because of his conviction of grand theft. She also noted that Mr. Saunders has been released from supervision of the courts for only three months and that it is too early to determine if he has been rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order and therein DENY Mr. Saunders’ request for an exemption.DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities abused its discretion when denying Petitioner’s request for exemption from being disqualified to work in a position of special trust.
Findings Of Fact Disqualifying Offenses As noted above, the Department of Children and Families, by correspondence dated July 5, 2018, informed Petitioner that his background check revealed two disqualifying offenses. The first offense is described by the Department as “04/25/2014 PINELLAS PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, LARCENY,” and the second is described as “08/30/2005 ST. PETERSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY DOM-VIOL.” As an initial matter, the August 2005 offense does not disqualify Petitioner from working in a position of special trust. Specifically, on August 30, 2005, Petitioner was arrested, and charged with misdemeanor battery in violation of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2005), which is a disqualifying offense. Petitioner’s arrest occurred as a result of a physical altercation with his brother, who was a minor when the alleged offense occurred. According to the case summary sheet (Resp. Ex. 2, p. 99), on April 13, 2006, the charge was reduced to the “lesser included misdemeanor [of] disorderly conduct,” to which Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere. On or about May 17, 2006, Petitioner was “adjudicated guilty” of disorderly conduct in violation of section 509.143, Florida Statutes (2005). A violation of section 509.143 is not a disqualifying offense under any of the controlling statutes. On April 25, 2014, Petitioner was arrested and charged with violating section 812.014(2)(c)1., Florida Statutes (2013). This section provides, in part, that “[i]t is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third degree … if the property stolen is … [v]alued at $300 or more, but less than $5,000.” On May 28, 2014, Petitioner was found guilty of the offense as charged (adjudication of guilty withheld), and ordered to serve 18 months of probation which included restitution of $75.00 to the victim. According to Petitioner, this offense occurred when he stole cellphones from a Metro PCS store. Non-disqualifying Offenses On August 20, 2018, Petitioner was cited for multiple traffic violations. According to the arrest affidavit, the following events occurred: A stop was initiated on the Defendant’s vehicle for failure to stop at a steady red signal. Upon initiating a stop utilizing emergency lights and sirens, the defendant failed to stop for the emergency vehicle. He continued 3 blocks to the Choice gas station located at 3401 5th Ave., S. Upon making contact, Defendant was identified by FL DL and confirmed via David as being suspended on 8/13/2018 with notice provided on 8/9/2018 for failure to pay a traffic penalty. David also confirmed 4 prior DWLS/R convictions and previously listed as a habitual traffic offender. Petitioner was cited for felony “driving while license suspended or revoked, fleeing and eluding police officer, [and] possession of marijuana.” On October 9, 2018, the State Attorney administratively closed the “marijuana and fleeing” charges, and on October 11, 2018, reduced the felony “driving while license suspended or revoked” charge to a misdemeanor. On November 14, 2018, the Court (Judge Dittmer) accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea, and adjudicated him guilty of the misdemeanor offense of “driving while license suspended or revoked.” See Resp. Ex. 2, p. 253 and 255. While the charges referenced in the previous paragraph were pending, Petitioner, on October 6, 2018, was stopped by the police, and again cited for the felony offense of “driving while license suspended or revoked.” Unlike before, there was no reduction in this charge, and on November 14, 2018, Petitioner entered a plea to the charged offense, and was adjudicated guilty (Judge Quesada) of the third-degree felony of “Driving While License Revoked (Felony-Habitual).” See Resp. Ex. 2, p. 260-265. General Background Information Petitioner is enrolled as a student, and is working towards earning his associate of arts degree. Petitioner has a sporadic work history, and during the last few years has subsisted primarily on student loans. Petitioner testified that he regularly attends church. He is not involved in any community activities, nor has he received any special recognition or awards since his conviction for the disqualifying offense. From approximately October 2016 through June 2020, Petitioner worked at several institutional facilities that offer services to vulnerable adults. During this timeframe, Petitioner was investigated five times for possible mistreatment of vulnerable individuals, with each investigation dismissed as unsubstantiated.1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Clifford Pennywell Apartment B3 5295 59th Circle West Kenneth City, Florida 33709 Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Agency for Persons With Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Francis Carbone, General Counsel Agency for Persons With Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Radhika Puri, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 309 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Danielle Thompson Senior Attorney/Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 309 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons With Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, because of a prior regulatory and criminal history, the Petitioner is entitled to licensure in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuity agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eugene P. Kent, at times pertinent hereto was a licensed insurance agent in South Dakota. He was apparently an agent or broker for the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and engaged in the insurance business with regard to the various group benefits coverage for that association. Apparently in 1995, he become involved in a dispute between the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. This dispute, the exact nature of which is not of record in this case, resulted in the Petitioner being charged with mail fraud by the United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota. He was prosecuted for mail fraud and ultimately was convicted by jury verdict on or shortly after October 26, 1996. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The Petitioner believed that evidence existed in the home office of United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, which would exonerate him, and that his counsel during the criminal prosecution had, for unknown reasons, failed to subpoena and obtain such evidence for use in his criminal trial. He obtained new counsel who was successful in obtaining the evidence in question, which indeed proved to be exculpatory. It resulted in the presiding judge in the criminal case vacating the order of conviction, resulting in the Petitioner's release from incarceration. Because of his conviction, the insurance departments of South Dakota, as well as North Dakota and Nebraska, had revoked his insurance licenses, based upon the criminal conviction. On October 26, 1996, during the progress of the criminal trial referenced above, the Petitioner and his wife became concerned that she would not have funds to pay for his counsel, to operate her home and the business and to pay for her son's alcohol rehabilitation expenses if the jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in his incarceration. Consequently, on that day, the Petitioner made a withdrawal from his business account, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., account in the amount of $9,900, by writing a check on that account. On the same day, the Petitioner went to a different branch of the same bank and negotiated a second check on this same account also made payable to him, again, in the amount of $9,900, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., business account. The bank officer upon the occasion of the second withdrawal that same day told him that a currency transaction report would have to be filed. The Petitioner readily agreed to file the report and assisted the bank officer in completing and executing the transaction report. Thereafter, the United States Attorney secured an indictment of the Petitioner, during his incarceration for the earlier criminal conviction, before it was vacated by the trial judge. He prosecuted the Petitioner for "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report." During the pendency of this second criminal proceeding, the Petitioner remained incarcerated from the earlier proceeding, which was later vacated. Because of this, his counsel in the second criminal proceeding advised him to plead guilty to the second charge in return for a light penalty, because his counsel believed that if he attempted to litigate the second criminal matter to trial, he would have difficulty convincing a jury of his innocence because he was already incarcerated on the earlier mail fraud charge. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment as a result of that plea, which ran concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1997, regarding the mail fraud charge. After release, he was sentenced to supervised release for a period of approximately two years. The preponderant evidence in this proceeding shows that the Petitioner did not attempt to defraud the federal government or to prevent the bank involved from filing the report. Upon being informed of the requirement of filing the report, he freely consented and helped execute the report form involved at his bank. The funds he withdrew with the two checks were his funds from an account over which he had ownership and signatory authority. There is no evidence that the funds in the account withdrawn by the Petitioner had been obtained through an criminal alleged enterprise or that the Petitioner contemplated using them for such a purpose. The post-conviction evidence that was obtained by the Petitioner and his counsel resulted in the judge vacating the first conviction for mail fraud. This new evidence was also the basis for the South Dakota Insurance Regulatory Agency reinstating his licensure. Ultimately, the other states which had revoked his licensure reinstated his licenses. The Petitioner is now similarly licensed in 17 or 18 states. He applied for licensure as a non-resident life, health, and variable annuity agent in Florida and that application was denied by the Department due to his criminal history and the prior administrative actions against his licensure in the other states. That denial resulted in this proceeding. The other states which have since either reinstated his licensure or licensed him did so with knowledge, as reported by the Petitioner, of his prior criminal and administrative proceedings. The Department has a rule listing various crimes (in Classes A, B, and C) such that, if a petitioner has been so convicted, then that petitioner cannot be licensed for periods of times stated in that rule. Class A crimes listed in that rule carry the longest period of time during which licensure is prohibited with a waiting period extending as much as 15 years. The Division of Licensing of the Department decided that the crime involved herein was a "Class A crime." The rule allows the Department to analogize the crime of which a petitioner or applicant has been convicted with one of the crimes listed in this rule if the crime, of which an applicant was convicted, is not itself listed in the rule. The Division of Licensing thus decided to classify the crime of "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report" as analogous to "defrauding the government" or "obstruction of justice." The Petitioner was not charged with either defrauding the government or obstruction of justice and was not convicted of those crimes. Although the stipulation of facts between the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, attendant to the Petitioner's plea in the second federal criminal case (Petitioner's Exhibit G), shows that the Petitioner knowingly attempted to avoid the reporting requirement imposed by Title 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) on the bank for currency transactions of more than $10,000 in one day, there is no persuasive evidence that he did so for any illegal purpose or fraudulent intent, or intent to in any way "obstruct justice," or engage in dishonest conduct. There was no demonstrative harm to the public nor was there any "victim" of his purported crime. If the Petitioner had truly wanted to conceal the transaction or induce the bank to fail to report it, he could simply have presented the second $9,900 check on another day for cashing, or had his wife negotiate such a check on a different business day. Instead, when told by the bank employee, on presenting the second check, that a currency transaction report would have to be filed, he freely assented and assisted in the preparation of the report form; even the above-referenced stipulation of facts attendant to his criminal plea shows this. There was no requirement that a report be made until the second check was negotiated on the same day. The Petitioner's testimony in evidence, including the fact that 18 states have licensed him or re-instated his licensure since the criminal and administrative proceedings at issue herein, with knowledge of those proceedings, shows preponderantly that his crime did not "involve moral turpitude" and that he is fit and trustworthy for engagement in the practice of insurance. The crime to which he pled did not involve any significant, rational relationship or nexus to the two "analogized crimes" involving "obstruction of justice" or "defrauding the government" for purposes of the Department's rule cited below. Two affidavits, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits J and K, as corroborative hearsay, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, bear out this finding and are worthy of quotation. The first affidavit is that of attorney James L. Volling, the Petitioner's counsel for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to his first conviction, and his counsel for purposes of the second criminal case. Mr. Volling practices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is admitted to practice by the Minnesota Supreme Court, as well as by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and for the District of North Dakota. He is also admitted to practice in the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, as well as the United States Supreme Court. He testified in pertinent part as follows: Following Mr. Kent's conviction on two counts of mail fraud, I was retained to represent him for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to the conviction as well as in connection with a second case brought against him. Upon reviewing the facts and the law in Mr. Kent's case, I became convinced that his conviction was defective and inappropriate. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and his petition for post-conviction relief was granted and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The government chose not to appeal that decision which I believe clearly would have been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During the pendency of post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Kent's case, the government brought a second case against Mr. Kent involving allegations of an attempt to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. In my view, these allegations were petty at best, especially considering that the bank involved did file a currency transaction report and Mr. Kent expressly permitted them to do so. Mr. Kent was simply withdrawing his own money and there was no claim that those funds were the product of any illegal activity [or for any illegal purpose]. The government's second case was only technical in nature and, in my view, would not have been charged in any other jurisdiction with which I am familiar. Indeed, the assistant United States attorney representing the government told me that the only reason the government brought the second case was their concern that Mr. Kent's conviction in the first case would ultimately be overturned, which of course it was. With regard to the currency transaction reporting matter, Mr. Kent elected to enter a plea bargain to avoid further expense and burden, and which did not augment the punishment that had been given to him in the first case. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Kent, had not been convicted in the first case so that he would not have had that stigma at the time of the second case, he would have elected to try the currency transaction reporting case rather than to enter into a plea agreement. It was after that plea agreement, that the conviction and sentence in Mr. Kent's first case were vacated. I have known and dealt with Eugene Kent for approximately five years now. During that entire time, he has always been a man of his word. He has done exactly what he said he would do and has told me the truth in every respect. I have great respect and admiration for Mr. Kent as person and as a client. I believe he has suffered unfairly throughout this entire ordeal, but he has remained steadfast and persevered through some truly difficult times. I have been proud to serve as his legal counsel, and I would recommend him unhesitatingly to anyone in terms of employment or any business relationship. The second affidavit is by Mark F. Marshall. Mr. Marshall is now a lawyer and at times pertinent hereto has been admitted to the practice of law by the South Dakota Supreme Court. He has been in the active practice of law since 1981. At times pertinent hereto from January 1, 1996, until August 1, 2000, Mr. Marshall served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. Mr. Marshall testified pertinently as follows: From January 1, 1996 until August 1, 2000, I served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted the initial appearance and detention hearings in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 96-40002-01. Over the objection of the United States, I ordered Mr. Kent released on conditions. A copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release, as well as Mr. Kent's Appearance Bond in the Amount of $100,000.00 is attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. [released on a non-surety bond requiring no security.] In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 97-40111. [the currency transaction prosecution.] I denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as I believed that an issue of fact existed as to the Defendant's intent. While I believed that it would be improper to dismiss the case because of that issue, I also know that if I had been the finder of fact I would have found the Defendant not guilty of all of charges in the indictment. Perhaps more so than any defendant who appeared before me, Mr. Kent comported himself with grace, dignity, and the utmost of integrity with regard to both criminal cases. Since being exonerated from all underlying criminal counts regarding this matter, Mr. Kent has asked me to submit an affidavit on his behalf. Initially, I was reluctant to do so not because Mr. Kent was unworthy of support, but because I was concerned about whether doing so would reflect adversely on my former judicial office. I have concluded that the interests of justice compel me to provide this affidavit on behalf of Mr. Kent. I am firmly of the belief that Mr. Kent committed no criminal acts in either of the cases venued in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and as such he should not bear the stigma of any criminal record. I have been a member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles since July of 2002. During my tenure as a member of the Parole Board, I have reviewed hundreds of applications for pardons. I have reviewed all public filings in Mr. Kent's civil actions arising from his conviction as well as all filings in the criminal action itself. Based on my experiences as a Parole Board member, my knowledge of Mr. Kent individually and professionally, and as well as my knowledge of the role that pardons serve in the state and federal judicial system, I believe that Mr. Kent is an unusually worthy applicant for such extraordinary relief. It is my personal belief that Mr. Kent poses no threat to society whatsoever. Society's interests, as well as those of Mr. Kent, would be well served by granting him the relief he seeks . . . . Dated this 11th day of November, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be granted licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Eugene P. Kent 1209 West 37th Street Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57105
The Issue Whether Respondent was the subject of an unlawful discrimination action as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. She was certified as a corrections officer in March 1991. In November 1995, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Taylor Corrections Institution in Perry, Florida, as a correctional officer with the rank of sergeant. Prior to her employment at Taylor Corrections Institution she had been a corrections officer at a correctional facility in Jefferson County. Petitioner did not have employment problems while working at the Jefferson County facility. Petitioner's first year at the Taylor County correctional facility was "O.K." However, Petitioner was not well liked among her fellow officers. Between June through October 1996, Petitioner was the subject of several complaints from her fellow officers. These separate complaints were: On June 12 or 13, 1996, King cursed at an entire dormitory of inmates. On June 19 King was assigned to assist another officer in conducting a recount of inmates. She failed to assist the officer in conducting the recount. On July 24, 1996, King was assigned to escort the swill truck (a food truck) by the control room sergeant. She refused to accept the assignment and cursed at the control room sergeant. A few days later, she confronted another officer in a hostile and threatening manner because the officer had submitted an incident report concerning King's conduct in cursing at the control room sergeant. On October 9, another sergeant asked King to sign a typed incident report regarding King's loss of her state-issued handcuff case. King initially refused to sign the report. Shortly thereafter, she tore up the report in the presence of an inmate because she was displeased with certain comments in the report. On October 28, King cursed at a coworker. Id. PERC Final Order dated October 8, 1997. In October 1996, Petitioner filed several internal discrimination complaints against the agency generally opposing unfair employment practices. The exact nature of these complaints was not established by the evidence. On December 13, 1996, Petitioner received a notice of disciplinary charges being brought against her based on the earlier-filed employee complaints. The notice lists the charges as follows: Multiple charges are being brought against you stemming from several investigations. In the first case, you are being charged with malicious use of profane or abusive language toward inmates, visitors, or persons under supervision, use of verbal abuse of an inmate, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement. Specifically on June 25, 1996, an anonymous request was received by the Superintendent's Office alleging that you cursed the entire dormitory of inmates on June 13, 1996. It was also alleged that you had been gambling and would not pay off your debts. This prompted an investigation into these allegations. Several witnesses including an inmate verified the above allegations. The basis for these charges is contained in the Institutional Investigation Report #96-044, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33- 4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4)(9), and 33- 4.003(6)(20)(22)(24), F.A.C., copies attached and made a part hereof. In the second case, you are being charged with willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, conduct unbecoming a public employee, unwilling to follow lawful orders or perform officially designated duties, interference with an employee, failure to follow oral or written instructions, witness tampering during an investigation, and retaliation. Specifically on July 24, 1996, Sergeant J. Pickles reported that while assigned as Control Room Supervisor, he advised you via radio that he needed an escort for the swill truck. You responded by telephone and stated "Why are you calling me? I'm not escorting that fucking swill truck. I'm busy in the Caustic Room. Get someone else to do that shit." Officer V. Aman submitted an incident report verifying the telephone conversation since it was the dormitory in which she was assigned to that you came to use the telephone. On August 1, 1996, Officer Aman also stated that you made threats toward her in retaliation for submitting her report, in which you admitted to confronting this officer. The basis for these charges is contained in Institutional Investigation Report #96-052, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33- 4.002(4)(11)(17), 33-4.003(22)(24)(32), F.A.C., and Sections 914.22, 914.23, Florida Statutes, copies attached and made a part hereof. In the third case, you are being charged with willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, conduct unbecoming, unwillingness to perform officially designated duties, substandard quality of work, negligence, and failure to follow oral or written instructions. Specifically, on June 19, 1996, a recount was ordered and you were informed by the control room that your dormitory officer needed assistance in the recount. The officer stated that he waited approximately ten (10) minutes for your arrival and proceeded to recount without assistance. He then submitted an report as to the incident. You then submitted an incident report concurring with the officer with the exception that you observed the recount from the Officer's Station. The basis for these charges can be found more specifically contained in the Institutional Investigation #96-058, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4)(11) and 33-4.003(10)(13)(22)(24)(32), F.A.C., Institutional Post Orders 17.02(j), 06.03(B)(1b)(1c)(1f)(lg)(2a), and (D)(4), and Institutional Operating Procedures 3.03.3(C)(5)(11e), copies attached and made a part hereof. In the fourth case, you are being charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, and destruction or abuse of DC property or equipment. Specifically on October 9, 1996, you submitted an Incident Report for losing your state issued handcuff case. On October 13, 1996, after being typed, Sergeant Chad Dees gave the Incident Report to you to be signed. Upon receiving the report, you allegedly stated "I will show you what I will do with this," then tore the report up and walked away. You admitted to tearing up the report because of the comments written by Captain Simons, but denied making the comment alleged by Sergeant Dees. Officer Tammy Alvarez witnessed you tear up the report, but denied hearing any statements made by you. The basis for these charges is contained in the Investigative Report #96-23008, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(25), and 33- 4.003(22)(24)(27), F.A.C., copies attached and made a part hereof. All of these charges pre-date Petitioner's internal complaints. On January 23, 1997, a predetermination conference was held on the above charges. The evidence did not demonstrate that the employee charges or the disciplinary action were retaliatory in nature or based in discrimination. Moreover, the factual basis of the charges was upheld in the PERC Final Order. As referenced in the letter, Petitioner was the subject of several investigations conducted by the Inspector General's Office of the Department of Corrections. The role of the Inspector General was to gather the facts and evidence involved in a complaint. The Inspector General does not make any recommendations as to discipline or determine if a rule or statutory violation has occurred. Raleigh Sistruck, an Inspector with the Inspector General's office conducted some of the investigations of Petitioner. He did not personally know Petitioner. There was no evidence that he treated Petitioner differently than he did any other investigatory subject. Nor did Inspector Sistruck engage in any conspiracy or act alone to fabricate evidence against Petitioner or elicit false testimony from witnesses. Indeed, the only evidence presented in this case, is that Inspector Sistrunk followed standard investigatory procedures in investigating the complaints against Petitioner. In January, 1998, Petitioner was accused of soliciting an inmate and another correctional officer to cause harm to another inmate at the facility. The Inspector General's office investigated that accusation. Again there was no evidence that the inspectors engaged in any conspiracy to falsify or fabricate evidence. Normal investigatory procedures were followed. Based on the various complaints and the findings set forth in various Inspector General investigations, Mr. Drake decided to terminate Petitioner. Petitioner received a letter of extraordinary dismissal on February 7, 1997. The dismissal letter dismisses Petitioner for: This dismissal is the result of you being charged with willfully engaging in conduct which violates state statutes and Agency rules; conduct unbecoming a public employee; failure to conduct yourself in a manner consistent with the welfare of inmates; soliciting, bartering, dealing, trading with or accepting a gift or other compensation from an inmate(s); willfully treating an inmate in a cruel or inhuman manner; threatening or interfering with other employees while on duty; failure to maintain a professional relationship with inmates; giving false testimony; and interfering with an inmate. Specifically, on or about January 10, 1997, you solicited the assistance of inmate Tony Jackson, DC#724515 and Correctional Officer Jacqualyn Jackson-Beasley to cause harm to inmate Mike Doty, DC#725094. As a result of your actions and requests, Officer Jackson- Beasley, inmate Jackson, inmate Mark Smith, DC#724887, inmate Alberto Matta, DC#191523 and inmate Thomas Carrillo, DC#195319, conspired and did plant a homemade knife, with an approximate 14 inch blade, in inmate Doty's cell in an effort to set him up. When inmates Carrillo and Matta entered F- Dorm with the knife, Officer Jackson-Beasley signaled then with her fingers indicating inmate Doty's cell number. She also acted as a cover while the inmates planted the knife in inmate Doty's cell. Once the knife was planted, you and Officer Jackson-Beasley had a telephone discussion during which you instructed her to call Sergeant Gerald Miller and have inmate Doty's cell searched. Once Officer Jackson-Beasley reported the information to Sergeant Miller, a search of Doty's cell was made and the knife was recovered. Sergeant Miller than notified Captain William F. Buchtmann. After questioning by Captain Buchtmann, inmates Carrillo and Mata, both admitted their participation in placing the knife in inmate Doty's pillow and stated they were contacted by inmates Jackson and Smith for assistance. Carrillo was told by Jackson and Smith that it was you who wanted inmate Doty taken care of and they gave inmate Carrillo the impression that if he took care of inmate Doty, he would be paid $50.00 and be given an undisclosed amount of marijuana for his assistance. The following day, January 11, 1997, you stated to inmate Jackson words to the effect, "They locked up inmate Smith" and "That motherfucker talked" (referring to inmate Matta) You also stated to inmate Jackson words to the effect, "It's not cool for me to be seen talking to you." On or about January 17, 1997, Officer Beverly Pratt overheard you state to an unidentified inmate, words to the effect, "Something needs to be done with Doty." On that same date, inmate Willie Jackson, DC#041463, overheard you state to an unidentified inmate, words to the effect, "I am going to get Officer Jackson-Beasley and Sergeant Miller." When questioned under oath, on January 24, 1997, you gave false testimony when you denied all allegations. Additionally, the letter dismisses Petitioner for the earlier disciplinary charges discussed at the predetermination conference in December. Mr. Drake, Superintendent of Taylor Correctional Institute at the time, testified that Petitioner's termination was based on his belief that she had in fact committed the aforementioned rule and statutory violations. He stated that the termination was not based on Petitioner's race or sex or any other of her characteristics; rather, the termination was based on rule and statute violations. There was no evidence which demonstrated Mr. Drake engaged in any conspiracy to concoct evidence against Petitioner or to falsely accuse her. Angela Ratliff, Personnel Supervisor at the time, testified that she did not have any conversation with Petitioner wherein she told her that the Department, her supervisors or coworkers were "out to get her" or words to similar effect. Additionally, Ms. Ratliff does not recall having any conversations with prospective employers for Petitioner. The Respondent's policy is to recite to a prospective employer information contained in the employee's personnel file. The Department does not offer opinions or recommendations about an employee. Moreover, most of the information in the personnel file is considered a public record and must be released to any person or entity requesting the information. In any event, other than broad general statements about seeking employment and what she was told by others who did not testify at the hearing, there was no evidence regarding any specific prospective employer or the information, if any, the prospective employer received from the Department. There is no doubt that Petitioner feels very strongly she was discriminated against. The problem with Petitioner's case is a total lack of evidence to support her allegations. Throughout the hearing she made allegations of discrimination. However, no evidence apart from her allegations of which she had no personal knowledge, was offered. For instance, the alleged paper trail created against her or documents she claimed were changed were not introduced into evidence. No witness was called who wrote or filed such document or statement was called to testify about any such document or statement or any alleged change made to the document or statement. The paper noises or pauses of tape-recorded interviews of witnesses taken during the Inspector General's investigation did not support Petitioner's claim that the witnesses were prompted or told what to say. Such noises or pauses sounded exactly like pages being turned in a notebook when one page is full and a new page is needed to continue taking notes. The pauses sounded like a note taker pausing the witnesses' statement in order to catch up the notes to the witnesses' statement. Given these critical lapses in evidence and the earlier PERC Final Order, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Anita King 108 Alice Street Perry, Florida 32347 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Azizi M. Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact On or about October 1, 1990, in Case No. 90-233 CF, pending in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sumter County, Florida, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to: one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony under Section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes; one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, a second degree felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and one count of resisting arrest with violence, a third degree felony under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes. On the same day, the Petitioner also was adjudicated guilty on all three charges. Sentence was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed in an adult community control program for two years subject to certain conditions. The Petitioner's nolo plea was entered notwithstanding a June 26, 1990, "No Information" filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. On July 28, 1991, the Petitioner was arrested for alleged spouse battery. As a result, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of his community control conditions. On September 19, 1991, a "No Information" was filed in the battery case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Nonetheless, an Order of Modification of Community Control was entered on October 28, 1991, adding a condition that the Petitioner attend and successfully complete marriage/family counseling. On or about April 19, 1992, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged spouse battery. On July 21, 1992, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Notwithstanding the April 19, 1992, arrest, there was no evidence that the Petitioner's community control program was further modified, and the Petitioner successfully completed the two-year program, as previously modified on October 28, 1991. On April 29, 1993, the Petitioner's civil rights, other than the right to possess and carry a firearm, were restored by Executive Order of the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida. On or about October 4, 1993, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged battery. (The record is not clear as to the identity of the alleged victim.) On November 29, 1993, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. There was no evidence of any other criminal arrests or convictions after October 4, 1993. The undisputed testimony of the Petitioner and his character witnesses was that there have been none. The Petitioner and his character witnesses also testified persuasively and without contradiction that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and integrity. The Petitioner now understands the importance of avoiding the circumstances that can lead to violations of the criminal law, he appears to have learned how to avoid them, and he appears to be determined to avoid them. Meanwhile, he also has proven himself to be a responsible and caring single father for his children and has made valuable contributions to his community as an adult volunteer, especially in community children's programs. It is found that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and approved integrity so as to qualify for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvie Edwards, pro se 1544 Bay Street Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a),2 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-20.0012(2)(f),3 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Taylor was certified by the Commission on March 21, 1990 and was issued Correctional Certificate No. 75624. On May 12, 1999, Mr. Taylor was issued Instructor Certificate No. 212961. On August 7, 2005, Mr. Taylor went to the house where his sister, Michelle Taylor (Ms. Taylor), and her boyfriend, Dean Radney (Mr. Radney), were living. Mr. Taylor owned the house and was allowing his sister to live in the house. Mr. Taylor had been drinking heavily and was intoxicated when he went to his sister’s home. An argument ensued between Mr. Taylor and Ms. Taylor. Ms. Taylor called 911 and requested the Holmes County Sheriff’s Department to intervene. Ms. Taylor felt that if she called the sheriff that Mr. Taylor would leave. Mr. Taylor did leave the house. Deputy Michael Raley came to the residence in response to Ms. Taylor’s call. When Deputy Raley arrived, James Taylor, the brother of Mr. and Ms. Taylor, was at the home. James Taylor told his sister not to press charges against Mr. Taylor. Deputy Raley asked James Taylor to leave, and James Taylor complied with the request. When Deputy Raley arrived at the home of Ms. Taylor, she was upset and told him that there had been a family dispute. Deputy Raley asked Ms. Taylor to walk him through the house, and she did. At the back door, Deputy Raley observed that the back door facing had been damaged. He saw a nine millimeter shell casing lying on the floor of a rear room. There was a bullet hole in the bathroom door and a fragmented bullet in the laundry hamper. Ms. Taylor told Deputy Raley that there was a bullet hole in the living room/kitchen area. He went to that part of the house and saw a nine millimeter shell casing lying on the kitchen floor and a hole in the window. Deputy Raley took a sworn statement from Ms. Taylor, but the statement was not submitted for introduction into evidence. Although Ms. Taylor called 911 to summon assistance, the tape of the 911 call was not submitted for introduction into evidence. At the final hearing, Ms. Taylor stated that she had just come home from a drug rehabilitation facility when Mr. Taylor came to her home, that she was under a lot of stress, and that she did not remember what happened except that she and her brother argued, and she called 911 for assistance. At the final hearing, Mr. Taylor testified that on the day of incident in question, he was too drunk to remember what happened. Other than hearsay testimony, there is no evidence to support the allegations that Mr. Taylor committed assault and battery against his sister or Mr. Radney or that he fired a gun in his sister’s home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Taylor did not violate Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2008.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications required for a correctional officer pursuant to Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2006),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(b), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified by the Department as a correctional officer in the State of Florida, having been issued Correctional Certificate #170241. Respondent and Candida Nowlin are engaged and live together. They have lived together since 2002. Ms. Nowlin has two children from a previous relationship and she and Mr. Saria have a child together. At the time of the events giving rise to these proceedings, the couple was under a great deal of stress because of a serious accident involving one of Ms. Nowlin's children. On the evening of November 6, 2006, Mr. Saria and Ms. Nowlin had an argument. She asked him to leave, and he refused. In his anger, he slammed a cordless phone in their home against the kitchen counter. However, there is no competent evidence that he struck or grabbed her, or threw her into a wall. The only competent testimony presented is that he touched her arms in order to move her out of his path as he went to another room in the home, but did not harm her in any way. Ms. Nowlin felt that she and Mr. Saria needed some time apart, so when Mr. Saria refused to leave their home, she went with her young daughter next door to her neighbor's home to call the police. Her neighbor, Ms. Epley, was having a dinner party. She noticed that Ms. Nowlin was crying and she let her use her phone, but was distracted by her hostess duties. She did not remember Ms. Nowlin being injured, and Ms. Nowlin did not tell her that Mr. Saria had beaten her up. Ms. Nowlin called the police from Ms. Epley's home. Two officers came to the home, then-officer Barraclough and Sergeant Spears. They interviewed Ms. Nowlin, Ms. Epley, and Mr. Saria, and arrested Mr. Saria and took him away. After they had removed Mr. Saria from the home, the two officers completed statements from both Ms. Epley and Ms. Nowlin. Officer Barraclough testified that he saw scratches and red marks on Ms. Nowlin's arms. However, his testimony was contradicted by all other witnesses who testified, and is not credited. Sergeant Spears, who did not testify, took Ms. Nowlin's statement. While she was doing so, Ms. Nowlin's mother came to the home. Her testimony, which is credited, is that Ms. Nowlin had no bruises or marks on her arms and that Ms. Nowlin was primarily upset at that point because Mr. Saria had been arrested. The only competent evidence of what happened between Ms. Nowlin and Mr. Saria during their argument is the testimony of the two of them. They both deny vehemently that he struck her or engaged in any unwanted touching. They both insist that they had an argument because of the amount of stress they were under, and that the police were called because Ms. Nowlin felt they needed some time away from each other.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a Firefighter II Compliance should be permanently revoked for the reasons stated in the Administrative Complaint (Complaint), dated June 6, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating firefighters in the State. Respondent is certified in Florida as a Firefighter II Compliance. He holds Certificate No. 139586. Until the incident underlying this controversy arose, Respondent was employed by the Sarasota County Fire Department as a firefighter/paramedic. He now is working in the emergency room of a local hospital. The parties have stipulated that on March 21, 2018, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a weapon, a third-degree felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under Florida law. Adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years, and he was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $1,525.00. See also Dep't Ex. 19. In response to the Complaint, Respondent essentially argues that: (a) he should not have been charged with the underlying criminal offense because he was defending himself against an aggressor in a road rage incident, and (b) he entered a nolo contendere plea based on bad advice from his attorney. At hearing, Respondent gave his version of the events resulting in his arrest. Also, two police officers involved with his arrest testified to what they observed and reported. Their testimony conflicts in many respects with Respondent's testimony. The undersigned will not attempt to reconcile the conflicts, as this proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to relitigate the criminal charge. During the criminal case, Respondent was represented by a criminal law attorney who presented him with two options: enter into a plea arrangement or go to trial and risk a harsher penalty if he were found guilty. Respondent says he accepted his counsel's recommendation that he enter a plea of nolo contendere on the belief that he would not have a felony arrest on his record. After the plea agreement was accepted by the court, Respondent learned that the plea required revocation of his certification and loss of his job. Respondent also testified that even though he paid counsel a $15,000.00 fee, his counsel did little or no investigation regarding what happened, as he failed to depose a single witness before making a recommendation to take a plea.1/ In hindsight, Respondent says he would have gone to trial since he now believes he had a legitimate claim to the "castle defense," and the so-called victim in the incident (the driver of the other car) has a long criminal history and is now incarcerated. At this point, however, if Respondent believes an error in the legal process occurred, his only remedy, if one exists at all, is through the court system and not in an administrative proceeding. A felony plea constitutes noncompliance with the certification statute and requires permanent revocation of a certification. According to a Department witness, however, five years after all requirements of the court's sentencing have been met, the Department has the authority "in a formal process" to make a "felony conviction review" that may result in the reissuance of a certification. Except for this incident, Respondent has no other blemishes on his record. He served in the United States Marine Corps, with combat tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was honorably discharged, and he was honored for saving a life at a Target store while off-duty. He has apologized for his actions, taken an anger management course, and received further treatment for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder at a local Veteran's Administration facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2019.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer and he was employed by the City of Tampa Police Department. Respondent was married to Stephanie Brown and is the father of two of her children. Marital problems arose and in June 1983 they separated. At the time, Stephanie Brown owned and operated a barbershop. Each time Respondent and his wife met they argued. At a judicial hearing Respondent was directed to pay child support to his wife. The check he gave Stephanie in the presence of the judge, Respondent tried to recover when he left the courthouse. He was quite angry when Stephanie refused to return this check to him. That same evening, which Stephanie identified as October 24, 1983, Respondent came to the barber shop shortly before closing. Respondent was very angry and demanded return of the money he had been directed to pay as child support, told Stephanie he was sick and tired of her, and did not intend to lose his job because of her complaints. At this time Stephanie was sitting behind her desk at the salon and Respondent was standing in front of the desk. During the argument Respondent tilted the desk toward Stephanie and a letter opener fell off the desk. This letter opener, which was described by Stephanie as having a metal blade approximately, eight inches long, was picked up by Respondent and waved around by him as they argued. Stephanie testified that Respondent was close enough to cut her with the letter opener and that she was afraid he would: however, no evidence was presented that Respondent made any attempt to use a letter opener as a weapon or made any specific threat to harm Stephanie with the letter opener. Ms. Jackson, a customer of Stephanie's who knew Respondent, came in from the back part of the salon and saw Respondent and Stephanie arguing, with Respondent holding the letter opener. She attempted to calm Respondent and apparently succeeded since 'Stephanie testified that after Ms. Jackson calmed Respondent down he cried and was upset. Stephanie also testified that on another occasion Respondent came in the salon shortly before closing and they again got into an argument. Although Respondent was off duty, Stephanie knew he was armed because he "always carried his pistol the course of this argument Stephanie never saw Respondent draw his pistol, have it in his hand, or even have the pistol exposed where she could have seen it. Stephanie testified that an employee' of hers, Yvette Spann, came in while she and Respondent were arguing and later told Stephanie that she had seen a gun in Respondent's hand. This hearsay testimony was corroborated no admissible evidence. The police officer who investigated the charges Stephanie had made against Respondent was the second witness called by Petitioner. This officer had no first-hand knowledge of either of the assault charges preferred against Respondent. As a result of Sergeant Wilkinson's investigation Respondent was discharged from the Tampa Police Department.
