The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause, filed on September 14, 2010, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating condominiums, including condominium associations, pursuant to chapter 718, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Whitehall was a condominium association operating in the State of Florida. At all times material hereto, Whitehall was responsible for managing and operating Whitehall Condominium in West Palm Beach, Florida. Pertinent to the case at hand, regarding a condominium's year-end financial statement, section 718.111, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: (13) Financial reporting. --Within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year, or annually on a date provided in the bylaws, the association shall prepare and complete, or contract for the preparation and completion of, a financial report for the preceding fiscal year. Within 21 days after the final financial report is completed by the association or received from the third party, but not later than 120 days after the end of the fiscal year or other date as provided in the bylaws, the association shall mail to each unit owner at the address last furnished to the association by the unit owner, or hand deliver to each unit owner, a copy of the financial report or a notice that a copy of the financial report will be mailed or hand delivered to the unit owner, without charge, upon receipt of a written request from the unit owner. The division shall adopt rules setting forth uniform accounting principles and standards to be used by all associations and addressing the financial reporting requirements for multicondominium associations. The rules must include, but not be limited to, standards for presenting a summary of association reserves, including a good faith estimate disclosing the annual amount of reserve funds that would be necessary for the association to fully fund reserves for each reserve item based on the straight-line accounting method. This disclosure is not applicable to reserves funded via the pooling method. In adopting such rules, the division shall consider the number of members and annual revenues of an association. Financial reports shall be prepared as follows: (a) An association that meets the criteria of this paragraph shall prepare a complete set of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The financial statements must be based upon the association's total annual revenues, as follows: * * * An association with total annual revenues of $ 400,000 or more shall prepare audited financial statements. (emphasis added). Whitehall's annual revenue is in excess of $400,000.00. Therefore, Whitehall is required to produce audited year-end financial statements. Whitehall's fiscal year coincided with the calendar year. As a result, Whitehall's 2009 year-end financial statement was due on or before May 1, 2010. On December 11, 2009, Whitehall engaged Hafer Company, LLC (Hafer), a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) firm, to produce its audited 2009 year-end financial statement. Whitehall must rely upon a third-party vendor, such as Hafer, to produce its audited financial statement. Hafer assigned Nicole Johnson as the auditor to produce Whitehall's audited 2009 annual financial statement.4/ Ms. Johnson's process involved, among other things, preparing a draft audit; providing a draft audit to the condominium board, which reviews the draft audit with Ms. Johnson; and then preparing the final audit. Whitehall's engaging Hafer in December 2009 did not contribute to any delay in producing Whitehall's audited financial statement. Ms. Johnson wanted to begin the auditing process early and made a request to Whitehall to begin on or about January 6, 2010, but Whitehall was not prepared to go forward at that time. She was not concerned with beginning at a later date because, among other things, her suggested date was an early date for beginning the auditing process. Whitehall's day-to-day bookkeeping and accounting was performed by a third-party vendor, The Accounting Department, Inc. (Accounting). On February 3, 2010, Ms. Johnson met with Accounting's representative who was handling the day-to-day bookkeeping and accounting. Having the meeting occur in February 2010 was not late or abnormal in the ordinary course of preparing an audited year-end financial statement for a condominium; and did not contribute to any delay in Ms. Johnson's producing Whitehall's audited 2009 year-end financial statement. On February 3, 2010, Ms. Johnson began her field-work and received the primary bulk of the accounting information necessary to complete the audit. From February 3, 2010, Ms. Johnson maintained communication, whether by telephone, email, or other methods of communicating, with Whitehall's directors and officers, and its property manager, Michael Weadock, who is a licensed Community Association Manager (CAM). Ms. Johnson's communications included requesting additional information, asking questions, and obtaining clarifications regarding items for the audited year-end financial statement. One of the items needed by Ms. Johnson to complete the audited year-end financial statement was independent verification from Whitehall's banks regarding Whitehall's certificates of deposit (CDs). Ms. Johnson, as the auditor, was responsible for obtaining the independent verification of the CDs from Whitehall's banks. Due to the economic crisis, which occurred in 2009, banks nationwide were taking an unusual amount of time to respond to auditors' requests associated with the independent verification of bank account information. The banks from which Ms. Johnson was requesting independent verification were no different. She did not receive independent verification of Whitehall's CDs until after the May 1, 2010, due date for Whitehall's audited 2009 financial statement. Whitehall could do nothing to expedite the banks' response to Ms. Johnson's requests. Additionally, on May 28, 2010, Ms. Johnson sent an email to Mr. Weadock requesting additional items that were outstanding. The requested items were non-bank items and were not items that would delay the completion of a draft audit, but were required for the final audit. The next business day, Whitehall provided the requested items. Whitehall had control over these non-bank items, which delayed completion of the final audit. Subsequently, Ms. Johnson received the independent verification of Whitehall's CDs from the banks. On June 23, 2010, Ms. Johnson completed Whitehall's audited 2009 Financial Statement and forwarded a copy to the Department. Even though the final audit was not completed until June 23, 2010, on or about June 10, 2010, Whitehall posted on its bulletin board a notice indicating that copies of the audited 2009 Financial Statement were available in its office. However, subsequently, another notice was posted on the bulletin board indicating, among other things, that copies of the audited 2009 Financial Statement would be available at the Board of Directors Meeting on July 1, 2010, in order to provide for the completion of the audited year-end financial statement. Whitehall does not dispute that neither notice complies with the manner/method of delivery requirement in section 718.111(13). Additionally, Whitehall provided notice to its unit owners as to the availability of the audited 2009 Financial Statement through its community television channel, website, and email blast. This same manner/method of sending the notices to unit owners was used in the past by Whitehall. Whitehall does not dispute that this manner/method of providing notice does not comply with the manner/method of delivery requirement in section 718.111(13). At the time of hearing, Whitehall had not provided its unit owners with a copy of the audited 2009 Financial Statement by mail or hand-delivery. Whitehall has prior disciplinary history regarding its failure timely to prepare and provide its audited year-end financial statements in prior years. On April 1, 2010, Whitehall and the Department entered a Consent Order resolving several statutory violations. One of the violations in the Consent Order was Whitehall's failure timely to prepare and provide its 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 audited year-end financial statements. As to this violation, the Consent Order concluded that Whitehall failed timely to prepare and provide the audited year-end financial statements for the four consecutive years. The Consent Order did not include a violation of the manner/method of delivery of notices regarding the year-end financial statements for the four consecutive years. Subsequent to the Consent Order, the Department received a complaint from a one of Whitehall's unit owners regarding Whitehall's failure timely to provide a copy of the 2009 audited year-end financial statement. The Department's usual practice is that, if a repeat violation occurs within a two-year period, administrative action is taken resulting in a consent order or notice to show cause. Considering the recent Consent Order, the Department followed its usual practice and appropriately pursued the complaint. On September 14, 2010, the Department filed a Notice to Show Cause against Whitehall, which is the subject matter of the instant case. Even though the unit owner's complaint did not include the manner/method in which notice was provided, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the Department was restricted to investigate only that which was complained of. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the Department's investigation of a violation of section 718.111(13) by Whitehall was improper. Further, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the Department's enforcement of the requirements of section 718.111(13) was selective enforcement against Whitehall. The evidence demonstrates that the Department participated in this proceeding primarily due to Whitehall having previously, within a short period of time, violated section 718.111(13) regarding Whitehall's failure timely to provide its unit owners a copy of audited year-end financial statements. Additionally, the evidence fails to demonstrate that either the Department or Whitehall needlessly increased the cost of litigation in the instant case.5/ Consequently, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the Department participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose as defined by section 120.595(1)(e)1.6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Finding that Whitehall Condominiums of the Villages of Palm Beach Lakes Association, Inc., violated section 718.111(13), Florida Statutes, by failing to deliver, in the manner authorized by statute, a copy of its audited 2009 year- end financial statement to all of its unit owners no later than 120 days after the end of the fiscal year, and by failing to make audited 2009 year-end financial statement available in the manner authorized by statute, when it became available; and Imposing a fine in the amount of $5,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Gardinier Big River is a New Jersey corporation authorized to transact business within the State of Florida. Gardinier is a Delaware corporation authorized to transact business within the State of Florida. Gardinier is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gardinier Big River. Petitioners were subject to the corporate income tax imposed by Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, for the tax years 1974 through 1981. For the tax years 1974 and 1975, Gardinier and Gardinier Big River each filed separate annual corporate income tax returns. Beginning with the tax year 1976, and continuing through the tax year 1981, Petitioners filed consolidated annual corporate income tax returns as authorized by Section 220.131, Florida Statutes. Annual corporate income tax returns were filed by Petitioners as follows: (a) Gardinier timely filed on April 1, 1975, an annual corporate income tax return for its tax year ending June 30, 1974; (b) Gardinier Big River timely filed on January 1, 1976, an annual corporate income tax return for its tax year ending March 31, 1975; (c) Gardinier timely filed on April 1, 1976, an annual corporate income tax return for its tax year ending June 30, 1975; (d) Petitioners timely filed on January 3, 1977, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending March 31, 1976; (e) Petitioners timely filed on March 30, 1977, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending June 30, 1976; (f) Petitioners timely filed on March 21, 1978, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending June 30, 1977; (g) Petitioners timely filed on March 27, 1979, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending June 30, 1978; (h) Petitioners timely filed on April 1, 1980, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending June 30, 1979; (i) Petitioners timely filed on April 1, 1981, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending June 30, 1980; (j) Petitioners timely filed on December 8, 1981, a consolidated annual corporate income tax return for their tax year ending June 30, 1981. For each of the years 1974 through 1981, Petitioners, either individually or jointly, timely paid the corporate income tax which Petitioners determined to be due pursuant to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes (1983), by the return date specified in Section 220.222, Florida Statutes (1983), without regard for extensions. Specifically, corporate income taxes were paid by the Petitioners on the following dates for the following tax years: (a) tax year ending June 30, 1975--taxes paid by October 1, 1975; (b) tax year ending March 31, 1975--taxes paid by July 1, 1976; and (c) tax year ending June 30, 1980-- taxes paid by October 1, 1980. On several occasions, the latest of which was April 5, 1983, Petitioners and the Department agreed, for the tax years 1974 through 1981, to extensions of the assessment and refund limitation provisions found at Sections 214.09 and 214.16, Florida Statutes. On or about February 21, 1983, the Department commenced a corporate income tax audit of the Petitioners for the tax years 1974 through 1981. On or about April 23, 1983, as a result of the foregoing audit, the Department issued to Gardinier a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes indicating an overpayment of corporate income taxes for the tax year ending June 30, 1975, and an underpayment of corporate income taxes for the tax year ending June 30, 1974. On that same date, the Department issued to Petitioners jointly two separate Notices of Intent to Make Audit Changes indicating overpayments of corporate income taxes for the tax years ending March 31, 1976, and June 30, 1980, and underpayments of corporate income taxes for the tax years ending March 31, 1975, and June 30, 1979. In addition, these Notices indicated that penalty and interest assessments would be made against Gardinier for the alleged late payment of estimated taxes for the tax year ending June 30, 1975, and against Petitioners jointly for the alleged late payment of estimated taxes for the tax year ending March 31, 1976. A Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes is a form used by the Department to advise taxpayers of overpayments or underpayments of taxes determined by the Department in an audit of the taxpayers' books and records. The notice forms are also referred to by the reference "DR 802." If the taxpayer agrees with the results set forth in the notice, it is instructed by the Department to sign the notice at the space indicated thereon and return it to the Department. By letters dated July 11, 1983, the Department advised Petitioners of its receipt of an unagreed Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes from the Department's audit staff. The letters further stated that the audit resulted in a refund of taxes to Petitioners' account and that signed agreements to the refunds were required to be reviewed by the Department by September 12, 1983. By letter dated July 21, 1983, Petitioners notified the Department of their disagreement with certain aspects of the Notices of Intent to Make Audit Changes. Specifically, Petitioners disagreed with the assessment of penalty and interest for the alleged late payment of corporate income taxes for the tax years 1975 and 1976. In addition, Petitioners indicated their disagreement with the Department's failure to provide for the payment of interest on Petitioners' overpayments of corporate income taxes for the tax years 1975, 1976, and 1980. By letter dated August 4, 1983, the Department advised Petitioners of its agreement that penalty and interest assessments should not have been made for the tax years 1975 and 1976. In addition, the Department advised Petitioners that interest would not be paid upon the overpayments of corporate income taxes for the tax years 1975, 1976, and 1980. On August 16, 1983, Petitioners submitted to the Department signed Notices of Intent to Make Audit Changes indicating Petitioners' agreement and entitlement to a refund of the net overpayments of corporate income taxes for the tax years 1974 through 1981. By letter dated August 16, 1983, Petitioners protested the Department's failure to pay interest upon the overpayments of corporate income taxes and made a formal claim for payment pursuant to Section 214.14, Florida Statutes (1983), for said interest. On November 10, 1983, the Department issued to Petitioners a Notice of Decision denying Petitioners' claim for interest upon the overpayments of corporate income taxes. Petitioners did not request reconsideration of this Notice of Decision. The overpayment of corporate income taxes by Gardinier for the tax year ending June 30, 1975, was $204,277.61. The overpayment of corporate income taxes by Petitioners for the tax year ending March 31, 1976, was $109,658.00. The overpayment of corporate income taxes by Petitioners for the tax year ending June 30, 1980, was $222,021.00. Total overpayments of corporate income taxes by Petitioners, either individually or jointly, for the tax years 1975, 1976, and 1980 were $535,956.61. Total underpayments of corporate income taxes by Petitioners for the tax years 1974, 1975, and 1979, including penalties and interest assessed thereon, were $153,595.92. The Department refunded to Petitioners, by checks dated October 13 and November 16, 1983, $382,360.69 which amount represented the difference between total overpayments and underpayments by Petitioners of corporate income taxes for the tax years 1974 through 1981. The provisions of Chapters 214 and 220, Florida Statutes (1983), are applicable to the circumstances of this action. The parties hereby agree that the Joint Exhibits are true and accurate copies of the original documents. It is the intent of the parties hereto that this stipulation resolve all material facts necessary for a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties in this action.
Findings Of Fact Basic is a general contractor specializing in asphalt resurfacing and related construction activities. Its principal offices are in Orlando, Florida. Basic is not currently qualified to bid on construction projects to be let by DOT. Its certificate of qualification expired on June 30, 1984. Until the expiration, Basic had been continuously qualified by DOT to bid on such jobs since 1975. During the time it was qualified, Basic successfully performed approximately fifty state jobs. In early September, 1984, Basic received its annual audited financial statement from its accountants, Fox and Company (Fox), which reflected Basic's financial condition for the year ending on March 31, 1984. On or about September 14, 1984, Basic filed its application for renewal of its certificate of qualification. With the application, Basic filed the audited financial statement prepared by Fox and Company and an additional financial statement prepared by Basic's new accountants, Colley, Trumbower and Howell (Colley). This Colley financial statement was merely a compilation and covered the period April 1, 1984 through June 30, 1984. The audited statement of Fox contained the opinion of a certified public accountant; the compilation of Colley contained no opinion. The audited statement preceded the date of filing by approximately 170 days. DOT reviewed the application and denied it on the ground that the financial statements submitted were of a date more than 120 days prior to the application DOT did not perform a fiscal analysis or further review of the application after it determined that the application did not contain what it believed to be the necessary financial statements. In response to the denial, Basic had Colley prepare an additional financial statement which reflected its financial condition through September 30, 1984. This financial statement was a review and did not contain an opinion of a certified public accountant (See transcript p 47, lines 22 and 23). DOT declined to accept this review. An "audited" financial statement is a financial statement that has been subjected to full audit scrutiny and verification. A compiled financial statement is merely a compilation of financial information as supplied by the client. A reviewed financial statement consists of inquiries and compilation of financial data with application of analytical procedures and is less in scope than an audited financial statement. An "opinion" is a term of art in the field of accounting and refers to an opinion that the basic financial information taken as a whole is fairly stated in all material respects and is in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals. A qualified opinion is subject to the same definition and level of scrutiny, but is qualified as it relates to one or more items in the financial statement. DOT only accepts audited financial statements which express an opinion. The financial information in the reviewed financial statement, when read in conjunction with the audited financial statement reflects that Basic is in an adequate financial situation with positive current rates and a substantial adjusted net worth. Basic is making a profit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of Basic for a certificate of qualification. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1985.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's certified public accountant's license should be disciplined for the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Flanagan & Baker, P. A. (respondent or firm), was a certified public accounting firm having been issued license number AD 0006179 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy (Board). When the events herein occurred, the firm's offices were located at 2831 Ringling Boulevard, Suite E-118, Sarasota, Florida, and John R. Flanagan and Michael L. Baker, both certified public accountants (CPA), were partners in the firm. In addition, Thomas A. Menchinger, also a CPA, was a junior partner. The firm has since been dissolved, and Flanagan and Menchinger have now formed a new firm known as Flanagan & Menchinger, P. A., at the same address. It is noted that Flanagan, Baker and Menchinger are not named as individual respondents in this proceeding, and at hearing respondent's representative assumed that only the firm's license was at risk. Whether license number AD 0006179 is still active or valid is not of record. In 1987, respondent, through its partner, Flanagan, accepted an engagement to prepare the 1986 calendar year financial statements for Ballantroe Condominium Association, Inc. (BCA or association), an owners' association for a fifty unit condominium in Sarasota. Financial statements are a historical accounting of what transpired for an entity during a particular period of time as well as the status of its assets, liabilities and equity on a given date. They are prepared for a variety of persons who rely upon them to see what transpired during that time period. If the statements are not properly prepared, the possibility exists that harm or other problems may accrue to the users of the statements. After the statements were prepared and issued, a unit owner made inquiry with respondent in August 1987 concerning two items in the statements. When he did not receive the desired response, the owner wrote the Department in September 1987 and asked for assistance in obtaining an opinion regarding the two items. Eventually, the matter was turned over to a Board consultant, Marlyn D. Felsing, and he reviewed the statements in question. Although Felsing found no problems with the two items raised by the owner, he noted what he perceived to be other errors or irregularities in the statements. This led to the issuance of an administrative complaint on September 29, 1988 charging the firm of Flanagan & Baker, P. A., with negligence in the preparation of the statements and the violation of three Board rules. That precipitated the instant controversy. The engagement in question represented the first occasion that the firm had performed work for BCA. The association's annual financial statements from its inception in 1980 through calendar year 1983 had been prepared by Touche Ross & Company, a national accounting firm, and for the years 1984 and 1985 by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., a Sarasota accounting firm. Some of these statements have been received in evidence. As a part of the Board investigation which culminated in the issuance of a complaint, Felsing visited respondent's firm, interviewed its principals, and reviewed the work papers and financial statements. A formal report reflecting the results of his investigation was prepared in June 1988 and has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. In preparing his report, Felsing relied upon a number of authoritative pronouncements in the accounting profession which underlie the concept of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). These included various opinions issued by the Accounting Principles Board (APB), Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board, and Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB) issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedure. The three organizations are a part of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). With regard to the concept of materiality, which requires an accountant to consider the relative importance of any event, accounting procedure or change in procedure that affects items on the statements, Felsing did not exclude any matters on the ground they were immaterial. Rather, he included all possible irregularities, regardless of their materiality, on the theory that the probable cause panel (for which the report was initially prepared) should consider all items in the aggregate. According to Felsing, a number of irregularities or errors were found in the financial statements prepared by respondent. These are discussed separately in the findings below. The first alleged deficiency noted by Felsing concerned a change by the association from accelerated to the straight-line method of depreciation. According to APB 20, such a change is considered to be significant, and "the cumulative effect of changing to a new accounting principle on the amount of retained earnings at the beginning of the period in which the change is made should be included in net income of the period of the change." In other words, APB 20 requires the cumulative effect of the change to be reported in the net income of the current year. However, respondent accounted for the change as a prior period adjustment on the statement of members' equity. Respondent justified its treatment of the item on the ground the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., did not show any accumulated depreciation. Thus, respondent asserted it was merely correcting an error because the other firm had not reported depreciation on the balance sheet. In addition, respondent noted that the effect on the balance sheet was only $721, deemed the item to be immaterial, and concluded its treatment of the item was appropriate. However, APB 20 requires the auditor to address the cumulative effect of the change ($2,072) rather than the effect of only the current year ($721), and therefore the cumulative effect should have been reported in current income. By failing to do so, respondent deviated from GAAP. The association had designated several cash accounts as being reserve accounts for deferred maintenance and replacements. Under ARB 43, such accounts must be segregated in the balance sheet from other cash accounts that are available for current operations. This would normally be done in a separate classification called "other assets" so that the user of the statements would be aware of the fact that the reserves were not available for current operations. However, the statements reflect that three such reserve accounts were placed under the classification of current assets. It is noted that these accounts totaled $25,514, $18,550 and $30,927, respectively. While respondent recognized the difference between cash available for current operations and reserves for future use, and the requirements of ARB 43, it noted that the association's minute book reflected the association regularly withdrew funds from the accounts throughout the year to cover current operations. Also, the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., had classified the item in the same fashion. Even so, if respondent was justified in classifying the accounts as current assets, it erred by identifying those accounts as "reserves" under the current assets portion of the balance sheet. Therefore, a deviation from GAAP occurred. One of the most important items in a condominium association's financial statements is how it accounts for the accumulation and expenditure of reserves, an item that is typically significant in terms of amount. The accounting profession does not recommend any one methodology but permits an association to choose from a number of alternative methods. In this regard, APB 22 requires that an entity disclose all significant accounting policies, including the choice made for this item. This disclosure is normally made in the footnotes to the financial statements. In this case, no such disclosure was made. Respondent conceded that it failed to include a footnote but pointed out that when the statements were prepared by Touche Ross & Company, one of the world's largest accounting firms, that firm had made no disclosure on the basis of immateriality. However, reliance on a prior year's statements is not justification for a deviation from GAAP. It is accordingly found that APB 22 is controlling, and footnote disclosure should have been made. The financial statements contain a schedule of sources and uses of cash for the current fiscal year. According to APB 19, all transactions in this schedule should be reported at gross amounts irrespective of whether they utilize cash. However, respondent reported all transactions in the schedule at their net amount. In justifying its action, respondent again relied upon the prior years' statements of Touche Ross & Company and Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., who reported the transactions in the same manner. It also contended the item was immaterial and that a detailed explanation of the item is found in the statement of members' equity. Despite these mitigating factors, it is found that the schedule was inconsistent with APB 19, and a deviation from GAAP occurred. Felsing's next concern involved the language used by respondent in footnote 6 to the statements. That footnote pertained to the unfunded reserve and read as follows: NOTE VI - UNFUNDED RESERVE As of December 31, 1986, the Association reserves amounted to $103,953 consisting of $18,931 as a reserve for depreciation and statutory reserves of $85,022. The amount funded was $95,422 leaving an unfunded balance of $8,531 due to the reserves from the operating funds. Felsing characterized the footnote as "confusing" because it referred to depreciation as a part of a future reserve for replacements. Felsing maintained the footnote contained inappropriate wording since depreciation relates to assets already placed in service and not to their replacements. Respondent agreed that the footnote, taken by itself, might be confusing. However, it contended that if the user read the preceding footnote, which he should, there would be no possible confusion. That footnote read as follows: NOTE V - RESERVE FOR DEPRECIATION The Association funds the reserves for depreciation through its operating budget. These funds are to be used for the replacement of property and equipment as the need arises. As previously noted, the Association changed its method of computing depreciation to conform with generally accepted accounting principles. As of December 31, 1986, the reserve for depreciation totaled $18,931. According to respondent, the above footnote made clear to the user that the firm was not referring to depreciation as a reserve but rather was setting aside funds equal to depreciation in an effort to have sufficient cash to purchase assets in the future. While the deficiency here is highly technical and minute in nature, it is found that the footnote is not sufficiently clear and that the user might be confused. Felsing next observed that the footnotes did not disclose how the association accounted for lawn equipment or other capital assets. According to APB 22, such a choice is considered a significant accounting policy and, whatever policy is utilized, the same must be disclosed in the footnotes to the statements. In response, Flanagan pointed to a footnote in Note I of the statements which read in part as follows: Property and Equipment and Depreciation Property and equipment capitalized by the Association is stated at cost. During 1986, the Association changed its method of depreciation from the accelerated cost recovery method to a straight line method in which property and equipment is depreciated over its estimated useful life in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. According to respondent, this footnote was adequate in terms of explaining the method of depreciation. Also, a number of other statements were introduced into evidence to show that other entities routinely used a corresponding footnote. Flanagan's testimony is accepted as being the most credible and persuasive evidence on this issue, and the footnote is accordingly deemed to be adequate disclosure on this policy. In the statement of members' equity, there is an item in the amount of $1,730 described as "capitalization of lawn equipment expensed in previous year." Although Felsing did not question the amount shown, he faulted respondent for not properly describing whether the item was a change in accounting principle or an error correction. According to APB 20, the disclosure of an error correction is required in the period in which the error was discovered and corrected. Although respondent considered the footnote described in finding of fact 11 to constitute adequate disclosure, it is found that such disclosure falls short of the requirements of APB 20. Work papers are records and documentary evidence kept by the accountant of the procedures applied, tests performed, information obtained and pertinent conclusions reached in the engagement. They serve the purpose of documenting the work performed and provide verification for the accountant. In addition, another important, required tool is the audit program, a written plan for how the auditor intends to perform the audit. The plan serves the purpose of documenting the accountant's mental process of deciding what procedures are necessary to perform the audit and to communicate those procedures to the persons actually conducting the audit. The audit plan should include in reasonable detail all of the audit procedures necessary for the accountant to perform the audit and express an opinion on the financial statements. Although a variety of checklists have been prepared by the AICPA and other organizations, each audit program must be tailored to fit the needs of a particular client. Felsing noted what he believed to be a number of deficiencies with respect to respondent's work papers, audit program, and engagement planning. In reaching that conclusion, Felsing relied upon various SAS pronouncements which govern that phase of an auditor's work. Those pronouncements have been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 7-14. Although the work papers themselves were not introduced into evidence, Felsing stated that his review of them reflected they were "deficient" in several respects. For example, he did not find a planning memorandum, time budget, checklist or other evidence that planning procedures were performed as required by SAS 22. In this regard, Flanagan corroborated the fact that no formal planning memorandum to the file was prepared. Although respondent's audit program was written for a condominium association, Felsing found it "extremely brief" and was not tailored to this particular client. He opined that such a program should have included reasonable detail of all audit procedures necessary to accomplish the audit and to express an opinion on the financial statements. In particular, it was noted that some required procedures were not on the list while some procedures actually used by respondent were not included. Through conversations with respondent's members, Felsing learned that much of the audit work was performed by Menchinger, the junior partner in the firm. In addition, "a few" other work papers were prepared by an unknown assistant. Although Menchinger reviewed all work performed by the assistant, Felsing found no evidence that the papers were reviewed by the supervising partner, Flanagan. Such review, which is a required step in the audit process, is generally evidenced by the supervising partner placing check marks or initials on the individual work papers. Felsing noted further that the decision to rely on the testing of internal controls was not documented in the work papers by respondent. He added that the amount of time budgeted by respondent for this engagement (around thirty hours) was inadequate given the fact that it was the first year the firm had prepared this client's statements. Finally, Felsing concluded that the violations were not peculiar to a condominium association but were applicable to all enterprises. Respondent pointed out that the association was a small client with less than five hundred line items, and the audit program and engagement planning were planned within that context. Respondent introduced into evidence its audit program which contained the steps taken by the firm in planning for the engagement. Testimony that all steps contained therein were followed was not contradicted. Similarly, Flanagan testified without contradiction that he reviewed all work performed by Menchinger but did not evidence his review with tick marks on each page. According to Flanagan, on a small audit such as this, he considered the signing of the tax return and opinion letter evidence that he had reviewed the work papers. However, Flanagan acknowledged that someone examining the papers would not know they had been reviewed by the supervising partner. Based upon the above findings, and after reconciling the conflicting testimony, it is found that respondent violated GAAP by failing to have a planning memorandum, time budget, and evidence of testing of internal controls within its work papers. All other alleged violations are found to without merit. Respondent has continued to represent the association since the Board issued its complaint. Indeed, Flanagan noted that the association is pleased with the firm's work, and this was corroborated by a letter from the association's board of directors attesting to its satisfaction with the firm. There was no evidence that the association or any other third party user of the statements was injured or misled by relying on the statements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations discussed in the conclusions of law portion of this Recommended Order, and that license number AD 0006179 be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October 1989.
The Issue Whether Commercial Carrier Corporation (Petitioner), has the financial strength necessary to ensure the timely payment of all current and future workers' compensation claims in the State of Florida; Whether Petitioner has maintained a net worth of at least $1 million during the period 1999 to 2004; and Whether Petitioner shall post an additional qualifying security deposit to remain qualified to self-insure and the amount of the additional security deposit to be posted.
Findings Of Fact Upon careful consideration, it is found and determined as follows: Petitioner, Commercial Carrier Corporation, is a privately-owned trucking company headquartered in Auburndale, Florida, which has been in business for over 50 years. Petitioner is one of five operating subsidiaries of Comcar Industries, Inc. (Comcar), whose primary business is truckload transportation of general and specialized commodities in the continental United States. Comcar routinely prepares consolidated financial statements reflecting the operations of all five subsidiary companies. Although Petitioner is the nominal Petitioner, Comcar is the de facto Petitioner in this proceeding. All of Comcar’s subsidiaries operate as self- insured in Florida. Petitioner has been self-insured for workers’ compensation in Florida since January 1, 1973. Pursuant to Florida law, Respondent has jurisdiction over Petitioner as a self-insured employer for purposes of workers’ compensation. Under Florida law, the general requirement is that employers must obtain and maintain workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The exception of this general requirement is found in Subsection 440.38(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), whereby an employer can seek to qualify to self-insure by "furnishing satisfactory proof to the Florida Self-Insurers Guaranty Association, Inc., . . . that it has the financial strength necessary to ensure the timely payment of all current and future claims[.]" FSIGA is a not-for-profit corporation established by Section 440.385, Florida Statutes (2004), to guarantee payment of the covered workers’ compensation claims by employees of self-insurers that become insolvent. Other than governmental entities and public utilities, all self-insurers, including Petitioner, must be members of FSIGA. FSIGA pays the covered claims of current and former insolvent self-insurer members to the extent an insolvent self-insurer’s security deposit is insufficient. An insolvency fund is established and managed by FSIGA for the purpose of meeting the obligations of insolvent members after exhaustion of any security deposit. The insolvency fund is funded by assessments from members of FSIGA. Accordingly, FSIGA and all of its members share an interest in ensuring adherence to the legislative standard that only financially strong employers are granted the privilege to self- insure. To maintain self-insurer status, an employer must submit annual financial statements no later than four months following the end of the self-insured’s fiscal year and furnish satisfactory proof to FSIGA that it has the financial strength necessary to ensure timely payment of all current and future claims. The financial statements that must be submitted to FSIGA for financial analysis must be prepared in accordance with the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). GAAP-prepared financial statements must show, at all times, a net worth of $1 million. The requirements of furnishing proof of the requisite financial strength and maintaining a net worth of at least $1 million, as shown on the employer’s financial statements, are continuing annual requirements to become and remain qualified to self-insure, and those requirements are applied equally to applicants and current members. FSIGA is required to review the financial strength of its current members. It makes recommendations to Respondent regarding the members’ continuing qualification to self-insure and the amount of security deposit that should be required of each member. If FSIGA determines that a current member does not have the financial strength necessary to ensure the timely payment of all current and estimated future claims, it may recommend that Respondent require an increase in the member’s security deposit. FSIGA operates under a statutorily-approved plan of operations. FSIGA’s plan of operation provides that its executive director has the responsibility to make FSIGA’s recommendations to Respondent. FSIGA’s recommendations are based upon a review of the financial information collected from member employers. It may include recommendations regarding the appropriate security deposit amount necessary for a self-insured employer to demonstrate that it has the financial strength to ensure timely payment of all current and future claims. Respondent is required to accept FSIGA’s recommendations unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the recommendations are erroneous. 2002 Financial Review of Petitioner Petitioner is currently a member of FSIGA and has posted a qualifying security deposit of $2,500,000.00. On October 2, 2002, Brian D. Gee, C.P.A., who is now FSIGA’s executive director, completed a review of Petitioner’s audited financial statements for 1999, 2000, and 2001. Gee was FSIGA's financial analyst, responsible for conducting financial reviews and developing information for FSIGA's executive director, to determine the financial strength of self-insured members and make recommendations to Respondent. Gee’s review of Petitioner’s financial statement consisted of an assessment of Petitioner’s liquidity, profitability, degree of leverage, liabilities compared to net worth, and cash flow generated by operations. He also reviewed the financial statements to determine if Petitioner was maintaining a net worth of at least $1 million. Gee concluded that Petitioner did not have the financial strength necessary to ensure the timely payment of current and estimated future workers’ compensation claims. On October 8, 2002, FSIGA's executive director forwarded a letter to the Division of Workers’ Compensation, Department of Insurance (now Respondent). He recommended to Respondent that Petitioner be ordered to increase its security deposit to 150 percent of actuarially determined loss reserves. FSIGA’s recommendations were reviewed by Cynthia Shaw, assistant general counsel for the Division of Workers’ Compensation. Shaw drafted a letter for signature by Mark Casteel, General Counsel for Respondent, which adopted FSIGA's recommendations. Casteel signed that letter dated October 28, 2002, without revision or discussion. Shaw, an attorney, has no financial background or expertise. Shaw did not perform any additional financial analysis. Additionally, since Respondent did not have a CPA firm under contract, FSIGA’s recommendation was not reviewed by anyone with financial background before being transmitted to Petitioner. Petitioner responded to the October 28, 2002, directive from Respondent by filing a petition requesting a formal administrative hearing. Petitioner failed to file financial statements with FSIGA within four months following the end of its 2000 and 2001 fiscal years. Petitioner’s failure to timely file financial reports for 2000 and 2001 was due to the fact that it was in default on certain loan covenants and was engaged in negotiations with its lenders. In 1999 and 2000, Petitioner incurred additional long-term debt to finance the purchase of a new fleet of trucks. Petitioner’s creditors had exercised their right for accelerated payment of the outstanding loan balances, which by the end of 2001, was approximately $205 million. In 2001 and 2002, Petitioner entered into negotiations with its creditors to amend and restate its loan agreements. In 2002, Petitioner implemented a business plan calling for the sale of non-core assets, reduction of long-term debt, and transition from purchasing to leasing truck tractors. In July 2002, Petitioner entered into amended and restated loan agreements with its creditors. In order to secure the amended and restated loan agreements, Petitioner was required to pay increased interest, pledge substantially all of its property to secure the loans, pay the lenders $3.3 million, provide certain lenders with warrants to acquire an equity interest in Petitioner under certain conditions and agree to restrictions on how it could use cash generated by its operations and asset sales. Petitioner timely made all principal and interest payments due pursuant to the restated credit agreement and maintained compliance with all required financial ratios and standards. Furthermore, Petitioner continued to timely pay all claims for current and estimated future claims under its workers’ compensation system. Following execution of the amended and restated loan agreements, Petitioner’s auditors prepared the financial statements of 2001, which Petitioner then filed with FSIGA. Separate audited financial statements for 2000 were never filed with FSIGA, although prior-year financial results were shown (without footnotes) on the audited 2001 financial statements. With respect to liquidity, Petitioner’s financial statements showed a current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) of 1.41 at December 28, 2001. It did not disclose that Petitioner had any available funds under its revolving credit line as of December 28, 2001. Although Petitioner’s current ratio was acceptable, further analysis raised serious concern regarding Petitioner’s financial strength. With respect to Petitioner’s capital structure, the financial statement review showed that Petitioner’s total liabilities-to-book-equity ratio deteriorated from 4.91 at December 1999 to 30.46 at December 28, 2001. This deterioration reasonably raised concern because Petitioner became much more heavily leveraged from 1999 to 2001, relying much more heavily on debt to fund its operations. FSIGA concluded, Petitioner’s financial statement showed a "very weak capital structure." The impact of the increasing reliance on debt was marked by the end of 2001, when the financial statements showed that Petitioner was in default of its debt covenants at December 28, 2001. To address its defaults, Petitioner entered into an agreement to restructure its debt by which the creditors waived the defaults in return for imposing additional restrictions on Petitioner as described in paragraph 20 above. Although Petitioner maintained a net worth of $11.1 million at the end of 2001, Petitioner’s net worth at the end of 2001 was significantly lower than its net worth of $74.8 million at the end of 2000. In addition, the financial statement review showed that Petitioner had incurred net losses of $24.2 million, $39.5 million, and $5.7 million for the years 2001, 2000, and 1999, respectively. These losses were substantial and raised significant concerns about Petitioner’s financial strength. The 2002 financial review of Petitioner also showed a substantial decline in Petitioner’s cash flow from operations, from positive $32.6 million for 1999 to negative $2.1 million for 2001. This meant that in 2001, Petitioner was spending more cash in its operating activities than it was collecting. At the time FSIGA made its recommendation to Respondent, neither FSIGA nor Respondent had current information from Petitioner regarding the amount of Petitioner’s net outstanding liability for workers’ compensation claims in Florida. This is because Petitioner failed to file the Form SI-20 report that had been due on August 31, 2002. From October 2002 until December 14, 2004, FSIGA and Respondent did not have accurate information in regard to the amount of Petitioner’s outstanding liability for workers’ compensation claims in Florida, because Petitioner did not file its required Forms SI-17 and SI-20 reports or provide an actuarial study. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not present evidence disputing the reasonableness of FSIGA’s 2002 assessment of Petitioner’s financial statements or of FSIGA’s conclusions based thereon regarding Petitioner’s lack of financial strength in 2002. Based on FSIGA’s analysis of Petitioner’s 2001 financial statements and the financial statements for the two preceding years, FSIGA reasonably concluded that Petitioner had not demonstrated that it had the financial strength to ensure payment of current and future workers’ compensation claims. Based on the information then available to it, FSIGA made the correct recommendation to Respondent. There was no clear and convincing evidence available to Respondent that demonstrates FSIGA's recommendation was erroneous, instead, the available evidence supports FSIGA’s recommendation. Accordingly, Respondent’s direction to Petitioner to provide an actuarial report and post additional security was reasonable and appropriate. Continuing Financial Review of Petitioner After 2002. In November 2002, Petitioner challenged Respondent’s determination and requested a formal administrative hearing. Petitioner requested that Respondent hold the petition in abeyance. The request was granted, and the petition was not filed with DOAH until July 9, 2004. During this period, Respondent re-examined Petitioner’s financial strength. Following its business plan, on January 16, 2004, Petitioner refinanced its debt. While there was conflicting testimony regarding whether the actual interest on the refinanced debt was lower than on the debt it replaced, it was undisputed that $30 million of the refinanced debt was carrying an interest rate of 19 percent. This is a higher rate than the nine-percent and 11-percent interest applicable to the earlier debt. It is undisputed that substantially all of Petitioner’s property is pledged to secure the 2004 refinanced indebtedness, and there continues to be restrictions on Petitioner’s use of cash generated by its operations. However, the 19-percent interest on a portion of the January 2004 refinancing has now caused Petitioner to go into the lending market to attempt to refinance its debt once again. Nevertheless, the refinancing of its long-term debt has reduced its financing costs. Since Respondent’s 2002 request that Petitioner provide an actuarial report and post an additional security deposit, FSIGA has reviewed Petitioner’s audited financial statements for the years ended December 27, 2002, and December 26, 2003, as well as Petitioner’s unaudited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2004. The financial information received from Petitioner since the 2002 review has not resulted in FSIGA changing its 2002 recommendations. Petitioner’s 2002, 2003, and 2004 financial statements revealed that Petitioner’s net worth had fallen below the required $1 million in each of those three years. The 2002 and 2003 financial statements also show that Petitioner continued to experience net losses. Petitioner sustained a net loss of $12.1 million for the year ended December 27, 2002, and a net loss of $9.9 million for the year ended December 26, 2003. Petitioner’s cash flow statement shows a $4.8 million decrease in cash in 2002 and a $2 million decrease in cash in 2003. Petitioner’s 2004 unaudited financial statements indicate net income of $4.1 million for 2004. However, because the 2004 financial statements are unaudited, whether adjustments may be necessary following the audit are unknown at this time. Financial statements prepared without footnotes are not prepared in accordance with GAAP. Even if the unaudited results are confirmed in audited financial statements, 2004 would be the first year that Petitioner has recognized net income since 1998, following a five-year string of annual losses totaling $90 million. Petitioner’s Financial Status Evidenced at Final Hearing At the final hearing, to demonstrate that it had the financial strength necessary to ensure the timely payment of current and future workers’ compensation claims, Petitioner presented testimony of its expert witness, Lawrence Hirsh, C.P.A. He posited that Petitioner's financial strength should be measured by determining its ability to generate cash flow through a calculation of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). EBITDA is a measure commonly used by financial institutions to evaluate the ability of a company to generate cash flows and in determining whether to extend credit or to make investments. Petitioner’s lenders evaluated its EBITDA before deciding to refinance its credit facility in 2002 and to refinance its long-term debt in 2004. However, EBITDA is not a calculation provided for under GAAP. GAAP provides a method for determining cash flows and that method is used in preparing the portion of a GAAP- compliant financial statement called the "Statement of Cash Flows." Evidence presented by Respondent demonstrated that EBITDA has many limitations and is not a good proxy for cash flow. Application of EBITDA to Petitioner’s known financial performance in the past consistently overstates Petitioner’s ability to generate cash flow from operations. In every year from 1999 through 2003, Petitioner’s cash flow from operations, as shown on Petitioner’s cash flow statement that was prepared in accordance with GAAP, was significantly lower than the amount calculated for EBITDA by Hirsh: Year Petitioner's Cash Flow From Operations as Shown on GAAP-Compliant Cash Flow Statement EBITDA 1999 $32.6 million $61.1 million 2000 $344,000 $21.2 million 2001 ($2.1 million) $40.3 million 2002 $11.9 million $54.8 million 2003 $12.3 million $42.3 million Petitioner's unaudited 2004 cash flow statement showed $18.1 million in cash flow from operations. This is significantly lower than the $52.9 million in EBITDA calculated for 2004. Similarly, each year from 1999 to 2003, Hirsh's EBITDA's calculation grossly exceeds Petitioner's net loss as shown on its financial statements that were prepared in accordance with GAAP: Petitioner's Cash Flow From Operations as Year Shown on GAAP-Compliant Cash Flow Statement EBITDA 1999 (5.7 million) $61.1 million 2000 ($39.5 million) $21.2 million 2001 ($24.2 million) $40.3 million 2002 ($12.1 million) $54.8 million 2003 ($9.9 million) $42.3 million EBITDA is also misleading because it includes gain from the sale of assets. To the extent that Petitioner is selling its operating assets, such as trucks, Petitioner will have to expend cash to replace the assets, either by lease or purchase. To the extent that Petitioner is selling non-core assets, such as its unused real property, Petitioner cannot continue this practice indefinitely. Petitioner will soon run out of assets to sell. Therefore, cash generated from the sale of operating assets and non-core assets should not be considered in determining Petitioner's ability to generate cash from operating activities. Petitioner sought to bolster its evidence of its financial strength through testimony that it had received a credit rating in November 2003 from Standard & Poor's of B-plus. However, a B-rating is not an investment grade rating. It means that while a company currently has the capacity to meet its debt obligations, adverse business, financial, or economic conditions likely will impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment on the obligations in the future. In addition, Petitioner received a lower credit rating of B-3 from Moody's Investment Services. A B-3 rating from Moody's Investment Services is equivalent to a B minus rating from Standard & Poor's. The Standard & Poor's and Moody's credit ratings do not effectively demonstrate that Petitioner has the financial strength necessary to ensure the payment of current and future workers' compensation claims. Respondent's expert witness, Dr. Sondhi, disputed Petitioner's calculation of its EBITDA interest coverage ratio because Petitioner's calculation was based on interest paid as opposed to interest expense, and it failed to adjust for non-recurring items. Petitioner's interest expense is greater than the interest paid partly because Petitioner's loan agreement provides that a portion of the interest payments will accrue monthly with payments deferred until the final prepayment date or other principal payment milestone dates. Petitioner's calculation of the EBITDA interest coverage ratio was not performed in accordance with Standard & Poor's formula for determining the EBITDA interest coverage ratio. Even if the calculation of EBITDA interest coverage ratio was an appropriate measure of Petitioner's financial strength, the formula used by Petitioner to calculate the ratio overstates the results and shows greater financial strength than would be shown if the Standard & Poor's formula had been used. For the reasons noted above, Petitioner's EBITDA calculations are rejected as an inappropriate, overstated method to assess whether a company has the financial strength necessary to ensure the payment of current and future workers' compensation claims. Petitioner also argued that it had the required financial strength because it has paid all workers' compensation claims to-date and because, at the end of 2004, it had a cash balance of $26.6 million in the bank. The ability to currently pay workers' compensation claims does not demonstrate the financial strength to ensure the payment of workers' compensation claims in the future. Current capacity to pay is only part of the statutory standard, which is a risk-based standard requiring a company to ensure payment into the future because of the long period of time that workers' compensation claim payments continue. Likewise, having cash in the bank in the amount of $26.6 million at the end of 2004, does not demonstrate the required financial strength. Current cash balance is not an indicator, by itself, of financial strength to ensure payment in the future. Given Petitioner's extensive operating expenses, $26.6 million represents a very small amount of operating expenses. Petitioner’s consolidated balance sheets list its assets at historical or book cost, the cost at which those assets were purchased, and not at their current fair market value. Petitioner argues that adjusting the book values of assets to current market value would provide the most accurate assessment of Petitioner's net worth. To demonstrate that it has maintained a net worth of $1 million, Petitioner presented testimony that when determining net worth, the fair market value of its assets should be considered in place of the book value of its assets that is reflected on its balance sheet. However, GAAP does not permit the value of assets to be shown at fair market value and instead, requires that assets be shown at book value. Even if GAAP permitted the use of fair market value of assets to be used on a balance sheet, Petitioner did not offer any admissible evidence to prove the current fair market value of its assets for 2002, 2003, and 2004. Consequently, it cannot be determined whether the use of the current fair market value of assets would result in Petitioner's financial statements showing a net worth at all times of at least $1 million. Respondent has interpreted the term "net worth," as it is used in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-5.106, to mean the total assets of a company as reflected on the balance sheet, minus the total liabilities of the company as reflected on the balance sheet. Respondent's interpretation of the term "net worth" is a reasonable interpretation, consistent with the interpretation given to the term by accountants and financial analysts. The more credible expert testimony is that net worth appears on the balance sheet as stockholders' or shareholders' equity. Based on the above interpretation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-5.106, for each year from 2002 through 2004, Petitioner has failed to maintain a net worth of at least $1 million. The preponderance of evidence demonstrates Petitioner's net worth was negative $976,000, and negative $10.8 million for the years ended December 27, 2002, and December 26, 2003, respectively. In addition, Petitioner's unaudited financial statements for 2004 show that Petitioner maintained a negative net worth of $6.7 million as of December 31, 2004. Although Petitioner's financial condition has strengthened significantly from year end 2001 to year end 2004, based on the evidence, Petitioner does not now have the financial strength necessary to ensure payment of current and future workers' compensation claims, nor has Petitioner maintained a net worth of at least $1 million. Therefore, an additional security deposit is required for Petitioner to remain qualified as a self-insurer. In May 2002, Thomas Lowe was employed by Petitioner as its vice-president in charge of Risk Management. Lowe instituted a number of risk management practices which have significantly reduced the number and costs of Petitioner's workers' compensation claims. In 2001, Petitioner's workers' compensation claims were adjusted by three separate third-party administrators (TPAs), resulting in three overlapping data bases of claims information. Petitioner was unable to reconcile this overlapping claims information and, consequently, was unable to accurately determine the amount of its workers' compensation reserves for 2001. As a result of its inability to determine its workers' compensation reserves in 2001, Petitioner did not submit the required SI-17 and SI-20 forms to FSIGA in 2002 and 2003. Petitioner informed FSIGA of the difficulty it was having in reconciling its claims data for 2001 and paid the required penalties for its inability to timely submit Forms SI-17 and SI-20 in 2002 and 2003. Failure to submit these forms did not affect Petitioner's ability to make timely payments of all current and estimated future workers' compensation claims. In 2004, Petitioner submitted Forms SI-17 to FSIGA reflecting incurred workers' compensation losses for calendar years 2002 and 2003. On December 14, 2004, Petitioner submitted Form SI-20 to FSIGA, reflecting that the present value of its estimated loss reserves was $6,894,776.00. Anthony Gripps, Sr., an independent actuary who is a member of the American Academy of Actuaries, reviewed Petitioner's workers' compensation claims data pursuant to Respondent's October 28, 2002, directive. Grippa issued two reports, one dated December 1, 2004, and the other dated December 15, 2004. Grippa concluded that the present value of Petitioner's workers' compensation loss reserves as of September 30, 2004, was $6,831,175.00. The parties stipulated to Grippa's finding that the amount of Petitioner's workers' compensation loss reserves as of September 20, 2004, was $6,831,175.00. Petitioner's financial statements for 2004 had not been audited as of the final hearing, but were received into evidence in unaudited form. There was no evidence presented that Petitioner's 2004 financial statements do not accurately represent its financial performance in 2004 and its financial condition as of December 31, 2004. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-5.101(4) does not require Petitioner to submit audited financial statements as it has been self-insured since prior to January 1, 1997. Petitioner timely supplied Respondent with unaudited financial statements at least annually as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-5.101(4). Petitioner currently has a qualified security deposit of $2,500,000.00 deposited with FSIGA. In 2002, FSIGA recommended that in light of Petitioner's "significant net losses and very weak capital structure," Petitioner's security deposit should be increased to 150 percent of the actuarially determined loss reserves. Upon consideration of all of Petitioner's financial statements from 1999 through 2004, FSIGA's recommendation should be followed. Petitioner's actuarially determined loss reserves for all current and estimated future workers' compensation claims are $6,831,175.00. One hundred and fifty percent of the actuarially determined loss reserves of $6,831,175 equals $10,246,762.50. Petitioner presented no evidence of a different amount of security deposit increase that would be sufficient assuming one were to find that Petitioner lacks the financial strength to ensure payment of future workers' compensation claims or that Petitioner has failed to maintain a net worth of at least $1 million.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The chief financial officer issue a final order determining that: (i) Petitioner does not have the financial strength to ensure the timely payment of all current and future workers' compensation claims; and (ii) Petitioner has failed to maintain a net worth of at least $1 million; and Because Petitioner has failed to meet the requirements to continue self-insuring, the final order should require Petitioner to post an additional security deposit in the amount of $7,746,762.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2005.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Respondents Wardlaw and Etue were Certified Public Accountants licensed by the State of Florida. A Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief was filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which alleged, among other charges against other codefendants, that Wardlaw and Etue had engaged and, unless enjoined, would engage directly and indirectly in aiding and abetting others (notably A.T. Bliss & Co. and some of its principals), in acts, practices and a course of business that constituted and would constitute violations of Section 17(a) of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78m(a), Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13, 71 C.F.R. 240.13a-1 and 240.13a-13. Individual consents to Entry of Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction were entered by each Respondent by which they each consented to the entry of a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction against themselves. By a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction as to each Respondent, each Respondent was permanently restrained and enjoined in connection with the offer or sale of any securities issued by A. T. Bliss and Company, Inc. and from other certain wrongful acts. By an Order Instituting Proceedings and Accepting Resignation from Practice Before the Commission pursuant to Rule 2(e) [See 17 C.F.R. Section 2O1.2(e)] of the Commission's Rule of Practice, each Respondent was separately identified as a Certified Public Accountant who has appeared and practiced before the Securities and Exchange Commission, and based upon certain stated facts, the Commission stated in its separate Orders as to each Respondent the following: In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that it is in the public interest to institute proceedings and to impose a remedial sanction. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Proceedings pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice be and hereby are instituted against Stuart C. Wardlaw (James E. Etue). The resignation of Stuart C. Wardlaw (James E. Etue) from practicing before the Commission is hereby accepted. Stuart C. Wardlaw (James E. Etue) shall not, in his capacity as an independent public accountant, directly or indirectly perform any audit service or render any opinion concerning financial statements which he has reason to believe will be contained in any filing with the Commission or prepare financial statements which he has reason to believe will be included in filings with the Commission. (Emphasis supplied) The public accounting firm of Etue, Wardlaw, and Company, C.P.A., performed accounting services in connection with the issuance of audits of financial statements of A. T. Bliss and Company for the years 1979 and 1980. Respondents Etue and Wardlaw were each 50 percent shareholders of the certified public accounting firm, which was formed December 1, 1979. Etue was President and Wardlaw was Vice-President and Secretary-Treasurer. Neither Wardlaw nor Etue had extensive experience in the field of auditing prior to formation of the firm, having only been licensed as certified public accountants since 1976. A. T. Bliss and Company (hereafter, Bliss) only became a public corporation in 1980. However, during the latter part of the calendar year 1979, Bliss entered into the business of manufacturing and distributing solar hot water heating systems. Sales were made to various investors, who financed the purchase through 15 and 30 year notes, plus a cash downpayment, with the notes receivable consisting of both recourse and nonrecourse long-term notes. The 1979 and 1980 audited financial statements prepared by Respondents recognized revenue on the accrual basis. It is the auditor's responsibility to determine whether the company issuing those statements has chosen a method of revenue recognition that complies with generally accepted accounting principles. The accrual method of revenue recognition is the generally accepted and preferred method in public accounting, unless the collectibility of the sales price is not reasonably assured. When collection is over an extended period and because of the terms of the transactions or other conditions there is no reasonable basis for estimating the degree of collectibility, the installment sales or cost recovery methods of revenue recognition may be used and are normally preferred. Bliss' revenue recognition policy in 1979 and 1980 recognized the sale at the time of executing the contract and receiving the cash down payment, with a recording of all costs of sales and establishing an allowance for doubtful collections. Petitioner contends that there was insufficient information gathered and sufficient information could not have been gathered by Wardlaw and Etue due to the lack of history of the relatively new company's (Bliss') collections and the length of the extended collection period (15 to 30 years) by which they could reasonably use the accrual method of revenue recognition instead of either the installment method or cost recovery method of revenue recognition, preferably the latter. Respondents contend that sufficient information was collected but not documented. By either assessment, it is clear that there was a violation of generally accepted accounting principles simply in the Respondents' failure to document. The greater weight of the credible expert testimony is accepted that the information gathered or "known" or "understood" by the Respondents concerning the collectibility of a few notes was both of insufficient quantity and quality so as to further offend generally accepted accounting principles. Further, the applicable accounting publications and pronouncements, particularly Accounting Principles Board Opinion 10, (APB 10) strongly suggest that if the collection of the receivables is not reasonably assured, the cost recovery or installment method of revenue recognition should be utilized. In making this finding of fact, the undersigned specifically rejects Respondents' suggestion that both the recourse and non-recourse notes had a high collectibility factor based on the present personal wealth of a small sampling of makers of these notes and based upon the assumption from a still smaller sampling that most solar unit purchasers would stay in for the long haul because they were investing for tax advantages. Equally unpersuasive is the Respondents' argument that because solar units may be attached to buildings and financed over a long period of time Respondents were entitled to utilize real estate sales accounting principles in their financial statements and accountants' reports, all without adequate documentation in their work papers. Based upon the absence of any collection information in the work papers, the 15-30 year collection periods and the fact that none of the notes had any lengthy collection period, those expert opinions that the installment method or cost recovery method of revenue recognition would have more appropriately presented the financial condition of the company in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice are accepted. Although Respondent Etue is correct that APB 10 is couched in permissive not mandatory language, it is significant that Respondents' C.P.A. expert, David Levy testified that the lack of documentation in Respondents' work papers precluded him from forming an opinion that the accrual method of revenue recognition fairly presented the financial position of Bliss and that Respondents' financial statements and accountants' reports do not comply with generally accepted accounting principles. Bliss' net income, if determined by either of the preferred methods (installment or cost recovery) rather than by the accrual method selected by Respondents would be materially lower than the amount reported in the 1979 and 1980 audited financial statements. See Finding of Fact 8, below. The significance of this variation could have been minimized or at least lessened by making a full and specific disclosure within the respective financial statements that the accrual method of revenue recognition had been utilized. This was not done by Respondents. Instead, the Summary of Significant Accounting Policies presented in the notes to the 1979 and 1980 financial statements did not disclose the revenue recognition policy utilized, except by a blanket statement that the financial statements (not necessarily the revenue recognition method of the client company) were presented on the accrual basis. Bliss' revenue recognition policy would materially affect its financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial position. Generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice would require the disclosure of such a significant accounting policy in light of the doubtfulness of collectibility of the long term notes. In making this finding of fact, the undersigned specifically rejects the Respondents' basically antithetical propositions advanced at hearing that either (1) anyone reading these financial statements is so sufficiently knowledgeable that he would automatically infer from the notes thereto that the accrual method of cost recovery had been utilized or (2) most persons reading the financial statements would not have the accounting background to appreciate the information if properly disclosed. Respondent Etue maintains that the fact that there is a difference in net income using the accrual method versus a cost recovery or installment sales method is immaterial or has little meaning as there is always a difference using the different methods and because depending upon the total volume of sales, there could be differences of billions of dollars. Even accepting this proposal and Respondent Etue's additional proposition that Certified Public Accountant Reilly's demonstrative figures utilized at hearing may have been slightly distorted, it still appears that concerning the revenue recognition policy alone, Bliss' 1979 financial statement showed close to a $735,000 net income rather than a $20,000-plus loss, as reflected by subsequent audits/restatements of that year. Showing close to a 2.3 million dollar net income rather than about $77,000 in the second year (again as reflected by subsequent audits/restatements) surely reflects at least that the Respondents' accounting decisions were major enough to warrant outside consultation or substantial research and documentation of decisions. Respondents failed to consult and failed to document substantial research and decision factors. These deviations of practice by Respondents are clearly material. There is no reference whatsoever in the 1979 work papers to the determination of the reasonableness of the 60 percent allowance for doubtful collections for notes receivable. Note Two (2) to the 1980 Bliss financial statements disclosed that 50 percent of the total notes receivable in 1980 constituted the allowance for doubtful collections for notes receivable. There is no documentation in the audit work papers to substantiate any audit review to determine the reasonableness of the allowance for doubtful collections for notes receivable except the following statement: "Reserve of 50 percent is reasonable Client has now a full year of experience and knows better the collectibility. Additionally, the ratio of nonrecourse to recourse has changed dramatically in 1980, with more people taking recourse loans. Accordingly, management felt there would be less losses than the 60 percent reserve in 1979 due to the shift. Although there are no dollar statistics to support the 50 percent reserve, it seems to be a reasonable conservative estimate." Considerable testimony was heard from each Respondent as to how this note came to be created. Recitation of most would be subordinate and unnecessary and contrary to the concept of ultimate findings of fact. However, the basic facts adduced are that it arose through collaboration of Wardlaw and Etue to at least some degree. See Finding of Fact 14, below. Despite all of the foregoing the uncertainty in determining a 50 percent allowance suggests strongly that Respondents as auditors merely accepted representations from Bliss' principals without adequate empirical testing and auditing of the judgment and further demonstrates the uncertainty of collections, thereby more strongly indicating that a different approach than the accrual method of revenue recognition should have been selected, because in the accrual method of revenue recognition, the sale is recognized at the time of the entry into a long term note and here, under the circumstances of the instant case, there was inadequate data to form a conclusion as to the collectibility of all monies due under the note. Pursuant to the most credible expert accountants' testimony, this failure in the audit with regard to the 50 percent reserve was a failure to comply with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice and constituted a departure from generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards, but it also appears from the evidence as a whole to be at least partly attributable to Respondents' inexperience in auditing, which was alluded to earlier. The greater violation occurred by the Respondents' failure to recognize the impartiality required of them in certified public accounting practice and their willingness to impose, as it were, their C.P.A. "imprimatur" upon the Bliss financial statements by an opinion without any qualifying language (an unqualified opinion). See Finding of Fact 7, above. Pursuant to Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) provisions 169.105 and 165.109, receivables of the nature retained by Bliss, must be recorded at their present value. The discount resulting from the determination of the present value should be reported on the balance sheet as a direct deduction to the face amount of the note, or properly disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements. There was no adjustment to present value for lower than prevailing interest rates in the 1979 financial statements, nor any disclosure in the footnotes to the financial statements beyond that previously discussed. The 1980 financial statement, disclosed in Note 2 that the 50 percent allowance for doubtful collections included both a provision for uncollectibility as well as a reduction in value due to a lower than prevailing interest rate. The footnote did not distinguish between the two and the total allowance was included in the operating expenses, when the greater weight of the credible expert witness testimony is that the adjustment to present value for lower than prevailing interest rates should have been made as a reduction of sales. The failure to separately disclose the discount and the reserve for doubtful accounts fails to conform with generally accepted accounting principles, specifically APB 21, which requires that the discount is to be made as a reduction of sales. The audit note disclosed that the entire 50 percent allowance was management's estimated allowance for doubtful collections and, after the fact, and without any supportable calculations, the 50 percent figure now included the adjustment in value due to a lower than prevailing interest rate. Proceeding as Respondents did resulted in a material misstatement of gross revenue and operating expenses for 1980, which fails to comply with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice and which fails to conform to generally accepted accounting principles. Cost of sales were not presented separately in the 1979 and 1980 audited Bliss financial statements or auditors' notes thereto. Although there is expert testimony by Leo T. Hury, C.P.A., to the effect that failure to separately present cost of sales is a violation of the custom of accounting and not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, Mr. Hury also felt it departed from generally accepted auditing standards. Moreover, APB 4 states that separate disclosure of the important components of the income statements, such as sales and other sources of revenue, including costs of sales, is presumed to make the financial statement more useful. The cost of sales as a separate item permits the reader of the financial statement to determine the gross profit on sales before other income items come into play. Under the circumstances of the instant case the best that can be said of this violation of "custom" is that it constituted only one of several components of a material misstatement of financial condition, which, if not an independent and specific departure from generally accepted and prevailing standards of public accounting practice, generally accepted accounting principles, and generally accepted auditing standards, was one component of such a departure. The 1979 and 1980 work papers associated with the Bliss audit do not document or justify Respondents' study of accounting policy issues in relation to the financial statements so as to accord with generally accepted auditing standards. In making this finding of fact, the undersigned specifically rejects Respondent Etue's proposal that sufficient competent evidential matter was obtained but not documented in the 1979 work papers while the 1980 work papers evidence compliance with generally accepted auditing standards. The proposal is rejected because the expert testimony is consistent that an accountant's "work papers" are to be a "catch all" of supporting documentation for not only the final figures reported but for his studies of accounting issues, judgment calls of accounting policies and principles, and his explanation of selected methodologies as well. Failure of the work papers to adequately reveal how these decisions were reached either indicates that the studies were not done, not documented, or the work papers were defectively maintained, any of which constitutes at least minimal noncompliance with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice. The Respondents only minimally agree upon what separate responsibilities each had with regard to Bliss' account and financial statements. As might be expected, the elements of "control," "final authority," "sign-off authority," "final say," and "ultimate authority" were used by both Respondents with some considerable variation of meaning. Where there was agreement or only minor deviation, those portions of their respective evidence has been reconciled and accepted. However, each Respondent has a high stake in the outcome of these proceedings and where each characterized their respective responsibilities with regard to the Bliss account generally, and with regard to the 1979 and 1980 Bliss financial statements specifically, in diametrically different ways, greater reliance has been placed on the testimony of Allan Karp, the independent contract accountant who performed the 1980 field work. By any and all points of view, however, and for want of better legal terminology, it would appear that this was a situation that fluctuated from both to neither of the C.P.A. Respondents "minding the store." Respondent Wardlaw was the titular "partner in charge" of both the 1979 and 1980 Bliss audits. Respondent Etue had obtained the client initially and both he and Wardlaw initially met with the client. Prior to introducing Wardlaw to the Bliss principals Etue advised them that he, Etue, was on probation with the Board of Accountancy and Wardlaw would be in charge of the audit. Etue had performed two audits prior to the formation of the public accounting corporation that came under the review of the Florida Board of Accountancy and both of which led to the imposition of the discipline of probation in 1978 and 1981. 1/ Etue's reasons for Wardlaw taking charge of the audits were the language in his prior stipulation with the Board of Accountancy and because he believed he needed improvement in auditing. Petitioner desires that the inference be drawn from portions of each Respondent's testimony taken out of context that Etue concealed from Wardlaw that he, Etue, had done previous audits and represented that he, Etue, was precluded from doing Bliss' audits, and that by these misrepresentations Etue maneuvered Wardlaw into assuming the partner-in-charge responsibilities for the express purpose of avoiding oversight by the Board of Accountancy of the Bliss audits. However, the full context of the Respondents' respective testimony, the internal contradictions of Wardlaw's testimony, and the general vagueness of both Respondents' testimony do not support Petitioner's inference and preclude its acceptance. The custom of the profession of certified public accounting is that the "partner-in-charge" bears the ultimate responsibility of the conduct of a certified audit, including supervision of subordinates, final review of the auditor's work, and recommendations for corrections and changes. That is not precisely what occurred as between these Respondents. Although Wardlaw was responsible for the field work in the 1979 audit, one Sherry Carasik in Wardlaw's office nine miles from where Etue's office was located did the bulk of the work under his supervision, including preparation of the work papers and tests of transactions involved in the field work. Etue had no supervisory responsibility for the 1979 audit and did little if any of the actual field work. Etue did, at Wardlaw's request, however, prepare a list of items to be performed in the audit. This does not support the inference that Etue deferred to Wardlaw's superior auditing experience but quite the opposite, supports the inference that Etue was instructing Wardlaw or they were jointly deciding courses of action with Wardlaw deferring to Etue. Later, Etue also drafted the confirmation letters to be mailed to all investors and edited Wardlaw's letter to Bliss recommending changes to the footnote disclosure. Respondent Wardlaw testified that all major decisions concerning accounting policies re Bliss were discussed with Respondent Etue and concurrence and "joint decisions" were reached between them. Allan Karp materially confirms this testimony with regard to the 1980 audit procedure on the few occasions he was able to view the two Respondents together. It was Karp's view that Respondent Etue was his primary employer who supervised Karp in performance of the 1980 Bliss audit with Wardlaw dropping by periodically but mostly operating out of his separate office. Wardlaw's involvement in the 1980 audit was in the nature of a review partner performing a "cold review" after audit completion but before finalization. In 1980, Etue also assisted Karp with inventory as part of the field work, discussed with Karp his concerns about related parties, and helped Karp locate materials for a portion of the audit. The joint decisions with regard to assessing collectibility have been discussed supra.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for a certificate of need was complete.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Intervenor each filed applications in the same batching cycle for certificates of need to establish Medicaid-certified home health agencies in Collier County, District 8. By letter dated October 6, 1994, Respondent advised Petitioner that its application omitted certain elements. The letter requests, among other things, an "audited financial statement," including a balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement for the previous two years' operation. Petitioner's application contained an unaudited financial statement for the part of the year that it had been operation. Incorporated in 1994, Petitioner had been receiving patients only since September or October 1994. Petitioner's agent contacted a representative of Respondent and discussed the omissions letter. A misunderstanding ensued in which Petitioner's agent thought that Respondent's representative said that Petitioner would not be required to submit an audited financial statement because Petitioner had not been in operation for a full fiscal year. In fact, Respondent's representative did not say that. Respondent's policy is to permit applicants to file audited financial statements for a partial year, if that is how long they have been in business. For example, Intervenor included with its application an audited financial statement covering the six-week period that it had been in existence. In this case, it would have been possible for Petitioner to obtain an audited financial statement for a period of time including at least its first month of operation.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the administrative withdrawal of the subject application for a certificate of need. ENTERED on April 24, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 24, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-6: rejected as subordinate. 7-8: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 9: adopted or adopted in substance. 10-11: rejected as not finding of fact. 12-14: rejected as recitation of evidence. 15: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Respondent and Intervenor All are adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Attorney Robert E. Senton P.O. Box 963 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Richard A. Patterson Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road Suite 301--The Atrium Tallahassee, FL 32303 Attorney Alfred W. Clark 117 South Gadsden Street Suite 201 Tallahassee, FL 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent abused its discretion in failing to settle or compromise the outstanding tax assessment against Petitioner, based on Petitioner's inability to pay, pursuant to Section 213.21, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation, engaged in the business of painting and repairing damaged automobiles and other vehicles. Petitioner's principal place of business and home office is located at 100 Northwest 9th Terrace, Hallandale, Florida. Respondent is the agency charged with administering the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to, among other provisions, Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. Respondent is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers. It is further authorized to request information to ascertain the tax liability of taxpayers, if any, pursuant to Section 213.34, Florida Statutes. It is undisputed that Petitioner is a taxpayer. From September 2, 1997 through March 12, 1999, Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner to determine whether Petitioner had been properly collecting and remitting sales and use tax and whether any additional sales and use tax amounts were due. On September 2, 1997, Respondent forwarded its form DR-840, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, to Petitioner. The period of time being audited was from August 1, 1992 through July 31, 1997. For part of the audit period, Petitioner's records were inadequate. Petitioner's record keeping was poor. For the remainder of the audit period, Petitioner's records were voluminous. A higher amount of gross sales were reported on Petitioner's federal tax return than on Florida's tax return. Petitioner could not document 95 percent of its exempt sales reported to the State of Florida. Petitioner reported a ratio of 35 percent for exempt sales on its filed Florida sales and use tax returns. Because of the two factors of inadequate and voluminous records, sampling was required by Respondent. On January 12, 1998, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written audit sampling agreement. On June 5, 1998, Respondent provided its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes to Petitioner. On July 21, 1998, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (revised), which was the first revision, to Petitioner. On January 12, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (revised), which was the second revision, to Petitioner. On March 12, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner. This notice indicated that Petitioner owed additional sales and use tax in the amount of $166,306.93, penalty in the amount of $81,443.38, and interest through March 12, 1999, in the amount of $77,468.37. Consequently, the notice further indicated that the total amount of the assessment against Petitioner was $325,218.68. A compromise of the assessed tax, interest, or penalty can be performed at Respondent's field level after an audit is completed and the case is still in Respondent's field office. However, the field office's authority is limited in that affected taxpayer must agree to the amount of the tax assessed. In the present case, Petitioner did not agree to the amount of the tax assessed and, therefore, Respondent's field office could not compromise the assessed tax, interest, or penalty against Petitioner. On September 17, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision. Respondent notified Petitioner that the assessment would not be changed. Petitioner requested a reconsideration as to whether Respondent should compromise the tax, interest, and penalty, based on grounds of doubt of collectibility. By Notice of Reconsideration issued January 7, 2000, Respondent notified Petitioner of Petitioner's failure to establish an inability to pay the assessment in full. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's determination of Petitioner's inability to pay the assessment and requested a hearing. It is undisputed that Respondent has the discretion to compromise an assessment. Respondent may compromise tax or interest based on doubt of collectibility of the tax or interest. The taxpayer bears the burden of providing documentation to support the taxpayer's position that it cannot pay the tax or interest. Respondent examines whether a compromise is in the best interests of the State of Florida in determining whether to compromise an assessment. Respondent considers a compromise to be in the best interests of the State and may compromise the assessment under the following circumstances: (1) on the basis of the taxpayer providing documentation of the taxpayer's inability to pay the assessment in full but having the cash flow to make payments in installments; or (2) when a taxpayer's business or the taxpayer-corporation is insolvent and the taxpayer's or corporation's assets were used to satisfy legitimate liabilities and not used to enrich any person closely related to the taxpayer or corporation; or (3) when a taxpayer is gravely ill and the cash flow of the taxpayer's business is poor. When it considers compromising any tax, interest, or penalty, Respondent reviews several factors, including the audit file, financial information, and any other factors or circumstances which may affect collectibility. The financial information considered includes positive and negative sales trends, cost of goods sold, profitability, and net worth. Additionally, any changes in assets, in particular fixed assets, and liabilities are taken into account. Other factors or circumstances considered include the fair market value of a taxpayer's assets, the future prospects of a taxpayer's business, and the solvency or insolvency of a taxpayer's business. Respondent does not consider the liquidation value of a taxpayer's business. Petitioner was, and is, not familiar with the State of Florida's sales and use tax law, as the law relates to Petitioner's business. Petitioner's president has no prior experience in maintaining the books and records of a company or in completing financial statements of a company. Petitioner's president never attended a seminar, presented or sponsored by Respondent, on Florida's sales and use tax, or read any of Respondent's pamphlets on sales and use tax. Petitioner has a New York accountant, who never provided Petitioner's president or treasurer with any instructions regarding Florida's sales and use tax. During the audit period, Petitioner never requested written advice from Respondent regarding the application of Florida's sales and use tax to its business. For the last three years, Petitioner's sales have been a little less than $1,000,000. For the years 1996 and 1997, Petitioner's federal tax returns showed cash balances at the beginning of each year even though the cash balance for 1997, $51,431, was less than for 1996, $93,497. Petitioner's federal tax returns for 1996 through 1998 indicate a loss for each year during that time period. However, a comparison between Petitioner's sales income in its federal tax returns and its state tax returns shows that Petitioner's sales income was grossly underreported. Respondent's analysis worksheet, referred to as Doubt as to Collectibility Analysis Worksheet, indicated a negative dollar figure as to cash available by Petitioner to pay Respondent. Inconsistencies existed between the information reported in Petitioner's tax returns and information provided by Petitioner during the protest period. Petitioner's sales figure as of August 31, 1999, an eight-month sales period for 1999, stated in its Petition for Reconsideration, dated October 6, 1999, was substantially less than the sales figure reported on Petitioner's sales and use tax returns filed during the same time period. Additionally, Petitioner overstated the cost of goods sold in one of its federal tax returns, which resulted in an overstated net loss. The fair market value of Petitioner's assets indicated in its Petition for Reconsideration, $30,000, was more than 100 percent of the value reflected on Petitioner's county tangible personal property return, $13,000. Also, further areas of inconsistencies existed between the information provided by Petitioner and the information reported on Petitioner's tax returns. Petitioner indicated that its former treasurer received a deferred compensation payment of $60,000, but neither Petitioner's tax returns nor financial statements reflected a payment for the expense. Petitioner showed a loss on its 1996 federal tax return, which, according to Petitioner, was a result of moving expenses and expenses in the construction business; however, no expense unique to moving or the construction business was reflected on Petitioner's tax return or financial statement. Petitioner's financial data, including federal tax returns and state wage reports, showed trends and deficiencies. A trend of an increase in gross sales for Petitioner was shown for the years 1997 through 1999, in Petitioner's federal tax returns for the same years and in Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration, regarding its gross sales as of August 31, 1999. Additionally, the same federal tax returns showed a trend of an increase in net income for the same years in that deductions in relation to sales were less than the previous years. For the years 1994 through 1997, as reported on Petitioner's federal tax returns, Petitioner's depreciable assets increased each year. Respondent's analysis worksheet also showed a negative dollar figure as to Petitioner's adjusted net worth. As of August 31, 1999, the first eight months of 1999, Petitioner's total assets were $40,814 and its total loans, payable to banks, were $90,000. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with adequate and complete documentation and information in order for Respondent to make a determination of collectibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against Copo Paint and Body Shop, Inc., and sustaining the refusal to compromise the tax, penalty, or interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Moffa, Esquire Moffa & Moffa, P.A. One Financial Plaza, Suite 2202 100 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Nicholas Bykowsky, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the petitioner should revoke respondent's self-insurance privilege for failure to comply with Rule 38F-5.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On February 12, 1980, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, through its Bureau of Self-Insurance, notified the Deauville Hotel (respondent) of its intention to revoke respondent's workers' compensation self-insurance privilege for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 38F-5.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. This Rule requires each se1f-insurer to have on file with the Department a "financial statement of a current date showing a net worth of not less than $250,000 and a current ratio of more than 1 to 1, and a working capital of an amount establishing financial strength and liquidity of the business to pay normal compensation claims promptly". Specifically, petitioner contends the respondent filed financial statements for calendar year 1978 that were not certified by an outside independent accounting firm, and that such statements reflected an unsatisfactory current ratio and net worth in contravention of the Rule. Respondent is a large luxury hotel located in Miami Beach, Florida, and employs more than 400 persons. It is a division of Deauville Operating Corporation. Respondent is now and has been for a number of years a self- insurer under Section 440.38(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The privilege to self- insure is granted by the Department when an employer demonstrates the financial ability to promptly discharge all amounts required to be paid under the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law as contained in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Having once established the requisite financial integrity, an employer must file within six months following the close of each succeeding fiscal year financial statements demonstrating the continued ability to discharge all obligations under the Law. The Department is reposed with the responsibility of reviewing the financial statements to insure compliance with the applicable rules governing self-insurers. When the administrative complaint was issued, respondent had on file financial statements consisting of a balance sheet, statement of income, home office equity, and changes in financial position (Exhibit No. 1). All statements were prepared using the year ending December 31, 1978. Three financial measurements are used by the Department to evaluate the financial integrity of an employer. These are current ratio, net worth and working capital. However, the Department has chosen to rely only upon the first two measurements as a basis for revoking the self-insurance privilege of respondent. The current ratio of a business entity is determined by comparing the ratio of current assets to current liabilities as shown in the most recent financial statement (Rule 38F-5.01 (10), Florida Administrative Code). The owner's equity or net worth is computed by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. Working capital is derived by taking the excess of current assets over current liabilities. (Rule 38F-5.01(16), Florida Administrative Code);. The application of these measurements to the 1978 financial statements of respondent reveals a current ratio of .82 to 1 based upon current assets and liabilities of $667,542 and $816,542, respectively, a negative net worth of $543,112, and a working capital in a negative position. Efforts by petitioner in late 1979 and early 1980 to obtain more current financial statements of respondent were not successful. However, in April and July, 1980, respondent filed certain financial data for calendar year 1979 and the year ending March 31, 1980 (Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, 6 and 7). Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 pertain to the financial position of the Deauville Operating Corporation at December 31, 1979, and incorporate therein the operating results of the Deauville Hotel. Exhibit No. 2 failed to segregate the Corporation's current assets and liabilities from total assets and liabilities. Therefore, no determination of current ratio or working capital can be made. The Exhibit does show the Corporation had a net worth of $2,643,487. Exhibit No. 3 revised the data shown in Exhibit No. 2 and provided a division of assets and liabilities from which a measurement of current ratio and working capital can be calculated. However, the Corporation improperly classified as a current asset a long-term receivable in the amount of $2 million. Had this asset been properly classified, current liabilities would have exceeded current assets and produced a negative working capital and current ratio of less than 1 to 1. Exhibit Nos. 6 and 7 are financial statements of the Deauville Hotel for calendar year 1979 and the year ending March 31, 1980, respectively. Exhibit No. 6 shows total current assets and liabilities of $495,449 and $1,072,540, respectively, as of December 31, 1979. The resulting current ratio is .46 to 1 while the working capital is in a negative position. Net worth is a negative $394,639. As of March 31, 1980, current assets had increased to $832,763 while current liabilities had slightly decreased to $1,017,636. The current ratio is accordingly less than 1 to 1. At the same time, net worth had increased to a positive amount of $137,901 while working capital remained in a negative position by virtue of current liabilities exceeding current assets (Exhibit No. 7). None of the financial statements are certified by outside independent accounting firms. The audit reports for the set of statements contained in Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 7 specifically contain a disclaimer by the accountants that they have "not audited or reviewed the accompanying financial statements, and accordingly, do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance on them". By the same token, the statements encompassed in Exhibit No. 3 include the conspicuous disclaimer by the accountant that such statements are "unaudited".
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that petitioner Department revoke the privilege of respondent to be a self-insurer under Section 440.38(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas P. Chanco, Esquire Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2652 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Wade Hampton, Esquire Post Office Box 355 Gainesville, Florida 32602
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue properly denied Petitioner's March 10, 2000, Application For Refund of Sales and Use Tax, Petitioner having asserted that the Department of Revenue obtained the Closing Agreement through misrepresentation and intimidation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Tuskawilla Learning Center, is a Florida corporation which operates a private Montessori School in Oviedo, Seminole County, Florida. Petitioner has elected to be an "S" corporation for federal income tax reporting purposes. Tuskawilla Learning Center is owned by its shareholders, Thomas E. Phillips; his wife, Lois; his daughter, Terry Lynn DeLong; and his son-in-law, Daniel F. DeLong. At all times material to this matter, a partnership comprised of the above-named owners of the Tuskawilla Learning Center also owned the real property upon which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. In early July 1997, Respondent audited Petitioner's corporate transactions for the period from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1997, for compliance with sales and use tax and the local government infrastructure surtax. During the audit Petitioner was requested to provide all information and documents which Petitioner felt supported its business activities. Respondent issued a Notice Of Intent To Make Audit Changes on September 25, 1997, which advised Petitioner that the audit revealed that Petitioner had failed to pay use tax on purchases Petitioner made from out-of-state vendors, which Petitioner acknowledged and paid. The audit also revealed that Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on the monthly rental charges that Petitioner paid to the property owner on which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. Petitioner did not agree with Respondent's position on the sales tax on monthly rental charges. On October 28, 1997, an audit conference was held in Orlando, Florida, where the tax assessment on the monthly rental charges was discussed. The parties were unable to resolve the issue, and Petitioner requested that the issue be referred to Tallahassee for further review. The review in Tallahassee essentially confirmed the original audit findings, and a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued on January 26, 1998. Petitioner filed a protest and requested a further review of the Notice of Proposed Assessment. As a result, the entire audit was reviewed, and Petitioner was allowed to provide additional documentation to support its position. On August 4, 1998, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision which essentially confirmed the findings of the original audit. At this point, Petitioner had certain rights of appeal which had to be exercised within specific time limits, or Petitioner could elect to pay the taxes and interest as set forth in a Closing Agreement in which Respondent waived the penalties which had accrued for failure to pay the tax. The various time deadlines passed without Petitioner electing one of the avenues of appeal nor did Petitioner execute the Closing Agreement. After all deadlines for appeal had passed, Petitioner contacted Respondent through an attorney seeking relief. Respondent found no basis for relief but renewed the opportunity for Petitioner to sign the Closing Agreement. On February 5, 1999, Petitioner executed the Closing Agreement and paid $71,693.87 (a $285.31 overpayment). The Closing Agreement clearly states: The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any judicial or administrative proceedings, including the remedies provided by ss. 213.21(2)(a) and 72.011(1), F.S., to recover, compromise, or avoid any tax, penalty or interest paid or payable pursuant to this agreement. This agreement is for the sole purpose of compromising and settling taxpayer's liability to the State of Florida . . . This agreement is final and conclusive with respect to the audit assessment or specific transaction/assessment and period described . . . and no additional assessment may be made by the Department against the taxpayer for the specific liability referenced above, except upon showing of fraud or misrepresentation of material fact . . . . On March 10, 2001, Petitioner filed an Application for Refund of the taxes and interest paid with the Closing Agreement. Attached to the Application for Refund was Petitioner's four-page "position paper," which outlined facts and arguments related to the sales tax issue. Petitioner's Application for Refund states that "the State has misled us." The Application for Refund went through the review process. On May 5, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Denial for the refund claim. Petitioner sought an informal review of the proposed refund denial. After an informal review of the proposed refund denial, on June 16, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. On August 12, 2000, Petitioner forwarded a letter to Respondent, which was interpreted as a request for an administrative hearing to review the decision to deny the Application for Refund which resulted in the instant administrative hearing. Thomas E. Phillips has a Ph.D. in accounting from the University of Nebraska, is a Certified Public Accountant, and had taught accounting at the University of Central Florida for 23 years prior to his retirement. He and his family founded the Tuskawilla Learning Center. On behalf of Petitioner, Dr. Phillips maintains that the tax audit and subsequent review process were "intimidating" and that Respondent "misled" Petitioner. Notwithstanding Dr. Phillips' assertion that the audit and review process were "intimidating," he testified that he found the auditor and her supervisor "not intimidating, but were very pleasant." Dr. Phillips testified about several aspects of the audit and review process and activities that occurred during the audit and review process that he found objectionable. For example, Dr. Phillips testified that Respondent failed to respond to his inquiries in an appropriate way and that Respondent had misinterpreted certain case law that he felt applicable. Nothing offered by Dr. Phillips suggests any impropriety or misrepresentation by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas E. Phillips 1625 Montessori Point Oviedo, Florida 36527 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
