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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. CHARLES D. YOUMANS, 88-002365 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002365 Latest Update: Aug. 30, 1988

Findings Of Fact In 1968, Petitioner's marriage to Judith Marie Youmans was dissolved by the Circuit Court in Duval County, Jacksonville, Florida. One child, D. R. Y. was born of the marriage. Custody of D. R. Y. was given to Petitioner's ex- wife. However, except for a few months, D. R. Y. was in the actual custody of her father until she reached the age of majority in 1982. Petitioner's ex-wife never paid any child support to Respondent for his custody of D. R. Y. Petitioner never had the final divorce decree modified to reflect D. R. Y.'s custody arrangement or to seek an award of child support for his custody of D. R. Y. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is not seeking child support enforcement in reference to D. R. Y. From 1968 until about 1977, Petitioner maintained an on again-off again relationship with his ex-wife. They never remarried. However, by 1977, Petitioner had fathered two children with his ex-wife, who are the subject of this action. C. D. Y., Jr., was born July 29, 1971, and M. S. Y. was born August 15, 1973. In 1977, Petitioner's ex-wife filed a paternity action against Petitioner alleging that the two boys were his children. Petitioner made an appearance in the paternity action and reached an agreement with his ex-wife regarding the paternity of the two boys and how much child support he would pay until they reached the age of majority. A final judgment incorporating the agreement between the parties was entered by the Circuit Court in Duval County, Jacksonville, Florida, on January 28, 1977. Petitioner states that he was never served with the 1977 paternity suit papers or the final judgment entered in the action. Petitioner testified that he was not aware that a final judgment had been entered awarding his ex-wife $15.00 per week per child until a few months before HRS became involved in the tax intercept under consideration here. However, Petitioner made two of the agreed to child support payments in February, 1977, after his attorney had advised him to do so. After the first two payments, Petitioner ceased making the $15.00 per child per week payments and has not made any child support payments to his ex-wife or to the Clerk's Office since February 4, 1977. Petitioner has, therefore, accumulated an alleged arrearage of child support for C. D. Y. and M. S. Y. in the amount of $16,35.00 through July 1987. Prior to HRS's involvement in the case in 1986, Petitioner's ex-wife neither asked for nor received any child support from Petitioner, except for the few payments made in 1977. She did not try to enforce the paternity settlement agreement until September 12, 1986, when she asked for HRS's help. Apparently, the reason she went to HRS was to attempt to collect the child support. She has not received any "public assistance" such as AFDC money from HRS and apparently is not asking for such aid. HRS has not obtained a court order finding Petitioner to be delinquent and no such order has been previously entered. Petitioner has, therefore, never been afforded an opportunity to raise his defenses to any alleged arrearage or non payment of support before the circuit court. Petitioner felt very strongly that he should not have to pay child support since his ex-wife did not perform her part of the agreement regarding her visitation. He testified that he attempted to visit the two boys on several occasions, but was usually frustrated in his attempts. The last time he attempted to visit the two boys was several years ago when he was met at the door by his ex-father-in-law who was pointing a shot gun at Petitioner and told him to leave. After the shot gun incident, Petitioner did not feel it to be in his best interest to attempt to see the boys anymore. Petitioner also maintained that he should not have to pay child support because she would not raise the boys correctly throughout the time period involved in this case. In essence, he left her because she would not give up certain drugs and he did not want to be living in such an environment nor did he want his boys to be living in such an environment. However, his ex-wife felt otherwise and didn't mind her children being raised around drugs. Petitioner felt that his ex-wife's involvement of HRS to collect child support was simply a tactic on her part to harass him and otherwise be mean. Petitioner also felt that he should have been paid child support for his custody of D. R. Y. who had refused to live with her mother. Petitioner felt that he should at least receive recognition of the fact that he did not receive any such support and be credited with the amount he should have been paid, i.e. $15.00 per week.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order in this case to the effect that the Department is not entitled to intercept Charles D. Youmans' federal tax refund unless and until Youmans is adjudicated delinquent by a circuit court in the periodic court ordered payment, and to the further effect that any federal tax refund which may already have been intercepted shall be returned to Youmans. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2365 Petitioner's factual allegations contained in paragraph 1 of his letter are immaterial. Petitioner factual allegations contained in paragraph 2 are irrelevant. The factual allegation in the 1st sentence of paragraph 3 was not shown by the evidence. The rest of paragraph 3 is adopted. Paragraph 4, 5 and 7 are subordinate. Paragraph 6 is not shown by the evidence. Paragraph 8 discusses evidence not presented at the final hearing and is inadmissible. Paragraph 9 is irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles D. Youmans, pro se Route 5, Box 44 Brunswick, Georgia 31520 Warren J. Schulman SCHULMAN, HOWARD & HEMPHILL, P.A. 331 East Union Street, Suite 1 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sam Power, HRS Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Tom Batchelor Staff Attorney House HRS Committee The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 =================================================================

USC (1) 45 CFR 303.72 Florida Laws (5) 120.57409.2557409.256409.256161.13
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GEORGE LUTHER vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 91-003857 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 24, 1991 Number: 91-003857 Latest Update: Oct. 03, 1991

Findings Of Fact On April 15, 1991, petitioner submitted a claim to the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) on a ticket he held for the Lotto drawing of April 13, 1991. Such ticket reflected that petitioner had correctly selected five of the six numbers drawn on that date, and rendered him eligible for a prize of $3,529.50. On May 10, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) certified to the Lottery that petitioner owed $10,374.81 in Title IV-D child support arrearage. Thereafter, by letter of May 15, 1991, the Lottery advised petitioner that DHRS had advised it of such outstanding debt and that, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, it had transmitted the prize amount to the Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). Petitioner was further advised that DBF would notify him shortly regarding the distribution of such funds. By letter of May 17, 1991, DBF notified petitioner that it was in receipt of his prize from the Lottery and that it intended to apply the entire $3,529.50 toward the unpaid claim owing for child support. Such letter likewise advised petitioner of his right to request a hearing to contest such action. By letter of June 3, 1991, petitioner acknowledged receipt of the DBF's letter of May 17, 1991, disputed that any such obligation was outstanding, and requested a formal hearing. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that on January 29, 1982, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida, rendered an order approving a stipulation for payment of child support by petitioner for the support of his children. Such stipulation provided that petitioner would pay the sum of $200.00 per month toward an arrearage of $12,234.91, due as of December 20, 1981. The stipulation further provided that such payments would be made payable to the clerk of that court, which would deduct its fee, and forward the balance to DHRS for transmittal to the State of Ohio, the apparent residence of petitioner's former wife. DHRS, the agency designated by the Circuit Court to receive the child support payments deposited with the clerk of that court, and to transmit such sums to the State of Ohio, has certified that as of May 10, 1991, petitioner owed $10,374.81 in Title IV-D child support arrearage. On May 16, 1991, DHRS confirmed such arrearage with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida, and reconfirmed such arrearage on August 25, 1991. Petitioner, the party responsible to make such payments, offered no proof at hearing to controvert such certification.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order dismissing the petitioner's request for formal hearing, and that it pay to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services petitioner's lottery prize of $3,529.50, in partial satisfaction of petitioner's debt for child support. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. George Luther 10900 S.W. 134th Terrace Miami, Florida 33176 Bridget L. Ryan Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Warren Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (2) 120.5724.115
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DARYL DAVIDOFF vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 03-001743 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 15, 2003 Number: 03-001743 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Department of Revenue should retain and apply the Petitioner’s $7,278.00 lottery prize to reduce an outstanding arrearage for child support.

Findings Of Fact DOR and DOL are the agencies of the State of Florida charged with the duty to enforce statutes which provide for the seizure of lottery prize winnings to satisfy past-due child support debt. DOR and DOL provided Davidoff with timely and proper notice of their finding that he was indebted to the state for court-ordered child support through the court depository, in the total amount of $32,400.00 as of July 29, 1996. Davidoff was further notified that it was the state's intent to intercept his lottery prize and apply it to partially satisfy his unpaid child support debt. Pursuant to a Final Judgment of Paternity and Order for Payment of Arrears entered on July 29, 1996, Davidoff is subject to a lawful order requiring him to pay child support retroactive to June 6, 1996, in the total amount of $32,400.00. Davidoff failed to discharge his child support obligations pursuant to that judgment. He admits arrearages in an amount in excess of $27,000.00 as of the date of the final hearing. DOR is entitled, indeed required by law, to apply the Petitioner’s lottery prize in the amount of $7,278.00 to partially satisfy this past-due child support debt.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order retaining Davidoff's $7,278.00 lottery prize to be applied to reduce the accrued arrearage on Davidoff's child support obligation. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David Davidoff 2956 Kirk Road Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David Griffin, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Hart, General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 409.2557
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TAMIEKA PETTY vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 03-000931 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Mar. 18, 2003 Number: 03-000931 Latest Update: Dec. 10, 2003

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should approve Petitioner's registration to operate a family day care home.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a 25-year-old female who admittedly has been providing unlicensed child day care in her home for the past several years. While she has no formal training in child care, she has been employed in the child care field for many years and obtained her GED in 1995. Petitioner has been married to her husband, A.P., for six years, and they live together. Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating child care facilities pursuant to Chapter 402. The Application On September 18, 2002, Petitioner submitted an application to Respondent seeking licensure to operate a registered family day care within her home located at 6351 Redwood Oaks Drive in Orlando, Florida. Respondent processed the application and effectuated the required background screening of the individuals living within the household, including Petitioner and A.P. The screening of Petitioner revealed that on October 3, 2000, a young girl, living within Petitioner's home and under her supervision, was removed following a report to the abuse hotline and the subsequent investigation by Donald Griffin, a protective services investigator employed by Respondent. The screening of A.P. revealed that he was arrested in October 2000 on charges of lewd, lascivious assault or act on a child; prostitution; lewd or lascivious molestation; renting space to be used for prostitution; and lewd or lascivious conduct. The screening further revealed that on May 15, 2002, the State Attorney's Office determined that the case was not suitable for prosecution and filed a "No Information Notice." Upon receipt and consideration of the screening results, Respondent denied Petitioner's application on January 23, 2003, advising her that: . . . the Department is unable to approve your application to operate a family day care due to safety concerns for children that may be placed under your care for the following reasons: Background screening revealed that a child was removed from your care following an allegation of abuse or neglect. Background screening revealed that a member of your household lacks moral character due to their arrest record involving minors which would place the children at risk of harm. With respect to Petitioner's screening results, Petitioner admits that a child was removed from her home, but alleges that the removal was at her request. Petitioner denies any allegation of abuse and insists that the removed child, her friend's daughter, was "extremely unruly and too difficult to handle." As a result, Petitioner claims that she requested that Respondent remove the child and Respondent complied. Respondent's investigator, Mr. Griffin, testified otherwise. Investigator Griffin stated that he personally investigated Petitioner following a report to Florida's child abuse hotline. He separately interviewed both Petitioner and the child and noticed clear bruises and welts on the child. Investigator Griffin determined that Petitioner's home was not suitable for the young girl and removed her from the residence. Mr. Griffin's testimony was more credible. No evidence was offered to support Petitioner's assertion. With respect to the screening results of A.P., Respondent presented compelling evidence that A.P. lacks the requisite good moral character. First, Respondent demonstrated and Petitioner admits that A.P. occasionally gets angry and lacks self-control. In fact, the local police department has responded to domestic disturbance calls from the family home on at-least two occasions. In addition, the evidence surrounding A.P.'s arrest demonstrates that A.P. lacks good moral character. Specifically, A.B., the alleged victim of A.P., credibly testified at hearing that in October 2000, at age 12, she and her minor female friend, L.M. were walking near their school during the early evening when an unknown black male, later identified as A.P., driving a green sports utility vehicle, offered them a ride. The female minors entered his S.U.V. and were taken to a convenience store and then to a hotel. A.B. testified that while in the hotel room, the male inappropriately touched her butt, pushed her on the bed and solicited her to have sex with him for money. A.B. said "no" to his offer and asked him to stop. Shortly thereafter, the male departed the hotel and abandoned the girls in the hotel room with the room key. The police were contacted and investigator Rick Salcido conducted an investigation. After interviewing the girls, Mr. Salcido acquired physical evidence at the hotel linking A.P. to the room and supporting A.B.'s allegations. He retrieved a copy of A.P.'s driver's license and hotel credit card used at check-in from the hotel manager. In addition to the physical evidence linking A.P. to the hotel, A.B. positively identified A.P.'s photo as the perpetrator. Moreover, the investigator determined, and Petitioner admits that A.P. owned and drove a green sports utility vehicle at the time of the alleged incident. While Petitioner asserts that she and A.P. were out of town and on vacation on the date of the incident, she admits that they returned home at approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening. Although A.P. was subsequently arrested, the State Attorney's Office later declined to prosecute and filed a "No Information Notice." At hearing, counsel for A.P. indicated that the statute of limitations had not expired and A.P. invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. A.P. declined to testify and answer questions related to his moral character and the circumstances of his arrest.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a registration to operate a child care facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Jeremy K. Markman, Esquire 800 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (5) 120.5739.202402.302402.305435.04
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. IRA CLAYTON DANIELS, 86-002173 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002173 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 1986

The Issue The ultimate issue is whether, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services may intercept Daniels' income tax refund. However, this turns on the issue of whether Daniels has been delinquent in excess of 3 months. Factually, Daniels owed money for aid provided his child. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has obtained a judgement in the amount of $6,673 upon which Daniels is to make payments of $25/month. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services argues that Daniels owes and has been delinquent on the $6,673 since the order was entered. Daniels argues that he is not over three months in arrears on his payments of $25/month. The evidence introduced by Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shows Daniels is in arrears only $27.91 on his payments on the judgement. The issue is whether Section 45 CFR Section 303.72 requires a delinquency in payments required to be made on the amount of money established in a court order.

Findings Of Fact On October 10, 1981, Carol Renee Neal assigned to the State of Florida her rights to child support for Latoya v. Daniels, acknowledged child of Ira Clayton Daniels. An Order was entered on January 14, 1985, which established that Ira Clayton Daniels owed the State of Florida $6,673 for a public assistance child support obligation and provided that Ira Clayton Daniels would pay $25/month until the $6,673 was repaid. The records of the Department, Daniels' Exhibit 1, reflect Daniels has made regular payments on the debt, and at the time of the hearing owed $27.91 arrearage on the debt. Daniels was less than three months in arrears on his payments established by the Order referenced above.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, the claim against Ira Clayton Daniels should be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED 16th day of September 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Schulman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Child Support Enforcement Program 105 East Monroe, Suite 101 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Frederick J. Simpson, Esquire HRS District IV Legal Counsel Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Ira C. Daniels 8904 Greenleaf Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208

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LEE ANN FLAGG vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 93-002297RU (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 23, 1993 Number: 93-002297RU Latest Update: Sep. 30, 1994

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Petitioner, Lee Ann Flagg, is a 22-year-old resident of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Since 1991, she has received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits for her 22-month-old son. Petitioner wants to learn a marketable skill, so she can obtain a job and stop receiving AFDC. Based on the information in Petitioner's AFDC case file, her total income was her AFDC grant of $241 per month. Petitioner is exempt from Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program due to the age of her child. On May 26, 1992, Petitioner volunteered for Project Independence (PI). On June 5, 1992, Petitioner attended PI orientation at which she stated her desire to attend school in the fall of 1992. At all times material hereto, Petitioner met PI target group criteria in that she is under the age of 24 and had not been employed for the past 12 months. On July 28, 1992, Petitioner requested child care assistance from Respondent. She advised her PI case manager that the lack of child care was a barrier to her being self-sufficient and that she needed child care to attend school in the fall of 1992. In July 1992, Petitioner's case manager informed Petitioner that, due to the child care freeze, Respondent could not provide her with child care and placed Petitioner in "limited contact." During the time in "limited contact," Petitioner provided monthly attendance verification to her PI worker until February 1993. In August 1992, Petitioner enrolled in business classes at Lively Area Vocational Technical School (Lively) in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Needing child care assistance, Petitioner's parents assisted her with child care temporarily. In February 1993, because Respondent could not provide Petitioner with child care, she requested disenrollment from the PI program. However, Petitioner can re-enroll in the PI program at any time. Petitioner continues to attend classes at Lively. But, due to her inability to obtain child care services from Respondent, she has been forced to reduce her classes. Additionally, Petitioner has taken a part-time clerical job at below poverty wages, for which she receives child care. Because of the child care freeze, Petitioner cannot receive child care assistance from Respondent for education and training activities. Background The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program is a joint federal-state assistance program authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 602. The AFDC program is administered by states under the supervision of the Federal Department of Health and Human Services. A "Job Opportunities and Basic Skills" (JOBS) program must be developed by each state participating in the AFDC program. The purpose of the JOBS program is to provide training, education and work opportunities for AFDC recipients, pursuant to the Family Support Act of 1988, that will help avoid long-term public assistance dependency. Supervision of the JOBS program and contracting for the provision of support services, such as child care, is the responsibility of the state agency administering the AFDC program (referred to as the IV-A agency). In Florida, Respondent is the IV-A agency, and the Department of Labor and Employment Security administers the JOBS program. Florida's JOBS program is called Project Independence (PI). The criteria governing PI is found in Section 409.029, Florida Statutes, the Florida Employment Opportunity Act. For PI purposes, all AFDC recipients are either exempt or nonexempt from participating in PI and are either target group or non-target group members. Exempt recipients are persons who have barriers to participating in PI, such as having young children or being disabled, based on federally defined exemption criteria. These recipients are not required to participate in PI, but may volunteer to participate. Nonexempt recipients are persons who do not meet the federal exemption criteria and are referred to as mandatory. These recipients may be referred to PI by their Respondent caseworker, and if referred, they are required to participate in PI as a condition of receiving AFDC, so long as resources are available. Conversely, if resources are not available, a nonexempt referred recipient is not required to participate in PI, but may volunteer to participate in PI. Furthermore, even if a nonexempt recipient is not referred to PI, such recipient may volunteer to participate in PI. Target group members are AFDC recipients who, based on certain characteristics such as work history or number of years already on AFDC, are likely to become long-term public assistance recipients. Non-target group members are AFDC recipients who do not meet target group criteria. Both target group members and non-target group members may be either exempt or nonexempt. Caseload Prioritization Rule Participation requirements for AFDC recipients in PI is set forth in Section 409.029, Florida Statutes, the Florida Employment Opportunity Act. In April 1992, Respondent promulgated Rule 10C-32.002 AFDC Employment and Training Program, Florida Administrative Code, implementing Section 409.029, Florida Statutes. Section (4) of Rule 10C-32.002, referred to as the caseload prioritization rule, sets forth Respondent's PI caseload prioritization procedures, implementing Subsection 409.029(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Subsection 409.029(9)(c) states: (9) PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS (c) All exempt and nonexempt AFDC recipients who do not meet target group criteria shall be permitted to volunteer. Nonexempt AFDC recipients who meet target group criteria shall be required to participate in the pro- gram. Exempt AFDC recipients who meet target group criteria shall be permitted to volun- teer. If the department lacks resources to provide the services necessary for participa- tion under this section, nonexempt AFDC recip- ients who do not meet the target group crit- eria shall be required to participate in in- itial job search if they are approved for ini- tial job search, but shall be deferred from further participation after completing up to 3 weeks of job search activities. If the department continues to lack resources to pro- vide the services necessary for participation under this section, nonexempt recipients who do not meet target group criteria and who are not approved for initial job search shall also be deferred from further participation after completing orientation. If deferring such recipients from mandatory participation does not alleviate budget constraints on ser- vices, the department shall defer nonexempt AFDC recipients who do not meet target group criteria from mandatory participation and may also defer participants who meet target group criteria from mandatory participation so long as the department is meeting federal particip- ation rates and target group expenditure re- quirements. If the department cannot, after making a good faith effort, meet federal part- icipation rates and target group expenditure requirements by deferring nonexempt target group AFDC recipients from participation, the department may limit service to AFDC recip- ients who meet target group criteria and may mandate the participation of those target group members who are non-target-group volun- teers only after the department has attempted to conserve its resources under the proce- dures established in this section. (Emphasis added.) Rule 10C-32.002(4) states: Effective October 1, 1991, the Florida Employment Opportunity Act, F.S. 409.029, was revised to allow the department to prioritize and disenroll participants based on target groups and assessment status where funds are insufficient to serve all partici- pants. Caseloads may be reduced to allow for sufficient case management when they exceed a staff/client ratio of 1:150. Staff/client ratios for the teen parent caseload should not exceed 1:100. Each district will init- iate case load disenrollment procedures as needed. Case managers must identify three cate- gories of participants in their caseloads: Priority One, exempt volunteers; Priority Two, mandatory target group participants; and Priority Three, mandatory non-target group participants. When caseloads exceed a staff/client ratio of 1:150, all Priority Three cases, mandatory non-target participants, will be offered an opportunity to continue partici- pation or disenroll. Priority Three participants who wish to continue in the program must be allowed to do so and will be placed in Priority One category. Priority Three participants who do not wish to continue in the program should be disenrolled after Orientation, and Job Search if the participant meets the criteria for Initial Job Search. To reach or main- tain the 1:150 staff/client ratio, new mand- atory non-target referrals may be disen- rolled after Orientation, and Job Search, if applicable, if they do not wish to continue to participate. If the staff/client ratio remains above 1:150 after disenrollment of Priority Three cases, then all Priority Two, mandatory tar- get groups may be allowed the opportunity to disenroll from the program after Orientation, and Job Search, if applicable. Information about disenrollment and re- entry into the program must be provided, verbally and in writing, to each participant being given these opportunities. This infor- mation must include: A participant who is given the opport- unity to disenroll will not be sanctioned, nor will disenrollment affect the AFDC grant amount. An individual who disenrolls may re- enroll in the program at a later date by con- tacting the local AFDC employment and train- ing office. An individual who disenrolls and becomes employed may be eligible for child care dur- ing the hours of employment and should con- tact the AFDC employment and training case manager. A participant who is given the opport- unity to disenroll and chooses to continue participating in the AFDC employment and training program can do so. A participant who does not meet an exemp- tion from program participation and who chooses to remain in the program although given the opportunity to disenroll can be sanctioned for failure to complete assigned activities. A participant who does not meet an exemp- tion from program participation and chooses to disenroll may be required to re-enter the program at a future date. Failure to do so without good cause will cause a sanction to be imposed. Support Services will be terminated for a participant who chooses to disenroll unless the individual is employed. If new referrals are not sufficient to maintain the staff/client ratio of 1:150, disenrolled cases should be identified for program re-entry. Program re-entry will be based on continuing eligibility for AFDC, priority group status, and length of time since disenrollment. The first individual disenrolled from the highest priority group will be re-enrolled first, etc. If the state fails to meet the feder- ally required expenditure rate for target groups, participation in the program may be limited to and required for target group members. (Emphasis added) The caseload prioritization rule only applies in situations in which PI staff/client ratio exceeds 1:150; staff meaning case manager. Respondent contends that Subsection 409.029(9)(c), Florida Statutes, was needed for the determination as to when PI's resources were sufficient to provide services to clients. In the caseload prioritization rule, Respondent interprets the statutory phrase "lacks resources" as the point at which the staff/client ratio exceeds 1:150. Respondent's districts meet this "limited resources" point when the staff/client ratio exceeds 1:150. The factors considered in the measuring stick used by Respondent to determine the limited resources were staff allocations and staff availability to provide services. Child care was not included, since it was, and is, a support service as interpreted by Respondent from Subsection 409.029(7), Florida Statutes. At the time Subsection 409.029(9)(c) was passed by the Florida Legislature, the staff/client ratio exceeded 1:400 and 1:500 in some of Respondent's districts. Respondent determined that a ratio exceeding 1:150 prevented a case manager from providing the services needed for clients, i.e., spending the amount of time needed, and that the lack of time, translating into the lack of services needed, could affect Respondent's PI federal funding. Respondent contends that the caseload prioritization rule was necessary for the administration of Subsection 409.029(9)(c). The rule in Respondent's view provided and clarified the procedures to be used for the disenrollment of clients to reduce caseloads. Respondent further contends that the caseload prioritization rule was necessary for the proper administration of Subsection 409.029(7), Florida Statutes, which Respondent interprets as applicable to the offering of child care services. According to Respondent, the rule gave Respondent the ability to identify specific reasons to defer individuals from participation in the PI program. On July 10, 1992, Respondent's caseload prioritization procedures were issued statewide and were generally applicable to all PI participants in Respondent's districts. Notwithstanding, because the staff/client ratio did not exceed 1:150 in Respondent's District 2, the procedure was not utilized in District 2. The caseload prioritization procedures were not invoked prior to instituting the child care freeze in Respondent's District 2. Child Care Freeze For the 1992-93 fiscal year, the Florida Legislature failed to appropriate sufficient funds to meet the needs of PI child care in Respondent's District 2. Subsequently, again, for the 1993-94 fiscal year, the Legislature did not appropriate sufficient funds. On July 10, 1992, Respondent issued a memorandum, effective that same date, freezing child care in Respondent's District 2 only for new enrollments of AFDC recipients who wished to participate (volunteers) in PI education and training activities and who needed child care in order to participate. The challenged child care freeze policy purports to be as follows: Due to the large over annualization we are projecting for FY 92-93 in Service I, Ser- vice II and Family Support Act child care services, I am directing you to immediately freeze new enrollments except for entitled groups (TCC and AFDC Employed) and the high- est at-risk group (Priority 1 in Service I). We will closely monitor utilization and let you know as soon as spending is within bud- get limits. This freeze applies to new enrollments only. Children currently in care should continue to receive services as appropriate. Respondent instituted the child care freeze because of projected annualized budget deficits; that is, Respondent annualized its current PI child care expenditures and projected a budgetary deficit if expenditures increased beyond what was currently spent. The child care freeze did not affect Transitional Child Care (TCC) recipients and AFDC recipients who work. Transitional Child Care is child care for former AFDC recipients who lost their AFDC eligibility due to earned income and who meet other federal requirements. TCC and AFDC employed individuals are guaranteed child care. Also, the child care freeze did not affect those individuals who Respondent requires to participate in PI. Respondent's District 2 is divided into two districts: Subdistrict 2A and Subdistrict 2B. Subdistrict 2A is comprised of Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson and Washington counties. Subdistrict 2B is comprised of Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla counties. Child care services are provided through contract with central agencies. Two child care provider agencies serve Respondent's District 2: Big Bend Child Care, serving Subdistrict 2B and Early Childhood Services, serving Subdistrict 2A. PI child care monies are split between the two provider agencies. Due to the child care freeze, from July 10, 1992, no AFDC recipient in Subdistricts 2A and 2B, who needed child care for education and training, received it. However, on January 19, 1993, child care slots became available in Subdistrict 2A with Early Childhood Services. On January 19, 1993, Early Childhood Services had 318 children of AFDC recipients on a waiting list. Only 35 slots became available. On March 15, 1993, Respondent allowed Early Childhood Services to provide child care services on a "one-in one-out" basis--equal number of child care slots filled as are vacated. As of January 1993, in Respondent's District 2, 542 children of AFDC recipients were waiting to receive child care services. Approximately 70 of the children, all residing in Subdistrict 2A, have been placed since January 19, 1993. For the offering of child care services, Respondent looks to both Subsection 409.029(7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10C-32.002(10)(b)2, Florida Administrative Code, for guidance as to what action to take when child care resources are limited. Respondent contends that Subsection 409.029(7) is applicable to child care services. Subsection 409.027(7) includes child care services as a support service and provides that child care services "shall be provided according to federal law to the extent funds are available." Rule 10C- 32.002(10)(b)2 provides that a PI participant, meeting the requirements for a deferred status and not required to participate, "will be placed in limited contact status" due to the "temporary unavailability of support services." In August 1992, Respondent conferred with the regional office of the federal agency overseeing the AFDC program, regarding the subject of guaranteeing child care to AFDC recipients as it relates to availability of funds. Respondent and the federal agency agreed to certain principles on the subject, which included the following: "To the degree resources are available" is acceptable as a factor in limiting participa- tion in a program component when child care is a determining factor (other than AFDC-emp- loyed and TCC). The state may determine the criteria for those required and/or allowed to participate in the program as long as the state meets the federal participation rate and target group expenditure requirements. [W]hen a state finds itself without sufficient resources, including child care resources, it may place individuals on a waiting list. Before placing an individual on a waiting list, the individual will be given an opportunity to make provisions for her own child care, or other services, in order to remain in the program. [W]ith the exception of AFDC-employed and TCC, the guarantee of child care to both JOBS and non-JOBS participants is directly tied to the conditions under which the participant is required or allowed to participate. One clear and explicit condition is the extent to which state resources permit such partic pation. Respondent interprets Florida law, as it relates to budgeting, that the law requires Respondent not to exceed its budget. To stay within its budget, Respondent instituted the child care freeze instead of the other available options which would involve the disenrollment of children already in care, including the entitled groups. The child care freeze required Respondent to constantly be aware of the status of the child care budget (on a monthly basis) due to its constant fluctuation. Also, in administering the child care freeze, Respondent interprets the federal law and Subsection 409.029(9)(c), Florida Statutes, to state that it is not required to provide child care to volunteers of the PI program. But, even with this interpretation, volunteers for the PI program are not denied participation in the PI program during child care constraints. An individual who does not need child care, or even one who does need child care but can provide it through other means can volunteer for participation in the PI program. No child care will be provided, but the participants can receive other services associated with the PI program. The child care freeze was never promulgated pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 602 Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68
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MICHAEL L. WRIGHT vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, 03-003684 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 06, 2003 Number: 03-003684 Latest Update: Feb. 02, 2004

The Issue Is it appropriate for Respondent, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Program, to garnish funds for past due child support reduced to judgment from a joint account pursuant to Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes (2001)?1

Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, an Order of Support was issued in Derrick v. Wright in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court; pursuant to this Order, Petitioner was ordered to pay $25.00 per week for the current support of his minor child, Mesheal Lee Wright, born on April 20, 1983, commencing December 16, 1985. On February 10, 1995, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and a Findings of Fact and Order on Motion for Contempt in Derrick v. Wright were filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $10,639.02 as of October 7, 1994. On May 11, 1995, a General Findings and Order of Arrest Instanter in Derrick v. Wright was filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $9,463.02 as of December 31, 1994. On or about May 13, 2002, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and a Findings and Establishing Arrears in Derrick v. Wright were filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $16,121.06 as of April 9, 2002, and ordered Petitioner to pay $167.00 per month in liquidation of his arrearage, commencing May 1, 2002. All the arrearage was owed by Petitioner to the custodial parent of the minor child; none of the arrearage was owed to the state. On October 15, 2001, Respondent mailed a Notice of Freeze in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Suncoast by certified mail, return receipt requested, regarding any accounts of Petitioner with the credit union; Suncoast received the Notice of Freeze on October 18, 2001. Suncoast confirmed a freeze on Petitioner’s joint account in the amount of $5,573.95 as of October 18, 2001. The signature card, produced as an exhibit by the Respondent, stipulated that the account was owned as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship by Petitioner and a non- obligor joint account holder, Petitioner's sister. On October 22, 2001, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested; the Notice of Intent to Levy was received and signed for at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, on October 23, 2001. The Notice of Intent to Levy advised that a non- obligor joint owner, who claimed to have an equal right to all of the money levied upon in a joint account, had a right to contest Respondent’s action. The non-obligor joint account holder did not file a petition to contest the levy nor did she appear at the final hearing. On or about November 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a Petition-Disputed Issues of Material Fact with Respondent. Respondent sent a Notice of Extension of Freeze in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Suncoast on November 9, 2001. Pursuant to the official records of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court in Derrick v. Wright, Petitioner’s child support arrearage was $16,121.06 as of November 21, 2003. Petitioner and his sister, Sandra W. Russaw, opened a joint account with survivorship rights at Suncoast on November 21, 1997. The Suncoast account had balances of less than $100.00 for 12 of the first 25 months it was open including the five months immediately preceding January 20, 2000, when $3,900.00 was deposited in the account. On December 27, 1999, Petitioner had $3,655.00 deposited in a Resident Trust Account he maintained at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. These funds, which were deposited by the U.S. Treasury, were followed by a deposit of $749.00 from the same source. These funds were initial payments to Petitioner for Veteran's Administration benefits. On January 14, 2000, $4,200.00 was withdrawn in the form of a check from Petitioner's Resident Trust Account at the Florida State Hospital. On January 20, 2000, $3,900.00 was deposited in the Suncoast account. Over the next 23 months, from January 20, 2000, to November 31, 2001, $20,538.00 directly attributable to Petitioner was deposited in the Suncoast account. The money was from Veteran's Administration benefits paid to Petitioner by direct deposit. Not surprisingly, upon notification of the Notice of Freeze the monthly checks from the Veteran's Administration stopped being deposited in Petitioner's Suncoast account. On March 8, 2000, $5,000.00 was withdrawn from the Suncoast account, and on July 10 and 20, 2000, $4,990.00 was deposited in the same account. With the exception of the July 2000 deposits, only $1,490.00 in deposits to the Suncoast account are not directly attributable to Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that: (1) levies upon the funds in Petitioner’s credit union account with Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union, Tampa, Florida, up to the amount of unpaid child support as of November 21, 2003, i.e., $16,121.06, or to the full amount frozen, whichever is less; (2) applies the funds levied to satisfy all or part of Petitioner’s past due child support obligation; and (3) credits Petitioner for the amount so applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2004.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68409.2557409.25656
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DENINE PITTMAN vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 97-003666 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Aug. 11, 1997 Number: 97-003666 Latest Update: Jan. 05, 1998

The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to be exempt from disqualification to work in a position of trust or responsibility, having been declared ineligible to work in that position by virtue of offenses involving child abuse and contributing to the dependency of a minor?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has two children, M.B. and D.P. On February 11, 1993, those children were two years old and eight months old, respectively. Both children were residing with Petitioner. At that time Petitioner and the children lived in Gulf County, Florida. Around 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on February 11, 1993, Petitioner decided to leave her apartment and go to a nearby store. At that time she left D.P. in the care of Sabina Daniels, Petitioner's step-sister, who was thirteen years old on that date. The Petitioner took M.B. to her neighbor's apartment and left that child with Dianna Harrison, an adult. However, the Gulf County Sheriff's office received a call around 10:30 p.m. on February 11, 1993, indicating that a child had been left unattended at the Pine Ridge Apartments where Petitioner resided. Officer Stacy Strickland, now a Sergeant, went to Petitioner's apartment around 10:34 p.m. and tried to get someone to answer the door to the apartment. No one answered. Consequently, Officer Strickland contacted the apartment manager who opened the door. Officer Strickland discovered D.P. standing in a baby bed. No other person was in the apartment at that time. Officer Strickland sought the assistance of other persons to help provide emergency care to the child. While waiting for that assistance, Officer Strickland remained in the apartment for fifteen to twenty minutes. When Officer Strickland and other officials departed Petitioner's apartment, they left a note for the Petitioner to call the Gulf County Sheriff's office concerning her child D.P. Petitioner called the Gulf County Sheriff's office at around 12:00 a.m., February 12, 1993. Petitioner came to the Gulf County Sheriff's office around 12:20 a.m., on February 12, 1993. At that time, Petitioner was placed under arrest for aggravated child abuse for having left D.P. unattended. Following her arrest, Officer Strickland read the Petitioner her rights under the Miranda decision, to include the right to seek counsel to aid her in confronting the charge. Although Petitioner was less than forthcoming during the hearing, concerning the disposition of the charges that arose from the incident in which D.P. had been left unattended, it is clear that Petitioner voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to child abuse and contributing to the dependency of a minor in the case of State of Florida v. Denine Pittman, in the County Court, in and for Gulf County, Florida, Number 93-133M. A judgment and sentence in that case was entered on March 3, 1993, requiring the Petitioner to serve three months' probation in which she would pay $30 per month for supervisory fees and was required to make monthly contacts with a probation officer. In addition, Petitioner was required to pay a fine in the amount of $214. It can be properly inferred that Petitioner complied with requirements in the judgment and sentence. Petitioner's assertions at hearing that she only left D.P. on the night in question for 30 minutes, that she had never been advised of her Miranda rights by Officer Strickland on February 12, 1993, and that she did not realize that she could have contested the charges through a trial are rejected. In 1995, Petitioner moved from Gulf County to Panama City, Florida. In August 1996, Petitioner was working in a child care facility in Panama City known as Phoenix Preschool. In her position she was providing direct care to children and was subjected to background screening in accordance with Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Through the screening process Respondent discovered the disposition in Case No. 93-133M, leading to Petitioner's disqualification to work in a position of special trust with children and the contest of that determination through Petitioner's request for an exemption from that disqualification. In her testimony at hearing Petitioner expressed her desire to continue to work with children as an employee in a child care facility. The record does not reveal that Petitioner has had other circumstances involving inappropriate behavior involving her own children or claims of inappropriate behavior or treatment of other children for whom she has rendered care. On November 11, 1988, Petitioner was provided a certificate indicating the successful completion of twenty hours of child care training offered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Department of Education. On September 28, 1996, Petitioner received a certificate of completion of Dr. Jean Feldman's Classroom Management Workshop. The course lasted six hours. By the nature of the appearance of the certificate it is found to relate to training to assist in caring for children. On September 30, 1996, Petitioner received a certificate from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Department of Education for completing a ten- hour course for developmentally appropriate practices for young children. On November 30, 1996, Petitioner received a certificate of completion of "Mr. Al's" course on "Music, Movement and More." This course lasted six hours. By the nature of the appearance of the certificate it is found to relate to children's issues. In 1996, in relation to her position of teacher-aide for the Phoenix Preschool, Petitioner received training from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services related to child care in-service. Ms. Gloria Lawrence testified at the hearing. She worked with Petitioner at the Phoenix Preschool, and found that Petitioner did a good job with children, in that Petitioner got along with children at the Preschool. Ms. Lawrence observed that Petitioner was trustworthy and responsible with those children. Ms. Lawrence's testimony is credited. Ms. Frances Frazier testified at the hearing. Ms. Frazier is a close friend of Petitioner and has known Petitioner during the course of Petitioner's life. Ms. Frazier finds the Petitioner to be reliable and responsible and to be good with children and believes that Petitioner has learned from the mistake that Petitioner made which formed the basis for Petitioner's disqualification to work in a position of special trust. Ms. Frazier has known Petitioner to baby-sit for Ms. Frazier's grandchildren. Ms. Frazier has not found the Petitioner to abuse children. The only incident that Ms. Frazier is aware of concerning the Petitioner leaving children unattended was the occasion under discussion here. Ms. Frazier's testimony is credited. In addition, Petitioner presented letters from Ms. Vanessa Fennell, Ms. Annie S. Fields, Ms. Dianna Harrison, Ms. Beverly Daniels, Ms. Charlotte L. Medley, Ms. Candy Robinson, and Pastor Shirley Jenkins concerning Petitioner's basic personality as a concerned person for children and the elderly.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the fact finding and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which grants Petitioner an exemption from disqualification to be employed in a position of special trust to work with children. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Denine Pittman Apartment D43 801 West 13th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57402.302435.04435.07827.04
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LAWRENCE FOWLER vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 90-003620 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 11, 1990 Number: 90-003620 Latest Update: Jul. 25, 1995

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether part of Petitioner's lottery prize should be withheld and used to pay an allegedly outstanding debt for child support.

Findings Of Fact On April 15, 1990, Petitioner submitted a claim to the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) on a ticket he held for the Lotto drawing of April 14, 1990. The ticket reflected that Petitioner had correctly selected five of the six numbers drawn on April 14 and rendered him eligible for a prize of $4,334.50. On May 4, 1990, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) certified to the Lottery that Petitioner owed $3,625.00 in Title IV-D child support arrearage. By letter dated May 9, 1990, the Lottery notified Petitioner that DHRS had advised it of the outstanding debt and that, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, it had transmitted the prize amount to the Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). Petitioner was further advised that DBF would notify him shortly regarding the distribution of the funds. By letter dated May 15, 1990, DBF notified Petitioner that it was in receipt of his prize from the Lottery and that it intended to apply $3,625.00 of the award toward the unpaid claim for child support. Enclosed with that letter was State of Florida warrant number 2537015 in the amount of $709.50 payable to Petitioner. This warrant was a partial payment of the lottery prize and represented the difference between the amount of the prize and the amount of chld support that HRS had certified as being due. In a letter received by DBF on May 30, 1990, Petitioner disputed that any obligation was outstanding and requested a formal hearing. On July 18, 1990, DHRS notified DBF that Petitioner's child support arrearage had been reduced by $2,154.82 as a result of an IRS tax refund interception. That letter indicated that, as a result of the interception, DHRS had calculated the amount of the Petitioner's outstanding child support obligation to be $1,470.18. In the letter, DHRS specifically relinquished its claim to the additional $2,154.82 it had originally certified. By letter dated July 30, 1990, DBF transmitted to Petitioner State of Florida warrant number 0129960 in the amount of $2,154.82. This warrant was a partial payment of the lottery prize and reduced the amount of the prize being held by DBF to $1,470.18. On July 18, 1991, General Master Helen T. Erstling entered a Recommended Order On Determination Of Arrears which concluded that as of July 11, 1991, Petitioner owed $1,568.68 in child support arrearage. That Recommended Order provided that DBF was authorized to release to DHRS up to $1,568.68 of Petitioner's lottery proceeds. On August 13, 1991, Circuit Court Judge George E. Orr of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, entered an Order Upon Recommended Order On Disputed Arrears which ratified and adopted the Recommended Order of the General Master. The arrearage calculated by the General Master and adopted by the court was calculated as of June 11, 1991, and established that, as of that date, Petitioner owed $1,568.68 in Title IV-D child support arrearage. Petitioner, the party responsible to make such payments, offered no proof at the hearing in this case to establish that such sum has been paid and/or is no longer owing. This arrearage exceeds the remaining amount of the lottery prize being held by DBF.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's request for formal hearing, and that it pay to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services the $1,470.18 remainder of Petitioner's lottery prize in partial satisfaction of Petitioner's debt for child support. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of October 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Lawrence Fowler Apt. 202 9481 Evergreen Place Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33324 Bridget L. Ryan Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Warren Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (2) 120.5724.115
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