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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JOHN DANIEL MUELLER, 10-003206PL (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jun. 14, 2010 Number: 10-003206PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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WILLIAM F. SHARRETT vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 88-000781 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000781 Latest Update: Jun. 27, 1988

The Issue The issue is whether the petitioner's applications for qualification and for examination as an insurance agent should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Wallace F. Sharrett applied on or about May 14, 1987, for qualification as a general lines agent or solicitor for insurance, and also applied for examination as a life and health insurance agent. On or about July 30, 1987, he filed another application for examination as a life and health agent. On all these applications he listed his social security number as 113- 20-3677. His social security number is actually 113-30-2677. All three applications contain the same question #6, which asks: Have you ever held an insurance license in this or any other state? On all applications Mr. Sharrett answered "no." All three applications also contain question #11: Does any insurer or general agent claim that you are indebted under any agency contract or otherwise? If so, state name of claimant, nature of claim, and your defense thereto. To all three questions, Mr. Sharrett checked the box labeled "no." On all three applications, in response to question 14(b), asking, "What insurance experience have you had?", Mr. Sharrett answered "none." Mr. Sharrett previously had sought and had been issued licenses and qualifications by the Florida Department of Insurance to represent insurance companies as follows: Security Life Insurance Company of Georgia, issued August 26, 1977. Conger Life Insurance Company, issued October 20, 1977. Security Life Insurance Company of Georgia, issued January 31, 1979. Coastal States Life Insurance Company, issued July 12, 1979. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, issued June 26, 1981. Mr. Sharrett has held no Florida licenses or qualifications for licensure for any insurers since 1984. From October 3, 1977, through December 27, 1978, Mr. Sharrett had been employed by Conger Life Insurance Company of Miami, Florida. After his termination, an internal audit of Mr. Sharrett's accounts at Conger Life was performed. The internal audit dated January 31, 1979, showed that Mr. Sharrett owed the company $707.66. Thereafter, Mr. Sharrett made payments of $510.14, and Conger Life's records show that as of March 31, 1979, based on total payments, and additional shortages allocated to Mr. Sharrett's account, he owed Conger Life $388.74. After Mr. Sharrett's termination of employment with Conger Life, he applied to become a salesman with Security Life Insurance Company of Georgia. On February 7, 1979, the agency vice president for that company, J. H. Phillips, wrote to Conger Life for information about Mr. Sharrett, and said: We particularly would be interested in, did he leave your company without a deficiency. On February 12, 1979, Mr. Henry J. Spaman of Conger Life wrote to Mr. Phillips stating He was employed by [us] from 10/3/77 to 12/22/78. He left our employment with a shortage of considerable amount which we are in the process of taking legal action [sic]. We also have reported to the State Department of Insurance the shortage and have been assured that it will be investigated. Nevertheless, Mr. Sharrett thereafter was hired as a salesman by Security Life Insurance Company of Georgia. Apparently the payment which Mr. Sharrett made of $510.14 settled his account with Conger Life Insurance Company to the satisfaction of Security Life Insurance Company of Georgia. Conger Insurance Company still maintains, however, that Mr. Sharrett is indebted to it in the amount of $388.74. No legal action to collect that amount from Mr. Sharrett has ever been taken, nor is there any evidence of a demand for payment being directed to him since his payment of $510.14 to Conger Life during the first quarter of 1979. Mr. Sharrett did not list his prior licenses to sell insurance on his recent applications because he had discussed his applications with a retired insurance agent, Mr. Morrelle, who had been an agent with Independent Life Insurance Company for 27 years, Mr. Morrelle told Mr. Sharrett that it was not necessary to list jobs with insurance companies which were more than five years old. Mr. Morrelle had not looked at the applications themselves, and did not know that the question about whether the applicant ever had been licensed in Florida or any other state has no time limit. Mr. Raines, the district sales manager for Independent Life Insurance Company, the company for which Mr. Sharrett will work if licensed, stated that he did not know that Mr. Sharrett had been employed by five different insurance companies. Independent Life's own background check of Salespeople through Equifax only goes back five years. Mr. Sharrett was employed by Independent Life from May 4, 1987, to January 22, 1988, and was a good employee. After this case began, Mr. Sharrett filed an amended application with the Department, dated February 17, 1988. In that application Mr. Sharrett listed his correct social security number, but with regard to question number 6 (concerning other insurance licenses) he listed only Conger Life Insurance Company, Security Life Insurance Company, and New England Life Insurance Company. He neglected to mention his licensure with Coastal States Life Insurance Company and Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. The Department has no record that Mr. Sharrett was qualified to represent New England Life Insurance Company. With respect to question number 11 (concerning whether any insurer or general agent claimed that Sharrett was indebted under any agency contract) on the amended application, he again answered "no." On question 14(b), Mr. Sharrett acknowledged 2 years experience in the insurance business in the amended application. The Hearing Officer finds no material misrepresentation with respect to question number 11 (claims of indebtedness by insurance companies) on any of the applications Mr. Sharrett filed. He had no reason to believe that Conger Life Insurance Company continued to maintain that he was indebted to it. Conger Life has never taken any action to collect the $388.74 it maintains Mr. Sharrett owes it. His payment of $514.14 during the first quarter of 1979, shortly after his termination with Conger Life settled the dispute between Conger Life and Mr. Sharrett. In making this finding, the Hearing Officer is persuaded that the dispute between Mr. Sharrett and Conger Life Insurance Company was made known to Security Life Insurance Company in February 1979, and it is more likely than not that both Security Life Insurance Company of Georgia and Mr. Sharrett were satisfied that an agreement had been reached with Conger Life about Mr. Sharrett's indebtedness to Conger Life before he would have been employed by Security Life. Mr. Sharrett did, however, make material misrepresentations in his applications for licensure. While the transposition of numbers on the portion of the application asking or a social security number would not, by itself, be sufficient proof of an intentional misrepresentation, although it would impede investigation into the applicant's background, the error in the social security number in the three original applications is highly significant in conjunction with two other facts: Mr. Sharrett did not reveal in answer to question 6 that he had been licensed to sell insurance in Florida before. Even crediting Mr. Morrelle's testimony that he told Mr. Sharrett it was not necessary to list insurance licenses more than five years old, a plain reading of the form would show that question 6 has no time limit on it, whereas question 10 asks for a record of employment "for the past five years" and is time limited. Minimal attention to the questions asked on the form would have put Mr. Sharrett on notice that he was required to disclose all past insurance licenses. This would have brought to light Mr. Sharrett's dispute with his prior employer, Conger Life, which he would be required to explain. Mr. Sharrett stated that he had no insurance experience in answer to question number 14(b). All these answers were simply untrue. The error in the social security number, the failure to list past licenses Mr. Sharrett held in Florida on three applications, the failure to correctly list past licenses on the fourth (amended) application, and the failure to acknowledge any past insurance experience, leads the Hearing Officer to find purposeful misrepresentation of Mr. Sharrett's past. These misrepresentations raise questions about Mr. Sharrett's trustworthiness. Although the dispute Mr. Sharrett had with Conger Life in 1979 can be explained and would not, in itself, disqualify him from licensure, several of the items of misinformation on his licensure applications apparently were designed to impede the Department from learning of the settled dispute with Conger Life. This misrepresentation is disqualifying.

Recommendation It is recommended that the applications of Mr. Sharrett for qualification and for examination as an insurance agent be denied. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of June, 1988. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX The following are my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Covered in finding of fact 5. General covered in finding 6-9, whether the indebtedness was on the payment bond or is general indebtedness is not relevant. Covered in finding of fact 12. [Introduction] The content of the original applications are recounted in findings of fact 1-4. 4(a). Rejected as unnecessary. 4(b). Sentence 1 covered in finding of fact 1, the remainder rejected for the reason stated in findings of facts 17 and 18. 4(c). Rejected for the reason stated in finding of fact 17(a). 4(d). Accepted in finding of fact 16. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 13. The following are my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the respondent pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statues (1987). Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 8. 4(a). The name used on the application is not a problem. Concerning the social security, see finding of fact 1. 4(b). See finding of fact 1. 4(c). See finding of fact 1. [Appears to be misnumbering] Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in findings of facts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Same as previous ruling. Same as previous ruling. Covered in findings of facts 16, 17, and 18. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Wallace F. Sharrett 109 Southwest Third Avenue Hallendale, Florida 33009 Hon. William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (3) 120.57626.611626.731
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs MICHAEL DAVID GARRETT, 04-003838PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Oct. 27, 2004 Number: 04-003838PL Latest Update: Sep. 29, 2005

The Issue Whether the licensure and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent in Florida held by Respondent Michael David Garrett should be disciplined based on the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed against him and, if so, the extent of such discipline.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency that is responsible for the regulation of insurance agent conduct and licensure. Respondent is currently eligible for licensure as an insurance agent and is licensed in this state as a life, variable annuity and health agent, life and health agent, and health agent. The Association for Independent Managers (AIM) is an entity that was founded in 1979 for the purpose of providing educational and other services or benefits to a membership base that is comprised primarily of small businesses. In February 2002, Jack Winebrenner, AIM’s chief executive officer, desired to secure health insurance benefits for AIM’s members. On or about February 7, 2002, Winebrenner delivered applications for health insurance and a cashier’s check in the amount of $23,920.77 to Respondent. The pertinent applications were intended to secure health insurance with an entity known as Mutual Service Life Insurance Company and/or an entity known as United States Life Insurance Company. Winebrenner agreed to gather the applications on behalf of AIM and to forward them to Respondent and Respondent’s company, known as Eastwich Re, Inc. Respondent had represented that he was a licensed insurance agent. The identifying number of the $23,920.77 cashier’s check referred to hereinabove that was delivered to Respondent is 381524555. Respondent’s company, Eastwich Re, Inc., had a business checking account at Flagship National Bank (Flagship) in Sarasota, Florida. On February 12, 2002, the $23,920.77 check that Winebrenner had delivered to Respondent was deposited into Eastwich Re’s Flagship account. Respondent was a signatory on Eastwich Re’s Flagship account. Respondent did not secure health insurance from United States Life Insurance Company or Mutual Service Life Insurance Company or any other company for any of the AIM applicants. Respondent did not forward any premium moneys in the year 2002 to United States Life Insurance Company or Mutual Service Life Insurance Company for the purpose of securing health insurance for any of the AIM applicants. Respondent returned only $10,000.00 from the amount that Winebrenner gave to him in the $23,920.77 cashier’s check. Winebrenner testified that he requested several times of Respondent that the full amount ($23,920.77) of the cashier’s check be returned, once it was clear that no health insurance had been secured for any AIM applicants. AIM engaged private counsel to seek return of the entire $23,920.77 amount, but the efforts of private counsel were not successful. No reason was offered for Respondent only returning $10,000.00. On September 19, 1991, Respondent’s licenses and appointments as an insurance agent were surrendered as part of a Consent Order into which he entered with the Department of Insurance. In 1996, Respondent’s application for licensure as an insurance agent was denied. Respondent’s application for licensure was denied based on information “indicating that Respondent transacted insurance in 1992, in violation of the September 19, 1991 Consent Order which resulted in the surrender of all licenses and appointments held by Respondent . . . [and] had the same force and effect as a revocation.” Respondent was again granted a license as an insurance agent in 1997. Respondent was a licensed insurance agent in Florida at the relevant times that are material to the Administrative Complaint that is the basis for the instant action.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Michael David Garrett guilty of violating the provisions of Section and Subsections 626.561(1); 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13); 626.621(6); 626.9521; and 626.9541(1)(o)1., Florida Statutes. As penalty for these violations, it is recommended that Petitioner (1) revoke Respondent's insurance licenses and eligibility for licensure; (2) that Respondent be required to pay an administrative fine of $20,000.00; and (3) that Respondent be required to pay restitution to AIM for the benefit of the defrauded insurance applicants in the amount of $13,920.77. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2005.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57626.561626.611626.621626.692626.951626.9521626.9561
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs JOHN WILLIAM HAY, 01-001862PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida May 14, 2001 Number: 01-001862PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. FRANK JOSEPH BRENNAN, 86-000707 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000707 Latest Update: May 01, 1987

The Issue The issue is whether the licenses of Frank Joseph Brennan should be disciplined for actions of Mr. Brennan or of agents associated with Frank J. Brennan, P.A. with respect to the sale of insurance products to three (3) clients: Rebecca Fisher, Celine M. Rompre, and Mr. and Mrs. Joseph T. Nolan.

Findings Of Fact Frank Brennan Frank Joseph Brennan holds licenses as an ordinary life agent, ordinary life including health, health agent, and ordinary-variable annuity agent. Brennan is the owner and president of Frank J. Brennan, P.A., which sells life and health insurance products, including tax sheltered annuities of the National Western Life Insurance Company. The firm has several thousand tax sheltered annuity clients. Brennan had been the president and the director of Lancer Securities Corporation. On March 22, 1979, he was enjoined by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida for acting as an officer or director of any registered investment company. That injunction states that it did not constitute evidence against or an admission by Brennan, and that the injunction did not "establish or prove any of the acts alleged or asserted in any pleadings." Brennan was suspended from associating with any investment advisor for 120 days, and barred from associating thereafter with an investment advisor other than as a supervised employee in an order entered by the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 26, 1979. Brennan was barred from associating with any member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the capacity of a principal in an order entered by that association on October 15, 1980. Brennan was barred by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 1980 from associating with any member in the capacity of a principal and fined $1,000. In May 1983, United Equitable Insurance Company terminated Brennan as an agent based on an adverse Equifax report. That report was not placed in evidence. (The foregoing findings 3 through 7 are based upon the Department of Insurance's Second Request for Admissions and Fifth Request for Official Recognition.) The Relationship Of Gregory Langsett And Betty Jones To The Frank J. Brennan, P.A. Frank J. Brennan, P.A., has contracts with a number of licensed insurance agents, including Gregory Langsett and Betty Jones. Langsett has a producer agreement with National Western Life Insurance Company which describes him as an independent contractor, and an agent's agreement with the Brennan firm. Under the agent's agreement Langsett has with the Brennan professional association dated December 4, 1981, Langsett is deemed an independent contractor and nothing in this agreement shall be construed to create the relationship of employer and employee. You are free to exercise your own judgement as to the persons from whom you solicit applications and the time and place of such solicitation. (Petitioner's Exhibit 28, Paragraph 1.) Brennan had been involved in training of Langsett and Jones when they first were associated with the firm. Agents such as Langsett and Jones are not listed on the employer's quarterly wage report made by the Frank J. Brennan, P.A. to the State of Florida Division of Unemployment Compensation. Agents such as Langsett and Jones pay their own estimated income tax withholding and their own social security taxes. The Brennan firm does provide agents with business cards (although Jones had her own cards printed). It also provides sales kits, telephone answering, postal services, makes available space for meeting with clients at the firm office and provides accounting services incident to the payment of commissions on business submitted to carriers through the firm, all without charge to the agents. Educational meetings are held on Fridays, which the agents are encouraged, but not required, to attend which discuss the various insurance products available through insurance companies the Brennan firm is associated with. Agents benefit from advertising done by the Brennan firm. Brennan occasionally provides leads to agents. For example, January 1986 Brennan provided to Betty Jones and her husband (also a licensed insurance agent) a list of approximately 100 names of employees of the Boca Raton Academy so that they could be solicited for purchase of tax sheltered annuities, and an arrangement was worked out under which Brennan and the Joneses would divide commissions from any such sales. There is no evidence that Brennan controlled the time, place or manner of these solicitations, or of any other solicitations for the purchase of insurance products. Langsett and Jones were not subject to the direct supervision and control of Brennan in their activities of soliciting insurance clients. They are not employees of the Professional Association -- they are independent contractors. This arrangement of appointing soliciting agents who are independent contractors is used by other sellers of tax sheltered annuities, and is not unique to the Brennan firm. (Tr. 496, 579). Brennan does have the authority, based on his contracts with insurance carriers, to appoint licensed agents as agents of insurance carriers. Rebecca Fisher's Dealings With Frank J. Brennan, P.A. and Frank Brennan Rebecca Fisher is an employee of the Dade County School Board. She contacted Langsett concerning tax sheltered annuities offered by the National Western Life Insurance Company, after learning of Langsett from another employee. Under Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, employees of school boards may have a portion of their wages paid into a tax sheltered annuity. They pay no income tax on the amounts deposited in the annuity through payroll deduction and the interest paid on the amounts deposited is not taxed when earned. Such annuities are long term savings plans designed to supplement the participant's retirement income. Ms. Fisher already had a tax sheltered annuity with Northern Life Insurance Company which had a face value of over $90,000. She had bought it through an insurance agent, Mr. Paul Indianer, with whom she had dealt over a number of years. Langsett met with Mrs. Fisher at her home for about 15 to 20 minutes on a Saturday in June 1985. Mrs. Fisher was not able to spend much time with Mr. Langsett that day because she had to go to a funeral at about noon. Thereafter, Mrs. Fisher attempted to call Langsett at the Brennan insurance offices. She called after 5:00 p.m. and Langsett was not there. Respondent Brennan answered the phone call. They discussed the possibility of opening a tax sheltered annuity account through National Western by rolling over into a new account money she had in her current tax sheltered annuity. Mrs. Fisher knew if the money were rolled over she would incur a surrender charge. She also discussed with Brennan whether it would be possible to borrow money from a new National Western tax sheltered annuity for home improvements. She was told money borrowed from a National Western annuity could be used for home improvements, and taxes would not have to be paid on the money borrowed from the annuity until her death. Her current annuity did not have a provision that permitted borrowing. At the hearing the provision permitting borrowing was referred to as the TEFRA provision -- so known , because it had its genesis in a portion of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). (Tr. 45, 46, 80) Reviewing the totality of Mrs. Fisher's testimony, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that Mrs. Fisher is able to recall with clarity the conversation which she had with Mr. Brennan. For example, the Hearing Officer does not accept the testimony that Respondent or Langsett told Fisher that National Western would pay 20 percent interest the first year and 18 percent the second year on its annuities. Those figures represented the surrender charges on the Northern Life tax sheltered annuity she already had. Neither did Brennan tell Fisher that she would get $75,000 of free life insurance in connection with a new tax sheltered annuity. One of the possibilities Brennan mentioned to Fisher was a more involved transaction in which her money would be rolled over into a new tax sheltered annuity, and a $50,000 loan would be taken against that new annuity. The $50,000 might be used to purchase a single premium life insurance policy. Interest paid on the amount placed in that policy would accumulate without any income tax being owed on the interest as it was paid. National Western Life Insurance Company would provide $75,000 of life insurance in connection with such a policy, over and above its $50,000 face amount, for a $155,000 total life insurance benefit. The single premium life insurance policy does not make a specific charge for the $75,000 additional death benefit. There is, of course, a charge for this insurance in that the interest rate paid on the $50,000 deposited in the single premium life insurance policy is reduced by the mortality charge on the $75,000 additional death benefit. Mrs. Fisher confused these two different insurance products (the tax sheltered annuity and the single premium life insurance policy), and thought that the life insurance was part of the tax sheltered annuity, which is not what Brennan discussed. Mrs. Fisher's notes of her conversation indicate that there would be a rollover penalty assessed against the face amount of her Northern Life tax sheltered annuity if she moved it to a National Western tax sheltered annuity. She had incurred penalties when she had moved money from her first annuity with Franklin Life to Standard Life the second annuity from Standard Life to Northern Life, both at the suggestion of her insurance advisor/agent, Mr. Indianer. (Tr. 57). Those notes also appear to indicate that Brennan referred to her current Northern Life tax sheltered annuity as "antiquated," and described the method by which payments are made under the annuity as "suicide" from an income tax point-of-view. In view of the complexity of these insurance matters, and Mrs. Fisher's misunderstanding of what Brennan had said on other significant portions of the conversation, the Hearing Officer is not satisfied that the evidence is clear and convincing that Brennan used those terms to describe Mrs. Fisher's current insurance products in his conversation with Mrs. Fisher. Similarly, the testimony that Brennan referred to her old Franklin Life and Standard Life annuities (which Indianer had already persuaded her to replace) as "garbage" is not accepted. Under the Internal Revenue Code, if money were borrowed from the annuity for the purpose of home improvements, no tax would be due on the amount borrowed until the annuitant's death, or the surrender of the annuity for cash or annuitization. (Tr. 624, 781). Borrowings for other purposes must be paid back in five years or they are treated as a distribution from the shelter, and require that income tax be paid on that distribution. Neither the code nor case law requires a loan to be repaid when the annuitant reaches a certain age. In short, contrary to the allegations of Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint, the evidence is not convincing that Brennan made improper or defamatory remarks about Fisher's prior annuities or existing annuity, that he misrepresented the actual tax implications of the plans or the interest rate offered by the plans, or falsely represented that Fisher would receive $75,000 of free life insurance with a National Western annuity contract. Celine Rompre's Dealings With Betty J. Jones Betty J. Jones is an insurance agent licensed by the State of Florida. She also worked as an independent contractor through the Frank J. Brennan, P.A., selling tax sheltered annuity products of the National Western Life Insurance Company. Unlike Langsett there is no evidence that she has a written contract with the Brennan firm, but she does have a producer agreement with National Western Life Insurance Company. On or about July 23, 1985, Ms. Jones solicited Celine M. Rompre for the purpose of selling her a National Western Life Insurance Company Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity. Rompre was an employee of the Palm Beach County School Board who already had a Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity payroll deduction handled through Voyager Life Insurance Company; the insurance agency which had sold that annuity to her was owned by Edward Parmele. Respondent Brennan personally had nothing to do with the solicitation which Betty J. Jones made of Celine Rompre. Betty J. Jones was not acting under the direct supervision and control of Frank J. Brennan in that transaction. Betty Jones met with Celine Rompre and discussed the National Western tax sheltered annuity. Mrs. Rompre's husband also works and the Rompres do not need Mrs. Rompre's salary for living expenses. At the time she spoke with Betty Jones, Mrs. Rompre's annual salary was $5,500. She believed that it would increase to $7,200 at the beginning of the next school year, which did happen. At the time Mrs. Rompre was putting $1,040 into her Voyager Insurance Company tax sheltered annuity each year. Betty Jones discussed with Mrs. Rompre increasing her tax sheltered annuity contribution to approximately $4,000 per year. Jones told her that the maximum amount she could contribute would have to be separately calculated for each year. (Tr. 752). Mrs. Rompre was interested in this because Mrs. Rompre's daughter was then in the 8th grade, and it would be possible to borrow against that money to help with her daughter's education. Mrs. Rompre knew she would incur a substantial surrender charge on her current annuity if she switched to National Western. She signed papers prepared by Jones to accomplish the transfer of her annuity to National Western. Rompre was not eligible to increase her Section 403(b) annuity contribution immediately because she had changed her contribution once that year and only one change in the payroll deduction can be made annually. (Tr. 751). When the paperwork went to the School Board to change the annuity from the Voyager annuity to the National Western annuity, Mrs. Rompre was contacted by Mr. Parmele about her Voyager annuity. He stated that Mrs. Rompre could not put $4,000 per year into a Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity. This influenced Mrs. Rompre to cancel the transfer to National Western. In fact, Mrs. Rompre was in a situation where she qualified to put as much as $5,051 into a tax sheltered annuity (this amount is known as the maximum exclusion allowance) over the next year under a catch-up provision of the Internal Revenue Code because she had not been contributing to an annuity for all eight years she had been employed by the Palm Beach County School Board. (Tr. 780). There is no evidence that Ms. Rompre was contributing to any other qualified retirement plans that would have affected her maximum exclusion allowance. Betty Jones did not misrepresent to Celine Rompre the amount of her maximum exclusion allowance, the terms of the surrender charges for the Voyager life insurance policy or the National Western life insurance policy, or improperly affixed the signature of Celine Rompre to a letter to the Voyager Life Insurance Company requesting cancellation of her existing account. Dealings Of Frank J. Brennan With The Nolans In about March of 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Nolan went to Brennan for help preparing their tax return and for financial planning. Mr. Brennan had been highly recommended to them. Mr. Nolan is a loss prevention manager for Radio Shack, and Mrs. Nolan is employed by the School Board of Broward County. Mr. Nolan had recently received an inheritance of about $30,000 and was looking for a way to invest it. The Nolans emphasized that the investment vehicle be liquid so they could access the money if they needed it. They were concerned that they might need it for the care of their parents. When Mr. Nolan came to Brennan, he had whole life insurance policies with Prudential and Metropolitan Life which had some cash value. Brennan suggested those policies be cancelled so that the cash value could be invested, and this was done. Mrs. Nolan's Section 403(b) Tax Sheltered Annuity When the Nolans came to Brennan, Mrs. Nolan did not have a Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity. Brennan suggested that she contribute to such an annuity program as a means of saving on income taxes. He also told them they could borrow against those funds, but this was of no interest to the Nolans. Mrs. Nolan purchased a tax sheltered annuity with Great American Life Insurance Company which currently paid 13.75 percent interest. One of the documents which is filled out to begin the payroll deduction with the Broward County School Board for Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuities is an amendment to the annuitant's employment contract to cause part of the salary to be paid directly into the annuity. On that form there are disclosures, including whether there is a sales charge, administration fee, or transfer fee, as well as whether there is a surrender charge. The amendment which she executed does not show any surrender charge in connection with the Great American Life Insurance Company Section 403(b) annuity she purchased. Later the Nolans received another copy of the amendment which had the surrender charge portion filled in. It stated there would be a surrender charge of one-fifth of the first year's deposits only, which is waived if all proceeds are withdrawn over 36 months or longer. When Mr. Nolan received this he immediately called Mr. Brennan to ask about the surrender charge. Brennan told him that the annuity document itself explained the surrender charge and it should have been on the amendment to the employment contract as well. Brennan negligently failed to explain the surrender charge to the Nolans when the annuity was first taken out. After receiving the altered amendment to employment contract, Mrs. Nolan instructed the School Board to stop the annuity deductions as of December She had contributed $7,234 to the annuity at that time. The Nolans then asked to cancel the annuity because they had not been made aware of the surrender charge. Mr. Brennan responded by stating that in order to get the refund, they would have to sign a release at the request of the insurance company, but the Nolans refused to sign any release. They prepared a short letter to the insurance company seeking the recision of the policy. Brennan also wrote to the company seeking the refund. The Nolans did receive their money back. In connection with the rescission, the Nolans demanded and received from Brennan assurances that if the amount deposited in the annuity were not received by March 3, 1986, that Brennan would pay 10 percent interest per year on the proceeds until the Nolans received the proceeds. The Nolans received the amount before the agreed date when Brennan would begin to pay interest. The amount they received was only the principal paid in, however, and did not include any interest for the period the money had been held by Great American Life Insurance Company. Repayment of the $7,234 rendered these funds subject to current income taxes, because that income had not been subject to tax when placed in the annuity. The Nolans' Other Insurance Purchases From Brennan When the Great American Section 403(b) annuity was purchased, the Nolans also purchased other insurance products. These included two $2,000 individual retirement accounts (IRAs) for Mr. and Mrs. Nolan with National Western in the form of annuity policies, a Kemper Life Insurance policy on Mr. Nolan with a face value of $100,000 to replace the existing policies he had cancelled, and a $30,000 single premium endowment policy on Mrs. Nolan from National Western Life Insurance Company, which included a life insurance benefit so that the face amount of the policy was $200,602. These purchases saved the Nolans about $3,000 in income taxes. The Nolan's had had IRA accounts at savings and loan institutions before they came to Brennan, which they would roll over when the instruments in which the money was deposited matured. Brennan explained that these National Western annuities were different than the accounts they had. These annuities were cancelled because the Nolans became dissatisfied with Brennan due to the non-disclosure of the surrender charge on the Section 403(b) annuity with Great American Life Insurance Company. Mr. Brennan arranged for those to be cancelled without penalty at the request of the Nolans. They received the principal paid in plus interest. After the cancellation of the prior whole life policies at Brennan's suggestion, see Finding of Fact 37, above, Mr. Nolan purchased a Kemper Life Insurance term life insurance policy. At first he considered rescinding it along with the IRAs, also due to dissatisfaction with Brennan because of the failure to disclose the surrender charge on the Section 403(b) annuity. Ultimately he kept the Kemper policy, which was a better policy than the ones that had been cancelled. The $30,000 inheritance Mr. Nolan received was used to purchase a $30,000 single premium life endowment policy on Mrs. Nolan, which then paid 11.12 percent interest on the amount deposited and permitted borrowing from the policy at 7.4 percent. The policy was placed on Mrs. Nolan's life because she was the better underwriting risk. The interest which accrued on that policy was not subject to current federal income taxation, so the purchase was consistent with the Nolan's goal of achieving a high yield on the money with minimum taxation. That $30,000 premium purchased over $200,000 worth of life insurance on Mrs. Nolan, which Brennan described as "a freebie" in connection with the tax sheltered investment of the $30,000. This policy was cancelled under a policy provision which gave the right to cancel the policy during the first year, in part due to dissatisfaction with Brennan over the non-disclosure of the surrender charge on the Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity. Nolan was also dissatisfied with the endowment policy after he received it because (1) the interest guaranteed to be paid on the $30,000 was only 4 percent although he understood that the actual interest to be paid would fluctuate with economic conditions and be competitive and (2) to access the $30,000 he could not withdraw money, but had to borrow from the policy. Although a loan could be processed quickly, Mr. Nolan did not like the idea of having to borrow his own money. The record is not clear whether the Nolans did or did not receive interest on the $30,000 for the time it was on deposit with National Western Life Insurance Company before the cancellation. The policy itself provides that on cancellation the insured "will be refunded the greater of the premium you paid or the cash value at that time." (Respondent's Exhibit 25) Because Mrs. Nolan signed an application naming Mr. Nolan and beneficiary for the insurance purchased with the $30,000, because she had a physical examination to obtain the policy, and because the check to purchase it was made out to National Western Life Insurance, Mr. Nolan's testimony that he did not understand that the "investment" he was making with his $30,000 involved the purchase of an insurance policy is not accepted. Brennan did sell the $30,000 policy to the Nolans in part on the basis that they would receive approximately $200,000 in free life insurance. The Nolans were more interested in a tax shelter for the $30,000 that would pay high interest, not in the insurance benefit. In summary, Brennan failed to explain the surrender charge associated with the Great American Life Insurance Company Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity to the Nolans when it was purchased. Brennan made no misrepresentations with respect to the sale of the two annuities from National Western Life Insurance which were to be used as the Nolans' individual retirement accounts. There were no misrepresentations made to Mr. Nolan with respect to the purchase of his Kemper Life Insurance policy, which he still has. Brennan told the Nolans that they would receive free life insurance associated with the deposit of $30,000 in the endowment policy on Mrs. Nolan's life, which had been purchased due to the tax free accumulation of interest on the $30,000 deposited.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Counts I and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. That on Count III, for offering free life insurance as an inducement for the deposit of $30,000 in the single premium endowment policy, Brennan be FINED $2,500.00 and his license SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0707 The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985), on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. See Rule 28-5.405(3), Florida Administrative Code. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Before ruling on the individual proposals made by the Petitioner, it is appropriate to make some general comments. The proposals submitted by the Petitioner are exceptionally detailed, indeed unnecessarily so. Many are rejected as unnecessary or cumulative to the facts found in the Recommended Order. Others are irrelevant because they address issues not properly raised by the allegations of the First Amended Administrative Complaint. The testimony of the principal witnesses on counts one and two, Rebecca Fisher and Celine Rompre, was certainly sincere but generally unpersuasive. The testimony of the other expert witnesses who make their livings by selling tax sheltered annuities was also not convincing because their view of Mr. Brennan and his activities is so colored by their competition. Mr. Parmele's testimony left an abiding impression of hostility to Brennan for trying to persuade clients of Parmele to switch their annuities to companies represented by Brennan, and Parmele's testimony is discounted based upon his hostility. Mr. Indianer was not as hostile, but his financial interest in removing Brennan as a competitor also causes substantial discounting of his testimony. The opinions of Robert Storms are accorded little weight because he does not regard himself as an expert in tax sheltered annuities. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 1. Covered in Findings of Fact 3-6. Covered in Finding of Fact 7. To the extent relevant, covered in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected because it is not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact. Covered in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent relevant, covered in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact. Rejected as unsupported by the transcript citation given. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 10. Rejected as irrelevant. Although true, rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary, and unsupported by the transcript citation given. Covered in Finding of Fact 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as unsupported by transcript citation given which only reflects a division of commissions between the Jones' and Brennan with respect to sales to employees of the Boca Raton Academy. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and not supported by the exhibit citation given. PX 25 authorizes Langsett to procure applications; whether this is a license as a "writing agent" is unclear. Rejected as a statement of law. Rejected because Betty Jones had no written contract with the Brennan firm. Langsett's relationships are covered in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected because Jones had no written contract with the Brennan firm. With respect to Langsett's contract with the firm, rejected as irrelevant. To the extent relevant, covered in Finding of Fact 8. Jones had no written contract with the firm. Rejected because Langsett and Jones testified that being independent contractors included that they pay their own expenses, not meant that they pay their own expenses. Rejected as irrelevant. Covered in Finding of Fact 14. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as inconsistent with the transcript citations given. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent that the information was provided in the form of sales kits, covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as subordinate and cumulative to Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary and inconsistent with the transcript citation given. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact, also irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary Rejected as unnecessary. The citation given supports only the statement made as to Betty Jones. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. - Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact, also unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact, also unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a statement of law, not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 23. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 23. Rejected as subordinate to Finding of Fact 23. Rejected as subordinate to Finding of Fact 23. Rejected as inconsistent with Finding of Fact 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 33. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 33. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected for the reasons stated for the rejection of proposed finding of fact 32. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative to Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Further, Mr. Storm's testimony is not persuasive on the point. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the form, PX 9, is a creation of a committee which is advisory to the risk manager of the School Board of Broward County and has no legal status. Rejected because the form, PX 9, is a creation of a committee which is advisory to the risk manager of the School Board of Broward County and has no legal status. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Mr. Storm's testimony as to what would be misleading is unpersuasive. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Although true, rejected as unnecessary. The power to appoint sub-agents who become producers for insurance carriers does not mean that Brennan exercised direct supervision and control over such persons, or over Langsett and Jones in the situations at issue in this matter. Although true, rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 14. Covered in Findings of Fact 8 and 25. Covered in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant. Covered in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a recitation of testimony7 not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 9. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the finding is taken out of context. Agents such as Langsett submit business through the Brennan firm and receive their commission through the accounting system at the Brennan firm. When the files are submitted to the carriers, this does not imply that the firm has the right not to pay Langsett, it is the medium through which his payments are processed. See Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as a misstatement of the testimony. That testimony occurred because Langsett was asked about commissions payable in a situation he never had experienced. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative to Finding of Fact 12 concerning education. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Findings of Fact 12 and 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative to Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally covered in Findings of Fact 15 and 16. As pointed out at the beginning of these rulings, Mrs. Fisher's version of her dealings with Langsett and Brennan were not found persuasive. For example, only one meeting occurred between Fisher and Langsett, not two. Rejected as irrelevant to the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint and unnecessary. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected because I do not accept Mrs. Fisher's version of the events, rendering Mr. Indianer's comments on that version irrelevant and unnecessary. See also the general comment about Indianer at the beginning of this section. The issue of free life insurance is covered in Finding of Fact 20. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not findings of fact. Covered in Findings of Fact 27, 29, 30 and 31. Many of the proposed findings are rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Findings of Fact 29, 30 and 31. The proposal that Jones told Rompre she could deposit $4,000 per year for five years is rejected and the contrary testimony of Ms. Jones, incorporated in Finding of Fact 31, has been accepted. Rejected because the testimony of Mr. Storms is not found persuasive. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not findings of fact. Many of the proposals are unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally rejected because Mr. Parmele's testimony is not found persuasive. Further, many of the proposals aggregated in the finding are unnecessary. That Jones told Rompre she could deposit $4,000 a year for five years has been rejected. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Covered in Finding of Fact 1. To the extent relevant, covered in Finding of Fact 2. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 8. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 8. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 25. The proposal that Jones had a written agent's agreement with the Brennan firm is rejected because no such document was offered in evidence. To the extent necessary, covered in Findings of Fact 9 and 12. Rejected as cumulative to Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary but discussed in the introduction to the rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact as relates to the credibility of Indianer and Parmele. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary but discussed in the introduction to the rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Covered in Findings of Fact 8 and 14. Covered in Findings of Fact 15 and 16. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary because Indianer's testimony has not been accepted. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Findings of Fact 14 and 25. Covered in Findings of Fact 26, 27 and 31. Covered in Finding of Fact 29. Covered in Finding of Fact 31. Covered in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as cumulative to Findings of Fact 30 and 31. Rejected as unnecessary, and as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 32. Rejected because the testimony of Mr. Parmele has not been accepted for the reasons. stated in the introduction to the rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. See also Finding of Fact 33. Generally rejected as a recitation of testimony. Rejected as unnecessary because it is based on income of $7,200 which was not Mrs. Rompre's income at the time of her meeting with Betty Jones. Accepted in Finding of Fact 33. To the extent not cumulative, covered in Finding of Fact 31. Covered in Findings of Fact 35 and 38. Covered in Finding of Fact 43. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 43. Covered in Findings of Fact 39, 44 and 46. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and because the problem was not only that the form did not contain the surrender charge, but that Brennan had not explained the surrender charge to the Nolans when the Great American Section 403(b) tax sheltered annuity was first purchased. Generally rejected as unnecessary. The surrender value is explained in the altered amendment to the employment contract. See Finding of Fact 39. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 41. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 44. Covered in Finding of Fact 44. Covered in Finding of Fact 46 and 47. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 46. Covered in Finding of Fact 46. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 46. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 23. Rejected as unnecessary and because the testimony of Mr. Indianer has not been found persuasive. Rejected because the testimony of Mr. Parmele has not been accepted. Covered in Finding of Fact 23. Sentences 1 and 2, covered in Finding of Fact 14. The remainder, rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Findings of Fact 10 and 11. Generally covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Findings of Fact 8 and 11. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James F. Falco, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Room 413-B, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Russell L. Forkey, Esquire Pamela M. Burdick, Esquire 400 Southeast 12th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 11.12120.57120.68626.611626.681626.795626.9521626.9541
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs AMERICAN FAMILY BENEFITS GROUP, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; ROY L. BEACH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR OR EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT OF AMERICAN FAMILY BENEFITS GROUP, INC.; ELLIS LEROY PRESTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR,, 94-001579 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Mar. 22, 1994 Number: 94-001579 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 1995

The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Amended Notice And Order To Show Cause and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance related activities in Florida. Petitioner is the agency responsible for regulating any licensed or unlicensed person or entity engaged in unfair insurance trade practices within the meaning of Section 626.951, Florida Statutes. 1/ Respondent, Leroy Preston, is licensed to sell life and health insurance in Florida. The other Respondents are not licensed to transact insurance in Florida and are not otherwise licensed by Petitioner pursuant to Chapters 624 through 632, 634, 635, 637, 638, 641, 648, and 651 (the "Florida Insurance Code"). Respondent, American Family Benefits Group, Incorporated ("AFBG, Inc.") is a Florida corporation wholly owned by the four individual Respondents. Respondent, Roy L. Beach, is an officer and director of AFBG, Inc., and is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Respondents, Preston, Kenneth King, and Robert King, are officers and directors of AFBG, Inc. The individual Respondents comprise American Family Benefits Group ("AFBG") and the board of directors for AFBG, Inc. (the "Board"). Background Respondents designed a marketing program for the sale of memberships in AFBG, Inc. Promotional materials describing the benefits of membership were reviewed and approved by each member of the Board and mailed to thousands of prospective customers in 50 states. Memberships were offered to individuals at a price of $99 per membership. The benefits of membership included: life insurance up to $350,000 at no cost to members; a certificate of deposit of $5,000; a major bank credit card, regardless of credit history, secured by the certificate of deposit; non- qualifying mortgage loans; non-qualifying automobile leases; discounted long distance service; and discounted catalog prices. Respondents received approximately 140,000 applications for membership. Approximately 600 applications included payment of the $99 membership fee. Petitioner issued a Notice And Order To Show Cause on February 10, 1994. The marketing program for the sale of memberships in AFBG, Inc. was terminated by Respondents. Respondents returned the membership fee paid by approximately 300 applicants. On May 6, 1994, Petitioner issued an Amended Notice And Order To Show Cause ("Amended Notice"). The Amended Notice charges that Respondents violated Sections 626.9521, 626.9541(1)(a), (b), (h), (l), and (n). The Amended Notice charges that Respondents violated Section 626.9541(1)(a) by making misrepresentations for the purpose of effecting an assignment or pledge of insurance policies to secure a loan. Respondents allegedly violated Section 626.9541(1)(b) by representing that insurance policies obtained on the life of members would be used to secure a loan that would fund membership benefits. Respondents allegedly violated Section 626.9541(1)(h) by offering the payment of money to induce customers to enter into an insurance contract. The Amended Notice charges that Respondents violated Section 626.9541(1)(l) by inducing customers to pledge, assign, borrow on insurance policies, convert insurance policies, or to take out an insurance policy with another insurer ("twisting"). Finally, the Amended Notice charges that Respondents violated Section 626.9541(1)(n) by offering free insurance as an inducement for the purchase or sale or services directly or indirectly connected with real or personal property. Pledge Or Assignment To Effect A Loan: Section 626.9541(1)(a) Respondents knowingly issued and circulated a statement or sales presentation (the "promotional materials") that was a misrepresentation. The misrepresentation was made for the purposes of: effecting a pledge or assignment of an insurance policy; and effecting a loan against an insurance policy. Payment of the $99 membership fee did not entitle a new member to any of the benefits of membership. A new member was not required to elect any membership benefit, including the insurance benefits. Such a member could simply pay Respondents $99 and choose to receive none of the benefits of membership. A new member who wished to elect any of the benefits of membership was in substantially the same position as a new member who chose to receive no benefits. A new member who desired any one of the benefits of membership was first required to elect the insurance benefits. Insurance benefits entitled a new member to five universal life insurance policies on the life of the new member. Each policy was to be issued for $70,000. 2/ No life insurance policies were available unless a new member applied for and obtained all five policies and assigned four of the five policies to a bank. The bank must then make a loan in an amount and terms that were sufficient to fund all of the benefits of membership. 3/ A loan in the gross amount of $84,000 was needed to fund the benefits of membership. The net loan proceeds were to be used to purchase an annuity, a certificate of deposit to secure the credit card for the new member, pay Respondents a profit of $5,000, pay commissions and referral fees to independent parties up to $3,000, pay administrative costs, and fund the other benefits of membership. 4/ Respondents' pro forma projections of economic feasibility for the membership program showed an annual interest rate of six per cent, an amortization period of 20 years, and level periodic payments of principal and interest. Respondents' pro formal projections were based, in relevant part, on three assumptions. First, the insurance policies would be used as part of the collateral securing the loan needed to fund the benefits of membership. Second, Respondents were to be personally liable for each loan. Third, an annuity would secure the loan, pay the debt service on the loan, and pay the premiums for the insurance policies assigned to the lender. The insurance policies that new members were required to assign to the lender to secure the purported loan had no loan value. Respondents represented to prospective members that the life insurance policies were universal life policies. However, the policies were "skeleton" universal life policies that had de minimis cash value and no loan value. The loan to value ratio of any loan secured by the insurance policies would necessarily exceed 100 percent. Respondents' personal liability for loans to new members lacked economic substance. Capital contributions to AFBG, Inc. and Respondents' individual assets were inadequate to secure individual loans of $84,000 to 140,000 members. The annuity needed to pay the debt service on the loan and the insurance premiums on the policies securing the loan was not economically feasible. 5/ The membership fee of $99 was inadequate to pay the first year insurance premium on one $70,000 policy, much less the other four policies required to fund any of the benefits of membership. The economic reality of the membership program required a new member to pay Respondents $99 and to apply for and obtain five insurance policies from independent insurance agents. There was little or no probability of receiving any of the benefits of membership because the loan needed to fund those benefits had little or no economic reality. Thus, the membership program required a new member to pay $99 to Respondents for no benefits of membership. If $99 had been paid by all 140,000 applicants, Respondents would have received $13,860,000 in return for illusory promises of membership benefits. Insurance Policies To Secure Loan: Section 626.9541(1)(b) Respondents knowingly published, circulated, disseminated, and placed before the public an untrue statement concerning the business of insurance. Respondents represented that the universal life insurance policies obtained by individual members would be used as collateral to secure the loan needed to fund their insurance benefits. Respondents knew that the insurance policies were skeleton policies with little or no cash value and no loan value. The untrue statements issued by Respondents concerned the business of insurance. Respondents used economic incentives to induce prospective members to obtain life insurance policies. Without life insurance policies, new members were not entitled to any of the other benefits of membership including, a certificate of deposit, a credit card, non-qualifying mortgages, and non- qualifying car leases. The purchase and assignment of life insurance policies was an integral part of the business conducted by Respondents. The economic incentives used by Respondents were designed to effectuate a contract of insurance. Respondents effectuated approximately five contracts of insurance. The subsequent assignment of insurance policies to a lender also constituted the business of insurance. Those assignments constituted the transaction of matters subsequent to the insurance contract and arising out of the insurance contract. Unlawful Rebates: Section 626.9541(1)(h) 27. Respondents knowingly offered an indirect rebate of an insurance premium to prospective members as an inducement to enter into an insurance contract. Respondents' offer to pay the insurance premiums on members' insurance policies was a valuable consideration intended to induce new members to enter into insurance contracts. Twisting: Section 626.9541(1)(l) 28. Respondents knowingly made misleading representations with respect to insurance policies for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce new members to pledge, assign, borrow on, or convert an insurance policy or to take out a policy of insurance in another insurer. Respondents representations were misleading. 29. Respondents' representations led prospective members to believe that a pledge, assignment, or conversion of their insurance policies could be used to secure a loan needed to fund other membership benefits. The representation that a loan could be obtained by new members upon assignment of their insurance policies had no economic reality. Free Insurance: Section 626.9541(1)(n) Respondents offered to provide free insurance as an inducement for new members to purchase real or personal property. The benefits of membership included non-qualifying mortgages in real property, non-qualifying car leases, and non-qualifying bank credit cards. None of those benefits were available to new members unless they obtained life insurance policies and assigned those policies to a lender. The insurance policies were free to new members. There was no cost to new members. The insurance premiums were to be paid out of the annuity to be purchased from the net loan proceeds.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of all of the charges in the Amended Notice and ordering Respondents to permanently cease and desist the marketing of memberships in AFBG, Inc. It is further recommended that a fine of $4,000 should be imposed on each of the Respondents, not to exceed the aggregate amount of $20,000, and that the license of Respondent, Leroy Preston, should be suspended for 30 days. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1995.

Florida Laws (4) 624.10626.951626.9521626.9541
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs FREDERICK BRUCE MAHLE, 89-006040 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Nov. 02, 1989 Number: 89-006040 Latest Update: Sep. 12, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing insurance agents of all types, regulating licensure status, and enforcing the practice standards of licensed agents within the powers granted by the Legislature in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the disciplinary action, Respondent Mahle was licensed as an insurance agent in the following areas: Life and Health Insurance and Health Insurance. During the last quarter of the year 1988, New Concept Insurance, Inc. mailed brochures to residents of Naples, Florida, which stated that representatives of the company were willing to provide information about long- term care insurance, including nursing facility benefits, to interested parties. Those who wanted to learn more about the insurance were asked to return their name, address and telephone number to the company on an enclosed card. Eleanor Drown responded to the advertisement, and an appointment was arranged for Thomas DiBello and Respondent Mahle to meet with her regarding the insurance program. On November 10, 1988, Thomas DiBello and Respondent Mahle met with Ms. Drown and discussed the benefits of a long-term care policy with a nursing facility daily benefit of one hundred dollars ($100.00). After the discussion, Ms. Drown completed an application for the insurance and gave it to Respondent Mahle, along with a check for five thousand one hundred and eighty-three dollars and forty-nine cents ($5,183.49). During the insurance transaction on November 10, 1988, Ms. Drown was given a receipt which states: This receipt is given and accepted with the express understanding that the insurance you applied for will not be in force until the policy is issued and the first premium is paid in full. If your application cannot be approved, we will promptly refund your money. Application is made to the company checked (/) on this receipt. On another area of the receipt, it is clearly written, as follows: If Acknowledgement of Application does not reach you within 20 days, write to: Mutual Protective Insurance Company, 151 South 75th Street, Omaha, Nebraska 68124. The Respondent Mahle did not forward the application and the check completed by Ms. Drown to Mutual Protective Insurance Company. The check issued by Ms. Drown to Mutual Protective Insurance Company was deposited into the account of New Concept Insurance, Inc. A cashier's check for the same amount of money was issued by New Concept Insurance, Inc. to Ms. Drown on March 7, 1989. The letter from New Concept that was mailed with the check represented that the check was the refund of the money paid to Mutual Protective Insurance Company by Ms. Drown. Mitigation An application for long-term care insurance from a different insurance company was sent to Ms. Drown by Respondent Mahle on March 2, 1989. Although this course of conduct was not directly responsive to the duties owed by the Respondent to Mutual Protective Insurance Company or his customer, Ms. Drown, it does demonstrate a concern about the insurance needs requested by the customer. This conduct also reveals that there was no intention to convert the funds received to the Respondent's own use, and it explains some of the delay in the return of the premium funds to the customer. The Respondent has been an insurance agent for twenty years. This was the only complaint against the Respondent the Hearing Officer was made aware of during the proceedings. The allegations in the Complaint involve a single insurance transaction.

Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of one violation of Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes, and one violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, during a single insurance transaction. That the Respondent pay an administrative penalty of $500.00 for the two violations of the Insurance Code within thirty days of the imposition of the penalty. That the Respondent be placed upon six month's probation. During this probation period, he should file a report with the Department demonstrating the manner in which he intends to keep accurate business records which assure him, the insurance company, and the customer that he is continuously accounting for premium funds and promptly carrying out his fiduciary responsibilities. That the Respondent's requests for licensure dated October 10, 1989 and May 18, 1990, be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE No. 89-6040 The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Rejected. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #7. Accept that Ms. Drown's funds remained in the insurance agency's financial accounts for four months. Reject that the interest bearing ability of these funds is relevant in any manner to this case. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3 and #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. Rejected. This testimony was rejected by the hearing officer as self serving. It was not found to be credible. Rejected for the same reasons given immediately above. Accepted, but not particularly probative. Rejected. Contrary to the testimony of Ms. Drown which was believed by the hearing officer. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to the testimony of Ms. Drown which was believed by the hearing officer. Accept that an application for Penn Treaty Insurance was sent to Ms. Drown on this date. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to the testimony of Ms. Drown which was believed by the hearing officer. Rejected. Self serving. Not believed or found to be credible by the hearing officer. Accepted. See HO #9. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Christopher Anderson III, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark P. Smith, Esquire GOLDBERG, GOLDSTEIN & BUCKLEY, P.A. 1515 Broadway Post Office Box 2366 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2366 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68626.561626.611626.621626.681626.691
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JARED ALAN WEISSMAN, 17-003486PL (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 16, 2017 Number: 17-003486PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs NELSON SPEER BENZING, 94-000137 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 11, 1994 Number: 94-000137 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1994

The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in conduct proscribed by the Insurance Code as is particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed December 7, 1993.

Findings Of Fact During times material, Respondent, Nelson Speer Benzing, was licensed with Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, as a life insurance and as a life and health insurance agent. During times material, Respondent was an employee of U.S. Savings Trust Management (herein USSTM). During times material, Respondent was never appointed with Petitioner to represent Wisconsin National Life Insurance Company (herein Wisconsin). However, Respondent did attend a workshop sponsored by Wisconsin. At some time prior to March 5, 1992, Respondent met with George Cantonis, President of Mega Manufacturing, Inc. (herein Mega) in order to obtain Cantonis' permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. Cantonis granted Respondent permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. On March 5, 1992, Respondent made a sales presentation to Mega's employees. The purpose of said presentation was to enroll the employees of Mega in a "savings plan" offered by USSTM. The presentation lasted approximately 15- 30 minutes. Employees were told that the plan, as presented, incorporated an insurance savings plan which had a "liquid" component as well as a long term savings component. At no time during this sales presentation did Respondent explain to employees of Mega that he was a licensed life insurance agent. During the course of his presentation, Respondent described USSTM's product variously as an "insurance saving plan", as an "investment in insurance companies" and as a "retirement savings plan". At no time during the presentation did Respondent specifically state that he was selling life insurance. At the conclusion of the presentation, Respondent enrolled all interested employees in USSTM's plan. During the enrollment procedure, Respondent told the employees to complete portions of at least three documents which included a form entitled "Employee History", a Wisconsin's life insurance application, and an employee payroll deduction authorization. Cantonis enrolled through the above procedure and signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application. Subsequent to the group sales presentation, Respondent made a similar presentation to Tina Netherton, Mega's office manager, who was working in the office and answering the telephone. At the conclusion of the presentation to Netherton, she enrolled in the plan and also signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application pursuant to instructions from Respondent. Both Netherton and Cantonis believed that the "savings plan" consisted of both a short term "liquid cash element and a long term investment". Neither were aware that they had purchased life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis had, in their opinion, adequate life insurance at the time of Respondent's sales presentation, and would not have purchased additional life insurance if they had been told (by Respondent) that they were purchasing life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis executed beneficiary designations on their belief that such was needed so that disbursements, if any, could be made to their designee in the event of their death. Approximately three weeks after enrollment, Netherton and Cantonis received brochures from USSTM which acknowledged their enrollment and detailed the benefits of the "savings plan". The brochure advised that Netherton and Cantonis had enrolled in an insurance "savings plan" and failed to state that they had purchased life insurance. Cantonis and Netherton attempted to withdraw funds from the liquid portion of the plan and were unable to do so. Four to five months after their enrollment, Cantonis and Netherton received life insurance policies from Wisconsin. Pursuant to the insurance applications, Cantonis and Netherton were issued Wisconsin life insurance policy numbers L00566485 and L00566483, respectively. Cantonis and Netherton maintained their Wisconsin policies in order to realize some gain from their overall loss in dealing with Respondent and USSTM. At the time that Respondent made his presentation to Mega's employees and officials, he had never before made sales presentations in order to enroll employees in plans offered by USSTM. Respondent's general manager, Vincent Radcliff, was the agent of record of Wisconsin. The insurance application and policies issued to Cantonis and Netherton were signed by an agent other than Respondent. Respondent's supervisor, Vincent A. Radcliff, III, was disciplined by Petitioner and Respondent cooperated with the Petitioner in investigating the complaint allegations filed against his supervisor, Radcliff. Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner on November 15, 1989. Respondent has not been the subject of any prior disciplinary actions by Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's life and health insurance licenses for a period of three (3) months. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner order that Respondent engage in continuing education respecting the manner and means of soliciting on behalf of insurance companies, and to the extent that he completes the required courses within an acceptable time frame, that the suspension be suspended pending the outcome of Respondent's satisfactory completion of such continuing education courses. 1/ RECOMMENDED this 1st day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1994.

Florida Laws (11) 120.57120.68624.501626.112626.341626.611626.621626.641626.752626.9541626.99
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs ACCELERATED BENEFITS CORPORATION, 00-003073 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 27, 2000 Number: 00-003073 Latest Update: Dec. 13, 2001

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Respondent's license as a viatical settlement provider in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated June 29, 2000.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance (Department), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of viatical settlement providers and the regulation of the viatical settlement industry in this state. The Respondent, Accelerated Benefits Corporation (ABC), was licensed as a viatical settlement provider in Florida. Pursuant to an investigative subpoena issued by the Department, in November and December 1999, investigators of the Department examined the records of the Respondent, as well as other viatical settlement providers operating within the state, looking into the viatical settlement industry's practices in Florida. As a part of the investigation, Janice S. Davis, an examiner/analyst with the Department, copied records of the Respondent relating to at least six individual viatical settlement transactions in which the Respondent was involved. These files relate to Counts 5 through 7 and 9 through 11 of the Administrative complaint. Ms. Davis also obtained from the Respondent the information regarding the location of several other cases, the files for which had been confiscated by the Statewide Prosecutor as a part of an ongoing investigation into the viatical settlement industry, and subsequently obtained copies of those files from the office of the Statewide Prosecutor. Those files relate to Counts 1 through 4 and 8 of the Administrative Complaint. As outlined in Count Five of the Administrative Complaint, in May 1998, D.K. applied to The United States Life Insurance Company (US Life) for a $250,000 life insurance policy. As a part of the policy application, D.K. stated that he had not consulted with any physician or other practitioner within the five years prior to the application. On July 29, 1998, Life Benefit Services (LBS), a viatical settlement broker used by ABC, obtained a "Confidential Application Form" completed by D.K. which revealed that sometime in 1982, D.K. had been diagnosed as HIV positive. LBS prepared a "Policy Summary Sheet" regarding D.K.'s application on which it noted that D.K. had been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. LBS also had records from D.K.'s physician reflecting that D.K. had been under a doctor's care during the preceding five years. The policy was issued to D.K. on or about August 1, 1998. Notwithstanding the information it had on hand, LBS brokered the sale of the instant policy to ABC. On or about August 25, 1998, D.K. and the Respondent entered into a contract which called for the Respondent to purchase D.K.'s $250,000 life insurance policy for $25,000. At that point, the policy was still contestable. As a part of the transaction, the Respondent gave D.K. written instructions not to contact his insurance company until advised to do so by ABC. The Respondent also had D.K. sign an addendum to the purchase contract in which he agreed to not advise US Life that he had sold his policy and acknowledged his recognition that his life insurance policy was still contestable. D.K. was also asked and agreed to sign an undated change of ownership form for use by ABC at the expiration of the period of contestability. While the policy was still contestable, an employee of the Respondent, Jennifer Grinstead, paid the annual premium on the policy out of her personal checking account. This served to conceal the fact that D.K. had sold the policy to the Respondent. Ms. Grinstead was reimbursed for the premium payment by American Title Company of Orlando. American Title was the Respondent's trustee. The Respondent did not report any of the information it had regarding D.K.'s actual health history to US Life or the Department. A review of the documentation related to this transaction reflected that the Respondent purchased the policy rights from D.K. after it knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that D.K. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health to US Life, and nonetheless attempted to conceal those misrepresentation from US Life. With regard to Count Six, the evidence of record indicates that on May 4, 1997, W.E. applied for a $45,000 life insurance policy from Life USA Insurance Company (Life USA). On the application form he signed and submitted, W.E. specifically stated he had not received any medical or surgical advice or treatment within the preceding five years, had not been advised by a medical doctor that he had AIDS or ARC, and was not, at the time, taking any medication. Based on the representations made by W.E., the policy was issued on November 12, 1997. Notwithstanding the representations made by W.E. to Life USA, W.E. also advised United Viatical Settlements (UVS), the settlement broker used by the Respondent, on December 17, 1997, through a corollary application form, that he had been diagnosed with HIV "a few years ago," and several different other forms utilized by the Respondent reflect that the Respondent knew W.E. had AIDS or HIV, and was under a doctor's treatment for the condition during the preceding five years. Nonetheless, UVS brokered the sale of this policy to the Respondent. In late December 1997, at which time the policy was still contestable, the Respondent entered into a contract with W.E. for the purchase of the $45,000 policy for $4,914.25. As a part of the sales procedure, the Respondent issued to W.E. instructions not to contact his insurance company until instructed to do so by the Respondent's representative, and it also had W.E. sign an addendum to the purchase agreement in which W.E. acknowledged that the policy in issue was still contestable. W.E. was also asked to agree not to inform Life USA of the sale of the policy to the Respondent and to sign an undated change of ownership form for use by the Respondent to transfer ownership when the contestability period had expired. The arrangement between the Respondent and W.E. called for Jennifer Grinstead to pay the annual premium on the policy for W.E. from her personal account and to receive reimbursement for those payments from American Title Company, the Respondent's trustee. This arrangement served to conceal from Life USA the fact that W.E. had sold the policy to the Respondent. The Respondent did not report the fact that it had knowledge of W.E.'s medical condition to the Department. The evidence of record reflects that at the time of the purchase of W.E.'s policy, the Respondent knew or should have known that W.E. had made material misrepresentations regarding his medical state to Life USA on his application for life insurance from that company, and it thereafter took actions which served to conceal those material misrepresentations from the company. In the Case of Count Seven, on April 26, 1997, A.T. applied for a life insurance policy from Lincoln Benefit Life (Lincoln) in the amount of $48,000. On the application form, A.T. specifically stated that he had not been under medical observation or treatment within the preceding five years, and that he had not been diagnosed as having AIDS or ARC, or tested positively for HIV. The policy was issued by the company on or about June 2, 1997. Notwithstanding those representations, on January 14, 1998, Medical Escrow Society, a viatical broker used by the Respondent in its dealing with Lincoln, received an application form from A.T. on which A.T. indicated he had tested positive for HIV on August 8, 1989, had been diagnosed with AIDS ON August 10, 1994, and was under the care of a physician. Medical Escrow Society nonetheless brokered the sale of the policy to the Respondent. Shortly after the contestability period on this policy expired. On June 25, 1999, the owner of the policy, Ralph Cahall, entered into a contract with the Respondent whereby the Respondent bought Cahall's interest in the proceeds for $29,238.72. At the Respondent's request, ownership of the policy was changed from Cahall to American Title Company of Orlando, the Respondent's trustee without either Lincoln or the Department being informed of the transfer. The file relating to this policy indicates that the Respondent brought about the transfer from Cahall after it knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that A.T. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health on the application to Lincoln, and that the Respondent, though it did not report what it knew to the Department, also thereafter undertook a course of action which was designed to conceal that information from Lincoln. With regard to Count Nine, the evidence indicates that on or about September 30, 1996, R.M. submitted an application for a $100,000 life insurance policy to Interstate Assurance Company (Interstate). On the application, R.M. indicated he had not been diagnosed with an immune system disorder within the preceding ten years, and the policy was issued on October 9, 1996. Notwithstanding that representation, on July 18, 1997, R.M. completed an application form for Benefits America, a broker used by the Respondent with regard to this policy, in which he stated he had been tested positive for HIV on February 11, 1994. A "Policy Acquisition Worksheet" utilized by the Respondent on or about July 22, 1997, when R.M. was dealing with Benefits America regarding the viatication of his life insurance policy, reflects that the company was aware at that time that R.M. had been diagnosed with HIV in 1994. Even with that knowledge, the Respondent went through with the viatication, and on July 31, 1997, while the policy was still within the contestability period, bought the policy for $15,430. On August 4, 1997, R.M. executed an addendum to the purchase agreement at the behest of the Respondent, wherein he recognized the policy was still contestable and agreed, among other things, not to contact his insurance company or tell them he had sold the policy to a viatical settlement provider. He also was asked to sign, and signed, an undated change of ownership agreement for use by the Respondent at the end of the contestability period. Jennifer Grinstead, an employee of the Respondent, paid R.M.'s annual premium on the policy during the contestibility period out of her personal checking account. This action, when done in conjunction with R.M.'s failure to advise the insurance company of the sale, served to conceal the transfer of ownership from R.M. to the Respondent. Ms. Grinstead was reimbursed for the premium payments by the Respondent's trustee. The Respondent did not report to Interstate or to the Department that R.M. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health in procuring the issuance of the policy even though it knew or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have known that the material misrepresentations had been made. As to Count Ten, on May 12, 1997, J.R. submitted an application to Interstate for a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of $980,000. On his application, J.R. indicated he had not been diagnosed with an immune system disorder within the preceding ten years, had not been treated by a member of the medical profession in the preceding five years, and was not, at the time, on medication or undergoing treatment or therapy. The policy was issued on May 19, 1997. Notwithstanding those representations, on July 9, 1997, J.R. filled out an application form for the Respondent's broker for this transaction, Life Benefit Services, on which he indicated he had been diagnosed as HIV positive in May 1996. A "Mortality Profile" provided to the Respondent by AVS indicated that J.R. was first diagnosed as being HIV positive in August 1995, nine months or so earlier than he admitted, and that he had been undergoing treatment by a doctor and receiving medications well within the five years preceding the application. On August 20, 1997, J.R. entered into a contract with the Respondent calling for the sale of this insurance policy to ABC for a net sum of $107,800. At this point, the policy was still contestable. At that time, the Respondent instructed J.R. in writing not to contact his insurance company until told to do so by the Respondent's representative. The Respondent also had J.R. sign an addendum to the purchase agreement in which he acknowledged the policy was still contestable, that he would not inform Interstate of the sale, and that he would sign an undated change of ownership form for use by ABC when the contestability period expired. Notwithstanding that the Respondent knew of the material misrepresentations made by J.R. as to his health when he procured the policy, it did not report what it knew to the Department, and took steps to insure Interstate was not informed of what was going on. With regard to Count Eleven, on May 16, 1996, the same J.R. applied to Massachusetts General Life Insurance Company, later, Conseco Life Insurance Company (Conseco), for a $99,900 life insurance policy. On his application, J.R. stated he had never had any medical tests or any known indication of diseases, conditions, or physical disorders which were not mentioned on the form. AIDS, ARC, and HIV positive were not mentioned on the form, and if known to have been present, should have been noted. About a year and three months later, on July 9, 1997, J.R. submitted an application form to Life Benefit Services, the broker used by ABC on this policy, on which he stated he had tested positive for HIV in May of 1996. By letter dated July 28, 1997, Life Benefit Services advised ABC that J.R. was terminally ill and had been on medication and undergoing treatment by a physician within the preceding five years. In addition to this information, the Respondent had available to it the information regarding J.R.'s condition discovered as a result of the purchase of the Interstate policy. Notwithstanding this knowledge, on September 17, 1997, while the policy was still contestable, ABC purchased the Conseco policy from J.R. for the net sum of $13,986. By letter dated September 17, 1997, the Respondent advised J.R. not to contact his insurance company until instructed to do so by Ms. Holman, the Respondent's Director of Contracts, and requested he execute an addendum acknowledging those instructions and that the Conseco policy was still contestable. He was also asked to agree to sign an undated change of ownership assignment for use by ABC after the contestability period had expired. While the policy remained contestable, the annual premiums due from J.R. were paid from her personal checking account by Ms. Grinstead, an ABC employee, who was reimbursed therefor by American Title, ABC's trustee. None of the above information was reported by the Respondent to Conseco or the Department even though it knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that J.R. had made material misrepresentations regarding his physical health in his application for life insurance to Massachusetts General Life Insurance company, and it appears the Respondent attempted to conceal those misrepresentations from Conseco.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing Counts One through Four and Eight of the Administrative Complaint, but finding the Respondent guilty of Counts Five though Seven and Nine through Eleven of the Complaint, and both revoking its license and its eligibility for licensure as a viatical settlement provider in Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark K. Logan, Esquire Smith, Ballard & Logan, P.A. 403 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (7) 120.57626.989626.9914766.101817.23490.803914.25
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